HSC - Strategy-Report - 2020-hsc PDF
HSC - Strategy-Report - 2020-hsc PDF
HSC - Strategy-Report - 2020-hsc PDF
Chris Hunt While any index target remains speculative, there is no doubt stock selection will
Head of Research remain key.
chris.hunt@hsc.com.vn
Hanoi office
Level 2, Cornerstone building
16 Phan Chu Trinh, Hoan Kiem District
T: (+84 24) 3933 4693
F: (+84 24) 3933 4822
E: info@hsc.com.vn
www.hsc.com.vn
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Table of Contents
Investment Summary: a great long term story .................................................................................................................. 3
The macro outlook: Reasons to be cheerful ..................................................................................................................... 8
Politics: Stability, resilience & positive change ............................................................................................................... 33
Demographics: Underpins everything ............................................................................................................................. 35
ESG: The start of positive change .................................................................................................................................. 40
Financial market restructuring & MSCI EM inclusion – the great stimulus to come? ..................................................... 45
Future stock market performance: The devil remains in the detail ................................................................................. 54
Chris Hunt - Head of Research Do Minh Trang - Sector Head Tran Huong My - Sector Head
chris.hunt@hsc.com.vn my.th@hsc.com.vn
+84 28 3823-3299 x350 trang.dminh@hsc.com.vn
+84 28 3823-3299 x168 +84 28 3823-3299 x362
Industrials
Pham Lien Ha Truong Hong Kim
Vo Thi Ngoc Han - Sector Head ha.plien@hsc.com.vn kim.thong@hsc.com.vn
+84 24 3933-4693 x4850
han.vtn@hsc.com.vn +84 24 3933-4693 x4847
+84 28 3823-3299 x314 Bui Nguyen Cam Giang
Nguyen Manh Dung
giang.bnc@hsc.com.vn
Che Thi Mai Trang dung.nmanh@hsc.com.vn +84 28 3823-3299 x369
trang.ctmai@hsc.com.vn +84 24 3933-4693 x4842
+84 24 3933-4693 x4848 Fixed Income
Energy and Utilities
Real Estate Luu Cong Thanh - Head of Fixed Income
Truong Thu My - Sector Head Research
Ho Thi Kieu Trang - Sector Head my.tt@hsc.com.vn thanh.luucong@hsc.com.vn
trang.htk@hsc.com.vn +84 24 3933-4693 x4806 +84 24 3933-4693 x4845
+84 28 3823-3299 x129
Vu Hoai Linh Market Data
Pham Anh Thu linh.vhoai@hsc.com.vn
thu.pa@hsc.com.vn +84 24 3933-4693 x4844 Vo Thi Nhat Minh - Sector Head
minh.vtn@hsc.com.vn
+84 28 3823-3299 x172
Economics/Macro +84 28 3823-3299 x365
Nguyen Duy Nam
Pham Vu Thang Long - Chief Economist Hoang Mai Xuan Lan
nam.nd@hsc.com.vn
+84 28 3823-3299 x156 long.pvthang@hsc.com.vn lan.hmx@hsc.com.vn
+84 24 3933-4693 x4805 +84 28 3823-3299 x160
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
We anticipate an index Broadly speaking, we are positive on the market due to a number of overarching themes, many
level of 1,200 by mid- based on HSC economics and equities research views, all of which we will go through in some
year detail in this report:
• GDP per capita is rising, the population is young and the middle class is growing. A
population experiencing increased growth is the key to future success.
• Inflation is, and should continue to remain, below 3.5% on an annualised basis. Interest rates
remain low which means short term liquidity remains abundant.
• The external position is on sound ground and trade is burgeoning. Currently total trade is two
times GDP.
• The US/China trade war works in Vietnam’s favour, which further underpins increasing
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.
There are a whole host • The regulatory environment is improving steadily; rate of change may accelerate post the
of structural reasons to 14th National Assembly in June 2020 and the 13th National Party Congress in 2021.
invest in Vietnam
• Financial liberalization will continue to remain in focus – the economy needs money, the
banks need money and companies need money. Positive change is not just desirable, but a
necessity.
• The MSCI story will be with us a while longer – however, experience tells us the time to buy
is before, not after, inclusion.
• Vietnam is favourably priced when compared to regional markets and attractively so when
future prospects are considered.
Notably, in a departure from the past, going forward we will be providing strategy updates as
events occur, rather than taking a single year long view from one static date – this document
hopes to set out our stall ahead of the release of more timely insights in the future.
The chart below is a depiction of why we consider Vietnam to be in a sweet spot. While some of
the positive trends we are currently experiencing will extend over a decade, we will see some of
the biggest changes having the most profound impact in the next three to five years.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
The key to our It is important to note that the speed of positive change will be variable in various areas. We
investment story is would fully expect the rise of the middle class to grow quickly and without restraint or interruption
positive change which is over the next 5-10 year period, but inclusion in the MSCI may take longer than we expect,
both real and structural infrastructure investment generally could prove to be lumpy and the regulatory environment
generally may move in fits and starts.
