Case Name: G.R. No.

177467 March 9, 2011  Thereafter, Velasco received a "Third Show-cause Notice," together with copies
PFIZER, INC. AND/OR REY GERARDO BACARRO, AND/OR FERDINAND CORTES, AND/OR of the affidavits of two Branch Managers of Mercury Drug, asking her for her
ALFRED MAGALLON, AND/OR ARISTOTLE ARCE, Petitioners, comment within 48 hours.
vs.  Finally, PFIZER informed Velasco of its "Management Decision" terminating her
GERALDINE VELASCO, Respondent. employment.
 The Labor Arbiter rendered its decision declaring the dismissal of Velasco illegal,
Topic: Consequences of Dismissal Author: Nur ordering her reinstatement with backwages and further awarding moral and
exemplary damages with attorney’s fees. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the same
Doctrine:
but deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages. Undaunted, PFIZER
appealed to the CA to annul and set aside the aforementioned NLRC issuances.
In sum, the Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement pending appeal necessitates
The CA upheld the validity of respondent’s dismissal from employment.
that it must be immediately self-executory without need for a writ of execution during the
Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, wherein the CA affirmed
pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose, and any attempt on the part
the validity of respondent’s dismissal from employment but modified its earlier
of the employer to evade or delay its execution should not be allowed.
ruling by directing PFIZER to pay respondent her wages from the date of the
Labor Arbiter’s Decision up to the Court of Appeals Decision.
Facts:  Pfizer’s contention – it should no longer be required to pay wages considering
 Private Velasco was employed with petitioner PFIZER, INC. as Professional Health that it had already previously paid an enormous sum to respondent under the
Care Representative since 1992. Sometime in April 2003, Velasco had a medical writ of execution issued by the LA
work up for her high-risk pregnancy and was subsequently advised bed rest which
resulted in her extending her leave of absence. Issue/s:
 While Velasco was still on leave, PFIZER through its Area Sales Manager (Cortez), 1. Whether the CA committed error when it ordered Pfizer to pay Velasco wages from
personally served Velasco a "Show-cause Notice" mentioning about an the date of the Labor Arbiter’s decision ordering her reinstatement until the time
investigation on her possible violations of company work rules regarding when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision declaring Velasco’s dismissal valid
"unauthorized deals and/or discounts in money or samples and unauthorized
withdrawal and/or pull-out of stocks". The notice also advised her that she was
RULING/RATIO:
being placed under "preventive suspension" for 30 days and consequently
ordered to surrender the "accountabilities” (Company Car; Samples and Promats;
NO.
CRF/ER/VEHICLE/SOA/POSAP/MPOA and other related Company Forms; Cash
Card; Caltex Card; and MPOA/TPOA Revolving Travel Fund)
Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement “shall either
 The following day, petitioner Cortez together with one Efren Dariano retrieved be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
the above-mentioned "accountabilities" from Velasco’s residence. In response, dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the
Velasco sent a letter addressed to Cortez denying the charges. Velasco claimed payroll.” It is established in jurisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to a
that the transaction with Mercury Drug, Magsaysay Branch was merely to state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. The person reinstated
accommodate two undisclosed patients of a certain Dr. Renato Manalo. In assumes the position he had occupied prior to his dismissal.
support thereto, Velasco attached the Doctor’s letter and the affidavit of the
latter’s secretary.
 Later on, Velasco received a "Second Show-cause Notice" informing her that a Here, it cannot be said that with PFIZER’s June 27, 2005 Letter, in belated fulfillment of the
certain Carlito Jomen executed an affidavit pointing to Velasco as the one who Labor Arbiter’s reinstatement order, had shown a clear intent to reinstate respondent to
transacted with a printing shop to print PFIZER discount coupons. Jomen also her former position under the same terms and conditions nor to a substantially equivalent
presented text messages originating from Velasco’s company issued cellphone position because the return-to-work order PFIZER sent respondent is silent with regard to
referring to the printing of the said coupons. the position or the exact nature of employment that it wanted respondent to take up as of
 That same day, Velasco filed a complaint for illegal suspension with money claims July 1, 2005.
before the Regional Arbitration Branch. The following day, PFIZER sent her a
letter inviting her to a disciplinary hearing. Velasco received it under protest and Even if we assume that the job awaiting respondent in the new location is of the same
informed PFIZER via the receiving copy of the said letter that she had lodged a designation and pay category as what she had before, it is plain from the text of PFIZER’s
complaint against the latter and that the issues that may be raised in the hearing letter that such reinstatement was not "under the same terms and conditions" as her
"can be tackled during the hearing of her case" or at the preliminary conference. previous employment, considering that PFIZER ordered respondent to report to its main
She likewise opted to withhold answering the Second Show-cause Notice. office in Makati City while knowing fully well that respondent’s previous job had her
stationed in Baguio City (respondent’s place of residence) and it was still necessary for decision of the Labor Arbiter by the CA. However, this is without merit, since the
respondent to be briefed regarding her work assignments and responsibilities, including prevailing principle is that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is
her relocation benefits. reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay
wages of the dismissed employee during the period of the appeal until reversal by the
Also, the Court does not see respondent’s letter as taking away the option from higher court.
management to effect actual or payroll reinstatement but, rather under the factual milieu
of this case, where the employer failed to categorically reinstate the employee to her DISPOSITIVE: PETITION DENIED, CA AFFIRMED.
former or equivalent position under the same terms, respondent was not obliged to comply
with PFIZER’s ambivalent return-to-work order.

Foreseeably, an employer may circumvent the immediately enforceable reinstatement

order of the Labor Arbiter by crafting return-to-work directives that are ambiguous or
meant to be rejected by the employee and then disclaim liability for backwages due to non-
reinstatement by capitalizing on the employee’s purported refusal to work. In sum, the
option of the employer to effect actual or payroll reinstatement must be exercised in good
faith.

In sum, the Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement pending appeal necessitates
that it must be immediately self-executory without need for a writ of execution during
the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose, and any attempt on
the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution should not be allowed.

Furthermore, we likewise restate our ruling that an order for reinstatement entitles an
employee to receive his accrued backwages from the moment the reinstatement order
was issued up to the date when the same was reversed by a higher court without fear of
refunding what he had received.

PFIZER's previous payment to respondent of the amount of P1,963,855.00 (representing

her wages from December 5, 2003, or the date of the Labor Arbiter decision, until May 5,
2005) that was successfully garnished under the Labor Arbiter's Writ of Execution dated
May 26, 2005 cannot be considered in its favor. Not only was this sum legally due to
respondent under prevailing jurisprudence but also this circumstance highlighted
PFIZER's unreasonable delay in complying with the reinstatement order of the Labor
Arbiter.

A perusal of the records, including PFIZER's own submissions, confirmed that it only
required respondent to report for work on July 1, 2005, as shown by its Letter dated June
27, 2005, which is almost two years from the time the order of reinstatement was handed
down in the Labor Arbiter's Decision dated December 5, 2003.

In the case at bar, PFIZER did not immediately admit respondent back to work which,
according to the law, should have been done as soon as an order or award of
reinstatement is handed down by the Labor Arbiter without need for the issuance of a
writ of execution. Thus, respondent was entitled to the wages paid to her under the
aforementioned writ of execution.

In any case, Pfizer implores the court to annul the award of backwages and separation
pay as well as to require respondent to refund the amount that she was able to collect
by way of garnishment from Pfizer as her accrued salaries, considering the reversal of the