Tregu I Drogës 2019

EU Drug
Markets Report
2019
EU Drug
Markets Report
2019
I Legal notice
Neither the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Europol nor any person acting
on behalf of either the EMCDDA or Europol is responsible for the use that might be made of the following
information.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019
Print ISBN 978-92-9497-421-1 doi: 10.2810/53181 TD-03-19-332-EN-C
PDF ISBN 978-92-9497-422-8 doi: 10.2810/561192 TD-03-19-332-EN-N
© European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2019

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© Europol, 2019
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File No: EDOC 798834
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For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the EMCDDA or Europol copyright,
permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders.
Recommended citation:
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol (2019), EU Drug Markets Report 2019,
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
Contents
5 | Foreword
7 | Introduction
9 | Acknowledgements
11 | Explanatory note on data
13 | Executive summary
21 PART I
Impacts and drivers of drug markets
28
| CHAPTER 1
Impacts and consequences of drug markets
60
| CHAPTER 2
Drivers and facilitators of drug markets
79 PART II
Main drug markets in the EU
82
| CHAPTER 3
Cannabis
104
| CHAPTER 4
Heroin and other opioids
126
| CHAPTER 5
Cocaine
150
| CHAPTER 6
Amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine
174
| CHAPTER 7
New psychoactive substances
191 PART III

Responding to drug markets
194
| CHAPTER 8
Policy instruments and structures
210
| CHAPTER 9
Targeting operational responses to drug markets and associated criminality
222 | References
240 | Abbreviations
241 | Annex: Principal areas of EU legislation linked to drug supply reduction
243 | Index
I
Foreword
Europe is confronted with a rapidly evolving drug market. The increased potency and purity
of illicit drugs, the record numbers of seizures and increased production in the EU, all
indicate that the availability of illicit substances is growing. We also see a dramatic increase
in the number of new, and often highly potent, synthetic substances present on the market.
Moreover, organised crime benefits significantly from the drug trade but, more worryingly,
these criminals have shown determination and ruthlessness in trying to grow their market
share. The direct impact of these developments is to be found in the number of fatal drug
overdoses, of which there were 8 238 in the EU in 2017, and individuals seeking help from
treatment providers or emergency services.
The increasingly global reach of organised crime groups involved in drug production and
trafficking also represents a major cross-border security threat. They are forward-looking
and quick to innovate in order to counter threats to their business model, but also quick
to take advantage of new opportunities. Indeed, the drug market has become increasingly
digitally enabled. Drugs purchased online can be transported across Europe and delivered
to consumers by post and parcel services. This creates new challenges for law enforcement.
The report also highlights the way drug market-related activities complicate and make
other security and health threats worse. It shows that the drug market is one of the major
sources of income for organised crime and how it is linked to other areas of criminality. The
drug market is also an important driver for the recruitment of young people into criminal
organisations and gangs, as well as the exploitation and trafficking of vulnerable individuals.
The negative impact of drugs and drug use in Europe must also be measured in terms of
its societal consequences. Violent crime in producer and transit countries leads to reduced
social development, failing institutions, ecological damage and blighted communities.
The evidence provided in this third European Drug Markets Report and the links to
organised crime that it highlights are a major contribution to informing policymakers.
Confronted with such a growing threat, the European Union must be innovative and
forward-looking; it must step up its effort to fight the criminal activities, while keeping drugs
policy anchored in a balanced and evidence-based approach.
Paraskevi Michou
Director-General Migration and Home Affairs
5
I
Introduction
It is with great pleasure that we present this new joint report by the European Monitoring
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and the European Union Agency for
Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). The report focuses on the drug supply chain,
the associated criminal activities and actors, and the policy, strategic and operational
responses to these. It highlights the importance of the drug market as a key source of
revenue for organised crime, its links to terrorism and wider criminal activity, and the
negative impact it has on the legal economy and society more generally, demonstrating how
the drug trade and its wider ramifications affect all aspects of the European security agenda
and why tackling them is essential to the European Union’s fight against serious and
organised crime. It describes, for example, the links between drugs and trafficking in human
beings, the increasing levels of violence and corruption associated with the drug trade, and
the environmental harms from drug production — all of which are now increasingly visible
within Europe.
The analysis underpinning this report is strengthened by the complementary perspectives

our two organisations bring to this topic. The synthesis of the operational intelligence
provided by Europol, with research data and the information available from the ongoing
monitoring undertaken by EMCDDA has produced a report and accompanying online
materials that provide a contemporary strategic and action-oriented analysis of Europe’s
drug markets. This will be a valuable source of evidence to inform policies and actions and
a strategic understanding of how criminal enterprises operate to assist the targeting of
operational activities.
This is the third EU Drug Markets Report – it builds upon the analysis provided in the 2013
and 2016 editions and many of the conclusions and recommendations of the previous
reports remain relevant today. However, this new report is able to paint a richer picture
and provides additional insights. For example, it highlights the way in which many of the
harms more traditionally associated with drug production and trafficking outside Europe
are becoming a growing threat within the EU. It also shows how the EU is increasingly
important as both a drug producing and transit region, while EU-based organised crime
groups are adapting their modi operandi and extending their reach, resulting in both
increased harms and new challenges for enforcement.
The increasingly globalised and digitally-enabled nature of drug markets illustrated in

the report means that the law enforcement activities countering these are becoming
more complex and resource intensive. This underlines the need to ensure the adequate
resourcing and prioritisation of supply reduction activities, including not only law
enforcement interventions and investigations, but also importantly activities to enhance
international cooperation, at both the national and EU level. The continued development of
joint programmes, networks, partnerships and capacity building in relation to drug supply
reduction among key regional partners, such as the Western Balkan and other neighbouring
countries as well as those in the drug producing regions of Latin America and Central Asia,
therefore needs to remain a high priority.
This report also illustrates the importance of continued investment in research, monitoring
and analysis, which is necessary to underpin the flexible and dynamic responses that
Europe requires to tackle the problems generated by drug markets. Having a reliable and
comprehensive picture of the drug market and its wider impacts available is essential for
decision-makers at both the national and EU Level as well as to law enforcement authorities
in planning resource allocation and deciding on investigative focus areas. The EU Drug
Markets Report helps to address these needs by providing an indispensable reference point
7
EU DRUG MARKETS REPORT
for audiences ranging from policy-makers with responsibility for both security and public
health to investigators, analysts and managers working on activities in the area of criminal
investigations and drug supply reduction.
The breadth of topics covered in this report means that it inevitably synthesises and
summarises a large amount of detailed information. We take this opportunity to thank not
only our own staff but also all the experts, both in Europe and internationally, who have
provided input and comments that have been essential to ensuring the quality the analysis
found here. We also thank the EU and national institutions and bodies, and especially our
colleagues in the European Commission, who have contributed so generously with their
time to provide comments on this report; these insights have been invaluable.
Finally, we must acknowledge that the hidden and criminal nature of the drug market makes
it challenging for research and monitoring, and inevitably there are knowledge and data
gaps in many areas, which can hamper the development of evidence-based responses. Our
analyses are necessarily based on triangulation between diverse, partial and sometimes
contradictory information sources. While putting these together helps provide a more
complete picture, uncertainty still exists and critical information gaps remain. Therefore,
throughout this report we give attention to the issue of ‘what we don’t know, but need to
know’ about the European drug market. Nevertheless, we are confident that this report
provides a state-of-the-art review of the data currently available in this area. It also draws
out key learning and action points that provide a strong platform for developing future
policies and actions, to enhance our understanding not only of the rapidly changing drug
markets but also of what we need to do in Europe if we are to take effective measures to
tackle them.
Alexis Goosdeel Catherine De Bolle
Director, EMCDDA Executive Director, Europol
8
Acknowledgements
The EMCDDA and Europol would like to thank the following for their help and contribution to
the production of this report:
Q the European Commission;

Q the Reitox network of national focal points;
Q the EMCDDA reference group on drug supply indicators;
Q law enforcement officials from the EU Member States;
Q the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), the EU Judicial Cooperation
Unit (Eurojust) and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex).
As well as these, many other people have been involved and while it is not possible to
thank everyone personally, we would like to acknowledge those who have given generously
of their time to support this work. In particular, thanks are due to staff of the following
organisations for providing supplementary data and information:
Q Belgian Federal Police;

Q Colombian National Police;
Q French National Police;
Q Netherlands Forensic Institute;
Q Police Service of Scotland;
Q Public Health Agency of Sweden;
Q Romanian National Police;
Q Swedish Police Authority;
Q United States Drug Enforcement Administration.
We also thank the experts who have kindly answered the questions of the authors, and all
those who have allowed us to reproduce their photos in the report.
Finally, we would like to thank the many individuals and organisations whose research and
analysis we have cited.
9
I
Explanatory note on data
This report utilises data from multiple sources. Primarily it includes data and information
reported to the EMCDDA and Europol. The EMCDDA data presented in this report are
based on annual data collection using standardised reporting tools by the EMCDDA via its
network of 30 national focal points across the 28 EU Member States (as of August 2019),
Norway and Turkey. Unless otherwise stated, data presented in this report relate to the 28
EU Member States and 2017 data year. EU+2 denotes data for the EU Member States,
Norway and Turkey. Where lists of countries are not in alphabetical order, they are in order
of importance. The analyses presented here are also informed by open source information,
including an EMCDDA database of reports of individual seizures identified through an
ongoing monitoring programme. There are sometimes inconsistencies between the data
from different sources and, in addition, data supplied by Member States to the EMCDDA,
such as seizures, may themselves be collated from a large number of different data sources
and in some countries the total values supplied may represent minimum estimates.
Estimates of the total size of the retail drug market in the European Union (EU) in 2017
for cannabis, heroin, cocaine, amphetamines and MDMA have been constructed using a
demand-side approach. These estimates are likely to underestimate the size of the market
due to gaps and underestimations in the currently available data, on which they are based.
Nevertheless, the process has proved valuable in identifying key gaps in our knowledge.
Some key principles underpinning the approach taken are:
Q European estimates were obtained by summing individual country estimates;

Q wherever possible, the data used came from routine EMCDDA data collection;
Q where imputation of missing data was essential to produce a national estimate, this
was based on related country-specific data, if possible, or else the average across those
EU countries for which data were available was used;
Q all imputations and assumptions made within the estimation process are noted, so that
the limitations are clear.
However, in areas where data on which to base assumptions are lacking or are of
insufficient quality, no imputations have been made. This includes, for example, the extent
of underestimation and undercoverage in the general population survey data underpinning
the estimates. Therefore, the retail market value reported here is a minimum estimate.
In addition, it only reflects the amount consumers spend on illicit drugs and provides no
information on other aspects of the drug market, such as the profits and losses for criminal
groups at different stages of the supply chain.
Global data are sourced from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and
the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).
Currency conversions to euros throughout the report are based on European Central Bank
exchange rates for the year corresponding to the data used (European Central Bank, n.d.).
11
I
Executive summary
This report provides a strategic and action-oriented analysis of the information available on
Europe’s drug market. It uses a broad definition of the illicit drug market, encompassing the
illicit production, trafficking, wholesale distribution and sale of controlled substances to the
end user. The drug market has wide-ranging impacts on both security and public health,
and therefore such a holistic and systemic perspective is important for the effective delivery
and monitoring of drug control policy and supply reduction activities.
The drug market is a major source of income for organised crime groups (OCGs) in the
EU, with minimum estimated retail value of EUR 30 billion per year. In addition to the
economic impact, drug-related deaths and other harms to public health, there are broader
consequences of drug markets, such as links with wider criminal activities and terrorism; the
negative impact on the legal economy; violence in communities; damage to the environment;
and the increasingly important issue of how the drug market can fuel corruption and
undermine governance.
Analysis of OCG activities highlights the importance of the drug market and that strong links
exist with other areas of serious crime. More than one third of the 5 000 OCGs identified
in the EU’s Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) 2017 were directly
involved in the drug market and, overall, illicit drugs represent the most valuable market
for criminal organisations operating in the EU. About two thirds of those engaged in the
drug trade are also involved in other criminal activities. There are also signs of increasing
competition between groups leading to escalating violence within the EU drug market. All
data indicate that overall drug availability within Europe, for both natural and synthetic drugs,
remains very high. The European drug market is increasingly characterised by consumers
having access to a wide variety of high-purity and high-potency products that, in real terms,
are usually equivalent in price or cheaper than they have been over the past decade.
This reflects high levels of production globally and within the EU. Cocaine production in South
America and heroin production in Afghanistan are estimated to be at historically high levels.
Europe is also a major producer of cannabis and synthetic drugs for the EU market and to
some extent is a global supplier of MDMA and amphetamine. Developments in the area of
precursors have been an important driver of the expansion of drug production.
The drug market is becoming more globally connected and technologically enabled. The
main drivers of change behind the developments and new threats detailed in this report
stem from the ability of OCGs to exploit the opportunities arising from the existence of global
commercial markets and the associated logistical developments and digitalisation.
Globalised commercial markets require the transportation of goods across borders as rapidly
and simply as possible. There has been a rapid growth in the volume of trade using both
intermodal transportation networks for large-volume shipments, often involving containers,
and rapid parcel and postal delivery services for smaller volumes. These are increasingly
exploited by OCGs for drug-trafficking activities. OCGs are becoming more internationally
connected and exploit the gaps and differences that exist in regulatory and drug control
environments.
The drug market is increasingly digitally enabled. Both the surface web and darknet
markets are used for online drug sales, as are social media and mobile communication
apps. Encryption and anonymised services are also increasingly used by OCGs for secure
13
communication in the trafficking and sale of illicit drugs. This can disrupt existing markets
by lowering the barriers for market entry, reducing the need for some of the capacities and
infrastructure traditionally needed for drug trafficking and distribution, and creating new
challenges for law enforcement and public health.
The drug market in the EU needs to be viewed from both global and regional perspectives.
There are specific challenges associated with different regions. Developments in drug
production in South America and Afghanistan have a clear impact on the EU drug market.
China is also important as a source country for drug precursors and new psychoactive
substances. In some neighbouring countries, such as Morocco, Turkey and the Western
Balkans, there are OCGs that are closely linked to ethnically-based groups residing in the
EU, which is changing the dynamics of drug supply. Africa is also important because of its
growing role as a trafficking and transit area, with the potential for this to be a destabilising
influence and have a negative impact on security and governance, and increasing drug
problems within the region.
Key themes and implications for action
The overarching themes emerging from the analysis have important implications
for action. In addition to those elaborated in the individual chapters of the report,
the following broad areas need to be addressed for an effective response to the
challenges identified in the European drug market.
Strengthening efforts to target top-level OCGs active in the global drug market
The threat posed by the changing OCG business models and their growing ability to
exploit new opportunities requires continuing investment to strengthen information
sharing, analysis and cooperative actions at the operational, strategic and policy
levels. This is necessary to tackle major OCGs across different drug types and areas of
criminal enterprise.
Reducing vulnerabilities at external borders

Reducing the opportunities for wholesale trafficking of drugs through key entry points
into the EU requires continued investment in risk analysis and profiling, intelligence
sharing and implementation of proven approaches to strengthen the external
borders of the EU. Effective cooperation within and across borders between police,
customs, border control, other law enforcement agencies, and across the EU between
judiciaries, is a critical requirement for success.
Focusing on key geographical locations for trafficking and production

Areas in which drug market activities are concentrated are identified in this report.
Targeting these key locations with special measures while remaining vigilant to the
potential for the displacement of activities, should be a strategic priority.
Investing in forensic and toxicological capacity

Innovations in drug production and trafficking methods for all drugs, the growing
importance of highly potent synthetic substances, and the introduction of new
psychoactive substances and precursor chemicals has meant that forensic and
toxicological analysis is becoming increasingly important. However, overall capacity
is limited, potentially impeding the development of effective policies and actions.
Investment is required both at the European and Member States’ level.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Addressing the links with other important security threats

It is increasingly recognised that there are some links between illicit drug markets and
other criminal activities, such as trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Such links
require further study and may be challenging to address. Tackling them effectively
involves the strengthening of multiagency partnerships in order to step up action in
the areas of prevention, prosecution of perpetrators as well as protection of victims.
Recognising the costs of drug-related violence and corruption

Historically drug-related violence and corruption were most commonly associated
with production and trafficking activities outside Europe. This report identifies
a growing threat that the European drug market is becoming a driver for increasing
violence and corrupt practices within the EU. Combating this threat is a major
challenge that requires concerted actions across a number of policy areas.
Responding to digitally enabled drug markets

A proactive analysis of the threats posed by the introduction of new technologies
is needed. The success of law enforcement actions against digitally enabled drug
markets will increasingly rely on the ability to identify and employ new tools and
technologies — to anticipate and respond to the emerging threats. This requires the
harnessing of specialist skills, for example in forensic science, financial investigations,
and information and communications technology.
Acting at a global level

Engagement with international organisations and third countries is a crucial element
in responding to a globalised drug market. Understanding developments in drug
production, trafficking and use in non-EU countries is therefore becoming increasingly
important to responding more effectively to the drug market in Europe. Working with
countries neighbouring the EU or on the main trafficking routes to the EU is essential.
This is particularly relevant in those countries where, for historical reasons, OCGs exist
with links to ethnically-based groups residing in the EU.
Cannabis
Europe’s biggest drug market is for cannabis and significant production of the drug takes
place within the EU. With around 25 million annual users, the retail market for cannabis was
estimated to be worth at least EUR 11.6 billion in 2017. Around one in seven young adults
in the EU reports having used cannabis in the past year, with prevalence rates generally
stable but with early signs of possible increases in some countries. Herbal cannabis is more
commonly used than cannabis resin in the EU. The cannabis market is rapidly becoming
more diverse and complex, complicating and putting a strain on current regulatory, law
enforcement and monitoring approaches to this drug. Resin and herbal cannabis, now of
higher potency, still dominate but other products are appearing. These range from
high-potency cannabis oils to a wide range of commercial medical and wellness products
with low levels of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).
15
Herbal cannabis is extensively produced within the EU, with estimates indicating that at
least 20 000 cultivation sites are dismantled each year, and is a major source of income
for the criminal economy. Despite efforts to counter production, the Western Balkans,
and Albania in particular, appear to remain an important source of origin for seized
herbal cannabis. In the case of cannabis resin, cooperation between European nationals
engaged in cannabis production and Moroccan producers has led to the introduction
of new cannabis strains and production methods in Morocco. These changes may have
exacerbated the environmental impacts of production, such as soil erosion, deforestation
and water security issues. In the EU, indoor production is also linked to environmental
and health and safety risks. There appears to be diversification in OCG involvement in
the cannabis market in the EU, with the competition leading to higher levels of intergroup
violence. However, OCGs of Moroccan origin still play a major role in cannabis resin
trafficking, and groups of Dutch, but also of Vietnamese, origin are important for large-scale
production of herbal cannabis.
Spain remains the main entry point for cannabis resin into the EU, although Libya has
emerged as a major transit hub alongside diffusion of trafficking activities throughout
the Mediterranean region. The Netherlands and Spain remain the major trafficking hubs
for intra-EU cannabis trafficking and are commonly identified as the sources of origin of
seizures made by EU countries. While the scale is currently small compared with traditional
offline supply, online sales of cannabis appear to be increasing and have the potential to
expand further.
The use of heroin and other opioids still accounts for the largest share of drug-related
harms. The retail value of the heroin market in 2017 was estimated to be at least
EUR 7.4 billion. There are indications that heroin availability in the EU may increase:
recent opium production estimates from Afghanistan, levels of seizures in Turkey and
intelligence assessments of activity along the main trafficking routes to Europe are all high,
and large consignments of heroin have been detected within the EU. Therefore, vigilance
is required to identify any increases in heroin use. Synthetic opioids such as methadone,
buprenorphine, tramadol and fentanyl derivatives are also available on the drug market.
They appear to be growing in importance and pose additional challenges from regulatory,
law enforcement and health perspectives.
Generally, Turkish OCGs maintain overall control over the wholesale importation of heroin
into Europe. However, other OCGs, such as Balkan, British, Dutch, Iranian and Pakistani
groups, are also important in different parts of Europe. Overlaps have been identified
between OCGs involved in heroin supply and those involved in the trafficking of other
drugs, precursors, weapons and other illicit commodities. The main heroin precursor, acetic
anhydride, is far cheaper to source in the EU than in areas nearer to opium-producing
countries, and there is evidence of increasing diversion and trafficking of the precursor
from the EU along the Balkan route to heroin production areas. This appears to be linked
to diffusion of heroin production outside Afghanistan to other places, including the EU.
The Balkan route still remains the key corridor for heroin entry into the EU and therefore
Turkey remains of central importance for actions to disrupt the trafficking of heroin to the
EU market. While activities on the Northern route decline, there appears to be an increase
in the trafficking of heroin on the Southern route, in particular through the Suez Canal.
This is taking place against a backdrop of growing domestic opioid problems in some
African countries.
16
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For synthetic opioids, sources are diverse, including conventional trafficking approaches,
diversion from medical use, online purchase and, although uncommon, production within
the EU. High-potency synthetic opioids pose particular challenges for law enforcement and
increased risks to health. They are increasingly traded online and dispatched by post, and
small-volume packages can contain a large number of potential consumer doses.
Cocaine
The cocaine market is the second largest illicit drug market in the EU, with an estimated
minimum retail value in 2017 of EUR 9.1 billion. Surveys estimate that about 4 million
people in the EU will have used cocaine in the past year. Use is still concentrated in
the west and south of Europe but appears to be becoming more common elsewhere.
Production estimates in the three main producing countries and seizures in Europe were at
record levels in 2017. Cocaine-manufacturing processes also appear to be becoming more
efficient, and the EU is a potential source of precursor chemicals; attempted diversion of
large amounts of the precursor, potassium permanganate, and significant seizures of other
chemicals used in cocaine production have been reported in Europe.
While Colombian and Italian OCGs have historically played a central role in the trafficking
and distribution of cocaine, increasingly other groups are becoming more significant,
including Albanian-speaking, British, Dutch, French, Irish, Moroccan, Serbian, Spanish
and Turkish OCGs. At the same time some European OCGs have established a presence
in Latin American countries, developing a new ‘end-to-end’ business model for managing
the supply chain, with large quantities of cocaine purchased near production areas at
lower costs. This may be driving competition and conflict within the cocaine market and
leading to increasing cocaine market-related violence and corruption within the EU. The
use of containers for cocaine smuggling means that seizures of large volumes of the drug
at ports are now common and the cocaine seized at the wholesale level in Europe is of high
purity, often above 85 %. Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain remain main entry points
and distribution hubs for cocaine in the EU. North Africa appears to be emerging as a more
significant transit point for both air and maritime shipments of cocaine destined for the
European and possibly other markets. The global market for cocaine appears to be growing
and a knock-on effect of this is that the EU appears to be increasingly used as a transit
area for cocaine destined for other markets such as Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Turkey
and countries in the Middle East and Asia. The cocaine market is increasingly enabled by
digital technology, including darknet markets and the use of the surface web, social media
and mobile phone apps to advertise and facilitate the delivery of cocaine to consumers.
Innovation seen in the supply chain at the consumer level is suggestive of both high
availability and attempts by OCGs to increase market share.
Synthetic drugs: amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine
Europe’s synthetic drugs market, particularly in respect to stimulants like amphetamine,

MDMA and methamphetamine, is evolving rapidly. Within the stimulant market, these
drugs compete for market share alongside cocaine and a number of new psychoactive
substances. Of the two closely related stimulants, amphetamine continues to be more
commonly used than methamphetamine in most EU countries, though there are growing
signs of a gradual diffusion of methamphetamine use. The value of the EU retail market for
amphetamines (amphetamine and methamphetamine combined) in 2017 is estimated to
be at least EUR 1 billion, and for MDMA EUR 0.5 billion.
17
Most production takes place in the EU, and a variety of developments in production
methods and source materials have made lower costs and higher profits achievable from
production. Another knock-on impact of these developments is the potential increase in
the strength or purity of synthetic drugs; for example, the MDMA content of ecstasy tablets
has risen dramatically in recent years. Large-scale production of MDMA and amphetamine
remains concentrated in the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Belgium, with Dutch-based
OCGs playing a major role. Methamphetamine production mostly occurs in central Europe,
particularly in and around Czechia. Recently, however, methamphetamine production
has also been detected in the Netherlands, with the possible involvement of Vietnamese
OCGs formerly operating in Czechia. An additional development of some concern is
the discovery in the Netherlands and Belgium, in the first half of 2019, of three large-
scale methamphetamine production facilities, where Mexicans were working with local
criminal groups. The dumping of waste products from synthetic drug production results in
environmental damage, health risks and high clean-up costs. The use of novel chemicals for
producing precursors has exacerbated this issue.
In synthetic drug distribution, changes in OCG practices and greater interaction between
groups involved in other areas of the drug market are observable. These include Dutch
OCGs working with criminals of Turkish origin to supply synthetic drugs to Turkey and
beyond, and a trend for outlaw motorcycle gangs who are involved in synthetic drug
distribution to become more involved in production. In addition, darknet markets facilitate
mid-level suppliers and distributors to access synthetic drugs, such as MDMA, which can
be purchased in batches of thousands of tablets and then be repackaged and sold on.
OCGs in the EU increasingly play a key role in the global market for amphetamine and
methamphetamine, as well as MDMA. Some amphetamine produced in the EU is trafficked
to the Middle East to be sold as captagon tablets, and Europeans have been involved in
amphetamine production in the Middle East. In addition, methamphetamine produced in
Africa and the Middle East, and more recently Mexico, transits through Europe, usually with
a final destination in Asia or Oceania.

Policies relating to new psychoactive substances (NPS) appear to be having some impact,
especially those aimed at reducing open trade in the EU as well as measures taken in
source countries, such as China. There has been a slow-down in the number of first
detections of NPS in Europe. Currently around 50 new substances are reported annually,
giving a total of over 730 that have been reported to the EU Early Warning System. Despite
this, NPS continue to represent a serious cross-border threat to health due to the number
of potent opioids, synthetic cannabinoids and benzodiazepines appearing on the market
and the associated reports of health emergencies and deaths. Problems attributable to
synthetic cannabinoids appear to be growing, as their relatively low cost, easy availability
and high potency are factors in increased use among marginalised groups, including the
homeless and prison populations. In addition, new synthetic opioids are a growing cause
for concern, with a rapid increase seen in the number of fentanyl derivatives, substances
particularly associated with health problems, including fatal poisoning.
The main source countries, where NPS are sold openly by chemical and pharmaceutical
companies, are China and, to a lesser extent but particularly for those sold as medicines,
India. However, a small number of illicit laboratories have also been detected in EU
countries, such as the Netherlands and Poland, usually producing synthetic cathinones.
Interactions between the NPS market and the market in established controlled drugs have
become stronger, with NPS increasingly sold alongside illicit substances or in mixtures
with them. Overlaps also exist with the market for fake medicines. For example, new
18
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
benzodiazepines, often sold at very low prices and having the appearance of licensed
medicines, have appeared on illicit drug markets in some countries and have been
associated with harm, including an increased risk of overdose. Another group of NPS,
the synthetic cathinones, has been associated with HIV outbreaks linked to their injection,
and also with increased sexual risk-taking behaviours.
Policies and actions
A number of themes that have important implications for EU policies and actions recur
across the analysis presented in this report. The contemporary drug market is increasingly
complex, adaptive and dynamic; it is also more global in nature and more interlinked than
in the past. EU policies and responses need to be equally agile, adaptive and joined-up
if they are to effectively address current and future challenges in this area. In addition
to operational activities, it is important that full use is made of the range of policy tools
available: these include coordination mechanisms and strategies, bilateral engagement
with third countries and industry, and the use of legislative and financial instruments.
The identification, disruption and dismantling of serious organised crime groups involved
in drug trafficking, money laundering and corruption remains a high priority. However, an
important message emerging from this analysis is that, in addition to the direct impact on
health and security, the drug market has indirect and wide-raging negative consequences
in other important policy areas. These include violence and community safety, economic
development and governance, and the environment. A better understanding of these links
is needed to inform the further development of more integrated and stronger multi-sectoral
responses.
Finally, the human and societal costs associated with the drug market remain considerable.
The reduction of the harm associated with the drug market should remain a priority.
This requires actions to be articulated across a broad range of policy domains at both EU
and Member State level, and is consistent with Europe’s commitment to a balanced and
evidence-based approach to responding to challenges in this area.
19
I
PART I
This report uses a very broad definition of the illicit drug

market, encompassing the illicit production, trafficking,
wholesale distribution and sale of controlled substances
to the end user. The rationale for this is that, despite being
one of the priority areas for drug control policy and supply
reduction activities, the drug market is rarely considered
holistically or systemically and yet such a perspective is
likely to be critically important to both the formulation and
the evaluation of activities in this area.
This part of the report introduces the latest findings on

the impacts and consequences of the markets for illicit
drugs in the EU and the key driving factors influencing their
operation. The first chapter presents a revised estimate of
the retail market size for the main illicit drugs before going
on to examine the interlinkages between the illicit drug
trade and other criminal activities and how the trade affects
communities and society at large. The second chapter
covers the key drivers and facilitators of drug markets.
We examine their influence on today’s drug markets and
related trends, with a view towards the future.
CHAPTER 1
Impacts and consequences of drug markets
CHAPTER 2
Drivers and facilitators of drug markets
EU drug markets —
Dri
ver
sa
nd
faci
litato
rs
Globalisation
S
INITIATIVES
2%
3%
Ecst
Am
as
phe
y/MD
tam
MA
ine
STRUCTURES
s
ACTIONS
ACTIO
O
ONS
Heroin
25 %
Technology
and
€30
innovation billion
STRATEGIES LEGISLAT
LEGIS LAT
TION
LEGISLATION
Cocaine
31 %
FRAMEWORKS
Criminal tools
S
PONSE
D RES
S AN
IE
OLIC
P
— a systems perspective
es
nc
que
n s e
d co
ts an
c
Impa Wider
criminal
activity and
terrorism
INITIATIVES
FRAM
MEWORKS
ME
EWORKS
FRAMEWORKS
Societal
Cannabis impact
EU retail 39 %
market
STRUCTURES
size
ACTIONS
A
minimum
estimate
Impact on
the legal
economy
STRATEGIES
STR
ST
TR
RATEGIES
LEGISLATION
LEG
L
Corruption
and strain on
institutions
POL
ICIE
SA
ND
RE
SP
ON
SE
S
Key points from Part I
Understanding the impact of the European drug market
X The drug market represents a major source of income for some involvement of OCGs, although the relationship
OCGs. The EU drug market was conservatively estimated to between these groups and the drug market remains poorly
be worth about EUR 30 billion in 2017. Cannabis accounts understood.
for about two fifths of this total (39 %), cocaine (31 %),
heroin (25 %) and amphetamines and MDMA (5 %). X Drug market-related violence and intimidation is
a growing concern in the EU. Some new models of
X Illicit drug markets have both direct and indirect impacts supply have emerged that are associated with high
on society that go far beyond the harms caused by the levels of violence and exploitation. There is no systematic
use of drugs themselves. These include the links that exist assessment of violent crime associated with the operation
with wider criminal activities and terrorism; the negative of the drug market. However, new data on drug-related
impact on the legal economy and communities; and the homicides suggest it is a significant phenomenon in some
increasingly important issue of how the drug market can countries and more likely to involve the use of firearms
fuel corruption and undermine governance. than other types of homicide. The violence and intimidation
associated with the drug markets spills over and affects
X Globally, involvement in drug production and trafficking, families and neighbourhoods as well as the individuals
either directly or indirectly, is an important source of funds directly involved.
for terrorist activities, although only one of many sources. In
Europe, currently there appear to be no strong, systematic X Drug production, both within the EU and in other
links between drug markets and terrorism beyond those countries to produce drugs sold on the EU market, results
arising from shared underlying factors or situations. in health and safety risks and environmental damage. The
Links to jihadist terrorism in the EU usually result from EU is a significant production area for synthetic drugs and
individuals’ previous involvement in the lower levels of the cannabis, resulting in damage to the environment through
drug market or in using drugs, which may then continue the dumping of chemical waste and creating risks both to
after their radicalisation. In contrast, some long-established those involved and to the communities where production is
paramilitary groups active in Europe have been observed to located.
be involved in drug markets, and their operations appear to
be closer to organised criminality. X The large amounts of cash generated by the drug
trade have wide-ranging negative impacts on the legal
X Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling economy. They need to be legitimised in some way, as
may both have links with the drug trade when they are well as often needing to be sent overseas to pay the costs
conducted by the same OCGs, although these links appear along the different stages of the supply chain. The range
quite limited. More importantly, trafficking in human of methods used to transfer money is increasing, and
beings and exploitation may also be linked to drugs when money-laundering services may be provided by syndicates
individuals are enticed, or coerced, into becoming involved providing this ‘crime as a service’ to other OCGs. The
in low-level and expendable roles within the drug trade, acquisition of businesses and high-value assets in order
for example as workers in cannabis farms or transporters to ‘launder’ or transfer cash distorts markets and pushes
of drugs, or when drugs are used to facilitate sexual out legitimate businesses, who are at a competitive
exploitation. These uses of coercion and exploitation may disadvantage.
not always be recognised.
X Drug market-related activities also impose direct costs
X Trade in various other illicit commodities may also on businesses. For example, companies that produce
be carried out alongside drug trafficking. In particular, chemicals used in drug production may suffer theft and
concerns are growing about the trafficking and use of diversion of these substances, while having to bear the
weapons by OCGs involved in the drug trade, although at financial burden of complying with legal controls and
present this still seems limited and often more for their own reporting. Seaport and airport operators must pay to
use. The trade in falsified, counterfeit, substandard and provide additional security and facilitate detection of
unauthorised medicines is highly lucrative and represents smuggled drugs. Some of these costs may be passed on to
a serious and growing public health problem. There is other businesses.
24
PART I
X Drug markets are one of the most corruptive influences X The use of encryption and anonymised services
in the EU and have a serious impact on governance in by OCGs to facilitate secure communication both
producer and transit countries. Corruption may be used facilitates global cooperation and poses challenges to
by organised crime to obtain information, to facilitate the law enforcement. High-end encrypted smartphones have
transit of illicit drugs and/or the diversion of chemicals to become important criminal tools, used as their primary
illicit markets, and to obstruct investigations. Despite this, means of communication to reduce the visibility of their
the extent of this problem remains both poorly understood activities to law enforcement.
and poorly monitored.
X Firearms and fraudulent documents are also
X A substantial amount of government expenditure in the increasingly important tools of OCGs engaged in the
EU that would otherwise be available for other purposes drug trade. The criminal use of firearms by OCGs involved
is used in tackling drug markets and responding to the in drug markets appears to be increasing. In addition
problems associated with them. In production and transit to firearms, including automatic weapons, the use of
regions, many of which are in less economically developed hand grenades and explosives in the context of drug-
countries, these costs and the associated corruption and related violence appears to be increasing. Many types of
violence can undermine social and economic development. fraudulent documents are used for a variety of purposes,
This can also further destabilise these countries, leaving including the transport of illicit drugs, money laundering
them vulnerable to increased exploitation and poor and cross-border transfer of cash.
governance.
Globalisation and digitalisation driving

innovation and facilitating change Implications for action to address
current threats and increase
X The drug market is rapidly becoming more globally preparedness
connected and technologically enabled, reflecting wider
societal changes. OCGs are quick to exploit the expansion
of global trade, which provides more opportunities for Improvements in information gathering, data sharing and
transporting and concealing drug shipments. For example, analysis are needed to address important information gaps
they have adopted new methods for drug trafficking, such that inhibit both strategic analysis of the current and future
as using intermodal transportation networks and general threats arising from the drug market and the targeting of
aviation, as well as exploiting rapid parcel and postal operational activities. This will require:
delivery services for drug delivery.
Q investment in information sharing and analysis to
X Globalisation also supports criminal cooperation support a more holistic and dynamic understanding
internationally, leading to efficiency gains, facilitated by of the activities of OCGs across drugs, including
online communication opportunities. OCGs seek out interactions with other types of serious crime and
and exploit the gaps and differences between different terrorism, with particular attention given to identifying
regulatory and drug control environments. This cross- new operational models, market entrants and
border criminal interaction complicates law enforcement alliances;
responses, increasing the need for international Q an improved understanding of the role of the drug
cooperation and coordination and technical sophistication. market in violence, including drug-related homicide;
gang involvement; money laundering; and corrupt
X The drug market is increasingly digitally enabled. Both practices;
the surface web and hidden darknet markets as well as Q improved monitoring of the price, purity and content
social media networks are increasingly used for online of drugs at different points in the supply chain, which
drug sales. The use of these technologies can significantly should include drugs purchased from online sources;
lower the barriers to entry into the market, be disruptive to Q continued efforts to monitor developments in online
established business models and create new challenges drug sale, as well as the role of new technologies and
for law enforcement and public health. social media in enabling drug markets;
25
Q a better understanding of the trends, developments It is essential that responses keep pace with developments
and variability in the operation of the retail drug occurring in the drug market. To achieve this, there is a
markets in Europe and the implications for drug-related need to:
harms and responses.
Q strengthen operational and regulatory responses
Effective partnerships and interagency working are to drug distribution using parcel and post delivery
necessary to improve responses. In particular, there is services. This will require the development of
a need to: a framework for risk analysis, and cross-sectoral
cooperation. Consideration also needs to be given to
Q promote greater collaboration and information sharing parcel-forwarding services and anonymous pick-up
between intelligence services, law enforcement and and drop-off networks;
other relevant agencies to facilitate a more integrated Q continue to support the implementation of tools
response, for example establishing a mechanism for such as the Passenger Name Record database to
cooperation between drug and cybercrime units; enable resources to be more effectively targeted
Q continue to support cooperation and information (e.g. continuing effort by Member States to improve
exchange between container ports in Europe and the acquisition of passenger data submitted by air
elsewhere; carriers);
Q invest more in identifying and agreeing priorities for Q continue to support the development of
cross-border collaboration with EU and key external a comprehensive suite of best practice tools for
partners; identifying and targeting criminal finances and money
Q develop a threat assessment and engagement strategy flows;
for industries whose services are used to enable Q raise awareness about the environmental impact and
or facilitate the drug market (e.g. financial services, costs related to drug production and processing in
telecommunication providers, technology companies, Europe to support the development of appropriate
delivery and transportation businesses). responses.
26
Photo: Europol
1
CHAPTER 1
Impacts and consequences
of drug markets
The size of the illicit drug market must be viewed as a minimum estimate for a number
of methodological reasons (see page 30). The cannabis
The illicit drug trade is a major global industry, encompassing market is the largest, accounting for about 39 % of the
production, trafficking and retailing. The hidden nature of total, followed by cocaine (including crack cocaine) (31 %)
the illicit drug business makes it difficult to estimate the and heroin (25 %) (Figure 1.1). These new estimates build
amount of money it generates, and published estimates are on the initial estimates produced for the last EU Drug
variable, covering different parts of the market and different Markets Report (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016), but make
geographical areas and involving many assumptions and use of new sources of data that have been developed in
associated uncertainties. One recent report on global the interim. They are therefore not directly comparable
transnational crime (Channing May, 2017) estimated the with the previous estimates and cannot be used to assess
value of the global market for the main illicit drugs (cannabis, trends. There are also still many gaps in the available data
cocaine, opiates and amphetamine-type stimulants) to be underpinning these calculations and they therefore remain
between USD 426 billion and USD 652 billion in 2014. The minimum estimates that require ongoing work to improve
large size of the market makes it attractive to criminals, and them (see box ‘The challenge of estimating the size of
the drug market contributed over a quarter of the total value the illicit drug market’). Nevertheless, they illustrate the
of the 11 major transnational crimes the report studied. importance of the markets for different drugs and the large
However, it is important to note that, as with legal markets, money flows associated with them.
the value of sales is not the same as profit; costs and losses
occur at all stages along the supply chain. To put the size of the illicit drug market into the context of
the wider economy in the EU, it has been estimated that illicit
In the EU, the total value of the retail market for illicit drugs drug production and trafficking in the 10 Member States
in 2017 was estimated at EUR 30 billion — this figure
Assessing the value of seized drugs
The value of the drugs seized may be an important as EUR 6 000 000 (100 000 × retail price per gram
component for assessing the impact of drug supply in Europe, say EUR 60), making no adjustment for
reduction. Despite being a fairly crude metric, it is one purity. However, the investment lost by the OCG,
that most people can relate to. Because commonly in this example, would be the much lower value of
available data relate to retail prices, the value is EUR 250 000 (100 × cost per kilogram of cocaine
sometimes expressed in terms of the potential value at the origin, say EUR 2 500). In addition, the OCG
at retail level. However, a more appropriate measure would also have incurred other costs, such as those
is to calculate the financial loss that the OCG would relating to transport, which they would not be able to
record on its balance sheet (Reuter and Greenfield, recoup. Estimating the value in terms of the loss may
2001). be a more transparent and realistic way to measure
the impact of drug supply reduction interventions.
This is best illustrated by an example. Consider However, this will require the collection of more data
a shipment of 100 kg of cocaine seized on entry to about a range of variables, such as price and purity,
Europe. The estimated street value could be reported along the supply chain.
28
CHAPTER 1 Impacts and consequences of drug markets
I
Figure 1.1
Estimated retail value of the illicit market for the main drugs in the EU
€0.5 bn
€1.0 bn
€10.5 bn
Ecs
Am
tasy
2
ph
€11.6 bn
/M
%
e ta
3%
€9.1 bn
DM
mi
ne Cannabis
A
s
39 %
€12.8 bn
€7.4 bn Heroin €30 billion

25 % EU retail market size
€6.4 bn minimum estimate
Cocaine
How to read the chart
31 %
Central estimate
€7.6 bn €10.5 bn €0.5 bn
Estimated range €0.3 bn €0.8 bn
€9.1 bn
EU retail market size
minimum estimate
(% of total)
Source: EMCDDA (2019a).
for which data are available (1) ranged between 0.02 % economics of other aspects of the drug market, such as
(Luxembourg) and 0.6 % (Italy and Sweden) of the national production and wholesale supply activities and the costs
gross domestic product (GDP) in the period 2004-15, and of responses to drug markets. Some progress has been
was 0.4 % or above in half of the countries (Eurostat, 2018a). made in improving the data in these areas, for example
This is broadly comparable with available global figures, commencing the collection of wholesale price and purity
showing retail drug sales in the US in 2010 being equivalent data, and developing estimates of the cost of the clean-up
to 0.7 % of GDP and across 21 EU countries (2) in 2015 being of waste from synthetic drug laboratories. Both of these
equivalent to 0.32 % of the GDP (UNODC, 2017). Although topics are discussed in this report. Other institutions and
all EU countries produce data on the contribution of illicit organisations are also working in this area. For example,
activities to GDP as part of their national accounts, often they Tops et al. (2018) sought to estimate the potential value of
are not disaggregated to allow identification of drug-related synthetic drugs produced in the Netherlands for the global
figures. Furthermore, where available, published studies market, suggesting that it was at least EUR 18.9 billion at
vary widely in the period covered — from 2004 (Denmark) to retail prices and that Dutch producers and traffickers may
2013 (Luxembourg) (Eurostat, 2018a). receive about EUR 3 billion to EUR 5 billion as revenue.
Estimates are also often made of the value of seized
Beyond estimates of the retail market size, there shipments of drugs (see box ‘Assessing the value of seized
remains a need to develop our understanding of the drugs’), but all these estimates are based on limited data
and broad assumptions, so they need to be viewed with
(1) Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, caution.
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
(2) Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal,
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
29
The challenge of estimating the size of the illicit drug market
The illicit nature of drug supply means that the market behaviours, people will often underestimate
is hidden, and collecting data on the nature and extent or under-report use. We have not made any
of the phenomenon is very difficult; for this reason adjustment for this in our core estimate because
there are important gaps in our knowledge of key we currently have no robust data on which to base
aspects. This hampers any estimation of the size of such an adjustment. However, the technical report
the market and its economic consequences. Any such includes some analyses of the potential impact of
estimates have a number of important limitations different levels of underestimation on the overall
and often vary considerably as a result of variations estimate.
in scope, the use of different data sources and the Q Knowledge gaps. In our previous report we
assumptions made to fill in gaps. highlighted a number of important knowledge
gaps hampering the estimation process. In the
For this report our approach has been the same intervening period we have increased the number
as in the previous EU Drug Markets Report, but of countries for which we have data on amounts
using improved data sources. Our aim has been of drugs used by different groups of users, the use
to use, wherever possible, routinely collected data of different forms of drugs (e.g. cannabis resin
sources that are reported to the EMCDDA by most versus herb, or MDMA powder versus tablets) and
EU countries to enhance consistency and facilitate the quantities consumed in different countries.
ongoing development. Details of the estimation However, significant knowledge gaps remain.
procedures, which take a demand-side approach,
and the assumptions used can be found in the These types of limitations are common to most
accompanying technical report (EMCDDA, 2019a). estimates of economic aspects of drug markets.
The estimation process essentially involves taking The knowledge gaps around other aspects, such
estimates of the number of people who use each as profits and losses at different stages of supply
drug in a year for each country in the EU and then activities and the costs of responses to drug markets,
multiplying these by an estimate of the average may be even greater. In the light of these limitations
amount used in a year and the average retail price in and others described in the accompanying technical
each country. The national estimates are then summed report, it is clear that the estimates presented in
to provide a European total. this report and elsewhere must be interpreted with
caution. Our estimates, because we have chosen
A number of key limitations must be borne in mind not to make adjustments where information is not
when considering the estimates presented here. generally available, must be seen as minimum
estimates. There is a need to continue work to improve
Q Undercoverage. General population surveys have the basic data on which such estimates are based,
formed the basis of most of the estimates of in order to improve future estimates and to enhance
numbers of people using drugs, but it is known our understanding of other economic aspects of the
that some groups, particularly some marginalised illicit drug trade. Interpreting estimates of retail market
groups, may be under-represented in these size is also challenging; it is necessary to take into
surveys. Although we have used estimates of consideration issues such as the fact that changes
high-risk drug use and treatment data to identify in content may not be reflected in retail price data
use by some of these groups, gaps in coverage but may have an impact on quantity consumed. For
remain likely. example, in the case of MDMA/ecstasy, the average
Q Under-reporting of use. Many of the data used MDMA content of tablets has markedly increased in
in these estimates, e.g. on the number of people recent years but the price has remained stable. In such
who use drugs, frequency of use and amounts circumstances the value of the market may decrease
consumed, are based on self-reports. It is known even if use has remained stable or increased, since
that, particularly with respect to stigmatised fewer tablets may be needed to get the same effect.
30
I
The ramifications of the illicit market extend beyond its Figure 1.2
financial value, inflicting a wide range of harms and thus Key impacts and consequences of drug markets
a heavy burden on societies (Figure 1.2). In the previous
edition of this report (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016) these
were grouped into four broad categories: links to terrorism
and wider criminal activity; the impact on the legal
economy; strain on government institutions; and the impact
Terrorism
on society more generally through harms to individuals,
families and neighbourhoods (EMCDDA and Europol, Wider
Human trafficking,
2016). criminal exploitation and
activity and migrant smuggling
Within these categories the report identified a number terrorism
of data and knowledge gaps that hampered the analysis Trade in other
illicit goods
and quantification of the impacts. These included
the need for monitoring and analysis of possible dual
involvement of individuals in both drug-related organised
crime and terrorist activity; the need to establish suitable Drug-related
data collection methodologies for the monitoring of homicide
the relationship between drugs and violence; and the
need to systematically implement data collection on the Societal Gangs, violence
environmental damage caused by dumping waste from impact and intimidation
synthetic drug production sites in Europe. In the three years

Environmental
since the last report, we have addressed a number of these
damage
knowledge gaps, with a focus on selected priority policy
areas: terrorism, trafficking in human beings, trade in other
illicit goods, drug-related crime, violence and intimidation,
and environmental impacts. In the following sections, the
findings from this additional work and other new sources Money
of evidence are used to update our analysis of the broader Impact on laundering
impacts of the drug market, based on the latest evidence the legal
Impact on
available. economy businesses
Corruption of
public officials
Corruption
and strain on Government
expenditure
institutions
Impact on
development
and governance
31
Links to terrorism and wider The global picture

criminal activity
The drug trade as a funding source for terrorist groups —
one among many
The previous EU Drug Markets Report (EMCDDA and The involvement of terrorist organisations in the drug trade
Europol, 2016) highlighted the different ways in which as a source of funding for their terrorist activities has been
drug markets may be linked to other criminal activities and recognised for some time. For example, since the 1980s,
terrorism, based on the limited evidence available at that the involvement of insurgents and terrorist groups in the
time. It described how the links are often opportunistic, cultivation, manufacture and trafficking of drugs has been
for example where shared trafficking routes encourage observed in Latin America and the Middle East (Felbab-
the trafficking of other commodities. Other links are more Brown, 2005; Piazza, 2011). This may generate funds
instrumental, for example when terrorists, both individuals directly through active participation in the drug production
and groups, use drug dealing or trafficking to fund their and supply chain, or indirectly through the levying of ‘taxes’
terrorist activities, or when drug traffickers exploit trafficked on producers or traffickers passing through territories under
individuals in drug production or drug dealing. In this report a group’s control. These connections between drug markets
we update the earlier findings, incorporating additional and terrorism have also been noted elsewhere in the world,
studies that have been undertaken in the intervening for example in Central Asia (Omelicheva and Markowitz,
period. 2018).
However, drug trafficking is not the only source of funding

Terrorism for such terrorist groups. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,
for example, is reported to have profited from a variety
There is considerable concern about the links between of crimes, including drug trafficking, in North and West
the illicit drug trade and terrorism, both in Europe and Africa (del Cid Gómez, 2010) as has the Taliban in Central
globally (e.g. US Senate Hearing, 2012; Coats, 2017). Asia (Omelicheva and Markowitz, 2018). Therefore, the
The European Agenda on Security of April 2015 (European relative importance of drug trafficking compared with other
Commission, 2015) highlights the need to tackle the nexus sources of income has been questioned (Tupman, 2014).
between terrorism and organised crime, pointing to the way Nevertheless, in Central Asia, drug trafficking has been
organised crime may feed terrorism through a variety of reported as top of the list of illegal money-making activities
channels, including supplying weapons, financing terrorist of terrorist groups (Reyes and Dinar, 2015). More recently,
activities through drug distribution and infiltrating financial based on best estimates from a range of sources (official
markets. reports, academic assessments and criminal intelligence),
it has been estimated that drug-related income makes
The data available on this topic are limited and much of the up more than a quarter of the finances of seven major
research relates to concerns about the role of drug markets terrorist/insurgent groups (Table 1.1).
in funding terrorist groups active outside Europe. Only limited
information is available on the situation in Europe, where the Terrorists, insurgents or criminals: a diverse picture
nature of terrorist activities is very different. Nevertheless, a Some of the terrorist organisations that are heavily involved
richer intelligence picture is emerging (Europol, 2019f) and in the drug trade have been found to resemble organised
more research has been undertaken recently, including that criminal groups in the nature of their operations and how
described in the background paper ‘A new high? Terrorists they shift and conceal their finances. However, there is
and drugs in Europe’ (Basra, 2019) commissioned for this considerable variability between groups. How terrorists
report. The main findings are highlighted below, but there meet their financial needs depends on a range of factors,
remain significant knowledge gaps. in particular the size of the organisation, the scale and
geographical location of its operations and the availability
Overall, the new research confirms the picture described of external support. For example, small groups have
in the previous EU Drug Markets Report, that the links been found to require only modest resources to carry out
between terrorism and drug markets are opportunistic and relatively low-tech attacks (Keatinge et al., 2018).
not systematic. Globally, terrorists use participation in drug
markets as an important source of funds for their activities, It has been suggested that the ideological and operational
but it is one source among many. In Europe the involvement divide between criminal and terrorist organisations would
of the perpetrators of terrorism in drugs and drug dealing is prevent their collaboration (e.g. Wang, 2010), but on the
generally part of a wider picture of, mostly petty, criminality. other hand there are reports of increasing networking and
32
I
Table 1.1 A focus on Europe

Sources of income for selected armed (terrorist and
insurgent) groups European drug markets: links to global terrorist financing
Source Income in % and recruitment
millions of Terrorist activity in Europe currently is of a different nature
EUR (USD)
to that described above. As a result, the links between the
Drugs 297 (330) 28
drug market and terrorism are also likely to differ, although
Oil and gas 207 (230) 20 the consumption of heroin and cocaine in Europe will help
Illegal mining 183 (203) 17 to fund terrorist groups such as the Taliban and FARC,
Taxation and extortion (not drug-related) 177 (197) 17 as well as the organised crime groups with which they
Confiscation and looting 89 (99) 9 cooperate (see Case study 12, page 52), and European-
External funding and donations 32 (36) 3 based OCGs may also provide support to terrorist
organisations operating outside Europe. For example, the
Kidnapping for ransom 32 (36) 3
Spanish authorities recently reported the dismantling of
Antiquities 14 (15) 1
an OCG involved in the trafficking of illicit goods, including
Charcoal 14 (15) 1
drugs, the exchange of cannabis resin for weapons,
terrorism financing and jihadist propaganda (Ministerio del
Source: Nellemann et al. (2018, p. 135). Interior, 2018).
Note: Groups included are al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Jama’a Nusrat ul-
Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State and the Taliban plus some groups Furthermore, the proceeds of criminal activity are reported
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. to be among the key sources of terrorist recruitment
financing (FATF, 2018) and in several cases law
enforcement investigations have found drug trafficking
convergence of terrorism and transnational crime due activity to be the main source of funds used for recruitment
to globalisation and related geopolitical changes (Reyes for terrorist purposes (see Case study 1).
and Dinar, 2015). Internationally, there is good evidence
that interlinkages do occur. For example, at the end of While some connections between terrorism and drugs have
fiscal year 2015, a quarter (10) of the US Department of been identified in Europe, there is little solid, systematic
Justice’s Consolidated Priority Organisation Targets list and up-to-date evidence and analysis of how terrorists
of key drug trafficking and criminal organisations were in Europe interact with drugs — as producers, dealers or
reported to have links to designated terrorist organisations users — and the dynamics and principles that guide those
(US Department of Justice, 2017). A recent study of the interactions. The lack of evidence has often resulted in
effect of drug trafficking on terrorism in drug transit states speculative and, at times, sensational reporting that has
in Central Asia also provides evidence that the drug trade raised policy concerns. However, to date there appears to
facilitates terrorism to some extent, but it also illustrates be little evidence of systematic links between the criminal
how the relationship between drugs and terrorism is groups engaged in the local drug markets in Europe and
variable and may have much broader impacts (Omelicheva terrorist activities. Nevertheless, within Europe, drug
and Markowitz, 2018). It highlights how drug trafficking not markets and terrorism appear to be linked to some extent,
only funds terrorist activities, but also how groups engaged in that criminals and terrorists recruit from the same pool of
in the drug trade may use political violence against the people with shared vulnerabilities (Basra et al., 2016).
state to protect their interests or otherwise undermine
or destabilise governments through their drug-related Throughout Europe there is evidence of some merging
activities. However, it also shows the complexity of these of criminal, including drug-related, and jihadist (3) social
relationships; for example, state actors potentially also networks, environments and milieus, with many jihadists
engage in drug-trafficking activities, and OCGs and terrorist and foreign fighters having a criminal past. For example, in
groups may forge strategic alliances to further their illicit Germany, two thirds of the country’s 778 foreign fighters
activities. who went to Syria and Iraq were known to the police prior
(3) The terms ‘jihadism’ and ‘jihadist’ have been contentious ever since
they entered common usage during the late 1990s. One of the most
frequent complaints is that they unfairly associate the religious concept
of ‘jihad’ with acts of terrorism and extreme violence. This study, therefore,
distinguishes between ‘jihadism’, a modern revolutionary ideology, and
‘jihad’, an Islamic concept that means ‘struggle’ and can refer to all kinds
of religiously inspired effort, be it spiritual, personal, political or military.
For more, see Esposito (2002, pp. 26-28), Hegghammer (2009) and
Maher (2016).
33
CASE STUDY 1
Low-level terrorist financing

The report by the Financial Action Task sources of income at the time. whom were present in court. The core
Force on financing and recruitment Nevertheless, they had high standards members were sentenced to up to
for terrorist purposes (FATF, 2018) of living, including cars and houses. 12 years’ imprisonment and a fine
includes a range of examples globally, They organised meetings at which they of EUR 30 000 in January 2016. All
including the following, which relate to would watch violent extremist videos others were judged, in absentia, during
the EU. and would set up personal defence February 2015. A large number of the
and physical training sessions. accused had already departed to fight
a. Drug trafficking and terrorist The proceeds of their petty crimes in Syria. Its leader, Person A, was also
recruitment activities financed all of these activities.’ convicted of drug trafficking in 2008
and 2014. He was involved in the
‘Several individuals were arrested on b. Recruitment of first wave of Belgian import of over 5 tonnes of cannabis
charges of terrorist-indoctrinating foreign terrorist fighters from Morocco. The Belgian Financial
activities in Ceuta and Melilla, the Investigation Unit received suspicious
Spanish autonomous regions in North ‘In 2010, Person A founded activity reports on large cash deposits
Africa, in 2015. A large number of Organisation X, an informal Antwerp- on the account of Person A. The origin
these individuals had criminal records based network responsible for the of the cash was unclear but Person
in relation to drug trafficking. At the recruitment of the first wave of Belgian A’s involvement in the drug trade led
time of their arrest, materials related foreign terrorist fighters in 2012 and to suspicions that he was using the
to Islamic State recruitment activities 2013. Organisation X was dissolved proceeds from the drug trade to fund
and to their criminal activities, as in September 2012. Two years later, part of the activities of Organisation X.’
well as arms and drugs, were seized. in September 2014, the judicial
Almost all the arrested individuals process started against 45 members Source: FATF (2018), p. 17.
were unemployed and had no legal of Organisation X, only seven of
to their departure (BKA et al., 2016), and in France over minor nature, such as drug possession or dealing, theft,
40 % of jihadists convicted between 2004 and 2017 had burglary, speeding or affray. This is in line with previous
criminal records (Hecker, 2018). Recent figures indicate research (e.g. Basra et al., 2016; Hecker, 2018) that
that, of 125 foreign fighters linked to Italy, 55 (44 %) had suggests an association between petty criminality and
a criminal record before departing for an area of conflict terrorism in Europe. At the same time, there were other
(Iraq, Libya or Syria), including an unspecified number major categories of more serious crime, amounting to 67 %
relating to the production and selling of drugs (Marone and of all known crimes, including money laundering, violent
Vidino, 2019). Community workers have observed similar robbery, assault, murder, and acts involving weapons and
overlaps in Molenbeek, a Brussels neighbourhood that has explosives. However, whether or not these more serious
been home to jihadist networks (Le Soir, 2017). offences were linked to drug markets was not examined.
In addition, although past events in Europe have shown
The importance of drug-related activities, and particularly that terrorist acts can be carried out with limited financial
drug market-related activities, relative to other criminality means, it has been argued that funding through crime,
is less clear. A project entitled From Criminals to Terrorists including drug-related crime, has the potential to become
and Back examined data on terrorism convicts from the more significant in the future (Basra and Neumann, 2016).
11 EU Member States with the highest number of arrests
for terrorism offences (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, A paper prepared as background for this report (Basra,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, 2019), looked at the nature and extent of the relationships
United Kingdom), identifying 116 crimes committed by between drug-related and terrorism-related activities based
56 individuals before 2015 (GLOBSEC, 2018). A third on information concerning more than 300 individuals or
(38 out of 116) of the recorded crimes were of a relatively
34
I
incidents (4) in Europe, gathered between 2012 and 2017 sale of property and loans — robberies, theft, fraud and
from open sources (newspaper articles, court documents, to a lesser extent drug dealing have been used as means
and government or law enforcement reports), in which of financing jihadist activity (Nesser et al., 2016; Oftedal,
there was evidence of both these types of activity. The 2015). However, large-scale drug dealing is rarely seen;
analysis separately considered two broad categories: most post-radicalisation drug dealing is relatively small in
jihadists, and ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist scale and ambition. For example, in February 2015, NL,
groups (mainly republican and loyalist paramilitaries in a drug user with a history of domestic violence who was
Northern Ireland, but also other groups, including the homeless at time of his arrest, was arrested for dealing
Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK, or Kurdistan Workers’ heroin in Ravenna, Italy: he had 3 g in his possession.
Party). He was planning to use the proceeds to fund his travel to
Syria, yet he had saved only EUR 40. There is not always
Jihadists’ links to the drug trade: generally indirect and such a clear connection, however, between someone’s
low level post-radicalisation drug dealing and their jihadist activities.
Based on records relating to at least 148 individuals with
jihadist links (Basra, 2019), it appears that jihadists may Finally, some take drugs preceding an attack. Jihadists
interact with the illicit drug trade in three broad ways. have consumed drugs directly before carrying out a terrorist
attack, thereby contradicting the stereotype of their uniform
The first is involvement in drugs prior to radicalisation. piety and religious observance.
They are found to often have a history of consuming and/
or dealing illicit drugs, which can have an ancillary, indirect Just as drug use can continue after an individual’s
role in their radicalisation process. radicalisation, it can also continue up to the point of
carrying out an attack. In a handful of cases, there is
For a third of the sample, drug use was historical behaviour, evidence that jihadists have taken drugs in the days
often occurring many months or even years prior to — or possibly hours — before carrying out a terrorist attack,
their radicalisation, whereas for the remainder it directly although there is little sign that their drug taking influenced
preceded or overlapped with it. However, judging whether their decision to act. In general, drug use appears to have
or not drugs played a role in a person’s radicalisation is been a continuation of habitual use, and it does not appear
difficult. In general, it appears that drugs formed part of to explain why they carried out their attacks.
the overall personal circumstances, experiences and other
factors that influenced the trajectory towards extremism Overall, among jihadists there appear to be no formal,
and political violence, rather than a deciding factor in any structural or inherent links to the drug trade. Many have
individual’s decision to engage in jihadism. Other factors a background in either dealing or using drugs, which can
were manifestly more influential, such as socialisation continue long after their process of radicalisation and
among extremists, the jihadist worldview and ideology, or their engagement with extremist ideas and networks. This
perceived personal and political grievances. If anything, it post-radicalisation behaviour generally mirrors their pre-
appears that drugs may play an indirect role, having been radicalisation involvement. Many appear to fit the profile
the reason an individual was in prison, which in turn was of volatile lone-actor terrorists in which ‘radicalization is
the place that facilitated their radicalisation (Case study 2). primarily characterized by inconsistency, brief interludes of
intense political or religious engagement before reverting
The second way is involvement in drugs after radicalisation. to patterns of hedonistic behaviour, including habitual drug
Jihadists’ involvement with drugs can continue long after consumption and, often, violent crime’ (Lindekilde et al.,
their initial engagement with extremism. 2017, p. 5). Understanding jihadists’ profiles, patterns of
radicalisation and how they may prepare for and undertake
Drug dealing and/or use, long after an individual’s terrorist activities has implications for those seeking to
radicalisation, was seen repeatedly in the dataset, contrary identify those likely to participate in terrorism and either
to stereotypes of religious observance. Those involved in prevent or detect their activities.
drug dealing may envisage the crime itself to be a form
of jihad (Basra et al., 2016; Basra and Neumann, 2017). Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups: varied
While jihadists in Europe have mostly used legal means involvement in the European drug trade
to finance their plots — such as salaries, welfare benefits, As well as the jihadist scene, some overlaps with the
drug market have been observed among some ethno-
(4) These figures represent a minimum number of individuals or events, as
sources would often state that multiple members of a group had engaged
in both terrorism-related and drug-related activity, without specifying how
many members this applied to. In such cases, to err on the side of caution,
only a single entry was included in the dataset.
35
CASE STUDY 2
Imprisonment for drug dealing leading to radicalisation

MM was sentenced for drug offences While in Sequedin prison in 2015, MM In a Marseille apartment used by the
in October 2013 after being arrested met CB, who had been convicted of pair, police discovered an Uzi sub-
in Lille. Police discovered EUR 1 500 using fraudulent documents, and the machine gun, 3 kg of the homemade
in small denominations on his person, pair formed a friendship after sharing explosive triacetone triperoxide (TATP)
and in his room found 1 563 g of the same cell for 2 months. It was drying in a cupboard, a homemade
cannabis, EUR 5 595 in cash and inside prison that MM was radicalised, grenade, a GoPro camera and an
weighing scales. MM claimed he was in part mentored by CB, a convert to Islamic State flag. Even in such cases
dealing drugs to pay off his debts: ‘I’m Islam who had been involved with of prison radicalisation, the key point
under threat, I have to pay off debts radical networks since 2007. Their is not necessarily the criminal offence
because I was robbed, and the thieves commitment to jihadism continued behind the conviction — be it for drugs
took away a lot of cannabis and after their release, culminating in or not — but the circumstances within
money’ (La Voix du Nord, 2013). It was a plan to carry out an attack in France. prison that led them to engage with
his 12th conviction. It was disrupted in March 2017, a week extremist ideas and networks.
before the French presidential election. Source: Basra (2019).
nationalist and separatist terrorist groups (5) (Basra, 2019). includes the Police Service of Northern Ireland, HM Revenue
For example, long-standing overlaps have been noted in and Customs, and the United Kingdom’s National Crime
Northern Ireland, where both republican (Europol, 2019f) Agency. Over the 2017/18 financial year, the Task Force
and loyalist groups have sought to either accommodate seized an estimated EUR 67 000 (GBP 58 000) worth of
or eradicate the drug trade. In contrast to the jihadists in drugs (OCTF, 2018, p. 68), although it is unknown how
Europe described above, the operations of these groups, much of this was directly related to paramilitary activity,
which include controlling or ‘taxing’ the drug trade, are or what the quantities or types of drugs were.
much more akin to those of terrorist organisations such as
the Taliban, or to organised criminality, with some groups The Northern Ireland Executive has similarly acknowledged
existing as what might be described as ‘hybrid criminal the convergence between paramilitaries and organised
terrorist groups’ and others having completely transformed crime. Its 2016 Executive Action Plan followed on from
into OCGs (Makarenko, 2012). The impact of these activities the Fresh Start Agreement. The plan stated that tackling
includes conflict between criminals and paramilitaries and organised crime should be an ‘integral part’ of the fight
internal tensions within paramilitary groups, both of which against ‘Northern Ireland related terrorism’ (Northern
lead to violence, which in turn may lead to alienation of the Ireland Executive, 2016, p. 18).
very communities these groups claim to represent.
The PKK, a paramilitary group based in the Middle East —
The 2015 Stormont Agreement A Fresh Start included primarily in south-eastern Turkey, northern Syria and northern
commitments to ‘challenge all paramilitary activity and Iraq — has been reported to be involved in organised crime
associated criminality’, and — recognising the cross-border (Europol, 2019f; Roth and Sever, 2007), with few examples of
nature of organised criminal activity — to establish a Joint its engagement in the drug trade in the EU (Basra, 2019).
Agency Task Force, led by officers from the Police Service
of Northern Ireland, An Garda Síochána, the Revenue The limited and patchy information available on the
Commissioners, and HM Revenue and Customs (Northern interaction between terrorism and drug markets in the
Ireland Executive, 2015, p. 15). Similarly, the Paramilitary EU makes it challenging to obtain a clear understanding
Crime Task Force was also established in October 2017 and of the importance and nature of the threat. In addition,
most attention has been paid to links to jihadist groups
and activities, which may lead to the activities of other
(5) Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups are motivated by
nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion. Separatist groups seek to carve out
groups being overlooked. For example, several countries
a state for themselves from a larger country or annex territory from one in Europe are experiencing a resurgence of the far right
country to that of another. Left- or right-wing ideological elements are not
uncommon in these types of groups. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), the
and an increase in associated violence and terrorism
Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Kurdish PKK fall into this (Europol, 2019f). Most of this appears to be perpetrated by
category.
36
I
individuals, but there is some evidence of organised activity. illegal movement of persons across international borders or
For example, in Germany, in 2017, guns, ammunition and the facilitation of irregular stay in a country. It differs from
illicit drugs were seized at a paramilitary training camp for trafficking in human beings in that the migrants are willing
far-right extremists. According to newspaper reports, at participants. However, smuggled migrants are vulnerable
least 13 known suspects were involved, including some to coercion and exploitation, for example because of their
from an internationally active group (Dearden, 2017). illegal status in the destination country or because they
become indebted to the smugglers.
In general it appears that currently there are no strong,
systematic links between these activities beyond those
arising from shared underlying factors or situations, as Trafficking in human beings
noted in the previous report. However, many EU Member
States maintain a functional separation between their Trafficking in human beings encompasses sexual
anti-drug agencies and their counter-terrorism agencies, exploitation, forced labour or services, including begging
which can potentially lead to crossovers being overlooked. and practices similar to slavery, forced criminality, and
The variability in the extent and nature of the interactions the removal of organs. It is often committed within the
between drug markets and terrorism is also a challenge framework of organised crime, generating high profits.
and there is a need to better understand the different The connections between drugs and trafficking in human
profiles of those involved. It is an area that requires more beings are yet to be fully understood, but it is clear that
research, but it would build on emerging findings from some exist, although they may be quite limited and
a recent project called PRIME (Preventing, Interdicting opportunistic in nature. Drugs and trafficking in human
and Mitigating Extremism), which was funded by the beings may be interlinked in three broad, sometimes
European Commission. This project, which ended in March overlapping, ways:
2019, aimed to provide an improved understanding of
lone-actor terrorism to inform the design of social and Q when drug trafficking and human trafficking are
physical counter-measures for the prevention of lone-actor conducted by the same OCGs;
radicalisation, the disruption of lone-actor terrorist plots, Q when trafficked individuals are coerced into playing
and the mitigation of terrorist attacks carried out by lone a role in the drug trade;
extremists. Q when drugs play a part in the human-trafficking
process, facilitating and maintaining the exploitation of
In addition, there is a need to develop statistics on terrorist vulnerable individuals.
financing in order to measure trends and assess risks
better. Terrorist financing has been identified as a key Lack of access to reliable data still hampers analysis
threat at the EU level, and concerted efforts are being made and the development of a fuller understanding of the
to monitor and improve the situation. Such efforts include multifaceted nature of the relationship. However, since
the adoption of the Commission Staff Working Document 2016 there has been increased recognition of the potential
(European Commission, 2017a) and the accompanying links between trafficking in human beings and drugs, and
Commission report on the assessment of the risk of money new data sources and case examples have emerged that
laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal shed more light on these interactions.
market and relating to cross-border activities (European
Commission, 2017b). OCGs involved in both drugs and trafficking in human
beings
A recent analysis focusing on the Balkans, a key crossroads
Trafficking in human beings and migrant for crime, illustrates the links between drugs and human
smuggling trafficking that arise when both activities are carried out
by the same OCGs (Kemp, 2017). The area provides
There are differences between trafficking in human beings many opportunities for such linkages. It has a history of
and migrant smuggling and the terms should not be used conflict and associated instability, is situated on the main
interchangeably as the legal consequences are different heroin-trafficking route from Afghanistan to Europe, the
(European Commission, 2018c). Trafficking in human Balkan route (see Chapter 4), and is a transit corridor and
beings is a crime against the person which involves using destination region for trafficked individuals.
threats, force and coercion to exploit vulnerable people in
order to make financial profit. The exploited individuals may Among the OCGs active in this area, Albanian-speaking
be traded by OCGs as commodities, sometimes, but not groups are prominent. After the Kosovo war at the end
necessarily, internationally. Migrant smuggling refers to the of the 20th century, some Albanian nationals took the
37
opportunity to obtain refugee status by claiming to be and Nigeria. Authorities in Palermo have noted that ‘Cosa
Kosovar, which then allowed them to move outside their Nostra tolerates the Nigerian Mafia in Palermo. Cosa Nostra
territories, creating a new diaspora all over Europe. Within allowed the Nigerians to organise a subordinate structure.
these communities, criminal elements have been able They were tolerated as long as they didn’t come outside
to operate. The term ‘Albanian-speaking’ is important, their perimeter’ (Pemberton Ford, 2017, p. 48).
as it encompasses a range of different nationalities that
share the same language and ethnic background, mainly Involvement of coerced individuals in drug production and
Albanian nationals, but also Albanian speakers originally trafficking
from Kosovo (6), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, The use of labour exploitation at cannabis cultivation sites
North Macedonia and various satellite communities within is a well-known phenomenon and remains an issue in some
Europe. It should be noted that borders and nationality are Member States. OCGs exploit vulnerable victims, in most
not relevant to the operations of these complex networks cases male irregular migrants, to work at indoor cultivation
of Albanian-speaking criminals. The main activities of sites. The victims are typically kept at the cultivation site,
Albanian-speaking OCGs in the EU extend to organised often in very poor conditions, to look after the cannabis
property crime, facilitation of irregular migration, trafficking plants. The victims are often held in debt bondage and
of a range of drugs, money laundering, trafficking in human forced to pay off debts of thousands of euros incurred for
beings and document fraud. Albanian-speaking OCGs are facilitation services in the context of irregular migration.
involved in cocaine trafficking, are highly active in cannabis EU nationals are also exploited at cannabis cultivation sites
distribution (and more recently production) and play roles with little or no pay. Some OCGs rely on teams composed
in support of long-established Turkish heroin activity (see of victims of trafficking in human beings to harvest large-
Chapter 4). They are also showing signs of lower-level scale cultivation sites.
independent wholesale supply in established markets for
cannabis and cocaine. A high level of ruthlessness and a Vietnamese OCGs continue to exploit irregular migrants
reputation for violence are reported to be features in their of Vietnamese origin by forcing them to work at indoor
operating model (Saggers, 2019). cannabis cultivation sites in various Member States.
Chinese OCGs are increasingly involved in the cultivation
Cases of transcontinental ties between drug-related of herbal cannabis in the EU and also frequently rely on the
organised crime groups for the transport of Nigerians to exploitation of Chinese or Vietnamese migrants. Albanian
Europe for exploitation have also been reported. A report nationals are also exploited at indoor cannabis cultivation
published by the Cambridge Centre for Applied Research sites operated by Albanian OCGs.
in Human Trafficking identifies a Nigerian criminal network
named Black Axe operating in Palermo in Italy — a centre A striking feature of human exploitation is the involvement
of activity for the Cosa Nostra, Sicily’s own Mafia — and of children, estimated to make up more than 30 % of
across the EU. The report indicates that this Nigerian all migrants in Europe (UNHCR, 2016; UNICEF, 2016).
criminal network is involved in drug dealing, prostitution The trafficking of Vietnamese children to work at indoor
and the fraudulent transfer of money between Europe cannabis cultivation sites was discussed in the 2016 EU
Drug Markets Report (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016), and
cases continue to be reported. However, the increasing
(6) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line numbers of asylum seekers and migrants arriving in
with UNSCR 1244/99 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of
independence. the EU in recent years has given rise to other examples
CASE STUDY 3
Child exploitation by OCGs in Sweden

In some cities in Sweden (Stockholm, applications have been rejected children involved in drug dealing live
Gothenburg and Uppsala), criminal — in particular young Afghan on the streets, making them even
gangs have been recruiting males — to sell drugs. Criminal gangs more vulnerable and exposed to
unaccompanied asylum-seeking usually force them to join by using recruitment.
children or children whose asylum threats and violence. Many of such
Source: FRA (2019).
38
I
(Case study 3). Given the very limited income-generating perpetrators. Nevertheless, the recent review of action in
options available to them, they have been found to engage this area found that many countries still highlighted this
in illegal activities to pay smugglers, including drug as a challenging area (European Commission, 2018a).
dealing and theft. A recent analysis of sexual exploitation Among the factors that make it difficult to identify victims
of migrant children in Greece highlighted a cascade of correctly and provide appropriate support are that victims
socio-psychological consequences evidenced by affected and perpetrators may come from similar ethnic groups,
children, including both drug use and dealing (Digidiki and specialist drugs teams may not be aware of the potential
Bhabha, 2017). The report documents the trajectories of for links to trafficking in human beings, and exploited
these children whereby sexual exploitation leads them individuals may fear prosecution because they were initially
to take up an active role in the drug trade, an ‘important illegal migrants or are drug users with a criminal record.
qualitative change of scope’ (Digidiki and Bhabha, 2017, Although data that would allow assessment of progress
p. 25). Furthermore, as a result of this kind of exploitation, in this area are not generally collected (see, for example,
vulnerable children may engage in coping behaviours, such Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group, 2018), the scale of the
as drug use. issue is illustrated by a report in The Times (Swerling, 2018)
that between 2012 and 2017 more than 1 133 Vietnamese
OCGs exploit victims of trafficking as drug couriers on children were arrested in the United Kingdom for offences,
commercial flights, buses or trains travelling both to and including drug-related ones.
within the EU. In most cases these victims are female.
Victims exploited as drug couriers are both EU and non-EU Drugs as a means of controlling trafficked individuals
nationals. Victims originating from West Africa, particularly Illicit drugs may also be used in a number of different
Nigerian nationals, and North Africa are most frequently ways by OCGs involved in trafficking in human beings
encountered. and exploitation (Shelley, 2012). They are used to recruit
victims for sexual exploitation. In addition, addictive drugs,
Other examples involve trafficking and coercion associated such as cocaine, heroin and benzodiazepines, are also
with the drug trade at the national level. For example, used to maintain victims’ dependence on their exploiters.
the ‘county lines’ model of drug supply has become However, drugs may also be used in other forms of human
widespread in the United Kingdom. Involving drug supply exploitation; for example, stimulants may be used in forced
from a central base to one or more supply areas using labour to enable victims to work for longer hours.
dedicated mobile phone lines to take orders, it makes
extensive use of the exploitation of vulnerable people
(NCA, 2019). These include recruiting vulnerable children, Migrant smuggling
for example in the care of social services or excluded
from school, and adults. The vulnerable adults are often ‘Migrant smuggling’ refers to the illegal movement of
people dependent on drugs, who may allow the use of their persons across international borders for financial gain. It
accommodation for drug dealing (known as ‘cuckooing’) differs from trafficking in human beings in that the migrants
in exchange for drugs or to pay off drug debts but then are willing participants who are paying to be smuggled.
are forced to continue engaging in drug dealing. This However, since smuggled migrants are vulnerable to
exploitative business model allows criminal groups to coercion and exploitation, for example because of their
expand to new areas at low cost and minimal risk, as they illegal status in the destination country or because they
do not have to pay the vulnerable individuals whom they become indebted to the smugglers, the smuggling of
exploit, who are also the most exposed to the risk of arrest. migrants may lead to trafficking and exploitation. In these
cases drugs may be involved, such as when the migrant is
The previous report raised the issue of trafficked individuals coerced into smuggling drugs while en route to their final
being prosecuted for their involvement in the illicit drug destination (Ventrella, 2017).
trade despite the coercive nature of their involvement
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2016). It noted that attempts Many of the routes along which migrants are smuggled into
have been made to address this in EU Directive 2011/36 the EU are also known drug-trafficking corridors. However,
on preventing and combating trafficking of human there do not appear to be any structural, sustained or
beings, which came into force in 2013. This includes widespread links between drug trafficking and migrant
a non-punishment principle stating that victims should smuggling. Although these criminal activities coincide in
not be punished for crimes they committed as a direct individual cases, these are not part of an emerging pattern
consequence of trafficking, which is intended to safeguard or trend. Some maritime vessels that were used by migrant
the human rights of victims and to encourage them to smugglers were previously recorded as suspect vessels
act as witnesses in criminal proceedings against the in drug-trafficking investigations. However, their use for
39
migrant smuggling does not typically coincide with drug Firearms trafficking
trafficking.
Links between the illicit trade in firearms and drug markets
There are, however, some opportunistic links arising take two main forms. The first is when OCGs are engaged in
from the geographical proximity of the activities as well the supply of both commodities, reviewed below. Secondly,
as shared logistical and other needs (see Case study 4). firearms may be used by OCGs as part of their drug market-
For example, both make use of ‘facilitators’ who provide related activities — this is covered in Chapter 2. However,
false documentation, act as guides and scouts, provide the distinction between these two forms is not always clear;
transport, accommodation and tickets, and bribe border OCGs that traffic both firearms and drugs are also likely to
guards. According to data provided by Europol, many such use firearms in the course of their drug-trafficking activities
facilitators engage in polycriminality, including trafficking in (Case study 5).
human beings (20 %), trafficking drugs (15 %) and property
crime (23 %). At the global level, the importance of reducing illicit
arms flows is also acknowledged in the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development, Goal 16 (United Nations,
Trade in other illicit goods 2015), and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) has begun gathering data on firearms trafficking,
The possible links and interaction between the trade its trends and its modi operandi, including combined
in drugs and other illicit goods have been noted in the trafficking with illicit drugs (UNODC Working Group on
previous edition of the report (EMCDDA and Europol, Firearms, 2018). However, no systematic monitoring of
2016), based on the similarities of criminal ‘business firearms and links to drugs exists at present in Europe.
models’, supporting expertise and infrastructures in these Nevertheless, open source information monitoring can
areas. The 2016 report, however, highlighted a knowledge provide some information. Between April 2017 and
gap. Since the last edition, evidence has been gathered March 2018, 12 seizures were identified, where firearms
that begins to address this gap, and polycriminality among were being trafficked with heroin, and 19 with cocaine
OCGs highlighted (Europol, 2019b). (see Chapter 9 for full methodology). As an example,
CASE STUDY 4
Smuggling of migrants and cannabis across the Mediterranean Sea