It is important to note that when we talk about positive change, the key word is not “change” per
se, but “positive”. It is a truism that outsize returns over a prolonged period are best achieved
when there is positive change which is both real and structural and this is the point we are
now at in Vietnam, in our view.
Like all positive market strategies on all markets, it remains easy to peel back the onion and find
reasons not to act, but in the case of Vietnam, the long term trends are powerful enough that
when the market corrects (and there will be pull backs over the coming months), we should see
those moments as excellent opportunities to buy.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Of course, there will be challenges, risks and road bumps along the way and throughout this
There are always strategy will be reviewing and discussing these issues. It should be noted though that these
challenges, but with factors, should they develop negatively, will only slow the long term trajectory of the country, not
them comes opportunity derail it.
• US/China trade wars: Currently a direct beneficiary, could Vietnam be the next China? We
think not.
• Slowing global growth: Out of our control, but as an export economy Vietnam is of course
affected, but not as much as others.
• Depth of the debt market: Access to capital remains an issue and a cap on growth.
• Government balance sheet: Strengthening for sure, but there is a need for a lot more private
investment participation.
• Infrastructure spending: As FDI accelerates, there will be more and more demand for first
class logistics.
• Power shortages: They are coming, what can and will be done?
• Domestic liquidity is here but we need the return of animal spirits. Money and confidence will
lead to a rising stock market.
2020 EPS growth of On a regional basis, Vietnam compares favorably when using Bloomberg consensus data. For
13.1% and a P/E of 2020, we are forecasting 13.1% EPS growth implying a PER of 12.56 x for our universe.
12.6x – Vietnam
compares favorably At the same we also consider ourselves to have been conservative in our own forecasting
relative to the market, especially so for the property and construction sectors where we see
upside risk to our numbers should difficulties with the HCMC market be resolved, and the retail
sector where stronger than anticipated demand could fuel better earnings growth than currently
forecast.
Our index target for the first six months of the year is 1,200, representing approximately 25%
upside. This would imply a market PER of 15.8x on 2020 forward earnings, which would then
place the market on approximately the same valuation multiples as Malaysia, Thailand and the
Philippines are trading at currently – Forecasted EPS growth for all four markets (Bloomberg
consensus) is similar.
While it may be argued that a liquidity discount could be applied to Vietnam, superior, unique
and long term, macro economic prospects must in turn be considered an offsetting factor.
If we accept that the macro picture justifies a rerating relative to regional peers, we can gain
further comfort from our target pricing. On the surface, we are forecasting total upside for our
universe of 11%.
However, if we remove the top five largest stocks we have under coverage (BIDV, VietCom
Bank, Vin Group, VinaMilk and PV Gas), our total universe performance rises to 25%. The
upside performance for our top picks is 35%. Of course, what this highlights is exactly how
important stock picking is in this market.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 5: Regional markets – 2020 forward P/Es and EPS growth rates
25.0 50.0%
20.0 40.0%
30.0%
15.0
20.0%
10.0
10.0%
5.0 0.0%
0.0 -10.0%
We believe stock selection is key. In a number of sectors, we see good opportunities…but also
Stock selection is key – bad choices. Earnings momentum, valuations and market positioning is always a factor in our
it is not about sector recommendations and target price setting, but equally important are corporate governance, an
allocation ability to execute and strategic vision.
We expect the index to reach 1,200 by the middle of 2020. In this context our key sector/stock
calls are:
Getting the timing right is crucial and also difficult. However, at present, investor interest, liquidity
Are we about to see a conditions and investment timing are not unfavorable, especially if you have a long-term
multi-year bull-run? perspective. Couple this with a very solid macro outlook and we appear to be well positioned to
be benefit from a return in confidence from domestic buyers and renewed interest by foreign
investors alike.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
We anticipate strong GDP growth in coming quarters which will be driven by domestic
consumption as well as export demand resulting from increasing FDI. Vietnam’s economy
presently looks to be on a path of long-term sustainable economic growth. Government finances
are in good shape, the external picture looks good and the currency should remain stable.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
As the charts below show, Vietnam is bucking the regional trend thanks to the impact of foreign
direct investment (FDI) and strong domestic demand relative to other regional economies.
7.0 6.97
6.0
y/y%
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
Mar-16 Sep-16 Mar-17 Sep-17 Mar-18 Sep-18 Mar-19 Sep-19
Manufacturing and We are forecasting that GDP growth will be between 6.5 to 7% over the next three years even
services are driving the in the face of a potential global slowdown and global geopolitical uncertainty; we think our
economy expectations are conservative. We expect the rising middle class to become increasingly
important as a driver and that the manufacturing sector will continue to move up the value
chain.
