LOCAL GOVERNMENT: SUSTAINABLE FISCAL

AUTONOMY

Abu Turab Mehdi, Maryam Islam, Rameen Mufti, Samee Haider

Abstract

Fiscal autonomy has become the new talk of local financing -especially in
federations or sub-national governments. The local governments today require
tax autonomy for smooth revenue-making process along with administrative
responsibilities to back it. This is the need of the times where social media has
evolved into a pillar of the state and people want communication gap between
them and the governments to diminish so they know where and how their tax
money is being used. To ensure these elements, an added factor of sustainability
has been added which encompasses constitutional and legal steps for prevailing
the structure.

1. Introduction

Local Government has remained a vexed subject, owing primarily to why it exists
in Pakistan. Democratic state must have local foundations- a component of
United States’ political tradition, the spirit of Magna Carta in Britain and a tenant
of federalism- which is an expectation that Pakistan is trying to fulfil.i However,
the existing political dogma and duly formed state structures have hindered the
process of sustainable fiscal autonomy and simultaneously led to the failure of
local government institutions.

Concept of Sustainable Fiscal Autonomy

A successful local government is dependent upon fiscal and administrative base
and also legal or constitutional backing which altogether forms the basis of
sustainable fiscal autonomy. This defines local government as a “legal entity”
that is responsible for providing public services to a territory under its authority
led by a council of elected representatives as permitted by the constitution (in a
democratic state).ii

In broader terms, sustainable fiscal autonomy is derivation of the word fiscal

autonomy or fiscal federalism which is:

“The extent to which resources and responsibilities are under

the control of local governments.”iii

It has three major components: taxonomy (tax autonomy), fiscal responsibility

and constitutional liberty of releasing approved annual appropriation.iv
Taxonomy is the extent of control that the local government has over its taxes
which includes: abolishing tax, setting tax rate, granting tax relief, defining tax
base and negotiating tax share formula with the provincial and central
government.v Fiscal responsibility is how the revenue must be used in an efficient
manner as to prevent over or under-spending.vi This implies that local government
has authority to make budgetary decisions. “Constitutional liberty of releasing
approved annual appropriation” means that local government is given
constitutional right to claim and access its due share in the government revenue.

With this, the question arises that “what makes fiscal autonomy sustainable?” It
is the extent to which constitution, political environment, administration and the
institution itself provides local government with the control over responsibilities
and resources of a territory. This includes the limitations caused by ambiguity
and insignificance of constitutional clauses and reforms, the influence of
provincial and central powers in decentralization and the flaws in the making and
maintaining of the local government structures altogether.
History

The history of decentralisation is rooted to the military regimes- a legacy passed

on from one ruler to another. First initiative for local government decentralization
was taken under the Local Governance Ordinance 1979- which was never
implemented. The model gave union councils authority to generate revenue by
levying taxes, rates, tolls and fees, and also claim their due share in provincial
grants. Certain taxes such as property tax, betterment tax, fines and penalties
levied on municipal offences, proceeds from auctions of mines and minerals and
fishing rights were shared by the provincial and local governments.vii
Furthermore, local councils had power to launch schemes, implement
development programs and performs functions of other government departments.
An example of this is that councillors with necessary qualification could be
appointed as ex officio Justice of Peace.viii This means that the local government
officials could claim considerable control over police services.

Impressed by Local Government Ordinance 1979, NRB, established by

Musharraf, presented “Devolution of Power Plan” in May 2000- it revived the
Zia’s three-tiered local government model with a promise of fiscal and
administrative devolution.ix

The plan was followed by a second ordinance in 2001(foundation for future local
government reforms) which delegated large number of public services to the local
government. The District Nazim was given power over the Deputy Commissioner
and District Police Officer.x They had to report to the District Nazim however
their appointment, suspension and transfer was not under local government’s
discretion. The reforms also laid foundations of the Provincial Financial
Commission: a “rule-based” transfer of finances to the local government which
has been made part of every local government reform since then. This practice
passed on the hierarchical fiscal centralization within the government; a chain of
financial dependency from NFC Awards at provincial level to PFC at local level. xi

It is to be noted that the 2001 and 1979 reforms were introduced during the
military regimes and, therefore, have dictatorial underpinnings. It may fully
translate to an autocratic rule by weakening power of direct representatives xii;
however, it compromises the democratic process creating an unfit match of power
devolution under 18th Amendment.

