CITATION: G.R. No.

213948
DATE: April 18, 2017
CASE TITLE: KNIGHTS OF RIZAL vs. DMCI HOMES INC, ET.AL
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.

FACTS: In 2014, the Knights of Rizal (KOR), filed a Petition for Injunction seeking TRO, and later a permanent
injunction, against the construction of DMCIPDI's Torre de Manila condominium project. The KOR asserts that the
completed Torre de Manila structure will "[stick] out like a sore thumb, [dwarf] all surrounding buildings within a
radius of two kilometer/s" and "forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal Monument in Luneta Park: Torre de Manila
building would loom at the back I and overshadow the entire monument, whether up close or viewed from a distance.”

Further, the KOR argues that the Rizal Monument, as a National Treasure, is entitled to "full protection of the law"
and the national government must abate the act or activity that endangers the nation's cultural heritage "even against
the wishes of the local government hosting it."

Next, the KOR contends that the project is a nuisance per se because the despoliation of the sight view of the Rizal
Monument is a situation that annoys or offends the senses of every Filipino who honors the memory of the National
Hero Jose Rizal. It is a present, continuing, worsening and aggravating status or condition. Hence, the PROJECT is a
nuisance per se. It deserves to be abated summarily, even without need of judicial proceeding.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop the
construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila project?
2. Whether Torre de Manila is a Nuisance Per Se?

RULING:

1. No. The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed. There is no law prohibiting the
construction of the Torre de Manila.
In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission, the Court held that "what is not expressly or
impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to morals, customs and I public
order." In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to morals,
customs, and public order" or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. On the contrary, the
City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under the pertinent laws and
local ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project.

There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de
Manila due to its effect on the background "view, vista, sightline, or setting" of the Rizal Monument.

On the other hand, Section 48 states: SEC. 48. Site Performance Standards. - The City considers it in the
public interest that all projects are designed and developed in a safe, efficient and aesthetically pleasing
manner. Site development shall consider the environmental character and limitations of the site and its
adjacent properties. All project elements shall be in complete harmony according to good design principles
and the subsequent development must be visually pleasing as well as efficiently functioning especially in
relation to the adjacent properties and bordering streets.

The design, construction, operation and maintenance of every facility shall be in harmony with the existing
and intended character of its neighborhood. It shall not change the essential character of the said area but will
be a substantial improvement to the value of the properties in the neighborhood in particular and the
community in general.
 Section 4 7 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the development of historic sites and facilities.
Section 48 regulates "large commercial signage and/or pylon." There is nothing in Sections 47 and 48 of
Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the construction of a building outside the boundaries of a historic site or
facility, where such building may affect the1 background of a historic site. In this case, the Torre de Manila
stands 870 meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument and cannot possibly obstruct the front view
of the Rizal Monument. Likewise, the Torre de Manila is not in an area that has been declared as an
"anthropological or archeological area" or in an area designated as a heritage zone, cultural property,
historical landmark, or a national treasure by the NHCP.

Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the subject of arts and culture, provides that
the State shall conserve, promote and popularize the nation's historical and cultural heritage and resources.
Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress passed laws dealing with the preservation and
conservation of our cultural heritage.

One such law is Republic Act No. 10066, or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009, which empowers
the National Commission for Culture and the Arts and other cultural agencies to issue a cease and desist order
"when the physical integrity of the national cultural treasures or important cultural properties is found to be
in danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original state." This law declares that the State
should protect the "physical integrity" of the heritage property or building if there is "danger of destruction
or significant alteration from its original state." Physical integrity refers to the structure itself - how strong
and sound the structure is. The same law does not mention that another project, building, or property, not
itself a heritage property or building, may be the subject of a cease and desist order when it adversely affects
the background view, vista, or sightline of a heritage property or building. Thus, Republic Act No. 10066
cannot apply to the Torre de Manila condominium project.