How the momentum of the economy has changed and will continue to change is evidenced in
the chart below. It is clear that the importance of manufacturing and services will be a major
driver and this is reflected in growth. At present, industry and construction, which captures
manufacturing, is growing at 7.9% per annum while the service sector is growing at 8.1%.
12
10
8 8.09
7.92
6
y/y%
2
1.62
-2
Mar-16 Mar-17 Mar-18 Mar-19
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
7 6.4 7
5.8
6 5.5 5.2 6
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1
0 0
-1 -1
Mar-16 Sep-16 Mar-17 Sep-17 Mar-18 Sep-18 Mar-19 Sep-19
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On Friday 13 December 2019, Vietnam’s General Statistics Office (GSO) issued a press release detailing its re-
evaluation of the country’s GDP over the period 2010-2017.
This GDP re-evaluation by the government has resulted in significant improvements in key macro-prudential
ratios, such as credit to GDP, budget deficit to GDP, public debt to GDP, for the 2010-2017 period. However, it is
important to note that higher macro-prudential ratios in the period 2010-2017 may not yet be assumed to imply
better prudential ratios now or in the future.
There was no mention of applying this new GDP calculation methodology for the 2018-2020 period. We therefore
continue to use the GDP figures published under the old methodology for 2018 and beyond. We also use the
older data (pre-2018) for historic comparisons as well for any calculations of the prudential ratios mentioned
above.
After the revisions, GDP (current price) has increased by 27.0%, 27.3%, 25.5%, 24.8%, 23.8%, 25.2%, and 25.7%,
respectively, for the years 2010-2017.
Regarding GDP breakdowns, on average for the whole period, the share of the agriculture, forestry and fishery
sector was revised down to 14.7% from 17.4%, whereas the shares of the industry and construction sector
(manufacturing) and the services sector were revised up to 34.8% and 41.2%, respectively, from 33.0% and
39.2%.
Despite these changes, real GDP growth rates for the years 2010 to 2017 have only changed marginally – on a
year by year basis real GDP growth rates using the new data were 6.41% (2011), 5.50%, 5.55%, 6.42%, 6.99%,
6.69%, and 6.94% (2017) vs. 6.42% (2011), 6.24%, 5.25%, 5.42%, 5.98%, 6.68%, 6.21%, and 6.81% (2017) as
previously released.
Due to changes in GDP denominators, key prudential ratios changed. As at the end of 2017, the public debt to
GDP ratio fell to 48.8% from 61.4% on the new numbers, the budget deficit to GDP fell to 2.8% from 3.5% and
credit to GDP fell to 103.5% from 130.1%. Also, GDP per capita in 2017 increased to USD2,985 from USD2,389.
Figure 14: Impact of GDP Revaluation, 2010-2017 Figure 15: GDP Per Capita Revaluation, 2010 to 2017
3,500
2,985
3,000 2,759
2,561 2,597 2,590
2,500 2,370 2,389
2,194
2,052 2,109 2,215
1,958 1,907
2,000 1,690 1,748
1,517
1,500 1,273
1,000
500
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
GDP per capita (before adjustment) GDP per capita (after adjustment)
Source: GSO & HSC Research Source: GSO, CEIC & HSC Research
Figure 16: Public Debt to GDP Revaluation, 2010 -2017 Figure 17: Credit to GDP Revaluation, 2010-2017
70 63.7 140 130.1 130.1
61 61.4 58.4 122.3
58 120 111.0
60 51.7 54.5 103.5
50.1 50.8 49.2 50.9 48.8 95.2 97.0 100.8 97.6
50 43.6 46.3 100 89.7
40.7 39.3 40.4 75.9 77.7 80.4
40 80
30 60
20 40
10 20
0
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Public debt/ GDP (%) (before adjustment) Credit to GDP (%) (before adjustment)
Public debt/ GDP (%) (after adjustment) Credit to GDP (%) (after adjustment)
Source: GSO, CEIC & HSC Research Source: GSO, CEIC, SBV & HSC Research
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
1. The latest general economic censuses have resulted in more accurate GDP assessments which led to
increases of VND589tn per year on average. This accounted for approximately 60% of the total average annual
increase we have seen for the period 2010 to 2017. To illustrate, the 2017 census included more enterprises
(+76,000) and household businesses (+306,000) than the numbers used to calculate GDP in 2016;
2. Additional administrative documents (mainly related to the collection of tax revenues) resulted in a GDP
increase of VND305tn per year on average for the period 2010 to 2017. This accounted for approximately 30%
of the total increase seen.
3. Updated national accounts (in line with SNA 2008 of the United Nations Statistics Division), resulted in a GDP
increase of VND98tn per year on average for the period 2010 to 2017, accounting for approximately 10% of the
total increase seen.