With the 18th Amendment and establishment of federalism, Article 140(A) was
also amended, in 2010 under Pakistan People’s Party’s tenure, and the following
clause was added:

“Each Province shall, by law, establish a local government

system and devolve political, administrative, and financial
responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the
local governments.”xiii

Thereafter multiple local government acts were introduced and amended over the
years in all the provinces. All the reforms were heavily borrowed from the 2001
and 1979 act and are, therefore, similar in terms of fiscal autonomy and power
decentralization.

Among its commonalities is the reduced power of local government to minimal

functions such as “organize cattle fairs and cattle markets”xiv, “sewage and
sewage treatment and disposal”xv, and “removal and disposal of manure and
street sweepings”xvi-which has to do with either maintaining what the provincial
government had established or advising the provincial government in minimal
administrative matters. Similarly, the Provincial Financial Commission of 2001
is preserved in all the acts, and the taxes are allocated from the 4th or 10th Schedule
of Federal Board of Revenue with little reference to tax-sharing or tax autonomy.
 2. Rationale

Local government in a sub-national or federal state revolves around two concepts:

fiscal autonomy and fiscal decentralization. The latter is defined as:

“The transfer of expenditure responsibilities and revenue

assignments to lower levels of government.”xvii

The difference between the two definitions is that fiscal autonomy gives full
authority to the local government to control its revenue and expenditure while
fiscal decentralization refers to the “transfer” of these subjects from the upper to
the lower tiers of government.

In conventional literature, extensive research has been done on fiscal

decentralization in context of the Devolution Plan and Local Government Act
presented in 2001. As fiscal decentralisation, in that era, was a newly evolved
concept in Pakistan, little attention was directed towards fiscal autonomy. In fact,
fiscal self- reliance of local governments was found impractical owing to the
“fiscal assignment problem”.xviii Added to this, the idea of a broader tax base and
tax autonomy was abandoned, and it was suggested that local government tax
base must be reduced to property and sales tax. Furthermore, progressive taxes
and taxes on mobile factors of production should be controlled by the centre
which is “suitable for economic stabilization”.xix Since the local government
model had dictatorial or centralised root, it failed in the democratic framework
which shifted the discussion from decentralisation of local government to why
local government reforms are a tactic for power centralisation.xx

International scholars, on the other hand, had a different take on local government
decentralisation- they were supportive of fiscal autonomy and a broader tax base.
They asserted that fiscal stress or increasing tax burden on people is a
consequence of narrow tax base and fiscal dependency. In the words of Jeffrey I.
Chapman (1999):
 “If the jurisdiction has a very pro-cyclical tax structure (for
example, a large dependence on sales and income taxes), then as
the economy turns down, the jurisdiction will lose proportionally
more tax revenues, and encounter fiscal stress. To the extent that
the jurisdiction can take actions to offset this fiscal stress, it has
fiscal autonomy. To the extent that it is forced to continue doing
business in the same manner (low initiative powers) or is
mandated by the state to provide certain services (low immunity
power), it has limited autonomy.”xxi

Similarly, Wallace Oates, in 1996, suggested that the solution to pro-cyclical tax
structure is:

“Lower levels of government, as much as possible rely on benefit

taxation of mobile economic units, including household and
mobile factors of production.”xxii