2. No. Torre de Manila is Not a Nuisance Per Se.

The Court recognizes two kinds of nuisances. The first, nuisance perse, is on "recognized as a nuisance under
any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that
reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity." The second, nuisance peraccidens,
is that which "depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact,
it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing in law
constitutes a nuisance. "

It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. The Torre de Manila project cannot
be considered as a direct menace to public health or safety. Not only is a condominium project commonplace
in the City of Manila, DMCI-PDI has, according to the proper government agencies, complied with health
and safety standards set by law. Later, DMCI-PDI also obtained the right to build under a variance
recommended by the MZBAA and granted by the City Council of Manila. Thus, there can be no doubt that
the Torre de Manila project is not a nuisance perse.

CITATION: G.R. No. 173120

DATE: April 10, 2019
CASE TITLE: SPOUSES YU HWA PING AND MARY GAW vs. AYALA LAND, INC.

PONENTE: PERALTA, J.

FACTS:

The case stemmed from the overlapping claims of Ayala Land Inc (ALI) and Spouses Yu Hwa Ping and Mary
Gaw. ALI obtained the property from Goldenrod Inc and Pesa. In 1992, following the merger of respondent
ALI and Las Pinas Ventures Inc., ALI acquired the property and eventually developed it into high-end
residential enclaves. The issue of two registered titles with overlapping boundaries based on their surveys
and technical descriptions was raised.

RTC Las Piñas directed the parties to conduct a verification survey. Through the supervision of the Bureau
of Lands of the DENR, the geodetic engineers of both parties conducted actual verification surveys. RTC
ruled in favor of the petitioner Spouses Yu and ruled that the conducted surveys of ALI were spurious and
void by reasons of various discrepancies and anomalies. It also gave great weight and appreciation to the
survey by Yu because no irregularity was demonstrated in the preparation thereof.

On appeal with the CA, it held that the numerous defects in the plans are not enough to deprive the
assailed decree of registration of its conclusive effect, neither are they sufficient to arrive at the conclusion
that the survey was definitely, certainly, and conclusively spurious.

The Supreme Court however did not agree with the CA, and stated that cannot close its eyes to the blatant
defects on the surveys upon which the original titles of ALI were derived, as reflected in their technical
descriptions, simply because its titles were registered. To allow these certificates of title in the registration
books, even though these were sourced from invalid surveys and contain erroneous technical
descriptions, would tarnish and damage the Torrens system of registration, rather than uphold its
integrity.

On February 14, 2018, ALI then filed the instant Second Motion for Reconsideration with the SC, arguing
that the SC’s previous decision supposedly modified and reversed doctrines and principles of law on land
registration, prescription, and Torrens System. ALI argues, among others, that the TCTs registered under
its name cannot be declared void simply because the survey conducted on the subject land was not valid.
It emphasizes that the survey of the subject land is not part and parcel of the TCTs, thus, it is immaterial
whether the survey suffered from any defect.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the titles of ALI are void due to the erroneous technical descriptions sourced from void
ab initio surveys?
2. Whether the Court should have applied the rule that, in case of two certificates of title purporting
to include the same land, the earlier date prevails?
3. Whether the court must conduct a verification survey when there are two registered titles with
overlapping or conflicting boundaries?

RULING:

1. Yes. Although a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title
to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein, it is not a conclusive proof of
ownership. It is a well-settled rule that ownership is different from a certificate of title. The fact
that a person was able to secure a title in his name does not operate to vest ownership upon him
of the subject land. Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or
vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot bused to
protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud;
 neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a
particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with
persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the
registered owner.

One of the distinguishing marks of the Torrens system is the absolute certainty of the identity of
a registered land. Consequently, the primary purpose of the requirement that the land must first
be surveyed is to fix the exact or definite identity of the land as shown in the plan and technical
description. It is imperative in an application for original registration that the applicant submit to
the court, aside from the original or duplicate copies of the muniments of title, a copy of a duly
approved survey plan of the land sought to be registered. The survey plan is indispensable as it
provides a reference on the exact identity of the property.

The survey of the land is vital and essential to uphold the validity of a certificate of title. A survey
plan precisely serves to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a
parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall
the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. Thus,
if the survey plan is evidently erroneous, then the exact and finite identity of the land cannot be
reflected in the technical description of the certificate of title.

In Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that when the
technical description appearing in the title is clearly erroneous, the courts have no other recourse
but to order its cancellation and cause the issuance of a new one that would conform to the
mutual agreement of the buyer and seller as laid down in the deed of sale. Furthermore, the
simple possession of a certificate of title is not necessarily conclusive of the holder's true
ownership of all the property described therein for said holder does not by virtue of said
certificate of title alone become the owner of what has been either illegally or erroneously
included.

Consequently, the invalidity of the survey affects the technical description of the land, which is
found on the title. Glaring and substantial errors in the technical description should not be simply
disregarded as trivial or formal errors because these precisely affect the identity of the land.

2. No. In Legarda v. Saleeby, the Court held that the general rule is that in the case of two certificates
of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land
comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate.
In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular
estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate
or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or
whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest
certificate issued in respect thereof.
The rule on superiority, however, is not absolute. If it can be clearly ascertained by the ordinary
rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate
 of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two
certificates of title to be conclusive.

3. Yes. The rule on the earlier dated title is absolute – would be absurd as it will limit the court to a
mere mechanical arbiter that will simply view the dates of the two registered titles with
overlapping boundaries to determine the prevailing title.

The better approach would be for the court to order the conduct of a verification survey on the
titles which have overlapping boundaries. In Cambridge Realty and Resources Corp. v. Eridanus
Development, Inc., it was ruled that a case of overlapping of boundaries or encroachment
depends on a reliable, if not accurate, verification survey; barring one, no overlapping or
encroachment may be proved successfully, for obvious reasons. The first step in the resolution of
such cases is for the court to direct the proper government agency concerned to conduct a
verification or relocation survey and submit a report to the court or constitute a panel of
commissioners for the purpose. After the verification survey, the court would be given all the
necessary and technical analysis and data over the two titles. At that point, the court can
judiciously and properly determine whether to apply (1) the general rule that in case of two
certificates of title purporting to include the same land, the earlier date prevails; (2)
the exception that if the inclusion of the land in the earlier registered title was a result of a
mistake, then the latter registered title will prevail.

(Note: In this case, ALI failed to assert any meritorious reason to allow its second motion for
reconsideration. The arguments raised by ALI are mere reiterations of its previous arguments in its
Memorandum and First MR. ALI did not anymore raise any genuine or novel issue that has not been
threshed out by the Court. Verily, the Court cannot entertain a second motion for reconsideration that
essentially raises the same grounds that have been repeatedly denied.)

CITATION: G.R. No. 223399

DATE: April 23, 2018
CASE TITLE: DE GUZMAN-FUERTE vs. SPOUSES ESTOMO

PONENTE: PERALTA, J.

FACTS: A complaint for unlawful detainer dated August 10, 2009 was filed by Fuerte against spouses
Estomo involving a lot in Antipolo City.

Fuerte alleged that Manuela Co (Co) executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property
in her favor. Upon Co's failure to pay the loan, Fuerte caused the foreclosure proceedings and eventually
obtained ownership of the property. However, the writ of possession was returned unsatisfied since Co
was no longer residing at the property and that the Spouses Estomo and their family occupied the same.
It was only after the said return that Fuerte discovered and verified that the Spouses Estomo were in
possession of the property. In a letter dated December 1, 2008, she demanded them to vacate and
surrender possession of the subject property and pay the corresponding compensation. The Spouses
Estomo refused to heed to her demands.
Spouses Estomo denied that they illegally occupied the subject property and that they received the
demand letter. They averred that they acquired the property through a Contract to Sell, registered it under
their names and had been their family home since 2000. Sometime in 2006, Concepcion sought the
services of Co, a real estate broker, to assist her in securing a loan. Co obtained the certificate of title to
be shown to potential creditors, however, she never returned it. The TCT was cancelled by an alleged
Absolute Sale of Real Property executed on June 22,2006, when Silvino was out of the country as a
seaman, and then TCT No. R-39632 was issued under Co's name. On July 13, 2006, Co mortgaged the
subject property in the amount of P800,000.00. Consequently, the Spouses Estomo filed an annulment
case against Co and Fuerte on January 30, 2007. When they were served with the writ of possession in
favor of Fuerte, they filed a terceria with the sheriff, a motion to recall the writ of possession, and asked
for the consolidation of the land registration case to the annulment case on August 5, 2008. In the Orders
dated October 28, 2008 and October 30, 2008, the trial court quashed the writ and directed the
consolidation of the cases.