An OCG from Morocco used jet skis migrants who had been smuggled with by Moroccans, mainly to transport
to smuggle migrants and cannabis falsified documents from the Spanish Moroccan males, most of whom
across the Mediterranean Sea to autonomous city of Ceuta, on the north have relatives in the EU who pay
Spain. The group was dismantled coast of Africa, to mainland Spain, for their transfer. Although in terms
in a joint action day by the Spanish crossing the Strait of Gibraltar, which of migratory impact the number of
National Police and the Civil Guard, separates Europe and Africa by only migrants being transferred with this
with Europol supporting them on 14.3 km. The criminals charged the type of asset is relatively low (one to
the spot with a mobile office and migrants EUR 4 000 and an additional three migrants, plus one skipper per jet
a Universal Forensic Extraction EUR 500 if they wanted to be housed ski), the number of incidents involving
Device — a stand-alone mobile in Spain. jet skis has sharply increased in the
forensic kit that can extract data from past few years.
mobile phones. In total, 19 people The criminal organisation used the
were detained and 11.6 kg of drugs same modus operandi for trafficking The criminal intelligence development
and over EUR 15 000 in cash were cannabis from Morocco to Spain. of this case was carried out in
seized. According to an intelligence report the framework of Europol’s Joint
issued by the European Border Operational Team Mare, a specialised
The OCG was made up of Moroccan and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), team of experts, hosted at Europol’s
citizens who were residing in various smuggling migrants on jet skis is headquarters.
EU countries, mainly France, Italy and a modus operandi specific to the
Spain. They transported and sheltered Strait of Gibraltar and used exclusively Source: Europol (2018b).
40
I
in September 2018, two Polish men were intercepted at Q There is some overlap between OCGs involved in the
Dover in the United Kingdom in an attempt to smuggle trafficking of firearms and of drugs via the Western
20 handguns, 1 000 rounds of ammunition and a variety Balkans — a region that remains a significant source
of drugs (approximately 300 kg methamphetamine, 50 kg of affordable, illegal firearms and also a key transit
ketamine, 50 kg cocaine and 10 kg heroin) into the country region for heroin and cannabis smuggled to the EU and
concealed within the stated cargo of photocopier paper elsewhere in the region. In some cases, illegal firearms
(NCA, 2018a). are exchanged for drugs in the region.
The trafficking of firearms is often a supplementary source Transnational organised crime networks involved in the
of income for OCGs that are primarily involved in other large-scale trafficking of cannabis across the Mediterranean
criminal activities, and the drug trade appears to be Sea are thought to be also involved in firearms trafficking.
a significant factor in the proliferation of illicit firearms in Vessels involved in the trafficking of drugs from North Africa
the EU. Within the EU there are a number of OCGs known to the EU are believed to be also involved in the trafficking
to be engaged in both drugs and firearms trafficking. of firearms and explosives to conflict regions, such as Syria
and Libya. The OCGs involved in this activity are likely to be
Q Dutch OCGs have been known to supply both firearms highly polycriminal and involved in trafficking various illegal
and wholesale quantities of various types of drugs to commodities.
OCGs based in other Member States.
Q Seizures of drug shipments destined for the United The trafficking of firearms is also linked to drug trafficking
Kingdom repeatedly also involve the seizure of from South America to the EU. Firearms are trafficked to
firearms. South America from Europe by OCGs originating from the
Q Outlaw motorcycle gangs, present in almost all EU Western Balkans region, which are heavily involved in drug
countries, are known to use existing criminal routes to trafficking and have established a permanent presence
traffic firearms and drugs, and are also heavily involved in key locations in South America to facilitate this activity.
in the trafficking of firearms to and within the EU. The price of firearms in some parts of South America
The firearms trafficked by outlaw motorcycle gangs exceeds the price in the Western Balkans by up to 10
are primarily intended for distribution to their own times and makes the trafficking of firearms from Europe
subsidiaries rather than to supply other OCGs. to countries such as Brazil a highly profitable opportunity.
International operations such as the one described below
CASE STUDY 5
Operation Escalade: illicit firearms, anti-surveillance and violence

In December 2017 nine men pleaded sub-machine guns, in concealed sophisticated methods, painstakingly
guilty to a variety of charges linked to compartments in a fleet of cars. engineered to evade detection, to
a sophisticated OCG mainly engaged The gang used a vast array of anti- conceal and export large amounts
in the importation of large quantities surveillance technology to keep ahead of cash tightly wrapped in tape and
of cocaine and the trafficking of illegal of the police. Officers recovered hidden in bundles.
firearms to the United Kingdom. listening devices and mobile phone
A cache of firearms, seized in a raid at jammers of the type normally used by The violence used by the group to
a garage in Glasgow, was estimated only the police and security services. maintain their operation eventually led
to have a resale value of EUR 45 000 The group also worked from a network to their downfall. A gun recovered by
(GBP 40 000). of rented premises, often industrial police was linked back to an abduction
units in out-of-the-way locations. In and beating committed by the group.
Their activities were recorded over all cases, the premises were rented The group used weapons to enforce
a 4-year period and were believed using false documents. The group set their own drug trade interests, while
to extend overseas. The group aside dedicated phones at several also supplying firearms to other crime
used ingenious techniques to hide of the premises to be used as ‘fake gangs.
guns, ranging from handguns to tenant’ phones. The gang also used
Source: BBC News (2018a).
41
(Case study 6) are another example of the complex ways Medicines that are traded illicitly may enter the supply
in which criminal organisations may link to other groups chain and reach the consumer in different ways:
outside Europe in mutually beneficial relationships that
facilitate their different operations. Q they may be diverted from licit use, as is the case when
people who are prescribed opioids or benzodiazepines
sell a proportion of their prescription;
Falsified, counterfeit, substandard and Q they may be stolen from the legitimate supply chain,
unauthorised medicines including manufacturers, wholesalers, pharmacies or
prescribers;
Globally, the sale of falsified, counterfeit, substandard and Q they may be obtained fraudulently through corrupt
unauthorised medicines is big business and a serious and healthcare professionals or using forged prescriptions;
growing public health problem, which has been fuelled Q they may be purchased from online pharmacies that do
by globalisation. The combination of modern transport not insist on a prescription;
networks, the internet, low labour costs, and the rapid Q they may be produced specifically for the illicit market;
growth of the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, Q they may be manufactured by OCGs utilising their own
particularly in China and India, has facilitated the clandestine laboratories and production lines;
development of this large market. The potential for huge Q counterfeit medicines may be imported by OCGs from
profits has also led to the involvement of OCGs, although outside the EU, then repacked and distributed within
the relationship between these groups and the drug market the EU;
remains poorly understood. Q some OCGs sell their own brands of pharmaceuticals,
posing as reputable companies selling legitimate
Alongside the risks to health posed by using such medicines.
medicines, consumers also face the risk of being victims
of fraud by buying from this market. This risk may be Although strict regulations and enforcement in EU
compounded by the poor security of many online shops, Member States mean that counterfeit medicines are not
which could lead to consumers having their personal as common as in some other parts of the world, there has
and financial information stolen or exposed. Although been a considerable growth in the trade in counterfeit
information on the extent of these problems is limited, medicinal products in recent years. The number of seizures
there are signs of both increasing misuse and greater of counterfeit medicines and other products by EU customs
availability of these substances on the illicit drug market. authorities increased from 1 554 in 2015 to 1 835 in 2017,
although the number of items seized actually decreased
from 895 324 to 568 122 (Europol and EUIPO, 2019).
CASE STUDY 6
Exchange of cocaine for weapons

In November 2018, the US Drug linked to al-Qaeda and promised the America to the EU. Various terrorist
Enforcement Administration (DEA) broker the use of smuggling routes and extremist groups control territory
in cooperation with Croatian law passing through territory controlled along the land route from West Africa
enforcement authorities disrupted by the group in the Sahara Desert to Europe, and South American cartels
an OCG proposing to trade cocaine for his drug-smuggling business. are known to have previously made
for surface-to-air missiles and other The exchange of cocaine for the arrangements with these groups to
advanced military-grade weapons. The weapons was to take place in Croatia. ensure protection for their shipments
Colombian broker was heavily involved A sample of 1 kg of cocaine was seized transported along these routes. The
in the trafficking of cocaine to the EU in the operation in Zagreb. cartels make payment to these groups
via West Africa and allegedly intended in money, drugs or weapons.
to pass on the weapons to the terrorist West Africa is a known transit region
group Ansar al-Dine. This group is for cocaine trafficked from South Source: Petrušić and Dešković (2018).
42
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This reflects the growing emphasis on trade in counterfeit suitably equipped laboratories. In some cases, counterfeit
medicines using parcel and postal services. medicines are produced by OCGs that are also involved in
the manufacturing and trade of synthetic drugs, such as
Most illicit drug monitoring systems were not designed to MDMA, LSD and ketamine.
identify signals of misuse of medicines, so the available
data are patchy. Nevertheless, data are available from There is a continuous expansion of unauthorised and
the EU Early Warning System, and recent developments unregulated online pharmacies, selling a range of
in EMCDDA annual data collections mean that some counterfeit, illicit and substandard pharmaceutical
substances are now included. In particular, there is now products. Such online pharmacies capitalise on
more evidence concerning opioid medications, such as increasing self-medication and consumer demand for
tramadol, which is presented in Chapter 4. The diversion cheap medicines including performance and image-
of methadone and buprenorphine from opioid substitution enhancing drugs. Some of these online shops advertise
treatment is reported to be a significant problem in some with the slogan ‘original preparation at low prices’, and
countries, accounting for a non-trivial proportion of overall are operated by criminal groups. In recent years, law
drug-related harms. Data from both individual studies enforcement authorities have also detected a growing
and routine monitoring suggest that, besides the opioid number of counterfeit medicines in postal packages, often
analgesics, the other main types of medicines misused in ordered through social media platforms or other online
Europe are benzodiazepines (for example alprazolam or marketplaces (see Case study 7). There are also indications
Xanax) and ‘Z-drugs’ (hypnotic drugs such as zolpidem that counterfeit medicines are being traded using mobile
and zopiclone). Users of benzodiazepines may develop instant messaging platforms.
dependence on them, and their use together with alcohol
and opioids increases the risk of drug-related death. Different approaches are needed to tackle these diverse
phenomena. Some of them focus on reducing demand
Not only are benzodiazepines increasingly being sold on by increasing the awareness of potential problems and
illicit markets, but in a number of EU countries concerns by improving prescribing practice to prevent dependence
have recently been raised that the availability of extremely developing or the need for topping up. Similarly, good
cheap illicit benzodiazepines, often counterfeit, on the practice in medical waste disposal can reduce the risk
internet may be leading to the increased use of these drugs of the diversion of used fentanyl patches. However,
by vulnerable teenagers, often in combination with alcohol partnerships with industry, the development of regulatory
(Byrne, 2018). This pattern of use is reported to be linked to controls, and customs and policing activity are all likely
behavioural problems, as well as posing a risk of overdose, to be appropriate responses to the involvement of
particularly when using counterfeit versions, which may OCGs, which are more likely to divert larger quantities of
be of variable dosages and may contain contaminants. medicines by infiltrating the supply chain or importing
Of particular concern is that some contain highly potent falsified, counterfeit and unauthorised medicines from
fentanyl derivatives. outside the EU.
There are different modi operandi when it comes to the The EMCDDA and the European Medicines Agency
production of counterfeit medicines. In some cases, routinely exchange information on the misuse of medicines
the medicines and packages are produced in the same through the EU Early Warning System. The EMCDDA also
clandestine laboratory, while in other cases the production collects information on psychoactive medicines through
is done at separate sites or even by separate OCGs. In one its ongoing drug-monitoring activities. Nonetheless, the
case, an OCG was found to send samples of branding to limitations of current monitoring systems mean that
China, where stickers can be produced on a large scale some potentially important developments in this area are
and sent back to be placed on the packaging. Finally, difficult to observe; for example, the misuse of tramadol,
there are also filler sites, where medicines and packaging gabapentin and pregabalin appears to be increasing,
manufactured elsewhere are put together. but this is difficult to detect in the routine data sources
available (Griffiths et al., 2014).
One of the trends observed in this area is the importation
of raw materials for local production. In recent years there
have been regular seizures of pill presses, mixers, blister Alcohol and cigarettes
machines, bottles and labels. Raw materials are illegally
brought into the EU from countries such as India and Within the EU there are large markets for alcohol and
China, usually under a fictitious brand and with forged cigarettes, which OCGs can exploit for profit. Alcohol and
documentation. Illicit medicines are then manufactured in cigarettes are subject to excise duty upon production
43
in, or import to, the EU. Avoiding such duties provides primarily from eastern European countries, these OCGs are
OCGs with one such opportunity for profit (excise fraud). present in established distribution hubs in Member States
Another is through the sale of counterfeit goods. OCGs use such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and the United
various modi operandi to avoid excise duties and generate Kingdom, and maintain links to the main production regions
significant profits, selling both genuine and counterfeit outside the EU.
excise goods at lower prices than their licit equivalents.
Excise fraud deprives the Member States and the EU
directly of significant revenue, which could be invested
in infrastructure projects, regional development or other
ventures benefiting EU citizens and businesses. Counterfeit Harms to individuals, families and
goods, which may contain dangerous substances, on the neighbourhoods
other hand can expose consumers to serious harms.
Counterfeiting is identified in a number of European Illicit drug markets have wide-ranging impacts on society
countries as a type of serious organised crime — one that and can scar neighbourhoods and the people who live
includes violence, illegal immigrant labourers and children in them. The illegal nature of the drug market means
who are forced into it (see Local Government Association, that those who use drugs expose themselves to a broad
2015; Scottish Government, 2016, p. 8). Often counterfeiting range of harms, but the harms extend beyond the people
schemes are initiated using money invested by criminal who use drugs. Violence stemming from the drug trade,
entrepreneurs, including drug traffickers, in the counterfeit including homicide, contributes to feelings of insecurity
alcohol or cigarette business, as risks are comparatively low within neighbourhoods, as does the operation of open
(Antonopoulos et al., 2018). Since OCGs involved in drug drug markets. This was identified as a key issue in the
trafficking often launder money through businesses such previous report (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016) and may
as nightclubs, bars and restaurants — venues that could include gang-related violence and intimidation, which
provide opportunities for benefiting from illicit supplies may extend to people who use drugs and to their families
of alcohol and tobacco — some links might be expected. and friends. A further issue is the environmental impact
However, at present the evidence for this is limited. of the drug trade, in particular that related to drug
production. Production within Europe may directly harm the
There are examples of OCGs involved in drug trafficking environment through the dumping of waste materials. In
across the EU engaging in the smuggling of illicit tobacco addition, drug production in other regions of the world may
products and alcohol as well as wholesale quantities of cause environmental degradation through, for example,
cannabis resin and cocaine. In addition to these smuggling deforestation and erosion, and these harms have an
activities, these OCGs also move criminal proceeds across indirect impact in the EU through migration, destabilisation
Europe and to destinations in South America. Originating and climate change.
CASE STUDY 7
Operation Pangea XI: illicit medicines sold online

During an international week of and the seizure of EUR 12.3 million dysfunction pills, hypnotic and
action (9-16 October 2018) in (USD 14 million) worth of potentially sedative agents, anabolic steroids,
Operation Pangea XI, coordinated dangerous pharmaceuticals. slimming pills and medicines for
and supported jointly by Interpol and treating HIV, Parkinson’s disease and
Europol, police, customs and health Almost 1 million packages were diabetes. More than 110 000 medical
regulatory authorities from 116 inspected, with 500 tonnes of illicit devices were also seized.
countries targeted the illicit online sale pharmaceuticals seized worldwide,
of medicines and medical products, including anti-inflammatory Source: Europol and EUIPO (2019).
resulting in 859 arrests worldwide medication, painkillers, erectile
44
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Drug-related homicide
Potential mechanisms underpinning the drug-
violence nexus
The extent and nature of drug-related homicide
Psychopharmacological — Direct relationship
between drugs and violence where the violent crime
One of the major manifestations of drug markets is serious
involves drug use by those involved.
violence and homicide, which, like drug-related crime more
generally, may be psychopharmacological (committed
Economic-compulsive — Indirect relationship
while under the influence), economic-compulsive (to gain
between drugs and violence: some drug users
money or goods to obtain drugs) or systemic (part of
engage in economically oriented violent crime in
the operation of the drug market) (Goldstein, 1985). The
order to support costly drug use.
extent and nature of drug-related violence and homicide,
in particular systemic violence, are likely to vary between
Systemic — Refers to the aggressive patterns of
countries and over time in response to differences in
interaction within the system of drug markets.
the way drug markets operate. Homicide cases range
from those conducted as a ‘crime as a service’ (as in Source: Goldstein (1985).
Case study 8) to ones that may be incidental to low-level
dealing (as illustrated by Case study 9). However, although
homicides are well recorded internationally, there is very
little information on the extent and nature of the link can help identify trends and new threats in order to plan
between homicide and the involvement of organised crime and implement proportionate responses. However, there
in the supply and distribution of illicit drugs, and there is are considerable inconsistencies in the data available on
currently no systematic collection of data on the topic. drug-related homicide in Europe. For example, just 10 of the
This was identified as an important gap in available data 28 EU Member States, Norway and Turkey systematically
and knowledge in the previous EU Drug Markets Report prepare data on this topic. This hampers efforts to tackle
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2016). the issue, as this information is necessary for designing
prevention efforts and monitoring their impact.
Addressing drug-related homicide is important given the
severity of such an event, affecting individuals, families and Since the importance of this information was highlighted
communities. Understanding the extent and nature of the in the previous EU Drug Markets Report (EMCDDA and
issue is essential for this to be done effectively. Homicide Europol, 2016), a programme of work has been undertaken
is an extreme expression of violence and the most likely to to explore how information on drug-related homicides can
be reported to the police and to be thoroughly investigated. be improved at the European level and more complete
It can also be an indicator of wider drug-related violent and comparable data in this area generated. The initial
crime. Comparing homicide statistics between countries findings already offer an improved understanding of the
CASE STUDY 8
Murder as a service: Stockholm’s Death Patrol

About 20 members of a Swedish the media reports, the gang originates Swedish OCG also trafficked drugs
OCG known as the Death Patrol from a poor immigrant suburb of such as cocaine, cannabis resin and
(Dödspatrullen), specialising in southern Stockholm. It is suspected amphetamine in Sweden, Spain
contract killings on behalf of drug- of being responsible for torturing and and Morocco. Charges against the
trafficking organisations, were arrested killing at least 15 people in Sweden gang members also include money
in coordinated operations in Sweden and Spain since 2016. Many of its laundering and document fraud.
and Spain between December 2018 victims were drug traffickers murdered
and February 2019. The arrestees by order of rival OCGs, including Sources: García Rey and Palmkwist (2018);
Madueño (2019); Ortega Dolz and Sánchez (2018).
are all young Swedish nationals aged Colombian cocaine cartels. In addition
between 20 and 30 years. According to to providing murder as a service, the
45
ramifications of the drugs phenomenon and also highlight related homicides were slightly more likely to take place in
opportunities for improving future monitoring in this area an urban area in all three countries. In the Netherlands and
(de Bont et al., 2018; EMCDDA, 2018a). Sweden, drug-related homicides also took place in public
settings such as parks, public roads, bars, restaurants and
In collaboration with the European Homicide Monitor, hotels more often than other homicides (64 % versus 42 %
which gathers data from Finland, the Netherlands and respectively in the Netherlands and 47 % versus 24 % in
Sweden (Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Norway and Switzerland Sweden). In all three countries, the victims of drug-related
are in the process of joining), a pilot study was conducted homicides were more often male (84 % versus 65 % in
aimed at collecting some standardised comparable data Finland; 82 % versus 55 % in the Netherlands; and 88 %
on homicide. Crucially, a set of drug-related variables versus 65 % in Sweden) and typically younger (about two
were added to the monitor, allowing a re-assessment of thirds in all three countries were under the age of 45)
homicide cases and an initial analysis of the relationship compared with non drug-related homicide victims (the
between drugs and homicide events in selected countries majority of whom were 45 years and over in Finland and
(for fuller details of the pilot study, methodology and Sweden or 35 years and over in the Netherlands).
findings, see EMCDDA, 2019a).
The pilot study found that a similar proportion (about Factors associated with drug-related homicide
50 %) of the homicides committed across the Netherlands
(2012-16), Finland (2014-15) and Sweden (2013-14) for In an exploratory study of contract killings in the
which sufficient information was available were drug related Netherlands, carried out by van Gestel and Verhoeven
(Table 1.2). However, there were differences in the types (2017), drug market control and money emerged as key
of drug-related homicides between the countries. While themes. Killings were identified as serving as instruments
psychopharmacological cases predominated in Finland for ‘compensation’ for failure to pay for or deliver drugs;
(100 %) and Sweden (89 %), in the Netherlands these made for punishment, intimidation and for asserting one’s
up only 24 % of the cases; in contrast, systemic homicides position within the drug market; as a precaution in order
were more frequently found in the Netherlands (63 %) than to avoid becoming a target; or to silence witnesses.
in Finland (13 %) and Sweden (30 %) (see Case study 9). Although no increase in contract killings was noted, the
phenomenon appeared to be changing, involving processes
In general, homicides are committed by a single of specialisation and professionalisation. Crucially, an
perpetrator, but this study found that, in all three countries, increased number of people were available to commit the
drug-related homicides were more likely to involve more crime in return for cash, there was increased use of heavy
than one perpetrator than other homicides; about one automatic firearms (noted to have become the standard for
in four drug-related homicides involved more than one contract killing), and perpetrators were more likely to cover
perpetrator per case compared with about one in 10 for up or avoid leaving evidence.
non drug-related homicides.
Analysis of global homicide trends has shown that in
There was also a difference in the settings in which drug- 2003/04 rates began falling (Eisner, 2008). However,
related homicides and other homicides took place. Drug- between 2014 and 2016, a number of countries, including
Table 1.2
Drug-related homicide in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden
Type Country (years studied)
Finland (2014-15) Netherlands (2012-16) Sweden (2013-14)
Psychopharmacological, N (% of drug-related cases) 83 (100) 44 (24) 66 (89)
Economic-compulsive, N (% of drug-related cases) 2 (2) 13 (7) 10 (14)
Systemic, N (% of drug-related cases) 11 (13) 116 (63) 22 (30)
Drug-related homicides, N (% of total) 83 (49) 186 (51) 74 (49)
Non drug-related homicides, N (% of total) 87 (51) 181 (49) 78 (51)
Total 170 367 152
Drug involvement unknown 0 277 16
Note: Because categories of drug-related homicides are not mutually exclusive, percentages do not add up to 100 %. These figures need to be read also in context
of the population size of the three countries.
46
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CASE STUDY 9
Systemic homicide in Europe

A drugs war broke out in 2012 between greater severity than usual in Europe beheading of Nabil Amzieb and to be
Moroccan gangs, which brought a new and closer to the level of violence seen the right-hand man of Naoufal Fassih,
level of gangland violence to Europe. in countries such as Mexico. Since who was arrested in Dublin in 2016 in
It started when a Dutch gang known then, the feud has resulted in at least a safe house operated by the Kinahan
as the Turtles stole cocaine worth 16 killings in Belgium, the Netherlands gang, key players in the drug trade.
EUR 15.6 million (GBP 14 million), and Spain. In response there has been Vega and his Moroccan associates in
part of a larger shipment — much of it an unprecedented level of cooperation the Netherlands had become closely
destined for the British market. between police forces across Europe in involved with the Kinahan gang,
order to identify and bring to justice the illustrating the global interactions
The torso of a 23-year-old Moroccan, key people responsible for the violence. between OCGs in the drug trade, the
Nabil Amzieb, was discovered in international impact of the market
a burning car, and his head was found Richard Eduardo Riquelme Vega was and the importance of cross-border
on a busy street in Amsterdam early arrested in a Santiago hotel in October collaboration by law enforcement
one morning. This was seen as a clear 2017 after flying into Chile’s capital agencies.
message to authorities and rival from Dubai. He is believed to be at the
gangsters that this was a gang war of top of the gang responsible for the Sources: Gangsterism Out (2017); Henley (2016);
Pieters (2016); Tallant (2017).
Canada, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the detailed information about drug-related homicides, such
US, recorded increases ranging between 3 % and 22 % as incorporating tactical intelligence (e.g. blood tests)
(Home Office, 2018). Although further observations are available at the police level, and reports on the use of
necessary before an upward trend can be confirmed, it alcohol and drugs at the time of offending.
has been suggested that these recent changes may be at
least partly due to drug markets. Important market shifts Extending the number of countries monitoring drug-related
that have been suggested as possibly contributing to the homicides, and incorporating this into analysis of drug
rise in serious violence include an increase in synthetic markets, would be valuable for identifying changes in
cannabinoids, linked to serious violence in prison and the level and nature of the use of extreme violence. For
homeless communities (Ralphs et al., 2017); a rise in coca example, anecdotal evidence suggests that Dutch systemic
cultivation in Colombia, the main supplier of cocaine for homicide in particular, and Dutch organised crime in
Europe; and higher (crack) cocaine purity. Another market general, has become more brutal over the years. Recent
development is the phenomenon of county lines, in which observations indicate that this dynamic could be explained
drug-selling gangs from the capital city, possibly driven by by highly fragmented, occasional criminal networks
excess supply, seek new markets in provincial areas. The (rather than the classic hierarchical criminal network
2017 National Crime Agency threat assessment on county structure) involving less-experienced young men (rather
lines showed that nearly every police force in England and than ‘professional’ hitmen) as perpetrators (Stoker and
Wales has been affected to some degree. The involvement Thijssen, 2018; Voskuil, 2018). What further characterises
of vulnerable people and, generally, the more violent nature these cases is the use of highly lethal automatic weapons,
of county lines drug-selling gangs than local drug dealers and the relatively reckless way in which homicides are
have been noted (Coomber and Moyle, 2018; NCA, 2017). committed — resulting in bystanders being killed, children
witnessing their parents’ homicide and several cases of
The pilot study demonstrated that the European Homicide mistaken identity.
Monitor can capture the role of drugs in European
homicides in a reliable way, although it also highlighted Finally, there should be an exploration of ways to apply
some challenges. The main limitations identified a similar data collection model to other crime areas to
concerned the lack of readily available data sources, better understand the role of drugs. Ultimately such
missing data and intercountry variations in data quality. developments could provide a solid, data-driven basis to
Future research is needed to identify new sources of more inform adequate drug-related policy responses in Europe.
47
Gangs, violence and intimidation the boundaries between national wholesale and local street
dealing (Coomber and Moyle, 2018).
An important area of impact on communities arises from
drug dealing at the local level and the fear arising from It has been argued that the cause of this phenomenon,
the violence and intimidation often used by the different especially in the case of heroin, is the saturation of markets
groups involved in the trade. They may range from loosely in major cities. This would appear a relatively credible
organised local groups of young people to offshoots explanation given recent trends of an ageing heroin-using
of national or international OCGs, with national and population and marginalised inner-city youths increasingly
international connections. associating themselves with gang culture, of which drug
dealing is a component in some countries. The new supply
There is a growing body of research that looks at drug model typically consists of more established ‘elders’
supply from the perspective of gang (or group) processes, recruiting younger (often teenage) associates and sending
which can inform drug enforcement practice and policy. them to provincial areas to act as dealers, while a dedicated
Research in Scotland illustrates that early offenders in phone line is established in the city (Spicer, 2018). Users in
young street gangs are typically involved in social supply the provincial areas call this line to place orders, which are
and only rarely involved in retail-level drug supply. Over then relayed to the dealers residing in the provincial town.
time these groups may move beyond social supply and This ensures that the provincially based dealers remain
mature into young crime gangs that can penetrate higher dependent on the city-based ‘elders’.
levels of the illicit drug market. Those gangs that are able
to avoid law enforcement action and grow may eventually The phenomenon has become associated with a range of
move on to wholesale buying. If sustained, wholesale harms, such as violence and the exploitation of vulnerable
activity and increased market share create the potential populations, including children. They are discussed in
for development into serious organised crime, including the section on human trafficking and exploitation above.
the adoption of business-like principles. McLean and The city-based drug-dealing groups seek to establish
colleagues noted that gangs have evolved not necessarily themselves and assert a dominant presence in new
to control drug markets but to participate in them and localities through aggression and intimidation. Another
benefit from territorial control (McLean, 2017; McLean et manifestation of the phenomenon is seen in the increasing
al., 2018, 2019). overlap between drug markets and sexual exploitation,
as highlighted in an analysis of the nature of violence in
the Stockholm drug scene (Stallwitz, 2018) and recent
Spread of gang influence and related violence assessments of the impact of organised crime in local
communities in the United Kingdom (Crocker et al., 2017).
In parallel with the traditional model of drug supply, where
local dealers from provincial towns source their drug It is important to note that markets with apparently similar
supply from a nearby city, a new phenomenon of drug structures manifest themselves differently in terms of
supply groups has emerged in some parts of Europe. This operation in different geographical locations, particularly
has been extensively documented in the United Kingdom regarding violence and intimidation. Responses to
(Coomber and Moyle, 2018; NCA, 2017, 2019) but drug market-related violence are discussed in detail in
a targeted data collection exercise in 2018 (EMCDDA and Chapter 9.
Europol; 60 % response rate) identified evidence of similar
phenomena in Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Ireland and
Sweden. These are groups based in major cities, expanding Intimidation
their selling operations to provincial towns and almost
exclusively supplying heroin and crack cocaine. Thus, end Intimidation carried out by those involved in the
users located in these provincial areas are buying directly distribution of drugs can manifest itself as disciplinary
from dealing networks from the big cities. The provincial intimidation, used to enforce social norms within the drug
towns are considered attractive thanks to the direct access distribution hierarchy, to discourage or punish informants,
to local users and potentially new customers and the or as a means to reclaim drug debt, and successional
comparatively weak competition from local drug dealers. intimidation, used to recruit new members or gain control
The phenomenon critically challenges the established over networks or territory. Disciplinary intimidation, much
understanding of drug markets in that the export of illicit of it related to drug debt, has escalated in certain areas,
drugs from big cities to one or more provincial towns blurs related to the particular way in which drug markets operate.
48
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Notably, in Ireland many communities have been severely can be used to produce the different synthetic drugs, and
affected, with major impacts on the health and wellbeing of may involve the use of additional chemicals and processes
individuals, families and communities and the functioning that are inherently dangerous. Furthermore, the waste
of local services and agencies (Murphy et al., 2017). This generated by the production process (which takes place
is reflected at policy level. The current strategy recognises on a fairly large scale in the EU, particularly in Belgium and
the problem and stresses the importance of appropriate the Netherlands) is often dumped, causing environmental
responses in the community (Department of Health, 2017). harm, and risk to public health and safety. The dumping of
waste was highlighted as a growing problem in the 2016
The drug distribution networks in Ireland appear to be edition of this report, and further work has shed more light
structured as a three-tier hierarchy, which has some on this issue.
parallels with the gang model mentioned above in
Scotland: (1) a lower tier of highly disadvantaged young Indoor cannabis cultivation may generate a number of
people generally involved in bullying, assaulting, stealing, health, safety and environmental risks, such as booby traps,
vandalising and spreading fear on behalf of the network; unsafe electric wiring (leading to possible electrocutions
(2) a middle tier of young people typically engaged in and/or fire), toxic atmospheres, toxic liquids (such as
high-risk, low-reward activities, such as transporting, pesticides and fertilisers) in the grow rooms, growing lights
holding or dealing drugs, carrying guns, and conducting emitting harmful ultraviolet radiation, mould and structural
shootings, beatings and serious intimidation; and damage to the buildings used for cultivation (Tytgat et
(3) a higher tier of serious players, often formed around al., 2017). Furthermore, the used materials from indoor
a kinship core, which controls the other tiers (Murphy et cultivation, such as used compost, containers and plant
al., 2017). The framework underlies a number of responses waste, are sometimes dumped or abandoned in remote
(see Chapter 9). The issue was also recently highlighted in places (see Chapter 3).
an assessment commissioned by the Scottish Government
of the experiences of serious organised crime in Scotland The production of 1 kg of MDMA, amphetamine or
(Fraser et al., 2018). methamphetamine is estimated to result in many more
kilograms of waste: 6-10 kg for MDMA and 20-30 kg for
The use of intimidation tactics and violence by Belgian amphetamine or methamphetamine. Containers of the
and Dutch criminal organisations against each other and waste product may be dumped in a forest or field, left in
against accomplices working at the port of Antwerp has abandoned premises, loaded in stolen vehicles or buried
been increasing. Between 2016 and 2017, 20 violent underground. There are also reports of synthetic drug
incidents suspected to be retaliations related to the production waste being mixed with industrial waste and
cocaine trade were registered in Antwerp. Intimidation, disposed of at sea. Recent estimates by the Dutch Police
violence and corruption are increasingly affecting the Academy (Tops et al., 2018) indicate that synthetic drug
port area itself as well as surrounding areas. The risks are production — and by implication the amount of associated
high, but corrupt workers at Belgium’s port of Antwerp waste — in the Netherlands is much higher than had
can earn between EUR 75 000 and EUR 125 000 for been previously assumed. The dismantling and cleaning
each drug shipment they help move safely (Stoker and up of synthetic drug production and waste dump sites
Thijssen, 2018). According to European port authorities, require considerable resources, financial as well as human
OCGs approach port workers in Antwerp and offer up to (Claessens et al., 2019) (see Chapter 6).
EUR 5 000 just for their availability to ‘have a conversation’.
The port workers are easily identifiable by their uniforms. When waste is discharged into the sewers, water treatment
Once a worker has cooperated with the drug-trafficking plants are affected and the drinking water of nearby
OCG, they do not have the option of ceasing their residents is contaminated (Boerman et al., 2017; Boles and
facilitating work lest they and their families become subject Wells, 2010; Schoenmakers et al., 2016). The sewage system
to intimidation. may be blocked by clogging, and the acidity of the waste can
disturb the working process of the water treatment plant
(Schoenmakers et al., 2016; see also Case study 10).
Environmental damage
In other drug-producing regions of the world a range of
The illicit production of plant-based and synthetic drugs other harms are associated with the cultivation of cannabis,
entails a range of environmental harms where it takes coca and opium poppies. In addition to the dumping
place. Synthetic drugs can be produced using a number of waste materials from production, threatening fragile
of different production techniques, involving a range of ecosystems, the extensive cultivation of these crops leads
different chemical precursor substances. Several methods to a range of harms, including deforestation and erosion.
49
These harms, although they affect countries outside of the money involved, whereas some will be indifferent
Europe, may nevertheless have an indirect impact in the EU and others simply negligent or incompetent in applying
through migration, destabilisation and climate change. anti-money laundering (AML) measures. The role of the
professions in facilitating the objectives of organised
crime is multifaceted and includes the concealment of
the proceeds of crime, obscuring the beneficial ownership
of assets (the person who actually benefits from property
Impact on the legal economy that is owned in another person’s name) and evading AML
regimes (Europol, 2017a). The global nature of organised
The pernicious effect of drug-related organised crime on crime is reflected in the area of money laundering: the
society includes the penetration of the legitimate economy. systems and services can be complex, involving a number
The illicit drug trade is an international business requiring of countries and employing a range of enablers to ensure
large amounts of money to be transferred around the world. continuity to their criminal activity. Countries that have not
It also generates large profits that need to be laundered, that implemented appropriate AML regulations represent an
is, made to appear legal, before they can be used further. unregulated ‘back door’ into the global financial system
(FATF and Egmont Group, 2018).
These illegal financial flows have impacts on the legal
economy in many ways, such as when businesses and Overall, despite robust legislation, the global AML
high-value assets are acquired to launder cash. These framework has a poor success rate in identifying and
‘investments’ distort the true economy, leaving legitimate seizing illegal funds generated by criminal organisations,
businesses and consumers at a competitive disadvantage. as it is implemented now. Europol estimates that
A further issue identified is that the activities of criminals authorities in the EU confiscate as little as 1 % of all
engaged in the drug market may also have a direct impact criminal proceeds, including money from the trade in illicit
on legitimate businesses, such as exposing companies drugs. In many cases, investigations into drug-trafficking
to the risk of being associated with trade-based money- activity are not complemented by money-laundering or
laundering schemes, the theft of electricity or damage to criminal asset investigations. However, efforts to investigate
rental properties used for drug production. money laundering and dismantle money-laundering
syndicates are being strengthened and, for the majority
of Member States, money laundering is now a national
Money laundering priority. Dedicated money-laundering investigations, better
implementation of AML strategies and more efficient
The laundering of profits from the drug trade often collection of financial data are expected to enhance the
requires the involvement of specialists and professional ability of law enforcement authorities to identify illegal
intermediaries from the legal and financial sectors, funds and increase the number of investigations initiated
although the degree to which they are criminally complicit (see Addressing money laundering, page 213).
may vary; some will be fully aware of the illegal source
CASE STUDY 10
Dumping leads to closure of municipal waste treatment plant

It has been determined that the waste profile found in the sewage
malfunctioning of a small wastewater system from the illicit production of
treatment plant in the Netherlands was synthetic drugs can contain useful
caused by the discharge of chemical information for law enforcement
waste from a drug production site purposes. The early identification
into the sewage system. Further of such waste profiles may be used
analysis revealed the process used to identify ongoing drug production
for manufacturing the drugs involved. processes in the wastewater
The study confirmed that the chemical catchment area (Emke et al., 2018). Photo: Europol
50
I
Well-publicised money-laundering investigations over the challenge of enforcing national laws in a borderless
recent years such as those into the Panama Papers, commercial environment (Lord et al., 2018).
Paradise Papers, Offshore Leaks, Swiss Leaks and
Bahamas Leaks have highlighted the global nature Some OCGs and criminals still launder their criminal
of money-laundering activities and increased public profits themselves. However, using the services of
awareness of the extent of this phenomenon (see Case money-laundering facilitators is increasingly common for
study 11). OCGs (see Case study 12). The facilitators rely on simple
money-laundering techniques, which mostly involve
Establishing a link between suspicious funds and a specific the smuggling of cash, trade in gold and other precious
predicate offence (the offence whose proceeds are to be metals, investment in real estate and trade-based money-
laundered) remains a key challenge for law enforcement laundering schemes. Money service businesses, alternative
authorities. Drug offences account for 15 % of all predicate banking systems and remittance services such as hawala
offences in the EU, according to a survey of the Member provide currency exchange and transfer services. These
States conducted by Europol — ahead of cybercrime services are frequently used to move money and legitimise
(6 %), corruption/bribery (4 %), counterfeiting (3 %) and profits.
trafficking in human beings (2 %) (Europol, 2017a).
Drug-related organised criminals use a range of techniques Money-laundering syndicates

and mechanisms to obscure their ownership and control
of illicitly obtained assets, in particular through schemes Money laundering in itself has become a profitable criminal
that exploit otherwise legal arrangements and structures. business for some criminals who provide money-laundering
Tools that are designed to encourage business growth services to other OCGs. Money-laundering syndicates
and development, such as trusts, foundations and other launder illicit proceeds in exchange for a percentage of the
corporate vehicles can be used to facilitate money laundered funds as commission. These ‘superfacilitators’
laundering. The globalisation of trade and communications operate highly professional money-laundering enterprises,
has only increased this threat, and countries now face which may involve the conclusion of contracts with OCGs
CASE STUDY 11
Panama Papers and PANA Committee report

As of April 2016, the International Regarding the practical effect of AML in current systems of regulation of
Consortium of Investigative regulation in those EU countries that these intermediaries. For example,
Journalists, together with reporting have applied it to the professions, the highlighting how self-regulation of
partners from around the world, evidence has been inconclusive. The the legal profession in many states
started revealing more than 214 000 PANA Committee highlighted how had failed in the prevention of money
offshore entities connected to people a range of intermediaries, including laundering. According to the report,
in more than 200 countries and banks, lawyers, accountants and lawyers (and other self-regulated
territories, including EU Member consultants, play a prominent role in professions) in the EU were generally
States. Following these revelations, ‘designing offshore structures and found to have filed a low number
commonly known as the Panama networks for their clients’, which of suspicious transaction reports,
Papers, the European Parliament set have the effect of facilitating money often in a reactive fashion, following
up a special committee of inquiry to laundering, tax avoidance and tax media reports. This was compounded
investigate alleged contraventions and evasion (European Parliament, 2017, by insufficient supervision by their
maladministration in the application of p. 27). The committee recognised professional associations and a low
EU law in relation to money laundering, a continuum of culpability, from risk of debarring — to the extent that
tax avoidance and tax evasion, known tacit knowledge of the criminality, there was no effective AML regulation
as the PANA Committee. through suspicion, to unknowing of lawyers.
participation in it (Smith, 2013). The
report highlighted the weaknesses Source: European Parliament (2017).
51
that detail remuneration rates and payment guarantees. (showing a tendency to move where opportunities for crime
They offer their services at scale and operate highly complex flourish) and polycriminal (involved in different predicate
money-laundering schemes exploiting gaps in the financial offences across Europe, from which they gain substantial
system or accessing the financial system in ‘cash-friendlier’ proceeds). Because of the large-scale Chinese cargo trade,
jurisdictions, where the level of regulation allows easier they operate and exploit legal structures and extensive trade-
integration. based money-laundering techniques. Chinese OCGs merge
their expertise and resources in order to be able to exploit
Money-laundering syndicates use a variety of money- vulnerabilities and loopholes in specific local environments,
laundering schemes, including cash transfers as well legislations and systems. Money-laundering activities are,
as trade-based money laundering, and rely on complex thus, conducted at international level through complex and
networks of legal business structures within and outside well-organised schemes.
the EU. Organised networks of ‘collectors’ physically
gather and transport criminal proceeds in the form of cash,
precious metals and jewellery. The use of professional Money transfer systems
enablers such as solicitors, accountants and consultants
provides money-laundering syndicates with the skills and Cash and liquid assets
knowledge to operate highly complex schemes. Money- The money-laundering threat related to cash couriers
laundering syndicates launder large amounts of money and (the physical transporting of criminally obtained cash)
have a considerable impact on the ability of other OCGs continues to be significant and has features in common
to disguise and invest criminal proceeds. It is common for with terrorist-financing threats (European Commission,
a money-laundering network to work with several OCGs. 2017b). For instance, both types of groups make use of
cash couriers for reasons related to the ease of access,
The money-laundering activities of Asian criminal groups, low level of expertise required, low cost, and little or no
particularly Chinese criminal groups, present a growing threat planning involved. This modus operandi is attractive for
to Europe. In recent years, the number of money-laundering organised crime, since it offers an alternative to the use of
investigations against Chinese criminal groups has been the formal financial sector to move funds while allowing full
steadily increasing in the EU. So have cash seizures and anonymity.
suspicious transaction reports involving Chinese nationals or
China as a country of destination/origin. Law enforcement Proceeds generated by the distribution of drugs
inquiries show that Chinese OCGs are extremely flexible are collected from street distributors by designated
CASE STUDY 12
Money-laundering ‘superfacilitators’: Operation Cedar

On 24 January 2016, law enforcement These high-value goods were then The targeted OCG was mainly
and judicial authorities from France, exported to Lebanon, where they composed of Lebanese nationals
the US, Germany, Belgium, Italy, the were sold and the proceeds placed also suspected of being involved
Netherlands and Spain, supported into the financial system for onward in financing terrorism through
by Europol and the EU Judicial transfer to cartels in South America. Hezbollah’s ‘military wing’. In
Cooperation Unit (Eurojust), took Financial investigations revealed the wake of coordinated days of
action against a prominent OCG that in 2014 alone the group spent action, one of the main suspects
responsible for the laundering of EUR 26 million in cash to purchase of Operation Cedar was placed on
profits from cocaine sales throughout luxury watches, without triggering any the Specially Designated Nationals
Europe. The OCG’s modus operandi suspicious activity reports. The sums and Blocked Persons list by the US
involved the use of cash couriers involved in 2015 are thought to have Office for Foreign Asset Control for
travelling across Europe by car been even higher, by which time the his involvement in the financing of
to collect the proceeds of crime, group was laundering an estimated terrorist activities.
followed by the purchase of expensive EUR 1 million per week.
cars, luxury watches and jewellery. Source: Europol (2017a).
52
I
collectors. OCGs then use money brokers, most often bank cards for these accounts, which are sent to countries
based outside the EU, who rely on money-laundering of origin such as Colombia, where the cash is withdrawn.
networks composed of contacts in different countries to
move the cash. Cash couriers typically smuggle larger The second method also involves the depositing of
amounts of money using large denomination banknotes proceeds in bank accounts by money mules, but, rather
such as EUR 500 and EUR 200 banknotes. These high- than being withdrawn in cash, the proceeds are exchanged
denomination banknotes are used by criminals both to into virtual currencies. The virtual currency is then sold to
store value and for transportation. The EUR 500 banknote is buyers in Colombia, who transfer the value to accounts
no longer being issued, but remains legal tender. held by the OCG.
A recently published study of cash and drug seizures Currently over 1 500 virtual currencies exist
at selected airports and postal centres illustrates the (WorldCoinIndex, n.d.). Although bitcoin remains the most
magnitude of cash smuggling in the EU (Groupe Pompidou popular for criminal-to-criminal transactions (EMCDDA and
and RILO WE, 2019). In 2018, a total of EUR 64.3 million Europol, 2017), some Member States highlight a small shift
was seized in 1 688 separate incidents at airports in 17 EU towards more privacy-oriented currencies such as monero
Member States. Spain seized the largest amount (almost or zcash (see Case study 13).
EUR 19 million), followed by the Netherlands (almost
EUR 16 million) and Italy (EUR 14 million). Virtual money laundering maintains anonymity and hides
the illicit origins of funds. Instead of adopting traditional
Cash profits from criminal activities are also often money-laundering approaches, for instance purchasing
converted to gold or jewellery. To address this issue, expensive items such as gold bars, cars, jewellery or real
new EU-level regulatory measures now include other estate, and then reselling them, in the virtual world this
instruments or liquid commodities, such as cheques, involves moving money into the cryptocurrency system
traveller’s cheques, prepaid cards and gold, within the and moving it around by using mixers, tumblers and
definition of cash. In addition, criminal cash may be chain hopping, services designed to obscure the origin of
converted into goods in high demand in non-EU markets. the currency by mixing it with funds from other sources.
Vehicles are one of the most common commodities bought The more dirty crypto money that goes into the systems
with criminal cash and exported to North Africa and the and the more it moves around, the harder it becomes
Middle East, along with luxury watches, gold and jewellery. for investigators to see through the web of action and
Machinery is exported to Iraq and Kuwait. trace a path back to the source. In addition, the pseudo-
anonymous nature of virtual currencies makes it more
EUR 500 banknotes have also been used in money- difficult to trace these funds than cash.
laundering schemes that make use of bitcoin automated
teller machines (ATMs). These ATMs accept cash and The next step towards clean money is integration of the
convert it to virtual currencies, and fall outside clear funds into the mainstream financial system. There is
regulatory statutes. For instance, an increasing number a risk at this stage of triggering suspicious activity reports,
of bitcoin ATMs in Colombia are being used to convert which flag high-risk transactions. However, once the funds
EUR 500 banknotes, which have been smuggled from the are legitimised, the criminals have multiple options for
EU to South America, into bitcoin. recouping them from the financial system.
Virtual currencies and crypto cards There are a number of money-laundering services available
An increasing number of investigations have focused on for virtual currencies, variously called mixers, tumblers,
the use of virtual currencies in money-laundering schemes, foggers and laundries. They take in funds from multiple
including money-laundering related to the trade in illicit customers, mix those funds together and then output the
drugs. Techniques used in the laundering of proceeds mixed funds. As in traditional money laundering, criminals
from the sale of cocaine by Colombian OCGs provide two generally lose a percentage of the funds in the process,
examples that illustrate the shift from using electronic but in the end the funds appear legitimate, making the
means to transfer money internationally to the use of virtual loss worthwhile. They typically charge between 1 % and
currencies. 3 % per transaction for their services. They are, however,
increasingly being taken down by regulatory enforcement.
In one approach, the OCGs use ‘money mules’, based in
key destination markets such as the EU, to deposit illicit Informal value transfer systems
proceeds in their bank accounts. The mules then request EU-level AML policies have made it more difficult to
integrate large quantities of criminal cash into the financial
53
system, especially the banking system. However, regulation Impact on businesses

is less effective when money launderers rely on informal
value transfer systems. The drug trade has both direct and indirect impacts on
legitimate businesses. For example, the indoor cultivation
The term ‘hawala’ is often used to describe a number of cannabis requires large amounts of electricity, which
of different systems. These mechanisms or networks may be stolen, reducing revenues and tax payments,
are primarily used for remittance payments by diaspora and potentially increasing costs to legitimate customers
communities based in the EU and elsewhere to transfer (Dadgari, 2018). A recent analysis of Office for National
funds to countries of origin. Transfers carried out through Statistics data (for the financial years ending 2016 and
hawala take place outside the regulated banking system 2017) related to seizures of illicit drugs, a freedom-of-
and are not subject to AML regulations or due diligence information request to police forces and insurance claims
practices. Hawala providers, known as hawaladars, often data in England and Wales revealed that since the start
run parallel businesses such as currency exchanges, travel of 2016 there had been 4 225 investigations by police
agencies or telephone shops. into electricity theft, with 31 % of cases relating to the
cultivation of illicit drugs (mainly cannabis) (Direct Line for
Hawala is frequently used by OCGs involved in the drug Business, 2018). According to the same report, the volume
trade to transfer criminal proceeds. Moroccan OCGs and of insurance claims made by landlords for malicious
South American cartels are known to use the services damage related to cannabis cultivation nearly doubled
of hawaladars as bankers and brokers. In some cases, between 2015 and 2017; the average value of a claim
hawaladars also manage cash deposits and transfer cash where cannabis was a contributing factor was 40 % higher
using cash couriers. than the average claim. In 2018, the Dutch electricity
provider Netbeheer Nederland estimated that around
1 billion kilowatt hours of electricity was stolen each year to
power the growth operations across the country’s 30 000
illicit cannabis cultivation sites (see Chapter 3).
CASE STUDY 13
Operation Tulipan Blanca

Coordinated by Europol and already circulating in the financial proceeds into bitcoin, then change it
conducted by the Spanish Guardia system, the ring just needed to transfer into Colombian pesos and deposit it
Civil with the support of the Finnish the criminal money back to the drug in Colombian bank accounts on the
authorities and the US Homeland dealers in Colombia. The investigation same day. The authorities in Finland
Security Investigations, the operation revealed that the criminals acquired gathered all the information on the
resulted in 11 arrests and 137 credit cards linked to the bank suspects held by the cryptocurrency
investigations of individuals. Members accounts in which criminal proceeds exchange. As a result of the operation
of a crime ring used credit cards and were deposited. Certain criminals the Spanish Guardia Civil carried out
virtual currencies to launder money then travelled to Colombia with eight searches and seized several
that other OCGs made by selling credit cards and made several cash computers, devices and the equipment
drugs. withdrawals from the bank accounts. used to commit the crimes, such
Once the criminals realised that cash as money bags or money-counting
The criminals based in Spain picked up withdrawals and bank operations machines. The suspects had deposited
the illicit proceeds in cash, which was were easy to track, they changed their more than EUR 8 million in cash using
then split into small quantities to be laundering methods and turned to 174 bank accounts.
deposited into hundreds of third-party virtual currencies, mainly bitcoin. The
bank accounts (a criminal method criminals used a bitcoin exchange Source: Europol (2018c).
known as smurfing). As the cash was based in Finland to convert their illicit
54
I
There are impacts on companies that produce drugs that Corruption and strain on public
have both legitimate pharmaceutical and illicit uses, and institutions
on those that produce chemicals that can be used as drug
precursors. There is a financial burden of compliance with
legal controls and reporting. They can also suffer theft and Drug markets may place particular strain on governments
diversion of these substances. Counterfeit versions of their and public institutions in three main ways (EMCDDA and
products sold on the black market can lead to reputational Europol, 2016), which are discussed further in this section.
damage. Similarly, there are considerable costs for banks
in applying AML procedures, for example the costs for staff Q The corruption of public officials in law enforcement
and systems for suspicious transaction reporting. There and the judiciary, as well as those operating at the
have also been some high-profile cases in which major political level, facilitates the operation of the illicit drug
banks have been implicated in money laundering, resulting market and exerts a corrosive effect, undermining the
in considerable reputational damage and significant fines authority of governments and the rule of law.
(see, for example, Reuters, 2019). Q Law enforcement places a strain on the public purse.
The resources required for drug supply reduction
Port operators are affected in several ways, such as costs activities account for the largest share of drug-related
associated with dealing with corrupt employees, providing expenditure in most EU countries. These activities are
security for goods passing through and facilitating the financed from budgets for public order and safety,
detection of smuggled drugs, and some of these costs may which are under increasing pressure.
be passed on to other businesses. The operators of ports Q The drug trade has adverse effects on the development
impose charges on shipping companies to provide security. and stability of transitional and developing countries
Any rise in port charges or any infrastructure surcharge where drugs are produced or through which they are
levied by port authorities will have an impact on the cost transported. Criminals often target them because of
of doing business. The security charge is applied to port their weak governance structures. In such countries,
users to recover the costs of installing security systems where there may be few alternative options for
and any ongoing security measures the port operator legitimate income generation, drug policies need
provides. There are no specific data on investments related to be integrated with international development
to increasing security at ports. programmes.
The drug trade can also have a more general and

insidious impact on the economy of a whole area (see Corruption of public officials
Case study 14), distorting property markets and putting
legitimate businesses at a competitive disadvantage. OCGs use corruption to infiltrate both public and private
sector organisations, relying on bribery, conflicts of interest,
trading in influence and collusion in order to facilitate their
criminal activities. Over the past two decades, the issue of
CASE STUDY 14
The criminal phenomenon of ‘undermining’ (ondermijning) in the Netherlands

In the past few years the Netherlands business world, the extortion and the phenomenon cannot be simply
has been facing the problem of blackmailing of administrators, the approached as a crime problem, but
criminal organisations involved infiltration of criminal phenomena into needs to be understood as a wider
in drug production and trafficking urban life or the emergence of ‘free- social problem that requires more
‘undermining’ the legal economy. The zones’ (Politie, 2019). than repression. This phenomenon
Dutch police describe undermining as depends on the combination of access
the intermingling of the underworld Many regions in the Netherlands to extensive illicit assets, threats of
with legitimate society, the insidious have established task forces against serious violence and the ability to
threat to the integrity of public undermining, following the principle exert pressure on society (Tops and
administration, civil servants and the indicated by the national government: Schilders, 2016).
55
corruption has rapidly entered the agenda of international as drug-related (direct or labelled expenditure). Changes
organisations and the EU. It was noted in the 2016 edition in the way in which policing is organised may occur in
of this report that drug markets have been identified as one response to a range of factors, including new challenges
of the most corruptive influences in the EU. Although most and priorities or resource constraints, and they may have an
Member States have legislation to address corruption, data impact on the amount of drug-related expenditure that is
are not routinely collected. readily identifiable as such. For example, a survey of police
forces in 2015, a follow-up to a similar survey in 2013,
Corruption perceptions have been repeatedly found to suggested that the number of countries with specialised
differ between government sectors and also between drug squads had reduced (EMCDDA, 2017a). A shift to
countries (e.g. Gemperle, 2018). Customs authorities having more drug-related activities carried out as part of
are, however, often viewed as one of the most corrupt the general work of police or border forces might therefore
government institutions in many countries (Chêne, have an impact on measures of drug-related expenditure.
2018). There are a number of specificities that make
border activities particularly vulnerable to corruption, A growing number of EU Member States have in the last
notably pressure from organised crime. Corruption decade attempted to produce estimates of the amount of
mechanisms related to organised crime may involve the drug-related public expenditure (EMCDDA and Pompidou
selling of information to criminal groups, facilitating the Group, 2017). Currently, 19 EU Member States have
transit of illicit drugs and/or the diversion of chemicals produced estimates of drug-related expenditure for years
to illegal markets and obstructing investigations that range from 2006 to 2017. Within these estimates
(see Case study 15). In Europe, 31 % of the respondents the share of drug-related expenditure relating to supply
to the European Barometer think that the giving and taking reduction activities ranged from 8 to 80 %, with expenditure
of bribes and the misuse of power are widespread among in nine out of the 19 countries split fairly evenly between
customs officials and the police (European Commission, supply and demand interventions; that is, the proportion
2017c). of spending on supply-related activities was within the
range of 40-60 %. Of the remaining countries, five reported
spending less than 40 % of their drug-related expenditure
Government expenditure on supply-related activities and five reported spending over
60 % (EMCDDA, 2019b).
A substantial amount of government expenditure that
would otherwise be available for other purposes is used Estimating the total social costs of licit and illicit drugs in
in tackling drug markets and responding to the problems Belgium, Lievens and colleagues (2017) found that law
associated with them. A challenge in estimating drug- enforcement expenditure accounted for about a third
related expenditure, which is particularly relevant to supply- of all direct costs and was mainly attributable to illicit
related activity, is that much drug-related activity occurs drugs (EUR 549 million, 54 %, 2012 prices) and alcohol
as part of general day-to-day work, so it is not separately (EUR 363 million, 42 %, 2012 prices).
identified in budgets or accounts (indirect or unlabelled
expenditure). Only funding for specialised activity, such as
drug squads or drug treatment services, is usually identified
CASE STUDY 15
Corruption of law enforcement officials

In April 2018, law enforcement 9 tonnes of cocaine was one of the from port facilities without inspection.
authorities in Algeciras, Spain, biggest ever in Spain. The officer who Outside the port, the crates of bananas
arrested an officer of the Guardia Civil was under suspicion was closely concealing cocaine were removed
suspected of being involved in the cooperating with members of the and replaced, and the container was
importation of a container containing OCG thought to be orchestrating resealed. Then the container was
8 740 kg of cocaine concealed within the cocaine trafficking. The officer returned to the port for inspection.
banana crates. The seizure of almost facilitated the removal of the container
Source: Morcillo (2018).
56
I
Impact on development and governance available sources of income. Tackling the drug trade
without providing alternative economic opportunities for its
Illicit drug markets, and the organised crime associated participants will at best result in short-term disruption.
with them, are increasingly seen as a development
issue (Reitano and Hunter, 2018). The EU drug market One approach focuses on substituting licit cash crops
is inextricably linked to production and transit regions, for illicit crops. Although there has been debate and
many of which are in developing countries. The associated concerns about the effectiveness of these interventions,
corruption and violence can undermine both social and innovative new initiatives are being evaluated. There has
economic development. Trafficking groups are attracted been renewed interest in Colombia, following the 2016-17
to areas of the world where governance and judicial ceasefire in the long-running civil war. In the region of
structures are weak. In these countries, for the poorest La Macarena, an innovative approach to replacing illicit
sections of society, participation in the drug trade may be crops is based on dialogue with the communities affected
the only viable source of income, while for elite groups and expert knowledge about linking prosperity and rural
the large profits available from the trade may provide development. It has produced promising early results
access to power. The dominance of the illicit economy (Ceron et al., 2018). However, expanding coverage and
also encourages other forms of criminality, decreasing ensuring they reach and are viable in the more remote
tax revenues and reducing respect for the law and state and disadvantaged areas remains a challenge for such
institutions in a vicious circle that increases vulnerability programmes.
to further exploitation and destabilisation. In addition,
a frequent spill-over from the drug trade is an increasing There remains a need for more comprehensive evidence
problem of drug use and addiction within these producer gathering and evaluation. Similarly, in the policy arena,
and transit countries (Channing May, 2017; Shaw, 2017). it is important that drug policies are integrated with
international development policies and programmes to
There is growing international recognition that tackling maximise their impact. The EU and Member States make
the drug trade in developing countries cannot focus solely significant investments in both drug control measures
on eradication and interdiction but should also promote and development support to countries in Asia, Africa and
economic and social development (see Chapter 8), in the Americas where drugs are produced and transported,
line with the Sustainable Development Goals (7). In some so ensuring coherence and seeking synergies between
communities, the drug trade represents one of the few these areas is important.
(7) See United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 United Nations
Development Agenda (2012), which categorises the Millennium
Development Goals along four dimensions: inclusive social development;
inclusive economic development; environmental sustainability; and peace
and security.
57
Photo: istockphoto
59
CHAPTER 2
Drivers and facilitators
of drug markets
The drug market is globally complex, highly adaptable Figure 2.1

and innovative. The growing transport infrastructure and Key drivers and facilitators of drug markets
mobility of people are reflected in increasingly globally
integrated drug production and trafficking networks.
In addition, the use of the internet and the effect of
information technology on all segments of society
have meant new transformational opportunities for
Transportation
ansportation
porta
organised crime in a number of essential areas, including and
nd logistics
log tics
logistics, criminal cooperation and financial flows. The
Globalisation
use of encryption — a small subset of the impact of the
internet — makes it easier to engage in illicit activities,
C
Criminal
al
a trend exacerbated by both the cross-border nature cooperation
coo ation
of internet activities and the challenge of enforcing
constraints on online behaviour (Figure 2.1).
Globalisation Online markets

ma
Globalisation is the process by which organisations Social

cial
networks and
Technology
become globally interconnected through networks of and
smartphone apps
pps innovation
communication, trade and transportation of goods and
New techniques
ques in
people. This process has a significant effect on illicit drug production
on and
markets, as the actors involved in them seek to harness smuggling
uggling
these developments and achieve similar benefits to those
in the legal economy.
Transportation and logistics

Firearms
rms and
other
ther weapons
the apons
Infrastructure development and transportation technology
are fundamentally important factors that continue to Encrypted
ncryp
have a significant impact on illicit drug markets and their communication
munication
catio Criminal tools
deivces
d ces
wider ramifications. Innovation in transportation and
logistics enables cheaper, more efficient and safer (thanks Fraudulent
F udule
to decreasing inspections) organised crime operation documentation
ocumentation
cum
and movement of large quantities of illicit drugs without

disruption.
60
CHAPTER 2 Drivers and facilitators of drug markets
I
The transportation methods used are diverse and evolving, Figure 2.2
and are influenced by a range of factors, including the Mode of transport for global trafficking of heroin and
geographical locations of producer, destination and transit cocaine for the European market: number of seizures
countries, and historical ties and cultural links between for each mode, March 2017 to April 2018
them. Some modes of transport, such as container ships, Heroin Cocaine
are able to transport large quantities at a time, while
7% 1%
others focus on the movement of large numbers of small
15 % 20 %
quantities, as when couriers are used to smuggle drugs on 44 %
commercial flights.
Our understanding of the relative importance of different

routes and modes of transport is largely obtained from drug
seizures and so is inevitably skewed. However, based on
78 % 35 %
open sources (73 heroin and 239 cocaine global seizures
for the European market, identified between March 2017
Maritime Land Air Mail
and April 2018; see Chapter 9), the majority (78 %) of the
heroin shipments seized appeared to have travelled by Source: EMCDDA open source information database.
land, while just under half (44 %) of the cocaine shipments
were intercepted on maritime routes (Figure 2.2).
Another aspect of globalisation is the digitalisation of
The exploitation of maritime routes constitutes a growing international logistics planning. The key role played by
threat. More than 750 million 20-foot equivalent units (8) information technology in controlling and managing traffic
are transported by sea every year, accounting for 90 % flows at air and sea ports has increased the importance
of the global cargo trade. Fewer than 2 % of shipping to criminals of having access to automated systems. They
containers globally are ever screened (UNRIC, 2018). may obtain such access either through the cooperation
Ninety per cent of the EU’s external trade and 40 % of staff or by hacking into relevant computer networks.
of its internal trade is transported by sea (European Furthermore, looking forward, it is conceivable that entire
Council, 2018). Large container ports in Europe and logistical chains can be automated and thus vulnerable to
other continents are being increasingly exploited by drug exploitation.
traffickers for bulk transportation. For example, in 2017,
the port of Antwerp, the busiest in Europe after Rotterdam,
saw incoming traffic of up to 3.5 million maritime shipping Figure 2.3
containers, of which only around 1 % were inspected Container traffic at five major European ports, 2007-17
(Schneider, 2018). Except for a brief fall in 2009-10, at Twenty-foot equivalent unit
(thousands)
a time of financial crisis in large parts of the world, the
14 000
number of containers moving through these two ports has
generally been increasing for the last decade (Figure 2.3). 12 000
10 000
Recent years have seen diversification in the methods
8 000
for maritime drug trafficking, as shown in Figure 2.4.
New methods have been developed that allow larger 6 000
quantities of drugs to be transported in individual 4 000

consignments. The choice of method by drug-trafficking
2 000
OCGs would typically involve an element of risk
0
management and mitigation (Boerman et al., 2017).
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Rotterdam Antwerp Hamburg

Bremerhaven Valencia
Source: Eurostat (2019a).
Note: The number of containers is based on a 20-foot equivalent unit, the
most common international standardised container type, including incoming,
outgoing and empty containers handled.
(8) A 20-foot equivalent unit represents the cargo capacity of a standard

multimodal container.
61
Figure 2.4
Maritime trafficking: diversification of modi operandi
Rip-on/rip-off
Loading the drugs in the port of departure and recovering them in the
port of destination, typically without the sender or the recipient of the
legal cargo being aware their container is being used for drug-trafficking
activities. Typically requires corruption in both ports.
Switch
A variant of rip-on/rip-off, increasingly used in the EU. In the port of origin the drugs are
placed in an easily accessible place in the container. At the EU destination port, before the
container is inspected, corrupt dock workers retrieve the drugs and transfer them to a
different container — either one that has already been cleared by customs or one that
doesn’t require inspection (e.g. intra-European transit). This requires involvement of port
employees and either the transporter or receiver of the new container.
Within legitimate goods

Drugs are disguised as or incorporated into the legitimate
goods. Typically this requires the involvement of the owners of
the legal cargo, but can also involve a corrupt dock worker or
others involved in the handling of the goods.
In container structure
Drugs are concealed in areas of the container such as cooling
compartments, insulation materials within the walls and floorings or
in the exterior beams. This method requires the involvement of
corrupt port employees to place and retrieve the drugs.
Commercial vessels and drop-off

Drugs can be transported by a range of commercial vessels such
as cargo ships, fishing vessels, tankers and tugboats.
Close to the destination, drugs can also be dropped off in the sea
for collection.
Pleasure vessels
Pleasure vessels such as yachts are frequently use,
as checks on them are typically less stringent.
Inflatable and speed boats

Small vessels adapted or custom-made and powered with multiple outboard motors are
used for the transportation of drug shipments over short to medium distances. Drugs are
loaded and unloaded in remote areas. The vessels are fast enough to avoid detection or
capture. They are extensively used in the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic coastal waters.
Underwater attachments and semi-submersibles

Drugs are transported in missile-shaped containers attached to the hull of the
vessels below the water. This method requires the use of specialised divers at both
the origin and destination ports. Semi-submersible and submarine-type vessels are
typically human-piloted, although unmanned crafts may be seen in future.
62
I
The misuse of general aviation for drug trafficking General aviation is mostly used for the secondary
in and to the EU distribution of small shipments of illicit drugs within the
EU, mainly cocaine and cannabis. However, it is sometimes
In addition to maritime transport, air transport is also used used for trafficking drugs to the EU, and in these cases
for drug trafficking in and to the EU. There are two main the typical volume of individual shipments is considerably
categories of civil aviation that can be used: scheduled air higher than on intra-EU flights. For example, the quantities
transport, including passenger and cargo flights operating of cocaine transported on transatlantic general aviation
on regularly scheduled routes, and general aviation, flights ranges from 500 kg to 1 200 kg.
which includes all other commercial and private civil
flights. General aviation, when used for criminal purposes, General aviation is also used to facilitate the movements
involves a wide variety of aircraft, ranging from business of fugitives and OCG members. For instance, UAVs are
jets to smaller aircraft, such as light and ultralight aircraft, used for the surveillance of law enforcement activities and
helicopters and most recently unmanned aerial vehicles border patrols, to inspect the security of unloading sites, or
(UAVs), such as drones. This includes privately owned for the remote surveillance of cannabis cultivation sites.
aircraft, rented aircraft owned by an aero or flying club and
aircraft owned by general aviation companies, which may Figure 2.5 shows the different routes and types of general
be booked. aviation used for trafficking drugs. Cocaine is directly
trafficked into the EU using business jets suitable for
General aviation possesses some inherent vulnerabilities. long-haul flights. The airports of departure are located
It is a flexible and fast mode of transportation, making it in the Caribbean, mainland South America, or even the
more difficult to monitor than other means of transport. Andean region. The countries of destination are mostly
Monitoring is also made more difficult by the large number located in western Europe. General aviation flights for the
of airports, airfields and small airstrips in the EU. Small trafficking of cannabis resin depart from the south of the
international airports and general aviation airfields are Iberian Peninsula to return from Morocco carrying cannabis
particularly attractive for OCGs, as they may be more resin. These flights, organised by OCGs based in Spain
susceptible to criminal infiltration, allowing traffickers to in cooperation with Moroccan OCGs, are clandestine,
cross borders without passing through regular custom carried out at very low altitude to avoid being detected by
checks or border controls. Moreover, some general aviation conventional radar, relying on only very basic navigation
aircraft can land almost anywhere or do not even need to systems and visual references of the terrain. Helicopters are
land to deliver their illicit cargo. most commonly used for this activity and can transport up
to 900 kg of cannabis per trip. OCGs also use light aircraft.
Compared with other transport means, the number of For example, drug trafficking occurs between Albania and
cases reported to Europol involving general aviation Italy, with flights departing from Italian aero clubs or remote
is low, although it has increased during recent years. airstrips, flying at low altitude under the cover of a pleasure
Under-reporting by the EU Member States and a lack of trip. They cross the Adriatic Sea and land in remote areas in
awareness and effective controls mean there are probably Albania.
a large number of unrecorded events. The real scale of the
threat is therefore almost certainly higher than reported. Criminal flights may be operated in four different ways:
Trafficking of illicit drugs is the most common criminal Q ‘white’ flights, properly operated in accordance with
use of general aviation (56 % of reported cases). Cocaine general aviation regulations;
trafficking is the most frequently reported activity related Q ‘grey’ flights, apparently conducted in accordance with
to the criminal use of general aviation (28 % of all cases general aviation rules, but deviating at some point
and 49 % of the reported drug cases). Cannabis resin and, (abuses of reporting, unscheduled stops/touch-and-go
to a lesser degree, herbal cannabis, are also trafficked and drop-off);
by means of general aviation (20 % of the reported drug Q ‘black’ flights, fully clandestine flights, unreported,
cases). Cases involving the transportation of heroin, operated at very low altitude, on radio silence,
amphetamine and MDMA are rare and mostly occur in the transponder off and relying on external visual
context of polydrug trafficking. references;
Q unmanned flights using UAVs.
63
Figure 2.5
General aviation and drug trafficking: routes and types of aircraft employed
Routes Types of aircraft

Cocaine
Business jet
Cannabis
Light aircraft
Heroin
Helicopter
Ultralight aircraft
Drone/unmanned
aircraft
Central and
South America,
the Caribbean
Western Balkan
Western Mediterranean
West Africa
The OCGs using general aviation are highly diverse. authorities in EU Member States, customs in particular,
They range from loose networks of criminal entrepreneurs, have had to increase their controls of postal hubs.
mostly pilots collaborating in ad hoc projects, to highly
developed and hierarchically structured groups. The pilots The increasing trend for shopping online in Europe is
involved in the use of general aviation for criminal purposes associated with an increase in parcel deliveries, which
are typically EU nationals, well experienced, with strong are predicted to increase by 69 % between 2017 and
knowledge of general aviation and advanced piloting skills. 2021 (Graham, 2017). This increase in delivery volumes
This is necessary because of some of these flights take makes systematic controls of all parcels challenging. This
place in difficult conditions. presents an opportunity for drug traffickers to expand their
use of this medium for delivering drugs too (Figure 2.6).
In particular, there has been a growth in online drug
The use of post and parcel services for drug purchases through social media, the surface web and
trafficking darknet markets, in which the postal system is exploited
(Council of the European Union, 2017).
Over the last few years the use of post and parcel services
to transport drugs has expanded rapidly. Although the The trafficking of drugs using post and parcel services
quantity shipped through these means is still limited affects all Member States, and a number of countries
compared with other forms of transportation, their use are seeing considerable increases in letters and parcels
has been increasing. As a consequence, law enforcement containing drugs. The specific routing of parcels can
64
I
Figure 2.6 dismantled in a joint US-European enforcement action in

Illicit drugs seized in postal traffic which two members of the organisation were extradited
from Romania to the US on charges of money laundering
and MDMA trafficking, primarily to US and Canadian
customers through the now defunct markets Silk Road and
Silk Road 2.0, using regular postal services to send the
drugs from Belgium to the US. Germany, as well as Belgium,
is increasingly used as a transit hub for the trafficking of
amphetamine and MDMA, NPS, cocaine or cannabis using
post and parcel services (Case study 16). Large EU parcel
hubs are located in Germany (Frankfurt and Leipzig) and
Belgium (Liège). The amount of ecstasy and amphetamine
found in the post more than tripled from 137 kg in 2016
to 460 kg in 2018, according to information from customs
Photo: Federal Police, Belgium
authorities in the Netherlands — and these numbers are
regarded as a small fraction of the bigger picture (Boffey,
vary widely, including direct routes from the source to 2019a). Intermediaries in Germany appear to be frequently
destination or via EU transit hubs and non-EU locations. used for the dispatch by mail of illicit drugs produced in the
In 2018, the amount of cocaine seized in postal parcels Netherlands and purchased on the darknet. Since August
sent to Europe decreased notably from 2017, and only the 2016, about 8 500 postal items containing illicit drugs have
Netherlands seized more than 100 kg that year. Parcels been identified at international airports across Germany,
containing cannabis mostly departed from the United amounting to a total of 404 kg of illicit drugs (287 kg
States, Canada and Spain. Heroin arrives in the EU from amphetamine and 111 kg MDMA, as well as cocaine and
Pakistan, often via Africa. The Netherlands continued to cannabis) and 307 250 MDMA/ecstasy tablets.
be the main source of MDMA seized in postal parcels in
2018, mostly destined for South America, the United States There are notable challenges in identifying postal items
and Asia. While NPS continued to be shipped mainly from containing drugs. For example, the total volume handled
China and Hong Kong, in 2018 few seizures of fentanyl every day by a major postal centre such as the Mail Centre
derivatives in postal parcels occurred in Europe (Groupe Vienna amounts to 4 million items. Furthermore, there
Pompidou and RILO WE, 2019). is currently no mechanism in place for the reporting of
suspicious parcels akin, for example, to the existing one
Dutch-based OCGs send postal packages and parcels from for reporting suspicious financial transactions. Although
Belgium, France, Germany or the Netherlands to customers systems are in place for service providers to remove
worldwide. For example, a Europe-based darknet drug- and destroy suspicious parcels, they do not have a legal
trafficking organisation called ItalianMafiaBrussels was obligation to inform police authorities.
CASE STUDY 16
International drug-trafficking network disrupted