After 2004, literature on fiscal decentralisation started to diminish owing to the

pro-cyclical tax problem and over-dependency of local governments on the
centre. This meant that fiscal decentralisation, as stated by the Local Government
Act 2001, had failed. The researchers were beginning to write on “excessive
taxation in certain tax bases” and “overlapping of taxes”. The provincial
government’s’ unwillingness to devolve power was also brought under the
spotlight; the tax-sharing of urban property tax- the largest revenue source for
local governments- was being shared on 80:20 ratio.xxiii This meant that local
government had to arrange for its revenue through minor taxes such as poll tax or
parking fee. Similarly, the issuing of grant under Provincial Financial
Commission was another scheme to centralise revenue. According to Muhammad
Sabir, Principal Economist SPDC:
 “More than 70 percent of the funds under PFC for education and
healthcare in Punjab are allocated to the provincial authorities
instead of district governments.”xxiv

In Pakistan, fiscal autonomy and administrative decentralisation- forming

sustainable fiscal autonomy collectively- is a newly emerging concept which
requires research for the following reasons:

1. The concept of decentralisation has failed to sustain in Pakistan owing to

the highly centralised political, institutional and bureaucratic structures in
the country.
2. The country is a federation, under the 18th Amendment of the constitution,
and therefore requires a degree of fiscal autonomy at all levels as the state
is gambling with a multi-party polity and regionalism.
3. Over- dependency on urban property and sales tax is causing fiscal stress
leading to fewer tax payers. A broader base can only exist if certain
significant subjects are devolved to the local level with autonomy to levy
taxes on the them.
4. Tax paying mechanism will improve when the local government will
control its own revenue and expenditure. Research shows that trust on
government enhances with autonomy of local government as the people
find local government officials accessible and easily accountable.
5. The researcher has added sustainability as an additional component to
fiscal autonomy as it ensures that the local autonomy does not seize to
prevail- inconsistency in case fiscal decentralisation was the major cause
for its failure.

3. Context of Issue

Fiscal decentralization failed in Pakistan due to the following causes:

 1. Political and Bureaucratic Environment
2. Constitutional and Legal Structures
3. Dilemma of democratization and federalism

Political and Bureaucratic Environment

Any institution formed in Pakistan can neither develop nor sustain as the political
and bureaucratic environment of the country is based on certain malignant
principles- fault lines that created a loop of institutional failures. The first
principle is centralisation of bureaucracy which was inherited from the Colonial
Era and authoritarian state structures.xxv The consequence was a centralised
constitution which allows centre to intervene in the provincial affairs such as law
and order, which obligates the provincial government to exercise power in a
manner established by the Acts of Parliament and bounds provincial government
to honour directives of the central government.xxvi

The second principle is personalized or individualistic leadership which exists

within the bureaucracy as well as in politics. The political vacuum created during
the early years of Pakistan had two consequences: bureaucratic activism and
political interference, and dynastic politics. Bureaucracy, with its imperial
training and ethos, established itself as a stronger institution with its own political
agenda for rule.xxvii Simultaneously, politics came, primarily, in the hands of
Bhutto and Sharif family which led to a power feud between the two institutions-
polity and bureaucracy. The example of this is the constitution protection for
bureaucracy removed by Zulifqar Ali Bhutto.

The third traditional principle is interference. There is a long history of military

interfering in the government, government interfering in the military, centre’s
influence over bureaucracy and bureaucracy’s political regimes. After Liaqat Ali
Khan, an era of bureaucratic leadership followed and sustained till the reign of
Zia Ul Haq- Ayyub Khan’s finance minister was a civil servant. Similarly, the
provisions made by Bhutto created constitutional space for politicization of Civil
Services.xxviii

Constitutional and Legal Structures

The meaning of devolution is:

“The transfer or delegation of power to a lower level, especially

by central government to local or regional administration.”xxix

Article 140(A) of the constitution uses the word devolution which is conditioned
to degree of transfer of power with the will of the provincial government. This
implies that the word “devolution” has no practical weightage for the provincial
governments can choose whether to decentralize all administrative powers or
none at all.

This is reflected in the reforms presented over the years. For this paper, the focus
is on Local Government Act 2019 and the clauses that hinder fiscal autonomy.
To begin with in Article 156 local government’s tax base is merely reduced to
sales tax which includes taxes on small businesses, federal excise, dividend
income tax. Added to this, in the 10th Schedule, the taxes that may add up
generously to local government revenue are to be reduced in years 2020-2023.
Similarly, Article 123, “Credits of money to a local fund”, neither takes into
account the share of local government in the taxes mentioned above nor the
profits gained from the development projects initiated by the local government.