The Spouses Estomo also prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the allegations are
insufficient to establish a cause of action for unlawful detainer. By Fuerte's own allegation, the Spouses
Estomo's entry to the property was unlawful from the beginning. The case cannot be considered as one
for forcible entry since it was never alleged that their entry was by means of force, intimidation, threat,
stealth or strategy. Lastly, prescription has already set, since Fuerte was aware that the spouses possessed
the property when they filed the complaint for annulment of deed of absolute sale and real estate
mortgage against Co and Fuerte on January 30, 2007.

The MTCC of Antipolo dismissed the complaint without prejudice finding that Fuerte failed to attach in
the complaint a copy of the demand letter and establish that the same was duly received by the spouses.

On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTCC. It held that Fuerte established the
existence of the demand letter, which was sent through registered mail—a substantial compliance with
the modes of service under the Rules of Court.

Subsequently, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. It held that the complaint in ejectment
cases should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which Section 1 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its
face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parole evidence. The CA found that the complaint
failed to describe that the possession by the Spouses Estomo was initially legal or tolerated and became
illegal upon termination of lawful possession.

Upon denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the case before this Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the CA erred when it ruled that the complaint filed by the petitioner does not constitute
unlawful detainer and thereupon concluded that MTCC Antipolo where the case was filed had no
jurisdiction to try it?
2. Whether a judgment rendered in a forcible entry case, or an unlawful detainer as in this case, will
not bar an action between the same parties respecting title or ownership?

RULING:
1. No. The instant petition is devoid of merit.
In summary ejectment suits such as unlawful detainer and forcible entry, the only issue to be
determined is who between the contending parties has better possession of the contested
property. The Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, and the Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over these cases and the proceedings are
governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally
legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following:

(a) Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
(b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant
about the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of its enjoyment; and
(d) Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the
defendant, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

As the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction
of the court, the complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the
absence of these factual allegations, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and
the municipal trial court does not have jurisdiction over the case.

A perusal of the Complaint shows that it contradicts the requirements for unlawful detainer. A
requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally lawful
but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. To show that the possession
was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must then be established. Paragraphs 2
and 3 make it clear that Spouses Estomo's occupancy was illegal and without Fuerte's consent.
Likewise, the Complaint did not contain an allegation that Fuerte or her predecessor-in-interest
tolerated the spouses' possession on account of an express or implied contract between them.
Neither was there any averment which shows any overt act on Fuerte's part indicative of her
permission to occupy the land.

Acts of tolerance must be proved showing the overt acts indicative of his or his predecessor's
tolerance or permission for them to occupy the disputed property. There should be any
supporting evidence on record that would show when the respondents entered the properties or
who had granted them to enter the same and how the entry was effected. Without these
allegations and evidence, the bare claim regarding "tolerance" cannot be upheld.
 From the foregoing, this Court finds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action for
unlawful detainer. Since the complaint fell short of the jurisdictional facts to vest the court
jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of respondent, the MTCC failed to acquire jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Fuerte's complaint and the CA correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case
against the Spouses Estomo.

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the
registered owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of
the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper remedy, and once he chooses
what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper. In
this case, Fuerte chose the remedy of unlawful detainer to eject the Spouses Estomo, but, failed
to sufficiently allege the facts which are necessary to vest jurisdiction to MTCC over an unlawful
detainer case. In fine, the CA did not commit reversible error in dismissing Fuerte's complaint for
unlawful detainer.

2. No. A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case, or an unlawful detainer as in this case, will not
bar an action between the same parties respecting title or ownership because between a case for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer and an accion reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of
action. Such determination does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land; neither is
it conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause
of action involving possession. In fact, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides
that a "judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with
respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the
land." Since there is no identity of causes of action, there can be no multiplicity of suits.