National investigations into an OCG the world. The orders were made business premises were searched
composed of 13 members, including online through the darknet, using at the German-Dutch border.
some of Afghan and Dutch origin, cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin and Large amounts of drugs, including
began in September 2018. The paysafecards. Members of the OCG 40 kg of amphetamine and 1 kg of
suspects in the Netherlands prepared were also suspected of being involved ecstasy tablets, as well as mobile
parcels or envelopes with drugs, in money-laundering activities related phones, computers, documents and
which were mailed to Germany. The to their profits. Amphetamines, MDMA, EUR 10 000 in cash, were seized.
perpetrators in Germany used various cocaine and heroin, with a total street Twelve suspects were arrested, four
mailboxes and post offices to ship value of more than EUR 400 000, were under European Arrest Warrants.
the packages on to recipients around seized. Ten private residences and
Source: Europol (2019a).
65
In practical terms, targeted screening could aid identification OCGs often engage in more than one criminal activity to
of postal items with illicit content, especially in cases when mitigate risks, reduce operational costs, increase profit
express postal services are employed. Such measures could margins, or finance or facilitate other criminal activities. For
have a significant impact in disrupting illicit drug distribution instance, an OCG may finance the maintenance of several
by this modus operandi and limiting related harm. They legal business structures to launder incomes from drug
can also help protect postal service staff from coming into trafficking by engaging in organised property crime.
contact with potentially lethal substances.
Many OCGs are highly flexible and able to shift from one
Europol analysis indicates that smaller EU-based secondary criminal activity to another or to add new criminal activities
distributors also trade several types of illicit drugs and to their crime portfolio. In many cases, OCGs operate on
subsequently distribute them through their national post and an on-demand basis and become active only once new
parcel services. Some criminals simply rely on innocuous profit opportunities emerge. The increasing availability of
packaging shipped by post, parcel and express parcel knowledge, tools and expertise provided to OCGs through
services. Some suppliers ship vacuum-packed parcels. In ‘crime as a service’, in which criminals use the services of
some cases, the higher-level OCGs are largely uninvolved other specialised criminals, has enabled a greater number of
in the trafficking of the illicit drugs, relying on intermediaries OCGs to engage in multiple criminal activities despite lacking
who receive or dispatch the products using fictional identities specific expertise or experience. As a result of an increasingly
and addresses. complex and interconnected criminal world, there are more
and more OCGs specialising in offering a wider range of highly
More generally, the origin and content of parcels is often specialised services to different OCGs, both offline and online.
concealed by making false declarations and using fraudulent
documents to circumvent risk indicators used to identify The OCGs involved in the trafficking of illicit drugs are the
parcels for checks. The identification of the suppliers is to most polycriminal groups in the EU. They traffic different
some degree also hampered by the nature of the non-EU types of illicit drugs, with polydrug trafficking continuing
postal systems and the use of parcel-forwarding services. to be a common feature among mid-level suppliers and
distributors, and increasingly for top-level OCGs. Polycriminal
Individual criminals and OCGs use parcel-forwarding services OCGs most frequently combine the trafficking of cannabis
to facilitate the trafficking of illicit commodities. Postal and cocaine. There is also some overlap in the activities of
companies provide their clients with addresses in other OCGs involved in the trafficking of illicit drugs and illegal
jurisdictions, repack the parcels and ensure international firearms. In some cases, OCGs involved in drug trafficking
shipment. This creates opportunities for criminals intending also engage in migrant smuggling, organised property crime
to conceal the origin, final destination and nature of illicit or different types of fraud.
shipments. Since these companies usually do not open
the packages, the nature of the shipments can easily be
concealed by sending a false customs declaration. Online cooperation
Online technologies are used extensively by OCGs for

Criminal cooperation communication, and the internet and new technologies
facilitate the formation and operation of new models of
Globalisation facilitates drug supply by providing new criminal groups. As some have put it, ‘knowing the right
opportunities for criminal cooperation and integration along people’ (the concept of social capital) may have transformed
the supply chain, thus improving the efficiency of operations. into knowing one’s way on the internet (Leukfeldt, 2017).
Currently important features of the operations of many OCGs An example can be seen in the fentanyl market. Anecdotal
in Europe are polycriminality and online cooperation. evidence suggests that vendor networks, particularly for
the supply of fentanyl derivatives via darknet markets, form
and exist online only, regardless of physical world location,
Polycriminality sometimes across continents.
Polycriminality remains a feature of many of the OCGs active UK investigation and prosecution of several fentanyl vendors
in the EU. According to the most recent data, 45 % of the has confirmed that some prolific UK-based vendors actively
OCGs reported for the SOCTA are involved in more than one seek to ‘recruit’ re-seller vendors in other countries where
criminal activity, a marked increase compared with 2013 they enjoy large customer bases. The UK vendors supply
(Europol, 2017b). wholesale amounts to their network of re-sellers so that
customers in those countries can receive expedited delivery
66
I
from their ‘local’ reseller. In one UK case a prolific fentanyl Figure 2.7
vendor arrested in April 2017 was supplying wholesale Surface web ‘pharmacy’ offering MDMA
amounts of its fentanyl preparations to three separate
US-based re-seller vendors, which enabled more timely
deliveries to satisfy escalating demand from US customers.
There is also some evidence that vendor brands are being
serviced by a networked collective of individuals based in
several different countries, which enables these brands
to offer prompt local deliveries in the countries in which
their constituent members reside. It is likely these mutual
arrangements also assist such a collective vendor brand
in becoming more resilient to law enforcement detection,
as a greater proportion of their transactions would be
undertaken within local national postal systems rather than
passing through the more stringent border checks imposed
on international postal traffic (S. Welsh, National Crime Darknet drug markets
Agency, personal communication).
The combination of digital technologies, namely of anonymity
technology (e.g. Tor; Dingledine et al., 2004) and pseudo-
anonymous (Nakamoto, 2009) or anonymous (Ben-Sasson
Technology and innovation et al., 2014; van Saberhagen, 2013) payment systems, has
led to the emergence of darknet markets in which sellers and
The impact of the rapidly evolving technological world buyers can conduct transactions online with a high level of
extends to drug markets. In 2017, 87 % of EU households anonymity. It is estimated that about two thirds of the offers
had internet access and 57 % of individuals aged 16-74 had on darknet markets are drug-related, with the remainder
bought goods or services over the internet (Eurostat, 2018b). related to a range of other illicit goods and services
Drug dealers have capitalised on this pool of potential buyers (EMCDDA and Europol, 2017). Darknet markets are most
and the technological opportunities. often global and operate in English, although some cater to
a particular country or language group.
Online markets The darknet markets ecosystem is dynamic and resilient,

with markets emerging and disappearing because of law
Surface web enforcement activities, exit scams or voluntary closure,
and with different markets dominating at different times
The surface web is an important medium for the sale of NPS (see Figure 2.8 and Case study 17). At the time of writing,
and misused medicines. To a limited extent, it is also used for there appear to be 10 active and operational marketplaces:
the sale of traditional illicit drugs, as illustrated in Figure 2.7. T•chka, OW Market, The Majestic Garden, Berlusconi
Legislative measures removing NPS from the legal market Market, Cannazon, Rapture Market, Empire Market, Apollon,
have resulted, for example in the United Kingdom, in the Serpent Market and Nightmare Market.
restriction of the role of the surface web in their distribution
(Wadsworth et al., 2018). UK-registered online shops were
found to close down or move domain location, but it is
unknown whether the UK retailers have ceased selling NPS
or have been relocated to darknet markets. Further research
is also required to understand how long-lasting this effect
will be. The trading of illicit drugs typically involves more
clandestine approaches.
67
68
Figure 2.8
Darknet markets ecosystem: lifetime and reasons for closure of over 100 darknet markets offering drugs, sorted by date
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
The Farmer’s Market At the time of closure of Silk Road, there were four active darknet
Raided
Silk Road Raided markets: Black Market Reloaded, Sheep Marketplace, Deepbay and
Black Market Reloaded Hacked BuyItNow. Shortly after, a proliferation of markets came into
Sheep Marketplace Scam
Atlantis Scam
existence.
BuyItNow Voluntary
One of the first and best-known darknet Deepbay Scam
marketplaces was Silk Road, which Budster Scam
Project Black Flag Scam
opened at the end of January 2011. Pandora Raided
Silk Road 2.0 Raided
TorMarket Scam
BlackBox Market Voluntary
Dream Market Voluntary
The Marketplace Voluntary
Pirate Market Scam
35 days after Silk Road was closed, Silk FloMarket Hacked
Black Market Raided
Road 2.0 was launched.
FreeBay Voluntary
Blue Sky Raided
Agora Voluntary
Tortuga Voluntary
TorBay Voluntary
White Rabbit Scam
Start date End date
Outlaw Market Scam or hacked
Still open GreyRoad Voluntary
Reasons for closure DrugList Scam
Evolution Scam
Doge Road Scam
Raided Hacked Exit Voluntary Scam or Unknown
scam exit hacked Cantina Hacked
Tor Bazaar Raided Operation Onymous resulted in the
Invitation-only marketplaces in bold DarkBay Voluntary
Breaking Bad Voluntary closure of a number of darknet markets:
TorEscrow Scam Pandora, Silk Road 2.0, Black Market,
Black Goblin Market Hacked
Cannabis Road
Blue Sky, Tor Bazaar, Topix, Hydra, Cloud
Hacked
Utopia Raided 9 and Alpaca.
BlackBank Market Scam
On average, the darknet Cloud 9 Raided
Darknet Nation Hacked
marketplaces observed Sanitarium Market Voluntary
remained active for just over Hansa Marketplace Voluntary
eight months. Red Sun Marketplace Hacked
EXXTACY Hacked
Topix Raided
Hydra Raided
Cannabis Road 2 Hacked
Mr Nice Guy Voluntary
Andromeda Scam
Silk Street Scam
Underground Market Voluntary
Pigeon Market Voluntary
1776 Voluntary
Alpaca Raided
Tortuga 2 Voluntary
TOM Scam
The most enduring marketplaces operate Deepzon Voluntary
between three and five years: Valhalla, Onionshop Hacked
Area51 Scam
Dream Market, Outlaw Market and T•chka. Middle Earth Marketplace Scam
Freedom Market Voluntary
Cannabis Road 3 Scam
Diabolus/SR3 Unknown
Nucleus Marketplace Scam
Panacea Voluntary
Silk Road 3.1 Scam
The majority of marketplaces did not Abraxas Scam
make it beyond a year. AlphaBay Raided
Silk Road Reloaded Unknown
Free Market Voluntary
T•chka
Crypto Market Scam
35 days after Silk Road 2.0 was closed, Silk Kiss Scam or hacked
Road 3.1 was launched. Mr Nice Guy 2 Scam
Ironclad Scam
The Majestic Garden
TheRealDeal Unknown
Havana/Absolem Hacked
13 marketplaces operated between one and two Oxygen Scam Major international law
years: Hansa, Agora, Nucleus Marketplace, East India Company Scam
enforcement operations Bayonet
Haven Scam
TheRealDeal, Acropolis, Middle Earth Marketplace, and GraveSac shut down
Zanzibar Spice Voluntary
Apple Market, BlackBank Market, House of Lions Anarchia Unknown AlphaBay and Hansa.
Market, Evolution, Silk Road Reloaded, Tornado Unknown
Horizon Market Scam
Silk Road 2.0 and Anarchia. Darknet Heroes League Hacked (date unknown)
Agape Voluntary
Poseidon Scam
Amazon Dark Scam
Hansa Raided
Simply Bear Scam
Valhalla Raided
Acropolis Voluntary
Nine marketplaces have made it for a period of between Apple Market Unknown
House of Lions Market Unknown
two and three years: Silk Road, AlphaBay, Silk Road 3.1, Minerva Unknown
BlackMarket Reloaded, Wall Street Market, Diabolus/SR3, TradeRoute Scam
The Farmer’s Market, Darknet Heroes League and Crypto Wall Street Market Raided
RSClub Market Hacked
Market. Zion Market Unknown (date unknown)
Infinite Market Unknown
Placemarket Unknown
CGMC Voluntary
I
Berlusconi Market
At the time of writing there are 10 marketplaces that appear to be active Empire Market
Olympus Market Scam
and operational: T•chka, OW Market, Rapture Market, The Majestic Garden, Apollon
Berlusconi Market, Cannazon, Empire Market, Apolon, Serpent Market and Cannazon
Rapture Market
Nightmare Market.
OW Market -start date unknown
Serpent Market -start date unknown
Nightmare Market
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Notes: A total of 112 darknet markets were identified along with key features. Start and end dates — the dates of the first and last known sales/withdrawals. Closure type — the reason for a market shut-down. Market status last
checked on 16 May 2019.
Sources: EMCDDA (2016a), DarkNet Stats (2019), DarkWebNews (2019), Gwern Archives (2019).
69
Several Member States suggest that another consequence Some vendors will abandon web shops altogether and
of these market closures, is the growth in both the number migrate their business to encrypted communications apps,
of vendor shops (shops run by a single vendor) and running their shops within private channels/groups and
secondary markets, i.e. non-English language markets automating the trade process using smart contracts and
(Europol, 2018d, p. 47). bots. Industry and media already report a trend in the abuse
of apps like Telegram or Discord, despite the provider’s
Well-established vendors with high trust levels and efforts to curtail such activity (Europol, 2018d).
reputation are more likely to set up their own hidden service
platforms. Some of these vendors can continue doing To obtain more information about darknet drug markets and
business solely with clientele established on the now- in particular on the role of European suppliers within them,
defunct markets, especially in relation to sales of products the EMCDDA commissioned a study, which collected regular
that are purchased repetitively, such as drugs. snapshots from four major global darknet markets (Dream
Market, Berlusconi Market, Valhalla and TradeRoute) during
Within the next five years, we can expect to see continued the period 15 July 2017 to 22 August 2018 (9). Based on
fragmentation of the darknet market scene. While a number an extrapolation of data from buyer feedback reports it was
of larger, multi-vendor, multi-commodity markets may possible to estimate the volumes and values of drugs traded
survive, there will be an increasing number of vendor over time. Although not exhaustive, this approach does allow
shops and smaller secondary markets catering to specific an audit of the target marketplaces over the study period
nationalities or language groups. These smaller markets will and an assessment of the impact of the combined AlphaBay
be less likely to attract the coordinated international law
enforcement response that larger markets invite.
(9) It should be noted that the period November 2017 to March 2018 was
excluded because of unreliable data.
CASE STUDY 17
Double blow to darknet markets

In April 2019, the German Federal marketplace, and over 63 000 offers selling suppliers of narcotics were
Criminal Police shut down the Wall had been made by the 5 400-plus arrested.
Street Market, under the authority of vendors. For payment, buyers used the
the German Public Prosecutor’s office. cryptocurrencies bitcoin and monero. Silkkitie has been operating on the
They were supported by the Dutch The alleged marketplace operators Tor network for the Finnish market
national police, Europol, Eurojust and are said to have received commission since 2013. It expanded operations
various US government agencies. payments of between 2 % to 6 % of the internationally (under the name
Another marketplace, Silkkitie (also sales value for the settlement of illegal Valhalla) in late 2015. Silkkitie is
known as Valhalla) was seized by the sales of the platform. one of the oldest and internationally
Finnish customs service in cooperation best-known Tor trade sites. Based on
with the French national police and The operation led by the German the findings of the investigation, the
Europol. authorities saw the arrest of three Finnish customs service also made
suspects and, as a result of the house a significant bitcoin seizure. After the
Wall Street Market was the world’s searches carried out, police officers Silkkitie site was shut down by the
second largest darknet market, seized over EUR 550 000 in cash, as authorities, some of the Finnish drugs
enabling the trade in drugs (including well as bitcoin and monero in 6-digit traders moved their activities to other
cocaine, heroin, cannabis and amounts, several vehicles and other sites in the Tor network, such as Wall
amphetamines), stolen data, fake evidence, such as computers and Street Market.
documents and malicious software. data storage. In the US, during the
More than 1 150 000 customer investigation by the Attorney General Source: Europol (2019e).
accounts were registered on the online in Los Angeles, two of the highest-
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I
and Hansa take-downs on the darknet ecosystem (for fuller The data collected also showed that the vast majority of
technical details see Christin and Thomas, 2019). sales originating from the EU were from three countries:
the United Kingdom, with EUR 28.2 million in total
The analysis of the development of sales between 2017 sales; Germany, with about EUR 18.8 million; and the
and 2018 revealed three distinct trends. Netherlands, with just over EUR 10.3 million (Figure 2.9).
Sales of much lower values originated from France
1. Revenue on Dream Market and TradeRoute experienced (EUR 3.8 million), Spain (EUR 1.1 million) and Belgium
a strong increase starting in July 2017. This corresponds (EUR 1.0 million), while vendors purporting to ship
to the take-downs of AlphaBay and Hansa. from multiple possible locations were also prominent
2. The overall revenue of these four markets reached (EUR 4.0 million). In the top three countries, the highest
approximately EUR 800 000 per day on average. revenue-generating substances were cannabis, cocaine
This is comparable to AlphaBay’s daily revenue at its and other stimulants. Vendors in the Netherlands
peak (EMCDDA and Europol, 2017). This suggests generated a significantly lower proportion of their revenue
that the AlphaBay and Hansa take-downs did not from cannabis than those in Germany or the United
have a significant impact on the overall revenue of Kingdom.
the ecosystem. This resilience of the darknet markets
ecosystem was also observed after the Silk Road take- The general trends observed with respect to financial
down and Operation Onymous. revenue also apply to the quantities of drugs traded by
3. Dream Market was by far the largest market by sales. European darknet vendors: Germany (3 153 kg overall),
TradeRoute was of significant size up to October 2017, the United Kingdom (2 825 kg overall) and the Netherlands
when it closed in an apparent exit scam. (1 174 kg overall) dominate the ecosystem. In all other
countries together, the total weight of products shipped
A comparison of sales of drugs originating from the EU was less than 1 tonne (1 000 kg). Vendors in the United
with those originating from other countries showed that EU Kingdom generated higher revenue than those in Germany
countries represented roughly 44 % of global drug revenue, yet sold a lower overall weight. This may reflect factors such
and 37 % of the weight sold during the period studied. as variations in price, as well as differences in the types of
drugs offered by vendors in different countries.
Figure 2.9
Breakdown of sales revenues originating from the EU, Norway and Turkey by country, 2017-18
Breakdown by revenue (major countries) Breakdown by revenue (other countries)
Million EUR Million EUR

30
4
25
20 3
15
2
10
1
5
0 0
United Germany Netherlands
tvia
le
ia
Bu ey
ria
Slo en
ia
ia
Slo nd
Sw ia
ly
l
d
d
urg
Cz ia
De hia
No k
Po y
e
Be in
m
ga
a
ar
nc
lan
Lu inlan
Ita
ltip
vak
an
ven
ton
str
a
lgiu
rk
rw
lga
ed
la
Kingdom
rtu
Sp
ec
nm
bo
La
Fra
Tu
hu
Ire
Au
Mu
Es
Po
xem
F
Lit
Cannabis Cocaine Dissociatives Hallucinogens NPS Opioids Non-cocaine stimulants
Notes: For readability, the three major countries (Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) are represented on a different scale from the other countries.
‘Multiple’ denotes that several EU countries are mentioned as country of origin. Cannabis: a range of forms. Cocaine: a range of forms. Dissociatives: ketamine,
gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), gamma-butyrolactone (GBL). Hallucinogens: LSD, PCP (excluding psychedelics). Non-cocaine stimulants: amphetamine,
methamphetamine, MDMA, MDA. Opioids: heroin, opium, analgesics.
71
The dynamic nature of online markets, their ability to evolve the empirical research gap characterising drug distribution
to counter threats and exploit new opportunities, and the through social networks, the EMCDDA commissioned
introduction or adoption of new technologies mean that a background report on the role of these networks in
enhanced monitoring capacity in this area is crucial to selected European countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
ensure that responses keep pace with developments and to Norway and Sweden) (Demant and Bakken, 2019).
reduce the health and security threats that developments
in this area now present. Denmark, Iceland and Sweden have active open social
media drug markets, especially within Facebook groups
and on Instagram. These markets are characterised by
Social networks and smartphone apps high accessibility, facilitating dealing between strangers.
In contrast, private digital markets predominate in Finland
While attention is often focused on the use of the darknet and Norway, with drug dealing facilitated through closed,
for drug trafficking, the use of mainstream applications may peer-to-peer-only messaging applications such as Wickr,
be equally important and more readily accessible. In 2018, Snapchat and Facebook Messenger. Accessing the markets
75 % of people aged 16-74 in the EU used a smartphone then demands a higher level of previous knowledge to be
for private purposes (Eurostat, 2019b). According to able to contact a seller (whom and how to contact), which
a social media report, the social networking platform is often achieved by friends acting as intermediaries.
Facebook has more than 1.6 billion registered users; the Depending on the app in use, sellers sometimes send
video-sharing site YouTube has more than 1 billion active group messages (e.g. by Wickr) or public stories (e.g. by
users; and the social streaming site Twitter has more than Snapchat) giving information about newly arrived drugs
500 million registered users worldwide (Nielsen, 2016). or special deals. In Norway, if Facebook is used to sell
and buy drugs, it is only through private messages or
Following the development and diffusion of social groups strictly exclusive to Facebook friends. In Finland,
platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter among a large public digital market operates on a forum, placed
young people, these platforms are being increasingly used as a hidden service on the darknet and available only with
by drug suppliers and dealers (Coomber and Moyle, 2018; a Tor browser. This darknet forum functions very much like
Miliano et al., 2018; Moyle et al., 2019). The use of online the groups on Facebook observed in Denmark, Iceland
social networks and smartphone applications, or ‘apps’, and Sweden. The main characteristic of these markets is
in the drug trade effectively negates the need for specific that sellers publicly post their drug offers, including their
expertise (as with Tor-based darknet markets) but still contact information, and encourage further communication
provides a level of hidden or encrypted communication on private channels such as Wickr. Despite the variations
that is not provided by public listings on the surface web. between countries, the overall process is similar: parties
Messenger services such as Wickr or WhatsApp can also first meet online, where price and amount are discussed,
be harnessed to provide dealers with end-to-end encrypted and then meet physically to exchange cash and drugs.
communication to work out transaction details at all levels
of the drug market. A closer examination of drug dealing on Facebook
revealed 113 Facebook groups where illicit drugs were
At the retail level, media reports have demonstrated how sold: 26 in Denmark, 30 in Iceland and 57 in Sweden.
easy it may be to obtain a range of illicit drugs via social Of them, 63 indicated a specific geographical coverage:
media platforms such as Instagram, Snapchat, Tinder and 34 nationwide, 20 citywide, six covering large regions
Facebook (Dooley, 2017). Journalistic reports must be (often including whole counties or more than one city),
viewed with caution (Coomber et al., 2000); however, they two concerning small regions (i.e. a city and surrounding
do illustrate some important aspects of technology-based areas) and, finally, one market focused on a specific area
distribution. On social media sites, the use of hashtags within a city. Despite these data, an estimation of market
(user-generated labels that enable the identification demographics is challenging because almost half of the
of content on a particular topic) and emoticons (small markets (50) did not inform members of their geographical
digital images or icons used to express an idea) provides reach (no specific instructions in the group summary). There
the gateway to advertisements for sale of a range of are clear differences between countries. Denmark has
substances (Ferguson, 2016). national markets for the most part, which fit the geography
of the country: every part is easy to reach in little time, and
While drug sales and advertising on social platforms and it is densely populated. Sweden, on the other hand, has
messenger services appear to be acquiring prominence, a significant number of citywide groups. In Iceland, the
there is relatively little research exploring the place of these majority of groups do not specify geographical reach, which
technologies in drug markets. To systematically address may suggest they are open to nationwide sales.
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New techniques in production and complex chemical methods have been observed, signalling
smuggling an emerging new type of technological innovation in the
drug trade. This technique involves modifying the drug into
Some cannabis resin producers based in Morocco have a new substance, which is undetectable by those conducting
adapted their production techniques in order to improve inspections even using advanced detection equipment.
the quality of their product, mainly through the introduction An example was found in 2017 when law enforcement
of crop varieties with higher yields (EMCDDA and Europol, officers in Spain found cocaine in a shipment of ion exchange
2016). Such agronomic techniques may be applied to other resin, a polymer substance used for separating molecules.
illicit crops relevant to drugs, for example opium poppies The cocaine was modified in order to chemically bond it to
grown in Afghanistan, coca plants grown in Latin America the resin, so the cocaine was not readily identifiable. Once
or ephedra plants grown in China. Over the last few years, the resin was smuggled, the cocaine could be recovered
the production outputs of Afghanistan and Colombia have from the resin by the simple application of an acidic solution.
been very high and the output of illicit methamphetamine Another example of a technique that makes the smuggled
laboratories in south-east Asia also seems to have been cocaine undetectable to customs inspection is the chemical
boosted in recent times (UNODC, 2018a). Although there combination of cocaine into a polymer such as polythene
will be many factors contributing to the increases in each or polymethylmethacrylate (also known as Plexiglas or
case, the adoption of new techniques play a part. This Perspex). This technique results in a plastic or rubber
has been reflected in an apparent oversupply of cocaine substance that incorporates the cocaine within the structure
and heroin in the global supply chain, with undesirable of the polymer. Extraction of the cocaine at the destination
consequences for Europe. A number of other developments requires the specialist knowledge of illicit chemists who know
have also been taking place that are providing opportunities the processes used at the place of origin. Typically, chemists
to increase drug production and supply. from Latin America would be used to perform this recovery
stage.
Precursor innovation and chemically masking These developments indicate that maintaining a competitive
drugs advantage by improving drug production processes,
minimising the risk of prosecution and avoiding detection is
As well as the innovation in plant-based drug production, high on the agenda of international groups involved in the
synthetic drug production has also been undergoing an drug business. Aside from these innovations, recognising
era of transformational development. Much like hackers how drug production has become more globally complex,
find vulnerabilities in computer systems to facilitate their and how those who produce and traffic drugs are quick
work, chemical techniques are applied to drug precursors, to exploit developments in the infrastructure supporting
modifying them in order to circumvent international control international trade and in information technology, is
systems and facilitate the production of synthetic drugs. becoming ever more important. These developments
have the potential to have a rapid impact on the kinds of
Whereas in previous years synthetic drug production relied problems we are likely to face in the future. Consequently,
on the acquisition of highly regulated chemical precursors, improving our monitoring and analytical capacity will remain
the current practice in Europe is to use non-regulated a critical requirement for being better prepared to respond
chemicals that can be easily converted to those precursor effectively to such future threats.
chemicals, or even more novel ones that can be directly
transformed into a synthetic drug (EMCDDA, 2019f). As
well as confirming that drug producers are becoming more
adept at borrowing techniques from the pharmaceutical
industry and applying them to the drug trade in order to Criminal tools
evade detection, these developments present a challenge
to the international precursor control regime (see Chapter 6 There are indications that drug-trafficking OCGs have
for more details). become more competent at using a range of items and
techniques as crime tools or, in some cases, more adept
Traditional methods to avoid detection of smuggling attempts at collaborating with people with such abilities. Here we
during the inspection of goods typically involve hiding highlight a few examples of material things that are being
drugs in some way or another. More recently, increasingly used to further the drug trade and related criminal activity.
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Firearms and other weapons involving explosives have been reported in the Netherlands
too. Former conflict zones, e.g. the Western Balkans, are
The damage caused by criminal use of firearms by OCGs a significant source of illegal firearms and explosives,
involved in drug markets is direct and indirect. Direct including grenades (Hustad, 2018; Triebel, 2016).
impact includes the number of killings and injuries, which
may for example occur in disputes between rival gangs
over territories, while indirect impact results from the use Encrypted communication devices
of firearms to intimidate and coerce their victims (UNODC,
2012a). The use of firearms by organised crime groups, Encrypted communication devices have become important
particularly in high-profile incidents of violence between criminal tools, making use of technological advances
members of rival groups, attracts considerable public as highlighted above. High-end encrypted smartphones
interest and can undermine community confidence and continue to be preferred by OCGs to reduce the visibility
wellbeing (Crocker et al., 2017). of their activities to law enforcement. OCGs use encrypted
communication devices and apps as their primary means
Changes in drug markets may affect firearms use. In of communication, owing to the content protection features
the United Kingdom some provincial police forces have available on these devices and applications (see Case
highlighted concerns about increasing firearms use related study 18).
to the phenomenon of county lines: the supply of primarily
heroin and (crack) cocaine from the capital and big cities A recent study on technology and organised crime in
to provincial towns, often associated with the exploitation the smart city indicated that, just as mobile telephones
of vulnerable people as discussed above, but also with revolutionised drug dealing back in the early 1990s, drug
intimidation and violence (see the section on harms to dealers have made extensive use of developments in
individuals, families and neighbourhoods in Chapter 1). mobile phones and other communication technologies
For example, a recent report on the phenomenon indicated and have a sophisticated understanding of their uses and
that 118 of these lines had been identified as having links potential vulnerabilities to law enforcement investigation
to firearms (NCA, 2019). (Berry, 2018).
This is one illustration of the strong connection between With data encryption playing an increasingly important role
drug supply and firearms use, and how firearms may be in data protection, like other technological developments it
used to protect and enable other criminal interests. When provides opportunities for criminals and challenges for law
automatic weapons are recovered in the United Kingdom, enforcement. For example, the entry into effect of the EU
for example, they are usually linked to drug supply General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) means that all
(NCA, 2018b, p. 52). personal information on registrants of domain names has
been redacted from the publicly available WHOIS database.
The EMCDDA-commissioned pilot study of drug-related Consequently, all public institutions whose task it is to
homicide in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden shows combat fraud and protect consumers, to investigate and
that firearms were used in 54 % of the Dutch drug-related prosecute online crime and to protect network information
cases, compared with 19 % in Finland and 39 % in Sweden. systems (computer emergency response teams) have lost
Firearms featured in drug-related homicides twice as often direct access to an essential source of information for their
as in non drug-related events. In general, drug-related online investigations: domain name registration information
homicides involved a firearm more often than non-drug- (WHOIS data). The end of direct access to WHOIS data
related homicides (EMCDDA, 2019c). represents a threat to investigations, including those of
terrorism, serious organised crime, child sexual abuse and
Recently there appears to have been an increase in the cybercrime. EU Member States are reporting to Europol
use of hand grenades in the context of drug markets (Barry a steadily increasing number of investigations hampered
and Anderson, 2018; Dalton, 2018). In Sweden increasing and delayed by the lack of access to WHOIS data.
numbers of seizures of grenades linked to cases of illicit
drug trade-related extortion and victimisation have been While data encryption is an important tool to provide
reported. According to police national figures, 43 hand protection and privacy to GDPR-mandated data, it should
grenades were seized in the country in 2017, of which 21 be stressed that increased availability and ongoing
had been detonated. In 2016, 55 were seized, of which advancement in this area will probably continue to
35 had been detonated, whereas only 10 detonated provide drug traffickers with a diverse range of resources
grenades were seized in 2015 (Roden, 2018). A similar to conduct their activity and impede law enforcement
trend and related incidents of drug-related violence investigations.
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Fraudulent documents A number of darknet markets provide access to such

documents, some of which come with bills or bank
Fraudulent documents are a significant issue, as they statements as proof of identity. Based on open source
enable a range of crimes, including drug trafficking, human information from darknet markets, in 2018 there were
trafficking and terrorism. Drug-trafficking OCGs use 425 listings of fraudulent papers that said they would be
fraudulent documents for various purposes. For example, shipped from European countries.
fraudulent personal identity documents may be used by
truck drivers transporting illicit drugs; work contracts may As highlighted by Europol in its latest SOCTA, the use
be obtained to pretend that companies conduct actual of fraudulent documents in the EU has significantly
businesses with employees or to provide cover to criminals increased and is expected to emerge as one of the
who are falsely declared to be company employees; or fastest-growing criminal markets over the coming years
fraudulent transportation and customs bills may be used (Europol, 2017b, p. 20). In response, the Council of the
to facilitate the cross-border transfer of cash, justified as EU in May 2017 identified document fraud as one of the
payments (Savona and Riccardi, 2018). 10 crime priorities to be addressed between 2018 and
2021 (see Chapter 8).
CASE STUDY 18
Encrypted phones for criminal purposes

In 2017 Dutch police arrested the hit. All BlackBerry devices were they were also able to secure
the owner of a company that sold provided by a single company; were several terabytes of encrypted data
encrypted mobile phones. Although paid for in cash; and lacked a camera from the BES server. The (meta)
the manufacture and sale of such and a microphone, able only to send data contained information on drug
phones are legal, Dutch investigators out encrypted text messages. The prices and the specific areas of
maintained that their primary purpose objective for investigators was not only crime in which a number of groups
was to facilitate drug trafficking and to prove that the company was acting were active. Notably, detail was
other crime. The phones sold for as a crime facilitator but also to locate unveiled about the activity of the
around EUR 1 200 and were preloaded the Blackberry Enterprise Server Mocro-Mafia, a group that received
with additional encryption software. (BES). Consequently, the director shipments of cocaine in Antwerp
and managers of the company were and ultimately was responsible for
Details emerged during the arrested and financial assets were a number of assassinations across the
investigation of an assassination, confiscated along with illegal firearms. Netherlands. Cases like this prompt
when forensics were able to decrypt a discussion on future procedures for
messages that were located on During the investigations, detectives law enforcement agencies in terms of
BlackBerry phones encrypted with found that communications between questions around privacy/security.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) containing the criminals in the Netherlands were
the communications between the routed through a BES in Canada. In Sources: Cox (2017); Egberts (2017).
perpetrators and the man who ordered collaboration with police in Canada
75
Increasing preparedness through a future-oriented approach
A central message that comes through in this report is that the drug market
is increasingly dynamic, with OCGs quick to innovate and take advantage of
opportunities presented by the global and digital economies. This is in many ways no
different from the situation observed across areas of legitimate commercial activity,
in which successful business models are increasingly ones that are future-oriented
and highly adaptive to changing circumstances. Drug policies and accompanying
law enforcement responses, on the other hand, are usually reactive. An example can
be seen around the emergence of NPS over the last decade, a phenomenon that has
posed a serious challenge to existing policy and response models.
There is a growing body of knowledge of how taking a future-oriented approach can

increase preparedness to respond to potential future challenges, helping to create
institutional resilience and fostering more agile policy approaches. There are various
approaches to future-oriented planning and analysis. Scenario planning is likely to be
particularly useful for increasing Europe’s preparedness to future challenges linked
to a more dynamic and innovative drug market. This technique involves forecasting
a range of different possible future developments and considering their implications
for harms and appropriate response models.
There are a number of linked areas where this approach could prove valuable. These
are all areas in which an impact on the drug market can already be seen but in which
it can also be predicted that the future implications will potentially be even more
profound.
Globalisation and developments in infrastructure to support trade. OCGs have been

quick to recognise the opportunities provided by the creation of a global marketplace
and to exploit these to circumvent existing control measures. Looking to the future,
there are a number of areas in which new opportunities for OCG activities may arise.
China’s Belt and Road initiative, creating a ‘new Silk Road’, could have a profound
impact on the flow of commercial goods both by road and by maritime routes.
Rapid developments in virtual currencies and anonymised payment systems, which
increasingly facilitate the online drug trade and allow OCG groups to reduce risks, are
likely to continue. A number of other developments are likely to have an impact on the
final stages of drug distribution models, such as the use of drone technology and the
expansion in more anonymised ‘pick-up and drop-off’ networks, which are increasingly
offering 24/7 options for deliveries.
Digitally enabled drug markets and cybercrime. The need to move large quantities
of goods rapidly to consumers creates a parallel need to manage large amounts of
information and underpins the moves towards digitalisation and automation in both
the areas of intermodal transportation (containerisation) and of parcel and post
technology. More generally, both the darknet and surface web and the use of social
media applications are growing in importance for drug distribution, while the use of
encryption, anonymised or semi-anonymised networks, and virtual currencies is also
likely to become increasingly important and challenging for law enforcement. These
digital and online developments bring with them new cybercrime risks but, at the same
time, also potential opportunities for regulation and law enforcement, such as the
development of artificial intelligence systems.
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Exploitation of regulatory gaps and differences. The development of global

e-commerce services has provided OCGs with the ability to exploit regulatory
differences across geographical space, as illustrated in recent developments in the
NPS area and in precursors for drug production. Potential opportunities for exploitation
include regulatory differences in areas such as medicines, lifestyle and other products
that may contain psychoactive chemicals or be converted into them, and also the
existence of a regulated cannabis market in some parts of the world and the parallel
rapid innovation in the products and forms of the drug available.
Disruption to existing market models. Many of the new developments described in

this report lower the barrier to new entrants into the drug market. An obvious example
of this is the way ‘entrepreneurs’ can sell synthetic opioids purchased online and thus
compete with heroin suppliers, who require a complex infrastructure to transport and
protect their product. They also create the conditions for OCGs to operate in new
ways and diversify their interests across illicit products. Overall, these developments
create the conditions for disruptive criminal business models, greater competition
and associated conflict, with the potential for an increase in harms, including violence,
associated with the drug market as highlighted, in this report.
Impact of the growth of new drug markets in less economically developed countries.
Historically, drug problems were often viewed through a lens that focused on drugs
produced in the developing world and consumed in the developed world. However, as
noted in this report, the EU is increasingly both a source and a transit point for drugs
consumed elsewhere. Moreover, demographic and social changes mean that the drug
problems of the future will increasingly be manifest in less economically developed
countries. This can be seen today in the growth in opioid problems in some African
countries or in cocaine markets growing among more affluent populations in Asia.
These changes often occur where capacity to monitor them is weak and where drug
problems have the potential to exacerbate other health and security threats. The direct
and indirect implications of these changes, both locally and on the EU, may potentially
be profound.
Impact of conflict, political instability and climate change. The lowering of barriers to
entry into the drug market already noted, combined with the considerable profits that
involvement can deliver, especially when other means of income generation become
difficult or when governance structures are weakened, mean that conflict and social
instability is a strong pull factor for drug market involvement, both in the EU and
elsewhere. Moreover, those affected by conflict and social instability also become
more vulnerable to recruitment or exploitation by OCGs involved in the drug trade.
A vicious circle can develop, as the income generated by the illicit trade adds further to
instability by undermining governance, and alliances develop between OCGs involved
in drug trafficking and other groups that pose a threat to security. Looking to the future,
existing conflicts will continue to pose a multifaceted security threat to the EU, and
drugs are likely to be an element in this that could be overlooked. Climate change
will increasingly add to these pressures, while also potentially leading to a shift in the
places in which drug production is possible.
77
III
PART II
Main drug markets in the EU

In Part II we take an in-depth look at the markets for the main
drugs used in Europe, in each case following the flow from
production and trafficking to distribution and use.
CHAPTER 3
Cannabis
CHAPTER 4
CHAPTER 5
Cocaine
CHAPTER 6
Amphetamine, MDMA and
methamphetamine
CHAPTER 7
Photo: istockphoto
81
CHAPTER 3
Cannabis
Key points
Cannabis in Europe
X Cannabis is the biggest drug market in the EU and reporting having used cannabis in the last year, although
a major source of income for the criminal economy. there are recent signs of increases in younger age cohorts
With around 25 million people reporting having used in some countries.
the drug in the past year, the retail market for cannabis
is conservatively estimated to be worth at least
EUR 11.6 billion. Developments in production and
trafficking
X Europe is a major cannabis producer; it is estimated that
at least 20 000 cannabis cultivation sites are dismantled in X Production near to, or by, consumers creates additional
the EU each year, although the number of sites producing challenges for law enforcement. A large proportion of the
cannabis at any given time is likely to be much higher. herbal cannabis consumed in the EU is grown there, closer
to its place of consumption, rather than being imported
X Diversity in OCG involvement and levels of intergroup from outside the EU, reducing the need to traffic the drug
violence appear to be increasing. OCGs of Moroccan origin across external borders and lowering the risk of interdiction.
still play a major role in cannabis resin trafficking, and This and how to address small-scale production, which
groups of Dutch origin especially, but also of Vietnamese is tolerated in some Member States, creates a more
origin, are important for large-scale production. However, challenging landscape for law enforcement actions.
more generally, involvement in the cannabis market can
be an important cash generator for both established and X Morocco’s Rif Mountains are the region of origin of
emerging OCGs, leading to increased intergroup violence. most of the cannabis resin available in Europe. Increased
cooperation with European cannabis producers appears
X The cannabis market is becoming more diverse and to explain the spread of high-yield, high-potency varieties
complex. Illicitly produced herbal cannabis and cannabis of cannabis in this region and therefore the increase in the
resin continue to be the most commonly used forms of potency of cannabis resin observed in Europe over the last
cannabis and tend to be much more potent than in the 10 years.
past. The market now also includes high-potency cannabis
oils, synthetic cannabinoids, cannabis and cannabinoid X Cannabis production causes a range of environmental
products and preparations intended for medical use, and harms. In Morocco it has been associated with soil
an increasing number of cannabidiol (CBD) or low-THC erosion, deforestation and water security issues, probably
products being sold in a range of forms. The regulatory exacerbated by the introduction of new plant strains. In the
status of these varies considerably, posing new challenges EU, production is also linked to environmental, and health
for law enforcement, regulation and monitoring. and safety risks.
X Consumption estimates generally appear stable, with X Diffusion is evident in cannabis resin trafficking routes.
around one in seven young adults (aged 15-34) in the EU While Spain remains the main entry point into the EU, the
82
CHAPTER 3 Cannabis
I
trafficking of resin produced in Morocco and Lebanon now Q Improve the monitoring and assess the impact of
affects the Mediterranean Sea region as a whole, following trends in cannabis products available on the EU
the emergence of Libya as a major storage and transit hub markets. This requires better forensic evidence on the
for the drug. content and sources of cannabis seizures as well as
the identification of any new higher-potency forms of
X The Netherlands and Spain are commonly identified as cannabis appearing on the market.
the source of origin of seizures made by EU countries. In Q Invest greater efforts in monitoring, analysis and
addition, despite efforts to counter production, the Western information sharing to understand the dynamics
Balkans, and Albania in particular, appears to remain an of cannabis trafficking and production in countries
important source of origin for herbal cannabis seizures. bordering the EU. Crop-monitoring programmes in
close cooperation with important countries such as
X The frequency of small-volume online cannabis sales is Albania and Morocco would contribute to this.
increasing. Although the scale is currently small compared Q Strengthen EU interagency cooperation and develop
with traditional retail markets, it has considerable potential targeted enforcement actions to identify and respond
to grow. to any threats resulting from Libya’s emerging role as
a significant storage and transit country.
Q Follow closely and assess the implications for
the cannabis market, and the potential risks, of
commercial, medical and regulatory developments
Implications for action to address occurring internationally and within EU Member States.
current threats and increase Strengthen coordination of activities at EU level to
preparedness ensure that the roles and responsibilities of various
partners, including law enforcement and regulatory
bodies, are well articulated.
To identify and respond to new threats related to the
cannabis market there is a need to take the following
actions.
Q Give high priority to sharing information and best

practice on law enforcement strategies to detect
significant cannabis production sites in the EU,
including models for cooperation with relevant utility
services, and strengthen the standardised reporting of
interdiction activities in this area.
83
Cannabis overview Global

Herb, resin
World
Last year use 181 million
Estimated number using cannabis in the last year aged 15-64
Wholesale price at key locations

Herb (EUR/kg)
*Mean **Mode ***Min-Max
Producer countries
Albania** 202 Herb Resin
United Kingdom** 880
Spain* 1 343
Italy* 2 287
Belgium* 4 525
Selected transit and destination

countries
Germany* 4 599
Global seizures of herbal cannabis Poland** 5 000
(tonnes) Sweden* 5 662
7 000 Latvia** 6 000

Ireland* 8 000
6 000 Finland** 10 000
Resin (EUR/kg)
5 000
Producer countries
Afghanistan** 72
4 000
Morocco** 694
3 000 Lebanon** 1 080
Selected transit and destination

2 000 countries
Algeria** 1 016 (2015 data)

1 000
Spain* 1 626
Albania*** 1 495-1 994
0
2007 2017 Italy* 2 338
Selected destination countries

Global seizures of cannabis resin
(tonnes) United Kingdom* 880
2 000 Germany* 2 775

Belgium* 3 140
1 000 Denmark* 3 842
Estonia* 5 500
0 Norway* 6 367
2007 2017
84
CHAPTER 3 Cannabis
I
Europe
39 %
EU retail drug
market share
EU 17.5 million young adults (15-34)

24.7
7 million
m
miill
millli
lio
ioon
n
Estimated number using cannabis in the last year aged 15-64
Number of seizures (thousands)

600
500 EU+2
EU
400
EU+2
300 EU
200
100
0
2007 2017
Treatment
Trends in first-time entrants for problems Quantity seized (tonnes)
related to cannabis
350 EU+2
80 000
EU
60 000
0
40 000
1 000
20 000
EU+2
0 EU
2007 2017 500
Data for 23 EU Member States.
0
Drug law offences related to cannabis 2007 2017
Retail price Potency

765 000 (EUR/g) (% THC)
Indexed trends:
€2
22
22 Price and potency
211
€13 15 %
12 %
532 000 9%
€7
€4
4 116 3%
2007 2017
100
2007 2017
15 % 83 %
Offences Other Offences for Indexed trends:
for supply possession/use Price and potency
€25 211
25 %
22 %
Total 15 %
764 743 €13
9%
€9 120
100
€2
2007 2017
minimum maximum
interquartile
range
85
Introduction THC and CBD
The market for cannabis products is the largest drug market The cannabis plant synthesises at least 144 unique
in Europe, since cannabis is the most commonly used compounds known as cannabinoids. The most
illicit drug both in Europe and worldwide (UNODC, 2019a). abundant of these is delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol
It is estimated that 91.2 million adults in the EU (aged (THC), which produces effects such as feeling ‘high’,
15-64), or 27.4 % of this age group, have tried cannabis relaxation and altered perception, effects that people
during their lives and 7.4 % have used cannabis in the last who use cannabis (recreationally) usually pursue
year. Use among young adults is even more common, with from the drug.
an estimated 14.4 % of people aged between 15 and 34
having used cannabis in the last year. Cannabidiol (CBD) is the second most abundant
cannabinoid that is typically produced by the
In most countries, recent survey results show either stable cannabis plant. CBD has been found to offset
or increasing last year cannabis use among young adults. some of the possible harmful effects of THC (such
Of the countries that have produced surveys since 2016 as memory impairment and paranoia) without
and reported confidence intervals, six reported higher influencing the ‘high’ that users seek.
estimates than in the previous comparable survey, five
were stable and one reported a decrease. In 11 of these THC and CBD are both synthesised in the cannabis
countries, an increase in use among 15- to 24-year-olds has plant in the glandular trichomes, which are
been reported in the most recent survey (EMCDDA, 2019b). resinous and sticky, helping to defend the plant
against herbivores and environmental stresses.
The illicit cultivation of cannabis mainly yields two distinct The production of THC and CBD is genetically
cannabis products: herbal cannabis (marijuana) and determined, with plants producing high levels of
cannabis resin (hashish). Other cannabis products available THC, high levels of CBD or a mixture of the two. In
in the EU include cannabis oil and hash oil. In the last few the cannabis plant, THC and CBD are synthesised
years a variety of other high-potency extracts of cannabis, from the same precursor, which means that CBD
collectively known as ‘concentrates’ (e.g. rosin, crumble and production limits the amount of THC synthesised and
wax), have been seen on the European market, although vice versa (EMCDDA, 2019d).
reliable information about these products is rather limited
In the EU, it is legal to cultivate and supply cannabis
(see Figure 3.1).
plants for hemp fibre if they have low levels of
THC. The granting of payments under the common
These products all differ in terms of their ‘potency’. In
agricultural policy is conditional upon the use of
pharmacology, ‘potency’ is often related to the amount
certified seeds of specified hemp varieties; only
(dose) of the drug required to produce an effect. Therefore,
varieties with a THC content not exceeding 0.2 %
using ‘potency’ to describe the concentration of THC
may be used (EU Regulation 1307/2013) (EMCDDA,
in cannabis products is not technically correct. A more
2018f). However, this report focuses on the illicit
accurate term would be ‘strength’, which is the amount of
production and distribution of cannabis products with
THC in a defined unit of the product. For consistency with
a higher THC content.
previous publications and reports, however, we use the term
‘potency’ throughout this report (see box ‘THC and CBD’).
86
CHAPTER 3 Cannabis
I
Figure 3.1
Taxonomy of cannabis products old and new
THC
concentration (%)
Traditional methods 2-18 %

Herbal
Sieved
Hand 7-27 %
rubbed Resin
Chilled
10-60 %
Solvent Heat Oil
(Dried)
flower
New methods
Butane
has oil
hash
Wax
~75 %
Solvent Heat C mble
Crumble Concentrates
Shatter
Extraction
Heat Pressure Rosin
~99 %
Crystalline
THC
Global overview In 2017, some 1 161 tonnes of cannabis resin was seized
worldwide, about 30 % less than in 2016. After peaking at
Cannabis is the most commonly used illicit drug in the 6 800 tonnes in 2004, worldwide herbal cannabis seizures
world and is reported to be produced in almost all countries declined to 4 682 tonnes in 2016, but then rose to 5 109
in the world, both indoors and outdoors. The extensive and tonnes in 2017 (UNODC, 2019a).
diverse nature of cannabis production makes it impossible
to produce reliable estimates of global production. In addition to the legal production of hemp (see box ‘THC
However, based on expert opinion and information from and CBD’), legislative changes in parts of the world have
105 countries, the UNODC reports that global cannabis led to the juxtaposition of regulated cannabis markets,
cultivation is likely to have increased between 2010 and in which products for medicinal and recreational use are
2017 (UNODC, 2019a). produced and distributed by legal companies, and the illicit
87
cannabis market, in which cannabis is either produced, Production

trafficked and distributed by organised crime groups
or cultivated for personal use or for sharing with other
people but still operates outside the legal framework. Cultivation processes
These changes have led to a diversification of products
as well as complicating the context within which policy The quality of the plant and of all the products derived from
and operational responses are conducted. In 2019, it depends on many factors. It is essential to have sufficient
the rescheduling of cannabis in the UN drug control light exposure (natural or artificial) and have access to
conventions was recommended by the World Health good-quality seeds, cuttings or clones. Further, the method
Organization (see box ‘WHO recommendations related to of cultivation, the number of plants per square metre,
cannabis and cannabis-related subustances’). water supply and soil acidity or alkalinity (which affects
the availability of nutrients) may influence the yield of the
cultivation site.
WHO recommendations related to cannabis and cannabis-related substances
In November 2018, the WHO Expert Committee on of which there is convincing evidence that would
Drug Dependence (ECDD) critically reviewed cannabis satisfy the criteria for inclusion in Schedule I of the
and cannabis-related substances. In January 2019, 1971 Convention.
the ECDD recommendations were submitted by the Q Extracts and tinctures of cannabis to be deleted
WHO to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as from Schedule I of 1961 Convention. There are
follows. three main types of illicit products derived from the
cannabis plant: extracts, tinctures and products
Q Cannabis and cannabis resin to be deleted from derived by application of heat or pressure. Under
Schedule IV of the Single Convention on Narcotic the 1961 Convention, ‘preparation’ is a general
drugs (1961). The ECDD considered that the term covering mixtures, solids or liquids containing
abuse and ill-effects associated with cannabis a substance. The ECDD therefore concluded that
and cannabis resin were similar to drugs in by relying on control of preparations of cannabis
Schedule I and were not commensurate with the there is greater certainty of the control measure.
other substances in Schedule IV. The Committee Q Cannabidiol (CBD) preparations – a footnote to
acknowledged there is now evidence that cannabis be added to the entry for cannabis and cannabis
preparations have therapeutic advantages. resin in Schedule I of the 1961 Convention
Q Dronabinol (delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol) to be that ‘preparations containing predominantly
added to Schedule I of the 1961 Convention and cannabidiol and not more than 0.2 % delta-9-
deleted from Schedule II of the Convention on tetrahydrocannabinol are not under international
Psychotropic Substances (1971). The criterion control’. It is noted that while CBD does not satisfy
for recommending that dronabinol be included in the criteria for control under the 1961 or 1971
Schedule I was the criterion of similarity in liability Conventions, Member States can regulate its
to abuse and to produce ill-effects to cannabis and availability using their own national legislation.
preparations of cannabis. This follows a similar Q Recommendation on pharmaceutical preparations
approach applied to coca leaf, where the plant and of cannabis and delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol
the drug that is included in the plant (cocaine) are (dronabinol) to be added to Schedule III of the
controlled within the same schedule. 1961 Convention. Preparations of controlled
Q Tetrahydrocannabinol (the isomers of delta-9- drugs included in Schedule III are exempted from
tetrahydrocannabinol) to be added to Schedule some of the requirements for control of these
I of 1961 Convention and deleted from Schedule drugs under Schedule I or II. However, they are still
I of the 1971 Convention, subject to the adoption subject to a significant level of control.
of the recommendation on dronabinol above. The
isomers of THC, including the isomer dronabinol, Source: WHO (2019) and letter of the WHO Director General to the UN
Secretary General.
comprise a varied group of substances for none
88
CHAPTER 3 Cannabis
I
Figure 3.2 Figure 3.3

Glandular trichomes on the surface of a cannabis The production of cannabis resin through the ‘sieving’
flower bud method using a mesh screen
Photo: David Potter
Outdoor cultivation varies in scale and can produce up to

three harvests per year depending upon the weather, the
amount of light and the strain of cannabis used (EMCDDA
and Europol, 2016). Indoor cultivation sites range from
small-scale home-grown operations with fewer than 20
plants to professional ones of many hundreds of plants
run by criminal networks that are often located in houses Photos: David Potter
or apartments taken over for the sole purpose of growing,

or in industrial warehouses or large sheds. The control In addition to resin production, there are several alternative
that can be exercised over growing conditions (light, heat, methods for extracting cannabinoids from cannabis
water, plant density, pest control, etc.) allows continuous plants. The physical removal of resinous secretions
cultivation throughout the year and can result in four to from the trichomes can be performed more efficiently
six full harvests per annum (Vanhove et al., 2012). The through the use of solvents or gases. These methods can
benefits of indoor cultivation include lower risk of detection achieve significantly higher potencies. Some of these
and generally higher yields of higher-potency strains and processes, especially those using flammable gases, are
less chance of spoilage due to adverse weather or pest known to be hazardous and have led to a number of
infestation. accidental explosions in several Member States. One
method of extraction uses liquefied butane gas to produce
The production of cannabis resin, or hashish, involves concentrated extracts ranging from 70 % to 80 % THC,
dislodging the glandular trichomes (small hairs that contain known as ‘butane hash oil’ or BHO. In order to produce
the resinous secretions; Figure 3.2) that form mostly on butane hash oil, ground cannabis flower may be packed
flowers (buds). The result is a fine powder that is high in into a sealed tube with a fine mesh covering the base.
THC, which is then compressed to form hashish. Traditional Butane is added from a compressed canister fitted to the
methods of resin production include rubbing and sieving top of the tube and the result is collected in a tray under the
(Figure 3.3). Leaves removed from the plants, and often base. The solution is then evaporated through heating to
discarded as waste from herbal cannabis, may be used for produce the final product (this is sometimes referred to as
resin production by sieving, but using the flowers produces purging). Depending on the solvent used and the method
a higher-potency product. In addition to traditional methods of purging, the finished product can vary in consistency.
of resin production, commercially available alternatives, For example, ‘shatter’ is hard and brittle, ‘wax’ resembles
often called pollinators, are also used. By reducing the a soft wax and ‘crumble’ is soft and flaky. ‘Rosin’ is a similar
temperature, using ice water or dry ice, these improve product made by heating and pressure, but it does not
the efficiency of the process, as the trichomes are more require any solvent.
easily removed, increasing the potency of the final product
(EMCDDA, 2019d).
89
Figure 3.4
Herbal cannabis Albanian police eradicating an outdoor cannabis plantation
Production outside the EU
Albania has for several years been a major non-EU

producer of herbal cannabis destined for the European
market. In response to the large-scale outdoor cultivation
of herbal cannabis, Albanian authorities have intensified
eradication actions in cooperation with the Italian Guardia
di Finanza law enforcement organisation, which conducted
aerial surveillance to locate cannabis cultivation sites in
remote and difficult-to-access areas. Overall, Albanian Photo: State Police Albania
authorities dismantled 5 205 cannabis cultivation sites in
2016, 500 in 2017 and 379 in 2018 (Albanian State Police, Production in the EU
2019), suggesting that eradication efforts are having an
effect on outdoor cultivation (Figure 3.4). Notwithstanding In the EU, herbal cannabis appears to be mainly produced
the law enforcement efforts and apparent scaling down of for sale on domestic markets and in neighbouring countries
outdoor production, many countries in Europe reported an rather than for export outside the region, although
increase in seizures of Albanian herbal cannabis in 2017 data on the phenomenon are lacking. A tool has been
(Austria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Sweden, developed by the EMCDDA and Europol for collecting
Turkey and the United Kingdom). Furthermore, Albania data on the number and scale of the cannabis cultivation
seized over 30 tonnes of herbal cannabis in 2016 and sites dismantled by law enforcement agencies in Europe
more than 78 tonnes in 2017; of the EMCDDA reporting (European Reporting on Illicit Cannabis Production, ERICP).
countries, only Turkey (92 tonnes) and Italy (90 tonnes) Plant seizure data, national expertise and ad hoc data
seized more herbal cannabis than Albania that year provided by law enforcement agencies and national focal
(EMCDDA, 2019b). The observed reduction in outdoor points from the EU Member States are therefore used to
cultivation sites coupled with the apparently continuous illustrate important developments in cannabis cultivation in
flow of cannabis from the region to the EU could imply that the EU.
stockpiles are held in the region, or that some cultivation
may have moved indoors or to areas with restricted Seizures of cannabis plants may be regarded as an
possibilities for aerial surveillance, or to neighbouring areas indicator of the production of the drug within a country.
in Western Balkan countries. This suggests a need for However, differences between countries, in law
further investigation and monitoring. enforcement priorities, resources and reporting practices,
warrant caution in the interpretation of these data
According to information reported to Europol, the (e.g. Figure 3.5). Recent changes to data collection tools
production of herbal cannabis in some other Western have facilitated the reporting of seizures of cannabis
Balkan states is also increasing and is intended in part for seeds. National control is not obligatory for cannabis
the EU market. Herbal cannabis produced in the Western seeds, although they are specified as subject to the drug
Balkans is increasingly trafficked to the EU by vessels control laws in Cyprus and Portugal. In other countries,
crossing the Adriatic Sea to Italy and by land on the supply of cannabis seeds for cultivation is often covered
Balkan route. The number of detected indoor cultivation by a more general offence of ‘facilitating drug production’
sites in the region has also been increasing over the last or something similar (EMCDDA, 2018f). Although the data
few years. coverage is partial for now, it will improve with time. Seven
countries (Belgium, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, Malta,
Apart from the Western Balkans, herbal cannabis is Portugal and Norway) reported a total of 1 483 seizures
cultivated in other regions of the world for the European amounting to almost 50 kg and more than 18 000 packets
drug market. For example, multi-tonne seizures of herbal of cannabis seeds in 2017.
cannabis originating from West Africa, south-west Asia
and the Caribbean are discussed later in the section on In 2016-17 the number of plants reported by the
trafficking. Netherlands decreased while the number of plants
90
CHAPTER 3 Cannabis
I
Figure 3.5 Historically, the Netherlands has been an important source

EU Member States that reported seizing the most of herbal cannabis supply within Europe. Each year the
cannabis plants, 2013-17 Dutch police have dismantled more than 5 000 cannabis
Number of plants (millions)
cultivation sites, the majority of them indoors, although
4
the numbers have declined in recent years (Dutch Police,
2019). A major study conducted by Belgian and Dutch
3 researchers has highlighted important details about how
these operate. The multimethod study, entitled ‘Dismark’,
2 used a varied range of data sources, including a review
of public prosecutors’ files and the collection of data
1 from law enforcement personnel and convicted prisoners
to investigate illicit markets for different substances
0
(De Middeleer et al., 2018). In relation to cannabis, it was
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 found that Dutch OCGs have established a business model
that guarantees a continued supply of herbal cannabis
Spain Netherlands Other countries
to the Dutch domestic market, including the cannabis
Belgium United Kingdom Italy
coffeeshops, or for further distribution to other European
countries. The model involves the transfer of know-how and
provision of professional growing equipment to ‘caretaker-
reported by Spain increased (Figure 3.5). The cultivation growers’ in return for all or a portion of the harvests
of herbal cannabis has been noted to have significantly generated by the growing operations.
increased in Spain over the last few years. Several factors
seem to be influencing the situation in Spain. Hundreds of This business model has been extended to other EU
cannabis social clubs exist in Spain, which are supposed Member States, first Belgium and Germany and more
to produce cannabis for non-profit distribution to their recently France and Spain. In Belgium, in addition to
members. In addition, there is an expanding network of satisfying some of the national demand for herbal
so-called grow shops, which sell equipment, chemicals and cannabis, large-scale production is distributed on various
literature that promote and facilitate cannabis cultivation. EU markets via the Netherlands using this model. Over
time, Belgian OCGs have adopted the know-how and have
Both the clubs and the shops are vulnerable to the expanded the domestic market. According to the study,
penetration of criminals seeking to develop large in addition to Dutch and Belgian criminal cooperation,
plantations and profitable businesses. These groups are law enforcement agencies indicated cooperation
interested in trading and profiting from their crops, often among North African OCGs, Turkish and Bulgarian
by exporting their products (Alvarez-Roldan et al., 2016). OCGs, Albanian-speaking OCGs, and South East Asian
It should also be noted that law enforcement intelligence (Vietnamese or Chinese) OCGs and outlaw motorcycle
confirms that some large growing operations in Spain gangs (De Middeleer et al., 2018). In addition, some reports
are established as collaborations between Dutch and suggest that individuals linked to Dutch coffeeshops have
Spanish criminal groups. In addition, there are reports become established in the Rif region of Morocco, where
that producers of cannabis extracts (including high- they produce a range of extracts, including high-quality
quality resin) linked to these clubs are established in the cannabis resin (Chouvy and Macfarlane, 2018; see also the
Rif region of Morocco (see section below on cannabis section below on cannabis resin).
resin). Cannabis clubs and grow shops may exist in other
European countries, although it appears not to the same The high numbers of cannabis plants reported by Italy and
extent. Cannabis social clubs have been established in the United Kingdom suggest that significant amounts of
Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, herbal cannabis are produced there (Figure 3.5). In the
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. However, it is unclear United Kingdom, domestic production is widespread,
if clubs still exist in all of these countries, and if they with British and South-East Asian OCGs controlling these
engage in production and distribution among members as operations. More recent information suggests that an
in the Spanish model (Decorte and Pardal, 2017; Pardal, increasing number of Albanian-speaking OCGs are also
2018). engaged in this activity. The majority of these growing
operations produce a perceived lower-quality product;
91
the demand for ‘branded’ or high-quality herbal cannabis

Estimating herbal cannabis production in the
remains high, and it is usually imported from Belgium
Netherlands
and the Netherlands and commands a premium price,
compared with the domestically produced herbal cannabis.
Based on relatively recent research, we believe it
is possible, even with the limitations of scientific
The involvement of Vietnamese OCGs in cannabis
studies on the subject, to arrive at a useful estimate
cultivation in EU Member States is not a new phenomenon
of a harvest expressed in yield per square metre of
as they have been active in this area in the United Kingdom,
cultivation surface. Vanhove et al. (2014), in their
Ireland and Czechia as well as Norway and Sweden for
attempt to estimate cannabis production yields,
a number of years. More recently this has also been
arrived at an average of 575 g of herbal cannabis per
reported by Denmark, Slovakia and Greece. In recent
cultivated square metre. When applying the average
years, Czechia has observed a reduction in cannabis
number of 16 plants per square metre in a modal
cultivation associated with Vietnamese OCGs, probably as
cultivation site to the total number of plants seized in
a result of their moving into methamphetamine production
the Netherlands in 2017 (722 618), this would result
(see Chapter 6). Meanwhile, Czechia reports that Serbian
in a tentative yield estimate for annual cannabis
criminal groups have stepped in, establishing indoor
production in the Netherlands of 520 tonnes. This
cannabis cultivation sites intended for the local market
calculation is based on an average of four growing
and for export. Europol information also suggests that
cycles per year and an estimated dismantling rate of
the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian OCGs are increasingly
20 % (CBS, 2018).
involved in the indoor cultivation and trafficking of herbal
cannabis within the EU.
In 2018, the Dutch electricity provider (Netbeheer
Nederland) was able to detect energy theft that could
This diversification of OCGs involved in large-scale
be related to 2 600 cannabis cultivation sites. People
cannabis cultivation in the EU is likely to be the result of
running these growing operations stole a total of
a combination of several factors, including high demand,
95 million kilowatt hours in 2018, costing the provider
increasing prices and lower penalties than for the
a total of EUR 60 million and the government about
trafficking of other illicit drugs. These groups increasingly
EUR 135 million in tax revenues. Based on police
rely on the support of specialists in cultivation, which allows
estimates of about 30 000 illicit cannabis cultivation
groups without specific expertise to set up larger and more
sites in the Netherlands, these would consume
complex operations. This probably explains why almost
and possibly steal about 1 billion kilowatt hours of
all countries reporting to the EMCDDA have mentioned
electricity, equivalent to the annual consumption of
continued professionalisation and up-scaling of cannabis
all households in the city of Rotterdam, which has
production.
650 000 inhabitants (Netbeheer Nederland, 2019).
Estimating the extent of cannabis production in Environmental impact and hazards of cannabis
Europe cultivation
Estimating the total production of cannabis in Europe The indoor cultivation of herbal cannabis requires
remains a difficult exercise. There is currently little significant amounts of water and electricity, and often
systematic monitoring of cannabis cultivation and entails the use of chemicals, which may be discharged to
production, not only in Europe, but also worldwide land or aquatic environments and harm these ecosystems.
(EMCDDA, 2019b; UNODC, 2018a). Furthermore, the The methods that are used in illicit cannabis cultivation
existing studies on yield determination (Toonen et al., 2006; are driven by the need to maintain profit margins and
Vanhove et al., 2014) are limited to fixed sets of growing secrecy, rather than minimising environmental damage.
conditions, which makes the calculation of yield in sites Furthermore, to ensure high temperatures in indoor
operating under different conditions problematic (Vanhove cultivation sites and appropriate lighting conditions,
et al., 2017). To extrapolate these calculations to a national an average indoor cannabis cultivation site has been
production estimate requires further data that are currently estimated to produce 4 600 kg of CO2 emissions per
unavailable (van der Giessen et al., 2016). In spite of such kilogram of finished product (Jenkins, 2019). While some
limitations, it may be important for policy-making purposes EU Member States report the dumping of used materials
to provide rough estimates of how much cannabis is from cannabis cultivation, such as contaminated soil, filters
produced in key countries (see box ‘Estimating herbal and empty chemical containers, the environmental impact
cannabis production in the Netherlands’). of cannabis-growing operations largely continues to be
92
CHAPTER 3 Cannabis
I
a knowledge gap in need of more research (Ashworth and Data from Morocco indicate that both the area under
Vizuete, 2017). cannabis cultivation (47 000 hectares) and the
estimated quantities of cannabis resin produced in the
Illicit cultivation sites do not comply with health and safety country (between 700 and 760 tonnes) have remained
standards, so they present potential hazards not only to the constant since 2010 (UNODC, 2012b, 2018a). However,
public, but also to law enforcement and other professionals. these figures do not take into account potential recent
These can be physical, electrical, chemical or biological developments that affect cannabis resin production in
hazards (Vanhove et al., 2018). Morocco and have an impact on the European market.
More detailed evidence has emerged concerning the
Q Physical: booby traps may be installed to protect the modernisation of the cannabis industry in Morocco
crop from theft or destruction. Structural modifications mentioned in the previous edition of the EU Drug Markets
made to the premises, e.g. holes made in walls to Report. This strongly suggests that European producers
accommodate wiring, pipework and flexible ducting, established in the Rif Mountains have introduced cannabis
may lead to instability and possible collapse of the hybrids of various origins that allow much higher resin
building. yields and THC contents, replacing traditional varieties
Q Electrical: improper wiring may lead to electrocution, or (Chouvy and Macfarlane, 2018). These European nationals
to short circuits that may cause fires. are reported to have connections with cannabis social
Q Chemical: fertilisers, pesticides and other chemicals clubs in Spain and coffeeshops in the Netherlands, and are
may cause dermatological or respiratory problems for reported to produce cannabis resin and extracts with high
those entering the premises. potency. Although many traditional Moroccan producers
Q Biological: cannabis plantations are ideal environments seem to have adopted the modern high-yielding varieties of
for mould development, presenting a risk of inhalation cannabis plants introduced by these European producers,
of mould spores. most of them are still growing cannabis and producing
resin in a traditional fashion (Chouvy and Macfarlane,
Although only rarely encountered, carbon dioxide 2018). These changes in Morocco are a major contributor
generators may be used in sophisticated indoor cultivation to the dramatic increase in the potency of cannabis resin
sites to increase the rate of plant growth. In such cases, seized in many European countries since 2012.
the resulting oxygen-deficient atmosphere is hazardous
to personnel entering such sites. Sufficient training,
equipment and expertise should be available to assess Production in the EU
these risks.
Some cannabis resin is produced in the EU using ‘modern’
methods, such as ice-cooling or ‘pollinating’ (see section on
Cannabis resin cultivation processes above). This appears to be at a small
scale so far, although data on the origin of the cannabis
resin available in the EU are limited. Production of cannabis
Production outside the EU resin has been documented in several Member States.
In the Netherlands, annual monitoring studies in Dutch
Historically, for cannabis resin, Europe has relied coffeeshops show that a number of shops sell a cannabis
heavily upon sources of production outside the region, resin variety called ‘Nederhasj’, referring to the fact that
predominantly Morocco. Afghanistan, Albania and Lebanon the resin has been made in the Netherlands with domestic
are mentioned as marginal sources by a limited number herbal cannabis (Niesink, 2000). However, there are no
of countries. However, in the United Kingdom Afghanistan indications of large-scale production; only a minority of the
is mentioned as a major source, alongside Morocco, and coffeeshops in the research sample have locally produced
Malta seized 11 tonnes of resin en route from Lebanon resin available. In 2017, the potency of this locally produced
in September 2018, suggesting that Lebanese resin may resin was on average 35 % THC, and there were samples
be becoming more available in Europe (Malta Customs containing over 60 %, compared with an average of 21 %
Department, 2018). for imported resins (Rigter and Niesink, 2018).
93
In recent years, a number of cannabis cultivation sites, Figure 3.6

specially equipped to produce resin and more potent Number of cannabis seizures and quantity seized in
extracts (such as butane hash oil), have been dismantled the EU, 2007-17
in Europe. For example, a cannabis cultivation site with Number of seizures (thousands)
specialised equipment for producing extracts, including 600

Herb
resin, was dismantled in 2018 by the Hellenic Police,
leading to the arrest of Dutch, Georgian, Greek and 400
Vietnamese nationals. Given the widespread availability

Resin
and apparent ease of purchase, for instance online, of 200
resin-producing equipment, and the existence across

Europe of extensive production of cannabis plants, 0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
this phenomenon has the potential to become more
EU EU+2
widespread. This is an area that will require monitoring.
Quantity seized (resin)
Tonnes
1 000
Trafficking and supply 800
600
Since 2009, the number of seizures of herbal cannabis
in the EU has exceeded that of cannabis resin, with 400
relatively stable trends in both resin and herbal cannabis

200
seizures since 2012 (Figure 3.6). In 2017, there were over
440 000 seizures of herbal cannabis and over 311 000 0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
seizures of cannabis resin in the EU. In contrast, the
quantity of cannabis resin seized is currently more than
Quantity seized (herb)
double that of herbal cannabis (466 versus 209 tonnes in
Tonnes
2017), partly as a consequence of cannabis resin being
300
more frequently trafficked across borders and in large
200
shipments. Because of their strategic location on major 100
cannabis resin-trafficking routes and/or their comparatively 0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
large consumer markets, some countries are particularly
important when it comes to quantities seized. Spain, for United Kingdom Portugal Italy
example, the major entry point for cannabis resin produced Other countries France Spain
in Morocco, reported about three quarters (72 %) of the Greece
total quantity seized in the EU in 2017 (Figure 3.6).
Over the last few years, Turkey has been seizing large
amounts of herbal cannabis, and a further recent increase
in the overall quantity of herbal cannabis seized in the EU
is mainly due to increases reported in Italy, Spain, Greece,
France and Hungary.
94
CHAPTER 3 Cannabis
I
Herbal cannabis northern Europe (see Cannabis overview, pages 84-85).