For grant allocation, Article 174 does not give the Local Government Officials
equal representation in the Financial Provincial Commission. Likewise, Article
23 and 39 reduce the administrative power of local government to provincial
government’s directions and discretion.
These are some of the clauses that, through the years, have been part of every
local government act and have altogether hindered the process towards fiscal
decentralization and, in future, sustainable fiscal autonomy.

Dilemma of Democratization

It is ironic how the preservati0on of democratic values and establishment of

democratic institutions has occurred under military regimes. The purpose behind
this had little to do with preservation of democracy rather it was to:

1. Depoliticise governance: curb power of regional and provincial political

parties through non-party local government elections.
2. Create a new political elite that is imbedded by the military rulers to sustain
their control.
3. To replace the demand of federalism with a promise of power
devolution.xxx

4. Legal Framework

Following are the extracts on decentralisation of local government and extent of

fiscal autonomy in the Constitution 1973, and Punjab Local Government Act
2019.

Constitution of Pakistan

1[140A. Local Government. — Each Province shall, by law, establish a local

government system and devolve political, administrative and financial
responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the local
governments.
Punjab Local Government Act 2019 1

1. 39. Extent of authority of local governments. – (1) The authority of every

local government shall be limited to the discharge of functions assigned to
it under this Act or any other law for the time being in force.

2. 23. Extent of Government control on functions of the local governments. –

(1) Without any prejudice to the provisions of section 6 of this Act, the
Government may, from time to time, give policy directions and fix
objectives for the effective, transparent and efficient undertaking of
functions by a local government.

(2) A local government shall perform functions listed in Part 1 of the Third,
Fourth and Fifth Schedules in such manner and to such extent as may be
directed by the Government.

3. 21. Responsibility of local governments. – (1) For the purposes of this

Act:-
(a) A Metropolitan Corporation, Municipal Corporation and Municipal
Committee shall be responsible for the functions listed in the Third
Schedule;
(b) A Town Committee shall be responsible for the functions listed in the
Fourth Schedule; and
(c) A Tehsil Council shall be responsible for the functions listed in the
Fifth Schedule.

1
2019 Punjab Local Government is taken as a case study to observe the extent of fiscal autonomy granted to the
provinces. Punjab Act has been selected for its recency. It includes only the clauses that are need to be amended
to ensure fiscal autonomy.
 (2) Any office, agency or authority established or maintained by the
Government, which at the commencement of this Act is providing public
services or discharging other duties in relation to the building control,
solid waste management, water supply, and sewerage collection and
disposal function in a Metropolitan, shall, subject to such conditions and
control as the Government may impose, stand transferred to the respective
Metropolitan Corporation.
(3) Every office, agency and authority referred to in subsection (2) shall
be transferred to the respective Metropolitan Corporation as soon as may
be but not later than six months of the commencement of this Act.
(4) A local government shall undertake such other functions as are
entrusted to it under any other law for the time being in force.

4. 156. Authority of a local government to levy taxes etc.– (1) A local

government may, through a notification published in the official gazette,
levy all or any of the taxes, fees, rates, tolls, rent and other charges given
in the Tenth Schedule.
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), every local government shall, among
other things, abide by the directions of the Finance Commission under
clause (f) and (g) of subsection (1) of section 180 of this Act.

5. 174. Establishment of Local Government Finance Commission.– (1) As

soon as may be, but not later than one hundred and twenty days of
commencement of this Act, the Government shall appoint a commission to
be called the Punjab Local Government Finance Commission, hereinafter
referred to as the Finance Commission, to perform such functions as are
mentioned in this Act.
(2) The Finance Commission shall comprise of thirteen members
including the Chairperson as under:
(a) The Minister in charge of Finance Department, who shall also be
the Chairperson of the Finance Commission;
(b) The Minister in charge of Local Government Department, who
shall be the co-Chairperson of the Finance Commission;
(c) Four members of the Provincial Assembly, out of whom two shall
be appointed by the leader of the house and the other two by the leader
of the opposition in the Punjab;
(d) The Secretary in charge of Finance Department, who shall also be
the Secretary of the Finance Commission;
(e) The Secretary in charge of Local Government and Community
Development Department;
(f) The Secretary in charge of Planning and Development
Department;
(g) Four experts, out of whom one shall be a woman, on local
governments and local government finance appointed in terms of
section 174 of this Act; and
(h) Four heads of the local government selected through drawing of
lots in the following manner:
(i) one head of the local government from amongst all heads of
Metropolitan Corporations in the Punjab;
(j) one head of the local government from amongst all heads of
Municipal Corporations, Municipal Committees and Town Committees
in the Punjab; and
(k) two heads of the local government from amongst all heads of Tehsil
Councils in the Punjab.
 6. 180. General functions of the Finance Commission. – (1) In addition to any
other work assigned to it under this Act or any other law for the time being
in force, the Finance Commission shall:
(a) establish formulae for determining the size of provincial allocable
amount and the share of local governments and panchayats and
neighbourhood councils from this amount under section 186 of this Act;
(b) oversee and report upon the transfer of share of local governments
from the provincial allocable amount in accordance with the formulae
referred to in clause (a);
(f) fix upper and lower limits of such local tax, fee, rate, toll, rent or other
charge imposed under this Act for various local governments as it
considers appropriate;
(g) fix an enhanced incidence of a local tax, fee, rate, toll, rent or other
charge of a local government if it is under fiscal distress;

5. Comparative Models

Nigeria

From this model one can conclude that lack of commitment towards local
government’s sustainable fiscal autonomy is the dilemma of all developing
countries. Like Pakistan, Nigeria has the following local government structure:xxxi

1. Centre gives states responsibility for establishing local governments which

decentralizes structural, administrative and fiscal powers.
2. Centre does not provide mandate to local governments for direct grants
rather through their respective states.
3. Unlike the reforms in Pakistan, the Nigerian law gives extensive
responsibilities to the local government but limited fiscal autonomy.
 4. The only revenue pool for local government is “State Joint Local
Government Account”.

United States

The commonality that United States shares with Pakistan is that it is a federation
with devolved subjects- one that Pakistan esteems to follow.

The process of fiscal autonomy in United States has evolved through three
processes:xxxii

1. The root cause for adopting federalism was agreed as bringing local
autonomy.
2. Federalism flourished and developed.
3. Federalism is being amended to meet international indicators.

This has a lesson for Pakistan that before introducing federal systems, it should
find a purpose for adopting federalism and let it adopt and adapt fully to the
nation’s structure. Another point of discussion in the American system is, that
unlike Pakistan, crucial subjects were kept under the centre’s discretion. This
model, for the essential years of Pakistan, can ensure sustainability of fiscal
autonomy.

France

The country has established an extensive model for fiscal autonomy as it has
devolved revenue in the following areas:xxxiii

1. Local governments are not allowed to have a operating net deficit which
they ensue through 10% net saving.
2. Local government revenue has been expanded by indirect taxes on private
households.
 3. Horizontal transfer of jurisdiction of business tax from communal to
central government level.
4. Devolution of occupancy and professional tax to local government.

The consequence of these policy measures is that today, instead of grants, taxes
make up most of the revenue of local governments. The case of France provides
extensive deliverance on how finances can be devolved to local levels.

6. Policy Model

The achievement of sustainable fiscal autonomy in local government is assessed

through Kingdon Stream Model. This policy technique has been selected as it
takes into account multiple windows which are all independent and
interdependent variables of this study.

Problem Stream

The fiscal autonomy of local government is subject to the military roots of local
government reforms that cannot adjust to the present federal settings.
Simultaneously, fiscal traditions, which includes over-dependency on property
and sales tax, centralised tax system, tax-sharing problem and little administrative
independence has hindered the process towards sustainable fiscal autonomy.