Passenger vehicles and lorries are still the modes of
transportation most often reported, but many countries also
Trafficking from outside the EU report that postal parcels are used for trafficking non-trivial
amounts of herbal cannabis, sometimes in connection with
As already discussed, Albania is likely to be the largest sales on darknet markets. Data collected in postal centres
producer of herbal cannabis trafficked to the EU. During in 19 EU countries in 2018 indicate that 874 kg of herbal
2017 and 2018, the large-scale trafficking of herbal cannabis cannabis and 299 kg of resin were seized in parcels and
from Albania into the EU continued. Italian seizures of letters. Most of the herbal seizures were carried out in Spain,
herbal cannabis increased from nearly 42 tonnes in 2016 and 62 % of those were made from parcels or letters posted
to more than 90 tonnes in 2017, reflecting the intensified to destinations outside Spain (Groupe Pompidou and RILO
trafficking activity across the Adriatic Sea. In response to WE, 2019).
the increasing pressure exerted by Italian law enforcement
authorities, Albanian-speaking OCGs, often in cooperation Belgium and the Netherlands together make up a distribution
with Italian mafia-style OCGs, now target locations further hub for herbal cannabis in the EU (see Cannabis overview,
north along the Italian coast as drop-off points. The Greek pages 84-85). The importance of Czechia as a country of
coast guard reports regular movements of small high-speed origin for herbal cannabis seems to have diminished since
boats from Albania and Italy towards the Aegean and Ionian the last edition of this report, possibly because of changes
seas, with the intention of smuggling Albanian herbal in the crime groups involved in production, discussed
cannabis to Turkey. Albanian-speaking OCGs cooperate with above. Only Germany and Slovakia still mention Czechia as
other OCGs in several EU Member States: Austria, Croatia, a country of origin of cannabis found on their drug markets,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Sweden, Turkey and the illustrating how dynamic such drug markets can be.
United Kingdom report increased seizures of herbal cannabis
reported to be of Albanian origin. Albanian OCGs involved The wholesale prices of herbal cannabis are available for
in herbal cannabis also use cash couriers, who typically some EU Member States. Prices tend to be lower closer to
smuggle cash to Albania from the EU by car. In Albania, source countries or large distribution hubs. This is reflected
the cash is used to invest in real estate, construction and in the lowest prices per kilogram being reported by Spain
tourism. (EUR 1 343), Italy (EUR 2 287) and Belgium (EUR 4 525).
The low prices observed in Italy suggest that cultivation is
Other recent seizures of herbal cannabis produced outside relatively extensive, as is suggested by data on seizures of
the EU are reported by Belgium, Ireland and the United cannabis plants (see above), although they could also reflect
Kingdom. Some origin countries have been reported to the large amounts of imported Albanian herbal cannabis
include Ghana, Nigeria, Thailand and the Caribbean. The available in Italy.
market for these exotic herbal cannabis products is not well
understood, but such varieties can be found on offer in Dutch
coffeeshops. It is also probable that some of this imported Cannabis resin
herbal cannabis is destined for African and Caribbean
communities present in some EU Member States. As mentioned above, most of the cannabis resin available
on the European drug market comes from Morocco. Spain is
a key entry point for Moroccan resin, although there has been
Trafficking inside the EU some diversification in trafficking routes and modi operandi
to the EU in the last few years (see Cannabis overview, pages
Although herbal cannabis is produced in each EU Member 84-85).
State, this may not be sufficient to satisfy local demand;
therefore, intra-EU trafficking exists. The means of transport used to traffic cannabis resin to the
EU are varied. Cannabis resin continues to be transported
There has been a sharp increase in the number of Member by lorries on ferries and in maritime shipping containers, as
States reporting Spain as the origin of herbal cannabis well as on recreational craft and fishing boats. The use of
seizures. Increased domestic production and the involvement speedboats that can transport up to 3 tonnes has increased
of Dutch OCGs may contribute to explaining why Spain considerably over the last few years, prompting the Spanish
is now exporting herbal cannabis to the rest of Europe, government to impose restrictions on the use of such vessels
sometimes via the Netherlands. Herbal cannabis is trafficked (see Chapter 9). Small private aircraft are also used between
from Spain directly to Ireland and the United Kingdom, and, Morocco and Spain, as well as for intra-EU trafficking.
after transiting through several countries, to eastern and
95
After Spain, the countries that seize the largest quantities three Portuguese nationals were arrested in northern Brazil
of cannabis resin in Europe are France and Italy, indicating in January 2019 for attempting to smuggle 2 tonnes of
that these continue to be major entry points to the EU drug cannabis resin, probably of Moroccan origin, into the country
market (Figure 3.6). Turkey, which seized the fourth largest (Lusa and Público, 2019).
quantities of resin in Europe in 2017 and indicates Morocco
as the source, may now also be a significant entry point. As discussed in Chapter 1, migrant smugglers use similar
routes and ships to transport irregular migrants to the EU
This reflects the frequent use of different branches of the from North Africa, although existing information suggests
Mediterranean Sea route, and the North African land route that structural, sustained or widespread links between
from Morocco to Libya, to traffic cannabis resin, which has drug trafficking and migrant smuggling are weak. OCGs
become an important focus of law enforcement activity (see transfer the profits from the sale of cannabis resin back to
box ‘Rose of the Winds’, page 216). The proximity of Libya Morocco using cash couriers as well as trade-based money-
to two large cannabis resin-producing countries, Morocco laundering schemes. Cash couriers travel to the collection
to the west and Lebanon to the east, and the instability points in the EU and then transport the cash in their carry-on
currently being experienced in the country make Libya luggage on commercial flights going to Spain. Malaga is
a potential weak point in the region that may be exploited a key location for cash couriers, who depart from there to
by traffickers (Figure 3.7). In addition to the potential EU the Spanish territory of Melilla, where the cash is turned
market, other possible large consumer markets for the over to the OCGs. Moroccan OCGs also use the services of
cannabis resin shipped to Libya include Egypt and possibly hawaladars.
Sudan, and countries further afield such as those of the
Arabian Peninsula. Although investigations indicate links
in the trafficking of cannabis resin via Libya to the EU, firm Cannabis oil and other concentrated
evidence is lacking at present. Whatever the final destination extracts
of the drugs, the trafficking of cannabis via Libya may
generate funds for armed insurgent and terrorist groups Cannabis oil, a dark green or dark brown viscous liquid, is
based in Libya, which could be used to finance terrorism- produced by extracting cannabis or cannabis resin using
related activities outside the EU. It is worth noting that other solvents. When produced from resin it may be called hash
North African countries may become departure points for oil, although the terms are often used interchangeably.
cannabis resin destined for Europe, so this warrants close Depending on the method, the potency can reach 60 %
attention. (UNODC, 2009). Although cannabis oil has been around for
decades, it is a niche product, rarely mentioned in national
Trafficking also appears to be increasingly bidirectional. Air reports to the EMCDDA, and monitoring of seizure data
couriers departing from South America carrying cocaine may commenced only recently, in 2014. When monitoring
smuggle cannabis resin back to their region of origin, where commenced, 11 countries reported seizures totalling 124 kg.
the price of cannabis resin is approximately the same as the Spain accounted for most of this, reporting 105 kg of
price of cocaine. Larger quantities of cannabis resin may cannabis oil spread over 57 seizures. It is not known whether
also be smuggled to South America by sea. For example, these seized batches were domestically produced or
Figure 3.7
Different forms of cannabis resin being trafficked to Europe
Photos: Malta Police Force (left); Romanian National Police, Antidrug Unit (right).
96
CHAPTER 3 Cannabis
I
imported. In the subsequent years, the quantities reported Criminal cooperation and competition in
by EU Member States have declined to fairly trivial levels. the cannabis trade
Turkey reported about 50 kg in each of 2016 and 2017, more
than all EU Member States combined, and reports of Organised crime groups involved in the cannabis trade
production in nearby Albania may account for this (see box appear to be increasingly cooperative and specialised in
‘Albania: a potential source of cannabis oil for the EU specific activities useful for different stages of the supply
market’). chain. These include setting up sophisticated cultivation
sites, transportation and storage, as well as cash collection
Trafficking cannabis oil instead of herbal cannabis or resin is and money-laundering services. Networks operating at
attractive to traffickers because more psychoactive material the distribution level also increasingly cooperate to fund
can be contained in a smaller quantity of product. Being the acquisition of larger quantities of cannabis in order to
a liquid, it may also be easier to conceal, reducing the risk of achieve more competitive prices and share the risks.
seizure.
Conversely, increased competition between OCGs has also
Albania: a potential source of cannabis oil for the resulted in higher levels of violence between rival groups
EU market (see box ‘Increased use of violence between OCGs involved
in the cannabis trade’). This has included public shootings
Seizure data suggest that cannabis oil is available and other violent crimes in the context of conflicts over
in countries in the south-east of the EU. Whereas territory and access to sources of supply.
production of cannabis oil is rarely reported in the
EU, there is some information suggesting that it Increased use of violence between OCGs
may take place in Albania. In 2014-15, Albanian involved in the cannabis trade
authorities dismantled three cannabis oil production
facilities (EMCDDA, 2017b). More recently, in 2017, Organised crime groups are continuously looking to
the Montenegrin police seized around 17 litres of increase their profits, and one way to do this is to try to
cannabis oil, suspected to originate in Albania, hidden gain control of different stages in the supply chain.
in a passenger car at the Montenegrin-Croatian
border (see image). Finally, data received from the French intelligence reports have described how the vast
Albanian forensic laboratory in Tirana confirmed majority of drug-related homicides (‘liquidations’) in the
the analysis of 312.5 litres of cannabis oil from five Marseille and Perpignan region of France are related to
different cases in 2017 (Koçiraj, 2018). This amount rivalry between crime groups. During law enforcement
is relatively large compared with the total amounts operations, automatic and semi-automatic weapons and
seized in the EU. even grenades have been seized (Service d’Information
de Renseignement et d’Analyse Stratégique sur la
There is a need to adapt monitoring tools in order to Criminalité Organisée, 2018).
collect data on other cannabis concentrates such as
rosin, shatter and wax as they become more popular. Furthermore, the violence is not only directed at other
criminal groups: law enforcement agencies increasingly
have to consider that drug traffickers and dealers will be
armed.
Another example is from La Línea de la Concepción,

the Spanish town bordering Gibraltar, where large
cannabis resin shipments are reported to be brought
to the European mainland on a daily basis. The media
reported that Molotov cocktails were thrown at Spanish
police vehicles by youths working for drug traffickers, in
order to disrupt police surveillance activities (Cañas and
Ortega Dolz, 2018). In the same town, an injured drug
Photo: Montenegro Police Directorate, Criminal Police, Anti-drug Department trafficker, under police custody in a hospital, escaped
when a heavily armed group of masked men raided the
hospital (Cañas, 2018). This example clearly shows how,
in order to maintain their business, criminal groups in
the EU apply guerrilla tactics normally associated with
drug markets in regions such as Latin America.
97
Retail supply and use Figure 3.8

Cannabis product of preference
As indicated above, cannabis is the most widely consumed France
illicit drug in Europe. Cannabis products account for the Netherlands
largest share (39 %) of the illicit drug retail market in the
Italy
EU, with an estimated minimum value of EUR 11.6 billion
(likely range EUR 10.5 billion to EUR 12.8 billion) in 2017. Belgium
The market for cannabis herb in the EU was estimated Luxembourg
to be at least EUR 9.4 billion (likely range EUR 8.6 billion
Czechia
to EUR 10.2 billion), equivalent to about 1 200 tonnes.
The cannabis resin market was estimated to be worth Austria
at least EUR 2.3 billion (likely range EUR 1.9 billion to Cyprus

EUR 2.6 billion), equivalent to over 300 tonnes.
Finland
The information on the amounts of the different types Croatia
of cannabis use, used to estimate the cannabis market United Kingdom

size, was obtained from the European Web Survey on
Poland
Drugs. It collected information about patterns of use and
Lithuania
purchases of the most commonly used illicit drugs from
40 000 people who use drugs, recruited primarily through Latvia
social media, in 15 EU Member States. It illustrates the Estonia
variation between countries. The findings show that herbal
cannabis was more commonly used than cannabis resin. % reporting use 0 20 40 60 80 100
of cannabis
However, many respondents reported using both types,
particularly in France, Italy and the Netherlands. The use of
Herbal Both resin and Resin only Other
cannabis resin only was reported infrequently (Figure 3.8). cannabis herbal cannabis
only
The use of cannabis products other than herbal cannabis Note: The survey was carried out in two waves, one in 2016 (Croatia, Czechia,
France, Netherlands, United Kingdom) and one in 2017/18 (remaining 10 EU
or cannabis resin was quite rare, which reflects the
countries).
relatively low amount of seizures and production discovered Source: European Web Survey on Drugs.
in Europe. It appears that, at this stage, the use of
concentrates such as rosin, butane hash oil and wax is
uncommon in Europe, although there is potential for it to Figure 3.9
spread (EMCDDA, 2019d). It is becoming more popular ‘Dabbing’: users heat a needle/nail holding cannabis
in some regulated markets in the US (Krauss et al., 2015; concentrate with a blowtorch and inhale through
Russell et al., 2018), so it is important that research and a modified waterpipe-like device
monitoring systems be alert to signals of an increase in this
practice (Figure 3.9).
Although it is estimated that over 7 % of adults in the EU

report having used cannabis in the last year, the majority
of those use it only occasionally. Based on surveys of the
general population, it is estimated that around 1 % of
European adults are daily or almost daily cannabis users
— that is, they have used the drug on 20 days or more in
the last month. Data on those entering drug treatment for
cannabis problems can provide some indication of the scale
of high-risk cannabis use in the EU. In 2017 approximately
152 000 people entered drug treatment in the EU for
problems related to cannabis use; of those, about 82 000
were entering treatment for the first time in their lives.
Although more than three quarters of a million offences

related to cannabis supply and use are recorded in the Photo: istockphoto
98
CHAPTER 3 Cannabis
I
EU each year, information on how cannabis is distributed dealers, who operate from fixed premises, either openly or
within the EU Member States is not well documented. for a restricted number of clients; mobile phone dealers,
However, there is more detailed information available on who can be contacted and deliver cannabis at any given
some forms of retail distribution specific to cannabis: the location; and street dealers, who frequent public places to
coffeeshops in the Netherlands (see box ‘Coffeeshops in sell small amounts of cannabis (Korf et al., 2005). There are
the Netherlands: the “controlled cannabis supply chain also known to be closed distribution groups, whereby an
experiment”’) and cannabis social clubs in Spain and individual buys a larger amount of cannabis and distributes
elsewhere (Decorte and Pardal, 2017). it among friends and friends of friends. Many users do not
buy cannabis themselves, but receive it through ‘social
The distribution level between wholesale and retail is supply’ (i.e. when a person produces or buys cannabis and
poorly documented: these middle-level drug markets are distributes it among his or her friends) or sharing. Another
less studied by researchers for various reasons. Suppliers group are those who produce cannabis for self-supply and/
higher up the distribution chain are likely to be less or a limited number of other users (Werse and Bernard,
accessible to researchers. Furthermore, defining what 2016).
this market segment covers remains a problem. Not only
do law enforcement agencies have their own definitions,
people involved in drug supply have their own specific Price and potency
definitions and terminology as well (Pearson and Hobbs,
2001). In general, it is assumed that middle-market A study undertaken for the EMCDDA shows that the average
distribution happens between importation and retail-level potency of herbal cannabis in the EU doubled from 5 % to
distribution (Smet et al., 2013). As mentioned earlier, OCGs 10 % THC between 2007 and 2017. In addition, over the
increasingly act and cooperate on specific distribution same period, the price of herbal cannabis increased from
levels; some of those crime groups even try to cover the an average of EUR 9 to EUR 11 per gram (Figure 3.10)
entire supply chain from production to retail level. (EMCDDA, 2019d). The potency of cannabis resin in the EU
has also increased substantially in recent years. The potency
At retail level, it is possible to identify a number of different of resin remained relatively stable from 2007 to 2011 (8-10 %
cannabis distribution practices. These include house THC) before rising gradually to 18 % in 2017. At the same
Coffeeshops in the Netherlands: the ‘controlled Low-THC/high-CBD products

cannabis supply chain experiment’
Since 2017, ‘low-THC’ herbal cannabis and ‘CBD oil’
The Dutch coffeeshop policy has long been a subject have been offered for open sale in health food shops
of public and political debate in the Netherlands and or specialist shops in several EU countries. Sales have
neighbouring countries. Coffeeshops are outlets been based on the claim that these products have little
where the sale of retail amounts of cannabis is or no intoxicating effect and therefore are not controlled
tolerated (under strict rules) by means of prosecutor under drug laws; for high-CBD products, sales may
guidelines. The public debate is mostly centred on be based on the associated health benefits, although
the anomaly this presents: sale and use are tolerated currently the evidence for their effectiveness is weak.
while production and supply are strictly prohibited.
Under this policy of tolerance, sale and use are still Member States’ responses to the open sale of such
criminal offences under Dutch law, but the authorities products have ranged from hard-line to tolerant.
choose not to pursue or prosecute offenders National limits for quantity of THC exist but may
(Government of the Netherlands, 2019). However, law come with conditions, such as ‘originating from
enforcement agencies may act upon those supplying an authorised variety of cannabis’, ‘if not viable for
the shops, but also the shop owners. narcotic purposes’, ‘if not misused’. Other applicable
laws may include (EU standardised) regulations on
In early 2019, to address this legal anomaly, the medicines, food and food supplements, cosmetics,
Dutch government opted to try a new approach called general product safety, etc. The legality of marketing
the ‘controlled cannabis supply chain experiment’. a product for its CBD content may therefore depend
The aim is for this to be conducted in six to ten on the source of the CBD, the format of the product or
large and medium-sized municipalities, involving an how the product is presented.
organisation to be selected by the government to
cultivate cannabis and supply it to the coffeeshops. Source: EMCDDA (2018f).
99
time, cannabis resin prices increased, like those of herbal per euro in 2016. As discussed earlier in this report, the
cannabis, from approximately EUR 9 to EUR 11 per gram. introduction of new cannabis strains in Morocco enabled
producers to create a more potent resin product in a cost-
These contrasting changes in potency and price appear effective manner. As a result, cannabis resin may have
to have altered the relative value of these products: when become a more attractive product to some consumers in
combining information on potency and price, the quantity the EU.
of THC for every euro spent on herbal cannabis or ‘price-
adjusted dose’ was similar in 2007 and 2017, at 13 mg In parallel with these developments is the emergence of
THC per euro. For cannabis resin, the price-adjusted low-THC/high-CBD products in the EU (see box ‘Low-THC/
dose was similar from 2007 to 2011 (remaining stable high-CBD products’). It is important to note the distinction
at 10 mg THC per euro) before increasing to 19 mg THC between these products and cannabis oil.
Figure 3.10
Potency and price of herbal cannabis and cannabis resin in the EU, 2007-17
Potency of herbal cannabis Potency of cannabis resin
% THC % THC
25 25
20 20
15 15
10 10
5 5
0 0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Price of herbal cannabis Price of cannabis resin

EUR/g EUR/g
25 25
20 20
15 15
10
10
5 5
0 0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Note: Data show means (+/– 95 % confidence intervals) for estimated trends after accounting for variation across countries. Expected changes based on inflation of
consumer goods are shown in red circles.
100
CHAPTER 3 Cannabis
I
Little is known about the adulteration of cannabis resin. Figure 3.11

However, a recent analysis of street vendor resin samples Proportion of cannabis listings on major darknet
has concluded that most samples were adulterated and markets by EU Member State, 2018
unsuitable for human consumption (Pérez-Moreno et al., Belgium
Czechia Other EU countries
2019). 1%
1%
1%
Multiple
Monitoring patterns of use of cannabis consumption using 10 % Netherlands
the technique of wastewater analysis is not feasible at 26 %
present. This is because THC-COOH, the main metabolite
of THC, is the only biomarker found to be suitable so far,
but its excretion percentage is low. Given the importance Spain
of the cannabis market, it will be important to try to develop 17 %
alternative biomarkers so that wastewater monitoring

becomes possible.
United
Kingdom
Online distribution 23 %
Germany
21 %
Overall, the scale of the online trade in cannabis remains
small compared with traditional offline supply and
distribution in the EU. Nonetheless, cannabis is increasingly
Note: Multiple denotes where several EU countries are mentioned as country
sold online in high-frequency low-volume transactions and of origin.
the online trade in cannabis and other drugs is expected to
continue to expand. Spain (17 %). Other reported EU origin countries included
Belgium and Czechia (1 % each). An additional 11 % of
Based on 2018 data from several major darknet cannabis listings offered shipping from another EU country
markets (10), a total of 7 378 listings (sale offers) that (1 %) or from multiple EU countries (10 %) (Figure 3.11).
could be attributed to vendors that said they would ship
cannabis from an EU country were detected. These offers Caution is needed in interpreting these data in respect of
were distributed across five marketplaces: Dream Market gauging the number of individual sellers offering cannabis
(6 479), Olympus Market (699), Berlusconi Market (159), on these marketplaces or the number of transactions —
Valhalla (21) and Wall Street (20). The available data neither of which can be extrapolated from the number of
suggest that the majority of EU sale offers during 2018 listings alone. Nonetheless the number of listings provides
originated primarily from four countries: the Netherlands a useful indicator of the scope of activity on darknet markets.
(26 %), the United Kingdom (23 %), Germany (21 %) and
(10) For more information on the data source and its limitations see the
section on darknet monitoring in Chapter 8.
101
Photo: David Mansfield
103
CHAPTER 4
Key points
Europe’s opioid problem
X Opioid use still accounts for the largest proportion of X Turkish OCGs continue to maintain control over the
the harms associated with illicit drug consumption in the wholesale importation of heroin into Europe. This is
EU, including high rates of morbidity and mortality. It is because of their long-standing presence and capacities
estimated that there are about 1.3 million problem users in key production and trafficking areas. In addition, other
of opioids, mainly heroin, in the EU. The retail value of the OCGs, including Dutch, British, Western Balkan, Iranian and
heroin market was estimated to be at least EUR 7.4 billion Pakistani groups, are also major players in different parts of
per year in 2017. Europe. An overlap often exists between OCGs involved in
heroin supply and those involved in the trafficking of other
X There is evidence of a potential threat from increased drugs, precursors, weapons and other illicit commodities.
heroin availability in Europe. Opium production estimates
in Afghanistan are at historically high levels, seizures are
increasing in Turkey, some large consignments have been Developments in production and
detected within the EU and intelligence assessments trafficking
suggest increased activity levels along major trafficking
routes into Europe. Taken together, these indicate X There are signs of production spreading to new
a potential for increased heroin availability. countries, including some in the EU. This is suggested by
morphine seizures outside Afghanistan and the recent
X Vigilance is required to identify any availability-driven detection of heroin production in some EU countries. In
increases in heroin use. Currently, demand indicators still part, this development appears driven by differences in
point to an overall stable and ageing population of heroin precursor costs and availability.
users, and the volume of heroin seizures in the EU is
relatively stable but small in relation to both consumption X Attempts to divert acetic anhydride, the main heroin
and production estimates. However, monitoring systems precursor, appear to be increasing within the EU. It is
may be relatively insensitive to new recruitment into heroin far cheaper to source in the EU than in areas nearer to
use. It is important, therefore, to be alert for other signs of opium-producing countries and there is evidence of it being
increased availability. trafficked from the EU, mostly by land but sometimes also
by maritime container, along the Balkan route to heroin
X Synthetic opioids, such as methadone, buprenorphine, production areas.
tramadol and fentanyl derivatives, are also available on
the drug market in the EU and represent a growing threat. X Sources of synthetic opioids are diverse. Conventional
They now account for around one in five new opioid-related trafficking approaches, diversion from medical use and
treatment demands. Because of the ways in which they online purchase are all important for synthetic opioids.
are produced, sourced and used, synthetic opioids pose The last is especially relevant to non-controlled opioids
additional challenges from regulatory, law enforcement and appearing as NPS. Although uncommon, some production
health perspectives. in the EU has also been detected.
104
CHAPTER 4 Heroin and other opioids
I
X The Balkan route still remains the key corridor for heroin on potential heroin-trafficking routes into the EU,
entry into the EU. This means that, in terms of organised particularly on the Balkan route.
crime activities and anti-trafficking measures, Turkey Q In particular, respond to the growing threat resulting
remains of central importance for actions to disrupt the from the trafficking of large quantities of heroin and
trafficking of heroin to the EU market. acetic anhydride by means of container shipping.
This requires investment in monitoring, investigating
X Evidence suggests that heroin trafficking on the and targeting of OCGs active in this area, and
Southern route to the EU may be increasing while activities strengthening of screening programmes for both
on the Northern route decline. Important changes appear inward- and outward-bound containers and vehicles.
to be taking place on the Southern route, particularly Q Improve the understanding of the dynamics of heroin
in relation to trafficking through the Suez Canal. This is trafficking within, and to, the EU through better
occurring against a background of a growth in domestic monitoring of, sharing information about and forensic
heroin problems in some African countries. analysis of heroin production sites, as well as the
origins of large seizures of heroin, morphine and acetic
X Recently seizures of very large heroin consignments, anhydride.
both by land and particularly at sea, have been made Q Give greater priority to the Southern route by increasing
along trafficking routes towards the EU. Iran is reported as operational capacities and threat assessment. Efforts
a departure country for many of these. are particularly needed in affected African countries to
strengthen the monitoring and interdiction of heroin in
X High-potency synthetic opioids pose challenges for law major ports and respond to any resulting displacement
enforcement and health. Synthetic opioids are increasingly in trafficking activities.
traded online and dispatched by post. For some synthetic Q Raise stakeholder awareness and develop new
opioids this means that small-volume packages can regulatory and investigative tools to prevent the
account for a large number of potential consumer diversion of acetic anhydride. This requires better
doses. Not only does this increase the challenges for monitoring and back-tracking investigations by law
law enforcement but the high potency of some synthetic enforcement agencies in close coordination with other
opioids also results in an increased risk to both consumers relevant agencies that have a role in drug precursor
and others, who may be accidentally exposed to these control.
substances. Q Recognise the potential threat posed by synthetic
opioids by scaling up information sharing about,
analysis of and forensic profiling of seizures, internet
sales, production sites and the diversion of opioids
from legal or quasi-legal sources. Continuing
Implications for action to address engagement with producer countries such as China,
current threats and increase India and Russia is also needed.
preparedness Q Improve efforts and develop new tools to identify
and provide early warnings of trends in the use of
synthetic opioids, or new recruitment into heroin
In order to respond effectively to current and emerging use, to facilitate the more rapid development and
threats in the area, there is a need to take the following targeting of appropriate supply- and demand-related
actions. interventions.
Q Raise stakeholders’ awareness that responding to
Q Build on the lessons learnt from successful cocaine opioid-related problems should remain a policy priority
interdiction strategies at major ports. To address the and that vigilance is required because a threat exists
relative rarity of large heroin seizures at EU borders, that a rapid change in consumption patterns of either
Member States need support to develop further established drugs, such as heroin, or newer synthetic
risk analysis and profiling capacity at land border- opioids is possible and could result in significant for
crossing points and at smaller European ports located individuals and society.
105
Heroin overview Global
World
34.3 million
Estimated number using opioids in the last year aged 15-64
Netherlands,
Belgium
Estimated opium poppy cultivation
(thousand hectares)
414
201
Turkey
2007 2017
Global estimated potential heroin

production (tonnes)
750
Wholesale price at key
locations (EUR/kg)
*Mean **Mode
500 Producer countries

Afghanistan** 2 558
West
Africa
Selected transit countries
Pakistan** 2 575
250
Iran** 4 180
Egypt* 6 281 East
Kazakhstan** 13 699
Africa
South Africa** 14 457
0 Albania** 17 172
2007 2017
Montenegro** 20 202
Global seizures of heroin and Selected destination countries

morphine (tonnes)
Italy* 19 059
United Kingdom** 27 500
200
Spain* 30 850
100 Poland** 38 000
Sweden* 47 245
Southern
0 Latvia** 60 000 Africa
2007 2017
106
I
25 %
Europe
EU retail drug
market share
EU
High-risk opioid users 1.3 million
Estimated number using opioids (mainly heroin) in the last year aged 15-64
Treatment
Trends in first-time entrants for problems
related to heroin
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
60
EU+2
20 000 50
40
10 000 EU
30
0
2007 2017 20
Afghanistan Data for 23 EU Member States. 10
Drug-induced deaths 0
Makran 2007 2017
Coast Opioids
present in Quantity seized (tonnes)
6 581 or 85 %
of the deaths 25 000 EU+2
Arabian
Peninsula 20 000
15 000
10 000
Drug law offences related to heroin 5 000 EU
0
82 000 2007 2017
Balkan route
Northern route
47 000
Retail price Purity
Southern route
(EUR/g) Indexed trends: (%)
2007 2017
Caucasus route Price and purity
35 % 64 %
Offences Offences for €140
€14
Other
for supply possession/use
51 %
100
87 31 %
80
Total 15 %
€58 9%
46 916
€28
€15
2007 2017
minimum maximum
interquartile
range
107
Introduction Opiates, opioids and heroin
Opioid use remains a major part of the drug problem in Opiates are drugs that originate or are derived from
Europe and a major contributor to the harms associated naturally occurring alkaloids found in certain poppy
with it. Heroin is the most frequently used opioid, but other species, especially Papaver somniferum. Opiates
opioids such as methadone, buprenorphine, tramadol and include opium, heroin, morphine and codeine.
fentanyl derivatives are also available on the illicit market.
For definitions used in this report, see box ‘Opiates, opioids Opioids are generally substances that bind to the
and heroin’. body’s opioid receptors. As well as the opiates, they
include synthetic drugs that produce opiate-like
It is estimated that there are about 1.3 million high-risk effects, such as fentanyl and methadone.
opioid users in the EU and the retail value of the heroin
consumed was estimated to be at least EUR 7.4 billion Heroin is a semi-synthetic product obtained by the
per year (likely range EUR 6.4 billion to EUR 9.1 billion) in acetylation of morphine; as such, it is also called
2017. Although the extent of opioid use in many countries diacetylmorphine or diamorphine. Morphine is found
in Europe has stabilised over recent years, the illicit use in opium, the dried latex obtained from poppies.
of opioids remains responsible for a disproportionately Whereas opium has been smoked for centuries,
large share of drug-related harms. These include high heroin was first synthesised from morphine isolated
levels of dependence, other health problems and mortality from opium in the late 19th century. Heroin is used
among people who use opioids. Primary opioid users still therapeutically for opiate dependence in some
represent over a third of those entering drug treatment in countries when other forms of treatment have not
the EU, and opioids are found in over 85 % of drug-related been effective.
deaths. Injecting use is associated with an increased risk
Illicit heroin is a crude mixture containing other opium
of acquiring blood-borne virus infections such as HIV and
alkaloids and any added substances, such as caffeine
hepatitis. The harms associated with opioid use extend to
and paracetamol. It usually comes as an off-white or
users’ families and the wider community. The wider social
brown powder that may be smoked, snorted/sniffed,
costs include the impact on neighbourhoods of open drug
or dissolved and injected.
scenes, the costs associated with the acquisitive crimes
that may be committed by people with opioid dependence
to obtain money to buy their drugs, and the government Transcaucasia, North America, and eastern and south-
expenditure on health and social support services and the eastern Europe (UNODC, 2019a).
criminal justice system.
The UNODC (2019a) reports that illicit opium production
The retail market for heroin in Europe appears to be quite occurs in about 50 countries worldwide. Opium poppies are
stable, having recovered from a period of ‘heroin drought’ grown illegally in around 50 countries worldwide in three
in some parts of Europe around 2010. However, the high main regions:
levels of production as well as an expansion in the range of
opioids now available may pose additional risks to existing Q south-west Asia (mainly Afghanistan and to a lesser
users or lead to an expansion in the market. extent India and Pakistan), supplying Europe, Africa,
south-west Asia, East Asia including China, the Middle
East and Oceania;
Q south-east Asia (mainly Myanmar and to a considerably
lesser extent Laos), supplying mainly south-east Asia,
Global overview China and Oceania;
Q the Americas (especially Mexico but also Colombia and
It is estimated that in 2017 there were about 29 million Guatemala), supplying the Americas.
users of opiates and 53 million users of opioids (opiates
and prescription opioids) worldwide. The prevalence rates Illicit poppy cultivation also takes place in some small
of opioid use appear to be highest in North America, areas in the EU (see section below on opiate production
Oceania, West and Central Africa, the Near and Middle in the EU). However the vast majority (about 96 %) of
East and south-west Asia, while rates of opiate use (mainly global opium production occurs in just three countries:
heroin and opium) are estimated to be highest in the Near Afghanistan is the largest illicit producer of opium in the
and Middle East and south-west Asia, Central Asia and world, with Myanmar and Mexico distant second and third
respectively.
108
I
Following several years of declining seizures, in 2016 the Figure 4.1

quantities of opiate drugs seized worldwide increased The heroin production process
sharply, surpassing the former peak from 2011. Seizures
1. Cultivation
increased again in 2017, although not as markedly, with
Most of the heroin available in
approximately 693 tonnes of opium and 189 tonnes of Europe comes from opium
Papaver poppy cultivation in
heroin and illicit morphine seized worldwide (UNODC, somniferum Afghanistan.
2019a). Most seizures of opiates occur in or near the
main opium production areas, particularly in Iran (39 % of
total seizures in 2017, expressed in heroin equivalents), 2. Harvest
Afghanistan (26 %) and Pakistan (14 %), with Turkey the Poppy capsules are lanced for
the opium latex to ooze out.
next highest (7 % of total seizures) (UNODC, 2019a). The opium is then collected
Opium latex and dried.
This reflects the main routes by which these drugs have
traditionally been trafficked from Afghanistan to western
Europe, particularly on the Balkan route via Iran and Turkey 3. Extraction
but also by sea from Pakistan and Iran to countries of the Ca(OH)2 morphine Morphine is extracted from the
NH4Cl base opium using calcium
Arabian Peninsula and along the coast of East Africa. hydroxide and
ammonium chloride.
4. Acetylation
Production and precursors (CH3CO)2O
heroin base
Morphine base is acetylated
resulting in diamorphine
Na2CO3 = brown heroin (the chemical name for heroin)
= diamorphine by adding acetic anhydride and
The process by which morphine and heroin are produced sodium carbonate.
from the opium harvested from poppies is illustrated in

Figure 4.1.
5. Crystallisation
The heroin base is precipitated
(C2H5)2O heroin in ammonium hydroxide and
HCl
Trends in opium production
hydrochloride filtered, before being dissolved
= white heroin in a mixture of acetone and
hydrochloric acid, filtered again
and evaporated.
Afghanistan has been the largest illicit producer of opium
in the world for about 20 years. In 2017 Afghanistan,
with a record 328 000 hectares, was estimated to have 6. Adulteration
Several ‘cutting agents’
accounted for 78 % of the total area of 414 500 hectares caffeine ? paracetamol (e.g. caffeine, paracetamol)
may be added and then the
under poppy cultivation identified in the world. However, resulting powder is pressed
into blocks with or without
in 2018, the global area under poppy cultivation was logos.
estimated to be 345 800 hectares, a drop that was largely
influenced by the 20 % fall in Afghanistan to 263 000
hectares. Despite this, the estimated cultivated area for
2018 remained at a high level by historical standards The estimated global opium production in 2017, at 10 500
(UNODC, 2019a). tonnes, was the largest ever recorded (UNODC, 2018a),
influenced by a number of factors, including agricultural
Afghanistan is estimated to account for around four fifths innovation and developments that have an impact on
of global production, accounting for on average 81 % of opium poppy cultivation and, consequently, opium
annual global opium production since 2007. Over this production (see Figure 4.3). For example, a large increase
period, estimated opium production in Afghanistan has in the number of opium farmers using solar-powered
fluctuated, with the lowest figure being 3 300 tonnes in tubewells has been observed in some areas of Afghanistan
2015 and the highest being the 9 000 tonnes estimated since 2013, resulting in an increase in both the surface
in 2017 (see Figure 4.2). This variation not surprisingly under poppy cultivation and the opium yields of the crops,
represents a major contributor to the overall fluctuation while also making it possible to harvest two crops a year
in global production estimates observed over this period, (Mansfield and Fishstein, 2016). These developments
underlining the importance of this one production location may also have environmental consequences (see section
to the global heroin problem. A caveat here is to note that of this chapter on environmental impact). In addition,
Afghanistan is not the primary source country for heroin improvements in morphine extraction methods have been
consumed in North America. reported.
109
Figure 4.2 even in Afghanistan, the opioid producer country on which

Estimated global illicit opium production (tonnes) and the most information is available. The proportion of the
proportion coming from Afghanistan, 2007-18 crop that is transformed into morphine and then exported
Tonnes out of the country and the fate of the opium exported to
12 000 neighbouring countries are also poorly documented.
10 000
The UNODC estimated that in 2018, from the 7 790 tonnes
8 000 of opium produced globally, between 1 225 and 1 525
remained unprocessed for consumption, while the rest was
6 000
converted into heroin, resulting in an estimated 486-736
4 000 tonnes of heroin of export purity (UNODC, 2019a).
2 000 Most of the heroin consumed in Europe is believed to

0
be manufactured from Afghan opium, but relatively little
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 information is available on where this manufacturing
takes place. Historically, Afghanistan is the country that
Afghanistan Rest of the world
has reported the most seizures of opiate laboratories. This
Sources: UNODC (2018a,b).
indicates that large quantities of opium are processed
into heroin in the country (UNODC, 2018a), although
In 2018 the estimated global quantity of opium produced it should be noted that the last time that Afghanistan
decreased to 7 790 tonnes mainly due to severe drought in reported dismantling heroin production facilities was in
Afghanistan affecting both the area under cultivation and 2014 (41 facilities dismantled). Following a period in which
yields in some parts of this country, but nevertheless the a constant decline in morphine seizures had been seen
total quantity estimated produced remained among the since 2011, in 2016 Afghanistan seized 47 tonnes, the
highest in the past two decades. largest quantity in the world, and seizures increased again
in 2017 to 63 tonnes. The reasons for the sudden dramatic
increase in morphine seizures in Afghanistan (Figure 4.4)
Trends in heroin production are unclear.
It is difficult to estimate the production of heroin. Significant seizures of opium and illicit morphine in
Improvements in technology and changes in methodology countries neighbouring Afghanistan suggest that heroin
can have a big impact on these estimates. The UNODC production could also take place there (see Figure 4.4).
stresses that its figures should be viewed as ‘best Although neither Iran nor Pakistan have reported
estimates’, giving an order of magnitude rather than precise dismantling heroin production facilities, seizures of opium
measurements (UNODC, 2018a). totalled about 2 000 tonnes in Iran and 210 tonnes in
Pakistan between 2014 and 2017, compared with only
Uncertainties remain, due to information gaps on key about 153 tonnes in Afghanistan itself. During the same
factors such as heroin laboratory efficiency. This is true four years, significant quantities of morphine were also
Figure 4.3
Harvesting opium in Afghanistan
Photos: David Mansfield
110
I

Heroin and morphine seizures in selected significant Estimating acetic anhydride requirements for heroin
countries, 2014-17 manufacture, 2017
Morphine Heroin Estimated global annual production of
acetic anhydride
Afghanistan 1 500 000 tonnes
2017
2016
2015
2014
Iran
2017
2016
2015 Estimated quantity of acetic anhydride

2014
required to manufacture heroin
810 tonnes
Pakistan
2017
2016
2015
Amount of acetic anhydride seized
2014
128 tonnes
Turkey Sources: INCB (2014, 2018, 2019); UNODC (2018a).
2017
2016
2015 Acetic anhydride, the heroin precursor

2014
Acetic anhydride is a key precursor for processing

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 0 10 20 30 morphine into heroin. It is used as an acetylation agent
Tonnes and is subject to international control because of its
Source: UNODC (2019c). critical role in the manufacture of heroin. However, it has
many licit uses, particularly in the pharmaceutical industry
seized in Iran (47 tonnes) and Pakistan (16 tonnes) (e.g. to manufacture aspirin), but also for the manufacturing
(see Figure 4.4). This provides evidence that some of of paints, plastics, polymers, cellulose (for cigarette
Afghanistan’s opium crop is not processed into heroin filters) and explosives. As a result, the global legitimate
in the country, and that there are markets for opium and manufacture of and trade in acetic anhydride is large and
morphine outside Afghanistan. Although fairly large reported to be expanding. This, combined with the fact
quantities of opium are consumed as opium in Pakistan that comparatively small amounts are required in heroin
and especially in Iran, the amounts seized could suggest manufacture, makes preventing diversion for illicit purposes
that there may be some manufacture of heroin and other a challenging task (see Figure 4.5).
opiates in both countries.
Estimates of annual licit global production of acetic
Hypotheses as to the possible intended uses for the large anhydride vary but the most recent estimate from the INCB
amounts of opium and morphine seized in the region put it close to 1.5 million tonnes (INCB, 2014). Set against
surrounding Afghanistan were discussed in the previous this, the INCB estimates that the requirement for illicit
edition of this report (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016). These heroin manufacture is between 450 000 and 1.1 million
included heroin manufacturing in Pakistan and Iran, and litres (or approximately 486 to 1 188 tonnes) (INCB, 2018,
probably in other countries, and illicit manufacture of 2019), i.e. less than 0.1 % of global licit production.
medicinal products, including injectable morphine and
syrups containing codeine. No new evidence has emerged Action to prevent the diversion of acetic anhydride for illicit
to confirm or deny such hypotheses, and this remains an uses includes the requirement for pre-export notification
important question for future consideration. of shipments, which may lead to stopped or suspended
shipments as well as seizures. The INCB undertakes global
monitoring of both of these indicators and noted a sharp
increase in demand for acetic anhydride during the period
111
2016-17, as shown by an increase in suspicious supply Figure 4.6

requests as well as the number of seizures reported. Total global and EU acetic anhydride seizures,
Although these have since declined to some extent, in the 2010-17
year beginning 1 November 2017 globally 1 900 pre-export Tonnes
notifications were reported for a total of 611 million 200
litres of acetic anhydride, of which approximately 15 %

160
were objected to by the importing countries either for
administrative reasons or for suspected diversion (INCB, 120
2019). In addition, global acetic anhydride seizures in 2017
80
amounted to 127 000 litres, with Afghanistan reporting the
largest amount seized (37 700 litres), followed by Turkey 40
(23 200 litres) and Iran (20 300 litres) (INCB, 2019) (11).
This is a strong indication that demand for acetic anhydride 0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
for illicit purposes is high at present, which may be due
to the increase in estimated Afghan and global opium Global seizures EU seizures
production (see Figure 4.6). Sources: INCB (2016, 2019); data from European Commission.
However, it is known that acetic anhydride can also be used

for the manufacturing of methamphetamine (INCB, 2018), In 2016, only Germany, the Netherlands and Spain reported
and methamphetamine production seems to be increasing seizing or stopping shipments of small amounts of acetic
in countries traditionally connected with the production anhydride (data from European Commission; INCB, 2018).
and trafficking of opiates. For instance, methamphetamine By contrast, in 2017 and 2018, large amounts of acetic
facilities are dismantled every year in Afghanistan, Iran, anhydride were seized on the ‘reverse Balkan route’ linking
Mexico, Myanmar, and recently, according to media reports, western Europe to Turkey, although some seizures could
Turkey (Ensonhaber.com, 2017; Haberayyildiz.com, 2017; be linked to heroin production within Europe (see section
Haberturk.com, 2019; Mansfield, 2019; Yenisafak.com, below on opiate production in Europe). Thus in 2017, more
2018). than 81 000 litres of acetic anhydride (about 75 tonnes)
were seized in the EU (67 500 litres in the Netherlands,
Recent seizures, stopped shipments and suspicious 10 500 litres in Bulgaria, 2 000 litres in Belgium and
queries or orders of acetic anhydride appear to confirm that 1 000 litres in Poland), while Turkey seized 23 000 litres
heroin-trafficking routes from Afghanistan to Europe are (data from the European Commission; INCB, 2019).
used to traffic acetic anhydride in the opposite direction.
Thus, for instance, the INCB suspects that a shipment of The upward trend appears to have continued in 2018:
almost 3 tonnes of acetic anhydride seized in Afghanistan Turkey seized 37.5 tonnes of acetic anhydride, according to
in 2017 had originated in the EU, while Iran reported the information at Europol — of which the INCB indicates that
EU and Taiwan as the sources of the more than 23 tonnes approximately 14 tonnes originated in the Netherlands —
it seized in 2017 (INCB, 2018). In addition, Pakistan seized and Romania seized 5 tonnes in August 2018 (data from
more than 15 tonnes of acetic anhydride originating from INCB; data from Romanian Police). Information on the
Poland in 2018 (INCB, 2019). origins of acetic anhydride diverted from legal supply in the
EU is limited. However, a number of the seized shipments
The information on seizures and stopped shipments in reported to Europol during this period appear to have
or originating from Europe confirms the picture of high come from Czechia, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and
demand for acetic anhydride for illicit purposes in recent Slovenia, although some of these may be storage or transit
years and also that the EU has become a significant source countries for acetic anhydride procured elsewhere.
of acetic anhydride diverted towards the illicit production
of heroin (and methamphetamine) in Afghanistan and In addition to seizures, there were many instances of
neighbouring countries (see Case study 19). suspicious activities involving acetic anhydride in Europe
in recent years, with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, France,
Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain all
reporting suspicious queries or orders of acetic anhydride
in 2017. In total, more than 100 such incidents were
detected and investigated in the EU in 2016 and 2017,
(11) It is also worth noting that 45.4 tonnes of ammonium chloride, a non-
scheduled chemical often used in the extraction of morphine from opium,
with the alleged destination countries including Azerbaijan,
was seized in Afghanistan in 2016. This was the highest amount ever Iran, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Suriname and Turkey (INCB, 2018),
reported seized by the Afghan authorities (INCB, 2018).
112
I
CASE STUDY 19
Two-way trafficking on the Balkan route

A recent report issued by the Dutch large batches of heroin, hundreds
Police Academy highlighted the large- of kilograms of morphine, millions
scale trade in drugs and precursors of MDMA tablets and multi-tonne
involving North Brabant criminals and shipments of acetic anhydride, appear
Turkish OCGs, which is believed to to confirm this barter trade between
have existed since the 1990s (Tops criminal gangs. For example, in August
et al., 2018). Turkish OCGs have 2018, Romanian law enforcement
incorporated themselves into the legal officers seized 5 000 litres of acetic
scene in the Netherlands and own anhydride and 20 kilograms of
restaurants, bars, hotels and other high-purity cocaine (see photos),
enterprises. These OCGs coordinate concealed in a lorry that was travelling
two-way trafficking flows whereby from Germany through Slovenia
heroin and morphine are transported and Romania to its final destination
to the Netherlands from Turkey while in Turkey. The lorry was registered
acetic anhydride, MDMA and other in Georgia and driven by a Turkish
drugs are shipped in the opposite national. The investigation revealed
direction (Tops et al., 2018). that the driver had picked up the
cocaine in Germany and loaded up the
Recent seizures in EU Member States acetic anhydride from an illicit storage Photos: Romanian National Police, Anti-drug Service
along the Balkan route, including location in Slovenia.
and stopped shipments of acetic anhydride in the EU for criminals and challenges for national authorities. This
totalled 324 300 litres in 2017 (data from the European mode of transport presents significant vulnerabilities,
Commission). allowing the transport of huge quantities of acetic
anhydride to the heroin production regions. The OCGs
The most frequently used modus operandi explaining the exploit the fact that cargo exported through EU ports is
increase in diversion of acetic anhydride involves setting subject to fewer checks than imports. In addition, customs
up new ‘front companies’ and applying for registration as and other law enforcement authorities in Afghanistan and
precursor operators using fraudulent documents in order other destination countries have difficulty implementing
to be able to purchase large quantities of acetic anhydride efficient checks based on risk profiles because they lack
from legal suppliers. In some cases, in order to conceal equipment or have insufficient resources.
their illicit activity, these companies attempt to source
acetic anhydride in small amounts from different suppliers The OCGs that have been linked to acetic anhydride
and in different countries to avoid purchase limits set trafficking are composed of nationals of Afghanistan, Iran
by authorities. The acetic anhydride is then pooled and and Turkey, often supported by EU-based OCGs and OCGs
stored in secret locations. Some law enforcement agencies originating from the Western Balkan region. It should be
in EU Member States have suggested that background noted that the OCGs involved and the routes used for
checks related to entities requesting registration could be acetic anhydride trafficking are similar to those for heroin,
strengthened in order prevent diversion of acetic anhydride. which will be discussed in greater detail in the following
section.
Although transport by road in trucks and lorries making
use of the reverse Balkan route represents the most often In spite of the efforts of regulatory authorities at the
detected means of transport of acetic anhydride from the European and national levels, it is likely that some
EU to heroin production regions, the use of containers suspicious purchases of acetic anhydride may have
surpasses it in terms of the quantities transported and escaped detection and some acetic anhydride may be
seized (see Case study 20). As observed of the smuggling stockpiled in Europe, which could be used in the future
of other commodities, containers represent opportunities for illicit heroin production in Afghanistan, neighbouring
113
CASE STUDY 20
Trafficking acetic anhydride from the EU to Turkey using roll-on roll-off ferries
A seizure of 14.8 tonnes of acetic is likely that this eastern Mediterranean roll-off networks offer fast services
anhydride occurred on 9 July 2018 in route is being exploited by traffickers as adjusted to different types of cargoes,
the port of Mersin, Turkey’s gateway an alternative route to the land-based such as trailers, other rolling cargoes
to the eastern Mediterranean. The Balkan route and the maritime container and containers, and can combine rail
acetic anhydride was transported in route to Iran. This modus operandi and maritime freight. Reports from
a lorry aboard a Turkish vessel that fits the recent trend, noted by Turkish Turkey also suggest that trains carrying
had departed from Italy. The shipment authorities, of the increased use of lorries are being used to smuggle acetic
was declared to be monomer, and was roll-on roll-off intermodal infrastructure anhydride to Turkey and Iran.
allegedly loaded in the Netherlands. It between Europe and Turkey. Roll-on
Source: Daily Sabah (2018).
countries and Europe (information from INCB). Law Bundeskriminalamt), and a facility processing morphine
enforcement agencies in various EU Member States into heroin was dismantled in Albania, where more than
report encountering problems with the fight against acetic 180 kg of heroin was seized. The morphine had come from
anhydride diversion for illicit purposes. Issues include the Turkey via North Macedonia and Kosovo, according to
fact that, in a majority of EU countries, the authorities in Albanian police reports (Meers, 2018a).
charge of monitoring precursors do not have investigative
powers, which limits efforts to gather evidence, while Seizures of opium have also increased in several countries:
in some cases acetic anhydride diversion attempts are in 2017 Belgium seized 1 133 kg of opium and Bulgaria
treated as a low-level offence punishable by only a fine. seized 221 kg of morphine and 43 kg of opium. The opium
Some Member States also report that the additional costs available in Europe could be used for heroin production or
incurred in adequately storing and destroying seized smoked by individual consumers. Open source information
precursors may represent a growing challenge. suggests that some heroin may also be produced in Turkey.
For example, according to the Turkish press, a range of
materials that indicate possible heroin production were
Opiate production in Europe found in Sakarya in July 2017 and in Van in April 2018
(CNNTurk, 2018; Karar, 2017).
The general picture of the European market in opiates is
one of large-scale production of heroin in Afghanistan There are several potential reasons for the emergence of
followed by smuggling into Europe by OCGs. However, it is heroin laboratories in Europe, although the information
increasingly clear that the true picture is more complex. available makes it difficult to draw definite conclusions.
However, the apparent widespread availability of cheaper
There is growing evidence that the final step of the heroin illicit acetic anhydride in Europe is probably a significant
production process, the manufacturing of heroin from factor. Indeed, the price of acetic anhydride has increased
morphine using acetic anhydride, takes place in several dramatically in Afghanistan in recent years, peaking at an
countries of Europe. For example, in the period 2014-17, average of EUR 605 per litre in August 2017 (MCN and
21 production facilities were dismantled in Greece (18), UNODC, 2018). In the EU, acetic anhydride reaches no
Czechia (2) and Spain (1) according to UNODC reports. more than EUR 50 per litre on the illicit market and between
More recently, the Netherlands reported dismantling EUR 1 and EUR 5 on the legal market. This also makes the
eight heroin production facilities in 2017 and Bulgaria trafficking of acetic anhydride to Afghanistan very attractive
dismantled one (data from Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, for OCGs based in the EU, especially since penalties are
2018). Heroin produced in these laboratories was made usually low for this type of offence, and recent information
from morphine of unknown origin. In addition, in 2017 suggests there is increasing diversion of this precursor in
Czechia reported dismantling two facilities producing Europe (see section on acetic anhydride above).
heroin from morphine extracted from tablets of medicinal
products. In 2018, a site manufacturing heroin was In addition to the production of heroin from imported
dismantled in Germany, where about 30 kg of heroin and morphine and opium, production of a range of other
some acetic anhydride were seized (data from German opiate preparations continues in some countries. Opium
114
I
poppy crops were destroyed in Greece and Italy in 2016 Table 4.1
(Ekathimerini, 2018; UNODC, 2018a). Small-scale heroin Synthetic opioid production sites dismantled in the
production facilities using home-grown opium poppy EU, 2007-18
straw or morphine extracted from medicines have also Year Country Type of production
been dismantled. Braun, an opiate made from codeine, is 2007 Germany Fentanyl — small-scale laboratory
traditionally consumed in Czechia, and kompot, a crude 2010 Latvia Methadone
preparation of heroin produced from poppy straw and
2011 Slovakia Fentanyl — small-scale laboratory
several chemical reagents, in Poland. Both are described
2013 Poland Butyrfentanyl
in more detail in the previous EU Drug Markets Report
2015 Germany Fentanyl — small-scale laboratory
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2016) and have continued to be
produced. 2016 Sweden Fentanyl — 2 small-scale laboratories
2017 Latvia Methadone
Estonia Fentanyl — medium-scale laboratory
Synthetic opioid production in Europe 2018 France Fentanyl — small-scale laboratory
A market for synthetic opioids has also been growing in

Europe. The majority of illegally produced synthetic opioids dismantling an illicit large-scale methadone production
distributed in the EU originate from source countries laboratory in September 2017 (Ukraine, 2017).
outside the EU. Depending on the country of destination
and the mode of distribution, the two main source Processing and packaging centres are more commonly
countries for synthetic opioids available on European drug detected in the EU than full-cycle laboratories. In general,
markets are believed to be China and, to a lesser extent, these laboratories receive bulk shipments of synthetic
Russia. opioids from China, use cutting agents to increase the profit
yield of a shipment and package the substance for street or
Some production of synthetic opioids does takes place online distribution. For example, in April 2017, British law
in the EU, although currently it appears to be marginal enforcement authorities dismantled a processing centre
compared with the manufacturing of other illicit drugs. used to distribute fentanyl and carfentanil online. Around
There is no widespread or sustained illicit production of 1 kg of fentanyl and carfentanil was seized on site as well
these substances. The production process for many of as caffeine, the cutting agent presumably used to dilute the
them is relatively simple and can be carried out at room product prior to distribution (see section on new synthetic
temperature using a ‘one-pot’ method. The synthesis opioids, Chapter 7).
of the particularly potent derivative carfentanil is more
complicated and several methods exist. Whatever In Estonia fentanyl has been the main opioid consumed
production exists is thought to rely mainly on precursors since 2001, when it displaced heroin, and Estonian law
originating from China. enforcement authorities have repeatedly discovered and
dismantled conversion laboratories in the country since
A few laboratories carrying out the full production cycle then. These laboratories typically convert liquid fentanyl,
of synthetic opioids, particularly fentanyl derivatives, have trafficked to the country from Russia, to fentanyl in powder
been dismantled over recent years (Table 4.1). Because form, which is then diluted with cutting agents prior to
fentanyl derivatives are very potent, these laboratories distribution.
require only a small production capacity to produce
sufficient material to satisfy national or even regional
demand. Recently, a facility producing fentanyl was Heroin adulteration
detected in France in November 2018 (Joany, 2018), and in
Estonia a lab that had been active since 2014 was seized in In addition to the substances, processes and skills used
August 2017. Large quantities of fentanyl precursors were during drug production, drug purity depends on the cutting
also seized in Estonia in 2016-17. agents that are frequently added. Indeed, pure drugs are
only rarely available on the market, especially at consumer
In addition, methadone production has also been detected level. These adulteration processes, also known as cutting,
in Latvia: two large-scale illicit laboratories producing are generally adopted for reasons of profitability but may
methadone using precursors acquired from the legal also increase if heroin is in short supply. They are common
market in the EU, which were believed to have been active practice with all powdered drugs. Adulteration may occur
since 2013, were dismantled in 2017. Ukraine also reported at all stages of the supply chain. For instance, the UNODC
estimated that Afghan heroin of ‘export quality’ was 51 %
115
pure in 2016 (UNODC, 2018a), and was found combined on the ground or in streams and rivers and, although
with a range of substances, some of which were harmful. scientific assessment of the impact of this process on
the environment is lacking, it is probable that tonnes of
For heroin, the most commonly used cutting agents are hazardous waste from heroin production are released into
paracetamol and caffeine, and premixed bags of brown the environment each year (UNODC, 2015).
paracetamol and caffeine powder have been seized by
law enforcement agencies in Europe. Given the increasing
segmentation of organised crime functions across distinct
organisations, it is likely that some organised crime groups
specialise in the procurement of these substances for Trafficking and supply
subsequent resale to heroin traffickers. For example,
law enforcement authorities in the Netherlands recently Most of the heroin available on the European drug markets
dismantled an illicit facility specialised in the production is produced in Afghanistan, and many different groups are
of cutting mixtures for heroin. The mixtures produced involved in heroin-trafficking activities along the extensive
combined caffeine, paracetamol and a colouring agent. supply chain from production zones to consumer markets.
What we know about both the routes and groups involved
Some insight into the range of adulterants that may be is fragmentary and based mostly on information gathered
found in the opioids sold on retail markets can be obtained through the activities undertaken by law enforcement
from analysis of the residue in used syringes. A study in agencies in order to disrupt supply. These are inevitably,
six European cities in 2017-18 confirmed the widespread to some extent, a reflection of the agencies’ expertise and
use of caffeine and paracetamol as cutting agents for priorities but they also provide useful information about
heroin, with caffeine found in 66 % of all syringes that drug-trafficking organisations active in the EU, their modi
contained heroin, and paracetamol in 62 %. Less common operandi and the trafficking routes used.
adulterants included griseofulvine (4.5 % of syringes) and
phenacetin (3.5 %) (Néfau, 2018). Furthermore, a recent
analysis of substances bought from darknet markets and Heroin trafficking to Europe
submitted to a drug-checking service also reported that the
main adulterants found in heroin samples were caffeine The main routes used to traffic heroin to the EU have
and paracetamol. A range of other potentially dangerous remained essentially the same over recent years, although
adulterants were also detected. Most worryingly, almost the intensity of use of particular routes appears to vary
a fifth of the heroin samples analysed were adulterated over time, depending on factors such as the state of
with other synthetic opioids (DoctorX et al., 2018). transportation infrastructure, law enforcement activity and
geopolitical stability. Four routes (see Heroin overview,
pages 106-107) are generally recognised:
Environmental impact of heroin
production Q the Balkan route — the main trafficking route to Europe
from Iran to Turkey and then through Bulgaria and
Although not well documented in the scientific literature, Greece or the Mediterranean Sea;
the growing of opium poppies on the same piece of Q the Southern route, through Iran and Pakistan to
land year after year will have an environmental impact, several countries in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula to
especially on soil quality. Recent research highlighted how supply local markets or for onward shipment to Europe
large increases in the use of solar-powered tubewells for locally — the branch through the Arabian Sea, Red Sea
opium poppy cultivation in the desert of Afghanistan since and Mediterranean Sea to Europe has gained some
2013 have been accelerating the drop in the water table importance recently;
(1-2 m per year 2017 compared with 0.5-1 m in 2015) Q the Southern Caucasus route, going from Iran to
(Mansfield, 2018). In addition, opium poppy cultivation Armenia or Azerbaijan to Georgia and then through the
practised in an unsustainable way may contribute to even Black Sea to Ukraine or EU Member States;
greater water scarcity in the arid regions of Afghanistan, Q the Northern route, from Afghanistan to Tajikistan and
and to soil salinisation due to inappropriate drainage then through Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan,
during irrigation (Mansfield and Fishstein, 2016). Finally, mainly destined for Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and, to
toxic chemicals, which include acetic anhydride, solvents a lesser extent, EU Member States.
such as ethyl ether and acetone, and hydrochloric acid,
are needed to transform opium into heroin. The waste Since 2013, heroin trafficking has increasingly involved
resulting from heroin production is often simply spilled large individual shipments in excess of 100 kg, a trend
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I
that has continued in recent years, probably due to the Figure 4.7
increasing availability of heroin in the countries of origin. The Balkan route
Large shipments are commonly transported from Iran to
Trafficking hubs
h
Europe, especially the Netherlands, through the Balkan
Main EU user
us markets
route, and increasingly via the Suez Canal and across the
Mediterranean Sea. Frequently these large shipments of
heroin are transported by road hidden among legal cargo in
lorries, as well as by sea in containers or in lorries on ferries
(Europol, 2017b).
The Balkan route
The route from Afghanistan through Iran, Turkey and Balkan

countries represents the shortest distance and the most
direct land route to European consumer markets, and it
has continued to be the key corridor for the trafficking of
heroin to the EU and for other drugs and acetic anhydride
in the other direction (see Case study 21). Turkey is crucial
to the Balkan route, and Istanbul is a key location for the
orchestration of heroin shipments to the EU. In 2017,
Turkey seized the largest quantity of heroin in the last increasing trade in recent years between Iran and the
decade, following a period marked by a significant decline EU and others may have contributed to this increase in
in seizures, probably caused by both external and internal trafficking activity from Iran, as the greater volume of trade
factors. provides more opportunities for smuggling. Iranian trucks
driven by Iranian drivers carrying hundreds of kilograms
Heroin may be shipped from Turkey to EU markets using of heroin have also been detected more frequently on the
three branches of the Balkan route (Figure 4.7). Balkan route. On this route, the trucks travel via Turkey to
enter the EU chiefly across the Bulgarian-Turkish border.
Q The southern branch runs through Greece, Albania From there, the heroin shipments are transported to
and/or Italy, using both sea and land transportation. distribution hubs in the EU.
Q The central branch runs through Bulgaria, North
Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Although the Balkan route is considered the most active
Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, and into Italy or smuggling route for heroin, the interdiction rate is quite low
Austria, essentially by land. along the portion of the Balkan route located in Europe,
Q The northern branch runs from Bulgaria and Romania relative to the large quantities of heroin seized in Iran and
to Hungary, Austria, Czechia, Poland or Germany, Turkey. This suggests that heroin trafficking through the
essentially by land. Balkans is well organised, but may also benefit from poor
enforcement and even possibly corruption among law
The information available suggests that heroin mainly enforcement officials (Kemp, 2017).
enters the EU at land border-crossing points in Bulgaria
and Greece. In some cases, heroin is temporarily stored in The usual method of transport for heroin smuggling on
warehouses in the Balkan region before being transported the Balkan route continues to be concealment in buses,
onwards. Bulgaria and Greece appear to be increasingly cars and especially lorries. However, a development on
important transhipment points along this route. Iran is this route is the increasing use of containers for onward
an increasingly significant hub for the trafficking of large transport from Turkey using a variety of modes of transport.
quantities of heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan to These include by ship across the Mediterranean Sea to
the EU via Turkey along the Balkan route using road ports in the EU, by lorry on ferries and by train. This allows
transportation. Iran is also more frequently used as the transport of large consignments of heroin (see Case
a departure point for large heroin shipments smuggled study 21). The same modus operandi is used to smuggle
to the EU in maritime containers, in an effort by OCGs to acetic anhydride from western Europe to Turkey.
avoid more strictly controlled land routes via Turkey. The
117
CASE STUDY 21
Use of containerised maritime transport on the Balkan route

Spanish police seized 331 kg of heroin heroin and was found at the port of a police operation. Two Dominicans,
in 2017 in one of the biggest ever Barcelona, hidden inside a shipment an Ecuadorian and a Spaniard were
heroin hauls in the country’s history. of cement from Turkey. The remainder charged as a result of the operation.
The largest part of the seized shipment was seized in the residences of
comprised 263 kg of high-purity four individuals detained as part of Source: Deutsche Welle (2017).
The Southern route Figure 4.8

The Southern route
The Southern route for the trafficking of heroin to the EU
Trafficking hubs
remains of some importance (see Figure 4.8). In recent
years large heroin consignments shipped from ports
on the coast of Iran and Pakistan on the Gulf of Oman
and the Persian Gulf (the Makran coast) have attracted
international attention. Some of these shipments are
destined for Europe. This Southern route to Europe entails
several modes of transportation and transhipment points Afghanistan
that may be combined in different ways. The heroin shipped

on the Southern route leaves the Makran coast either
Makran
concealed in containers or transported in traditional sailing Coast
vessels (dhows). Thus, heroin may be shipped to the EU

using various branches of this route, all departing from Arabian
Peninsula
ports in Iran and Pakistan.
West
Africa
Q The first branch, which is the most relevant to Europe
transits from the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea through
East
the Suez Canal and Mediterranean Sea to reach EU or Africa
Turkish ports, mainly by containers.

Q Another branch of this route uses transhipment
ports in the Arabian Peninsula. From there the heroin
is transported inland to reach countries on the
Mediterranean Sea, or continues on the sea route to
reach countries in East Africa. Southern
Africa
Q A third branch departs from smaller ports on the

Makran coast to ports along the Swahili coast (Kenya,
Tanzania and northern Mozambique), using dhows. transhipment points for containers along this route makes
From here, the heroin is smuggled onwards to the EU it more difficult for authorities to intercept cargoes based
and/or other international markets. on a risk analysis of their origins (Boerman et al., 2017).
There is evidence suggesting the route is growing in Several large shipments of heroin seized in the port
importance, not least because of the increasing demand of Antwerp, primarily originating from ports in Iran
reported for heroin and other opioids in large countries — 4.3 tonnes in 2018 and 1.9 tonnes in the first quarter of
such as South Africa (Haysom et al., 2018), but also 2019 — confirm the increasing activity along this branch of
possibly because of its use as an alternative route to enable the Southern route. This route may also involve transhipment
the transportation of large shipments of heroin to Europe points in Turkey, from where heroin consignments are
while avoiding stricter border controls on the traditional transported either by land via the Balkan route or by sea via
Balkan route. In addition, the increasing use of multiple the Mediterranean Sea directly to ports in western Europe.
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At the same time, heroin departing from the Gulf of Oman years due to increased law enforcement activity along the
and the Persian Gulf in dhows is unloaded in several Balkan route in the context of the migration crisis combined
countries along the East African coast and is typically with instability in Ukraine and the Caucasus region.
transported onward over land to other countries in East
Africa or to West Africa. Although the land routes used for
further transportation from the East African coast to other The Northern route
countries in Africa and to Europe are complex and remain
an intelligence gap, available data relating to seizures The heroin trafficked on the Northern route is exported by
made in Europe highlight Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Kenya, land from Afghanistan’s northern borders and appears
Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique, Pakistan, Qatar, to be essentially destined for consumer markets in
South Africa, Tanzania and the United Arab Emirates as Central Asia, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Consignments
all being potential departure or transit countries for the cross from Afghanistan into Tajikistan and then are
heroin seizures made in the EU. For example, in April 2019, trafficked northwards through Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan to
the Egyptian navy seized 2 tonnes of heroin and 99 kg of Kazakhstan before entering Russia. Less heroin is thought
crystal methamphetamine from a European-flagged vessel to arrive at the EU’s external border via the Northern route
off the Red Sea coast. The ship’s seven crew members than via the other established heroin-trafficking routes.
were arrested in the operation. This provides evidence that Nevertheless, a proportion of the heroin shipped on the
the Red Sea may serve as a transit point for Afghan heroin Northern route may eventually enter the EU through Poland
trafficked through Pakistani and Iranian ports into Europe and the Baltic countries, but also from Ukraine to Hungary,
and other destinations. Romania and Slovakia. Some heroin seized in Belarus,
Romania and Ukraine in the last few years was reported
Finally, the Southern route also involves smaller amounts as originating from Central Asia and intended for western
of heroin shipped by air couriers and freight, as well as European markets.
postal parcels from India, Iran, Pakistan and Sri Lanka or
from transit countries in Africa, especially South Africa,
Kenya and Mozambique. Heroin seizures from couriers Heroin trafficking within the EU
at European airports are reported to have increased
dramatically in recent years, and a total of 486 kg was Once smuggled into the EU via the trafficking routes
intercepted in 106 separate incidents in 2018. An increase described above, heroin is then distributed to consumer
in heroin seizures in postal parcels is also reported (Groupe markets. The Netherlands, in particular, and to a lesser
Pompidou and RILO WE, 2019). extent Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece and Spain, appear
to be important hubs for heroin trafficking within the EU, as
these countries are the most frequently reported as origin
The Southern Caucasus route or transit points for heroin shipments seized in other EU
Member States. The heroin supply to the Baltic and Nordic
The Southern Caucasus route continues to be used to countries is mostly secondary distribution from the main
smuggle large amounts of opiates from Iran to Europe via distribution hubs in the EU. The Øresund Bridge connecting
Armenia, Azerbaijan or Georgia. Heroin is smuggled on the Denmark and Sweden is the main transit point for heroin en
ferries that cross the Black Sea from Georgia to Bulgaria, route to the Nordic countries.
Romania and Ukraine. From Ukraine it is possible to reach
both lucrative western European markets and the large Available data suggest that, in terms of absolute numbers
Russian market by a variety of overland routes. Large heroin of users, the five main heroin markets are the United
shipments were seized along the Southern Caucasus route Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany and Spain. Therefore,
mainly in 2015 and 2016. In 2016, one shipment of almost large quantities of heroin are likely to be smuggled to these
100 kg of heroin was seized in the port of Batumi, Georgia, countries in order to meet demand (estimated to be about
purportedly destined for the Netherlands, while several 115 tonnes at street-level purity in 2017). Within the EU
other large heroin seizures totalling more than 1 tonne, there was an overall drop in both numbers of seizures
reported to be destined for Belgium and Ukraine, were and quantities of heroin seized around 2010 to 2012.
seized in Azerbaijan (UNODC, 2018a). Since then, seizures in the EU have largely stabilised, with
37 000 seizures amounting to 5.4 tonnes reported in 2017
More recently, several seizures of heroin in several regions (Figure 4.9). Heroin flows within the EU are influenced by
in Ukraine, totalling more than 700 kilograms could confirm factors including drug supply reduction activities and by
the hypothesis that this route has been preferred for some changes in consumer markets.
119
Figure 4.9 Following a period of decline from 2009 to 2012, the

Heroin seizures in the EU, 2007-17: number of amounts seized in the EU have remained stable at about
seizures and quantity seized 5 tonnes a year, apart from a spike in 2014 linked to a few
Number of seizures very large seizures that year in Greece. The total amount
60 000 seized yearly (5.4 tonnes in 2017) is less than 5 % of
50 000
the amount estimated to be consumed (149 tonnes in
2017) in the EU. This ratio is much lower than for the
40 000
other drugs considered in this report. The difference
30 000
is difficult to explain and suggests a need to better
20 000
understand the relative impacts of drug seizures on the
10 000 markets for different drugs in Europe. Despite increases
0 in heroin production, availability and use do not seem
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
to be increasing strongly in Europe. This can be seen,
United Kingdom Spain Other countries
for example, in the relative stability of price and purity
France Germany Italy Greece
estimates and in data from drug treatment reporting
systems.
Quantity seized
Tonnes
9 Organised criminal groups involved in
8 heroin trafficking
7
6
Trafficking and distribution of heroin is a mainstay activity
5
for some specific OCGs, which rely on well-established
4
routes, contacts and infrastructure in the EU.
3
2
Overall, a two-tier structure in the heroin trade in the EU
1
0
remains prevalent. Europol intelligence suggests that
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Turkish OCGs continue to be the main importers and
United Kingdom Bulgaria France Italy facilitators of heroin distribution in key regions of Europe
Spain Other countries Greece Germany as they orchestrate the wholesale supply of heroin and
maintain control over various links in the supply chain,
including key connections to suppliers in production
countries. They have established legal businesses in key
Estimates suggest consumer markets for heroin are locations along the trafficking routes in Bulgaria, Germany,
generally stable, with only limited fluctuation in the number Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom
of users in the short term. However, for a number of reasons and Western Balkan countries, in order to facilitate their
these estimates may not give a particularly robust indication smuggling activities. Nevertheless, Turkish OCGs may also
of consumption totals; for example, it is difficult to estimate outsource some activities, such as the transportation of
the impact on consumption of the considerable expansion heroin from source countries to the EU, the laundering of
in substitution therapy that has been seen. Other indicators criminal profits or the perpetration of violent crime. For
of heroin use also suggest an ageing population with low example, Iranian OCGs manage shipping and transportation
levels of new recruitment and high levels of service contact companies used to traffic heroin, while Turkish OCGs
in most countries. The drop in the number of seizures typically manage front businesses used to receive the
after 2010 is difficult to explain. A heroin drought was heroin shipments. Turkish OCGs have also gradually
reported in many countries at this time and linked to major expanded their activities to other drugs such as cocaine and
law enforcement successes in Turkey. Consequently it is synthetic drugs (see Case study 19, page 113).
possible that law enforcement priorities may have changed
because of greater emphasis on migration and terrorist- Other OCGs are also engaged in heroin distribution in
related activities. It is also possible that trafficking routes specific geographical areas and sometimes perform
may have developed in ways that reduced the effectiveness specific roles. They are often also engaged in trafficking of
of interdiction efforts. Seizures in Turkey and in countries other drugs. As noted above, the Netherlands appears to
along trafficking routes into the EU also need to be be one of the hubs for heroin distribution in the EU. Dutch
considered in an overall assessment of seizure dynamics as OCGs cooperate extensively with other crime groups. They
well as the long-term trend in heroin use in the EU. receive shipments of heroin, and store them for further
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I
distribution to final destination markets in different parts the production regions, as well as the Turkish and Iranian
of the EU. Dutch OCGs are also involved in the diversion OCGs that orchestrate the importation of heroin into the
of acetic anhydride and have set up heroin-processing EU. Proceeds from heroin distribution in the EU are typically
laboratories in the Netherlands (see section on opioid laundered using trade-based money-laundering schemes. In
production in Europe above). many cases, these profits are also smuggled outside the EU
using cash couriers or relying on the hawala system. Hawala
For many years, Albanian-speaking OCGs have also been is a commonly used informal value transfer system used
identified as being involved in the supply and distribution in heroin source regions (see Chapter 1, section on money
of heroin in the EU, controlling sections of the Balkan laundering). Heroin also continues to be used as means of
route. Albanian-speaking OCGs, as well as Serbian and payment between OCGs bartering various types of drugs. As
Bulgarian groups, procure heroin from Turkish OCGs and part of these deals, heroin is exchanged for acetic anhydride,
cooperate with other EU-based crime groups. Recently cannabis, synthetic drugs and cocaine trafficked to
they appear to have been expanding their involvement in destinations outside the EU (see Case study 19, page 113).
heroin distribution in EU Member States, especially the
United Kingdom, and becoming more involved with local
distribution. In some cases, they have displaced other Synthetic opioid trafficking and
players, including Turkish OCGs, in wholesale heroin distribution
distribution (Saggers, 2019).
The production of synthetic opioids in the EU is uncommon.
Pakistani, Dutch and British OCGs have also been linked to Most synthetic opioids distributed in the region appear to
large-scale drug-trafficking activities in some EU countries. originate outside Europe. An important caveat here is that
Pakistani and British OCGs appear to jointly orchestrate the diversion of opioids intended for therapeutic purposes
large-scale importation of heroin to the United Kingdom. is a known problem, but the extent of this problem is
Pakistani OCGs are also active in Spain, directing the currently unclear (Table 4.2). The trafficking of fentanyl
importation of heroin arriving in the EU in containers, and derivatives is a particular recent concern for the EU due
they also provide money-laundering services to heroin to the potency of these substances and an increase in the
traffickers (Boerman et al., 2017). number and quantity of seizures as well as an increase
in the number of poisonings associated with these
African OCGs also have some involvement in heroin substances.
trafficking and distribution in the EU. West African OCGs,
especially Nigerian groups, continue to be involved in The distribution of illicitly produced fentanyl derivatives in
importing and distributing heroin in the EU, relying on the EU can be viewed as two separate phenomena. On the
couriers travelling from Africa to major EU airports. In one hand, fentanyl derivatives originating from Russia are
particular, they play a role in the heroin trade in northern trafficked for distribution in Baltic and, to a lesser extent,
and, to a lesser extent, western Europe. It should also be Nordic countries. On the other hand, fentanyl derivatives
noted that Nigerian OCGs cooperate with OCGs composed originating from China are often purchased throughout the
of nationals from Ghana, Senegal and The Gambia, as well EU via online platforms on the surface web and the darknet.
as Morocco and Tunisia, in the local distribution of heroin
in some Member States. Moroccan OCGs based in some The trafficking of fentanyl and derivatives from Russia
EU countries are involved in the cutting and repackaging of is undertaken primarily by OCGs with ties to Russian-
heroin, as well as its retail distribution (Boerman et al., 2017). speaking diaspora communities based in the destination
countries. These substances tend to be of lower quality
Some of the profits obtained from the distribution of than those available through online distribution and are
heroin in the EU need to be transferred to the suppliers in primarily intended for distribution on the Estonian market,
Table 4.2
Selected synthetic opioids seized in the EU, 2017
Opioid Number of Quantity Number of
seizures countries
Kilograms Litres Tablets Patches
Methadone 1 428 17.2 26.4 30 381 – 18
Buprenorphine 2 649 0.5 0.01 58 682 – 17
Tramadol 4 290 13.8 0.1 118 935 898 – 11
Fentanyl derivatives 940 14.3 1.9 10 551 2 291 13
121
where fentanyl has replaced heroin as the main opioid

Tramadol
consumed since 2001. In recent years, there has been
an increase in the availability of fentanyl derivatives on
Tramadol is a synthetic opioid analgesic widely used
neighbouring markets, especially Latvia and Lithuania as
in human and veterinary medicine to relieve pain.
well as Sweden, where action has now been taken to tackle
Medicines containing tramadol are authorised in a large
the issue (see Chapter 9).
number of countries. In recent years, concerns have been
raised both about the diversion and misuse of tramadol
China is a large-scale producer of synthetic opioids,
as a medicine and about its illicit production and sale as
particularly fentanyl derivatives, supplying large drug
unlicensed and fake medicines on the drug market.
markets in south-east Asia and North America. China is
also the main supplier of the synthetic opioids distributed
Tramadol’s main mechanism of action is as an opioid,
in the EU via the surface web and the darknet. China has
but other actions are thought to contribute to its pain-
recently introduced some control measures, including
relieving effects. Overdose can cause acute opioid
some generic measures targeting fentanyl derivatives. The
poisoning (such as respiratory depression), seizures and
future impact of these measures on Europe will need to
serotonin syndrome. It can also cause dependence and
be evaluated. It is currently difficult to establish trafficking
withdrawal.
routes for fentanyl derivatives and identify countries of
origin, transit and destination with any degree of certainty.
Medicines containing tramadol are marketed in a range
However, it seems that fentanyl derivatives from China are
of formulations, such as tablets or capsules, sublingual
trafficked to the EU either in bulk, and then redistributed by
drops, intranasal spray and injectable solutions. Globally,
EU-based vendors in various Member States, or in smaller
tablets and capsules are the most commonly used and
quantities directly supplied to users of online platforms.
easily available formulations. Oral formulations contain
However, it appears that such shipments frequently come
between 50 mg and 300 mg of tramadol. Alongside
through key logistics hubs in the EU prior to arriving at
these legitimate products, a range of unlicensed and fake
their final destinations. Although the problem of synthetic
tramadol medicines, especially tablets and capsules,
opioids in the EU is much less severe than the opioid crisis
have appeared on the market in recent years. Some of
in North America, the potency of fentanyl and its derivatives
these contain high doses, up to 500 mg of tramadol
means that even relatively small-scale suppliers can have
(WHO, 2018).
a significant harmful impact. This therefore remains an
area requiring vigilance and requires some precautionary India appears to be one of the main producers of
measures. The high potency of some of these substances tramadol for use in medicines. Some of this is exported
can mean that they pose a risk, not only to those who use to other countries as finished pharmaceutical products;
them, but also to family members, first responders or law in other cases the bulk powder (hydrochloride salt) is
enforcement or other professional groups who may come exported and used to make the final products locally.
into contact with them.
Both the licit and illicit markets for tramadol in some
Other opioids are also distributed within the EU, in some Middle Eastern and African countries appear to be large.
cases for use outside the region. For example, shipments A record amount of 125 tonnes of tramadol seized in
of the synthetic opioid tramadol in transit to Africa have 2017 combined with several studies and estimates
repeatedly been seized in Cyprus, Greece and Italy over highlight the increasing misuse of this substance in some
the last few years, as reported in numerous media reports. regions. According to the World Drug Report 2019, most
Another synthetic opioid, buprenorphine, has been of the tramadol available on the illicit markets in Middle
misused in Finland for many years, and the trafficking East and Africa is believed to have been produced in
of this medicine via Lithuania to Finland is believed to illicit laboratories in South Asia and only a small amount
have increased recently. Most of the buprenorphine appeared to have been diverted from the market for
misused in Finland is believed to originate in France. In medicines. However, the situation may be changing
December 2017 a Europol-supported operation dismantled rapidly. This requires active monitoring to improve our
a trafficking ring, which smuggled high-dose buprenorphine understanding of the market.
tablets (Subutex) from France to Finland in significant
quantities. Although tramadol is not currently under international
control, some countries have controlled it over concerns
In addition to production outside the EU or in the EU for about its potential to cause harm. These include India,
the illicit market, medicinal products containing synthetic which controlled the substance in 2017 (Government of
opioids, such as tramadol (see box ‘Tramadol’), are known India, 2018).
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I
to be diverted from legitimate supplies and misused in most abundant metabolite of heroin, which can be used as
some Member States. Synthetic opioids are key active a target residue to estimate heroin consumption, may also
ingredients in many legal pharmaceutical products be an indicator of the commonly used medicines morphine
prescribed and sold in the EU and come in a variety of and codeine.
forms, including tablets, patches, sprays or lozenges. In
some countries, such as France, the diversion of these Many other potential indicators of heroin use have some
products, such as methadone or buprenorphine, is reported time lag. For example, the mean age of opioid users
to be the main source for their illicit drug markets. Other entering treatment for the first time in the EU is 34, while
Member States, including Latvia, reported an increase in the mean age for first-time use is 22. Therefore, treatment
the abuse of pharmaceutical products containing fentanyl indicators will identify opioid users only after approximately
in the early part of 2017. The pharmaceutical products 12 years of use, and the number of opioid users entering
containing fentanyl diverted from legal supply that are most treatment could be influenced by financial priorities or
commonly seized are patches, sprays and lozenges. by EU Member States modifying the laws governing this
activity.
Many of the new synthetic opioids notified to the EU
Early Warning System on new psychoactive substances Nevertheless, a number of indirect methods for obtaining
are fentanyl derivatives. Occupational exposure to some estimates of the extent of use of opioids are available.
synthetic opioids, especially fentanyl derivatives, is The prevalence of high-risk opioid use among adults
potentially dangerous for law enforcement officers. Law (aged 15-64) is estimated at 0.4 % of the EU population,
enforcement personnel could encounter synthetic opioids the equivalent of 1.3 million high-risk opioid users in 2017,
in a range of operational settings and they should be of which three quarters (77 %) were reported in the five
trained to recognise the signs of poisoning and how to most populous countries in the EU (France, Germany,
respond to such a situation. This may include training in Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom). However, there is
first aid, including basic life support and how to use the considerable variation between countries; prevalence
antidote naloxone. estimates of high-risk opioid use range from less than one
to more than eight cases per 1 000 population aged 15-64.
Because of their high potency and therefore potential Synthetic opioids now account for 22 % of all primary
presence in very small quantities, certain synthetic opioids opioid clients and, in some countries, non-heroin opioids
may be difficult to detect using some of the routine represent the most common form of opioid use among
analytical methods and techniques currently used by specialised treatment entrants (EMCDDA, 2019b).
forensic laboratories. Sniffer dogs can be trained to detect
synthetic opioids, including fentanyl derivatives, and have In most countries, it appears that the number of people
been successfully used by law enforcement authorities for who use heroin is quite stable. However, as discussed
that purpose in some Member States, such as Estonia. in the introduction to this chapter, the use of heroin is
associated with a disproportionate amount of drug-related
harms. Although the number of people reporting use
of the drug is quite low compared with drugs such as
cannabis and cocaine, a large proportion of people who
Retail supply and use use heroin are dependent on the drug; this means that
they use it more frequently and in larger amounts than is
the case for other drugs. This is reflected in the estimated
The consumer market for heroin size of the market — a minimum of EUR 7.4 billion (range
EUR 6.4 billion to EUR 9.1 billion) in the EU in 2017. In
In Europe, the most common illicit opioid sold on the terms of quantity, this is equivalent to at least 149 tonnes
market is heroin. Most frequently, heroin is smoked, inhaled of heroin at street-level purity (range 127 to 181 tonnes)
or injected. (EMCDDA, 2019a).
Obtaining information on the number of users and the Most of the people who use heroin and other opioids buy
amount of heroin they use is challenging, firstly because their drugs on the traditional illicit market rather than
people who use heroin are mainly dependent on the online. These offline illicit drug markets in the EU evolve
drug, living on the margins of society and unlikely to be over time, and there are some general changes in these
included in surveys of the general population. Wastewater markets that also apply to the heroin market. For example,
analysis, another source of information on drug use, in the United Kingdom heroin is one of the main drugs now
cannot be performed for heroin because morphine, the supplied through the county lines highlighted in Part I of
123
the report, by which OCGs in the big cities supply drugs Figure 4.10
to smaller towns. People dependent on heroin as well Indexed trends in price and purity of heroin
as young people from disadvantaged urban centres are Retail price Purity
frequently exploited and coerced into participating in this EUR/g %
form of supply. Indexed trends:
Price and purity
In general, the retail price is viewed as a marker of €140
availability relative to demand. However, in an illicit drug
market, where there are no quality controls and many 51 %
100
users are dependent on drugs, the picture may be more 87 31 %
complex and the market may react in other ways to supply 80 15 %
€58 9%
problems. For example, purity may be reduced or users
may seek substitute drugs, which may be one driver of €28
the diversification of opioids on the market reported in €15
this chapter. Among those countries that consistently 2007 2017
report price and purity data, indexed trends suggest that,
following a sharp decrease between 2009 and 2011, minimum maximum
interquartile
when several EU countries reported heroin shortages and range
dealers appeared to react by lowering purity rather than Note: Price and purity of ‘brown heroin’: national mean values — minimum,
changing price (EMCDDA, 2015), heroin purity increased maximum and interquartile range. Countries covered vary by indicator.
rapidly before stabilising in recent years. In contrast, overall

the retail price of heroin has been declining slightly over Figure 4.11
the last decade. However, price and purity vary widely, both Proportion of heroin listings on major darknet markets
within and between countries (Figure 4.10). by EU Member State, 2018
Belgium France
United Kingdom 1%
As indicated in the section on adulteration above, 2%
1%
the cutting agents most commonly used for heroin are