Policy Stream

The anonymities and ambiguities in the local government acts and the act on local
government in the constitution of Pakistan is a policy failure. The policy-makers
are unable to grasp the fuller meaning on fiscal decentralization and autonomy
and where they are applicable. For instance, revenue generation and self-
sufficiency require fiscal independence while decentralised authority is the best
way to go about an effective administration. Finally, fiscal autonomy and
administrative decentralization are linear concepts. If local government has fewer
and minimal functions but fiscal autonomy, it may lead to fiscal disequilibrium
and vice versa.

Political Stream

Dynastic politics, individualistic political motives, institutional interference,

constant administrative vacuum and centralised institutions are political
shortcomings that have been preventing the process of sustainable fiscal
autonomy for local government. Two political families- the Sharif and Bhutto-
had been the dominant political powers after 1970s. Their refusal to accept Local
Government Reforms 2001 shows that they want centralised power. Similarly,
the bureaucratic, military and democratic eras have created a competitive rift
between the institutions and attempts had been made, in the past, to dismantle one
another which contributes to administrative vacuum and immature development
of basic government structures.

Altogether the problem, political hinderances and policy miscalculations must be

addressed to form basis of local government development, sustainability and
autonomy.

7. Conclusion

The political, policy and problem streams of Pakistan must come together to form
a justification for federalism in the country. In the next step it should establish
efficient decentralized structures at provincial level which are carried on to the
local level. Added to this the false fiscal traditions adopted should be abandoned
for a future of sustainable fiscal autonomy.

8. Suggested Amendments
The amendments are of the articles mentioned above.

Constitution of Pakistan

1. 1[140A. Local Government. — Each Province shall, by law, establish a

local government system and devolve autonomous political, administrative
and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of
the local governments.

Punjab Local Government Act 2019

1. 39. Extent of authority of local governments. – (1) The authority of

every local government shall be limited to the discharge of functions
assigned to it under this Act or any other law for the time being in force.
(2) The Act or any other law can be amended with discretion and
consensus of two-third of district councils and district nazims in a
province.

2. 23. Extent of Government control on functions of the local

governments. – (1) Without any prejudice to the provisions of section 6
of this Act, the Government may, from time to time, give policy
directions and fix objectives for the effective, transparent and efficient
undertaking of functions by a local government. (2) A local government
shall perform functions listed in Part 1 of the Third, Fourth and Fifth
Schedules in such manner and to such extent as may be directed by the
Government.
(3) The objectives of local government or any amendment in the Act or
law cannot be made without approval of one-third of district nazims.
 3. 156. Authority of a local government to levy taxes etc.– (1) A local
government may, through a notification published in the official
gazette, levy all or any of the taxes, fees, rates, tolls, rent and other
charges given in the Tenth Schedule.
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), every local government shall,
among other things, abide by the directions of the Finance Commission
under clause (f) and (g) of subsection (1) of section 180 of this Act.
(3) A local government may, through a notification published in the
official gazette, levy, raise, reduce, abolish all or any of the taxes, fees,
rates, tolls, rent and other charges given in the Tenth Schedule and
157(11)2.
157(11): Local government has authority to levy, suspend, abolish,
reduce, increase property tax, business tax, natural resource
consumption tax.

4. 180(k). allocate the percentage share of local government in taxes as

mentioned in clause 156, before the beginning of a fiscal year in
accordance to the budgetary demand.

5. 174(J) 2 heads from municipal corporations, 2 heads from town

committee.

9. Recommendations

1. High end and overlapping dependency on sales tax should be reduced to

curb poverty alleviation.

2
Subject to the clause in other provincial reforms. Here, Punjab model 2019 is referred.
 2. Innovative and new taxes must be introduced basing on regional needs such
as environment tax on industries, patient safety fine on hospitals. The taxes
must be directed towards the producer in order to reduce damages and tax
burden on consumers.
3. Introduce newer services to the people through public private partnership
which will contribute to the revenue.
4. Like in provincial devolution, a considerable area of the constitution must
be given to local governments containing the mandatory measures that the
provincial governments must take.

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