Other EU countries
caffeine and paracetamol. 11 %
Netherlands
61 %
Online distribution
Heroin is also distributed across the EU via darknet

marketplaces (see Chapter 2). The quantities offered
are typically small, and purchases are typically delivered
using post and parcel services. Although the online trade
Germany
in heroin (and other drugs) remains marginal compared 24 %
with traditional, offline supply, it is important to understand
its scope. Based on 2018 data from several major
darknet markets (12), we detected a total of 1 855 listings
(sale offers) that could be attributed to vendors that said Caution is needed in interpreting these data in respect of
they would ship heroin from an EU country. These offers gauging of the number of individual sellers offering heroin
were distributed across three marketplaces: Dream Market on these marketplaces or the number of transactions —
(1 722), Berlusconi Market (110) and Olympus Market neither of which can be extrapolated from the number of
(23). The available data suggest that the majority of these listings alone. Nonetheless the number of listings has been
sale offers during 2018 originated from the Netherlands used as a valid indicator of the scope of activity on darknet
(61 %) and Germany (24 %). Other reported EU origin markets.
countries included the United Kingdom (2 %) and France
and Belgium (1 % each). An additional 11 % of heroin As indicated above, there is also a limited online retail
listings did not specify a country but indicated Europe as market for opioids, mainly synthetic opioids (see also
a shipping origin (Figure 4.11). Chapter 7).
124
Photo: Anti-narcotics Directorate of the Colombian Police
125
CHAPTER 5
Cocaine
Key points
Europe’s growing cocaine problem
X Cocaine is the second most commonly consumed illicit X Cocaine market-related corruption and violence
drug in the EU. The estimated minimum retail value of are a growing problem within the EU. Historically, they
the cocaine market was EUR 9.1 billion in 2017. Survey were most prominent outside European countries. Now
estimates suggest that about 4 million adults in the EU increased competition among OCGs appears to be driving
have used cocaine in the past year. Although cocaine higher levels of violence within the EU as well as fuelling
use is concentrated in western and southern Europe, use corruption around some trafficking hubs, particularly in
elsewhere appears to be increasing. large European ports.
X Seizures in the EU are at record levels, reaching 104 000

seizures amounting to 140 tonnes in 2017. In addition, Expanding production and trafficking
data indicate that cocaine seized at the wholesale level in
Europe is of high purity, often above 85 %, suggesting that X The EU is a potential source of a range of precursors and
cocaine availability in Europe is currently high. other chemicals for cocaine production. Attempts to divert
the main cocaine precursor, potassium permanganate,
X Recent production estimates are similarly high. Coca from the EU have been observed recently and there have
cultivation and cocaine production in the Andean region also been significant seizures in Europe of other chemicals
have increased dramatically, the latter approaching used in cocaine production, such as sodium metabisulfite
2 000 tonnes in 2017. Colombia accounts for the largest and calcium chloride.
share of this total. The knock-on impact of this has been
intensified trafficking to Europe. X Cocaine-manufacturing processes in South America are
becoming more efficient. Innovations in production allow
X A wider range of OCGs now appear to be involved in cocaine hydrochloride to be produced in larger amounts at
the European cocaine market. Colombian and Italian a time.
OCGs historically played a central role in the production,
trafficking and distribution of cocaine, but other groups are X The use of shipping containers for trafficking means
becoming more significant, including Albanian-speaking, that seizures of large quantities of cocaine at ports are
British, Dutch, French, Irish, Moroccan, Serbian, Spanish now common. For example, large seizures are reported at
and Turkish OCGs, resulting in increased competition. the ports of Antwerp in Belgium and Algeciras in Spain,
and in vessels bound for Europe at foreign ports, usually
X More European OCGs have now established a presence in Colombia and Brazil. Maritime containers continue to
in Latin American countries. This permits a new ‘end- be the main mode of transport used to smuggle cocaine
to-end’ business model for managing the supply chain, into Europe, and quantities per container appear to have
allowing the purchase of large quantities of cocaine near to increased. However, other trafficking methods remain
production areas at lower costs. This could also be a factor important.
driving competition and conflict within the cocaine market.
126
CHAPTER 5 Cocaine
I
X The global market for cocaine appears to be growing, Q Give greater priority to assessing and countering the
use is increasing in countries where previously it was threat posed by changing OCG business models,
uncommon, including some large developing countries. including European OCGs establishing a presence in
As a result, the EU appears to be increasingly used as South American countries and non-European OCGs
a transit area for cocaine destined for other markets such becoming active within Europe. This requires greater
as Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Turkey and countries in cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean
the Middle East and Asia. countries, including capacity building at key port
facilities; intelligence sharing within the EU and
X North Africa appears to be emerging as a more with external partners; and investment in targeted
significant transit and storage hub for air and maritime operations along the supply chain.
shipments of cocaine destined for the EU and possibly Q Continue to invest in intelligence sharing and joint
other markets. maritime initiatives and operations in the Atlantic
Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.
X The Netherlands, Belgium and Spain are the main Q Strengthen intelligence gathering and the collection of
entry points and distribution hubs for cocaine in the EU. data at large container ports to inform both operational
From these locations, cocaine is distributed to other parts targeting and strategic planning. Measures are also
of Europe, mostly by road in lorries, although personal needed to strengthen capacity through the sharing of
vehicles and, increasingly, post and parcel services may be best practice and delivery of specialised training.
used to move small consignments rapidly. Q Recognise the growing importance of North Africa,
particularly Morocco, in cocaine trafficking to Europe,
X Cocaine distribution at the local level in Europe is and the greater involvement of Moroccan OCGs in the
generally conducted by domestic OCGs. In some countries, wholesale and distribution levels of the EU market.
Albanian-speaking, Moroccan and West African OCGs as This requires proactive engagement with partners in
well as outlaw motorcycle gangs also play a role. the region and assessment of the implications for law
enforcement of the links between the cannabis and
X Digital technologies, including darknet markets, social cocaine markets.
media and mobile phone apps, are increasingly enabling Q Support awareness raising and engagement
the retail cocaine market. Innovation in the supply chain at among stakeholders, including business, labour
the consumer level is suggestive of both high availability representatives and local communities, to help counter
and attempts by OCGs to increase market share. the corruption that is inherent in smuggling methods
used at ports and transportation hubs.
Q Develop strategies to anticipate the displacement
of smuggling through secondary ports or smaller
airports. This requires targeted risk assessment and the
Implications for action to address development of preventative measures scalable to the
current threats and increase potential vulnerabilities of different locations.
preparedness Q Raise awareness and develop preventative approaches
to reducing the recruitment of vulnerable individuals in
the drug market, for example as drug couriers.
In order to respond more effectively to developments in the Q Better understand and document the links between
cocaine market there is a need to take the following actions. the retail cocaine market, localised violence, gang
membership and young people’s recruitment into
Q Increase capacity to perform routine forensic profiling crime, and share experiences of what measures may
of cocaine seized at key points of entry in Europe, from reduce these problems.
dismantled cocaine production sites, and in forms
requiring processing within the EU. It is also necessary
to strengthen capacity to report on existing indicators
on cocaine availability.
127
Cocaine overview Global
World
Last year use 18.1 million
Estimated number using cocaine in the last year aged 15-64
Estimated coca bush cultivation

(thousand hectares)
Maritime route
245
Air route
182 Land route
To western
and central
Europe
2007 2017
Estimated cocaine production Wholesale price

tonnes, 100 % purity at key locations (EUR/kg)
2 000 *Mean **Mode ***Min-Max
Producer countries
To Panama Canal
Colombia** 1 354
1 500 and Caribbean
Peru** 1 808
Bolivia** 2 250
1 000
Colombia
Selected transit locations
Paraguay** 3 240
500 Peru Main
Dutch Antilles* 4 000
coca producer
Jamaica*** 7 100-8 520 countries
0 Uruguay** 7 200
2007 2017 Nigeria*** 35 800 38 827
Bolivia
To
Morocco** 73 998
Europe
Global seizures of cocaine
(tonnes) Selected European markets
Netherlands* 25 000
1 200
Belgium* 28 650
1 000
Spain* 35 415
800
Norway* 37 773
600
Slovenia** 40 000
400
Italy* 40 918
200
Poland** 50 000
0
2007 2017 Slovakia* 70 000
128
CHAPTER 5 CocaineI
31 %
Europe EU retail drug
market share

4.0 million
ioon
n
Estimated number using cocaine in the last year aged 15-64

120 EU+2
100 EU
Treatment
Trends in first-time entrants for problems 80
related to cocaine 60
40 000 40
30 000 20
0
20 000 2007 2017
10 000 Quantity seized (tonnes)

150 EU+2
0 EU
2007 2017
To transit 100
countries
and Europe Drug law offences related to cocaine
50
To West Africa
and neighbouring
islands
113 000 108 000 0
2007 2017
Retail price Purity

2007 2017
(EUR/g) (%)
Indexed trends:
Price and purity
29 % 70 %
Offences Other Offences for €135
for supply possession/use 128 88 %
71 %
To southern €82
Africa 100
Total 95 49 %
107 559 €55
€38
27 %
2007 2017
minimum maximum
interquartile
range
129
Introduction Cocaine
Cocaine is Europe’s most commonly used illicit stimulant
Cocaine is a natural product extracted from the
drug, but its consumption is most prevalent in the south and
leaves of Erythroxylum coca and Erythroxylum
west of Europe. It is estimated that 18.0 million adults in
novogranatense. These tropical shrubs are cultivated
the EU (aged 15-64), or 5.4 % of this age group, have tried
widely in the Andean-Amazonian region, and are the
cocaine during their lives. Among these are about 4 million
only known natural source of cocaine (1), which is
who have used the drug in the last year. Cocaine is used
produced almost exclusively in Bolivia, Colombia and
in two main forms (see box ‘Cocaine’). Cocaine powder is
Peru. Cocaine has been used as a central nervous
primarily sniffed or snorted, but is also sometimes injected,
system stimulant since the early years of the 20th
and the freebase form of the drug, crack cocaine, is usually
century.
smoked. Most use is of cocaine powder, comparatively
infrequent — but a small proportion use it more frequently
In Europe, cocaine is available in two forms. The
and may experience more serious problems. There are also
more common is cocaine powder (a hydrochloride
a few countries in which there are small groups of people
salt). Less commonly available is crack cocaine,
who use crack cocaine in a more harmful way, often in
a smokeable (freebase) form of the drug. The crack
conjunction with heroin.
cocaine available in Europe is typically manufactured
from cocaine hydrochloride near to where it is retailed
The minimum estimated value of the retail market for
and used. Therefore, cocaine in crack form generates
cocaine in the EU in 2017 was EUR 9.1 billion (range
very little cross-border or long-distance trafficking.
EUR 7.6-10.5 billion). This represents almost a third (31 %)
of the total illicit market in drugs and makes it the second (1) It is possible to obtain synthetic cocaine by various methods, but
largest, after cannabis. This suggests that in 2017 about this is rare and is less economical than the extraction of the natural
product.
119 tonnes of cocaine was consumed, with a likely range of
100 to 137 tonnes.
America, particularly from Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador,
Recently, data from a range of sources have suggested that and destined for large European ports, such as Antwerp and
cocaine use and associated harms may be increasing in Algeciras. Another frequently used route, involving other
Europe. For example, surveys in those countries that can forms of sea transport, appears to involve transit through
provide long-term trends suggest rates of cocaine use have the Caribbean or West Africa, including the islands off the
stabilised or increased (EMCDDA, 2019b). These patterns coast of West Africa. In addition, North Africa appears to
are also reflected in data on people entering treatment; after be emerging as a significant transit area. Cocaine enters
a period of decline, the number of treatment entrants for Europe mainly through western and southern countries.
cocaine increased by over 35 % between 2014 and 2017.
In 2017, the highest ever amount of cocaine, 140 tonnes,
The health harms associated with regular cocaine use was seized in the EU. Belgium and Spain together were
include dependence, heart and mental health problems, estimated to account for about 60 % of the total.
and an increased risk of accidents. Harms may be
exacerbated when cocaine is used in conjunction with
alcohol. Cocaine injection and the use of crack cocaine are
associated with the greatest health risks. There were an
estimated 1 220 cocaine-related deaths in 2016, or one Global overview
in seven of all drug-related deaths that year in the 28 EU
Member States, Norway and Turkey (EMCDDA, 2018b). In the three countries in which coca cultivation is almost
This was a significant increase from the 800 cocaine- exclusively concentrated, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, coca
related deaths reported in 2013. Most of these deaths were leaves play a significant cultural role. In Bolivia and Peru,
attributed to drug overdose, with other substances also some growing of coca is permitted to supply licit domestic
being detected in many cases, primarily opioids. consumer markets for leaves and to supply de-cocainised
flavouring agents to international manufacturers of soft
Cocaine is trafficked to Europe from the producer countries drinks, which complicates efforts to control cocaine
of South America by both air and sea using a range of production.
methods and routes. The largest amounts of cocaine
may now be smuggled into Europe hidden in cargo ships, The extraction of cocaine alkaloids from the coca leaves
especially in maritime shipping containers, departing South also takes place almost exclusively in the three coca
130
CHAPTER 5 Cocaine
I
producer countries, which also account for the majority of Figure 5.1
the global production of cocaine hydrochloride. However, Colombian police operation against facilities
some cocaine-processing laboratories have been detected producing coca paste, Caucasia, Antioquia, April 2019
in other South American countries and elsewhere, including
Europe (see section on cocaine production in Europe),
and globally about 8 000 cocaine-type laboratories were
reported to have been dismantled in 2017 (UNODC, 2019a).
The majority of cocaine users are found in North and South

America and western and central Europe. Global prevalence
rates are estimated to have increased between 2012 and
2017. Prevalence of use is particularly high in North America
(especially in the United States), Oceania (especially
Australia), and western and central Europe (Spain, the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands); a potential increase
in cocaine use is reported in West Africa and Asia in 2017
Photo: Anti-narcotics Directorate of the Colombian Police
(UNODC, 2019a).
Global seizures of cocaine reported by UNODC totalled in alternative development programmes; the signing of
1 275 tonnes in 2017, the highest quantity ever reported a free trade agreement with the United States that made
(UNODC, 2019a). licit Colombian agricultural products less competitive; and
an increase in new planting of coca by farmers seeking to
benefit from compensation for stopping coca cultivation
under the peace agreement signed between FARC and the
government in 2016 (UNODC, 2018a).
Coca and cocaine production
The peace accord also had an impact on the Colombian
criminal landscape linked to coca production. FARC had
Recent trends in coca production limited involvement in international cocaine trafficking
but played a key role in the production of coca leaf in
In the period 2014-17, the South American cocaine supply Colombia until 2017. Then the peace agreement led to the
chains witnessed some changes, particularly with respect emergence of various FARC splinter groups and networks
to the estimated areas under coca bush cultivation and the that took control of some coca cultivation regions for their
methods used to illicitly manufacture cocaine (Figure 5.1). own benefit. Some former and current insurgent groups
thus remain involved in the cocaine trade. For instance, the
In 2017, global coca bush cultivation was estimated to National Liberation Army is increasingly exerting control over
have increased for the third consecutive year to reach territories and cultivation operations previously dominated
245 400 hectares (UNODC, 2019a), its highest level ever. by FARC. This is reminiscent of the events following the
This represents an increase of 15 % compared with 2016. demobilisation of paramilitary organisations in 2006, which
The 2017 increase in the global coca acreage was due to led to the fragmentation of large paramilitary/criminal groups
increases in each of the three Andean producer countries, and the emergence of smaller gangs known as bandas
but the largest increase (17 %) took place in Colombia. criminales (‘bacrim’), which took over cocaine production and
As a result, in 2017 Colombia accounted for about 70 % trafficking activities in Colombia (Schultze-Kraft, 2016).
of estimated global coca cultivation, Peru for about 20 %
and Bolivia for about 10 % (UNODC, 2019a). The latest
crop monitoring information available indicates that coca Recent trends in cocaine production
cultivation decreased slightly in Colombia in 2018 (UNODC,
2019d). The increase in coca cultivation has resulted in a parallel
increase in cocaine production, which the UNODC
The increases in coca production in the three Andean estimates at 1 976 tonnes in 2017, an all-time high
countries are likely to be explained by the interplay of (UNODC, 2019a) (see Cocaine overview, pages 128-129).
multiple factors. In Colombia, the main explanations are More recent estimates of cocaine production for 2018,
reported to be the suspension of eradication by means of in Colombia only, at 1 120 tonnes show a 6 % increase
aerial spraying of herbicides on coca crops; a reduction compared with 2017 (UNODC, 2019d).
131
Larger harvests of coca leaves have contributed to the Figure 5.2

dramatic increase in estimated global cocaine production. The cocaine production process
In addition, there is evidence of increased optimisation of
1. Cultivation
cocaine-manufacturing processes. A recently identified Erythroxylum
Erythroxylum coca and
coca
trend is the use of ‘reoxidised base’, which involves the Erythroxylum novogranatense
Erythroxylum are cultivated in the
standardisation of the oxidation level of cocaine base novogranatense Andean-Amazonian region.
produced in different locations before it is processed into
hydrochloride (INCB, 2018). Another recent development, 2. Extraction
which could be linked to it, is the processing of larger batches H2SO4
coca base Coca leaves crushed with
of cocaine base into hydrochloride, whereas previously CaCO3
paste sulfuric acid, calcium carbonate
gasoline/
hydrochloride was produced 1 kg at a time. This latter kerosene and kerosene.
development may make it more difficult, or even impossible,

to generate strategic intelligence by comparing seized
cocaine by means of forensic analysis (Mallette et al., 2018).
3. Purification
KMnO4
Potassium permanganate is
cocaine added to coca base paste and
Cocaine laboratories and cocaine
base resulting mixture is filtered.
precursors
Most cocaine manufacture takes place in Bolivia, Colombia Re-oxidation (optional) Potassium permanganate and
and Peru (see box ‘Profiling of cocaine seized in Europe’). KMnO4 NaOH sodium bisulfite or sodium
NaHSO3 gasoline/ sulfate are mixed with cocaine
Together these countries are home to the majority of /Na2SO25 kerosene base for 15 minutes. Then
sodium hydroxide and gasoline
reported dismantled cocaine laboratories. However, there or kerosene are added. The
re-oxidised base is then filtered
is also evidence that some cocaine hydrochloride is refined and pressed into blocks or
re-oxidised
elsewhere in South America, further along the trafficking directly crystallised.
base
routes, and perhaps in Europe.
4. Crystallisation
NH4OH cocaine Ammonium hydroxide, acetone
Potassium permanganate is an essential chemical in the hydrochloride and hydrochloric acid are
acetone
illicit manufacture of cocaine, mostly used as an oxidising HCl added to the cocaine base.
agent to turn coca paste into cocaine base (see Figure 5.2).

It is listed in Table I of the United Nations Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 5. Adulteration
1988 (United Nations, 2017). Efforts to control trafficking in phenacetin ? levamisole ‘Cutting agents’ (e.g. levamisole)
potassium permanganate are complicated by the fact that are added to the cocaine
hydrochloride and then the
it is a chemical used extensively by industries throughout resulting powder is pressed into
blocks and logos may be added.
the world, for instance in drinking water treatment.
According to the INCB, more than 25 000 tonnes was traded
Note: This illustration is intended to provide an indicative schematic overview
internationally in the November 2017 to November 2018 of selected stages of a production process. It must be noted that alternative
reporting period. Imports to the three main coca-producing methods, chemicals and procedures may be used.
countries accounted for 1.4 % of this (INCB, 2019).

Colombia, where, in 2016, 14 illicit potassium permanganate
Global seizures of illicit potassium permanganate increased facilities were dismantled (INCB, 2018; UNODC, 2018a).
dramatically in 2016, to a record-breaking 585 tonnes, before A number of other, unscheduled, substances are used in the
decreasing sharply to 103 tonnes in 2017 (see Figure 5.3) production of cocaine. These include nitric acid, a substitute
(INCB, 2018, 2019). The 2016 total is much greater than the for potassium permanganate used in the purification of coca
estimated minimum of 319 tonnes required to manufacture paste (see Figure 5.2), and sodium hypochlorite; dozens of
the quantity of cocaine estimated produced globally that year. tonnes of these substances were seized in South America in
Colombia accounted for 99 % and 96 % of the total seizures 2016 (INCB, 2018). Sodium metabisulfite, a reducing agent
in 2016 and 2017, respectively, and the major sources of used in the process of standardising cocaine base, and
these were diversion from domestic licit trade and illicit calcium chloride, a drying agent for solvents, are also seized
manufacture in clandestine facilities (INCB, 2018, 2019). in large amounts in South America.
Illicit manufacture of potassium permanganate using
chemicals such as manganese dioxide and potassium In Europe, seizures of potassium permanganate were very
manganate is a fairly long-standing phenomenon in small in 2016 and 2017, with a total of 13.5 kg confiscated,
132
CHAPTER 5 Cocaine
I
Figure 5.3 210 kg seized in Barcelona and nearby towns in 2016

Global seizures of potassium permanganate, 2007-17 (Cawley, 2014; Diariocronica.es, 2016).
Tonnes
The detection of base-to-hydrochloride laboratories in
700
Europe could also be a consequence of the importation
600
of cocaine hidden in carrier materials, such as plastic. In
500 secondary extraction facilities, the cocaine is often retrieved
400 in the form of base and then needs to be transformed into
300
hydrochloride before being sold. Although it is known that
using carrier materials to hide cocaine before importation
200
in Europe is one of the methods employed by traffickers
100
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2013, 2016), it seems that few
0 ‘secondary extraction’ laboratories are dismantled in
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Europe; only five countries report a total of 10 facilities since
2014 via the ad hoc European Reporting on Illicit Cocaine
almost entirely in Spain. However, there were several attempts Extraction-Conversion Sites (ERICES) tool, jointly developed
at sourcing this chemical in Europe during this period, and by the EMCDDA and Europol. However, media reports
Spain stopped shipments that had been requested and suggest that more secondary extraction facilities are found
totalled a little more than 54 tonnes (data from the European than are reported through ERICES (Van Wely, 2019).
Commission). In addition, sodium metabisulfite is also seized;
for instance, the Netherlands seized notable amounts in
2016 and 2017 (INCB, 2018). Seizures of calcium chloride Environmental impact of cocaine
also occurred in Europe recently; in 2016 an unspecified production
quantity was seized in Spain and more than 1 tonne in the
Netherlands (INCB, 2018). These seizures suggest that some Two categories of environmental harms are caused by
cocaine hydrochloride production and processing takes place cocaine production: those resulting from the agricultural
in Europe, especially the Netherlands. production of the coca plant and those caused by the
chemical extraction of the cocaine alkaloid from coca
leaves. The first harm caused is deforestation. Removing
Cocaine production in Europe the natural vegetation from a patch of land in order to grow
a single-species crop harms biodiversity. Erosion is another
Except for seizures of chemicals used in the manufacture negative consequence, especially due to the slash-and-burn
of cocaine, little information is available about facilities practice frequently used in clearing land. Erosion, caused by
potentially manufacturing cocaine hydrochloride in Europe. wind and especially rain, leads to soil depletion. In addition,
This intelligence gap is a concern, especially as some the drive to maximise yields of what are essentially cash
OCGs have started to manufacture heroin from morphine in crops, often leads to use of chemical fertilisers, herbicides
Europe (see Chapter 4). Some limited information suggests and pesticides in order to increase production. In the
that the last stages of the cocaine production process, context of drug production, this is likely to be done with little
i.e. converting base, or even base paste, into hydrochloride regard to dosage, further polluting already degraded soils
(see Figure 5.2), may be carried out in Europe. For instance, and spreading to rivers and underground water deposits.
it is suspected that two illicit laboratories dismantled in the In addition, aerial spraying of herbicides to eradicate coca
Netherlands in the first half of 2018 were converting coca plantations may pose a threat to the environment.
base paste into hydrochloride. In one of those facilities,
additional evidence was found indicating that morphine Many of the chemicals used to process coca leaves into
was also processed into heroin on site. cocaine hydrochloride, including potassium permanganate
and solvents such as acetone, toluene, kerosene and acids,
If cocaine is being processed in Europe, cocaine needs to mention only a few, are toxic. The waste product resulting
to be exported to Europe in base or paste form. The data from cocaine production where these chemicals are used
currently indicate that the vast majority of the cocaine is often simply dumped on the ground or in streams and
seized is the hydrochloride salt. Other cocaine products are rivers (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016).
rarely mentioned, but seizures of about 377 kg (2015) and
86 kg (2016) of base paste were reported to the EMCDDA It is probable that the environmental harms caused by the
by Spain and Italy. In addition, there are occasional media cocaine industry have increased in recent years because
reports of seizures of cocaine base paste in Colombia of the dramatic expansion of both coca crops and cocaine
destined for Europe, and seizures in Europe, such as the production in the Andean region, especially Colombia.
133
Trafficking and supply the rest was intercepted on land (25 %) and at airports
(15 %) (UNODC, 2019a). North, Central and South America
Much of our knowledge about trafficking routes results from together were estimated to have seized almost 90 % of the
law enforcement activity and intelligence. Information on global total in 2017 (see section on trafficking routes to
quantities of drugs seized and on the origin and destination Europe, below). Western and central Europe accounted for
of shipments can give an indication of the main routes about 11 % of the global total, and Belgium was the country
and modes of transport. However, such information is that seized the largest amount (3.5 % of global total),
also affected by many factors, including law enforcement followed by Spain (3.2 %) and France (1.4 %) (UNODC,
strategies, resources and priorities, as well as changes to 2019a).
routes and practices in response to interdiction efforts or
new opportunities. Hence, care is needed in interpreting Taken together, seizures in western, central and south-
these data. While the information below highlights the eastern Europe increased by 105 % between 2016 and
main known trafficking routes and other significant aspects, 2017. Although small in comparison with seizures in
these are not set in stone, and the picture is constantly the Americas and Europe, seizures in emerging cocaine
changing in response to new markets, technological and markets in Africa and Oceania increased, in some cases
political developments and law enforcement activity. considerably, for the fourth consecutive year in 2017
(UNODC, 2019a).
The total of 1 275 tonnes of cocaine seized worldwide
in 2017 was the highest ever to be reported. Because
cocaine seizures are reported at varying levels of purity, the Trafficking routes to Europe: overview of
global quantities seized are not comparable with global recent changes
production estimates, which are of ‘pure cocaine’. At global
level, a majority of the cocaine was seized at sea or at ports The main cocaine trafficking routes to Europe are illustrated
(55 % of the significant drug seizures reported to UNODC); on pages 128-129.
Profiling of cocaine seized in Europe
The Cocaine Signature Program has the potential to In the 474 EU samples, purities varied between
provide new insights into the origin of the cocaine 28 % and 95 %. In seven out of the 10 Member
being sold in Europe. This programme, run by the US States, purities of 90 % or more were detected, while
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), performs samples of less than 70 % purity were found in only
in-depth chemical analyses on samples of cocaine two Member States (see figure). This suggests that,
hydrochloride obtained from bulk seizures. It is at the importation and wholesale levels, the cocaine
primarily focused on seizures made in the United available in Europe is of high or very high purity.
States, but also examines a small number of samples
seized in Europe. The analyses provide extremely Over two thirds (68 %) of the EU samples originated
accurate (97 % confidence level) evidence of the from Colombia, and 60 % of those originated in the
geographical origin of the coca leaf that is then three large coca-growing regions of south-western
processed into cocaine base, the starting material for Colombia, Cauca, Nariño and Putumayo. These
cocaine hydrochloride (powder cocaine). The samples regions have also been reported as the main sources
are also tested for purity. of the cocaine available in the United States (Mallette
et al., 2016). Colombia was the most frequent country
Results pertaining to 474 samples of cocaine of origin in eight out of the 10 EU Member States,
hydrochloride, submitted by 10 EU Member States as would be expected, since Colombia is by far the
between 2015 and 2018, have been compiled by largest cocaine-producing country in the world.
the EMCDDA under the aegis of the policy cycle’s
European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Almost one fifth (19 %) of the total number of
Threats (EMPACT) (see figure). Although the samples EU samples originated from Peru, the world’s
are not representative of all of Europe and are biased second largest coca producer, and half of them
towards larger seizures, the findings demonstrate the were submitted by Belgium. The vast majority of
valuable insights this type of analysis can provide. the Peruvian-origin samples were found to have
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CHAPTER 5 Cocaine
I
originated from the Upper Huallaga River Valley/ number one coca-growing region, the Apurímac,
Ucayali region of central Peru. This is of interest, Ene and Mantaro Rivers Valley, is not identified as
since this region is estimated to be a marginal coca the origin of any of the EU samples. Bolivia, the third
producer in Peru in the most recent crop-monitoring largest coca producer country, was identified as the
survey available (UNODC, 2018c), while Peru’s origin of only 20 samples (4 % of the total).
474 samples of cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) submitted by 10 EU countries between 2015 and 2018
Origins Percentage Destinations

of samples (number
from origin of samples)
55 %
Belgium (204)
26 %
Colombia
68 % 7%
12 %
Czechia (2)
98 % France (115)
Cyprus (2)
Malta (3)
90 % Netherlands (20)
Romania (1)
Peru 76 % Poland (17)
19 %
Slovenia (6)
54 %
Bolivia United
4%
Kingdom (104)
Unknown/
27 %
not
determined 2%
17 %
9%
Purity (lowest – highest)

Belgium
Czechia
France
Purities above 85 % were Cyprus
found in a majority of cases. Malta
Netherlands
Romania
Poland
Slovenia
United Kingdom
0% 20 40 60 80 85 % 100 %
135
Departure points The other traditional transit area is the West African
mainland and neighbouring islands, Cape Verde, Madeira
Cocaine is shipped from Latin America to Europe mainly in and the Canary Islands. The West African coast, from
vessels departing from Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and other Mauritania to Nigeria, may have decreased in importance
countries, such as Paraguay and Peru. The importance of in recent years. In 2017, the largest amounts seized were
Venezuela, which in the past was a major departure point, reported by Nigeria (92 kg) and neighbouring Benin (45 kg)
seems to have declined in recent years. Seizures made (UNODC, 2019a). Although the yearly totals for the region
in 2017 at or en route to the port of Antwerp suggest that are generally relatively modest, occasional large shipments
large, multi-tonne shipments departing from Colombian are seized. For instance, in January 2019 a huge shipment
ports account for the biggest share of the cocaine entering of about 10 tonnes of cocaine was captured in Praia, Cape
the EU, followed by smaller, though more numerous Verde, from a ship travelling to Tangiers, Morocco (Agência
shipments from Brazil and Ecuador (see Figure 5.6, Lusa, 2019).
page 140). These observations and the recent dramatic
increase in cocaine production in Colombia suggest that From West Africa, the cocaine is transported onwards to
Colombia is likely to remain a key departure point for Europe by air, sea or land routes. It is therefore likely that
maritime shipments of cocaine to Europe in years to come. countries located in the Sahel/Sahara region between the
West African coast and North Africa are transit locations
for shipments of cocaine smuggled by land to Europe,
Transit areas although they report only tiny or no seizures of the drug.
There have traditionally been two main areas through North Africa is strategically located at a crossroads
which maritime and air cocaine shipments transit en route between Europe, a major cocaine consumer market
to Europe: the Caribbean, and the West African mainland and transit area, West Africa and the Middle East, both
and neighbouring islands, Cape Verde, Madeira and the emerging consumer markets and transit areas for the drug.
Canaries. While the Caribbean and West Africa and nearby Transport through North Africa, often taking advantage
islands remain significant transit areas today, the increase of pre-existing cannabis routes, was identified as an
in the movement of cocaine hidden inside maritime issue some years ago (UNODC, 2007). However, recent
containers and other developments seem to be fostering developments suggest that the region, particularly its
the emergence of newer important transit areas such as coasts on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, is a growing
Central America and North Africa. cocaine transit and storage hub for cocaine both arriving
by sea directly from South America and coming via West
From the Caribbean, the cocaine is generally shipped by Africa for onward transport to Europe or elsewhere.
sea on pleasure craft via the Azores, or by air, either on Conversely, some cocaine may be smuggled from North
direct flights or via a variety of transit points. The Dominican Africa to West Africa, particularly by air, as was suggested
Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica are considered by the arrest of a Lithuanian courier smuggling 8.5 kg
the main cocaine hubs of the Caribbean. In 2017 cocaine of cocaine from Brazil to Sierra Leone via Casablanca,
seizures in the Caribbean region amounted to 16.7 tonnes, Morocco, in July 2018 (H24Info.ma, 2018a).
or about 1 % of the global total (UNODC, 2018a, 2019a).
The main hub appears to be Morocco, which seized more
In contrast, more than seven times as much cocaine than 1.6 tonnes of cocaine in 2016, 2.84 tonnes in 2017
was seized in Central America as in the Caribbean, with (UNODC, 2019a) and 1.6 tonnes in 2018 (Moroccan police,
120 tonnes captured in 2017 (10 % of the global total), personal communication). Couriers smuggling a few
making it the region seizing the fourth largest quantity of kilograms of cocaine are frequently arrested at Casablanca
cocaine in the world. Panama’s location on Colombia’s airport, particularly on flights from São Paulo, Brazil.
northern land and sea borders together with its recently However, larger amounts have been seized elsewhere in
expanded canal, through which about 14 000 ships the country, for example 200 kg at a cocaine and synthetic
transited in 2018, make it a key storage, transit and drug laboratory dismantled by police close to the Algerian
distribution hub for cocaine destined for Europe, and it border, 1.2 tonnes on a fishing vessel off Dakhla, in Western
accounted for over 50 % of the 2017 seizures in Central Sahara, 2.5 tonnes from two farms located between
America (UNODC, 2019a). Spain and the Netherlands, Casablanca and Rabat, in north-western Morocco, and
two major entry points for the drug, are the only European another tonne reported as ‘cocaine paste’ (UNODC, 2019a)
countries listed in the top 15 destinations for goods in the port of El Jadida, in western Morocco. Investigation
transiting the Panama Canal in 2018 (Panama Canal of this last seizure led to the identification of a farm in the
Authority, 2018). Boujdour area, in Western Sahara, where an airstrip was
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CHAPTER 5 Cocaine
I
under construction. The suspects arrested in connection Figure 5.4

with these seizures included nationals of Colombia, Cocaine bricks seized in the Danube Delta, Romania,
Morocco, Peru and Spain (Bladi.net, 2016; El Hamraoui, March 2019
2016; Europe1.fr, 2018; H24Info.ma, 2018b,c; Luaña, 2016;
Sidiguitiebe, 2016). It appears that cocaine traffickers
may be particularly targeting the contested and sparsely
populated Western Sahara with its long coastline on the
Atlantic.
Although apparently on a much smaller scale than

Morocco, the possible roles of Algeria and Libya as transit
points for cocaine en route between South America and
Europe has been highlighted recently with the seizure of
701 kg of cocaine in a container of meat from Brazil in the
port of Oran, in western Algeria, in May 2018 (Ben Yahia
and Farrah, 2019). The modus operandi used in this case
suggests that this was a well-established smuggling route.
Photo: Romanian National Police, Anti-drug Unit
Similarly, several smaller cocaine seizures have been
reported in Libya in 2018 (Micaleff, 2019).
and other OCGs may be exploring opportunities in other,
Wholesale cocaine-trafficking activities in the region may less saturated and potentially more profitable, markets and
lead to an increase in cocaine use in Algeria, Libya and using Europe as an export platform. For instance, members
Morocco. of the so-called ‘Kinahan cartel’, an Irish OCG, were arrested
in Ireland and Australia in 2018 as part of an investigation
Some large seizures of cocaine have suggested the use into the smuggling of cocaine using air couriers between
of south-eastern Europe as an entry point (EMCDDA and Ireland, Australia and New Zealand (Meers, 2018b).
Europol, 2016). However, the data suggest that use of
this region for cocaine smuggling seems to be sporadic
and much less important than established primary routes. Importation and distribution in Europe:
Thus, non-routine data reported by the European Border record quantities seized
and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) on drug seizures at
a number of border posts between the EU and the Western The 142 tonnes of cocaine seized in the EU, Norway and
Balkans in 2017 and the first 10 months of 2018 indicate Turkey in 2017 was the highest on record. It surpassed
that minimal amounts of cocaine enter the EU from that the previous peak, in 2006, by more than 20 tonnes and
region, while similar Frontex data show large quantities of represented a doubling of the amount seized in 2016
cocaine being seized in Spain, a known hub for cocaine (see Figure 5.5). Two countries, Belgium (45 tonnes) and
importation into the EU (Frontex, 2018). Analysis of EU Spain (41 tonnes), accounted for more than 60 % of the
routine data on drug seizures appears to confirm that estimated European total, but large quantities were also
little cocaine enters the EU from the east, as the total seized by France (17.5 tonnes), the Netherlands (14.6
amount seized in the 10 countries located on the eastern tonnes) and Germany (8 tonnes). Although smaller than
border of the EU during 2013-17 remains at under 2 % in previous years, multi-tonne quantities of cocaine were
of all seizures. That said, recent seizures of large cocaine also seized in Italy (4 tonnes) and Portugal (2.7 tonnes).
consignments in eastern EU countries and in countries Meanwhile, new records were established in 2017 in Turkey
bordering the EU, including about 2 tonnes seized in (about 1.5 tonnes) and Lithuania (623 kg), although these
Latvia in January 2019, more than 1 tonne in the Danube countries are not usually associated with cocaine trafficking
Delta, Romania in March 2019 (see Figure 5.4) and 615 kg or consumption.
intercepted in Dürres, Albania, in February 2018, are
warning signs of a changing situation. Early indications suggest that the quantities seized
in Europe could be even larger in 2018. For instance,
It is also important to note that the EU and the Balkan region preliminary data on cocaine seizures at the port of Antwerp,
appear to be increasingly used as transit areas for cocaine provided by the Belgian police, indicate that 50 tonnes was
destined for other markets such as Australia, Russia, Turkey, seized in 2018, that is, more than in the entire country of
and countries in the Middle East and Asia. As the supply Belgium in 2017.
of cocaine meets or exceeds demand in the EU, EU-based
137
Figure 5.5 using private business jets is a trend that seems to have
Quantities of cocaine seized in Europe 2005-17 accelerated in the last few years (see Chapter 2).
Tonnes
160
Cocaine importation: a more crowded and
120
competitive criminal market
80
Historically, the wholesale supply of cocaine to the EU
40
was dominated by cooperation between established
0 cartels in South America and Italian OCGs, especially the
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta (see Case study 22), acting as
United Kingdom Germany France wholesale brokers for EU-based distributors. However, the
Other countries Spain Belgium
cocaine-producing scene in Colombia has fragmented
and diversified, and numerous Italian traffickers have
Most of the cocaine available in Europe continues to been arrested in Europe and Latin America in recent
be smuggled into the largest container ports of Europe, years (McDermott, 2018). The disruption caused by these
located in Belgium (Antwerp), Spain (Algeciras and developments seems to have given a broader range of
Valencia) and the Netherlands (Rotterdam). However, EU-based OCGs easier access to cocaine producers
other ports, in France (Le Havre), Germany (Hamburg) and in South America (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016).
Italy (Gioia Tauro) for instance, have now also become Comparatively small players are now using this direct
significant cocaine entry points. In addition, larger amounts access to producers and pooling funds to purchase larger
of cocaine are increasingly shipped from South America quantities of cocaine at more favourable wholesale prices.
to smaller ports in the EU, where security measures may
be less stringent, such as Malta Freeport (Malta), Montoir- Thus, Albanian-speaking, British, Dutch, French, Irish,
de-Bretagne (France), Vlissingen (Netherlands), Marin Moroccan, Serbian, Spanish and Turkish OCGs are
(Spain) or Tilbury (United Kingdom). Smaller quantities of increasingly establishing their own operations to transport
the drug also continue to be smuggled by air by individual cocaine directly from South America to Europe, or even
couriers, in luggage and in freight. All major European directly acquiring cocaine in or near producing countries.
airports are targeted, as well as, increasingly, secondary For instance, French OCGs make use of connections with
ones. In addition, the transatlantic smuggling of cocaine French Guiana and the French Antilles to smuggle bulk loads
CASE STUDY 22
Operation Pollino takes down ‘Ndrangheta clan

In a Eurojust-coordinated based mafia-like organisation is and Investigation Service, acting
international operation by judicial established in several European on a suspicion that two restaurants
and law enforcement authorities in and South American countries in the southern Netherlands were
early December 2018, 84 alleged including Colombia, but also in being used to launder drug money.
members of a ‘Ndrangheta mafia-style Canada and the United States. It is This case illustrates the value of
organised criminal group from the often described as one of Europe’s ‘follow the money’ approaches in the
Reggio region of Calabria, Italy, were richest and most powerful criminal fight against drug-related and other
arrested in Belgium, Germany, Italy, organisations, notably because of forms of organised crime. Financial
Luxembourg and the Netherlands on its role as one of the region’s largest investigations have been made
charges of criminal association, drug wholesale importers of cocaine and a cross-cutting priority for all the crime
trafficking and money laundering. misappropriators of EU funds. areas covered by the present policy
Several tonnes of cocaine, more than cycle.
100 kg of ecstasy tablets and about The initial investigation that led to
EUR 2 million in cash were seized Operation Pollino was launched in Sources: Anesi and Rubino (2018); BBC News
(2018b); Meers (2018c); OCCRP et al. (2018).
in several countries. The Calabria- 2016 by the Dutch Fiscal Information
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CHAPTER 5 Cocaine
I
back to mainland France (see box ‘The Guianese connection’). Balkan organised crime networks and
Western Balkan OCGs are also very active at key staging cocaine trafficking
posts along the main trafficking routes and are involved in
the infiltration of, and corruption at, key South American OCGs originating from the countries of the former
and EU ports (see box ‘Balkan organised crime networks Yugoslavia (sometimes collectively referred to
and cocaine trafficking’). Meanwhile, Turkish OCGs are as the ‘Balkan Cartel’) continue to increase their
increasingly involved in the transatlantic trafficking of cocaine role in international cocaine trafficking. These
to the EU and Turkey, relying on their own maritime transport groups are mainly composed of Serbians together
infrastructure, which has also been used to traffic large with Montenegrins and Croatians who cooperate
quantities of cannabis resin across the Mediterranean Sea. regardless of nationality. Spain, the Netherlands,
Germany, Austria and Croatia are emerging as key
OCGs that were previously only marginally involved in the locations for their activities. They also cooperate with
EU, such as Mexican cartels, are believed to have intensified Albanian-speaking, Italian and Moroccan OCGs. They
their cooperation with other crime groups in order to increasingly apply a crowdsourcing business model
orchestrate the trafficking of cocaine to the EU. Moroccan to the wholesale acquisition of cocaine. Several
OCGs that used to be hired by established OCGs to retrieve distribution networks collectively invest in very large
cocaine shipments in the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam cocaine shipments from various sources of supply
are now becoming important players in their own right in South America. They have also increased their
(Colman, 2018). Outlaw motorcycle gangs are also involved footprint in locations where they can access cocaine
in trafficking of cocaine to the EU and distributing it in at cheaper prices, such as Colombia, the Dominican
various EU Member States, mainly in the north of Europe. Republic and Ecuador. However, they appear to be
Outlaw motorcycle gangs are increasing their presence at present mainly in Peru and even more in Brazil, where
some ports in the EU to facilitate this business. Serbian OCGs are particularly prominent at the port
of Santos. They are also present at key staging posts
Conversely, the relevance of West African (specifically along the main trafficking routes. These OCGs are
Nigerian) OCGs to the trafficking of cocaine to the EU involved in infiltration and corruption at key European
seems to be in relative decline, as they have been displaced international ports, and they use mostly containers
in some European countries by criminal groups originating and pleasure vessels to traffic the cocaine into the EU.
from the Western Balkans and North Africa. Nigerian OCGs
primarily rely on the use of couriers to transport cocaine
to the EU, often from West Africa and more recently also are able to bring in large quantities of cocaine in single
directly from South America. shipments, entering Europe at many points.
South American representatives of Colombian Large European container ports have recorded many
organisations are established in the EU and supervise seizures of large cocaine shipments in recent years.
shipments, ensure payments and liaise with international In addition to targeting major ports, OCGs are now
money-laundering facilitators (McDermott, 2018). increasingly shipping larger amounts of cocaine from
South America to smaller ports in the EU or neighbouring
countries, where security measures may be easier to
Cocaine in containers: targeting the port of circumvent.
Antwerp
It is important to note that corruption of port (and airport)
Cocaine traffickers make use of a wide range of trafficking employees and security officials in facilities throughout
methods, which are used flexibly and evolve over time Europe is in most cases a key condition for the successful
in response to enforcement efforts and other factors. use of these facilities for cocaine importation by OCGs.
Although cocaine also enters the EU by air (see box
‘The Guianese connection’), the main route used to The port of Antwerp remains a key entry point for cocaine
smuggle the drug into Europe is still the maritime route trafficked to the EU. Its role appears to have increased since
from South America to western Europe, especially taking the previous edition of this report (EMCDDA and Europol,
advantage of the containerised trade in goods. Maritime 2016). From Antwerp, cocaine is frequently transported to
transport allows the transportation of large quantities the Netherlands by road for processing and cutting prior
at one time, and the nature of international commercial to redistribution to other EU destinations. In 2016, cocaine
maritime traffic means that a vast number of routes can seizures at Antwerp totalled 26.5 tonnes, and that rose
and will be used. In addition, smaller, private sailing boats to almost 42 tonnes in 2017. In 2018, some 50 tonnes of
139
Figure 5.6
Cocaine seized in containers in or bound for Antwerp, 2017
Quantities, modus operandi and countries of departure
Other Within legitimate goods Rip-off Container structure
Other countries
Costa Rica
Suriname
Paraguay
Peru
Ecuador
Brazil
Colombia
0 10 20 30
Tonnes
Brazil and Colombia: quantities, modus operandi and number of

seizures
Within legitimate goods Rip-off Container structure
Seized at origin Seized in Antwerp
14 Brazil 18
11 Colombia 13
10 0 0 10 20 30
Tonnes
Source: Belgian Federal Police.
cocaine was seized at the port (data provided by Belgian Meanwhile, the largest number of seizures involving the
police, 2019). Information from seizures outside the EU port of Antwerp were of smaller amounts of cocaine
in 2016 indicated that, in addition to these seizures at shipped from Brazil using mostly the rip-on/rip-off method
Antwerp, 36 tonnes of cocaine was intercepted in Latin (described in Figure 2.4, page 62). The largest quantity of
America in shipments for which Antwerp was the final cocaine shipped from Colombia was seized in Antwerp,
destination. In 2017 this rose to 45 tonnes and during the while comparable quantities of cocaine shipped from Brazil
first half of 2018 at least 16 tonnes destined for Antwerp were seized in Brazil and in Antwerp (see Figure 5.6).
was seized outside Europe.
There are multiple reasons why the port of Antwerp is
As mentioned above, the largest quantities of cocaine a major hub for the importation of cocaine and other drugs
seized at Antwerp, or seized elsewhere and destined for in Europe. It is Europe’s second busiest container port,
Antwerp, were shipped from Colombia. In most cases they after nearby Rotterdam, and handles millions of tonnes of
were concealed within consignments of goods, especially containerised goods every year. It is physically a very open
fruit such as bananas. Concealment within goods was also harbour area, located within the city of Antwerp and with
the main method used for cocaine shipped from Ecuador. many opportunities to break and enter. Antwerp is also
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CHAPTER 5 CocaineI
the largest fruit handler in Europe, with direct cargo lines increasingly trafficked directly from South America and the
from Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala and Panama, and, Caribbean to western Europe using private business jets.
given that it is imperative that fresh produce be processed The use of general aviation for the trafficking of cocaine is
rapidly through the port, it may be often difficult for limited expected to increase in future. Stricter border controls and
numbers of customs and law enforcement officers to deal more effective security checks can act as a push factor for
with the drug threat alongside their many other duties. OCGs to use secondary international airports and small
Antwerp is close to the Netherlands, especially Rotterdam, general aviation airfields.
which is another key hub for cocaine importation and
distribution, and for organised crime groups involved in On commercial flights, cocaine is mainly concealed in
drug supply. It should also be noted that Moroccan OCGs baggage, but also swallowed, attached to the body or
have long been key players in the port of Antwerp, and concealed in clothes, and to a lesser extent stuffed in
that they have become much more involved in cocaine body cavities. Cocaine air couriers depart from airports in
trafficking and distribution in Europe in recent years. This, South and Central America and the Caribbean, especially
together with the increasing role played by Morocco as Colombia and Brazil, and fly to major European airports
a transit hub for cocaine destined for the EU, probably either directly or after stopovers in countries such as
helps to explain why large amounts of the drug are Morocco, Nigeria and the United Arab Emirates. An increase
trafficked through Antwerp. In addition, Turkish, Italian and in cocaine seizures from Kenyan couriers has been
Dutch OCGs, as well as OCGs from the Western Balkans, observed at several European airports in 2018, which is
especially Albanian-speaking ones, are also known to be a relatively new trend (Groupe Pompidou and RILO WE,
involved in trafficking drugs, including cocaine, through the 2019) (see box ‘The Guianese connection’).
port of Antwerp.
Drug importation methods
Although there have been no major changes to the

established trafficking modi operandi, all methods of
cocaine trafficking now appear to be encountered more
frequently than before, reflecting the fact that larger The Guianese connection
amounts of cocaine are now smuggled in Europe.
Smuggling consignments in maritime containers continues National overseas territories are often used as transit
to be the most common modus operandi associated with locations by OCGs in order to take advantage of both
cocaine, especially relying on the rip-on/rip-off method. their inclusion in the European Single Market and
However, use of this method may be declining, as it is European customs territory and their geographical
less suitable for the smuggling of very large shipments proximity to cocaine producer countries. A recent
of cocaine and made more difficult to implement by the illustration is the case of the cocaine connection
automation of container handling in ports. OCGs also between French Guiana, France’s overseas
increasingly rely on variants such as the switch method department in South America, and mainland France.
(see Figure 2.4, page 62). Corruption remains a key Increasing amounts of cocaine have been smuggled
facilitator for the trafficking of cocaine into the EU; OCGs on commercial flights between Cayenne, French
rely on it to gain access to ports and airports. Guiana’s largest city, and Orly Airport in Paris since
2015. Arrests and seizures peaked in 2018, when
OCGs involved in cocaine trafficking now also more 1 349 couriers were caught carrying a total of about
frequently employ methods of transport such as mother 2.3 tonnes of cocaine, an average of 1.7 kg per
ships, pleasure craft and fishing vessels, cruise ships and courier. Most of the couriers are French nationals,
the drop-off method (see Chapter 2). Sophisticated means but the cocaine is probably sourced in neighbouring
of concealment such as placing the illicit load in metal Suriname. The vast majority of the cocaine seized in
cylinders attached to the ship’s hull are also encountered France from the ‘Guianese connection’ is destined
(see Figure 2.4, page 62). to be sold in Paris and other French cities, but about
11 % is exported abroad, mainly to the Netherlands.
The smuggling of drugs by air transportation includes the
use of passenger commercial flights, air cargo aircraft Sources: Office central pour la répression du trafic illicite des
stupéfiants, L’Institut national des hautes études de la sécurité et de la
and general aviation (private aircraft). Large quantities justice and Observatoire français des drogues et des toxicomanies.
of cocaine, typically ranging from 500 to 1 200 kg, are
141
Negative consequences: violence and corruption markets. Smaller shipments continue to be trafficked
mostly in private vehicles. Like all other illicit drugs, smaller
A serious consequence of the increase in cocaine consignments of cocaine are frequently sent across the EU
importation and distribution in Europe is that corruption of using post and parcel services, sometimes in connection
seaport and airport employees by organised crime groups with darknet drug markets.
is likely to have become pervasive across Europe, since
complicity in the ports is often an essential component of OCGs involved in the intra-EU trafficking of cocaine
the smuggling methods used. Drug-related corruption also use various methods to manage the risk of discovery
seems to be affecting larger numbers of law enforcement by law enforcement agencies. They rely on fraudulent
officials, especially customs officers, with cases emerging documents to conceal the nature and origin of their loads,
so far in Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands (Boerman employ advanced technologies and use sophisticated
et al., 2017). Some port workers, customs and other law means of concealment in motor vehicles. In a continuing
enforcement officers have also been subjected to threats trend highlighted in the previous edition of this report
by crime groups. (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016), OCGs continue to
specialise in providing services related to particular stages
Another grave concern is an increase in violence around of the cocaine supply chain. For instance, Bulgarian
cocaine importation activities. Homicides and kidnappings and Romanian criminal groups increasingly invest in
between crime groups in Europe now appear to be more road transport businesses in order to facilitate intra-EU
frequent and violent than in the past. For instance, in trafficking of cocaine and other drugs.
March 2016 a severed head was left on the street in
front of an Amsterdam shisha bar in an episode of a feud It is worth noting that Albanian-speaking OCGs continue
between rival Moroccan gangs involved in the cocaine to aggressively expand their involvement in the cocaine
business (Henley, 2016). An increase in homicides between trade, becoming central players in distribution and
OCGs is also affecting Antwerp (Colman, 2018), where retail sales in some large markets, such as the United
harbour workers have been intimidated by crime groups. Kingdom. In addition, they have extended their activities
A war between two rival Irish gangs involved in cocaine to comparatively smaller consumer markets in Belgium,
importation and distribution in Ireland, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands (Saggers, 2019). Dutch,
Australia and New Zealand has led to at least 15 murders, Spanish and British OCGs cooperate with international
many of them in public places, in Ireland and Spain since OCGs to transport or distribute cocaine in the EU. These
2015 (McDonald, 2018; Meers, 2018b). OCGs are in close contact with the representatives
of international OCGs who are based permanently or
A service industry seems to be developing in order to temporarily in the main entry points for cocaine to the EU.
supply the European cocaine market’s demand for violence.
For instance, the emergence of younger contract killers, Although criminal groups often compete with one another,
or hitmen, has been documented in the Netherlands cases of cooperation also exist. For instance, certain Dutch
(Van Gestel and Verhoeven, 2017). Another example and Turkish OCGs are known to have been cooperating
is in Spain, where the press has reported that some for some time in order to smuggle cocaine from the
recent murders of cocaine traffickers were committed by Netherlands to Turkey in exchange for heroin travelling
Colombian sicarios, or contract killers, while observing that in the opposite direction (Tops et al., 2018) (see Case
hitmen of North African origin are also active in the country. study 19, page 113).
It apparently costs between EUR 30 000 and EUR 70 000 to
have a person killed in Spain (Montero, 2019). In Sweden, OCGs involved in the trafficking of cocaine often rely on
a Stockholm gang known as the Death Patrol provided cash couriers to transport large amounts of money from
murder as a service to other OCGs, including Colombian the EU to ‘cash-friendlier’ jurisdictions such as Dubai or
cocaine cartels, before being dismantled between late 2018 Lebanon. According to a recent survey of seizures of cash
and early 2019 (see Case study 8, page 45). leaving 17 EU and 5 Western Balkan airports in 2018,
the top seven destinations in order of rank are Turkey,
China, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand and Egypt
Trafficking within the EU (Groupe Pompidou and RILO WE, 2019).
Roads remain the preferred means of transport for A single courier can transport up to EUR 1 million in cash.
cocaine distribution within the EU. Lorries transport For instance, Lebanese money-laundering networks use
large shipments from the main EU distribution hubs in designated couriers who travel from Lebanon to the EU.
Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain to regional and local Cash couriers travelling from the EU to the Middle East
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CHAPTER 5 Cocaine
I
Figure 5.7 Germany, the presence in the country of Europe’s largest

Intra-European cocaine-trafficking routes, top five air freight and dispatch centre, belonging to a global
trafficking hubs and top five consumer markets, express parcel firm, may be a factor, since public and
2017-18
private postal services are increasingly used to traffic
drugs within Europe (see beginning of this section). It is
Trafficking hubs
Main EU user
u markets
also important to note that a country’s role as importer/
distributor often coincides with, and probably helps to
explain, the presence of a large consumer market in it.
Retail, supply and use
The expanding European retail markets

for cocaine
Several indicators suggest that the European retail

market for cocaine is expanding in line with the increase
in importation and distribution of high-purity cocaine. As
a result, cocaine availability to consumers in Europe could
be at an all-time high. Although the vast majority of cocaine
often carry gold or jewellery, which has been bought using consumers appear to remain concentrated in a limited
criminal cash proceeds in order to justify the transfer as number of western and southern European countries,
trade activity and conceal it. there are indications that retail markets are expanding in
northern and eastern Europe.
Trafficking of cocaine within the EU remains concentrated
in the west and south of Europe, where the largest The purity of cocaine at retail level has been increasing
consumer markets are. The countries of the Iberian in Europe since 2010, and in 2017 it reached its highest
Peninsula, the Netherlands and to a lesser extent Belgium level in the last decade; however, adulteration still takes
are key cocaine distribution hubs (Figure 5.7). This is place (see box ‘Cutting cocaine’). Meanwhile, the retail
likely to be because they are also key importation hubs price of the drug remained stable or slightly decreased
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2013, 2016; see also section on between 2007 and 2017 (see Cocaine overview, pages
importation and distribution in Europe above). They supply 128-129). This indicates that more cocaine is now available
mainly the largest consumer markets in Europe, located on retail markets than was previously the case, most
in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, as well probably as a direct consequence of an increase in the
as other, comparatively small, markets further afield (see availability of high-purity cocaine at the wholesale level and
section on the expanding European retail markets for of competition between an increasing number of OCGs
cocaine, below). involved in the cocaine business (see box ‘Profiling of
cocaine seized in Europe’, page 134).
The presence of Germany and France among Europe’s
five main cocaine-trafficking hubs may be viewed as In Europe, the retail market for cocaine has historically
a relatively new and perhaps surprising trend. However, been concentrated in western and southern Europe,
both countries are also relatively large cocaine importation which is where most of the drug is imported, and is the
points, especially because of their large container ports and most populated and one of the wealthiest regions of
international airports (see box ‘The Guianese connection’ Europe. This remains very much the case today. For several
and the section on importation and distribution in Europe, years, a number of general population surveys reported
above). But additional factors may be at play. For instance, a decrease in last year use of cocaine. Recent trends
in the case of France, its geographical location between indicate that the decline has stopped and that levels of
southern and northern Europe probably plays a role, since use are now stable. This would imply that retail markets for
France sends and receives cocaine shipments to and from cocaine are also stable. However, this is at odds with trends
both Spain and Germany (see Figure 5.7). In the case of observable in other datasets, which are reviewed below.
143
Cutting cocaine
Cutting drugs with cheaper materials (also known be used more frequently than phenacetin, although
as adulteration; see Figure 5.2) is usually done to levamisole remains the cutting agent most frequently
increase profit along the distribution chain but may used.
also enhance or modify the effects of the drug and may
affect the health of users. The purity of powder cocaine Levamisole is used as a cutting agent primarily because
appears to be lowest at retail level, and a wide variety it is widely available on the market and is similar in
of substances can be used as cutting agents (Broséus colour and melting point to cocaine; it is cheap and
et al., 2015; Villar Núñez et al., 2018). In addition to heavier than cocaine and gives a specific cocaine-like
inert diluents such as sugars, talc, plaster and starch, sheen to the drug, allowing further adulteration down
pharmacologically active adulterants are often found the retail chain (Brunt et al., 2017). Levamisole has also
in both powder cocaine and crack cocaine, including been described as an effect enhancer (Tallarida et al.,
various local anaesthetics, analgesics, other licit and 2014). This may be true but the main effect is probably
illicit stimulants, nootropic agents and anti-allergy related to aminorex, a metabolite of levamisole, which
drugs (Kudlacek et al., 2017). may prolong the perceived stimulating effect of cocaine
(Solomon and Hayes, 2017).
Levamisole, a veterinary antiparasitic drug, has been
the most common adulterant of cocaine products over Although cocaine has been described as the most
the past decade, followed by the analgesic phenacetin; adulterated illicit drug (Kudlacek et al., 2017),
both were identified by forensic laboratories and several recent studies point to a decrease in cocaine
drug-checking services in 40-70 % of cocaine samples adulteration in Europe. For instance, an analysis of
analysed in recent European studies (Broséus et al., 902 samples submitted for testing to drug-checking
2015; Brunt et al., 2017; Villar Núñez et al., 2018). In services collected in seven EU Member States between
addition, levamisole appeared in used syringes in six January and July 2018 found that 62 % contained
European cities, where phenacetin was also detected cocaine and no other substance, 31 % contained
(EMCDDA, 2019e). However, EMCDDA data covering cocaine and cutting agents and 6 % contained no
the first half of 2018 indicate that caffeine may now cocaine at all.
Data on prevalence of cocaine use expressed in estimated 2015. However, this cannot be readily interpreted as an
numbers of users during the last year may be viewed increase in the number of cocaine users, although this
as an indicator of the location and approximate size of is certainly one of the possibilities, since other factors
retail markets. The latest data available confirm that the could have caused this increase in metabolites. Higher
largest retail markets are located in western and southern concentrations of metabolites could mean that the same
Europe. Thus, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, number of people used more cocaine, or they could simply
Spain and the United Kingdom, which together represent reflect the increased purity of cocaine found on retail
about 66 % of the total EU population (Eurostat, 2018c), markets mentioned earlier. Finally, a combination of these
account for a little over 87 % of Europe’s estimated three causes could also be an explanation. Whatever the
4 million last year cocaine users. Two Nordic countries, cause, wastewater data suggest an increase in cocaine
Sweden and Denmark, follow the top six, but report much consumption since 2015 in many of the cities studied.
lower estimated numbers of users. Poland ranks ninth and
may therefore be viewed as the largest cocaine market in Wastewater information also provides some detail on other
eastern Europe. characteristics of European retail markets for cocaine.
Thus, a multi-city study covering 73 cities in 20 European
As already mentioned, new entries to treatment for countries in 2018 showed that higher concentrations of
problems associated with cocaine use have increased in the cocaine metabolite benzoylecgonine tended to be
Europe since 2015 (see Cocaine overview, pages 128-129). found in larger cities, and in more than 75 % of cases
Furthermore, analysis of wastewater information shows higher concentrations were found at weekends than on
a strong increase in cocaine residues in 26 of the weekdays, a finding confirmed by other data, which show
32 cities for which data were available for 2015 and 2017, that cocaine-related hospital emergency presentations are
following a relatively stable period between 2011 and much more frequent at weekends.
144
CHAPTER 5 Cocaine
I
Information on the number of drug seizures may be viewed Figure 5.8

as an indirect indicator of a drug’s availability at the retail Number of cocaine seizures in the EU, 2007-17
level, although they primarily reflect law enforcement 120 000
activity and the factors affecting it (resource availability

and allocation, priorities, etc.). This is because the vast 80 000
majority of drug seizures reported in Europe are of small

amounts of under 10 g seized mostly on retail markets. 40 000
This is confirmed by information indicating that, of the

0
75 000 cocaine seizures reported by the 18 EU Member
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
States that provided a breakdown by market levels
Denmark Italy France
(wholesale, middle market, retail), 83 % were carried out at
Other countries United Kingdom Spain
the retail level in 2017.
Like cocaine purity, the number of cocaine seizures

recorded in the EU has increased recently, and more countries mentioned above, reaching a few hundred
than 104 000 individual seizures were reported in 2017, annually. However, they have increased, sometimes
the highest level in 10 years (Figure 5.8). Out of the dramatically, in the 10-year period considered here. Croatia,
29 countries that report sufficient information, only three Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
(Latvia, Portugal and Slovakia) did not report an increase Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia all reported more cocaine
between 2015 and 2017. seizures in 2017 than in 2007. Poland, mentioned earlier as
eastern Europe’s largest consumer market, reported only
The country that reported the largest number of cocaine nine seizures of cocaine in 2017, and did not report data
seizures in 2017 (and in previous years) is Spain, followed in previous years; however, data from the police are not
by the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Denmark available. Luxembourg and Malta, whose populations are
(see Figure 5.8). Four of these also rank in the top six for quite small, reported both comparatively large numbers of
estimated numbers of cocaine users; the exception is seizures in 2017 and remarkable increases since 2007.
Denmark, which ranks eighth. It should be noted that the
Netherlands, one of the top six retail markets in numbers
of cocaine users, does not report numbers of drug seizures Retail markets for crack cocaine
and as a result is not included in this analysis.
In general, a broad distinction can be made between retail
While the largest cocaine markets of western and southern markets for cocaine hydrochloride, or powder cocaine,
Europe appear to be continuing to grow, others seem to and for crack. Consumers of the former are more socially
be emerging or expanding in eastern and northern Europe. integrated and often sniff the drug in a recreational
The Turkish retail market is a striking illustration of this context. Crack users are mostly marginalised, and inject
trend. Turkey reported 3 829 cocaine seizures in 2017, or smoke cocaine freebase, or crack, often alongside
more than 10 times the number reported in 2007 and the use of opioids. However, it should also be noted that
its highest number on record. This probably signals the not all crack is purchased on the market, since some
emergence of a sizeable retail market for cocaine in Turkey, consumers manufacture cocaine freebase themselves
which currently ranks 14th in Europe for reported numbers for their own use. Those who smoke cocaine freebase
of cocaine users while Germany ranks fifth. The increasing usually view themselves not as crack users but as cocaine
involvement of Turkish organised crime in the cocaine trade users. This could mean that crack use is underestimated at
mentioned earlier is likely to be a significant factor here present in Europe, especially because it may be difficult for
(see sections on cocaine importation and on trafficking in law enforcement officers to distinguish cocaine freebase
the EU above). from purchased crack when it is seized. The practice of
basification for own use may be rising among cocaine
Another example of market expansion is Sweden, which consumers in some countries. For example, the distribution
reported a record of 3 640 seizures in 2017. Likewise, of crack-smoking kits by low-threshold facilities and non-
but to a lesser extent, other Nordic countries such as governmental organisations is increasing in many regions
Finland and Norway now report many more cocaine of France, although the commercial market for crack is
seizures than they did in the mid-2000s. largely restricted to the greater Paris area (Cadet-Taïrou et
al., 2017).
As far as countries in the east of Europe are concerned,
the numbers reported are generally lower than in the
145
Seizures of crack cocaine are generally low, and relatively That said, like the diversification of the OCGs involved in the
stable, in both numbers and quantities in the countries importation and distribution of cocaine in Europe analysed
that report them. Among other factors, this is likely to be above (see section on importation and distribution), some
because crack is manufactured from cocaine hydrochloride evidence exists to show that retail markets have seen the
within Europe, close to the consumer markets, and is not emergence of new players and are becoming more diverse,
transported across borders, where the largest quantities of in both where and how they operate. A key factor likely to
drugs are usually seized. have brought about change in cocaine retail markets is the
emergence of new technologies, especially internet-based
Based on the latest data reported to the EMCDDA, the platforms such as darknet markets, public social media and
largest crack market in Europe continues to be the United semi-private encrypted communications applications.
Kingdom, which reported the largest quantity, 70.3 kg, and
the highest number of crack seizures, 5 903, in 2017. Then For instance, call centres dedicated to distributing cocaine
come France, with 8.3 kg in 2016 (France does not report by courier are reported to operate in some parts of Belgium
numbers of crack seizures), and Italy, with 5.5 kg and 262 but are physically located in Western Balkan countries, the
seizures. Germany and Spain follow, reporting much lower Netherlands or in Spain (De Ruyver et al., 2018). Belgian
quantities — in the hundreds of grams. Finally, Austria, consumers place an order at a central telephone number and
Malta and Portugal report tiny amounts and numbers of then local couriers deliver the drugs to the location specified.
seizures. Reports have suggested that a courier can sell up to 1 kg of
cocaine per week. A similar phenomenon has been reported
Turkey reported seizures of crack for the first time in 2017, in the greater Paris area, where deliveries of cocaine to
amounting to 1.3 kg and 50 seizures. These indicate that consumers are organised through similar call centres (Cadet-
Turkey could now be a significant consumer market for Taïrou et al., 2017; Kauffmann, 2018).
crack cocaine as well as cocaine hydrochloride (see section
on the expanding European retail markets). Research projects, official reports and media articles
indicate that social media platforms and encrypted
It should be noted that the crack trade is associated communication tools are commonly used across Europe
with increasing levels of violence in the United Kingdom, for retail cocaine trafficking. For example, in the Nordic
especially in connection with the county lines phenomenon countries, communication among vendors and buyers
(see next section). Meanwhile, in Paris, France, qualitative may be conducted through encrypted applications such
data suggest an expansion of crack markets outside the as WhatsApp and Telegram. Open public social media
open drug scene, which is usually confined to a particular applications such as Instagram, Twitter and Facebook
district and into more public areas, where it is linked to are used to promote time-limited offers to a wider public
noticeable street violence. (EMCDDA, 2018b). A different model of retailing (crack)
cocaine has become prominent in the United Kingdom,
where ‘county lines’ are used to supply drugs from large
How cocaine is retailed in Europe urban centres to smaller provincial towns, couriered by young
people. The drugs are ordered through a central mobile
There is less systematic information available on the phone numberm, and mobile communication devices, often
methods used to sell cocaine directly to consumers in Europe encrypted, support the delivery of the drugs.
than on other aspects of the market. The traditional view is
that most sales to users are conducted in ‘the street’ or on Another potential form of diversification of the cocaine
open drug markets, where they exist, and in other such public market may result from the use of new sophisticated
or semi-public settings. Recent research has suggested that technologies, such as the darknet, that allow an increasing
the delivery of drugs to consumers by dealers contacted by number of suppliers to deliver small amounts of cocaine
mobile phone may be an important additional mechanism for directly to consumers (see Chapter 1). Although the extent
cocaine retailing in Europe (Søgaard et al., 2019). However, to which they are replacing traditional retail supply is unclear,
the nature of the connections between the players active cryptomarkets could alter the nature of cocaine retailing in
at different levels of the market — importation, wholesale Europe in future. Cocaine is one of the drugs that generate
distribution, mid-market distribution and retail sales — is the highest revenues for dealers operating in anonymised
generally poorly documented. Until more and better data are darknet markets. For example, on AlphaBay, which was one of
systematically collected on this aspect, it will be difficult to the leading cryptomarkets until law enforcement authorities
paint a comprehensive picture of how retail drug markets shut it down in 2017, cocaine was the drug that generated
operate in Europe. the third highest revenue, with total sales estimated at
EUR 5.81 million in the United Kingdom, EUR 2.65 million
146
CHAPTER 5 Cocaine
I
in the Netherlands and EUR 1.55 million in Germany over Figure 5.9

the lifetime of the market (EMCDDA and Europol, 2017). Proportion of cocaine listings on major darknet
These three countries continued to be the largest sources of markets by EU Member State, 2018
darknet cocaine sales in Europe in 2018 (see Figure 5.9). Other EU countries
Multiple 2%
7%
Belgium
Cocaine is one of the most expensive drugs sold on 3%
European cryptomarkets, with prices per gram varying by United Kingdom
6%
geographical location and ranging from EUR 72 in Sweden
to EUR 145 in Finland (Janetos and Tilly, 2017). These prices
are somewhat higher than retail prices reported by the Reitox
network to the EMCDDA, but consumers may be willing to
pay more on cryptomarkets because they feel secure in terms
of evading both law enforcement and direct encounters
with potentially dangerous individuals. In addition, the rating
systems applied to the vendors may result in a perception
Netherlands
of higher drug quality. Darknet cocaine vendors are primarily Germany 47 %
located in a small number of highly active consumer 35 %
countries rather than in producer countries (Dittus et al.,
2018), which seems to confirm that most cryptomarket Note: Multiple denotes where several EU countries are mentioned as country
of origin.
vendors are local retailers who probably still rely on some of
the same producers, importers and distributors involved in
the conventional cocaine trade. United Kingdom (6 %) and Belgium (3 %). An additional
9 % of cocaine listings were offering shipping from multiple
countries (7 %) or other EU Member States (2 %) (Figure 5.9).
Online distribution These findings are consistent with previous research, which
found that cocaine vendors on darknet markets shipped from
Based on 2018 data from several major darknet markets (13), countries known to have a sizeable cocaine consumer market
we detected a total of 3 879 listings (sale offers) that could rather than from cocaine producer countries (Dittus et al.,
be attributed to vendors that said they would ship cocaine 2018).
from an EU country. These offers were distributed across
eight marketplaces: Dream Market (3 740), Olympus Market Caution is needed in interpreting these data in respect of
(50), Berlusconi Market (25), Valhalla (24), Wall Street gauging the number of individual sellers offering cocaine on
(16), T•chka (12), Empire (8) and Zion (4). The available these marketplaces or the number of transactions — neither
data suggest that the majority of sale offers during 2018 of which can be extrapolated from the number of listings
originated from the Netherlands (47 %) and Germany (35 %). alone. Nonetheless the number of listings provides a useful
Other reported EU Member States of origin included the indicator of the scope of activity on darknet markets.
147
Photo: Netherlands Forensic Institute
149
CHAPTER 6
Amphetamine, MDMA and
methamphetamine
Key points
The EU market for amphetamine, Developments in production and

MDMA and methamphetamine trafficking
X The stimulant drug market continues to evolve rapidly, X Innovation is increasing production capacity and
with amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine vying creates new challenges. Developments include the use
for market share alongside cocaine and a number of new of low-cost, non-scheduled chemicals, mainly sourced
psychoactive substances. from China, that can be converted into drug precursors;
custom-made and industrial-scale equipment allowing
X Amphetamine continues to be more commonly used larger production runs; and methods borrowed from the
than methamphetamine in most, but not all, EU countries, pharmaceutical industry, such as automating production
but there are signs that methamphetamine production and processes. In some countries OCGs have also established
use are spreading. Regional differences exist in the use chemical companies to facilitate the supply of materials.
of amphetamine and methamphetamine, which is more Among other factors, this has led to amphetamine and
common in northern and central Europe, whereas the use MDMA being readily produced cheaply in large quantities
of MDMA appears to be more generally diffused. and may have contributed to the rise in the amount of
MDMA in ecstasy tablets seen since 2009, which increases
X All three drugs are produced in Europe. The production the risk to consumers.
of MDMA and amphetamine is concentrated in the
Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Belgium, under the X The dumping of waste products from production results
control of Dutch OCGs. Methamphetamine production in environmental damage, health risks and high clean-up
mostly occurs in central Europe, particularly in and around costs. A variety of methods are used to dispose of the
Czechia. It appears that some Vietnamese OCGs involved tonnes of chemical waste created during synthetic drug
in methamphetamine production in Czechia may have production. This creates health and safety hazards, has
relocated some of their operations to the Netherlands. negative impacts on the environment and necessitates
costly clean-up procedures. The use of novel chemicals for
X Synthetic drug production in the EU, close to consumers, producing precursors has exacerbated this issue.
can be highly profitable. The value of the European
retail market for amphetamine and methamphetamine X Changes in OCG practices and greater interaction
is estimated to be at least EUR 1 billion and for MDMA between groups involved in other areas of the drug market
about EUR 0.5 billion. These estimates imply that between are observable. These include outlaw motorcycle gangs
51 and 81 tonnes of amphetamine and methamphetamine now becoming involved in the production of synthetic
and between 50 million and 70 million MDMA tablets drugs as well as their distribution. In addition, Dutch OCGs
will be produced for the EU market each year. Significant appear to be working with criminals of Turkish origin,
quantities are also produced for export, although exactly resulting in two-way trafficking: MDMA and other drugs are
how much is difficult to quantify. sent from the Netherlands to Turkey in exchange for heroin
and morphine.
150
CHAPTER 6 Amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine
I
X Heightened awareness at border entry points to the Q Prioritise development of a comprehensive set of
main drug-producing countries has led importers to divert measures to respond to the growing threat posed by
shipments of precursors and alternative chemicals to other the emergence of alternative substances that can
EU Member States, from where they are trafficked by land be easily converted to drug precursors. These would
once inside the Schengen Area. include:
Q strengthening regulatory approaches at both EU and
X MDMA is exported to consumer markets globally, often international levels;
exploiting parcel delivery services and online darknet Q establishment of a European early warning system
marketplaces. Darknet markets facilitate access to and database for identifying and profiling drug
EU-produced MDMA tablets by mid-level suppliers and precursors, alternative chemicals and other relevant
distributors. MDMA may be purchased in batches of substances;
multiples of 1 000 tablets, which can then be repackaged, Q engagement with China and other source countries;
sold online and dispatched through post and parcel Q continued engagement with industry within the EU.
services or through traditional distribution networks. Q Invest to improve the profiling and monitoring of the
methods used in the production of synthetic drugs in
X Europe also plays a role in the global market for Europe.
amphetamine and methamphetamine. Some of the Q Highlight and develop strategies to address the
amphetamine produced in the EU is trafficked to the Middle environmental impacts, hazards to health and costs to
East to be sold as captagon tablets. The dismantlement, the public purse associated with the chemical waste
in the Netherlands and Belgium in 2019, of three large generated by synthetic drug production.
crystal methamphetamine production facilities where Q Give greater recognition to the implications of the EU’s
Mexican nationals were involved suggests that Europe role as a global producer and supplier of synthetic
may also be emerging as a global supplier of this drug. In drugs, and the need to do more to restrict drug flows
addition, methamphetamine produced in Africa and the leaving, or transiting through, the EU.
Middle East, and more recently Mexico, transits through Q Strengthen cooperation with Turkey to improve the
Europe, usually with a final destination in Asia or Oceania. understanding of synthetic drugs’ availability and flows
from and to the EU, for both operational and strategic
X Currently demand for amphetamine, methamphetamine purposes.
and MDMA in the EU appears largely to be met by Q Work with countries in the Middle East to better
production in EU Member States. This means that most monitor amphetamine (captagon) production and
distribution occurs locally within the EU, limiting the supply. There is a need to gain information from the
opportunities for interdiction. A comparatively small forensic analysis of seizures, locate source countries
number of groups are currently involved in distributing and identify trends in patterns of use in the consumer
methamphetamine, in particular Vietnamese OCGs and markets for this drug.
outlaw motorcycle gangs. Q Improve current knowledge and awareness about the
health risks associated with synthetic drug production
and dismantling of production sites, to inform the
development of health and safety guidance for those at
risk of occupational exposure.
Implications for action to address Q Assess the threats associated with Mexican OCGs that
current threats and increase appear to be involved in the supply and production
preparedness of methamphetamine in Europe, in order to develop
responses.
Q Improve the assessment of the size, nature and impact
To respond to the current and potential future threats of the ketamine and GHB/GBL market in the EU.
posed by the synthetic drug market in Europe, the following
actions are needed.
151
Synthetic drugs overview Global

Amphetamine, MDMA, methamphetamine
World
Last year use 28.9 million A
Estimated number using these drugs in the last year aged 15-64
21.3 million
Main producer countries

Amphetamine
Wholesale price at key locations MDMA
Amphetamine (EUR/kg)
Methamphetamine
*Mean **Mode ***Min-Max
Producer countries
Netherlands* 700
Belgium* 1 928
Transit and destination countries
United Kingdom** 1 430 Netherlands
Latvia* 3 500
Sweden* 7 225
Spain* 13 940
Slovakia* 35 000
Global seizures of amphetamine Belgium
and methamphetamine (tonnes) MDMA (EUR/1 000 tablets)
Producer countries
300
Netherlands* 600
Belgium* 1 410
250 Transit and destination countries
United Kingdom** 1 650
200 Poland** 3 000
Lithuania* 4 000
Sweden* 5 381
150
Finland** 10 000
Transit/destination countries outside EU
100 Australia*** 2 700 -10 800
South Africa** 4 035
50 Malaysia** 6 256
Algeria** 8 129
0 Methamphetamine (EUR/kg)
2007 2017 Producer countries Drug law offences related to these drugs
Netherlands* 15 500
Global seizures of MDMA Czechia* 21 000 53 515
(tonnes) Transit and destination countries
20 Austria** 30 000
43 492
Germany* 31 250
15 24 794
Slovakia* 42 000
10 Norway** 45 000
23 021 19 724
5 Transit/destination co
countries
ountries outside EU
U
Australia*** 54 795-193 282 1674
0
2007 2017 Japan*** 32 000-72 000 2007 2017
152
I
3%/2%
Europe EU retail drug
market share

Amphetamines 1.7 m
Estimated number using these drugs in the last year aged 15-64
Ecstasy/ 2.6 million
MDMA
2.06 million young adults (15-34)

EU+2
40
EU
30 EU+2
Treatment
Trends in first-time entrants for problems
related to amphetamines EU
20
15 000 EU+2
10 000 10 EU
Germany Poland
5 000
0
0 2007 2017
2007 2017
Amphetamine
Czechia Quantity seized (tonnes) Retail price Purity
EU+2 (EUR/g) Indexed trends: (%)
15
Price and purity
50 %
10 €22
€13 29 %
EU 133
€7 17 %
€4 114
13 %
5 100
EU+2
EU 2007 2017
0
2007 2017
MDMA
Quantity seized (million tablets) Retail price Purity
20 % Other (EUR/g) (mg/tablet)
Offences 78 % 15 Indexed trends:
for supply Offences for Price and purity
possession/ 213
use
EU+2 190
53 515 10 160
€16
6
€10
Other €6
72 % 5 EU €4 84
31 % 68 % 28%
100
92
24 794 36
19 724
0 2007 2017
2007 2017 minimum maximum
interquartile
range
153
Introduction Figure 6.1

Amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine are
This chapter describes the production, trafficking, from the same chemical family
distribution and use of amphetamine, MDMA and N
methamphetamine, the three main synthetic drugs
Phenethylamine scaffold
available in the EU. Other, less widely used, synthetic drugs
available on the EU drug market are worth mentioning,
in particular ketamine, GHB and GBL, which are briefly
discussed at the end of the chapter. N
Amphetamine
The synthetic drugs amphetamine, methamphetamine and
CH3
MDMA (often known as ecstasy when in tablet form or MD
in crystal form) compete with cocaine and a range of new
psychoactive substances on the European drug market. N
CH3
They have chemical similarities (Figure 6.1) and are most Methamphetamine
commonly available in tablet, powder or crystal form (see CH3
box ‘Common forms of synthetic drugs used in Europe’),
but they have their own distinct patterns of use and profiles
O N
of users. Methylenedioxy- CH3
methamphetamine
Amphetamine is much more commonly used in most (MDMA) O CH3
countries than methamphetamine. However, in some
Note: The phenethylamine scaffold comprises a six-carbon ring separated from
datasets it is not possible to distinguish between a nitrogen atom (N) by a further two carbon atoms. ‘O’ represents oxygen and
these two substances; in these cases, the generic term ‘CH3’ represents a carbon bonded to three hydrogen atoms (a methyl group).
‘amphetamines’ is used. Methamphetamine consumption
has historically been restricted to Czechia and Slovakia,
although recent years have seen increases in use in other
countries.
Common forms of synthetic drugs used in Europe
Amphetamine and methamphetamine are sometimes such as lactose, dextrose or caffeine, but tablets
grouped together as ‘amphetamines’ and therefore containing amphetamine are also available and may
can be difficult to differentiate in some datasets, carry logos similar to those seen on ecstasy tablets or
whereas MDMA is normally reported separately. alternatively the Captagon logo. Amphetamine sulfate
All three drugs exist in two chemical forms: base and may be ingested, snorted or, less commonly, injected.
salt. The pure bases are clear, colourless, volatile oils, Unlike the hydrochloride salt of methamphetamine,
insoluble in water, which can be readily converted amphetamine sulfate is insufficiently volatile to be
into powders/crystals of the most common salt smoked.
forms: amphetamine sulfate, methamphetamine
hydrochloride and MDMA hydrochloride. Methamphetamine hydrochloride is a crystalline solid
that is soluble in water. In illicit methamphetamine
MDMA hydrochloride is a crystalline solid, soluble powder, in the same way as amphetamine sulfate,
in water. It is normally found in the form of tablets finely ground crystals are usually mixed with
(ecstasy), but also as crystals and powders; tablets other ingredients, such as lactose, dextrose or
are usually swallowed, while crystals and powder may caffeine. Large white or translucent crystals of
be taken orally or snorted. methamphetamine hydrochloride suitable for
smoking, known as ‘ice’ or ‘crystal meth’, are also
Amphetamine sulfate is a white or off-white powder available, although this route of administration is not
that is soluble in water. Illicit products mostly consist commonly reported during surveys of users in Europe.
of powders, usually mixed with other ingredients,
154
I
It is estimated that 12.4 million European adults (aged is a producing region for these three drugs for the EU
15-64), or 4 % of this age group, have tried amphetamine consumer market, but in addition Europe’s role as an
and/or methamphetamine during their lives and 1.7 million international supplier of these drugs is increasingly being
(0.5 %) during the last year. The available data suggest that recognised. For example, huge quantities of ecstasy
use of these drugs is relatively stable. tablets are trafficked to Turkey each year, and tablets and
crystals are internationally distributed, including smaller
Long-term, chronic and injecting amphetamine use has, quantities distributed via darknet markets. Bulk quantities
historically, been most evident in northern European of EU-produced methamphetamine have been seized in
countries. For example, the estimated prevalence of high- places such as Australia and, more recently, amphetamine
risk amphetamine use was 0.2 % in Germany in 2015, and in the form of captagon tablets has been produced in
users of amphetamines are likely to make up the majority Europe for markets in the Middle East. The EU is also an
of the estimated 2 234 (0.2 %) high-risk stimulant users occasional transit area for methamphetamine produced
reported by Latvia in 2017. In contrast, methamphetamine in Africa, Iran or Mexico on its way to the lucrative markets
use has been most apparent in Czechia and Slovakia. In of Asia and Oceania, and there are a few signals emerging
Czechia, high-risk methamphetamine use among adults to suggest that methamphetamine from Mexico and West
(aged 15-64) was estimated at around 0.5 % in 2017. Africa may be available on the drug market in some EU
Member States.
Approximately 28 000 clients (6 %) entering specialised
drug treatment in Europe in 2017 reported amphetamine A potentially important development has been noted
or methamphetamine as their primary drug. About in a particular area of Afghanistan, where some heroin
11 000 of them were first-time clients (7 % of all first-time producers have been making methamphetamine. The
clients). Considering route of administration, 14 % of all process used was initially based on the extraction of
amphetamines clients reported oral consumption of the ephedrine from cough medicine, and then more recently
drugs, 65 % reported sniffing, 11 % reported smoking or from ephedra plants grown in other regions of Afghanistan
inhaling and 9 % reported injecting. (Mansfield, 2019). It will be important to monitor this
phenomenon, given the significant traffic of heroin to the
It is estimated that 13.7 million European adults (aged EU from Afghanistan.
15-64), or 4 % of this age group, have tried MDMA/ecstasy
during their lives and 2.6 million (1 %) in the last year. Use
is more common among young people, and it is estimated
that 2 % of young adults (15-34) have used MDMA in the
last year. Production
The estimated annual value of the retail market for The amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine
amphetamines in the EU is at least EUR 1 billion, with consumed in the EU are almost exclusively produced in
a range of EUR 0.8-1.3 billion, while the estimate for MDMA the EU, although many EU Member States report no or very
is at least EUR 0.5 billion (range EUR 0.4-0.6 billion). limited production of synthetic drugs on their territories
Together they make up about 5 % of the total illicit market (UNODC, 2019a). Europe has emerged as a main global
in drugs. Estimates of amounts used suggest that in 2017 production centre of MDMA, but the amphetamine and
about 62 tonnes of amphetamines (likely range 51 to methamphetamine manufactured in Europe are primarily
81 tonnes) and 60 million MDMA tablets (50 million to for European consumers, although some is exported,
70 million tablets) were consumed. principally to the Middle East, East Asia and Australia.
Synthetic drug production relies on the availability of

drug precursors. The global effort to reduce the supply of
synthetic drugs therefore begins with the international
Global overview drug precursor control regime, which for the last 10 years
or so has been challenged by the emergence of alternative
With a burgeoning market in Asia, methamphetamine substances designed to avoid controls. Analysis of
is reported to be the most widely consumed synthetic precursor developments suggests that producers have
stimulant in the world, whereas amphetamine and MDMA active research programmes to exploit chemical loopholes
are more commonly used in Europe, although there are in the regulations. The development of this phenomenon
some indications that methamphetamine use may be is the topic of a supporting report (EMCDDA, 2019f),
slowly diffusing from the traditional zones of use. Europe which concludes that the current regulatory approach
155
is struggling to achieve an appreciable reduction in the secure locations in which to perform the various operations.
availability of amphetamine, methamphetamine or MDMA, This is the business model predominantly used in the
and that a policy debate is needed to develop fresh ideas Netherlands and Belgium for amphetamine and MDMA
about how this problem should be tackled in the future. (and to a lesser degree methamphetamine), where large-
scale production operations are most common. There is
The large-scale production of synthetic drugs is a complex a developing trend of using larger and more sophisticated
operation, as can be seen from the illustration of MDMA equipment, and both custom-made and commercial
supply chain logistics (Figure 6.2). It requires infrastructure industrial equipment are used. The most sophisticated
and logistics that, to a certain extent, mirror those of many illicit laboratories employ computer-controlled timers and
legitimate pharmaceutical manufacturing businesses. The complex electronic switching gear, demonstrating how
correct combination of skills and access to drug precursors, elaborate and professional they have become (Europol,
other chemicals and equipment are needed, as well as 2019b) and making investigating them more technical.
Figure 6.2
MDMA supply chain logistics
Ecstasy tablets ordered
Controller
based in the
Netherlands
Chef Specialist Logistics Chemicals Tableting

chemist hardware specialist dealer specialist
facilitator
Corrupt
personnel
Mislabelling,
forged
Unskilled Specialist Corrupt papers
operators cook builder
and farmer
European PMK-
port glycidate
Collect
hardware
and legal
chemicals
C
is
on
es
ve
Synth
rsion
Dumping MDMA Dumping

specialist powder specialist
Ta b l e ti n g
Dumping of Dumping of
toxic waste toxic waste
Smuggling
specialist
Ecstasy tablets delivered to client
156
I
Dutch OCGs continue to dominate the production of Figure 6.3

synthetic drugs in the Netherlands and are heavily involved Location of sites related to amphetamine production in
in the production of these drugs in Belgium. Some Dutch the EU, 2015-17
and Belgian OCGs involved in the production of synthetic
drugs are closely integrated and orchestrate the large-scale
production of synthetic drugs together. Groups operating
in the Netherlands are increasingly specialised in carrying
out specific steps in the production cycle such as the
Finland
acquisition of precursor substances, the production and
tableting phases and distribution or trafficking. These
Estonia
groups appear to be highly flexible and adaptable. Latvia
Sweden
Conversely, small amounts of synthetic drugs can be Netherlands

produced relatively easily in what are known as ‘kitchen Poland
labs’ using drug precursors extracted from medicinal Germany

Belgium
Czechia
products and household chemicals. This is the predominant
method for methamphetamine production, which in the EU Austria Hungary
mainly occurs in Czechia and to a lesser extent in Germany, Slovenia Croatia
Poland and Slovakia. Bulgaria
Spain
Production methods and sites
Amphetamine
Amphetamine is most often made from the internationally sulfate from amphetamine base oil. In addition, during
controlled drug precursor benzyl methyl ketone (BMK), darknet market monitoring, offers of relatively small
also known as phenyl-2-propanone (P2P), although other quantities of amphetamine oil were noted (50 ml for
methods are documented. Rather than being imported EUR 175, purporting to ship from the Netherlands). This
as a liquid from China as was previously the case, BMK implies that the crystallisation step of the production
is now primarily produced in the EU from alternative process will be conducted at the destination, which would
chemicals (EMCDDA, 2019f), which also typically come be a novel development.
from China. The conversion process, which is dangerous
but relatively straightforward, may be done at the same
place as the synthetic drug is produced or at a dedicated MDMA
site (conversion lab). According to Belgian authorities, all
amphetamine production facilities dismantled in 2017 MDMA is produced primarily from the internationally
included conversion labs. controlled precursor piperonyl methyl ketone (PMK), also
known as methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone (MDP2P).
As well as the mid- to large-scale production operations Like BMK, this precursor has also been supplanted
found in the Netherlands and Belgium, sites linked to by alternative substances from China, which are then
amphetamine production have been reported in other EU converted to PMK in Europe.
Member States, especially in central and eastern Europe
(see Figure 6.3). Between 2015 and 2017, 366 sites related MDMA production mainly takes place in the Netherlands,
to amphetamine production, including laboratories, dump and occasionally in Belgium with Dutch connections.
sites and storage locations, were reported in the EU, most Between 2015 and 2017, according to ERISSP, 158 sites
notably in the Netherlands (225), Belgium (50), Poland (32), related to MDMA production were dismantled in the EU,
Germany (27) and Sweden (10), via the European Reporting most notably in the Netherlands (135) and Belgium (21)
Instrument for Sites related to Synthetic Production (see Figure 6.4). These MDMA production facilities tend
(ERISSP). Such sites are also found from time to time in to be highly professional and with large outputs. The
other EU Member States (see Figure 6.3). It should be increasing sophistication of MDMA production facilities
noted that some of the production sites perform only the was reported in the last edition of this report. That situation
crystallisation stage of production, making amphetamine continues, with more automation being a notable feature
157
Figure 6.4 wastewater catchment area, thus pointing to significant

Location of sites related to MDMA production in the drug production in this region (WATCH, 2018).
EU, 2015-17
Methamphetamine
There are two main methamphetamine production

Netherlands
phenomena observed in Europe: production of relatively
small quantities in small to mid-scale illicit laboratories in
Czechia, using precursors extracted from medicines; and
the less frequently encountered large-scale production
in the Netherlands and Belgium based on BMK. Small
quantities of methamphetamine may also be produced in
relatively amateur settings using recipes from the internet,
Germany based on precursors extracted from medicines and some
readily available household chemicals. This is typically
carried out by methamphetamine consumers to supply
Belgium small circles of users, in various Member States.
France
Although the scale and production potential are not
routinely reported, between 2015 and 2017 a significant
number of laboratories manufacturing methamphetamine
were dismantled in the EU. Data reported to the
of the more advanced laboratories. There has been an EMCDDA and Europol (2016-18) show that most
increase in the number of sites related to MDMA production illicit laboratories were dismantled in Czechia (1 252),
notified recently, with the Netherlands reporting 59 in Bulgaria (64), Germany (38), Slovakia (36) and Poland
2017 compared with 41 in 2016, and Belgium reporting (21) (see Figure 6.5). Czechia clearly accounts for most
10 in 2017 compared with 3 in 2016. Laboratories are of the methamphetamine production laboratories in
rarely found in other EU Member States, although Poland Europe, and Czech authorities assess that 6.5 tonnes
reported a tableting site in 2015 and Italy reported a small are consumed in Czechia annually. Although much of
manufacturing site in 2016. the small-scale production is not thought to be linked to
organised crime groups, there is intelligence suggesting
The annual Sewage Analysis Core Group Europe (SCORE) that Vietnamese organised crime groups are up-scaling
wastewater-monitoring campaigns showed unusually high methamphetamine production sites in Czechia and (to
loads of MDMA and amphetamines in wastewater influents a lesser extent) Poland; for example, Czechia dismantled
in the Dutch cities of Amsterdam, Eindhoven and Utrecht, two large-scale methamphetamine production facilities
which could not be ascribed to human consumption only in 2017. Vietnamese groups are also reported as having
(EMCDDA, 2018c). Further chemical analysis confirmed established methamphetamine production operations in
that the high levels of MDMA observed in Utrecht reflected the Netherlands, in some cases shifting their operations
direct disposal of non-consumed MDMA in the sewer from Czechia, which may be related to the lower penalties
system, suggesting drug production in that region. Studies for drug-related crime imposed there (EMCDDA, 2017c;
show that direct disposal of substances in the sewer Tops et al., 2018).
system is often related to police interventions in suspected
drug production facilities (Emke et al., 2014). Occasionally, large-scale methamphetamine laboratories
are discovered in the Netherlands, producing crystal
The Wastewater analysis of traces of illicit drug-related methamphetamine using BMK, for export to Asia
chemicals for law enforcement and public health (WATCH) and Oceania. To make the more potent form of
project included a 30-day synthetic drug production methamphetamine, a further processing step uses tartaric
monitoring campaign in Eindhoven and Tilburg in the acid. This technique has been used by OCGs in Mexico
Netherlands and Turnhout in Belgium. High levels of since around 2012 to supply the large consumer markets
MDMA were recorded during the entire monitoring period in the United States (INCB, 2016). Recent information
in one city in the Netherlands, suggesting continuous suggests that this know-how has now been transferred
discharges of unconsumed MDMA from sources within the to Europe (see Case study 23). In February 2019, for
example, Dutch law enforcement officers dismantled
158
I
Figure 6.5 report that some of the methamphetamine on their drug

Location of sites related to methamphetamine markets comes from the Netherlands.
production in the EU, 2015-17
Synthetic drug production: a complex

logistical exercise
Dutch and Belgian criminal groups are the most important

producers of synthetic drugs in the EU, possessing the
most advanced capabilities and investing a significant
amount of resources. The large-scale production of
Lithuania synthetic drugs appears to be linked to a small number of
interconnected OCGs, sharing and exchanging knowledge,
Netherlands Poland
resources and expertise. Investigations have shown that
Germany
Czechia prominent criminal groups are involved in the production
Slovakia of MDMA and amphetamine and, less frequently,
Hungary methamphetamine. Dutch OCGs also continue to
export their expertise in establishing synthetic drug
Bulgaria
laboratories and designing production processes to other
Spain Member States, as well as in non-EU locations (see box
‘Captagon’, page 167). In addition, some OCGs engaged
in synthetic drug production have also been involved in
heroin production in the EU (see Chapter 4). OCGs have
been active in the Belgian-Dutch border region since
2000, setting up illicit synthetic drug laboratories. Risks
a laboratory producing methamphetamine and arrested are minimised by maintaining separation of the various
nationals of the Dominican Republic, Mexico and the processes involved. In the Netherlands and Belgium,
Netherlands. The laboratory was used for the crystallisation for example, a controller arranges chemicals, equipment,
stage in the production process and around 400 kg of the synthesis or ‘cooking’ step, the dumping of waste and
methamphetamine and various chemicals were recovered. tableting by specialists working independently from each
In addition, in June 2019, Belgian police dismantled a large other, to minimise the risk of exposure.
production site where crystal methamphetamine was
synthesised. One Belgian, two Dutch and four Mexicans
were arrested in connection with this case (data from Precursors and alternative chemicals used to
Belgian Federal Police). make them
Although the production of methamphetamine in the To circumvent the strict controls placed on the precursors
Netherlands is primarily for export to lucrative markets BMK and PMK, traffickers have introduced alternative
outside the EU, Spain and to a lesser degree Poland both chemicals, adding an extra step in the production process.
Although not a new phenomenon, this practice seems
CASE STUDY 23
Methamphetamine lab found on a boat in the Netherlands

In May 2019, an illicit was seized from the boat and the abandoned when the boat started
methamphetamine laboratory was 65-year-old Dutch captain and three taking on water, in what could have
located on an 85-metre German- Mexican men aged 23, 26 and 37 were been an attempt to destroy evidence
registered cargo boat moored in the arrested. A car with German licence by the remote activation of a pump.
Dutch port of Moerdijk. More than plates was also seized. The forensic
300 litres of methamphetamine oil investigation of the scene had to be Source: Boffey (2019b).
159
to have intensified in the last few years, as can be seen Whereas conversion laboratories have been a feature of
from the timeline (Figure 6.6). Perhaps because these synthetic drug production in the Netherlands and Belgium
alternatives are legal, they are available at a fraction of the for a number of years, Dutch and Belgian OCGs have
cost of BMK and PMK, making production more profitable recently begun to collaborate more closely with Polish
for the organisers. criminals, and/or legitimate businesses based mainly
Figure 6.6
Timeline: alternative chemicals for the production of BMK
Selected alternative chemicals used in the production of BMK

Seizure
BMK BMK is the main
CH3 precursor used
to make Laboratory
O amphetamine
in Europe Control measure
2009
APAAN APAAN
CN
detected
CH3
in Europe
O 2010
2011
APAAN
conversion labs
in the Netherlands
2012
APAA APAA
O
2013 detected in
NH 2 the Netherlands
CH3
APAAN
O
2014 controlled
in the EU
APAAN
2015 included in Table 1
of 1988 Convention
2016
APAA
conversion labs
in the Netherlands
2017
MAPA conversion lab

in Belgium
CH3
MAPA
detected in
O O
2018 the Netherlands
CH3
2019
APAA
included in Table 1
of 1988 Convention
2020
Note: APAA, alpha-phenylacetoacetamide; APAAN, alpha-phenylacetoacetonitrile; BMK, benzyl methyl ketone; MAPA, methyl-alpha-phenylacetoacetate.
The 1988 Convention: United Nation Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, 1988.
160
I
in Poland, that can supply chemicals. Law enforcement Figure 6.7

intelligence suggests that some Polish OCGs that were Simplified general schema of synthetic drug
previously involved in the production of amphetamine in production
Poland are now instead increasingly involved in the supply 1. Precursor conversion
Synthetic drug production
of chemicals for the production of synthetic drugs in other BMK for amphetamine/ requires drug precursors, often
methamphetamine produced from alternative
countries. These OCGs may then receive payment in the chemicals in conversion
APAAN, APAA, MAPA,
form of an agreed quantity of the manufactured drugs. laboratories using acids.
glycidic derivatives of BMK
PMK for MDMA

In the last report, APAAN (a pre-precursor) was highlighted Safrole, glycidic
derivatives of PMK,
as the chemical used in Europe to make BMK. However, MD-APAAN
its scheduling at international level in 2014 led to the

development of alternatives: first, glycidic derivatives of 2. Synthesis/cooking
BMK, then APAA and then MAPA. Although the market The next step involves
BMK amphetamine/
is dynamic and rapidly changing, the most frequently methamphetamine converting precursors to drugs.
Other chemicals are needed
encountered non-scheduled precursor used in illicit and vary depending on the
production process.
drug production in Europe at present is APAA for making PMK MDMA
amphetamine. However, MAPA is increasingly detected.

PMK glycidate appears to be the most favoured precursor 3. Separation
for MDMA production. Producers do not seem to be After the chemical synthesis is
crude complete, the drug is present in
concerned about the precise identity of the chemical base oil a reaction mixture, and sodium
hydroxide is added to separate
used for producing BMK or PMK, as long as it works and the drug base, in the form of a
crude oil.
they know how to do the conversion. Rather than being
chemically accurate, they simply refer to these compounds
as BMK-intermediate or PMK-intermediate.
The crude base oil is then

purified by distillation or
The synthesis (‘cooking’) process some other method.
The synthesis step is the most important stage of synthetic

drug production; it is often called ‘cooking’. In general
5. Crystallisation
terms, this involves synthesis, separation and crystallisation amphetamine Acids are used to convert the
sulfate base oil to a solid salt form.
(see Figure 6.7). In recent times, it has emerged that Sulfuric acid is used to
methamphetamine
synthetic drug producers may make use of ad hoc hydrochloride obtain amphetamine sulfate
MDMA and hydrochloric acid is used
contacts to oversee this part of the production process; hydrochloride to obtain methamphetamine
hydrochloride and MDMA
for example, members of outlaw motorcycle gangs may hydrochloride.
be used. Less-experienced operators may be expected
to perform the drug synthesis under the supervision of
6. Finishing
a ‘chef’ chemist. The dangerous nature of the process may powder
caffeine
expose them to significant harm, as was highlighted in amphetamine
lactose methamphetamine
January 2019 when three men were found dead in such
micro- tablets MDMA
a laboratory in Belgium after apparently breathing toxic crystalline amphetamine
cellulose methamphetime
fumes (Belgian Federal Police, personal communication).
The inhalation of methanol vapour has been highlighted as crystals
rarely adulterated MDMA
a particular hazard for those working in illicit synthetic drug methamphetamine
laboratories (Wijnands-Kleukers et al., 2019). Such health The finishing stages include filtering, drying, cutting, processing and packaging
harms are not well documented, and additional monitoring as powder or crystals, or pressing as tablets.
of this phenomenon would be valuable to assess them.

Note: This illustration is intended to provide an indicative schematic overview
In recent years, trafficking amphetamine base oil from the of selected stages of a production process. It must be noted that alternative
methods, chemicals and procedures may be used.
Netherlands for conversion to amphetamine sulfate in other
EU countries has been observed. The practice appears to
be continuing, and outlaw motorcycle gangs appear to play
a prominent role in it.
161
The equipment for the cooking stage of synthetic drug This work demands some skill and is done by specialists,
production is largely custom made. For this reason, the usually in an isolated or well-insulated location in order
characteristic appearance of such equipment, when to avoid attracting attention, as tableting equipment
recovered from a dismantled laboratory, provides valuable makes a lot of noise. Although tableting and synthesis
clues about the criminal groups involved. In contrast, the are sometimes co-located, tableting is often conducted
equipment used for tableting is commercially produced at a dedicated site, for two main reasons. First, it reduces
and can be easily sourced online. In addition, the machines the risk of losing all important equipment and chemicals
are relatively inexpensive, for example EUR 8 000 for at the same time if the site is raided. Second, illicit drug
a machine with capacity to produce 10 000-15 000 tablets laboratories tend to be humid environments, which can
per hour or EUR 23 000 for one that can produce 100 000 have a negative effect on the quality of the tablets. The
tablets per hour. ‘tableteers’ can produce tablets of any colour or shape
requested by the client. The correct pressing materials are
In Czechia, methamphetamine is produced mainly from needed, typically microcrystalline cellulose products and
ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, which is extracted from colouring agents to add to the mix, as well as custom-made
medicinal products originating mainly in European punches fabricated with the desired shapes and logos.
countries and trafficked by land. Up until fairly recently,
Turkey was reported to be the source of such tablets,
which were trafficked by land transiting countries including Environmental impact of waste materials
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. However,
the INCB reports that Turkey is less commonly identified as As can be seen from Figure 6.2, specialists are also
a source, and controls implemented to tackle the issue are involved in disposing of the waste produced during
having the desired effect (INCB, 2019). The National Police synthetic drug production processes. The environmental
in Czechia now report that Poland is a key transit country impact of synthetic drug production in the EU was
or source of such medicines (Police of the Czech Republic, highlighted in the last edition of this report. Since then we
2018). have studied this phenomenon and have a much greater
understanding of this part of the European synthetic drug
chain.
Tableting
It is estimated that producing 1 kg of amphetamine creates
Processing MDMA into ecstasy tablets is the last step in between 20 and 30 kg of waste, and producing 1 kg of
the production process for this important nightlife drug. MDMA creates between 6 and 10 kg of waste (Europol,
Challenges in estimating synthetic drug production in the EU: the example of the Netherlands
Our estimate of the retail value of the market for realised by the Dutch production and distribution level
amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA in the is between EUR 3 billion and EUR 5 billion.
EU in 2017 was EUR 1.5 billion (range EUR 1.2 billion
to EUR 1.9 billion) (EMCDDA, 2019a). However, a report The EU market size estimate and the global retail revenue
commissioned by the Dutch police in 2018 concluded estimate figures are not directly comparable. However,
that the business model of Dutch OCGs engaged in we do know that the EU markets for these drugs are small
synthetic drug production has been so successful that compared with the markets elsewhere, in particular in
the estimated global revenue from amphetamine and Asia, and that the Netherlands is a key global producer of
MDMA produced in the Netherlands in 2017 was at synthetic drugs, so the figure of EUR 18.9 billion for the
least EUR 18.9 billion (Tops et al., 2018). This amount value of that part of the global retail market supplied by
relates to the retail value on global markets of the total production in the Netherlands seems possible. The topic of
amount produced, including adulteration. This figure is study is by its very nature a hidden phenomenon. Estimates
based on retail prices in consumer countries; it does not such as these are difficult to produce and are, by necessity,
appear to take into account costs and losses outside based on a number of assumptions. Tops and colleagues
the EU, although it does account for precursor losses in have been transparent in their approach and careful to use
the Netherlands. These amounts relate to sales and do figures that produce conservative estimates. The findings
not take account of costs incurred or the profits made confirm what we already knew: that the Netherlands is an
by other groups along the supply chain. The authors important global hub for synthetic drug production.
estimated that the proportion of the global revenue
162
I
2019b). The production of BMK and PMK precursors from Figure 6.8
alternative chemicals also produces a significant amount of Van modified for illegal dumping of synthetic drug
waste, even before the synthetic drug production process production waste
takes place.
Based on the estimated amount of synthetic drugs

consumed in the EU, calculated as part of the market size
estimates, between 1 293 and 1 948 tonnes of synthetic
drug production waste is generated each year (Table 6.1).
It must be stressed, however, that these estimates do not
take account of the portion of production that is seized by
law enforcement agencies, or the portion that is produced
in the EU for export. Using the figures produced by Tops
and colleagues in 2018, although they were somewhat
controversial when published, the total amount of waste
produced is between 7 000 and 11 000 tonnes. Neither of Photo: Federal Police, Belgium
these estimates factors in the amount of waste generated

at precursor conversion labs. Waste contaminants dumped on land are broken down
by the fauna and flora that live in the soil. The acidity/
The waste may be disposed of by simply pouring it down alkalinity of synthetic drug production waste is harmful to
the sink or toilet, although this is likely to be rare, as it the organisms living there, e.g. earthworms or millipedes,
brings with it the risk of detection should smells or leaks which need a neutral environment (Boerman et al., 2017;
occur. If this does occur, it may affect the quality of drinking Schoenmakers et al., 2016). Waste discharged into surface
water, block the sewage system or disturb the workings of water may cause aquatic life to die, can create hazards,
municipal wastewater treatment plants. More commonly, such as the potential contamination of cattle affecting
members of the public report containers of waste dumped the human food chain, and risks the further spread of
in the countryside but there have been instances where chemicals into the soil and waterways (Boerman et al.,
it has been found buried underground. Waste can also 2017; Kates et al., 2014; Schoenmakers et al., 2016).
be left in abandoned residences or loaded in stolen vans Certain types of chemical waste cause water pH levels
or lorry trailers, which may then be set on fire to conceal to rise, which can reduce oxygen levels, harming fish and
forensic evidence. More elaborate methods have been plants (Schoenmakers et al., 2016; UNODCCP, 1999).
found, including the use of modified vans that pump waste These harms are likely to be more acute in the main
onto the road surface while driving in rainy conditions (see production areas. Between 2015 and 2017, almost 660
Figure 6.8). These discharges have a higher environmental dump sites were notified to authorities in the Netherlands
impact than waste found dumped in containers, and are (591) and in Belgium, especially the part neighbouring the
less likely to be discovered. When discharges are identified, Netherlands (68) (see Figure 6.9).
however, they are not always registered by law enforcement
officers (Schoenmaekers et al., 2016).
Table 6.1
Estimated amount of chemical waste generated in the production of the amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine
consumed in the EU in 2017
Synthetic drug Estimated production in the EU Waste output per tonne Total waste (tonnes)
(tonnes) produced (tonnes)
Amphetamine and 62 20-30 1 240-1 860
methamphetamine
MDMA 8.8 6-10 53-88
Total 1 293-1 948
Source: Europol (2019b).
163
Figure 6.9
Location of dump sites of waste from synthetic drug Trafficking and supply
production in the Netherlands and Belgium, 2015-17
The amphetamines and MDMA consumed within the EU
are largely supplied from EU sources and therefore supplied
by intra-EU trafficking. However, as discussed above, EU
Netherlands OCGs are also important producers for the global market, so
trafficking from the EU to these external markets also needs
to be considered.
Trafficking within the EU
Trafficking within the EU is complex and dynamic, with

many criminal groups and individuals involved. Whereas
synthetic drug production processes are well understood,
Germany thanks to extensive forensic investigation of dismantled illicit
laboratories, trafficking is less so. The most useful information
is derived from police investigations. Concerted efforts at EU
Belgium level to improve data collections are starting to address this
France
information gap around trafficking of synthetic drugs but they
will take some time to be fully established.
The trafficking of synthetic drugs within the EU is primarily

The cost of dismantling synthetic drug carried out using land transportation, as well as post and
production sites parcel services. Trafficking by post and parcel services
is believed to be primarily linked to the online supply of
Apart from the damage to the environment, there is also relatively small quantities of synthetic drugs from both
the financial impact of cleaning up after the production EU- and non-EU-based vendors.
of synthetic drugs and the waste that it generates.
When synthetic drug laboratories or dump sites are The free movement of goods within the Schengen Area
discovered, they must be safely dismantled and/or cleaned coupled with the EU-based production model for synthetic
up so that they do not cause harm. This is done by various drugs means that the opportunities for controlling shipments
specialists, which generates a number of direct costs to at the external border of the EU are limited in comparison
society. The EMCDDA commissioned a study to estimate with cocaine and heroin, for example. When they do
the costs of dismantling and cleaning up synthetic drug occur, large seizures made at borders tend to result from
production sites in Belgium and the Netherlands, because coordinated law enforcement operations. Furthermore, action
of the high incidence of synthetic drug production in those against street dealers and users may result in a large number
countries (Claessens et al., 2019). of smaller retail-level seizures. This variability complicates the
interpretation of the data although, clearly, both the number
The cost estimation was based on working hours, training of seizures and the amount seized give an indication of the
hours and materials used by all the actors involved in the importance of the market for these drugs in the EU.
dismantling and cleaning up. The costs include the police,
a separate specialised police synthetic drug lab dismantling
team, the fire department, civil protection services and
private companies involved. Environmental services were Table 6.2
also involved in both countries, but no cost data were Minimum estimated cost of dismantling illicit
available for those. The estimated cost can be considered laboratories and cleaning up waste dump sites in
a minimum, as it became clear during the information- Belgium and the Netherlands, 2016
gathering process that there were no standardised recorded Country Number of sites Total cost (EUR)
data and the costs that were retrieved were a minimum
Belgium 42 1 401 634
estimate by the bodies involved. The minimum estimate
Netherlands 322 4 368 294
for these countries for one year is almost EUR 6 million
Total 364 5 769 928
(Table 6.2).
164
I
Seizures of amphetamine in the EU have remained relatively Figure 6.10

stable for a number of years (see Figure 6.10), in terms of Number of amphetamine seizures and quantities
both the number of seizures (approximately 35 000 per seized, 2007-17
year) and the amount seized (around 5 tonnes per year). Number of seizures
However, two significant countries — the Netherlands and 45 000

Poland — do not report the number of seizures, which limits
the analysis. 35 000
25 000
In 2017, EU Member States reported 35 000 seizures of
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
amphetamine, amounting to 6.4 tonnes. The estimated
quantity of amphetamine seized in the EU has generally EU EU+2
fluctuated around 5 to 6 tonnes each year since 2010,

although there have been increases in each of the past Tonnes
2 years (Figure 6.10). Germany and the United Kingdom 8
generally seize the largest amounts, often more than a tonne 6

each.
4
2
There have been coordinated international law enforcement
efforts to tackle synthetic drug production and trafficking, 0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
some of which are conducted under the banner of the
European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal
Spain Poland Sweden
Threats (EMPACT) (see section on the policy cycle, United Kingdom Germany Other countries
Chapter 8). Such operations tend to focus on drug
precursors, on production labs or on trafficking in general,
resulting in the dismantling of the criminal enterprise. PMK. The quantity of MDMA seized is more often reported
Law enforcement operations of this type are complex and by number of tablets than by weight. The estimated
require a multidisciplinary response, but the results can be 6.6 million MDMA tablets reported seized in 2017 is the
significant (see Case study 24). highest number reported seized in the EU in any year since
2007. The trend, however, has been variable. In addition,
The number of reported MDMA seizures in the EU has been some countries report seizures of MDMA powder. Reported
on an upward trend since 2010 (Figure 6.11). This is linked seizures of MDMA powder in the EU increased from
to shortages of precursors in the preceding years and the 0.3 tonnes in 2016 to 1.7 tonnes in 2017. This increase is
subsequent switch to non-scheduled chemicals for making mainly in quantities reported by the Netherlands.
CASE STUDY 24
Intra-EU chemical trafficking for synthetic drug production

In April 2018, in a coordinated Poland to addresses in the south of the production laboratories. Dutch law
cross-border operation led by the Netherlands up to three times a week. enforcement officers seized more
Polish Police Central Bureau of than 100 kg of MDMA crystals and
Investigation and Dutch and German On the day of action, simultaneous 12 litres of MDMA base oil, more
police, and supported by Europol, raids were conducted in Poland, than 1 000 litres of drug precursors
300 officers were deployed to tackle Germany and the Netherlands. In and more than 60 000 litres of other
a major supplier of chemicals used Poland, eight suspects were arrested chemical substances, as well as four
for synthetic drug production in the and 17 tonnes of chemicals and 4 kg illegal firearms and ammunition.
Netherlands. Polish law enforcement of amphetamine paste were seized. Encrypted phones used by the gang
agencies had been gathering In Germany, a further 7 tonnes of members were also confiscated by law
information on the traffickers since chemicals was seized. Police in the enforcement during the action day.
2016 and, during the investigation, Netherlands conducted 17 searches,
it was revealed that around 2 tonnes arrested seven suspects and shut Source: Europol (2018a).
of chemicals were transported from down three illicit synthetic drug
165
Methamphetamine seizures are far lower, with 9 000 The latest data from the INCB show that the low quantity of
seizures reported in the EU in 2017, amounting to BMK seized globally (4 200 litres) in 2017, and reports of
0.7 tonnes (Figure 6.12). France (122 kg), Germany only ‘negligible’ aggregate seizures of PMK apart from one
(114 kg) and Czechia (93 kg) seized the largest amounts. important seizure of approximately 5 000 litres in Europe,
The number of seizures of methamphetamine has shown confirm that the diversion of these controlled precursors
an overall upward trend since 2002 but with signs of is becoming less significant. The alternative chemicals
stabilisation in recent years; the quantity seized has been used to make BMK and PMK predominantly flow to the
increasing, albeit with some fluctuation, since 2009. EU from Asia and are converted in laboratories in the EU.
The INCB reports that, in relation to BMK, in 2017, the
It is important to note that synthetic drugs are frequently largest amounts of APAA were seized in the Netherlands
seized as part of multidrug shipments, which indicates that (more than 10 tonnes), followed by France (more than
polydrug-trafficking activities remain a common feature 600 kg) and Belgium (250 kg). Between 2017 and January
of OCGs involved in the trafficking and distribution of 2019, Europol was made aware of seizures of more than
synthetic drugs in the EU. Outlaw motorcycle gangs have 10 tonnes of MAPA globally. In relation to PMK, more than
traditionally been involved in the trafficking and distribution 10 tonnes of glycidic derivatives have been seized each year
of synthetic drugs, particularly in Nordic and Baltic states. since 2016 (INCB, 2019).
As noted above, these groups are also increasingly involved
in orchestrating synthetic drug production. Synthetic drugs are trafficked from centres of production
in the EU to consumer markets outside the EU, including
important and lucrative markets in Asia and Australia.
Trafficking outside the EU Methamphetamine produced in the Netherlands is thought
to be mainly intended for export to these destinations,
Outside the borders of the EU, two phenomena can be with small quantities often trafficked by couriers and
observed. First, there is the flow of drug precursors and large quantities by maritime transportation. As well as
the alternative chemicals that can be converted into them, highlighting large shipments of EU-produced synthetic
which are predominantly imported to the EU from Asia. drugs detected in other regions of the world, open
Second, there is the export of synthetic drugs, mainly MDMA source information monitoring has also shown that other
and to a lesser degree methamphetamine, to important and methods for smuggling smaller amounts, such as internal
often lucrative consumer markets in Asia and Australia. concealment, also occur. However, their frequency is
difficult to assess. For example, in March 2019, authorities

Number of MDMA seizures (all forms) and quantities Number of methamphetamine seizures and quantities
of tablets seized, 2007-17 seized, 2007-17
Number of seizures Number of seizures
32 000 20 000
15 000
16 000 10 000
5 000
0 0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
EU EU+2 EU EU+2
Tablets (millions) Tonnes
0.9
15
0.6
10
0.3
5
0
0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Spain United Kingdom Germany Spain Finland Czechia

France Other countries Germany France Other countries
166
I
at the international airport in Santiago de Chile arrested destinations, such as Turkey or countries in the Middle
a Dutch citizen who had arrived from Amsterdam via Rome. East along this route, while drug precursors and associated
On examination, 82 capsules containing ecstasy tablets or substances flow into the EU in the opposite direction.
powder valued at almost EUR 60 000 were recovered from
his stomach. This was the first case of this type recorded In 2017, Turkey seized more amphetamine (6.6 tonnes) than
in Chile (Prensa Latina, 2019). It should also be noted that the EU Member States combined (6.4 tonnes). Almost all of
the smuggling of synthetic drugs to non-EU countries via the amphetamine seized in Turkey was in the form of tablets
postal parcels appears to be gaining momentum in Europe. (26.3 million tablets — over 99.5 % of the total estimated
For instance, 328 kg of MDMA was seized at European amount seized), including large quantities of captagon
postal centres in 2018 and most of this was destined to tablets containing amphetamine (see box ‘Captagon’).
markets in South and North America and in Asia. However, Large seizures of captagon amounting to millions of tablets
synthetic drugs may also be smuggled by mail within also took place in Greece in the early part of 2019. Large
the EU. For instance, customs in Austria reported seizing quantities of MDMA tablets were also seized in Turkey in
numerous parcels and letters containing small amounts 2017, more than double the amount in the previous year,
of methamphetamine sent from the Netherlands in 2018 amounting to 8.6 million tablets and exceeding the total
(Groupe Pompidou and RILO WE, 2019). amount seized in the EU (Figure 6.11). Turkey also seized an
exceptionally large quantity of methamphetamine in 2017
The Balkan route is a significant trafficking route for (658 kg), a similar amount to that reported for the entire EU
synthetic drugs produced in the EU heading to non-EU (662 kg).
Captagon
Countries in the Middle East regularly report seizing

millions of tablets of captagon, a common illicit
stimulant drug used in the Arabian Peninsula, and,
to a lesser extent, other Middle Eastern countries.
Media reports have linked captagon to perpetrators
of terrorist attacks in Europe and terrorist groups
based in areas of conflict in the Middle East, leading
to concerns about this drug, which prompted the
EMCDDA to review the available evidence in a recent
paper (EMCDDA, 2018d).
Photo: Department of Identification and Forensic Science, Israel Police
The drug now known as captagon takes its name from
the medicinal product Captagon; however, nowadays
manufacturing facilities’ in Syria may be misused
amphetamine is the drug most frequently found in
to produce amphetamine (INCB, 2018). There are
seized captagon tablets, although this could change
indications that drugs, including captagon, may also
in future.
be produced in Iraq, although a lack of hard data
makes drawing any conclusions on this issue difficult.
Large quantities of captagon used to be
manufactured illicitly in Balkan countries, chiefly
There is evidence suggesting that European OCGs
Bulgaria, and in Turkey, and then exported to the
specialising in synthetic drug production, particularly
consumer markets in the Arabian Peninsula. However,
amphetamine production specialists, are active in the
since the mid-2000s, captagon production has
Middle East. A Bulgarian and a Belgian were arrested in
moved closer to the consumer markets. Clandestine
Lebanon in 2014 and 2015, respectively, in connection
facilities were dismantled in Lebanon and Jordan in
with drug production, and a large captagon laboratory
2011, 2015 and 2018, and large amounts of BMK
dismantled in Lebanon in 2015 contained custom-made
have been seized in these countries. Although no
synthetic drug production equipment characteristic of
amphetamine laboratories have been reported as
the type found in the Netherlands and Belgium. The
dismantled in Syria, the INCB recently expressed
illicit manufacturing of captagon tablets has also been
the concern that Syrian companies may be used to
encountered in Europe over the last few years, particularly
import BMK or its precursors, and added that ‘existing
in the Netherlands.
167
Methamphetamine produced in Mexico, West Africa and Figure 6.13

Iran is trafficked to the EU, but on a much less significant Darknet market offers: MDMA listings shipping from
scale than intra-EU production and trafficking. Belgium, Europe, 2018
for example has reported that methamphetamine shipments Belgium Other EU countries
2% 2%
have arrived there from Burkina Faso and Nigeria, and Spain United Kingdom
5%
has reported shipments from Mexico and Côte d’Ivoire. It is
likely that these cases reflect the EU’s role as a transit hub for Multiple
methamphetamine heading to East Asia and Australia. 10 %
Drug precursors and the alternative chemicals used to produce

them are normally trafficked from outside the EU. Some
chemical companies have been established in the EU for the
sole purpose of trading in chemical substances that can be
used in illicit synthetic drug production. All EU airports and
seaports are potential entry points or transit areas for illicit
goods, which are typically offloaded from containers for further
Germany Netherlands
transportation by road. OCGs involved in the trafficking of 31 % 50 %
precursors target the main seaports close to synthetic drug
Note: Multiple denotes where several EU countries are mentioned as country
production hubs such as Antwerp and Rotterdam, but also, of origin.
increasingly, smaller seaports across the EU with less strict
control measures in place. Shipments also enter the EU at
border-crossing points along the EU’s external border among 15 874 MDMA listings (sale offers) that could be attributed
legal freight on trucks and trains. to vendors that said that they would ship MDMA from an
EU country. The equivalent figures for amphetamine and
Seizure reports from outside Europe, identified through the methamphetamine were much smaller by comparison (2 238
monitoring of open source information, and analysis of darknet and 1 146 respectively), so these drugs will not be examined
market data illustrate the important role played by European in further detail. The MDMA offers were distributed across
producers in the global supply of MDMA. For example, darknet nine marketplaces, with three markets accounting for 99 %
market monitoring data show that, as well as facilitating direct of all offers: Dream Market (14 242), Olympus Market (1 334)
retail sales to consumers, these markets are used by dealers and Berlusconi Market (182). The available data suggest
around the world to purchase larger quantities of MDMA that the majority of sale offers originating from the EU during
produced in Europe. Analysis shows that transactions involving 2018 were from the Netherlands (50 %) and Germany (31 %).
quantities of MDMA tablets indicative of the middle level of Other reported EU Member States of origin included the
the market account for more than double the revenue of sales United Kingdom (5 %) and Belgium (2 %). An additional 12 %
of retail-level quantities. In contrast, darknet cannabis and of listings offered shipping from other EU countries (2 %) or
cocaine transactions are overwhelmingly at the retail level multiple EU countries (10 %) (Figure 6.13).
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2017).
Caution is needed in interpreting these data in respect of
gauging the number of individual sellers offering synthetic
Online distribution drugs on these marketplaces or the number of transactions.
Neither number can be extrapolated from the number of listings
Synthetic drugs are also distributed across the EU via darknet alone. Nonetheless, the number of listings has been used as
marketplaces (see Chapter 2). As well as the sale of small a valid indicator of the scope of activity on darknet markets.
quantities of amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine,
larger quantities of MDMA, often in multiples of 1 000 tablets
for redistribution, are also sold. Such purchases tend to
be delivered to the buyer using post and parcel services.
Although the online trade in MDMA (and other drugs) remains Retail supply and use
marginal compared with the offline/traditional supply, it is
important to understand its scope. Based on 2018 data from
several major darknet markets (14), we detected a total of MDMA
Until recently, in many countries, MDMA prevalence had

(14) For more information on the data source and its limitations see the been on the decline from peak levels reached in the early
168
I
to mid-2000s. In recent years, however, monitoring sources Figure 6.14

suggest a mixed picture with no clear trends. Among the MDMA content of ecstasy tablets, 2014-18
countries that have produced new surveys since 2016 and %
reported confidence intervals, four reported higher estimates 100
than in the previous comparable survey, six reported stable

80 >200 mg
estimates and two reported lower estimates.
151–200 mg
60
MDMA is often taken alongside other substances, including 100–150 mg
alcohol. Current indications suggest that, in higher-prevalence 40 <100 mg
countries, MDMA is no longer a niche or subcultural drug

limited to dance clubs and parties, but is used by a broad 20
range of young people in mainstream nightlife settings,

0
including bars and house parties. Marketing appears to play
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
a role in retail sales, and new tablet designs in various colours,
Source: Trimbos Institute, the Netherlands.
shapes and brand logos are constantly being introduced.
The European Web Survey on Drugs found that, among people
who had used MDMA in the previous year, the proportion
reporting frequent use (more than 50 days in the past year) Amphetamine and methamphetamine
ranged from none at all in Cyprus to around 8 % in Croatia and
Austria. Compared with 2007, both the price and purity of
amphetamine in Europe were higher in 2017, despite
MDMA use is rarely cited as a reason for entering specialised a slight fall compared with the previous year. Typically,
drug treatment. In 2017, MDMA was reported by fewer than both the average reported purity and the price are higher
1 % (around 1 600 cases) of treatment entrants in Europe, with for methamphetamine than for amphetamine samples.
Turkey (616), the United Kingdom (230), France (168) and Amphetamine is typically adulterated with caffeine. The
Hungary (111) accounting for 70 % of these. drug-checking study conducted for the EMCDDA in 2018
found that, of 488 samples containing amphetamine, 70 %
The average MDMA content of tablets, in those countries contained caffeine. No samples of methamphetamine were
that routinely report data, has been increasing since 2010. identified in the study (EMCDDA, 2019b).
In 2017, a 10-year high of 167 mg per tablet was reported by
the Netherlands (Trimbos Institute, 2019; see Figure 6.14). Analysis of municipal wastewater carried out in 2018 found
A drug-testing service in the United Kingdom also reported that mass loads of amphetamine varied considerably across
increased amounts of MDMA in ecstasy tablets, from 129 mg Europe, with the highest levels reported in cities in the north
in 2016 to 156 mg in 2017 (Harm Reduction Wales, 2018). and east of Europe. Amphetamine was found at much lower
In a study conducted for the EMCDDA in seven Member States levels in cities in the south of Europe. It must be noted that not
between January and July 2018, of 35 ecstasy tablet samples all European Union Member States participate in this activity.
submitted for testing to nine onsite and offsite drug-checking Of the 38 cities reporting data for 2017 and 2018, 21 noted an
services and confirmed to contain MDMA, 11 were found increase, seven a stable situation and 10 a decrease. Overall,
to contain caffeine. In the case of MDMA in crystal form, of the data from cities with data from 2011 to 2018 showed
44 positive samples, 19 contained an unknown adulterant and a diverse picture, but with relatively stable trends in most cities
11 contained caffeine. for amphetamine (EMCDDA, 2019b).
Wastewater analysis can detect fluctuations in weekly patterns Temporal fluctuations observed in wastewater data show
of illicit use. The 2018 multi-city analysis found the highest that, whereas use of amphetamine used to be distributed
mass loads of MDMA in the wastewater in cities in Belgium, more evenly over the whole week, increasing loads have been
Germany and the Netherlands. Of the 37 cities that have data detected during the weekend more recently, probably related
for 2017 and 2018, 21 reported an increase, nine a stable to increasing use in recreational settings.
situation and seven a decrease. Looking at longer-term trends,
in most cities with data for both 2011 and 2018 (10 cities), Methamphetamine use, which is generally low, stable and
wastewater MDMA loads were higher in 2018 than in 2011 historically concentrated in Czechia and Slovakia, now
(EMCDDA, 2019b). appears to be present also in other European countries, such
as Cyprus, Germany, Spain and northern Europe (Figure 6.15).
In 2017 and 2018, of the 40 cities that have data on
169
Figure 6.15
Methamphetamine residues in wastewater in selected European cities: trends and most recent data
mg/1 000 population/day

300 Helsinki
Espoo
Oslo
250
Copenhagen
Vilnius
200 Amsterdam
Utrecht
Antwerp Berlin
Bristol Dresden
150 Brno
Brussels
Paris Piestany
Budweis
100
Innsbruck Bratislava
Bordeaux
Milan Zagreb
50 Ljubljana Istanbul
Lisbon Barcelona
0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Valencia Nicosia
Limassol
Dresden Budweis Barcelona
mg/1 000 population/day
Oslo Amsterdam Milan
200 150 Below level of quantification
100 50 25 10
Note: Mean daily amounts of methamphetamine in milligrams per 1 000 population. Sampling was carried out in selected European cities over a week in each year
from 2011 to 2018.
Source: Sewage Analysis Core Group Europe (SCORE).
methamphetamine in wastewater, five reported an increase, Dienst Nationale Recherche, 2012), a ketamine production site
20 a stable situation and 15 a decrease. was found in the Netherlands. In addition, a storage site found
in Belgium in 2017 was reported to be connected to ketamine
production in the Netherlands (see Chapter 7). Sixteen EU
Member States reported around 2 000 seizures of ketamine
Other important synthetic drugs on in 2017, amounting to an estimated 194 kg and 5 litres of the
the EU drug market drug, most of which was accounted for by Belgium, France and
the United Kingdom. Complementary data were reported to the
EU Early Warning System on new psychoactive substances in
This section considers ketamine and GHB/GBL, which seem 2017 amounting to 1 945 seizures from 19 countries: 947 kg
to be growing in importance in the EU drug market, to the of powder, with France and the Netherlands contributing
extent that some EU Member States are raising concerns most to the total; 13 litres of liquid, mainly reported by France;
about them. There are many other synthetic drugs available on and 216 tablets. In addition, in the first half of 2018, the
the EU drug market, for example mephedrone, 2C-B and some Netherlands reported seizures of approximately 1 tonne of
niche substances with weak user demand, on which very little ketamine, which may indicate increasing demand for the
information is available. The data available for LSD show that, drug (see below). The United Kingdom reported the highest
while the quantities seized fluctuate year to year, the number number of seizures (523) and quantities of ketamine seized
of seizures has doubled since 2007, to 2 200 seizures and (68 kg) in 2016/2017. In previous years, however, seizures
74 000 units seized in 2017. were larger and more numerous: for example, in 2013/14 when
1 650 seizures occurred, totalling 357 kg of powder.
Ketamine In its annual report on the drug situation, the Dutch Trimbos
Institute highlighted that, while ketamine use among the
Although apparently used on a much more limited scale than general population is low (1.1 % lifetime prevalence and
the other drugs discussed in this chapter, ketamine is another 0.5 % in the past year), it has now become a mainstream
synthetic drug that is worthy of some attention, not least drug in the Netherlands among adolescents and young
because of its harmful effects on those who use it on a regular adults participating in the nightlife scene, with 17.3 % of this
basis. Although most ketamine would appear to be imported population ever having used it and 12.3 % in the past year
into the EU generally from China or India (ACMD, 2013; KLPD (Trimbos Institute, 2019). There has also been an increase
170
I
in ketamine samples delivered to the Drug Information In 2017, seizures of GHB or GBL were reported to the EU in
and Monitoring System (DIMS); they now account for 4 % three ways: to the EU Early Warning System, to the EMCDDA
of all drug samples. DIMS found that, in 2017, ketamine through the standard seizure data collection or, as GBL is
samples had an average purity of 63 %, with an average a precursor of GHB, to the European Commission. Analysis of
price of EUR 25 per gram (range from EUR 5 to EUR 60). the data from these sources is hampered by inconsistencies in
The European Research Area Network on Illicit Drugs (ERANID) reporting, such as a country reporting different numbers to two
project survey reported slightly higher prices of between or three of the data collections.
EUR 30 and EUR 40 per gram. A study of four of the largest
darknet markets conducted between July 2017 and June What is clear, though, is that 19 EU Member States, Norway
2018 found that, in 1 251 ketamine listings, the amount most and Turkey have reported data to at least one of them. It
commonly offered was 1 g (209 listings), with a median price appears that Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands and Norway
of EUR 23 per gram (Christin and Thomas, 2019). Caffeine is are the countries that report the largest numbers of seizures,
the most common adulterant of ketamine. The drug-checking respectively. Taking the EU Early Warning System data into
study conducted for the EMCDDA between January and account, 13 EU Member States, Norway and Turkey reported
July 2018 showed that, of 48 ketamine samples, 25 of them over 1 000 seizures amounting to approximately 250 kg and
contained caffeine (EMCDDA, 2019b). almost 460 litres of the drug. According to reporting through
the standard table, Belgium alone seized two hauls of GBL
Another reason for increasing seizures in some countries in amounting to 305 litres and 2.28 kg and 444 hauls of GHB
Europe could be the sale of ketamine on darknet markets. amounting to 1.5 kg and 2 litres, whereas Norway reported
While some ketamine appears to be offered for sale from 488 seizures (170 litres) of GHB and 75 seizures (190 litres)
vendors based in Europe, in the absence of sales data it is of GBL.
difficult to assess the extent of this phenomenon. A previous
study identified 469 sales of ketamine shipping from the EU In 2016, Germany reported to the European Commission that
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2017). It will be important to closely it had stopped 29 suspicious orders of GBL, amounting to
monitor the diffusion of ketamine and related substances in some 57 100 litres of the substance. However, in 2017 no EU
the EU in the coming years. Member States reported stopping any attempts to purchase
GBL.
GHB and GBL Synthetic drugs have been noted offered as a cocktail, for
example ‘Blue-69’, purported to be a mixture of amphetamine,
GHB (gamma-hydroxybutyric acid) is also known as ‘liquid MDMA and GHB. Dutch vendors have placed such items
ecstasy’, ‘gamma’ or simply ‘G’. It is a synthetic drug that is for sale on darknet markets at a cost of EUR 27.50 for 5 ml
usually consumed in recreational nightlife settings, where it of the liquid, although the exact contents are not known
is taken orally in liquid form for sought-after effects that are (Figure 6.16).
similar to those of alcohol. GHB has a steep dose-response
curve: even a small increase in dose can cause serious toxic
effects, including impaired consciousness and coma, so
developments in this market are worthy of study. Figure 6.16
Advert for ‘Blue-69’, a cocktail of synthetic drugs
GBL (gamma-butyrolactone) is the main precursor for GHB,
and is increasingly being trafficked in the EU for the purpose
of GHB production, or for direct consumption, as it is rapidly
converted to GHB in the body. Whereas GHB was added to
Schedule IV of the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic
Substances in March 2001 and then moved to Schedule II in
2014, GBL is not scheduled at global or EU level as a drug or
as a precursor. That enables criminal groups to divert it from
licit supplies. In some countries, such as Poland, control is
possible because GBL is an ester of GHB. GBL has legitimate
use as an industrial solvent, but, despite this, some Member
States have imposed controls on the substance in their
national drug legislation. As well as being diverted from licit
supplies within the EU, GBL is also smuggled to the EU from
China. Source: ‘Berlusconi’ a darknet market.
171
Photo: Netherlands Forensic Institute
173
CHAPTER 7
Key points
Developments in new psychoactive the Netherlands and Poland, usually producing synthetic
substances in the EU cathinones.
X Policies on NPS appear to be having some impact. X Interaction with the market for traditional illicit drugs
Measures taken in the EU, especially those that have is now greater. The NPS market continues to evolve and
reduced the open trade, and in source countries, such is characterised by a range of substances that are cheap,
as China, appear to have resulted in a slow-down in the easily replaceable and potent. Interactions with the market
number of first detections of NPS in European countries. in established controlled drugs have become stronger
Currently, around 50 new substances are reported annually, and influence the demand for and use of NPS, with NPS
within a total of over 730 reported to the EU Early Warning increasingly sold alongside illicit substances or in mixtures
System. with them.
X Despite a slow-down in first-time detections, NPS X Problems attributable to synthetic cannabinoids appear
continue to pose serious cross-border threats to health. to be growing. The relatively low cost, easy availability and
This is evident from the number of potent synthetic opioids, high potency of synthetic cannabinoids appear to have
synthetic cannabinoids and benzodiazepines appearing resulted in increased use among marginalised groups such
on the market and the associated reports of health as the homeless and prison populations. This development
emergencies and deaths. is associated with an increase in reports of serious negative
consequences.
X Globalised markets, the internet and other technologies
drive the availability of NPS in the EU. The internet, both the X New opioids are a growing cause for concern. There has
surface web and darknet markets, is an important source of been a rapid increase in the number of fentanyl derivatives,
supply, particularly since in many EU countries open sales substances particularly associated with health problems,
in shops have been reduced. However, there appear to be including fatal poisoning. Developments in this area are
increasing sales of NPS on the illicit market. likely to be influenced by the prominent role played by this
group of drugs in the current opioid epidemic in North
America.
Developments in production and
trafficking X Overlaps exist with the market for fake medicines.
New benzodiazepines, often sold at very low prices, have
X China remains the major source country for NPS, from appeared on illicit drug markets in some countries and have
where they are exported and openly sold by chemical and been associated with harm, including an increased risk of
pharmaceutical companies. To a lesser extent, India is overdose. They are also used to make fake versions of these
also an important source of some NPS, particularly those medicines, which are sold on the illicit drug market. A small
sold as medicines. A small number of illicit laboratories number of new benzodiazepines may be sourced from
have also been detected in European countries such as companies in India, typically as finished medicinal products.
174
CHAPTER 7 New psychoactive substances
I
X HIV outbreaks have been linked to the injection of Q Share intelligence, assess threats, monitor the situation
synthetic cathinones. This is likely to be because the and carry out research to improve the understanding of
injecting of stimulants is associated with high injecting the production of NPS within Europe, the involvement
frequency and more chaotic behaviours. The use of of OCGs and interactions that may exist between the
cathinones among some groups of men who have sex NPS market and the more established controlled drugs
with men has also been associated with increased sexual market.
risk-taking behaviours. Q Raise awareness and develop appropriate guidance
and training on the risks associated with occupational
exposure to potent and highly toxic NPS and their
adulterants and contaminants.
Q Continue to support capacity-building activities,
Implications for action for including training, sharing of best practices and
preparedness and response provision of specialist equipment for law enforcement
activities agencies, in particular customs, to increase the
detection of shipments of NPS at European borders
and within the postal and parcel services.
To respond to the current and potential future threats Q Increase the ability of forensic science and toxicology
posed by the synthetic drug market in Europe, the following laboratories to identify new substances as well as
actions are needed. precursors and metabolites. This requires support for
training, resources for testing, and a mechanism for
Q Continue to support and develop the capacity of production and sharing of analytical data, reference
national and EU early warning systems to increase materials and expertise.
situational awareness and preparedness, and to Q Systematically monitor and disrupt online
support the development of responses. marketplaces, particularly those selling wholesale
Q Develop effective models to rapidly identify and quantities, both on the surface web and on darknet
respond to outbreaks of mass poisoning linked to markets, and to strengthen even further the
NPS use. These need to include, where relevant, the partnerships with industry to restrict such sales.
provision of opioid antagonists. Q Support research into the pharmacology and toxicology
of NPS identified by the EU Early Warning System.
175
New psychoactive substances overview

Substances reported to the EU Early Warning System since 1997
731 NPS
Monitored EU risk assessment International control EU risk assessment and international control Reported in 2018
Synthetic cannabinoids (190)
Cathinones (138)
Phenethylamines (99)
Other substances (87)
Opioids (49)
Tryptamines (42)
Arylalkylamines (36)
Benzodiazepines (28)
Arylcyclohexylamines (18)
Piperazines (17)
Piperidines and pyrrolidines (14)
Plants and extracts (8) Aminoindanes (5)
Benzodiazepines — flualprazolam 2018: >30 000 tablets seized

First detected: February 2018, Sweden
X N
N
In 2018: 2 Member States
Structurally related to alprazolam (Xanax),
but more potent and not under A NA N reported poisonings
involving flualprazolam.
international control. X N
Has been used to make falsified Cl F
Risk communication to the
2
(fake) Xanax tablets. EU EWS Network: Mar 2019
Number of seizure cases, 2007

Reported to the EU Early Warning System
EU EWS Network
Formal
EU+2 reporting
Where the Early
4 740 Warning System Open
Targeted
EU gets its data from research
source
information
4 542
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20
176
I
Synthetic cannabinoids — MDMB-CHMICA Number of detections

3 457
First detected: September 2014, Hungary O 29 deaths in 6 countries
MDMB-CHMICA is typically sold as a O
N O
‘legal’ replacement for cannabis. H 1 728
Because of its high potency and the way 1 438
N
Risk assessment: Jul 2016
that ‘legal high’ products are produced, 172
European drug control: Feb 2017
users are at risk of serious poisoning.
International drug control: 2017 2014 2017
Number of seizure cases, 2017 EU+2

Cathinones — mephedrone (4-MMC)
2016 Reported to the EU Early Warning System
First detected: March 2008, Finland
Mephedrone was sold as a ‘legal’ replacement for amphetamine,
cocaine and MDMA or mixed with or sold as these drugs. 3-MMC,
a chemically similar cathinone, appeared in 2012. Cannabinoids 32 615
Quantity seized (kg) 4-MMC 3-MMC
616 O O
H H
N N
461
Cathinones 15 218
4-M
MMC 3-MMC
C
Risk assessment: Jul 2010
European drug control: Dec 2010 Benzodiazepines 3 443
0
2007 2017 International drug control: 2015 Opioids 1 273
Others 11 611
Synthetic opioids — carfentanil
First detected: February 2013, Latvia O
O
One of the most potent opioids known. O EU+2
N
In overdose it stops people from breathing. 64 160
N
Used as a veterinary medicine for the EU
immobilisation of large animals.
61 deaths 39 115
Number of detections
in 8 countries
345
50 % of cases detected in
160 209
mixtures with heroin/fentanyl
48
28 derivatives.
2013 2017 Risk assessment: Nov 2017
International drug control: 2018
Number of NPS notified to the EU

Early Warning System for the first time
101
98
81
74
66
55
Quantity seized (all forms, tonnes) 51
48
6
41
5
4
24
3
2 15 13
0
2007 2017 2007 2010 2015 2018
12 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
177
Responding to new psychoactive substances

Introduction in the EU
New psychoactive substances make up a broad range
A three-step legal framework of early warning, risk
of drugs that are not controlled by international drug
assessment and control measures allows the EU to
laws (15). They include stimulants, synthetic cannabinoids,
rapidly detect, assess and respond to public health
benzodiazepines, opioids, hallucinogens and dissociatives.
and social threats caused by NPS. The EMCDDA
Many of these substances are intended to mimic the effects
is responsible for the first two steps in this system,
of controlled drugs and are traded as legal replacements
namely operating the EU Early Warning System
for them. They may be sold in a range of products under
with Europol and conducting risk assessments. The
the guise of ‘legal highs’, ‘research chemicals’ or ‘dietary
European Commission, the Council of the European
supplements’. They are also sold as drugs in their own
Union and the European Parliament are responsible
right, and, unknown to users, as controlled drugs and fake
for control measures. The legislation comprises
medicines. An additional aspect of the market is the use
Regulation (EU) 2017/2101 of the European
of non-controlled psychoactive medicines that are either
Parliament and of the Council of 15 November
diverted from the regulated market in Europe or sourced
2017 amending Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006
from vendors in other countries.
as regards information exchange on, and an early
warning system and risk assessment procedure for,
In the EU, a legal framework exists to detect, assess and
new psychoactive substances; and Directive (EU)
respond to the issues posed by these substances (see
2017/2103 of the European Parliament and of the
boxes ‘Responding to new psychoactive substances in the
Council of 15 November 2017 amending Council
EU’ and ‘The data in this chapter’).
Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA in order to
include new psychoactive substances in the definition
of ‘drug’ and repealing Council Decision 2005/387/
JHA.
Global overview
Since around 2008, there has been a dramatic growth in Much of the NPS market is highly dynamic and constantly
the NPS market as globalisation and new technologies, changing. It is characterised by a high turnover of cheap,
such as the internet, have allowed them to be produced, easily available and replaceable substances. One of the
sold and supplied on an industrial scale. Between 2009 main reasons for this high turnover is that, as soon as
and 2018, 119 countries and territories reported the national governments signal their intention to control
emergence of 892 different NPS to UNODC, through the a substance, producers can easily switch to a new, non-
UNODC Early Warning Advisory on NPS (UNODC, 2019b). controlled, replacement. Despite this, some NPS have
In Europe, more than 730 NPS have appeared on the drug remained on the market for a number of years. A few of
market since monitoring began in 1997, with around 90 % these, such as ketamine, GBL and 2C-B (4-bromo-2,5-
of these being detected between 2008 and 2018 (EMCDDA, dimethoxyphenethylamine), have become established drugs.
2019b). The growth in the market has also been reflected
in large increases in the number of seizures made by law The broad range of substances and products, combined
enforcement agencies, and in reports of severe and fatal with the highly dynamic nature of the market and strong
overdoses. links with the market in established controlled drugs, gives
rise to a complex picture across Europe. The situation
Many NPS are produced and sold openly by chemical and differs widely over time and place. The ability to detect and
pharmaceutical companies in China. They are imported into report NPS also differs across Europe, meaning that there
Europe, processed into products and sold in shops, on the is both underdetection and under-reporting in some areas.
internet or through the illicit drug markets. To a lesser extent, Understanding the epidemiology of many NPS is also limited.
India is also an important source of some NPS, particularly Commonly used methods for studying drug use, including
those sold as medicines (Evans-Brown and Sedefov, 2018). those for estimating prevalence, may not be suitable or
Illicit laboratories in China, India, and Europe also produce appropriate for many NPS. This may especially be the case
some types of NPS. for those substances that have recently appeared on the
market, have low levels of use or are passed off as other
(15) Increasingly, some NPS are controlled or otherwise regulated at national
drugs. Together, these issues have left gaps in understanding
level, irrespective of whether or not they are controlled under the UN the overall size, scale and impact of the market.
conventions.
178
I
The data in this chapter

Regarding the prevalence of use, data are limited, but
what we do know is that, in most cases, the use of NPS
in the general population tends to be lower than that of The seizure data reported in this chapter are from
established controlled drugs. There are some important 2007 to 2017. Data on formal notifications are from
exceptions to this, such as ketamine, which has become 2007 to 2018. It is important to note that, when
an established drug in some places (see Chapter 6). In interpreting the seizures of NPS reported to the EU
addition, the use of some types of NPS, such as stimulants, Early Warning System, they must be understood as
synthetic cannabinoids and opioids, may be relatively minimum values. This is because data are drawn
common in high-risk drug users and other marginalised from case reports rather than monitoring systems.
groups in some areas. Despite what appear to be relatively Reports are influenced by a range of factors such
low levels of use, some of these substances may cause high as increasing awareness of new substances, their
levels of harm. Adding to the complexity is that NPS are changing legal status, law enforcement capacities
also used by dealers as replacements for established drugs, and priorities, and the reporting practices of law
such as MDMA, amphetamine, cocaine, benzodiazepines enforcement agencies. The data are not directly
and heroin, when they are in short supply. In these cases, comparable to the data on established controlled
people may be unaware that they are using an NPS. drugs. Quantitative data on the amount of NPS
Standard data collection tools do not account for such present in the seizures is not available, as this type
instances. of analysis is not routinely performed. The data
also include a number of former NPS that have
In some cases, NPS pose a challenge as a group, such subsequently been controlled internationally under
as the synthetic cannabinoids. Suppliers care less about the UN conventions. These include 2C-B, GHB and
a specific substance and more about mimicking, broadly some synthetic cathinones, synthetic cannabinoids
speaking, the pharmacological effects of cannabis. In and opioids. Although it has been used for a number
essence, each synthetic cannabinoid is disposable: as soon of years now, ketamine is also classed as an NPS as it
as a substance is controlled, or even before, manufacturers is not under international control.
can have one or more replacement substances ready
for sale, while suppliers and retailers can have legal when a substance first appears on the market because of
replacement products on the shelves. In other cases, NPS a lack of experience with the substance, but also because,
may simply be used as a temporary replacement for an unknown to users, such substances may be sold as the
established drug, such as heroin or MDMA, that is in short established drug they wanted. As a result, these types of
supply. In still other cases, they are used to make fake substances can also cause outbreaks of mass poisonings
medicines (Evans-Brown and Sedefov, 2018). that can overwhelm local healthcare systems. Although the
picture differs greatly across Europe, outbreaks involving
Since the last edition of this report there have been some a range of different types of NPS have occurred in recent
encouraging developments in the NPS market in Europe. years. In some circumstances, personnel may also be at risk
The number of new substances reported for the first time of occupational exposure to such substances (Europol and
each year has dropped from a high of around 100 in 2014 EMCDDA, 2017).
and 2015 to around 50 since then. This is thought to partly
reflect recent policy responses in Europe, including efforts Potent substances are also easier to conceal and smuggle,
to control NPS and their open sale. It may also reflect control making them an attractive option for traffickers. A few
measures and law enforcement activity in source countries, grams of a substance, easily hidden in an envelope, can be
such as China (EMCDDA, 2019b). Nonetheless, at least one sufficient to make many thousands of doses for the drug
new substance is still detected every week, increasing the market. It is also concerning that synthetic cannabinoids
overall number that need to be monitored. (known as ‘spice’) are now sought after by some vulnerable
groups because they are cheap, easily available and
Major new challenges have also emerged. They include powerful, capable of causing mind-numbing effects
what appears to be a general upward trend of more potent (EMCDDA, 2018e).
NPS appearing on the market, especially substances such
as the synthetic cannabinoids and fentanyl derivatives, Globalised markets also increase the opportunity for NPS,
which can be highly potent. These types of substances and a whole range of toxic chemicals, to be sold either
pose a greater risk of life-threatening poisoning to deliberately or accidentally as other drugs, which can have
users because their high potency makes it easier to disastrous consequences. An example of this is carfentanil,
unintentionally overdose. This risk may be especially acute which was sold as heroin in parts of Europe during 2017.
179
Strong links also exist between the trade in NPS and in the EU. In other cases, they appear to be unlicensed
markets in established controlled drugs. The increasing use products. At least historically, India was also an important
of new benzodiazepines to make fake versions of common source of ketamine for Europe. In the last few years, illicit
anti-anxiety medications, such as fake alprazolam and laboratories producing synthetic cathinones have also
diazepam, provides some indication of this. The use of been seized in India, and the country has been named as
NPS by high-risk drug users and other marginalised and a source for several large consignments of them that were
vulnerable populations also appears to have increased in seized at ports in Europe.
some places.
The processing stage of NPS production is fairly common
in the EU. For example 2017, a site where the synthetic
cannabinoids were sprayed on herbal mix and packaged for
distribution was dismantled in Belgium. As well as synthetic
Production cannabinoid products, other types of substances can also
be found, (see box ‘Production of fake diazepam tablets
Most NPS are produced in China, and to a lesser degree from etizolam, Scotland, UK, 2017’, page 188). The chemical
India and Europe. The growth in the market observed in synthesis stage also takes place in Europe, although to
recent years is due to the involvement of chemical and a limited extent. Stimulants, such as the phenethylamines
pharmaceutical companies operating predominantly in and synthetic cathinones, have been produced in illicit
China, which are capable of making a large number of laboratories in bulk quantities. Some of these laboratories
substances on an industrial scale. This has been driven by were operated by criminal groups that were also involved in
increasing expertise and capacity in the Chinese science the production of MDMA and amphetamine. Two attempts
and technology economy, low labour costs, the internet, to produce ketamine, apparently on a large scale, were also
and cheap and efficient shipping (Levinson, 2016; Morris, reported in 2016 and 2017.
2012; Smil, 2010; Stearns, 2011). The companies use
the internet, including online marketplaces, to advertise Details of the NPS production sites reported as dismantled
and sell a diverse range of substances. Typically, they are in the EU and their locations are shown in Table 7.1.
supplied in powder form, in quantities that range from a few The data have been reported systematically at EU level
milligrams to tens or even hundreds of kilograms. Some
of the companies also offer a custom synthesis service Table 7.1
for customers looking to obtain a specific NPS that is not Sites related to NPS production in the EU, 2007-17
currently available on the market. Some NPS, including Year Country Number NPS produced
ketamine, are also produced in illicit laboratories. of sites
2009 Netherlands 1 4-MAR
The substances are shipped to wholesalers, retailers and 2010 Netherlands 4 4-MA
dealers in Europe by express mail and courier services; 2011 Netherlands 1 4-MA
larger quantities ship by air and sea cargo. Consignments
2013 Netherlands 2 PMMA
may be mislabelled and declared as common goods of
Poland 2 4-BMC/alpha-PVP, FU-
low value, including foodstuffs, cosmetics and chemical F/4F-BF
products, in order to conceal their true nature and avoid
Romania 1 PMA
interception by customs and border forces. More rarely,
Slovakia 1 3-MMC
they are concealed using similar methods to those used for
2014 Estonia 1 4-MMC
trafficking controlled drugs. Suppliers and importers may
also deliberately route NPS to specific air and sea ports in Poland 1 4-BMC/alpha-PVP/NEB
Europe where the substances are not controlled, in order to 2015 Italy 1 4-MMC
reduce the chance of interception. Netherlands 2 4-MEC, 4-MMC
Poland 2 4-MMC
Companies based in India are also important producers
2016 Netherlands 1 Ketamine
of some NPS, particularly those that are also used as
Poland 2 4-MMC, 4-CMC
medicines. These include modafinil, tramadol and etizolam.
Slovakia 1 3-CMC
Unlike many of the NPS from China, the substances from
India are typically supplied as finished products ready for 2017 Belgium 1 Ketamine
use. These may be medicines that are licensed in India and Netherlands 2 4-CMC, 3-MMC
appear to be diverted from the legitimate supply chain; Poland 2 4-CMC
these are classed as unlicensed and falsified medicines
180
I
since the EMCDDA and Europol introduced ERISSP in the Polish case, alpha-PVP, 4-bromomethcathinone and
2015. Previous to 2015, the data were largely actively N-ethylbuphedrone were produced; the total amount of
sought from Member States by the EMCDDA. material seized there was 4.5 kg.
Between 2007 and 2017, 28 sites in the EU related to In 2015, five cathinone production sites were detected,
the manufacturing of NPS were notified to the EMCDDA one in Italy, two in the Netherlands and two in Poland. The
or Europol. Of the 28 sites, most were found in the Italian case was small-scale and two Polish suspects were
Netherlands (13) or Poland (nine), with Slovakia reporting arrested at the site. In the Dutch cases, which were linked,
two and Belgium, Estonia, Italy and Romania each 26 kg of 4-methylmethcathinone crystals was seized at one
reporting one. Before 2014, most sites were located in the site and, although no final product was found at the second
Netherlands and producing phenethylamine stimulants site, similar equipment was seized and the production of
(e.g. 4-methylamphetamine, paramethoxyamphetamine/ 4-methylethcathinone was confirmed. Importantly, the
paramethoxymethamphetamine). The use of substitute production of MDMA on a large scale was also ongoing
precursor chemicals led to the production of these at the second site and 160 kg of MDMA crystals was
amphetamine-related substances; for example, in 2010, seized. Finally, the two labs in Poland were producing
the 4-methylamphetamine produced in the Netherlands 4-methymethcathinone from the precursor 2-bromo-4-
was due to the use of the precursor 4-methyl-BMK instead methylpropiophenone.
of BMK. Synthetic cathinones have predominantly been
produced in recent years, mainly in the Netherlands or In 2016, four NPS production sites were reported, one
in Poland. There was an isolated case of production of in the Netherlands, two in Poland and one in Slovakia.
fentanyl derivatives in Poland in 2013, when butyrfentanyl The Dutch case involved production of ketamine from
and 4-fluoro-butyrfentanyl were produced (EMCDDA, the precursor 1-[(2-chlorophenyl)-N-(methylimino)
2017b). Ketamine production has been reported by the methyl]cyclopentanol hydrochloride. In the first
Netherlands in 2016 and Belgium in 2017. Polish case, a sophisticated laboratory producing
4-methylmethcathinone was dismantled and 14 kg of
Laboratories producing synthetic cathinones first emerged the drug was seized. In the second, four people were
in 2013, with labs found in Poland and Slovakia. In Poland, detained for the production of 4-chloromethcathinone
a production site was dismantled where alpha-PVP and at a site where 8 kg of the substance was seized. In
4-bromomethcathinone were produced; approximately Slovakia, a large laboratory with links to Polish organised
50 kg of alpha-PVP was seized. In the Slovakian case, 15 kg crime was dismantled; 3-chloromethcathinone and
of 3-methylmethcathinone crystals was seized. N-ethylnorpentedrone were being produced.
In 2014, two cathinone-producing laboratories were In 2017, five sites related to NPS production were reported:
dismantled, one in Estonia and one in Poland. The one in Belgium, two in the Netherlands and two in Poland.
Estonian site produced 4-methylmethcathinone — As already mentioned, the site in Belgium was related
274 g of which was recovered from the site — with to ketamine. Specifically, a chemical storage site was
2-bromo-4-methylpropiophenone used as a precursor. In located and 880 litres of bromocyclopentane, a precursor
CASE STUDY 25
Production of clephedrone, a synthetic cathinone, in Poland, 2017

In 2017, police in Poland dismantled seized, 900 000 finished units of and the transporting of dangerous
an NPS production laboratory where NPS products could have been chemicals took several more days.
135 kg of 4-CMC, also known as manufactured. Furthermore, the location of the lab
clephedrone, with a value of over meant that the water supply for the
PLN 7 million, was seized. The location According to the police, the inhabitants of two towns had to be cut
was found after officers had stopped concentration of chemicals in the off, in case of contamination.
a car and detained a man who was laboratory and its surroundings was Source: Policja (2017).
transporting more than 14 kg of the so strong that it was safe to enter only
substance. From the total quantity after 2 days. The dismantling operation
181
for ketamine production, was recovered. In one Dutch chemicals’ and ‘dietary supplements’. The products were
case, 3-methylmethcathinone was being produced, and designed to be attractive to consumers, avoid the attention
4-chloromethcathinone (4-CMC) in the other. At each of the of regulators and get round consumer protection laws.
Polish sites, 4-chloromethcathinone was being produced, ‘Legal highs’ were marketed in colourful packaging, with
at one of them on a relatively large scale, with 135 kg of names often suggestive of controlled drugs or psychoactive
material seized from the site (see Case study 25). effects, while ‘research chemicals’ were labelled as if they
were chemical reagents for laboratory use. Some of the
As is the case with other synthetic drugs produced in the ‘dietary supplements’ were advertised as natural products
EU, the drug precursors needed may be sourced from in order to avoid regulatory scrutiny and promote them
China. In order to avoid interception, they may be shipped as safe and healthy options — a technique also widely
in mislabelled consignments or concealed using similar used to sell unlicensed and fake medicines, particularly
methods to those used for trafficking controlled drugs. performance- and image-enhancing supplements. More
Production may be carried out in Europe for a number recently, with vaping on the rise, e-liquids containing
of reasons: existing knowledge of, equipment for and synthetic cannabinoids and fentanyl derivatives have
experience in synthetic drug production; sufficient demand appeared on the market; ready-to-use nasal sprays
for a substance, making it economically attractive; control containing fentanyl derivatives have also been marketed in
measures and law enforcement operations targeting some areas.
laboratories in China and India that reduce availability at
source; the potential to make greater profits; diversifying NPS can also be packaged to look like drugs sold on
risk and building greater resilience into the supply chains; the illicit drug market (sometimes called ‘designer
and reducing the risks of detection by law enforcement drugs’). They can be sold under their own names or
agencies. as an established controlled drug such as heroin,
cocaine, amphetamine or ecstasy. In the latter case, new
Depending on the type of substance and market, some benzodiazepines and, less commonly, new synthetic
NPS are processed into branded products. These are sold opioids have been used to make fake versions of commonly
openly or under the counter in shops as well as online. prescribed benzodiazepine and opioid analgesic medicines,
At least initially, it was these products that characterised which are also sold on the illicit market. Sales are via
the growth in the market from around 2008 onwards. The existing street-level drug markets as well as online markets,
three main product categories were ‘legal highs’, ‘research including darknet markets (see Case study 26).
CASE STUDY 26
Operation Dryer: NPS darknet market sales network dismantled

In 2018, Spanish and Austrian police, Valencia, over 100 different NPS During the investigation, it was
supported by Europol, dismantled were seized, including synthetic discovered that postal packages
a criminal network producing and cannabinoids, benzodiazepines, had been sent to more than 100
distributing NPS worldwide via darknet dissociatives, cathinone stimulants, countries, sometimes mislabelled as
markets. The operation resulted in the hallucinogens and synthetic opioids, legal products, such as additives for
seizure of more than EUR 4 500 000 in whose market value exceeded cement. As well as the seizures of NPS
cryptocurrencies. EUR 12 000 000. Nearly 800 000 and cryptocurrencies, eight people
doses of an NPS similar to LSD were were arrested (Spanish, Austrian and
The OCG had been operating in confiscated, making it the biggest ever French nationals), accused of drug
Spain since 2012 and imported haul of this type of substance in the trafficking, money laundering and
the raw material to make the NPS EU. membership of a criminal organisation.
products mainly from China. The Three properties were seized, with
group also established a laboratory in The OCG offered the synthetic drugs a value close to EUR 1 million, and
the Netherlands, where it produced exclusively through darknet markets, 10 luxury vehicles were confiscated.
substances that were then shipped to where access was restricted to
Spain for packaging and distribution to previously invited users redirected Source: Europol (2018e); Guardia Civil (2018).
the final consumers. At two locations from forums.

in the provinces of Granada and
182
I
Other ingredients are needed to make consumer doses of Figure 7.1

NPS products, such as herbal material for making smoking Number of new psychoactive substances notified for
mixtures, and microcrystalline cellulose for making tablets. the first time in the EU, Norway and Turkey, 2007-18
Equipment such as tableting and packaging machines 120
is also needed, as well as the packaging materials. All of

100
these additional materials can be readily sourced from
companies based in the EU, China and elsewhere. 80
60
40
Distribution and supply in Europe

20
By the end of 2018, the EMCDDA was monitoring more

0
than 730 new psychoactive substances that have appeared 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2018
on Europe’s drug market since 1997. More than 90 % (652)
of these were notified between 2008 and 2018, including Other substances Indolalkylamines
Arylalkylamines Benzodiazepines
55 substances that were notified for the first time in 2018 Piperidines and pyrrolidines Phenethylamines
(Figure 7.1). Plants and extracts Opioids
Aminoindanes Synthetic cannabinoids
Arylcyclohexylamines Cathinones
During 2017, approximately 64 160 seizures of NPS Piperazines
were reported to the EU Early Warning System by law

enforcement agencies from across Europe. Like in recent Figure 7.2
previous years, the seizures were dominated by synthetic Seizures reported to the EU Early Warning System:
cannabinoids and synthetic cathinones, which, together, trends in total number of seizures and number of
accounted for around 75 % of the total number of seizures seizures by category, 2017
reported during the year in the EU, Norway and Turkey Number of seizures
(Figure 7.2). Large increases have been reported in other 80 000
categories such as synthetic opioids and benzodiazepines 60 000

(discussed later in this section).
40 000
20 000
In 2017, NPS were most commonly reported as powders,
which amounted to 2.8 tonnes, across all categories. 0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
This is broadly comparable to the figures from previous
years. In addition, just under 240 kg of herbal material was
EU EU+2
reported, two thirds of which was in the form of smoking
mixtures containing synthetic cannabinoids. NPS were Number of seizures by category
also found in tablets (6 770 cases, 2.8 million units),
EU EU+2
blotters (980 cases, 23 000 units) and liquids (1 430 cases, Aminoindanes
490 litres). Some of these liquids were sold as ready-to-use Piperazines
Plants and extracts
nasal sprays or as e-liquids for vaping in e-cigarettes. Indolalkylamines
Arylalkylamines
Piperidines and pyrrolidines
Although a broad range of NPS are monitored by the EU
Opioids
Early Warning System, the rest of this section is limited Arylcyclohexylamines
Phenethylamines
to a discussion of synthetic cannabinoids, synthetic
Benzodiazepines
cathinones, opioids and benzodiazepines. It must be noted, Other substances
however, that dissociative substances, largely mimicking Synthetic cannabinoids 21 % 51 %
Cathinones 39 % 24 %
the effects of ketamine, and hallucinogens, mimicking the
10 000 0 10 000 20 000 30 000
effects of LSD, are also important NPS categories.
183
Synthetic cannabinoids Figure 7.3

Number of synthetic cannabinoids notified for the first
When synthetic cannabinoids first appeared on the time in the EU, Norway and Turkey, 2007-18
market in Europe around 2006, they were sold as legal 31
29 30
23 24
replacements for cannabis. That is still the case, but
11 11 11
they have also gained a reputation for having powerful 9 10
0 1
intoxicating effects, and, as a result, some users specifically
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2018
use these substances for their effects. Typically, the
cannabinoids are sprayed on to or mixed with herbal
plant material and smoked as a joint. Although synthetic
cannabinoids are used recreationally, in some places they Table 7.2
are also used by prisoners, homeless people and other The most seized cannabinoids in the EU, Norway and
vulnerable groups because of the profound intoxication Turkey, numbers and quantities, 2017
they can cause. Because of their high potency, synthetic Substance Number of Powder Herbal
cannabinoids can pose a high risk of severe poisoning, seizures (kg) (kg)
which in some cases can be fatal (EMCDDA, 2018e). 5F-MDMB-PINACA/5F-ADB 2 295 41.7 33
MDMB-CHMICA 1 438 0.6 10
The EMCDDA currently monitors 190 synthetic AMB-FUBINACA 1 400 13.6 42
cannabinoids. This includes 11 reported for the first time in AB-CHMINACA 691 0.1 7
2018. Whereas an average of 27 cannabinoids appeared
ADB-FUBINACA 542 0.4 3
each year in Europe between 2011 and 2015, since 2016
CUMYL-PeGACLONE 303 5.0 7
the number has dropped to around 10 (Figure 7.3). The
CUMYL-4CN-BINACA 31 5.0 1
most frequently seized synthetic cannabinoid in 2017 was
5F-MDMB-PINACA/5F-ADB (Table 7.2). JWH-018 21 < 0.1 36
In 2017, just over 32 610 seizures of cannabinoids were

reported to the EU Early Warning System, which represents
just over 50 % of the total number of seizures reported Figure 7.4
during the year (Figure 7.4). Seizures of synthetic cannabinoids reported to the EU
Early Warning System: trends in number of seizures
Most of these detections were in the form of herbal plant and quantity of powders and herbal mixtures, 2007-17
material (4 870 cases, 159 kg), and in powders (950 cases, Number of seizures
84 kg). Since 2013, there has been a drop in the number 40 000
and quantity of seizures of powders containing synthetic 30 000
cannabinoids. Since 2015, there has been a drop in the 20 000
quantity of seizures of herbal material containing synthetic 10 000
cannabinoids. 0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Since 2016, the EMCDDA has conducted five joint EU EU+2

investigations with Europol on synthetic cannabinoids that
have caused serious concern at the European level. These Quantity seized
are MDMB-CHMICA in 2016, and AB-CHMINACA, ADB- (kg)
CHMINACA, 5F-MDMB-PINACA and CUMYL-4CN-BINACA 2 500
during 2017. Together, these substances have been

2 000
involved in more than 100 deaths, many of which were
attributed directly to these substances. All five of these 1 500
substances were formally risk assessed by the EMCDDA

1 000
during 2016-17.
500
0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Herbal (EU) Powder (EU)
184
I
Synthetic cathinones Table 7.3

The most seized cathinones in the EU, Norway and
Synthetic cathinones first appeared in 2004 and, since Turkey, numbers and quantities, 2017
then, have typically been sold as legal replacements for Substance Seizures Powder Tablets
controlled stimulants such as amphetamine, cocaine and (kg)
MDMA. Unknown to users, they are also sold as controlled N-ethylhexedrone 2 653 224 13
stimulants. The cathinones are used recreationally, but in 4-CMC/clephedrone 1 769 443 4
some places they are also used by high-risk drug users, 4-CEC 1 638 137 92
including people who inject stimulants and/or heroin and 3-CMC 1 085 29 0
other opioids.
3-CEC 926 1 3
Ephylone 445 39 38 991
The EMCDDA currently monitors 138 synthetic cathinones.
Dibutylone/bk-MMBDB 262 7 6 723
These include eight reported for the first time in 2018.
Like the synthetic cannabinoids, in the past few years
there has been a drop in the number of new cathinones
appearing each year (Figure 7.5). The most frequently Figure 7.6
seized synthetic cathinone in 2017 was N-ethylhexedrone Seizures of synthetic cathinones reported to the EU
(Table 7.3). This substance was one of the three most Early Warning System: trends in number of seizures,
frequently seized cathinones, along with 3-CMC and quantity of powders and number of tablets, 2007-17
4-CMC, in postal centres in 19 EU Member States in 2018 Number of seizures
(Groupe Pompidou and RILO WE, 2019). 30 000
20 000
In 2017, approximately 15 200 seizures of cathinones
were reported in the EU, Norway and Turkey (Figure 7.6), 10 000
which represents just over 20 % of the total number of NPS
0
seizures reported during the year. In addition to powders
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
(14 400 seizures, 1.27 tonnes), cathinones were also
detected in tablets (300 seizures, 48 170 units), herbal EU EU+2
material (140 seizures, 1.2 kg) and liquids (40 seizures,

2.8 litres). Other forms were also reported. In 2017, the Powder
(kg)
large majority (95 %) of seizures of cathinones were in
2 000
powder form (14 400 seizures). This represents 69 % of all
1 600
NPS seizures in powder form (14 400 out of 20 900). This
figure is comparable to the value in 2015 (14 000 seizures), 1 200
and a decrease of around 35 % compared with the previous

800
year (22 020 seizures).
400
0
Figure 7.5 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Number of synthetic cathinones notified for the first

time in the EU, Norway and Turkey, 2007-18 Tablets
31 (thousands)
26
100
14 14 12
7 8 8 80
6 4 4
0
60
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2018
40
20
0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Note: Quantity data are for EU only.
185
Synthetic opioids Figure 7.7

Number of new opioids notified for the first time in the
Since 2015, there has been a large increase in the EU, Norway and Turkey, 2007-18
number of new synthetic opioids detected in Europe.
These substances are sold as legal replacements for
9 13 11
controlled opioids, such as heroin. Unknown to users, 4 4 4
0 0 1 0 0 3
they are also mixed with or sold as controlled opioids,
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2018
particularly heroin. They are also sometimes used to make
fake benzodiazepine and analgesic medicines. Some
people use new opioids recreationally, but they are also Figure 7.8
used by high-risk drug users, including those who inject Seizures of new opioids reported to the EU Early
heroin and other opioids. Although they play a small role Warning System (excluding tramadol): trends in
in Europe’s drug market, many of the opioids (particularly number of seizures, quantity of powders and number
of tablets, 2007-17
fentanyl derivatives) are highly potent substances that
pose a severe risk of life-threatening poisoning, as they can Number of seizures
cause severe respiratory depression. This can be reversed 1 400

1 200
by the timely administration of naloxone (Kim and Nelson, 1 000
800
2015). Some countries have been disproportionately
600
affected, such as Sweden (see box ‘Responding to the 400
200
situation of new synthetic opioids in Sweden’, page 217). 0
As well as presenting a risk of harm, these substances are 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
easier to conceal and smuggle, with a few grams sufficient
EU EU+2
to make many thousands of doses for the drug market. This
makes them easier to import undetected into Europe and,
Powder
from there, move them across the rest of Europe, as small
(kg)
letters and packages can easily be disguised.
20
15
The EMCDDA currently monitors 49 new synthetic opioids
10
(Figure 7.7). These include 11 reported for the first time
5
in 2018. Overall, more than 80 % (41) of the opioids have
0
been detected for the first time during the last five years. 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Almost 70 % (34) of the opioids are fentanyl derivatives.
The most frequently seized new synthetic opioid in 2017
Tablets
was carfentanil (Table 7.4).
14 000
12 000
In 2017, approximately 1 300 seizures of opioids were
10 000
reported to the EU Early Warning System, which represents 8 000
around 2 % of the total number of seizures reported during 6 000
the year (Figure 7.8). Most of these cases (70 %) were 4 000
fentanyl derivatives. A number of other types of opioids 2 000
were also reported, including U-47700. The total quantity 0

2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
of opioids reported as powders and tablets has seen
a continued increase since 2012 (Figure 7.8). Overall, the
quantities seized in 2017 amounted to approximately 17 kg Table 7.4
of powders, 1.8 litres of liquids and over 29 200 tablets. The most seized new synthetic opioids in the EU,
Norway and Turkey, numbers and quantities, 2017
Less commonly, new opioids have also been found in (excludes tramadol)
blotters and in herbal smoking mixtures; in these cases, Opioid Seizures Powder Tablets
(kg)
there may be no indication that they contain potent
opioids, which could pose a high risk of poisoning to Carfentanil 318 4.1 0
people who use them, particularly if they have never Furanylfentanyl 183 0.8 3 225
used opioids or have not used them recently. In addition, Cyclopropylfentanyl 131 2.8 329
opioids may be found in fake medicines. For example, U-47700 110 5.0 238
between mid-November 2017 and mid-January 2018, Ocfentanil (A-3217) 55 0.7 0
186
I
Swedish police made at least 10 seizures of fake Xanax Benzodiazepines

(alprazolam) tablets (‘2 mg Xanax bars’) that contained
cyclopropylfentanyl or cyclopentylfentanyl. In addition, Like that of the synthetic opioids, there has also
a seizure of 48 fake OxyContin (‘OP 80’) tablets that been a significant increase in the availability of new
contained cyclopropylfentanyl instead of oxycodone benzodiazepines over the last few years in Europe. Most
(an opioid) was also made during December 2017. The are sourced from China as bulk powders. In Europe they are
tablets are visually indistinguishable from the legitimate processed into tablets and other products and sold as legal
medicines. The prevalence of fake tablets containing replacements for commonly prescribed benzodiazepine
fentanyl derivatives in Europe is unknown but, given the medicines, such as alprazolam and diazepam. They are also
international supply chains for such fake medicines, used to make fake versions of these medicines, which are
availability elsewhere is likely. Similar tablets to those then sold on the illicit drug market (see box ‘Production of
reported by Sweden have caused severe and fatal fake diazepam tablets from etizolam, Scotland, UK, 2017’).
poisoning, including mass poisonings, in the United States A small number of new benzodiazepines may be sourced
and Canada in the past few years (Arens et al., 2016; Sutter from companies in India, typically as finished medicinal
et al., 2017). The risk of poisoning may be especially high products.
when tablets are sold as benzodiazepines (such as Xanax),
as they may be used by non-opioid users who have no The EMCDDA currently monitors 28 new benzodiazepines.
tolerance to opioids. These include five reported for the first time in 2018.
Overall, more than 80 % (23) were detected for the first
Since late 2015, the EMCDDA has conducted eight time between 2014 and 2018 (Figure 7.9). The most
joint investigations with Europol on fentanyl derivatives frequently seized NPS benzodiazepine in 2017 was
that have caused serious concern at the European etizolam (Table 7.5).
level. The two agencies investigated acetylfentanyl
in 2015, acryloylfentanyl and furanylfentanyl in In 2017, close to 3 500 seizures of new benzodiazepines
2016, and 4-fluoroisobutyrylfentanyl (4F-iBF), were reported to the EU Early Warning System,
tetrahydrofuranylfentanyl (THF-F), carfentanil representing around 5 % of the total number of seizures
(see box ‘Carfentanil in Europe’), methoxyacetylfentanyl reported during the year. Most of these were of tablets,
and cyclopropylfentanyl during 2017. Together, these amounting to more than 2.4 million units, which represents
substances have been involved in more than 250 deaths, an increase from around 0.5 million tablets reported
many of which were attributed directly to these substances. in 2016. This increase is due to a single large seizure
Subsequently, seven of these substances were formally risk of 1.67 million tablets in Scotland, United Kingdom
assessed by the EMCDDA. (see box ‘Production of fake diazepam tablets from
Carfentanil in Europe Figure 7.9

Number of new benzodiazepines notified for the first
time in the EU, Norway and Turkey, 2007-18
Carfentanil is one of the most potent known opioids.
It was first detected in Europe in 2012, and its
availability sharply increased during 2016 and
2017. This appeared to have been driven by its bulk 2 4 5 6
3 5
1 0 0 0 1 1
manufacture in China (where it was not controlled
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2018
at the time) and its sale on darknet markets. In 2017
alone, over 300 seizures of carfentanil were reported.
These seizures amounted to just over 4 kg of powder
and 250 ml of liquid. Unknown to users, the drug Table 7.5
The most seized new benzodiazepines reported in the
was being mixed with heroin, which led to a spike in
EU, Norway and Turkey, numbers and quantities, 2017
deaths. By mid-2017, 61 deaths involving carfentanil
had been reported. The substance was formally risk Benzodiazepines Seizures Powder Tablets
(kg)
assessed by the EMCDDA during 2017. Carfentanil
Etizolam 1 634 25.06 2 218 797
was controlled internationally in 2018.
Clonazolam/clonitrazolam 741 0.03 48 037
Norfludiazepam 365 0.25 28 234
Diclazepam 274 1.09 17 960
Phenazepam 102 0.05 13 757
187
etizolam, Scotland, UK, 2017’). In addition, around 27 kg of Among young adults (aged 15-34), in the most recent
powders, 1.4 litres of liquids and 2 400 blotters containing findings, last year prevalence of use of these substances
new benzodiazepines were also seized in 2017. ranged from 0.1 % in Norway to 3.2 % in the Netherlands,
with 4-fluoroamphetamine (4-FA) being the most
commonly used. Survey data on the use of mephedrone
(now an internationally controlled drug) are available for
the United Kingdom (England and Wales). In the most
Use of new psychoactive recent survey (2017), last year use of this drug among
substances 16- to 34-year-olds was estimated at 0.2 %, down from
1.1 % in 2014/15. In their most recent surveys, last year
estimates of the use of synthetic cannabinoids among
The use of NPS in the general population tends to be at 15- to 34-year-olds ranged from 0.1 % in the Netherlands
a lower level than that of established controlled drugs. to 1.5 % in Latvia. While consumption levels of NPS are
There are some important exceptions to this, such as low overall in Europe, in a 2016 EMCDDA study, over two
ketamine, which has become an established drug in some thirds of countries reported that their use by high-risk drug
places. In addition, the use of some types of NPS, such users resulted in health concerns. In particular, the use
as stimulants, synthetic cannabinoids and opioids, may of synthetic cathinones by opioid and stimulant injectors
be relatively common in high-risk drug users and other has been linked to health and social problems. In addition,
marginalised groups in some areas. Despite what appear the smoking of synthetic cannabinoids in marginalised
to be relatively low levels of use, some of these substances populations, including homeless people and prisoners,
may cause high levels of harm. Adding to the complexity has been identified as a problem in a number of European
is that NPS are also used by dealers as replacements for countries. Overall, few people currently enter treatment in
established drugs such as MDMA, amphetamine, cocaine, Europe for problems associated with use of NPS. For some
benzodiazepines and heroin, when they are in short supply. countries, however, these substances are significant. In
In these cases, people may be unaware that they are using the most recent data, the use of synthetic cannabinoids
an NPS. was reported as the main reason for entering specialised
drug treatment for 19 % of clients in Turkey and for 5.5 % in
Since 2011, more than half of the countries reporting Hungary. Problems related to the primary use of synthetic
to the EMCDDA have national estimates of the use of cathinones were cited by 0.2 % of treatment entrants in
NPS (not including ketamine and GHB) in their general the United Kingdom. All three countries, however, have
population surveys, although differences in methods and reported a recent decrease in treatment entries related to
survey questions limit comparability between countries. NPS in the most recent data.
Production of fake diazepam tablets from etizolam, Scotland, UK, 2017
In Scotland, criminal groups are known to be involved

in the large-scale illicit manufacture and distribution
of fake benzodiazepine medicines. Typically made
to look like 10 mg diazepam tablets, and known as
‘street valium’, these fakes often contain new or
uncontrolled benzodiazepines. During 2016 and
2017, one such benzodiazepine, etizolam, was
reported to have become the predominant substance
within the illicit market for benzodiazepines; 65 % of
tablets found contained it.
During 2017, police seized 1.67 million tablets

containing etizolam at one such production site.
Their estimated street value was EUR 1.9 million.
Photo: Police Scotland
The etizolam was sourced as a bulk powder from
China, diluted, mixed with blue dye and then pressed
meaning that the amount of active ingredient needed
into tablets using an industrial tablet press. The
to produce the number of tablets seized at the time of
dose of etizolam in each tablet was around 0.8 mg,
the police raid was less than 1.5 kg.
188
III
PART III
Responding to drug markets

In Part III we look at the policy, structural, strategic
and operational responses to all these different
aspects of drug markets, mainly at the European
level, but also at the national level. Rather than
attempt to present a comprehensive library
of responses, this part provides a selection of
examples that illustrate the variety of measures
employed to directly target the illicit drug supply
chain as well as those that tackle drug market
ramifications and drivers. An important feature of
the EU drugs strategy is the link between supply
and demand interventions. The latter are reviewed in
other EMCDDA reports such as the European Drug
Report and ‘Health and social responses to drug
problems: a European guide’.
CHAPTER 8
CHAPTER 9
Targeting operational responses to drug
markets and associated criminality
Photo: istockphoto
193
CHAPTER 8
EU drug supply reduction policy Figure 8.1

Drug supply reduction strategies linked to the EU
Drug supply reduction is part of several policy areas at the policy context
EU level and a core component of the drug strategies and International European
responses of Member States. This chapter looks at the
main EU policies and strategies addressing drug supply
reduction, the supporting institutional arrangements and
some key policy tools.
Regional
EU drug policy context Other relevant EU strategies
A Global Strategy for the European
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy
The production, trafficking, distribution and use of illicit
European Agenda on Security
drugs create a range of security and public health (2015-20)
challenges, spanning many levels and areas of public
National European Agenda on Migration
policy. The illicit drug trade has a global impact and the (2015-20)
harms it gives rise to know no boundaries. Responding
European Maritime Security Strategy
to the trade in illicit drugs requires an equally extensive and Action Plan
approach, and the EU’s drug policy reflects this reality. EU Strategy and Action
It has been designed to be coherent with drug policy at
Plan for Customs Risk Management
various levels. These include the international level, through
the United Nations and regional organisations such as the
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, as well trafficking, dismantling the OCGs involved, utilising the
as complementing the policies of the EU Member States criminal justice system and intelligence-led policing, and
at the national level (Figure 8.1). At the same time, EU drug targeting large-scale cross-border organised drug-related
policy is situated within and connects to other areas of crime (Council of the European Union, 2012, 2017).
EU policy where drug market-related issues arise. In this
way, the EU has developed an integrated, balanced and To ensure a high level of internal security and protection
evidence-based approach to drug policy. against organised crime, terrorism and cybercrime, the
EU has put in place a range of legal, practical and support
The EU drugs strategy (2013-20) and action plan on drugs tools, notably the European Agenda on Security (European
(2017-20) (16) are key components of the framework for Commission, 2015). The European Agenda on Security
responding to illicit drugs. Drug supply reduction is one is a shared agenda, between Member States and EU
of the core elements in them. These strategic documents institutions, and serves as the basis for cooperation and
elaborate a set of measures developed with the Member joint action by the EU. It highlights a number of actions
States to target the health and security issues raised and instruments, including but not limited to the Schengen
by the illicit drug trade. One of the strategy’s objectives Information System, the European Criminal Records
is to reduce the availability of illicit drugs by disrupting Information System and the EU Passenger Name Record
(PNR) system for airline passengers. Some of them are
(16) The EU drugs strategy (2013-20) and action plan on drugs (2017-20) are elaborated on in this part of the report.
going to be evaluated by the European Commission in 2019/20.
194
CHAPTER 8 Policy instruments and structures
I
identifies a number of key priorities, which, in Europol’s

The policy cycle view, require the greatest concerted action by Member
States and other actors to ensure the most effective
The EU policy cycle for organised and serious international impact. The SOCTA 2017 is the outcome of the work of
crime (the policy cycle) is an important strategic approach many contributors from law enforcement authorities in
that ensures effective cooperation between national the Member States and in countries with strategic and
law enforcement agencies, EU institutions, EU agencies operational agreements with Europol, institutional partners
and other relevant partners in the fight against serious in the EU and Europol. The EU Council of Justice and
and organised crime. It calls for robust action to target Home Affairs Ministers uses these recommendations to
the most pressing criminal threats facing the EU. There define its priorities for the next four years. For each of
are four phases in the policy cycle that facilitate the the priorities, an ad hoc expert group drafts a four-year
implementation of policy objectives in law enforcement multiannual strategic plan (MASP) under the coordination
responses: (1) policy development, (2) priority setting, of the Commission, setting out the strategy to achieve
(3) implementation and monitoring, and (4) evaluation a multidisciplinary, integrated approach to address the
of the current policy cycle and definition of the next one prioritised threats of crime, and defining key performance
(Figure 8.2). indicators. The MASP contains a list of objectives (‘strategic
goals’) that should be achieved during the cycle. These
The starting point of this EU policy cycle is the SOCTA, MASPs are approved by the Standing Committee on
by which Europol delivers a set of recommendations Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI).
based on an in-depth analysis of the major crime threats
facing the EU (Europol, 2017b). The SOCTA is the most Representatives of the Member States, and of the EU
comprehensive criminal intelligence picture in the EU. institutions and agencies, convert each MASP into an
Informed by its analysis of the prevailing threat, the SOCTA annual operational action plan (OAP) for each priority and
Figure 8.2
The policy cycle on organised and serious international crime
1
Policy
s development
tion EU SOCTA Pr
da io
en
rit
m
ies
om
ion · Continu
lect ou
Rec
l s
co
co
us
lle
ion · Continuo
4 2
ctio
n · Cont
Evaluation
Policy setting
Review and
MASP
assessment
i
ect
nuou
ll
co
co s
lle ou
ctio
n · Continu
ls
Ac
oa
io G
t
ns
Implementation
and monitoring
OAP
3
Note: MASP, multiannual strategic plan; OAP, operational action plan; SOCTA, Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment.
195
Figure 8.3 and terrorist financing, migrant smuggling — including

Ten EU crime priorities, 2018-21 exploitation of vulnerable migrants — and trafficking in
human beings. This builds synergies between drug policy and
Cybercrime other areas to develop work across crime priorities.
Document Drug
fraud trafficking
Criminal
Facilitation EU structures developing and
of illegal
finances immigration supporting drug policy
into the EU
10 EU crime
priorities
2018-21 Organised Drug markets are complex and have a multifaceted impact
theft on society. Several EU institutions, bodies, other structures
and
Environmental
burglary and the Member States play various roles in designing and
crime
implementing different aspects of the EU’s drug policy
(Figure 8.4).
Firearms Trafficking in
human beings
Excise and
missing trader
intra-community fraud EU institutions
Source: Council of the European Union (2018a). Alongside the Member States, several EU institutions (17)
are tasked with designing and implementing different
aspects of the EU’s drug policy through the different
year. These OAPs detail the actions for each strategic goal. priorities and actions set out in strategic planning
The OAPs are approved by COSI. Relevant Member States, documents.
EU institutions and agencies, and third partners, using the
EMPACT framework, then develop their joint activities as The EU institutions have different roles with respect to
outlined in the OAPs. policy-making and implementation, and establishing any
necessary legislation to implement policies. The European
Ten crime priorities were set for the period 2018-21 Parliament’s functions include passing laws, approving the
(Figure 8.3), one of which addresses drug trafficking with EU budget and discussing EU policies. Drug issues arise in
a focus on (1) disrupting the activities of OCGs involved in different areas of the Parliament’s work when, for example,
the wholesale trafficking of cannabis, cocaine and heroin it considers internal security matters or relations with
to the EU, (2) tackling the criminal networks involved in the non-EU countries (third countries).
trafficking and distribution of multiple types of drugs on EU
markets and (3) reducing the production of synthetic drugs The Council of the EU (the Council) adopts legislation
and NPS in the EU and dismantling OCGs involved in their in conjunction with the European Parliament, plays
production, trafficking and distribution. a policy coordination role for the Member States, devises
the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, signs off
In addition, many of the other 2018-21 crime priorities have on agreements between the EU and third countries,
connections to the illicit drugs area. Europol’s 2017 SOCTA and adopts the EU’s annual budget (Council of the
showed that, while illicit drugs represent the most valuable European Union, 2019b). The Council also has a number
market for criminals, with more than one third of the 5 000 of committees and working groups that are involved in
OCGs reported in the SOCTA involved in it, many OCGs drug policy implementation, in particular COSI and the
engage in polycriminality. Of those engaged in illicit drug Horizontal Working Party on Drugs (HDG). COSI plays
trafficking, 75 % traffic more than one type of drug, and 65 % a leading role in defining, implementing, monitoring and
of those engaged in the drug trade are also involved in other evaluating EU activities in the policy cycle (Council of the
criminal activities, such as the trade in counterfeit goods, European Union, 2010). The HDG plays a central role in the
migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. As development of EU drug strategies and action plans, and its
discussed in Part I of this report, these different crimes utilise
common techniques, technologies and trafficking routes.
Action 48 of the EU action plan on drugs (2017-20) seeks to (17) These include the European Parliament, the European Council, the
Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the Court
enhance analysis and information sharing on drug trafficking of Justice of the European Union.
196
I
Figure 8.4
Main EU structures addressing drug supply issues
Policy-making Legislative Policy support,
processes processes coordination and
implementation
EU institutions and bodies
European Council
European Parliament
Council of the EU
European Commission
EEAS
Council working groups

HDG
CCWP
CATS
COSI
EU agencies
EMCDDA
Europol
Eurojust
Frontex
CEPOL
Member States
Note: CATS, Coordinating Committee in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters; CCWP, Customs Cooperation Working Party; COSI, Standing
Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security; CEPOL, European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training; Frontex, European Border and Coast
Guard Agency (established in 2016, built on the existing structures of Frontex); EEAS, European External Action Service; HDG, Horizontal Working Party on Drugs.
remit covers all areas of drug demand reduction and drug the implementation of EU laws designed to prevent the
supply reduction (Council of the European Union, 1999). diversion of chemical precursors for illicit drug production.
Other Council working groups also play an important role in It also promotes European cooperation in addressing drug
drug policy, for example the Customs Cooperation Working problems through the provision of financial assistance and
Party (CCWP), the Working Party on Customs Union and cooperation programmes.
the Coordinating Committee in the area of police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters (CATS). The EU is actively engaged in ongoing political dialogues
with third countries in its immediate geographical
The European Commission proposes new legislation, neighbourhood and other parts of the world through EU
conducts evaluations and is responsible for ensuring delegations and the European External Action Service
that Member States correctly implement EU laws (EEAS). This process involves working with other regions
(European Commission, 2019a). Alongside drafting the and countries to achieve common goals, such as
EU’s annual budget and overseeing how funds are used, strengthening democracy and the rule of law, supporting
it undertakes international negotiations on behalf of the trade, and promoting sustainable and alternative
EU. Because of their cross-cutting nature, drug supply development. Drug issues often feature in these dialogues
reduction issues arise in a number of different areas of and various EU-level policy documents, including drug-
its work, including DG Migration and Home Affairs, DG specific and broader strategies, cooperation programmes
Justice and Consumers, DG Health and Food Safety, DG worldwide, and political declarations and agreements.
Taxation and Customs Union, DG Internal Market, Industry, The approach taken in these documents reflects the
Entrepreneurship and SMEs and the European Anti-Fraud principles and objectives of EU drug policy set out in the
Office. The Commission addresses all aspects of drug EU drugs strategy (2013-20) and other key documents
control policy, including the reduction of drug use and the addressing drug problems. Action 38 of the action plan on
prevention of drug-related crime and drug trafficking. It drugs (2017-20) seeks to reinforce and conduct dialogue
proposes measures for the control of NPS and ensures with partners globally (Figure 8.5).
197
Figure 8.5 Q cooperation and coordination

EU engagements on drugs with key partners Q threat and risk assessment and analysis
Q specialised technical services
Q training
Q operational actions
European
Neighbourhood United States
Policy
countries Understanding vulnerabilities in the economic,
administrative and logistical infrastructure of the EU and
Acceding countries, the dangers presented by OCGs exploiting them is a key
candidate countries
Russia
and potential drug policy issue. Several agencies address this policy
candidate countries
EU engagement concern through their work. This includes the analytical,
with partners on threat and risk assessments undertaken by the EMCDDA,
illicit drugs
Other countries
Afghanistan and
Europol and Frontex. These assessments consider issues
depending on national
Pakistan ranging from the challenges arising from NPS, cybercrime
and international
developments
and terrorism to illegal border crossings and migratory
Africa and Latin flows (Figure 8.6).
in particular America and
West Africa the Caribbean
(CELAC)
Responding to the cross-border multijurisdiction reality
of organised crimes such as drug production and
trafficking requires the involvement of several EU Member
States. Therefore, all of the EU agencies are involved in
coordinating networks and facilitating tasks that support
The EU’s approach on cooperation with third countries on actions against drug production and trafficking. In addition,
drugs focuses on specific drug-trafficking routes, involving several agencies are actively involved in operational
producer, transit and consumer markets. The EU conducts measures and judicial response. Europol and Frontex take
regular experts’ Dialogues on Drugs with Latin America and part in various operations with the Member States. This
the Caribbean (CELAC), Central Asia, Eastern Partnership includes initiatives such as joint action days implemented
countries, Russia, the US and the Western Balkans. to target the 10 crime priorities of the policy cycle. In
addition, Eurojust facilitates judicial cooperation by
The EU has also agreed on action plans which addressed organising coordination meetings and coordination centres
drugs with a number of countries/regions and funds and for joint actions and assists the Member States in the use
provides assistance for a wide range of major drugs- of mutual legal assistance and mutual recognition tools
related cooperation programmes in third countries, such as the European Arrest Warrant and the European
through EU bilateral, sub-regional or regional cooperation Investigation Order. Both Eurojust and Europol assist
programmes: for example in Latin America, the Caribbean
and West Africa along the cocaine-trafficking route, and in
Afghanistan and Central Asia along the heroin route.
Figure 8.6
The EU closely cooperates with other international EU agencies’ analytical, threat and risk assessments
organisations working in the field, among others the UN:
for example UNODC, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs
(CND), INCB, UNAIDS and the WHO.
EU agencies
Several EU agencies assist the European Commission

and the Member States in implementing EU drug
policy (Figure 8.4). These agencies provide support to
the drug policy process through aspects of their work
encompassing:
Q development of policy-relevant information systems,

networks and centres
198
I
the Member States in the establishment and funding Europol supports and strengthens Member States’ actions
of joint investigation teams (JITs). Member States can and their cooperation in preventing and combating serious
also receive assistance from Eurojust and Europol for crime. Europol works with EU Member States through
planning operational work such as the controlled delivery Europol national units and provides a range of services,
of shipments of illicit drugs and money-laundering cases. including the collection, storage, processing, analysis and
Eurojust can also ask Member States to investigate or exchange of information, including criminal intelligence,
prosecute a crime, to coordinate their work and to establish forensic and technical support, networking and cooperation
a JIT. Eurojust works closely with the European Judicial with Member States, third countries and international
Network and Europol (Eurojust, 2019; Europol, 2019c; organisations, and provides a source of law enforcement
Frontex, 2019). expertise and training. This allows Europol to provide
operational support throughout the EU and beyond. It
When facilities for the production of illicit drugs are operates the Europol Analysis System, which contains
detected, a range of specialised supports can be needed analysis projects on key crime areas, and runs the Europol
to process evidence and make the locations hazard-free. Criminal Assets Bureau and the Europol Cybercrime
Europol assists Member States by providing services in Centre. Europol provides secretariat services for the
this area. These include technical and forensic expertise, Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network. It facilitates
on-the-spot support including dismantling of laboratories action under the EU policy cycle through its specialised
or cultivation sites, and technical and comparison reports information services, and supports EMPACT, through which
on chemicals and equipment seized in illicit synthetic coordinated operational actions are implemented (Europol,
drug production/storage locations and waste dump sites 2019c).
(Europol, 2019b).
Frontex develops and operates information systems
The timely provision of strategic information and analysis enabling the exchange of information, including the
is a critical component of the policy and operational European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) and
processes in the drugs area. In order to operate a system provision of Eurosur Fusion services. Joint operations
that yields information effectively, EU agencies run various coordinated by Frontex have a multipurpose character,
information systems, networks and centres (Figure 8.7). and in addition to tackling irregular migration they aim to
The EMCDDA works with its network of Reitox national prevent and counteract cross-border crime, including drug
focal points to monitor and provide factual, objective, trafficking. eu-LISA is the European Union Agency for the
reliable and comparable information and analysis on the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in
drugs phenomenon in Europe. This includes information the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. This includes
about drug law offences, drug seizures, drug purity and security and border information systems such as the
potency, and retail prices for drugs. Schengen Information System (SIS II), the Visa Information
System (VIS) operational in Schengen countries, and the
Eurodac asylum fingerprint database. These systems can
Figure 8.7 be consulted by national police, customs and border guard
Examples of information systems, networks and agencies to assist their operational work (eu-LISA, 2019;
centres operated by EU agencies Frontex, 2019).
Allowing the information and knowledge accumulated from

EMCDDA
Reitox operational actions to flow into the work of training Member
network European
Europol Serious European States’ police and other personnel is critical for keeping
Organised Judicial
Information
System Crime Network responses up to date. A number of EU agencies facilitate
Centre
this by developing training materials and providing various
European
Cybercrime courses. The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement
Centre
EU Early (EC3)
Training (CEPOL), also known as the European Police
Europol Frontex:
Warning National Eurosur College, helps build police cooperation across the EU.
System on Units
NPS CEPOL brings together law enforcement professionals to
eu-LISA: offer them opportunities to grow professionally through
SIS II
VIS
European training, learn to solve issues related to EU security and
criminal
Europol Eurodac establish networks of training institutes and professionals.
assets
Analysis bureau
System It provides a wide range of training courses relevant to
different aspects of drug supply reduction and security
activities. In cooperation with Europol and the EMCDDA,
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it provides training to national law enforcement officers Revised legislation to address the health and security
on a range of topics, influenced by the findings of the challenges presented by NPS was adopted in 2017.
previous EU drug markets reports. The joint CEPOL- It provides for early warning, risk assessment and control
EMCDDA training course ‘Drug crime and markets – measures and a streamlined reporting and assessment
strategic analysis’ has been organised annually since process. The chemicals required to produce illicit
2017 and it brings together law enforcement managers drugs have legitimate uses in many industries. Two EU
and prosecutors. The course aims to improve the use of regulations facilitate the control and monitoring of the trade
strategic analysis of drug markets for decision-making between EU Member States and between the EU and third
with the view to enhancing the impact of law enforcement countries, and seek to prevent diversion of these chemicals
responses on organised crime and consequently the to criminals (see box ‘Drug precursor control in the EU’).
security of EU citizens. The activity is certified by ISO
29993:2017 ‘Learning services outside formal education’.
Drug precursor control in the EU
Frontex develops training standards that facilitate the
development of common ground among EU Member States Drug precursors, chemicals needed to manufacture
that have different land, sea and air border agencies and illicit drugs, primarily have wide and varied legitimate
needs. It seeks to build capacity in the areas of educational uses such as in the production of plastics, medicinal
standards, European border guard team training, thematic products, cosmetics, detergents and scents. Because
training support, and training infrastructures and networks. many uses are legitimate, trade in drug precursors
eu-LISA supports Member States by providing technical cannot be prohibited. Instead, licit trade in them
training for personnel who operate the security and border needs to be monitored to ensure they are not diverted
information systems SIS II, VIS and Eurodac (CEPOL, 2019; to illicit uses. Preventing the diversion of drug
eu-LISA, 2019; Europol, 2019c; Frontex, 2019). precursors can be an effective and efficient way of
limiting the supply of illicit drugs and is therefore an
important part of the EU drugs strategy.
The EU legislation on drug precursors implements Article

Key legislation 12 of the 1988 United Nations Convention against
the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
A comprehensive set of legal instruments has been by Substances by means of two basic regulations:
developed by the EU to address drug supply reduction
issues and respond to the rapidly developing illicit drug Q Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 on trade in drug
production and distribution systems highlighted earlier in precursors between EU and third countries,
the report. To effectively counter the threats this represents, amended by Regulation (EU) No 1259/2013;
the EU develops laws in a variety of areas that are related to Q Regulation (EC) No 273/2004, on trade in drug
drug trafficking (Figure 8.8 and Annex). precursors within the EU, amended by Regulation
(EU) No 1258/2013.
Figure 8.8 The amendments to both regulations in 2013

Principal areas of EU legislation linked to drug supply significantly strengthened powers to control the
reduction export of medicinal products containing ephedrine or
pseudoephedrine (precursors for methamphetamine),
Risk Judicial and and the use of acetic anhydride (precursor for heroin)
Drug assessment police
precursors and control of cooperation in in the EU and of so-called non-scheduled substances
NPS criminal
matters in illegal drug manufacture. It is also now possible to
react more quickly to new diversion trends and add
Cybercrime
Money Information Proceeds new chemicals to the lists of scheduled substances
laundering exchange of crime
through a fast-track procedure.
At the time of drafting the European Commission is

Trafficking Document
Firearms in human fraud carrying out an in-depth evaluation of the EU drug
beings
precursor regulations. This evaluation is expected to
be finalised by the end of 2019.
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Effective coordination and cooperation lie at the core under the PNR Directive. The system primarily supports
of responding to cross-border organised crimes such the prevention of terrorist offences and serious crime,
as drug trafficking. A number of legal instruments by making the data available in a timely fashion and
facilitate collaboration between EU Member States allowing the authorities to apply preset selection criteria
on multijurisdiction cases. These include mutual legal to flag up high-risk passengers. It also serves a role in the
assistance and mutual legal recognition tools such as JITs coordination of law enforcement activities by allowing
(see, for example, Case studies 12 and 13), the European overlapping requests to be observed. It is worth noting that
Evidence Warrant and the European Arrest Warrant. Legal private general aviation is not subject to the directive.
provision is also made for facilitating the processes that
underpin forensic and criminal investigations, such as Another example of legislative approaches to tackle
those into the movement of controlled drugs. The critical the tools that facilitate the activities of OCGs relates to
information flows that support operational measures document fraud. This activity is related to various smuggling
against drug trafficking are also provided for in EU laws. activities including drug trafficking, money laundering and
These includes Council decisions ensuring that EU trafficking in human beings. An EU regulation that simplifies
information exchange standards are no more constraining the authentication of identification documents addresses
than national ones, and provision for automated exchange this by facilitating cooperation between the Member States
of information such as DNA, fingerprints and vehicle through the Internal Market Information system. Firearms
registrations. can be traded as a commodity by OCGs and can be used
in violent crimes related to drug trafficking and other crime
Since OCGs may be involved in multiple forms of crime areas. The European Firearms Directive was recently
that utilise similar tools and techniques, legislation, such revised to make it more difficult to acquire and possess
as on firearms control, money laundering and document firearms, as well as addressing their trafficking (European
fraud, often addresses several criminal activities at the Parliament and the Council, 2017).
same time, including drug smuggling. For example, in
response to the threats posed by globalisation and the Tackling criminal finances is seen as a key way of
increased movement of people around the globe, which undermining the operations of OCGs, and a range of
facilitates both terrorism and other serious crime such as legislative tools have been put in place at both the EU and
drugs trafficking, as discussed in Chapter 2, the European national levels. These include EU legislation to facilitate
Parliament and the Council (2016) adopted a directive on coordinated action between Member States involved in
the use of PNR data (the PNR Directive). The PNR Directive cross-border money-laundering cases. Several pieces
obliges air carriers to send to Member States the PNR data of legislation allow national authorities to cooperate
they have collected in the normal course of their business. in targeting the proceeds of crime at all stages of their
These data include each passenger’s travel requirements movement (identification, tracking, freezing, seizing and
held in carriers’ reservation and departure control systems. confiscation) and to protect their financial systems.
The collection and processing of PNR data are an important
law enforcement tool. At the same time, the use of PNR The EU Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Directive was
data for law enforcement purposes involves the processing adopted in 1990 in order to prevent the misuse of the
of personal data, which raises important issues with financial system for the purpose of money laundering.
respect to the fundamental rights to the protection of It has been continuously updated, most recently
private life and to the protection of personal data. with the Fifth AML Directive, adopted in April 2018,
partly as a response to the Panama Papers leaks. This
Each Member State is required to establish/designate includes, among other measures, close regulation of
a special entity (Passenger Information Unit) to collect, cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin, to prevent them from
store and process the PNR data received from air carriers. being used for money laundering and financing of terrorism
At the time of writing, a first cluster of nine Member (European Parliament and the Council, 2018).
States are at an advanced stage of the implementation
process (Council of the European Union, 2018b; European EU-wide initiatives are backed up by a variety of policy
Commission, 2018b). For example, in Finland, the PNR tools at the national level. One example of these is the
Directive has led to the development of the Passenger Data Unexplained Wealth Order (UWO). This was introduced by
System, a technical tool for the collection of passenger the United Kingdom in the Criminal Finances Act 2017,
information. It is used by the police, customs and border and came into force at the end of January 2018. It is a civil
guard in the management of their statutory duties and investigative power aimed at strengthening the United
provides a one-stop shop for all information collected
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Kingdom’s AML and asset recovery regime (Sproat, 2018). must submit to alert law enforcement agencies of any
A UWO can be applied for if three criteria are met: unusual financial transactions that might be consistent
with money laundering or other criminal activity (Europol,
1. there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person 2017a). Suspicious transaction reports must be submitted
has been involved in serious crime; to the country’s financial intelligence unit (FIU), the
2. there is reasonable cause to believe that the person state authority tasked with the ‘receipt, analysis and
owns property with a value greater than GBP 50 000; transmitting of reports of suspicions identified and filed
3. there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the by the private sector’ (Council of Europe, n.d.). FIUs form
known sources of the respondent’s lawfully obtained the backbone of the AML framework set out in the AML
income would have been insufficient for the purposes Directive.
of enabling the respondent to obtain the property.
Since money laundering can be a cross-border enterprise,
If granted, the UWO requires the recipient to disclose international cooperation among FIUs is vital (European
their interest in the identified property and to explain its Commission, n.d.). The sharing of suspicious transaction
funding. If the recipient fails to respond by the deadline reports and other intelligence is facilitated through an
or the answer to the UWO is unsatisfactory, the money online network hosted at Europol, FIU.net (Europol, n.d.).
is presumed to have been acquired illegally and the FIU.net became operational in 2012 as a decentralised
information can be used to apply for a civil recovery order. intelligence-sharing network for FIUs. In 2016 it was
incorporated into Europol, enabling the intelligence
It is hoped that UWOs will bolster AML efforts, as it shared to be combined with other Europol products and
represents a shifting of the burden of proof away from the services.
authorities, who previously had to prove that the money
used to purchase a property was acquired illegally before In 2016, Ireland made amendments to asset recovery
asset recovery procedures could be initiated. A UWO places legislation, including lowering the threshold value of an
the responsibility on the recipient to demonstrate that asset that can be seized from EUR 13 000 to EUR 5 000.
the money used to fund the purchase of the property was This change allows the Criminal Assets Bureau, in certain
obtained legally (see Case study 27). circumstances, to seize an asset worth EUR 5 000 or more
without court order, for an initial period of 24 hours. The
The legislation used to combat cybercrime is also relevant period can be extended to 21 days. In the first two years
to targeting the proceeds of crime. Proposed legislation after the change, the power was invoked 10 times —
in this area includes the European Production and typically related to the seizure of vehicles, although
Preservation Order for electronic evidence. cryptocurrency has also been seized (English, 2018).
Suspicious transaction reports, also called suspicious

activity reports, are reports that financial institutions
CASE STUDY 27
First UK Unexplained Wealth Order issued

A politician from central Asia with Agency was granted the power to The new measures were introduced
a multimillion-pound property portfolio enforce a UWO worth GBP 22 million in response to the mounting evidence
became the first person in the United (EUR 25 million) and freeze the assets that British properties are being used
Kingdom to be subject to a UWO as of the owner. The order related to two as vehicles to launder illicit foreign
authorities attempted to stop the properties, one in London and one in money.
flow of dirty money through London. the south-east of England.
In early 2018, the National Crime Source: Busby (2018).
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Figure 8.9
Financial instruments Measures supported by the Council Conclusions on
alternative development
As part of its comprehensive drug supply reduction
approach, the EU finances a wide range of activities
within and outside the EU. Financial instruments with
a broad focus are used to implement the drug supply Rural Poverty
development alleviation
reduction, international cooperation and other objectives
of the EU drugs strategy (2013-20) and action plan on
drugs (2017-20) (Table 8.1). These instruments fall into
International Combined
four categories: framework programmes (e.g. the Internal human rights efforts of the EU Access to
obligations and alternative land and
Security Fund), programmes for EU candidate and potential commitment to land rights
gender equality development
candidate countries (e.g. Instrument for Pre-accession
approach
Assistance II), geographical or regional programmes
(e.g. European Neighbourhood Policy), and thematic
programmes that complement geographical ones (e.g. Rule of law, Environmental
security and good protection and
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace). The tools governance climate change
are funded through the EU budget and in cooperation with
consortiums of Member States and international partners.
Both the EU drugs strategy (2013-20) and action plan on

drugs (2017-20) emphasise the importance of alternative
development (see Chapter 1, section on impact on European Union and Community of Latin American and
development and governance) for countries affected by Caribbean States Action Plan and supporting declarations.
the production and trafficking of drugs. In supporting the The EU also contributes to action against the production
implementation of this approach, the Council Conclusions and trafficking of drugs through its financial support for the
on alternative development (Council of the European UNODC, provided by the European Commission. The EU
Union, 2019a) propose a range of measures in combination funds major drug-related projects and programmes in third
to address the underlying conditions that facilitate illicit countries, through EU bilateral, sub-regional or regional
drug economies (see Figure 8.9). The Council has called on cooperation programmes and closely cooperates with other
the EU Member States and the EU institutions to continue international organisations working in the field, including
to engage with affected countries and international the UNODC.
partners to address the cultivation of illicit crops and
other related challenges. In this way, the Council seeks to
support the EU’s contribution to implementing the outcome Table 8.1
document of the United Nations General Assembly Special EU financial instruments supporting drug supply
Session on the world drug problem, and the United Nations reduction
Sustainable Development Goals (Council of the European EU internal action EU external action
Union, 2019a). Internal Security Fund (ISF) Instrument contributing to
Stability and Peace (IcSP)
Various financing tools and programmes are used by ISF Borders and Visa Instrument for Pre-accession
the EU to translate these policy objectives into concrete Assistance (IPA) II
actions (see Table 8.1). For example, the European ISF Police European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP)
Commission and the EEAS operate funding instruments European Neighbourhood
that finance projects in different countries. This includes Instrument (ENI)
the EU’s involvement in helping Afghanistan recover TAIEX (Technical Assistance
and Information Exchange)
from conflict through the provision of financial support
The Justice Programme Development and Cooperation
through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). Instrument (DCI)
Similarly, the EU supports alternative development
The EU Health Programme European Development Fund
in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, where most cocaine is (EDF)
produced, and in Latin America generally, through the Horizon 2020 European Instrument for
Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR)
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Partners, platforms and MAOC (N) is an operational platform established by and

programmes consisting of seven Member States of the EU (France,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands) with
financial support from the Internal Security Fund of the
Countering the chain of negative effects arising from EU, to provide the basis for engagement in multilateral
drug production and trafficking around the world requires cooperation to suppress illicit drug trafficking by sea and
targeted responses where different aspects of these by air. Along with its own staff, the headquarters in Lisbon
problems are present. To achieve the external aspects of its are operated by country liaison officers (CLOs) representing
drug and security polices, the EU cooperates with a range the police, customs, military and maritime authorities of
of partner organisations working at the international, the participating Member States, as well as by permanent
regional and national levels. Several operational observers from the United States through the US Drug
coordination platforms support interdiction activities, and Enforcement Administration’s Lisbon Country Office and
other programmes facilitate cooperation with partners the Joint Interagency Task Force — South.
(Figure 8.10).
The European Commission, several EU agencies (including
EMPACT and the Maritime Analysis and Operations the EMCDDA, Europol and Frontex) and UNODC are all
Centre — Narcotics (MAOC (N)) are both key platforms observers of MAOC (N). From its inception in 2007 to
for coordinating interdiction operations between EU May 2019, MAOC (N) supported the coordination and
Member States and international partners. Through these seizure of over 173 tonnes of cocaine and over 445 tonnes
mechanisms, shipments of illicit drugs and the complex of cannabis (MAOC-N, 2019). In addition, a range of
multijurisdiction crimes that enable the operation of drug programmes have been established to counter the efforts
trafficking and drug markets can be targeted. of OCGs seeking to exploit vulnerabilities in the logistics,
border and customs infrastructure of various countries,
and areas where conflicts and other challenges enable
Figure 8.10
Cooperation programmes
EU DCI Synthetics
Indicative funding Monitoring: Analysis,
UNODC WCO programme for OECD Reporting and Trends
Afghanistan 2014-20 Programme
Border
Paris Pact Management
INCB Initiative OSCE Programme in CADAP
Central Asia
European
Cocaine Container
Pompidou Multi-disciplinary
route Control MAOC (N)
Group Platform Against
programme Programme
EU CELAC EU Enhancing
action plan Liaison
COPOLAD EU ACT Africa’s Response to
and Transnational
declarations network
Organised Crime
Note: EU-ACT, EU Action against Drugs and Organised Crime; CADAP, Central Asian Drug Action Programme COPOLAD, Cooperation Programme between Latin
America, the Caribbean and the European Union on Drugs Policies; EU DCI, Development Cooperation Instrument; OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development; OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; WCO, World Customs Organization.
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I
drug production and trafficking. Much of this work involves Monitoring drug markets
capacity building and better coordination of actions. Both
the cocaine route programme and EU ACT (EU Action To target responses, it is important to collect monitoring
against Drugs and Organised Crime; formerly the heroin data to improve our understanding of the illicit drug
route programme) seek to disrupt key shipment channels markets and how they and the criminals involved in them
by strengthening various aspects of the airports, seaports, operate. It is also necessary for monitoring the impact
land border-crossing points and routes that OCGs can of these responses. For that purpose, the European
target. The Border Management Programme in Central Asia Commission has established an expert group on policy
continues this cascade approach to capacity building and needs for data on crime (in DG Home) and a working group
focus on enhancing the national-level barriers to trafficking on statistics on crime and criminal justice (in Eurostat).
illicit drugs along the Balkan route. In the Paris Pact
Initiative, the EU works with over 70 international partners The EMCDDA operates a number of key indicators of drug
on a capacity-building programme to stop the international markets and law enforcement activities, which have been
heroin trade. Enhancing the capacity of national authorities used throughout this report: drug seizures, drug prices
that address drug supply reduction is a key objective of and purity, and drug law offences. In recent years these
the Cooperation Programme between Latin America, the have been revised and improved, and new ones have been
Caribbean and the European Union on Drugs Policies. added, to create a more comprehensive suite of monitoring
tools and data sources — to inform three linked thematic
The EU is also involved in building monitoring capacity areas: drug markets, drivers and facilitators; drug-related
through work coordinated by the UNODC to address the crime, harms and other consequences; and drug supply
international problems of synthetic drugs through the reduction and responses. Additions to the core monitoring
Global SMART (Synthetics Monitoring: Analyses, Reporting data include information on production and estimates
and Trends) Programme. The EMCDDA, which operates the of market size (EMCDDA, 2017d) (Figure 8.11). New
EU Early Warning System on new psychoactive substances analytical tools are being developed, such as the drug
(see Chapter 9), is the single largest contributor to affordability measure for comparative cross-border market
the UNODC Early Warning Advisory system on new analysis (Groshkova et al., 2018).
psychoactive substances. Under the EU’s Pan-African
Programme, the project Enhancing Africa’s Response to In addition, a range of new information sources are being
Transnational Organised Crime (ENACT) aims to strengthen explored and tested. Examples of these include wastewater
the assessment of and responses to crimes such as drug data, the use of open source information to collect
trafficking. The project supports the development of threat information on drug seizures and the monitoring of drug
assessments that are based on indexes of the presence of sales on darknet markets, which are described below.
organised crime, the risk it presents and a country’s ability
to respond. This project complements the approach of the
EU policy. ENACT also reflects the aims of action 37 of the Wastewater data
EU action plan on drugs (2017-20), which seeks to support
third countries to address drug-related organised crime. Wastewater-based drug epidemiology involves sampling
a source of wastewater, such as a sewage influent to
In line with the action plan to enhance drug crime a wastewater treatment plant, and allows scientists to
investigations, Europol’s Serious and Organised Crime estimate the quantity of drugs consumed by a community
Centre supports the operational activities on selected (Zuccato et al., 2008). Although these data are primarily
high-value targets within the framework of the established used to infer drug consumption patterns in a given
operational task forces targeting OCGs involved in drug geographical location (EMCDDA, 2016b), they are
trafficking affecting two or more EU Member States and increasingly being used to indicate drug supply changes in
specified Western Balkan countries. a given region (EMCDDA, 2018c).
The Western Balkan region is a key transit region for drugs In recent years, new approaches in analytical chemistry,
and precursors flowing from and to the EU. This is reflected such as enantiomeric profiling (18), have been developed to
in Europol’s overall policy and operational framework with distinguish between drug loads in wastewater that result
regard to the Western Balkans, more specifically Albania,
Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is designed to
(18) Enantiomeric profiling is based on the fact that chiral molecules (if only
enhance operational cooperation with the countries in the one chiral centre is present) exist as two enantiomers (opposite forms),
which are non-superimposable mirror images of each other. As the
specified region in investigating serious and organised enantiomeric ratio will change after the substance passes through the
crime affecting two or more EU Member States. human metabolism, the enantiomeric fraction can be used to determine if
the studied drugs in wastewater originate from consumption.
205
Figure 8.11
The EMCDDA drug supply monitoring system
Core data Non-routine data sources
Quantitative
}
• Surface web
Drug seizures Open source information • Deep web — darknet markets
• Possession/use
• Europol drugs and NPS experts
Drug law offences • Supply • Retail • EMPACT: plant-based drugs, synthetic drugs and NPS
• Production • Middle • European Network of Forensic Science Institutions
• Wholesale Expert • Reference group on drug supply indicators
groups
Prices Purity • Reitox national focal points
• Legal correspondents
Purity-adjusted prices • Wastewater analysis

• Hospital emergencies
Complementary methods • Syringe residue analysis
}
• Drug checking services
Market size estimates • Web surveys
• Retail
Perceived availability • UNODC system
(population surveys)
Key periodical • Illicit crop monitoring (INCSR)
• Precursors-related data (European Commission,
analysis INCB, Europol)
• SOCTA (Europol)
Production
Individual subject experts
Qualitative • Studies: fieldwork, contracts

• Markets Ad hoc research (e.g. drug-related homicide)
• Published literature
• Crime
• Supply reduction
Thematic areas
Drug markets, drivers and facilitators
Drug-related crime, harms and other consequences
Drug supply reduction and responses
from consumption and those that result from the direct information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated
disposal of unused drugs (Emke et al., 2014). They provide in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for
new opportunities to acquire information on drug markets, the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence and
particularly concerning drug production. Wastewater data information requirement’ (Williams and Blum, 2018).
are also being used in some places to improve estimates Many law enforcement and security agencies use OSINT
of the market for some particular drug types, for example for the additional breadth and depth of information it
cocaine in the canton of Lausanne in Switzerland (Zobel yields, providing a more complete picture of activities,
et al., 2018) and in Australia (ACIC, 2019). However, there entities and individuals, which can reinforce and help
is insufficient geographical coverage for it to be used to validate contextual knowledge (Hobbs, 2014; Ramwell et
provide European estimates at present, and the use of some al., 2016; Tabatabaei and Wells, 2016). Openly available
drugs cannot yet be estimated using wastewater analysis. online information can complement routinely collected
data on drug seizures in Europe by addressing some of
their shortcomings, notably in timeliness, and by providing
Open source information additional context that enriches our understanding of drug
supply, for example by providing information on emerging
The concept of open source information is related to routes and concealment methods.
the intelligence discipline of open source intelligence
(OSINT). OSINT has been defined as ‘publicly available
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The EMCDDA, in collaboration with the European Darknet markets analysis and findings in this report are
Commission Joint Research Centre, applies the European informed by two principal data sources, both relying on
Media Monitoring tool (EMM, an automated multilingual ‘web crawlers’ that systematically gather and process
internet-monitoring system), for the purposes of identifying information from darknet markets, although there are some
large seizures of heroin and cocaine. In addition to the differences.
standard information sources, the system is also configured
to retrieve data from national and regional law enforcement 1. The analysis in Chapter 2 is based on the following
authorities across Europe. To target the monitoring, sets of data collected by crawlers from major darknet markets:
keywords are applied, defining two categories: large heroin vendors, drug listing description (including shipping
seizures and large cocaine seizures. Records containing origin), quantity, price, feedback left by buyers (and
the appropriate keywords are automatically identified its associated timestamp). These data are analysed
by the EMM categorisation system and placed into the to derive more complex metrics, such as the revenue
appropriate category. The records are manually screened generated and the associated sales volumes (see
for relevance, established on the basis of two criteria: Chapter 2). More extensive technical details are
(1) explicit connection to Europe (i.e. seizure performed available from Christin and Thomas (2019) and Soska
within or allegedly destined for Europe) and (2) seizure size and Christin (2015).
(100 kg) (EMCDDA, 2019g). 2. The analysis in Part II (Chapters 3-6) is informed by
a data source, originally developed for operational
purposes, which is currently being piloted by the
Darknet monitoring EMCDDA to support strategic analysis. Data are
collected from major darknet markets and currently
There are concerns that the distribution of illicit drugs and include drug listing description (including shipping
other commodities via darknet markets is increasing. This origin), quantity and price. Although the number
poses a number of challenges to responding to online- of listings (sales offers) has been used as a valid
facilitated drug distribution (EMCDDA and Europol, 2017). indicator of activity on darknet markets, it is not without
Systematic monitoring of and research into drug-related limitations. For example, whereas only unique sale
activity on these markets provides an opportunity to offers in the category ‘drugs and chemicals’ were
understand the scope and nature of the phenomenon. That extracted, it is not uncommon for an individual sale
can inform future policy and operational responses and offer to include two or more items (differing only in the
support interventions addressing the security and health- quantities advertised for sale). Each of these items
related threats stemming from the online supply of drugs was counted as a separate entity, therefore creating
and other illicit commodities. a possibility that the number of listings reported
was overestimated. In addition, caution is needed
Studies to date have illuminated darknet market activity in interpreting these data to gauge the number of
with varying degree of success. A number of different tools individual sellers offering different drugs on these
to collect and analyse data captured from these platforms markets or the number of transactions. Neither of these
have been developed along the way. Similarly, a wide range can be extrapolated from the number of listings alone.
of units of analysis has been applied, including listings
(sales offers), sales or vendors.
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Photo: Europol
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CHAPTER 9
Targeting operational responses
to drug markets and associated
criminality
As the production, trafficking, distribution and use of illicit international responses to drug-related criminality are
drugs continue to evolve, so too does the EU’s response aimed at disrupting drug markets and those OCGs and
to it. This chapter provides some examples of how key other criminals that sustain these markets.
problems associated with drug markets that have been
highlighted earlier in the report are being addressed at an
operational level. Europol’s bold response and Programme
Board
In December 2016, the European Commission published

a mid-term assessment of the EU drugs strategy 2013-20
Europol’s role in drug-related and a final evaluation of the drug action plan 2013-16.
operational activity A general conclusion was that law enforcement cooperation
appears to be improving but with no strong impact on the
problem. There are no signs of reduction in the supply of
Countering the production, trafficking and distribution drugs, seizures are not increasing and the number of drug-
of drugs is a key priority for the EU and Member States related offences is growing.
in the fight against serious and organised crime. As the
EU’s Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, Europol As a result, the Executive Director of Europol tasked its
supports the Member States with a wide range of services Serious and Organised Crime Centre with drawing up
and acts as the information hub for the exchange of ideas for how to significantly improve the strategic and
intelligence on serious and organised crime, cybercrime operational approach of the Member State community,
and terrorism in the EU. Europol and the EU policy cycle in this area. A team of
experts from various Europol directorates conducted
Europol supports drug investigations across the EU an assessment and produced the report ‘Toward a bold
working with a multitude of agencies in the Member States Europol response to drugs in Europe’, which contained
and non-EU partners such as law enforcement agencies a number of recommendations. The report was endorsed
in Australia, Canada, Colombia, the United States and by the Executive Director, who asked for a plan to be drawn
elsewhere. A dedicated team of analysts and specialists up for implementing the recommendations. A key role
support investigators in their investigations into cannabis, for the implementation process is expected to be played
cocaine, heroin, new psychoactive substances, synthetic by a Drugs Programme Board, in order to achieve the
drugs and other illicit drugs. Europol is the key intelligence- objectives of the whole exercise.
sharing platform for criminal intelligence at the European
level and its sophisticated databases regularly deliver vital Europol is increasingly called upon by Member States to
leads to support drug investigations in the Member States. provide operational support in complex high-profile and
polycriminal investigations, which are resource-intensive
In addition to the regular support delivered to the Member and require specialised skills in a number of domains. This
States by Europol in drug investigations, a number of includes tactical, technical and financial support provided
operational activities and innovations highlight how joint both from headquarters and on the spot.
210
CHAPTER 9 Targeting operational responses to drug markets and associated criminality
I
Operational task force and high-value that use financial intelligence to understand how terrorist
target mechanism networks operate (Keatinge et al., 2018).
In 2018, as a response to the increasing demand for such To that end, a number of measures have been developed.
operational services, Europol in cooperation with Member In 2004, the EU leaders adopted a declaration on
States developed a standardised high-value target (HVT) combating terrorism. As part of the measures set out in
and operational task force concept, which is now applied the declaration, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator
to assist complex investigations against individuals and was established (European Council and Council of the
organisations that constitute the highest serious and European Union, 2019). The Coordinator’s responsibilities
organised crime risks to more than one Member State. include:
The concept is also designed to intensify asset tracing
and increase the rate of confiscation of criminal proceeds. Q coordinating the work of the Council of the EU on
For example, the 2019 OAP on cannabis, cocaine and combating terrorism;
heroin includes a strategic goal with focus on financial Q presenting policy recommendations and proposing
investigations, aimed at identifying synergies with the 2019 priority areas for action to the Council;
OAP on criminal finances, money laundering and asset Q monitoring the implementation of the EU counter-
recovery. The goal is to promote cross-cutting opportunities terrorism strategy;
and joint investigations for the identification and seizure of Q maintaining an overview of all EU instruments,
criminal assets. reporting to the Council and following up Council
decisions;
Since 2018 the EU Member States have applied this Q coordinating with the relevant preparatory bodies of
standardised concept and jointly with Europol selected the Council, the Commission and the EEAS;
a high number of HVTs and established operational Q ensuring the EU plays an active role in the fight against
task forces. Most of these demanding investigations terrorism;
are ongoing. Initial results led to the arrest of more than Q improving communication between the EU and third
400 suspects, including HVTs and the seizure of a variety countries.
of assets worth more than EUR 60 million. The successfully
targeted investigations proved to have a broad security There are a number of examples of responses in this
impact well beyond specific crime areas. area. Sometimes, these have taken a holistic approach
to tackling terrorism as well as addressing the context
in which it tends to occur, i.e. state instability, weak
governance and corruption. It should be noted that these
contextual factors and vulnerabilities equally apply to the
Addressing drug market- illicit drug trade (see box ‘Counter-terrorism responses in
associated criminality the EU’).
A number of measures and initiatives have been Countering trafficking in human beings
introduced, addressing drug markets and their relationship
with other types of criminality. The legal framework for tackling the trafficking in human
beings in the EU is provided by Directive 2011/36/EU of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011
Counter-terrorism measures on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings
and protecting its victims (19). On 4 December 2017 the
It is often stated that drug trafficking may in one way or European Commission adopted a new Communication
another provide financing for terrorist activities. To a limited addressing trafficking in human beings and committed
extent, this has been borne out by a few cases in which itself to a new set of priorities in three broad areas:
the small amounts of money needed to finance a lone increased action against organised criminal networks
actor plot have been raised through small-scale drug by disrupting the business model and untangling the
dealing (Basra, 2019). In addition to international sanctions trafficking chain; providing victims of trafficking with better
and asset freezing to target high-level terrorist finances access to their rights and realising those rights; intensifying
and their networks, some have suggested that greater a coordinated and consolidated response, both within
emphasis should be placed on complementary strategies
(19) OJ L 101, 15.4.2011, p. 1–11, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/36/oj
211
physical or mental disabilities, and people with substance

Counter-terrorism responses in the EU
use disorders. In addition, victims of human trafficking may
be forced to use drugs as a means of coercion in order to
In 2005, the Council adopted the EU counter-
ensure their obedience.
terrorism strategy. The strategy focuses on four pillars:
In response to this issue, the EU action plan on drugs
Q prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or
2017-20 calls for the gathering of evidence on the potential
supporting terrorism, which can be referred to as
connection between drug trafficking and trafficking in
the ‘countering violent extremism’ or ‘preventing
human beings. In addition, there is the EU Anti-Trafficking
violent extremism’ component of counter-
Coordinator, who is responsible for improving coordination
terrorism;
and coherence among EU institutions, EU agencies,
Q protect: to strengthen our protection against
Member States and international organisations, and for
a terrorist attack, which includes both physical
developing existing and new EU policies to address the
and online components;
trafficking in human beings. In June 2018, the heads of
Q pursue: to stop terrorist attacks, which primarily
10 EU agencies, including the EMCDDA and Europol,
involves law enforcement, intelligence and justice
signed a joint statement of commitment to working
authorities;
together to address trafficking in human beings (European
Q respond: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist
Commission, 2018a,c) (20).
attack, whereby first responders and critical
infrastructure providers take on an important
In April 2019 the Council of the EU approved the
role, with regard to both physical injuries and
reinforcement of Frontex, enabling it to respond better
psychological trauma.
to the common challenges Europe is facing in managing
migration and borders. The reinforcement will consist of
Across these pillars, the strategy recognises the
a standing corps of up to 10 000 border guards ready to
importance of cooperation with third countries and
support EU Member States at any time. The agency will
international institutions.
also have a stronger mandate on returns and will cooperate
Source: European Council and Council of the European Union (2018). more closely with non-EU countries, including those
beyond the EU’s immediate neighbourhood (European
Commission, 2019b).
and outside the EU. One of the priority actions highlighted

in this Communication is to make use of a range of EU Tackling drug market violence and
funding programmes, such as the Asylum, Migration and intimidation
Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund, Horizon 2020,
the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, the European There appears to be a growing recognition of the value of
Development Fund and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for applying harm reduction measures and principles to drug
Africa, to support anti-trafficking objectives and priorities markets (Bacon, 2016; Spicer, 2018). Fundamental to such
(European Commission, 2017d). an approach is the recognition that the level of harm in
a drug market is more important than its overall size, and
As traffickers’ modi operandi are constantly evolving, the therefore law enforcement should prioritise crimes that
EU needs to tackle the linkages between multiple crimes. represent the most significant harms to society (UKDPC,
According to the European Commission (2018d), many 2009).
Member States note that trafficking in human beings is
linked to other crimes, including drug trafficking. When In the United Kingdom, the application of harm reduction
evaluating the EU action plan on trafficking in human principles to drug market violence includes an emphasis
beings 2012-16, Eurojust also stressed that drug trafficking on a comprehensive approach with a focus on the role of
was one of multiple crimes linked to trafficking in human partnerships across a range of sectors, such as education,
beings. Multiple links between drugs and human trafficking health, social services, housing, youth and victim services,
have been identified (see Chapter 1), such as victims working alongside law enforcement. Such multiagency
being forced to work in cannabis cultivation sites or to approaches ensure the safeguarding of those who
carry drugs across borders. Some Member States (e.g.
Austria, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
(20) The other signatories were the European Asylum Support Office, eu-LISA,
the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia) have reported Eurojust, the European Institute for Gender Equality, Frontex, the EU
that traffickers increasingly target vulnerable people with Agency for Fundamental Rights, CEPOL and the European Foundation for
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound).
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I
are exploited as well as tackling organised crime. The keeps pace with financial and technological developments
authorities have invested in prevention and early response, is a key part of this response. This approach is supported by
including education and risk assessment (e.g. Home Office, various EU structures that address the operational aspects
2018); disruption and intervention (e.g. Drug Dealing of financial crimes linked to the trade in illicit drugs. Given
Telecommunications Restriction Orders Regulation, the interconnectedness of today’s global financial system,
2017) (21). Furthermore, there is a recognition of the the EU also works with a range of organisations in different
trafficking and slavery context (Anti-Trafficking Monitoring regions of the world that are involved in addressing money
Group, 2018), in particular with a focus on the use and laundering (see Chapter 1 and Table 9.1).
exploitation of children (e.g. Home Office, 2018). Finally,
targeted law enforcement is essential to disrupt criminal A crucial question for research and policy is how effective
activity and take away its proceeds (NCA, 2019). and efficient an existing AML regime is. National risk
assessments for money laundering, required from all
In Ireland, drug distribution networks have a three-tier members of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), are
hierarchical structure. Based on that, a number of designed to determine if AML resources are sufficient
responses to tackle intimidation can be designed and and can reduce overall money laundering in the country.
applied that differ in (1) their approach, whether based on Ferwerda and Reuter (2018), based on analysis of
a criminal justice or social inclusion perspective, (2) their Italy and Switzerland, provide a general judgement
target, whether they aim to prevent recruitment into gangs, and recommendations to strengthen forthcoming
prevent escalation of gang involvement, intervene to national risk assessments across all FATF countries.
promote leaving gangs, or deter or suppress gang activity, The recommendations include, among others, using risk
and (3) the time horizon of their impact, whether short or assessment standards from other fields and integrating
long term (Murphy et al., 2017). a measure of uncertainty into the risk assessment process
and analysis.
Addressing money laundering

Tackling corruption at ports
As highlighted in the section on legislative responses in
Chapter 8, targeting the profits from the illicit drug trade In Chapter 1 we highlighted the problem of major European
and the financial resources of OCGs is a complex task ports being targeted by organised crime groups to exploit
on a global scale. The EU action plan on drugs (2017-20) vulnerabilities in port security in order to facilitate drug-
and the European agenda on security prioritise responses smuggling activities. These groups often target port
in this area in order to restrict the ability of criminals to workers, by threatening the worker or their family or simply
infiltrate the legitimate economy and exploit vulnerabilities offering money as an incentive. In many cases, the money
in financial systems. Enacting legislation at the EU level that may be to finance a drug habit or other addiction.
Table 9.1
Entities addressing money laundering
International European Regional
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) EU Expert Group on Money Laundering and Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
Terrorist Financing
Egmont Group EU Committee on the Prevention of Money Financial Action Task Force against Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Laundering in South America
International Money Laundering Information EU informal network of Financial Intelligence Inter-Governmental Action Group against
Network (IMoLIN) Units (the EU FIUs Platform) Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA)
Camden Asset Recovery lnteragency Network Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts Middle East and North Africa Financial Action
(CARIN) on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Task Force
Measures and the Financing of Terrorism
(MONEYVAL)
Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money
Laundering Group
Eurasian Group on Combating Money
Laundering and Financing of Terrorism
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering
(21) UK Statutory Instruments 2017, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/

uksi/2017/1240/contents/made
213
The Stroomplan Initiative has a specific component for child sexual exploitation, illicit trade in drugs
focused on anti-corruption and integrity (see the box on and firearms, trafficking in human beings, currency
the Stroomplan Initiative, page 219). Other major points and document counterfeiting, etc. The complexity
of entry for drugs have also introduced measures to of the threats emanating from the darknet calls for
counter corruption. The port of Rotterdam has introduced coordinated operational action that draws upon the
a mechanism to rotate staff among roles to help prevent expertise held by the various competent authorities in
cases of corruption occurring. different crime areas.
Q Developing tools, tactics and techniques to conduct
darknet investigations: the wide range of offences
Responding to drug distribution via online facilitated by the darknet, combined with rapidly
markets and social networks changing modi operandi, has proven that there
cannot be one specific investigative method. Each
In Chapter 2 we discussed the fact that one of the investigation and approach depends on the specific
issues driving the accessibility of drugs is the range of circumstances, and the investigative tools, tactics and
comparatively new options to source them. techniques must be tailored to the particular case
and adapted to broader trends and changes in modi
operandi.
Europol’s Dark Web Team and Cyber Patrol Q Prioritising top threats and/or targets: an improved
intelligence picture should form the basis for the
Criminality on the darknet has been identified as a cross- selection and prioritisation of those investigations that
cutting crime threat with significant impacts across the will have the biggest impact.
spectrum of serious and organised crime. It is no longer Q Deconflicting among the different entities involved:
merely a modus operandi, but an established, highly with multiple actors involved in such complex
dynamic and substantial criminal underground economy, operations, there is a clear need for central
which has been expanding steadily over recent years and is coordination of, and deconfliction in, investigations
expected to grow further. The thriving online trade in a wide related to the darknet. At present, many of these
range of illicit goods and services on darknet markets has investigations are carried out on the basis of bilateral
become one of the main engines of organised crime in the collaboration and case by case, which can jeopardise
EU. The competitive nature of the service-based model the actions planned by other law enforcement
underpinning criminality on the darknet has expanded agencies and the overall success of the operation.
the opportunities to commit crimes facilitated, enabled or Q Supporting joint technical and investigative actions:
amplified by technology. In addition, darknet markets pose experience to date indicates that the law enforcement
significant investigative and prosecution challenges for law actions with the greatest impact on the darknet have
enforcement. The main obstacles to effective action by the been those executed jointly (see Case study 28).
competent authorities are technological and legislative, Q Engaging in training and capacity building: as
further exacerbated by limited resources. The Member criminality on the darknet is a cross-cutting problem
States and other law enforcement partners have made that requires support from specialists in multiple types
increasing requests to Europol for operational support. Its of crime, it is not feasible or practical for cybercrime
response has been the establishment of a dedicated team units to deal with all such crime when the predicate
to tackle criminality on the darknet. This team delivers crime is related to drugs, firearms or some other illicit
a range of services in support of operational activities, commodity. It is essential, therefore, that appropriate
including the following. training and capacity building be extended to those
working in these areas to provide them with the
Q Providing an enhanced intelligence picture and required knowledge and expertise.
continuous monitoring of the threats, trends and Q Carrying out prevention and awareness raising: in the
developments related to criminality on the darknet: light of the growth in cyber juvenile delinquency and
successful operations on the darknet require in-depth the proliferation of threat actors (individuals or groups
knowledge, expertise and understanding, as well as responsible for events or incidents that impact, or have
a mix of new and traditional investigative techniques. the potential to impact, the safety or security of others)
Q Delivering operational support and expertise in active on the darknet, prevention and awareness
different crime areas: the cross-crime nature of activities could play a crucial role in deterring
criminality on the darknet can be addressed only individuals from pursuing a pathway into cybercrime
in a multidisciplinary manner, by engaging with the or cyber-facilitated crime. Such endeavours can have
cybercrime experts alongside those responsible a strong deterrent effect.
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I
CASE STUDY 28
Global actions coordinated by Europol to tackle online criminality

Law enforcement agencies from the EUR 2.2 million in cash and developed intelligence packages that
EU, Canada and the United States EUR 35 000 in gold). They also were disseminated to the concerned
joined forces in early 2019 to target conducted 122 interviews. countries to inform subsequent
vendors and buyers of illicit goods on investigations.
darknet markets. During the course These global actions followed on from
of this operation, international law the second annual Cyber Patrol Action This international coordination
enforcement agencies made 61 Week, held at Europol’s headquarters approach demonstrates law
arrests and shut down 50 darknet in The Hague in July 2018. The Cyber enforcement agencies’ determination
accounts used for illicit activity. They Patrol Action Week brought together to tackle the criminal use of darknet
executed 65 search warrants, seizing 60 online investigators and subject markets.
299.5 kg illicit drugs, 51 firearms matter experts from 19 countries,
and over EUR 6.2 million (almost Eurojust and Europol. The experts Source: Europol (2019d).
EUR 4 million in cryptocurrency, detected 247 high-value targets, and
Cooperation with the private sector and heroin, and the other on synthetic drugs and new
psychoactive substances.
Social media platforms, instant messaging apps and
e-commerce sites are increasingly being exploited to Each OAP is structured around seven strategic goals, with
advertise and distribute drugs or precursors. An initiative specific operational actions listed under each goal. The
that may be useful to respond to this is the EU Internet strategic goals of the two OAPs on drugs in the 2018-21
Forum. The forum, established under the European Agenda policy cycle are as follows:
on Security and launched in December 2015 by the
European Commission, brings together EU home affairs Q intelligence picture
ministers, the internet industry and other stakeholders Q operational activities
to work together in a voluntary partnership to address Q prevention and capacity building
the misuse of the internet by terrorist groups. The forum Q cooperation with non-EU partners (third countries,
has two key objectives: to reduce the availability and international organisations and partners)
accessibility of terrorist content online; and to empower Q document fraud
civil society partners to increase the volume of effective Q financial investigations
alternative narratives online. This model may be equally Q online trade in illicit goods and services
applicable to reducing the availability and accessibility
of drug-related content on the internet, in particular the Each OAP is supported by a dedicated Europol team and
advertising and sale of drugs and precursors. OAP meetings often take place at Europol’s headquarters in
The Hague. Participation in the OAPs is optional and open
to all EU Member States and third countries, alongside
Targeting drug supply chains the European Commission, the European Council,
several EU agencies including the EMCDDA, platforms
such as MAOC (N) and projects such as the EU Action
EMPACT operational action plans Against Drugs and Organised Crime (EU-ACT). Similarly,
participation in individual operational actions is open to all
EMPACT is the coordination platform for the EU Member those participating in an OAP but is optional.
States and institutions to develop and manage actions
supporting the policy cycle (see section on the policy cycle
in Chapter 8). Of the 10 crime priorities defined in the
2018-21 policy cycle, one concerns drugs. It is addressed
through two distinct OAPs: one on cannabis, cocaine
215
Cannabis
Rose of the Winds
An example of the activities carried out under EMPACT
In response to the threat posed by large-scale
are activities targeting the OCGs and facilitators involved
trafficking of cannabis resin in the Mediterranean
in wholesale trafficking of cannabis resin across the
Sea, a joint operations team called Rose of the
Mediterranean Sea, particularly departures from Morocco,
Winds (RoW) was established. This multilateral and
Libya and Lebanon, with direct or indirect impacts on the
multidisciplinary European law enforcement initiative
EU. It encourages participants to appropriately pursue
involves several permanent partners, including France’s
other serious forms of criminality perpetrated by those
Office central pour la repression du traffic illicite des
OCGs.
stupéfiants, Greece’s Hellenic Coast Guard, Italy’s
Guardia di Finanza and Direzione Centrale per i Servizi
As discussed in Chapter 3, the main source of cannabis
Antidroga, Spain’s Guardia Civil and Europol. The
resin for the European drug market is Morocco, and huge
stable engagement of these competent authorities of
quantities are trafficked to Europe each year (see box ‘Rose
Member States with Mediterranean coastline serves as
of the Winds’). Many methods have been documented for
a task force safeguarding the interests of the EU and
smuggling resin from Morocco to southern Spain. However,
the international community. Various other authorities
of particular concern to Spanish authorities are boats that
from EU Member States and third countries also
can carry loads of 2.5 tonnes at high speed, allowing them
have been engaged as needed. The joint operations
to evade detection. As well as drugs, such vessels have also
team pools and synergises resources and expertise
been used to smuggle migrants from the shores of North
from law enforcement and other organisations in
Africa into Europe.
the participating Member States and Europol. Thus
RoW shares new developments in real time and,
The Spanish Ministry of the Interior supported a law to
when required, convenes at short notice and on the
restrict certain types of vessels. It was then introduced in
crime scene. In addition, RoW conducts strategic
October 2018 (22). The law applies to all rigid inflatable
analysis based on the operations carried out by its
boats and high-speed boats that are more than 8 m in
Member States and other information. RoW has been
length, or those of equal or lower length that have
a key source of intelligence and awareness raising in
a maximum power of more than 150 kilowatts. Also
Europe concerning the new role played by Libya as
included are any other such vessels, regardless of size and
a major drug storage and distribution platform in the
power, if there are signs (specified in the regulation itself)
Mediterranean region, especially for cannabis resin.
that they can be used to commit or facilitate the smuggling
of contraband. The law allows police to seize such vessels
Operations carried out by the RoW partners, or
on land, even if they contain no illicit cargo. To support the
supported with intelligence provided by them, since
implementation of the law, the Spanish Tax Agency created
2015 have resulted in the seizure in the EU, in
a special register for rigid inflatable boats and high-speed
international waters and in third countries of hundreds
boats, accessible by public agencies. Anyone who owns
of tonnes of cannabis resin produced in Lebanon and
a rigid inflatable boat or high-speed boat must register it,
Morocco, multitonne amounts of cocaine from South
declaring its length, the power of its engines, the activity for
America and millions of captagon tablets from the
which it is intended and the geographical area where it will
Middle East. It has also led to the arrest of a major
be used.
cannabis resin trafficker in Morocco. Above all, the work
model in place continues to collect valuable insight
into evolving trends and modi operandi regarding
Heroin and other opioids: EU-ACT
cannabis resin trafficking and polycriminality in the
Mediterranean basin, thereby revealing the dynamics
EU-ACT aims to build capacities to increase regional
of transnational organised crime affecting the region
and transregional law enforcement cooperation and
(Europol, 2016).
coordination in the fight against organised crime and
trafficking activities along the heroin route. It also supports
the development of drug policy and drug demand
reduction activities. The project has been effective in facilitating international meetings on heroin investigations.
In particular, it has funded several operational and
(22) Real Decreto-ley 16/2018, de 26 de octubre, por el que se adoptan coordination meetings for field investigators and judicial
determinadas medidas de lucha contra el tráfico ilícito de personas
y mercancías en relación con las embarcaciones utilizadas. Boletín
authorities. The project provides intelligence on various
Oficial Del Estado 260 (https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt. activities concerning heroin interceptions along several
php?id=BOE-A-2018-14747).
216
I
heroin-trafficking routes, especially within the Indian Cocaine

Ocean, East Africa, Central Asia and the Black Sea corridor.
The Cocaine Route Programme represents a concerted
Various actions are taking place at Member State level. An effort by the EU and its partners to focus on transnational
example from Sweden is presented in the box ‘Responding organised crime and the flow of illicit drugs to Europe.
to the situation of new synthetic opioids in Sweden’. It does this mainly by facilitating communication and
cooperation between law enforcement officials and the
judiciary. Since 2009, under the Instrument contributing
Responding to the situation of new synthetic opioids in Sweden
The presence of fentanyl and its derivatives on the the focus of investigations. In a judgment in such
Swedish drug market since 2014 is considered to a case in May 2018, two vendors who had sold
be among the most serious developments that have fentanyl derivatives were convicted of eight counts of
affected Sweden’s drug-using population. Since involuntary manslaughter; the judgment was referred
2015, these synthetic opioids have surpassed heroin to the Court of Appeal and in April 2019 the vendors
in the number of drug-related deaths they cause. were convicted of involuntary manslaughter and
each received a prison sentence of four and six years
In order to tackle this issue, the Swedish authorities respectively.
introduced a raft of measures using a multiagency
approach. The initiatives included prioritising The trade may move to darknet markets as a result
investigation of fentanyl derivatives by the Public of intensive repressive measures against open sale
Health Agency of Sweden and proposals for fentanyl online. However, the Swedish police consider that
derivatives to be considered as goods dangerous to such a move would limit public exposure by reducing
health or as narcotics. As a result, control measures accessibility to these substances (Polisen, 2018).
were adopted on two occasions in 2017 and again
in 2018. The National Forensic Centre developed The combination of these measures seems to have
procedures for safe handling of the substances and been effective, as can be seen in the falling numbers
a multidisciplinary team was established to reduce of calls to the poison information centre and of the
drug-related mortality by making naloxone available. occurrence of fentanyl or its derivatives in post-
Other measures included a new provision enabling mortem toxicology cases over the course of 2018
the Public Health Agency of Sweden and the Medical (see figure below).
Product Agency to purchase samples of substances
under consideration for regulation in order to analyse
Data related to fentanyl and its derivatives in Sweden:
and chemically identify those substances. seizures, calls to the poison information centre and
mentions in post-mortem toxicology cases (per
In terms of the law enforcement response, the month), January 2017 to October 2018
strategy included knowledge support, international
40
and interagency cooperation, crime prevention
measures, informing regulatory responses and
30
initiating investigations. Such investigations mainly
targeted the sale and distribution of fentanyl and
derivatives online. In Sweden, the sale of fentanyl 20
derivatives takes place almost exclusively on the

internet. Based on police information gathered since 10
2014, an estimated 300 of the 370 deaths related to

fentanyl or its derivatives in Sweden can be traced 0
Jan Jan Oct
back to internet purchases. The limited number 2017 2018 2018
of Swedish vendors implies that a small number
Seizures Poison centre calls Deaths
of vendors appear to be behind the availability of
fentanyl and its derivatives. Such vendors became
217
to Stability and Peace, the EU has committed more than Synthetic drugs: EU training on dismantling illicit
EUR 50 million in 40 countries along the recognised labs
trafficking routes for cocaine in Latin America, the
Caribbean and Africa. Current components of the Cocaine In the EU, Member States work in a coordinated manner to
Route Programme are AIRCOP, SEACOP, CRIMJUST and provide training to law enforcement agencies on the topic
COLIBRI. of dismantling illicit synthetic drug laboratories. There is
a now well-established yearly training programme, which
The AIRCOP component increases the resilience of has three components: online basic training, a 2-week
interdiction efforts by building Joint Airport Interdiction residential advanced training course and then a further
Task Forces at selected airports in Africa, Latin America and 1-week follow-up course.
the Caribbean. These are connected to secure international
databases and systems for transmission of operational The basic course is an online module that teaches
information. International operations supported through the the student some theoretical knowledge about illicit
project have led to significant seizures of drugs, cash and synthetic drug production and precursors, back-tracking
other illicit goods. investigations, forensic aspects and safety regimes.
The basic course is a prerequisite for proceeding to the
The SEACOP element builds capacity by establishing advanced course.
Maritime Intelligence Units and Joint Maritime Control
Units, first to detect and then to search suspect vessels The advanced joint CEPOL-Europol illicit synthetic drugs
and shipments in selected countries in West Africa, Latin laboratory dismantling course is run once a year at the
America and the Caribbean. This project also strengthens international training facility of the Central Bureau of
national and regional maritime information systems, Investigation in Warsaw, Poland. The follow-up training
increasing the effectiveness of interdiction efforts. is held in Belgium at the facility in Emblem — offered
to graduates of the advanced course, two years after
CRIMJUST focuses on criminal justice cooperation and graduation, provided that they are still working in the same
investigations and is designed to complement the other function. Experts from Belgium, the Netherlands and
projects of the Cocaine Route Programme. This component Poland support these courses, and technicians from the
aims to achieve a stronger focus on criminal investigation suppliers of portable electronic detection equipment also
and criminal justice cooperation between countries in Latin provide assistance. The EMCDDA provides expertise during
America, the Caribbean and West Africa to enhance their the theoretical parts of the course.
capacity to counter organised crime along the cocaine
routes. These courses are available to law enforcement officers in
EU Member States, and occasionally officers from non-EU
The COLIBRI component is being implemented as part of countries will be accepted by special request. For example,
the WCO Strategic Plan: ’Protect society, public health and officers from Colombia and Serbia have participated in the
safety, and contribute to combating crime and terrorism’, advanced course.
and in line with the role of customs in achieving the
Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the United
Nations in 2015, in particular SDG 16: Peace, Justice and New psychoactive substances: EU Early Warning
Strong Institutions. System
The use of containers for the trafficking of illicit drugs has Operated and financed by the EMCDDA, in close cooperation
led to the development of specific responses such as the with Europol, the EU Early Warning System on new
UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme (UNODC, psychoactive substances (EWS) is the first step in a three-
n.d.) for capacity building and responses such as the step legal framework designed to allow the EU to rapidly
Stroomplan Initiative (see box ‘Stroomplan Initiative: detect, assess and respond to health and social threats
targeting cocaine trafficking through Antwerp’). caused by NPS. The work of the EWS aims to build, maintain
and strengthen situational awareness, preparedness and
In Chapter 5 we presented recent findings from the forensic responses to NPS at national and EU levels.
profiling of samples of cocaine seized in Europe. This
initiative is being carried out under EMPACT and is an The EWS was first set up in 1997 under Joint Action
important aspect of the EU’s coordinated response to the 97/396/JHA (23). It was strengthened in 2005 by Council
threat posed by cocaine.
(23) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31997F0396
218
I
Stroomplan Initiative: targeting cocaine trafficking through Antwerp
In Chapter 5 we described how Antwerp has team comprises officers from a number of agencies,
emerged as one of the key ports of entry for cocaine such as the federal and local police, maritime police,
into Europe. In 2017 almost 40 tonnes of the drug customs and the public prosecutor’s office.
was intercepted, and in 2018 the amount seized
was just under 50 tonnes. Furthermore, over (3) Increased action against money laundering
50 tonnes of cocaine was intercepted outside the and the link between the legitimate and the illegal
EU, allegedly en route to Antwerp. In addition, this economy: cooperation with the prosecutor’s office
increased trade has brought associated problems has intensified (port prosecutors, dedicated to
of violence and intimidation, as discussed in port-related cases only, have been appointed) and
Chapter 1. Recognising this, the Belgian authorities international cooperation is more thorough, as many
developed a comprehensive plan to respond to of the crime flows are across borders.
this phenomenon, called the Stroomplan Initiative
(4) An enhanced integrity and anti-corruption policy:
(Stream plan).
the pressure that organised crime groups exert on
public servants has intensified over the years. Not
The plan focuses on four main priorities.
only bribes but also threats of violence are now more
(1) Intensified controls in the port of Antwerp: large- common. Even criminal infiltration in government
scale scanning of containers, use of cameras placed institutions can no longer be ruled out.
directly at the terminals so that verifications can be
Currently about 1 % of the containers arriving at
done immediately, use of automatic number plate
the port are inspected. Checks are intensifying
recognition on connecting roads to the port terminals,
considerably under the ‘Stroomplan’. Meanwhile
smart seals on containers to monitor deviations
cases of serious violence, including abduction and
before scanning and an anonymous whistleblowing
shootings, have been reported around Antwerp.
system for reporting suspicious activity by co-workers.
As part of the plan, government institutions and the
private sector are also joining efforts to tackle the
(2) The creation of a multidisciplinary taskforce,
unprecedented rise of cocaine trafficking at Antwerp
known as the ‘Kali-team’, perhaps a reference to
port.
both the goddess Kali and the Cali cartel: this joint
taskforce focuses on tackling drug-related crime Sources: EMCDDA open source information database; Schneider
linked to the cocaine trade. The multidisciplinary (2018).
Decision 2005/387/JHA (24). As of 23 November 2018, it the purposes of early warning and to allow the EMCDDA to
operates under Regulation (EC) 1920/2006 (as amended draw up an initial report on a new psychoactive substance
by Regulation (EU) 2017/2101) (25) (Figure 9.1). that may pose health or social risks at EU level or
a combined initial report on several similar NPS.
The EWS is composed of a multiagency and
multidisciplinary network, which includes the EMCDDA, Underpinning each of the national early warning systems,
30 national early warning systems (the 28 EU Member and in turn the EWS, is the exchange of information on the
States, Norway and Turkey), Europol and its law chemical identification of NPS from forensic and toxicology
enforcement networks, the European Medicines Agency, laboratories. Principally, these laboratories handle casework
the European Commission and other partners. The related to seizures of NPS by law enforcement agencies
EMCDDA, in cooperation with Europol, is responsible (such as police, customs and border forces), poisonings
for collecting, collating, analysing, assessing and (such as those from hospital emergency departments and
communicating the information reported by the network medico-legal death investigations) and samples collected
in order to provide them with any information required for from people who use NPS and from test purchases
(e.g. from online marketplaces). This approach allows the
(24) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2005/387/oj
collection and rapid reporting of event-based information
(25) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ on the appearance of, and harms caused by, NPS at
TXT/?uri=CELEX:32017R2101
219
Figure 9.1
New accelerated EU procedure to identify and respond to new psychoactive substances appearing in the EU
New legislative package Shorter deadlines
Regulation (EC)
Regulation Council Decision
Launch 1920/2006 as
Regulation (EU) 2017/2101 of the 2005/387/JHA amended by
European Parliament and of the Council Regulation (EU)
of 15 November 2017 amending Regulation 2017/2101
(EC) No 1920/2006 as regards information
exchange on, and an early warning system
and risk assessment procedure for,
new psychoactive substances 2 Information
weeks collection (optional)
Directive
Directive (EU) 2017/2103 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 15 November
2017 amending Council Framework Decision
Information 5/6 Initial report/
2004/757/JHA in order to include new
collection weeks Combined initial
psychoactive substances in the definition of reports
‘drug’ and repealing Council Decision
2005/387/JHA
7/8 Risk assessment

weeks requested
Unchanged three-step approach
I. Information exchange Initial

Early Warning System (EWS) reports EMCDDA-Europol 10
Joint Report weeks
Risk
II. Risk assessment
assessments
Risk assessment 13/14 Risk assessment

requested weeks report
Control
III. Decision-making measures
Risk assessment 26
report weeks
national level to the EMCDDA. The Joint Research Centre responsibility. Although these systems have developed
is providing support to the European network of customs to meet national needs, they draw on a common format,
laboratories and the EWS through the provision of advanced guidelines and tools to report information to the EMCDDA.
analytical testing capability and expertise. These data
are complemented by reports twice a year, which include Perhaps the highest-level response applied by any Member
aggregated data on seizures by law enforcement agencies State to any issue is to introduce legislation. The significant
and from poisonings. The organisation and functioning threats posed by NPS have prompted many EU Member
of the national early warning systems is a national States to adopt new laws to combat this problem.
220
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239
Abbreviations
2C-B 4-Bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenethylamine MAOC (N) Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre -
Narcotics
AML anti-money laundering
MAPA methyl alpha-acetylphenylacetate
APAA alpha-phenylacetoacetamide
MASP multi-annual strategic plan
APAAN alpha-phenylacetoacetonitrile
MDMA 3,4-methylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine
CBD cannabidiol
NPS new psychoactive substances
DG Directorate-General
OAP operational action plan
EEAS European External Action Service
OCG organised crime group
EMPACT European Multidisciplinary Platform Against
Criminal Threats PNR Passenger Name Record
EU-ACT EU Action against Drugs and Organised Crime RoW Rose of the Winds
EWS early warning system SAR suspicious activity report
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia SIS II Schengen Information System
FATF Financial Action Task Force SOCTA Serious and Organised Crime Threat
Assessment
FIU financial intelligence unit
THC tetrahydrocannabinol
Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
GBL gamma-butyrolactone
UWO Unexplained Wealth Order
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
VIS Visa Information System
GHB gamma-hydroxybutyrate
WCO World Customs Organization
HVT high-value target
WHO World Health Organization
INCB International Narcotics Control Board
JIT joint investigation team
240
Annex: Principal areas of EU legislation
linked to drug supply reduction
Drug precursors
Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 on trade in drug precursors between EU and third countries, amended by Regulation (EU) No 1259/2013.
Regulation (EC) No 273/2004, on trade in drug precursors within the EU, amended by Regulation (EU) No 1258/2013.
EU agencies addressing drug supply issues
Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the European Monitoring Centre for
Drugs and Drug Addiction (recast) as amended.
Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law
Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA,
2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA.
Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the European Union Agency for Criminal
Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), and replacing and repealing Council Decision 2002/187/JHA.
Regulation (EU) 2015/2219 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on the European Union Agency for Law
Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and replacing and repealing Council Decision 2005/681/JHA.
Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard
and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the
European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC.
Risk assessment and control of new psychoactive substances
Regulation (EU) 2017/2101 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2017 amending Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006
as regards information exchange on, and an early warning system and risk assessment procedure for, new psychoactive substances.
Directive (EU) 2017/2103 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2017 amending Council Framework Decision
2004/757/JHA in order to include new psychoactive substances in the definition of ‘drug’ and repealing Council Decision 2005/387/JHA.
Counterfeiting of medical products
Council of Europe Convention on the counterfeiting of medical products and similar crimes involving threats to public health (Council of
Europe Treaty Series – No. 211).
Judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters
Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union the Convention on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union (2000/C 197/01).
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams (2002/465/JHA).
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States
(2002/584/JHA).
Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal
acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking.
Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime.
Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects,
documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters.
Cybercrime
Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on attacks against information systems and replacing
Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA.
Council Framework Decision of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment (2001/413/JHA).
Forensic analysis and criminal investigation
Council Decision of 28 May 2001 on the transmission of samples of controlled substances (2001/419/JHA).
Council Recommendation of 30 March 2004 regarding guidelines for taking samples of seized drugs (2004/C 86/04).
Information exchange
Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law
enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union.
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and
cross-border crime.
241
Firearms
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession
of weapons.
Proceeds of crime
Council Decision of 17 October 2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation between financial intelligence units of the Member States in
respect of exchanging information.
Council Framework Decision of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of
instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime (2001/500/JHA).
Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on confiscation of crime-related proceeds, instrumentalities and property.
Council Decision 2007/845/JHA of 6 December 2007 concerning cooperation between asset recovery offices of the Member States in the
field of tracing and identification of proceeds from, or other property related to, crime.
Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information accompanying transfers of funds
and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006.
Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system
for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing.
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic
evidence in criminal matters — COM/2018/225 final — 2018/0108 (COD).
Document fraud
Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on promoting the free movement of citizens by
simplifying the requirements for presenting certain public documents in the European Union and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012
(OJ L 200, 26.7.2016, p. 1-136).
Trafficking in human beings
Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings
and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA.
242
Index
A finishing 161
acetic anhydride 104 GBL (gamma-butyrolactone) 171
case study on trafficking from the EU to Turkey using roll- Germany, amphetamine production in 157
on roll-off ferries 114 GHB (gamma-hydroxybutyric acid) 171
heroin precursor 111-114 global overview 152, 155
acetylation of morphine 109 intra-EU chemical trafficking for synthetic drug production,
ACIC (Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission) 206 case study of 165
ACMD (Advisory Council on Misuse of Drugs) 170 ketamine 170-171
adulteration of heroin 109 logistics of synthetic drug production 159-162
Afghanistan 13, 14, 16, 73, 104 MAPA (methyl-alpha-phenylacetoacetate) 160, 161, 166
MCN (Counter Narcotics Ministry) in 114 MD (MDMA in crystal form) 154
morphine and heroin seizures in 111 MDMA
opiate seizures in 109 MDMA hydrochloride 154
Africa 14, 18 production methods and sites 157-158
see also North Africa; West Africa retail supply and use of 168-169
AIRCOP in Cocaine Route Programme 218 supply chain logistics 156
Al-Qaeda 42 methamphetamine 154-155
in Islamic Maghreb 32 lab on boat in the Netherlands, case study of 159
Albania 17, 38, 63, 83, 121 methamphetamine hydrochloride 154
cannabis production in 90 production methods and sites 158-159
opiate production in 114 retail supply and use of 169-170
potential source of cannabis oil for the EU market 97 methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA) 154-155
State Police in 90 Netherlands
alcohol 43-44 amphetamine production in 157
alprazolam 43 challenges of estimation of synthetic drug production
aminoindanes 176 in 162
AML (Anti-Money Laundering) Directive (EU) 201, 202 PMK (piperonyl methyl ketone) 157, 159, 160, 161, 163,
165, 166
amphetamine 17-18, 154-155
Poland, amphetamine production in 157
amphetamine sulfate 157
precursor conversion 161
production methods and sites 157
precursors and alternative chemicals used in
retail supply and use 157
production 159-162
amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine 150-171
preparedness requirements for dealing with threats 151
APAA (alpha-phenylacetoacetamide) 160, 161, 166
production 155-164
APAAN (alpha-phenylacetoacetonitrile) 160, 161
of BMK (benzyl methyl ketone), alternative chemicals
Belgium, amphetamine production in 157 in 160
BMK (benzyl methyl ketone) 157, 158, 159, 161, 163, methods and sites 157-159
166, 167, 181
and trafficking, developments in 150-151
captagon 167
purification 161
cost of dismantling synthetic drug production sites 166
retail supply and use 168-170
crystallisation 161
separation 161
current threats and action recommendations 151
Sweden, amphetamine production in 157
Czechia, methamphetamine production in 162
synthesis (‘cooking’) process 161-162
ecstasy (MDMA in tablet form) 154
synthetic drug production
environmental damage of waste products from production
complex logistical exercise of 159-162
of 49
in the EU, challenges of estimation of 162
environmental impact of waste materials 162-164
sites, cost of dismantling 166
Europe, common forms of synthetic drugs used in 154
synthetic drugs used in Europe, common forms of 154
European markets for 150, 153
243
tableting 162 Bolivia 130, 135

trafficking and supply 164-168 Bosnia and Herzegovina 38, 92
trafficking outside EU 166-168 Brazil 126, 130, 136
trafficking within EU 164-166 Bulgaria 112, 119, 120, 167
waste materials, environmental impact of 162-164 Interior Ministry of 114
Amzieb, Nabil 47 opiate production in 114
Ansat al-Dine 42 buprenorphine 43, 104, 121
Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group 39, 213
Antwerp, Stroomplan Initiative targeting cocaine trafficking C
through 219 caffeine as cutting agent for heroin 116
APAA (alpha-phenylacetoacetamide) 160, 161, 166 Cambridge Centre for Applied Research in Human
APAAN (alpha-phenylacetoacetonitrile) 160, 161 Trafficking 38
Apollon darknet market 67, 69 Canada, homicide trends in 47
Armenia 116, 119 cannabidiol (CBD) 82, 86, 87, 88, 99, 100
arylalkylamines 176, 177 cannabis 15-16, 82-101
arylcyclohexylamines 176 Albania, potential source of cannabis oil for EU market 97
Asia 17, 18, 127, 167 cannabidiol (CBD) 86
money-laundering syndicates in 52 cannabis oil and concentrated extracts, trafficking and
supply of 96-97
Australia 17, 127, 131
cannabis products, taxonomy of 87
Austria 167
cannabis resin 86
cannabis product of preference in 98
production outside the EU 93
aviation, drugs trade misuse of general aviation 63-64
production within the EU 93-94
Azerbaijan 112, 119
trafficking and supply of 95-96
B coffeeshops in the Netherlands, ‘controlled cannabis
supply experiment’ 99
Balkan route 16, 37, 90, 104, 105, 107, 112, 114, 116, 118,
119, 121, 167, 205 competition in trade in 97
case study of two-way trafficking on 109 cultivation of, environmental impact and hazards of 92-93
heroin and other opioids 117 cultivation processes 88-90
Balkans 14, 16, 41, 74, 83, 105, 120 current threats and action recommendations 83
cannabis production in 90 delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) 15, 82, 85, 86, 87,
88, 89, 93, 99-101
BBC News 41, 138
Europe, cannabis in 82, 85
Belgium 17, 18, 34, 48, 95, 112, 119, 126, 127, 151
global overview 84, 87-88
amphetamine production in 157
hemp fibre 86
Antwerp, Stroomplan Initiative targeting cocaine trafficking
through 219 herbal cannabis 86
Antwerp-based Organisation X 34 production outside the EU 90
cannabis product of preference in 98 production within the EU 90-92
cannabis seizures in 90-91 trafficking from outside the EU 95
cannabis social clubs in 91 trafficking inside the EU 95
cocaine seizures in 137 illicit cultivation sites, hazards of 93
cocaine trafficking in 143 indoor cultivation of, environmental effects of 49
drug sales revenues in 71 low-THC/high-CBD products 99
Federal Police in 140, 159, 161 Netherlands, estimation of herbal cannabis production
in 92
intimidation tactics by criminal organisations in 49
online distribution 101
NPS production in 180
‘potency’, differences in 86
benzodiazepines 19, 43, 176, 177
preparedness requirements for dealing with threats 83
distribution and supply in Europe of 187-188
price and ‘potency’ of 99-101
Berlusconi darknet market 67, 69, 70, 101, 124, 147, 168,
171 production 88-94
BHO (‘butane hash oil’) 89 production and trafficking, developments in 82
BMK (benzyl methyl ketone) 157, 158, 159, 161, 163, 166, production within the EU, estimation of extent of 92
167, 181 retail supply and use 98-101
244
INDEX
targeting supply chains for 216 waste treatment, dumping drug waste and closure of 50
trade in, criminal cooperation and competition in 97 cathinones 18, 19, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181-182,
trafficking and supply 94-97 183, 188
violence between OCGs, in trade in 97 CBS (Statistics Netherlands) 92
WHO recommendations on 88 Central Asia 32
Cannazon darknet market 67, 69 CEPOL (EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training) 9, 200
captagon 167 CEPOL-Europol illicit synthetic drugs laboratory
dismantling course 218
carfentanil 115, 177, 179, 186
Ceuta 34, 40
in Europe 187
chemical masking of drugs 73
Caribbean 95, 130
child exploitation by OCGs in Sweden 38
cocaine transit area 136
Chile 167
case studies
China 18, 42, 73, 151
acetic anhydride trafficking from the EU to Turkey using
roll-on roll-off ferries 114 money-laundering activities in 52
Balkan route, two-way trafficking on 109 NPS production in 180
child exploitation by OCGs in Sweden 38 synthetic opioid production in 122
clephedrone production in Poland 181 cigarettes 43-44
cocaine in exchange for weapons 42 clephedrone 185
containerised maritime transport on Balkan route 118 production in Poland, case study on 181
corruption of law enforcement officials 56 CND (Commission on Narcotic Drugs) 198
criminal phenomenon of ‘undermining’ (ondermijning) in cocaine 17, 126-147
the Netherlands 55 adulteration of 132
darknet markets, double blow for 70 Antwerp, container transport targeting port of 139-141
drug dealing imprisonment, radicalisation and 36 Balkan organised crime networks and cocaine
encrypted phones for criminal purposes 75 trafficking 139
Europe, systemic homicide in 47 coca and cocaine production 131-133
illicit medicines sold online 44 coca cultivation 131-132
international drug-trafficking network disruption 65 coca production, recent trends in 131
intra-EU chemical trafficking for synthetic drug cocaine extraction 130
production 165 cocaine laboratories and cocaine precursors 132-133
law enforcement officials, corruption of 56 cocaine production, recent trends in 131-132
methamphetamine lab on boat in the Netherlands, case cocaine production in Europe 133
study of 159 container transport, targeting port of Antwerp 139-141
municipal waste treatment, dumping drug waste and crack cocaine, retail market for 145-146
closure of 50
crystallisation of 132
online criminality, global actions coordinated by Europol for
current threats and action recommendations 127
dealing with 215
cutting cocaine 144
online sale of illicit medicines 44
departure points for cocaine shipments 136
Operation Cedar and money-laundering
‘superfacilitators’ 52 detection of base-to-hydrochloride laboratories 133
Operation Escalade and firearms, anti-surveillance and environmental impact of cocaine production 133
violence 41 Europe, importation and distribution in 137-139
Operation Pangea XI 44 European retail markets for, expansion of 143-145
Operation Pollino, ‘Ndrangheta clan takedown in 138 in exchange for weapons, case study on 42
Operation Tulipan Blanca 54 extraction of 132
Panama Papers and PANA Committee Report 51 global overview 128, 130-131
radicalisation, imprisonment for drug dealing and 36 Guianese connection 141
sales network dismantling in Operation Dryer 182 importation methods 141
smuggling of migrants and cannabis across levamisole as cutting agent for 144
Mediterranean 40 negative consequences, violence and corruption 142
Stockholm Death Patrol, murder as service and 45 online distribution 147
systemic homicide in Europe 47 Operation Pollino, case study of ‘Ndrangheta clan
terrorist financing 34 takedown in 138
UWOs (unexplained wealth orders) first issue of 202
245
origins of cocaine hydrochloride in Europe (2015- of cannabis, processes 88-90

2018) 135 of coca 131-132
potassium permanganate, seizures of 133 of opium poppy 109
preparedness requirements for dealing with threats 127 current threats, action recommendations and
problem in Europe, growth of 126, 129 amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine 151
production and trafficking, expansion of 126-127 cannabis 83
profiling of 134-135 heroin and other opioids 105
purification of 132 NPS (new psychoactive substances) 175
re-oxidation of 132 Cyprus
record quantities seized in Europe 137-139 cannabis product of preference in 98
retail, supply and use 143-147 cocaine market expansion in 145
retailing in Europe of 146-147 Czechia 18, 29, 71, 135, 145, 162
targeting supply chains for 217-218 cannabis and 92, 95, 101, 112, 114-115, 117
trafficking and supply 134-143 cannabis product of preference in 98
trafficking within EU 142-143 cocaine market expansion in 145
transit areas for cocaine shipments 136-137 methamphetamine production in 162
violence and corruption 142 methamphetamine seizures in 166
wastewater information on retail markets for 144-145 opiate production in 114
Cocaine Route Programme 204, 205, 217, 218 synthetic drugs and 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157,
Cocaine Signature Program 134 158-159, 162, 166, 169
coffeeshops in the Netherlands, ‘controlled cannabis supply
experiment’ 99 D
COLIBRI in Cocaine Route Programme 218 darknet markets 67-72
Colombia 17, 45, 47, 53, 54, 57, 73, 126, 130, 135, 136 Apollon 67, 69
containerised maritime transport, case study of use on Balkan Berlusconi Market 67, 69, 70, 101, 124, 147, 168, 171
route 118 Cannazon 67, 69
corruption 25, 31 darknet monitoring 207
cocaine, violence, corruption and 142 double blow for 70
in the EU, increasing evidence of 5 Dream Market 68, 69, 70, 71, 101, 124, 147, 168
of law enforcement officials 56 Empire Market 67, 69, 147
at ports, dealing with 213-214 Majestic Garden 67, 69
public institutions and 55-57 Nightmare Market 67, 69
of public officials 55-56 Olympus Market 69, 101, 124, 147, 168
Council of the European Union 75, 178, 196-197, 211-212 OW Market 67, 69
counter-terrorism measures 211 Rapture Market 67, 69
responses in the EU 212 sales network dismantling, case study on Operation
counterfeiting 24, 44, 51, 55, 196, 214 Dryer 182
counterfeit medicines 42-43 Serpent Market 67, 69
criminal cooperation, illicit drugs market and 66-67 T•chka 67, 69, 147
criminal flights, operation of 63-64 TradeRoute 69, 70, 71
criminal phenomenon of ‘undermining’ (ondermijning) in the Valhalla 69, 70, 101, 147
Netherlands 55 Wall Street 69, 70, 101, 147
criminal tools 73-75 Zion Market 69, 147
criminality, dealing with drug-associated crime 211-220 delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) 15, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88,
CRIMJUST in Cocaine Route Programme 218 89, 93, 99-101
Croatia 42, 92 Denmark 92
cannabis product of preference in 98 diazepam 180, 187
cocaine market expansion in 145 diazepam fakes, production in Scotland from etizolam 188
crystallisation digital enablement of illicit drugs market 7, 13-14
of heroin 109 Dream Market (darknet) 68, 69, 70, 71, 101, 124, 147, 168
of synthetic drugs 161 drivers of illicit drugs market 13-14, 21-23, 28-57, 60-75
cultivation drugs market in the EU
of cannabis, environmental impact and hazards of 92-93 business costs of drug-related activities 24, 31
246
INDEX
cash generated by drugs trade 24 cocaine market expansion in 145

corruption and 25, 31 NPS production in 180
costs to government of tackling drugs trade 25, 31 synthetic opioid production in 115
current threats and action recommendations 25-26 etizolam, production in Scotland of fake diazepam tablets
digitisation and 25 from 188
drivers and facilitators 22 EU (European Union) 7-8, 9, 11
drug-related violence 24 agencies of 198-200
global drug production 24 AML (Anti-Money Laundering) Directive 201, 202
globalisation and 25 aviation, misuse in drug trafficking in and out of 63-64
human trafficking 24 cannabis in 82, 85
impacts and consequences 23 common forms of synthetic drugs used in 154
preparedness requirements for dealing with threats 25-26 context of EU drug policy 194
regional challenges of 14 cross-border security and health threats 5
trade in illicit commodities 24 distribution and supply of NPS in 183-188
understanding impact of 24-25 drug policy, EU structures developing and supporting 196-
200
see also EU (European Union); illicit drugs market
drug precursor control in 200
E drug supply reduction in, legislation linked to 200-202,
241-242
economic-compulsive drug-violence relationship 45
drug supply reduction policy 194-196
ecstasy (MDMA in tablet form) 18, 30, 65, 138, 150, 154,
155, 156, 162, 167, 169, 171, 182 EU-ACT (EU-Action Against Drug and Organised
Crime) 204, 215
Ecuador 130, 136
heroin, other opioids and 216-217
EMCDDA (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug
Addiction) 7-8, 9, 11, 111, 115, 123-124, 191 eu-LISA 199, 200
amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine 155, 157, EUIPO (European Union Intellectual Property Office) 42,
158, 162-163, 164, 167, 168, 169, 171 44
cannabis 86, 89, 90, 92, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99 Eurojust (EU Judicial Cooperation Unit) 9, 199
cocaine 130, 133, 134, 137, 138, 139, 142, 143, 144, European Agenda on Security (2015) 32
146-147 EWS (Early Warning System) for NPS 18, 43, 123, 179,
drivers and facilitators of drug markets 61, 67, 68-69, 70, 183, 187, 218-219, 220
71, 72, 73, 74 substances reported to 176-177
impacts and consequences of drug markets 28, 29, 30, GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) 74
31, 32, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 53, 55, 56 institutions of 196-198
NPS (new psychoactive substances) 178, 179, 181, 183, intra-EU chemical trafficking for synthetic drug production,
184, 185, 186, 187, 188 case study of 165
policy instruments and structures responding to drug legislation linked to drug supply reduction in 200-202,
markets 197, 198, 199, 204, 205, 206, 207 241-242
targeting operational responses 212, 215, 218, 219-220 markets for synthetic drugs 150, 153
open source information database 61 misuse of general aviation and drug trafficking in and out
Pompidou Group and 56 of 63-64
EMPACT (European Multidisciplinary Platform Against new accelerated procedure to identify and respond to NPS
Criminal Threats) 134, 165, 196, 199, 204, 206, 218 appearing in 220
Empire Market (darknet) 67, 69, 147 NPS developments in 174
encrypted communication devices 74-75 OCGs (organised crime groups) in 5, 13
environmental damage 31, 49-50 identification, disruption and dismantling of 19
cannabis cultivation of, environmental impact and hazards opioid problem in 104, 107
of 92-93 policies and actions, recommendations for 19
cocaine production, environmental impact of 133 policy and action coordination, optimism on 5
indoor cultivation of cannabis, environmental effects of 49 Regulation 1307/2013 86
of waste products from production of synthetic drugs 49, responses to NPS (new psychoactive substances) 178
163-164
systemic homicide in 47
ERICES (European Reporting on Illicit Cocaine
Extraction-Conversion Sites) tool 133 training on dismantling illicit synthetic drug labs 218
Estonia 48 violence and corruption in, increasing evidence of 5
247
see also policy instruments and structures in response to synthetic opioid production in 115
illicit drugs; targeting operational responses fraudulent documents 75
European Border and Coast Guard Agency, see Frontex Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency) 9, 40,
European Commission 8, 9, 32, 37, 39, 52, 56, 112-113, 212 137, 197, 198, 199, 200, 204, 212
policy instruments and structures 194, 197, 201
European Council 61, 196, 197, 211-212, 215 G
European Homicide Monitor 46, 47 gangs, violence and intimidation 48-49
European Medicines Agency 43 GBL (gamma-butyrolactone) 171
European Parliament 51, 178, 196-197, 201, 211, 220 Georgia 119
European Web Survey on Drugs 98 Germany 37, 95, 112, 119, 120
Europol (EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation) 7, 9, amphetamine production in 157
11, 89, 93, 182, 215-216 Bundeskriminalamt 114
cocaine 133, 137, 138, 139, 142, 143, 147 cocaine seizures in 137
Dark Web Team and Cyber Patrol 214 cocaine trafficking in 143
drivers and facilitators of drug markets 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, drug sales revenues in 71
73, 75 homicides trends in 47
heroin and other opioids 111, 115, 117 MDMA seizures in 166
impacts and consequences of drug markets 31, 32, methamphetamine seizures in 166
38-40, 42, 44, 45, 48, 50-55 opiate production in 114
policy instruments and structures 195, 199, 200, 202, synthetic opioid production in 115
207
Ghana 95
role in drug-related operational activity 210-211
GHB (gamma-hydroxybutyric acid) 171
synthetic drugs 156, 158, 163, 165, 168, 171
Gibraltar 40, 97
Eurostat 29, 61, 67, 72, 144, 205
global overviews
F amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine 152, 155
Facebook, drug dealing on 72 cannabis 84, 87-88
families, drug markets and harms to 44-50 heroin and other opioids 106, 108-109
Fassih, Naoufal 47 NPS (new psychoactive substances) 176-177, 178-180
FATF (Financial Action Task Force) 33, 34, 213 globalisation 7, 25, 33, 42, 51, 60-67, 76, 178, 201
Egmont Group and 50 Greece 48, 92, 115, 119
fentanyl derivatives 16, 18, 43, 65, 66-67, 104, 108, 115, cannabis cultivation in 94
121-123, 217 cannabis seizures in 90
NPS (new psychoactive substances) 174, 177, 179, opiate production in 114
181-182, 186-187 griseofulvine as cutting agent for heroin 116
financial instruments 203
Finland 74 H
cannabis product of preference in 98 hemp fibre 86, 87
drug-related homicide in 46 herbal cannabis 86
methamphetamine seizures in 166 production outside the EU 90
firearms production within the EU 90-92
anti-surveillance and violence, Operation Escalade and 41 trafficking from outside the EU 95
and other weapons, drugs market and 74 trafficking inside the EU 95
trafficking of 40-42 heroin and other opioids 104-124
flualprazolam 176 acetic anhydride, case study on trafficking from the EU to
France 17, 40, 96, 112, 119 Turkey using roll-on roll-off ferries 114
cannabis product of preference in 98 acetic anhydride, heroin precursor 111-114
cannabis social clubs in 91 acetylation of morphine 109
cocaine seizures in 137 adulteration of heroin 109, 115-116
cocaine trafficking in 143 Balkan route 117
MDMA seizures in 166 case study of two-way trafficking on 109
methamphetamine seizures in 166 caffeine as cutting agent for heroin 116
Service d’Information de Renseignement et d’Analyse consumer market for heroin 123-124
Stratégique sur la Criminalité Organisée 97
248
INDEX
containerised maritime transport, case study of use on corruption of public officials 55-56
Balkan route 118 counterfeit medicines and 42-43
crystallisation of heroin 109 criminal cooperation and 66-67
cultivation of opium poppy 109 criminal flights, operation of 63-64
current threats and action recommendations 105 criminal tools and 73-75
Europe, opioid problem in 104, 107 darknet drug markets 67-72
extraction of morphine 109 development and governance, impact on 57
global overview 106, 108-109 digital enablement of 7, 13-14
griseofulvine as cutting agent for heroin 116 drivers of 13-14, 21-23, 28-57, 60-75
harvesting of opium 109 drug-related homicide 45-47
heroin 16-17, 108 economic-compulsive drug-violence relationship 45
heroin production, trends in 110-111 encrypted communication devices 74
heroin trafficking environmental damage 31, 49-50
to Europe 116-117 Facebook, drug dealing on 72
within Europe 119-120 facilitators of 60-75
OCGs involved in 120-121 families, harms to 44-50
Northern route 119 Finland, drug-related homicide in 46
online distribution 124 firearms and other weapons 74
opiate production in Europe 114-115 firearms trafficking and 40-42
opiates 108 fraudulent documents 75
opioids 108 future-oriented approach and preparedness against threat
opium production, trends in 109-110 of 76-77
paracetamol as cutting agent for heroin 116 gangs, violence and intimidation 48-49
phenacetin as cutting agent for heroin 116 globalisation and 7, 60-67
preparedness requirements for dealing with threats 105 government expenditure and 56
production and precursors 109-116 human trafficking and 31
production and trafficking, developments in 104-105 impacts of 13-14, 21-23, 28-31
retail supply and use 123-124 individuals, harms to 44-50
Southern Caucasus route 119 informal value transfer systems 53-54
Southern route 118-119 intimidation 48-49
synthetic opioids Ireland, impact on communities in 49
production in Europe 115 knowledge gaps in estimation processes 30
trafficking and distribution 121-123 legal economies, impacts on 50-55
trafficking and supply 116-123 logistics, transportation and 60-62
tramadol (synthetic opioid) 122 maritime routes, growing threat of exploitation of 61
homicide 45-47 maritime trafficking, diversification of modus operandi 62
human trafficking migrant smuggling and 39-40
counter-measures against 211-212 misuse of general aviation and 63-64
illicit drugs market and 31 money laundering 31, 50-52
Hungary 120 syndicates for 51-52
cocaine market expansion in 145 money transfer systems 52-54
monitoring of, challenging nature of 8
I neighbourhoods, harms to 44-50
illicit drugs market Netherlands, drug-related homicide in 46, 47
action, key themes and implications for 14-15 online criminal cooperation and 66-67
alcohol and 43-44 online markets and 67-73
analysis of, key themes emergent from 14-15 polycriminality and 66
businesses, impact on 54-55 post and parcel services, use in 64-66
chemical masking of drugs 73 precursor innovation and 73
cigarettes and 43-44 preparedness against threat of, future-oriented approach
consequences of 28-57 and 76-77
corruption, public institutions and 55-57 production and smuggling, new techniques in 73
249
psychopharmacological drug-violence relationship 45 J

public institutions, strains on 55-57 jihadist terrorism 24, 33, 34, 35-36
ramifications of, extent of 31
research on, challenging nature of 8 K
responding to 191, 194-207, 210-220 ketamine 170-171
size of 28-31 knowledge gaps in estimation processes 30
challenge of estimation of 29-30 Kosovo 37, 38, 114
limitations on estimation of 30 Kurdistan 35
smartphone apps and 72 Kyrgyzstan 112
smuggling, new techniques in 73
L
social networks and 72
Latin America 17, 32, 73, 126, 127, 136
surface web and 67
Latvia 112
Sweden, drug-related homicide in 46
systemic drug-violence relationship 45
cocaine market expansion in 145
technology, innovation and 67-73
synthetic opioid production in 115
terrorism, links to 31, 32-37
Lebanon 52, 83, 93, 96, 142, 167, 216
trade in other illicit goods and 40-42
legislation
trafficking in human beings and 37-39
key legislation in response to illicit drugs 200-202
transportation, logistics and 60-62
Libya 34, 41, 83, 96
UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), use of 63
Lithuania
unauthorised medicines and 42-43
under-reporting of use of drugs 30
value of seized drugs, assessment of 28
cocaine seizures in 137
violence
logistics
intimidation and 31
of synthetic drug production 159-162
spread of gang influence and 48
transportation and 60-62
virtual money laundering 53
low-THC/high-CBD products 99
see also policy instruments and structures in response to
illicit drugs; targeting operational responses Luxembourg 29
illicit medicines sold online 44 cannabis product of preference in 98
imprisonment, radicalisation and 36 cannabis seizures in 90
INCB (International Narcotics Control Board) 11, 111-112, cocaine market expansion in 145
114, 132-133, 198, 204, 206
M
India 42
Majestic Garden darknet market 67, 69
informal value transfer systems 53-54
Malta
international drug-trafficking network disruption 65
cannabis seizures in 90
intimidation 48-49
Iran 16, 34, 112
MAOC (N) (Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre —
morphine and heroin seizures in 111
Narcotics) 204, 215
opiate seizures in 109
MAPA (methyl-alpha-phenylacetoacetate) 160, 161, 166
Iraq 112
marijuana see herbal cannabis
Ireland 17, 48, 95
maritime routes, growing threat of exploitation of 61
Criminal Assets Bureau 202
maritime trafficking, diversification of modus operandi 62
drug distribution networks in 49
MD (MDMA in crystal form) 154
impact of drugs market on communities in 49
MDMA (methylenedioxy-methamphetamine) 17-18, 154-155
Italy 17, 29, 35, 38, 40, 96, 115, 119
MDMA hydrochloride 154
production methods and sites 157-158
retail supply and use of 168-169
cannabis social clubs in 91
supply chain logistics 156
cocaine trafficking in 143
MDMB-CHMICA 177
drug and cash seizures in 53
Melilla 34
mephedrone 170, 177, 188
250
INDEX
methadone 43, 104, 121 Northern route 16, 105, 107, 116, 119
methamphetamine 17-18, 154-155 Norway 45, 92
lab on boat in the Netherlands, case study of 159 cannabis seizures in 90
methamphetamine hydrochloride 154 cocaine seizures in 137
production methods and sites 158-159 NPS (new psychoactive substances) 18-19, 174-188
retail supply and use of 169-170 aminoindanes 176
Mexico 18, 151 arylalkylamines 176, 177
Middle East 17, 18, 32, 127, 151, 167 arylcyclohexylamines 176
migrant smuggling 39-40 Belgium, NPS production in 180
money laundering 31, 50-52 benzodiazepines 176, 177
dealing with 213 distribution and supply in Europe of 187-188
‘superfacilitators’ 52 carfentanil 177
syndicates for 51-52 in Europe 187
money transfer systems 52-54 cathinones 18, 19, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180,
monitoring drug markets 205-207 181-182, 183, 188
challenging nature of 8 China, NPS production in 180
Morocco 14, 16, 17, 34, 40, 45, 63, 127 clephedrone production in Poland, case study on 181
cannabis cultivation in 93, 95, 96 current threats and action recommendations 175
Rif Mountains and production in 82, 83, 91, 93 darknet market sales network dismantling, case study on
Operation Dryer 182
municipal waste treatment, dumping drug waste and closure
of 50 diazepam fakes, production in Scotland from etizolam 188
murder as service and Stockholm Death Patrol 45 distribution and supply in Europe 183-188
Estonia, NPS production in 180
N etizolam, production in Scotland of fake diazepam tablets
neighbourhoods, drugs market harms to 44-50 from 188
Netherlands 16, 17, 18, 41, 74, 83, 95, 112, 119, 120, 127, EU EWS (Early Warning System) for 18, 43, 123, 179,
131, 151 183, 187, 218-219, 220
amphetamine production in 157 substances reported to 176-177
cannabis product of preference in 98 Europe, NPS developments in 174
cannabis seizures in 91 Europe, responses to 178
cannabis social clubs in 91 fentanyl derivatives 174, 177, 179, 181-182, 186-187
case study of methamphetamine lab on boat in 159 flualprazolam 176
challenges of estimation of synthetic drug production global overview 176-177, 178-180
in 162 Italy, NPS production in 180
cocaine seizures in 137 MDMB-CHMICA 177
coffeeshops in, ‘controlled cannabis supply mephedrone 177
experiment’ 99 Netherlands, NPS production in 180
criminal phenomenon of ‘undermining’ (ondermijning) Operation Dryer, case study on NPS darknet market sales
in 55 network dismantling 182
drug and cash seizures in 53 phenethylamines 176, 177
drug-related homicide in 46, 47 piperazines 176
drug sales revenues in 71 piperidines and pyrrolidines 176
estimation of herbal cannabis production in 92 plants and extracts 176
intimidation tactics by criminal organisations in 49 Poland, NPS production in 180
Netbeheer Nederland 54, 92 preparedness requirements for dealing with threats 175
NPS production in 180 production 180-183
opiate production in 114 trafficking and, developments in 174-175
police in 55, 91 Romania, NPS production in 180
New Zealand 17, 127 seizure data 179
Nigeria 95 Slovakia, NPS production in 180
Nightmare Market (darknet) 67, 69 Sweden, NPS seizures in 187
North Africa 17, 32, 40-41, 96, 127, 130 synthetic cannabinoids 176, 177
Northern Ireland 35-36 distribution and supply in Europe of 184
251
synthetic cathinones opioid substitution treatment 43

distribution and supply in Europe of 185 opioids 16-17, 108
HIV outbreaks and 175 opium production, trends in 109-110
synthetic opioids 176, 177 see also heroin and other opioids
distribution and supply in Europe of 186-187 Øresund Bridge 119
tryptamines 176, 177 OW Market (darknet) 67, 69
use of 188
P
O Pakistan 16
Oceania 18, 108, 131, 134, 151, 155, 158 morphine and heroin seizures in 111
OCGs (organised crime groups) 13-14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 25 opiate seizures in 109
amphetamine, MDMA, methamphetamine and 150, 151, Panama Papers and PANA Committee Report 51
157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 166-168 paracetamol as cutting agent for heroin 116
cannabis and 82, 91, 92, 95-97, 99 Paraguay 128, 136, 140
cocaine and 126, 127, 133, 137, 138-139, 141, 142, Peru 130, 135, 136
143, 146
phenacetin as cutting agent for heroin 116
cocaine trafficking and distribution by 17
phenethylamines 176, 177
drug market driving and facilitation by 61, 63, 64, 65, 66,
piperazines 176
73, 74, 75, 76, 77
piperidines and pyrrolidines 176
heroin, other opioids and 104, 105, 113, 114, 117,
120-121, 124 PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) 35, 36
heroin trafficking and distribution by 16 PMK (piperonyl methyl ketone) 157, 159, 160, 161, 163, 165,
166
heroin trafficking by 120-121
Poland 18, 112, 115
impacts and consequences of activities of 33, 36, 37-38,
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 51-53, 54, 55, 56 amphetamine production in 157
NPS (new psychoactive substances) and 175, 182 cannabis product of preference in 98
policy instruments and structures in response to illicit cocaine market expansion in 145
drugs 194, 196, 198, 201, 204, 205 NPS production in 180
targeting operational responses 210, 213, 216 police in 181
OCTF (Organised Crime Task Force) 36 policy instruments and structures in response to illicit
Olympus Market (darknet) 69, 101, 124, 147, 168 drugs 194-207
online criminality AML (Anti-Money Laundering) Directive (EU) 201, 202
case study of global actions coordinated by Europol for CCWP (Working Party on Customs Union) 197
dealing with 215 CELAC (Dialogues on Drugs with Latin America and the
cooperation in illicit drugs market 66-67 Caribbean) 198
online distribution context of EU drug policy 194
cannabis 101 COSI (Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on
Internal Security) 195, 196, 197
heroin and other opioids 124
darknet monitoring 207
online markets
drug policy, EU structures developing and support-
illicit drugs market and 67-73
ing 196-200
for illicit medicines 44
drug precursor control in EU 200
private sector cooperation on dealing with online markets
drug supply issues, EU structures addressing 197
and social networks 215
EEAS (European External Action Service) 197
responding to drug distribution using 214-215
EU agencies 198-200
open source information 206-207
EU drug supply reduction policy 194-196
Operation Cedar and money-laundering ‘superfacilitators’ 52
EU institutions 196-198
Operation Dryer, case study on NPS darknet market sales
network dismantling 182 eu-LISA 199, 200
Operation Escalade 41 European Arrest Warrant 201
Operation Pangea XI 44 European Evidence Warrant 201
Operation Tulipan Blanca 54 European Firearms Directive 201
operational responses see targeting operational responses financial instruments 203
opiates 108 Global SMART (Synthetics Monitoring: Analyses, Reporting
and Trends) Programme 205
production in Europe 114-115
252
INDEX
HDG (Horizontal Working Party on Drugs) 196 heroin and other opioids 109-116
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission 194 NPS (new psychoactive substances) 180-183
key legislation 200-202 smuggling and, new techniques in 73
MASP (multiannual strategic plan) of EU Home Affairs synthetic drugs 155-164
Ministers 195 production and trafficking, developments in
monitoring drug markets 205-207 amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine 150-151
open source information 206-207 cannabis 82
partners, platforms and programmes 204-205 heroin and other opioids 104-105
policy cycle 195-196 NPS (new psychoactive substances) 174-175
SOCTA (Serious and Organised Crime Threat psychopharmacological drug-violence relationship 45
Assessment) 195-196, 206
public institutions, strains on 55-57
UWO (Unexplained Wealth Order) 201-202
wastewater data 205-206 R
polycriminality 66 radicalisation, imprisonment for drug dealing and 36
Portugal Rapture Market (darknet) 67, 69
cannabis seizures in 90 Reitox network 9
cocaine seizures in 137 retail supply and use
post and parcel services, use in illicit drugs market 64-66 cannabis 98-101
precursors heroin and other opioids 123-124
acetic anhydride, heroin precursor 111-114 synthetic drugs 168-170
and alternative chemicals used in synthetic Romania 112, 119, 120
production 159-162
cocaine laboratories and cocaine precursors 132-133
heroin production and 109-116
RoW (Rose of the Winds) 96, 216
precursor conversion, synthetic drugs 161
Russia 17, 105, 115, 116, 119, 121, 127, 137, 198
precursor innovation 73
preparedness S
cannabis 83 SCORE (Sewage Analysis Core Group Europe) 158, 170
climate change, impact of 77 Scotland 48
commercial trade flows, infrastructure developments Scottish Government 49
and 76 SEACOP in Cocaine Route Programme 218
conflict, impact of 77 Serbia 17, 92
cybercrime 76 Serpent Market (darknet) 67, 69
digitally enabled drug markets 76 Slovakia 92, 95
future-oriented approach 76-77 cocaine market expansion in 145
globalisation and 76 NPS production in 180
growth of new drug markets, impact on less developed synthetic opioid production in 115
countries 77
Slovenia 112
heroin and other opioids 105
cannabis social clubs in 91
infrastructure developments and 76
less developed countries, impact of new drug markets
growth on 77 smartphone apps 72
market model disruptions 77 smuggling
NPS (new psychoactive substances) 175 of migrants and cannabis across Mediterranean 40
political instability, impact of 77 new techniques in 73
regulatory gaps and differences 77 social networks
synthetic drugs 151 illicit drugs market and 72
PRIME (Preventing, Interdicting and Mitigating Extremism) responding to drug distribution using 214-215
project 37 SOCTA (Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment) 13, 66,
production 75, 195-196, 206
of BMK (benzyl methyl ketone), alternative chemicals South America 13, 14, 44, 126, 127, 130
in 160 Southern Caucasus route 116, 119
cannabis 88-94 Southern route 16, 105, 107, 116, 118-119
253
Spain 16, 17, 34, 40, 45, 63, 73, 112, 119, 126, 127, 131 T
cannabis cultivation in 95 tableting synthetic drugs 162
cannabis entry point 82-83 Taiwan 112
cannabis seizures in 90-91 Taliban 32
cannabis social clubs in 91 targeting operational responses 210-220
cocaine seizures in 137 AIRCOP in Cocaine Route Programme 218
drug and cash seizures in 53 Antwerp, Stroomplan Initiative targeting cocaine trafficking
drug sales revenues in 71 through 219
Guardia Civil in 54, 182 cannabis, targeting supply chains for 216
MDMA seizures in 166 CEPOL-Europol illicit synthetic drugs laboratory
dismantling course 218
methamphetamine seizures in 166
cocaine, targeting supply chains for 217-218
opiate production in 114
Cocaine Route Programme 204, 205, 217, 218
Stockholm Death Patrol, murder as service and 45
COLIBRI in Cocaine Route Programme 218
Stormont Agreement — A Fresh Start (2015) 36
corruption at ports, dealing with 213-214
Stroomplan Initiative, targeting cocaine trafficking through
Antwerp 219 counter-terrorism measures 211
Suez Canal 16 counter-terrorism responses in EU 212
supply chain targeting 215-220 CRIMJUST in Cocaine Route Programme 218
surface web 67 drug-market-associated criminality, dealing with 211-220
Suriname 112 drug supply chain targeting 215-220
Sweden 29, 48, 74, 92 EMPACT (European Multidisciplinary Platform Against
Criminal Threats) 134, 165, 196, 199, 204, 206, 218
amphetamine production in 157
OAPs (operational action plans) 215-216
child exploitation by OCGs in 38
EU-ACT (EU-Action Against Drug and Organised
Crime) 204, 215
drug-related homicide in 46
heroin, other opioids and 216-217
homicides trends in 47
EU new accelerated procedure to identify and respond to
NPS seizures in 187 NPS appearing in 220
responding to new synthetic opioids in 217 EU training on dismantling illicit synthetic drug labs 218
synthetic opioid production in 115 Europol Dark Web Team and Cyber Patrol 214
Switzerland 46, 206, 213 Europol role in drug-related operational activity 210-211
cannabis social clubs in 91 human trafficking, counter-measures against 211-212
synthetic cannabinoids 18, 176, 177 money laundering, dealing with 213
distribution and supply in Europe of 184 NPS, EU EWS (Early Warning System) for 176, 218-219,
synthetic cathinones 220
distribution and supply in Europe of 185 online criminality, case study of global actions coordinated
HIV outbreaks and 175 by Europol for dealing with 215
synthetic drugs 17-18 online markets, responding to drug distribution
using 214-215
common forms of 154
private sector cooperation on dealing with online markets
production in EU of, challenges of estimation of 162
and social networks 215
production of, complex logistical exercise of 159-162
RoW (Rose of the Winds) 96, 216
production sites for, cost of dismantling 166
SEACOP in Cocaine Route Programme 218
synthesis (‘cooking’) process for 161-162
social networks, responding to drug distribution us-
see also, amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine ing 214-215
synthetic opioids 176, 177 Stroomplan Initiative, targeting cocaine trafficking through
distribution and supply in Europe of 186-187 Antwerp 219
production in Europe 115 Sweden, responding to new synthetic opioids in 217
trafficking and distribution 121-123 UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme 204, 218
Syria 34, 35 violence and intimidation, measures to deal with 212-213
systemic drug-violence relationship 45 TATP (triacetone triperoxide) 36
systemic homicide in Europe 47 T•chka darknet market 67, 69, 147
Team Mare (Europol) 40
technology, innovation and 67-73
254
INDEX
terrorism unauthorised medicines 42-43

illicit drugs market and 31 under-reporting of use of drugs 30
links to drugs 32-37 United States 131
terrorist financing 34 DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) 42
Thailand 95 Department of Justice 33
THC (tetrahydrocannabinol) 15, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, Justice Department Consolidated Priority Organisation
99-101 Targets 33
TradeRoute darknet market 69, 70, 71 UNODC (UN Office on Drugs and Crime) 11, 178, 203, 218
trafficking cannabis and 86, 87, 92, 93, 96
cannabis 94-97 cocaine and 131, 132, 134, 135, 136
heroin and other opioids 116-123 heroin, other opioids and 108-111, 114, 115-116, 119
human beings 37-39 UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme 204, 218
synthetic drugs 164-168 Working Group on Firearms 40
tramadol (synthetic opioid) 104, 121, 122 UWO (Unexplained Wealth Order) 201-202
transportation
intermodal transportation networks 25 V
logistics and 60-62 Valhalla darknet market 69, 70, 101, 147
Trimbos Institute 169, 170 Vega, Richard Eduardo Riquelme 47
tryptamines 176, 177 Vietnam 16, 38, 92
Turkey 14, 16, 17, 18, 45, 96, 97, 104, 112, 120, 127, 151 violence
amphetamine seizures in 167 cocaine trade, negative consequences of violence and
corruption in 142
and corruption in EU, increasing evidence of 5
cocaine seizures in 137
drug-related violence 24
crack cocaine seizures in 146
economic-compulsive drug-violence relationship 45
morphine and heroin seizures in 111
firearms, anti-surveillance and violence, Operation
opiate production in 114 Escalade and 41
opiate seizures in 109 intimidation and 31
intimidation and, measures to deal with 212-213
U
between OCGs in cannabis trade 97
UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), use of 63
psychopharmacological drug-violence relationship 45
UK (United Kingdom) 16, 17, 41, 48, 74, 95, 119, 120, 121,
131 spread of gang influence and 48
cannabis product of preference in 98 systemic drug-violence relationship 45
cannabis seizures in 91 virtual money laundering 53
cannabis social clubs in 91 W
cocaine trafficking in 143 Wall Street Market (darknet) 69, 70, 101, 147
Drug Dealing Telecommunications Restriction Orders waste materials, environmental impact of 162-164
Regulation (2017) 213 waste treatment, dumping drug waste and closure of 50
drug sales revenues in 71 wastewater data 205-206
herbal cannabis production in 91 WATCH wastewater analysis 158
Home Office 47, 213 weapons, cocaine in exchange for 42
homicides trends in 47 West Africa 32, 42, 90, 130
MDMA seizures in 166 WHO (World Health Organization) 88, 122
NCA (National Crime Agency) 39, 41, 47, 48, 67, 74, 213 cannabis, recommendations on 88
Office for National Statistics 54 ECDD (Expert Committee on Drug Dependence) 88
Unexplained Wealth Orders, case study of first issue WHOIS database 74
of 202
Ukraine 119 Z
UN (United Nations) 40, 132 Zion darknet market 69, 147
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and zolpidem 43
Psychotropic Substances (1988) 132
zopiclone 43
drug control conventions 88
255
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About this publication
The EU Drug Markets Report 2019 is the third comprehensive overview of illicit drug markets in
the European Union by the EMCDDA and Europol. The analysis presented in this report spans
numerous topics such as the links between drugs and other crimes, the licit economy and society
more generally as well as the processes and players involved in the trade from production and
trafficking to distribution. Taking an evidence-based approach, the report reviews the markets
for heroin, cocaine, cannabis, amphetamine, methamphetamine, MDMA and new psychoactive
substances. It also provides action points to inform policy development at EU and national level.
This publication is an essential reference for law enforcement professionals, policymakers, the
academic community and indeed for anyone seeking up-to-date information and analysis on drug
markets in Europe.
About the EMCDDA
The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) is the central source
and confirmed authority on drug-related issues in Europe. For over 20 years, it has been collecting,
analysing and disseminating scientifically sound information on drugs and drug addiction
and their consequences, providing its audiences with an evidence-based picture of the drug
phenomenon at European level. Based in Lisbon, the EMCDDA is one of the decentralised
agencies of the European Union.
www.emcdda.europa.eu
About Europol
Europol is the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, whose mission is
to support its Member States. Europol employs almost 1 000 staff at its headquarters in The
Hague. They provide a unique and evolving set of operational products and services to EU law
enforcement authorities in their fight against serious and organised crime, cybercrime and
terrorism. Europol is at the heart of the EU’s security architecture and has developed into the
hub for the exchange of criminal intelligence in Europe. Europol’s focus is to look ahead for more
opportunities to streamline law enforcement cooperation in order to create a safer Europe for the
benefit of all EU citizens.
www.europol.europa.eu

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EU Drug

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019

Print ISBN 978-92-9497-421-1 doi: 10.2810/53181 TD-03-19-332-EN-C

PDF ISBN 978-92-9497-422-8 doi: 10.2810/561192 TD-03-19-332-EN-N

© European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2019

191 PART III

The analysis underpinning this report is strengthened by the complementary perspectives

The increasingly globalised and digitally-enabled nature of drug markets illustrated in

Alexis Goosdeel Catherine De Bolle

Director, EMCDDA Executive Director, Europol

Q the European Commission;

Q Belgian Federal Police;

Q European estimates were obtained by summing individual country estimates;

Impacts and drivers of drug markets

Key themes and implications for action

Reducing vulnerabilities at external borders

Focusing on key geographical locations for trafficking and production

Investing in forensic and toxicological capacity

Addressing the links with other important security threats

Recognising the costs of drug-related violence and corruption

Responding to digitally enabled drug markets

Acting at a global level

Heroin and other opioids

Synthetic drugs: amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine

Europe’s synthetic drugs market, particularly in respect to stimulants like amphetamine,

New psychoactive substances

Policies and actions

Impacts and drivers of drug markets

This report uses a very broad definition of the illicit drug

This part of the report introduces the latest findings on

Key points from Part I

Understanding the impact of the European drug market

Globalisation and digitalisation driving

Assessing the value of seized drugs

€7.4 bn Heroin €30 billion

Source: EMCDDA (2019a).

The challenge of estimating the size of the illicit drug market

synthetic drug production sites in Europe. In the three years

Links to terrorism and wider The global picture

However, drug trafficking is not the only source of funding

Table 1.1 A focus on Europe

Low-level terrorist financing

were unemployed and had no legal of Organisation X, only seven of

Imprisonment for drug dealing leading to radicalisation

Child exploitation by OCGs in Sweden

Smuggling of migrants and cannabis across the Mediterranean Sea

Operation Escalade: illicit firearms, anti-surveillance and violence

Exchange of cocaine for weapons

Operation Pangea XI: illicit medicines sold online

resulting in 859 arrests worldwide medication, painkillers, erectile

Murder as a service: Stockholm’s Death Patrol

Systemic homicide in Europe

Dumping leads to closure of municipal waste treatment plant

Drug-related organised criminals use a range of techniques Money-laundering syndicates

Panama Papers and PANA Committee report

Money-laundering ‘superfacilitators’: Operation Cedar

system, especially the banking system. However, regulation Impact on businesses

Operation Tulipan Blanca

The drug trade can also have a more general and