These changes for the 2010-2017 period are intended to improve calculation methods and to allow alignment with
global standards. As explained by the GSO, the re-evaluation of GDP was in-line with recommendations on
national accounts systems (SNA 2008) with the focus on eradicating shortcomings arising in the previous
compilation process, and thereby enhancing the quality of statistical data. The GSO had worked closely with UN
and IMF experts in reviewing its assessment methodologies before the publication of the results of this GDP re-
evaluation.
Notably, the new 2010-2017 GDP data will not be used to assess the achievement of socio-economic development
objectives for the 2011-2020 period nor for socio-economic development planning for the 2011-2015 and the 2016-
2020 periods.
To restate, there was no mention of applying new GDP calculation methodologies for the 2018-2020 period. We
therefore continue to use the GDP figures published under the old methodology for 2018 and beyond. For the
purposes of this strategy report we use the older data (pre-2018) for historic comparisons as well for any
calculations of future prudential ratios.
Despite these upward trends, we expect inflation to go no higher than our 3.5% inflation forecast
for 2020. This forecast remains intact as we look into the new year.
We hold this sanguine view on inflation as housing and construction is likely to remain weak until
issues around the HCMC property market are resolved; we expect sometime in the second half
of next year at the earliest. Additionally, high pork prices, which are driving short-term food
inflation, should stabilize and then fall in coming months as the impact of swine fever is expected
to abate. Finally, oil prices are generally forecasted to trend down (Bloomberg consensus)
beyond the first quarter although this very much will depend how global macro and geopolitical
conditions develop.
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Figure 18: Headline inflation: Spiking up due to pork Figure 19: …but food inflation is likely to fall longer-term
prices…
6.0 6.0
10.0
9.2 10.0 5.2
8.0 8.0
2.0 2.0
4.0 4.0
2.8
2.0 2.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
-2.0 -2.0
-2.0 -2.0 Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18 Jan-19 Apr-19 Jul-19 Oct-19
Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18 Jan-19 Apr-19 Jul-19 Oct-19
Food and foodstuff Housing and construction Transport
Core Inflation Food and foodstuff Inflation Headline Inflation
Medicine and health care others Headline Inflation
Note: Core inflation excludes food items; energy products and commodities under Source: GSO, CEIC & HSC Research
the State management including medical and educational services
Longer-term, structural inflation risks will increase, especially once we begin to see infrastructure
investment reignite post the National Assembly in 2021. This may in turn have an impact on the
property and construction constituents of inflation. However, this won’t be in real evidence until
post 2021. Other inflation trends to watch will be wage inflation as FDI continues to grow strongly
and domestic consumption increases.
A decline in yields has been seen in all regional and generally all global bond markets
throughout this year, but the extent of bond declines in Vietnam has been dramatic. In ASEAN,
only the Philippines has seen a sharper decline, but in this case bond yields are much higher
than in Vietnam.
Figure 20: Vietnam government bond benchmark Figure 21: Vietnam government bond yield curves (%)
yields
12/31/2019 Changes since (bps)
Tenor
(%) 9/30/2019 6/30/2019 12/31/2018 12/31/2017 7.0
1Y 1.36 137 180 262 221
6.0
2Y 1.55 126 193 257 226
3Y 1.70 121 189 252 222
5.0
5Y 1.91 110 196 256 238
7Y 2.70 97 149 198 183
Yield %
4.0
10Y 3.39 65 127 167 175
15Y 3.57 73 145 174 204 3.0
20Y 4.02 70 139 162 197
30Y 4.44 70 137 154 195 2.0
1.0
-
1
10
15
20
30
Tenor, Years
31/12/2019 31/03/2019 31/12/2018 31/12/2017
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
While there are a number of specific reasons for the unusually pronounced downward shift in the
yield curve, we also think that what we have seen is structural in nature and we are forecasting
that bond yields are not likely to rise until 2021 at the earliest. Demand and supply, liquidity and
foreign capital are all playing their interlinked role in what the bond market is experiencing.
The total stock of government bonds is currently at VND1,139tn, and it has only increased by
The government has VND77tn this year (VND215tn new issuance and VND138tn maturing). Not unsurprisingly, such
slowed down its pace of a limited increase in available government bonds has been a major factor in pushing up
issuance government bond prices. This, in turn, has led to the sharp decline in bond yields that we have
witnessed over the last two quarters.
Specifically, during the course of this year, Vietnam Social Security (VSS) will have had to invest
about VND90 trillion into VGBs. By implication, the VSS alone has absorbed nearly half of the
new issuance seen in 2019.
Life insurance companies are estimated to have increased their holdings of VGBs by about
VND22.4tn in 2019-through-November, based on an average annual rate of portfolio growth for
in recent years of 18%. In turn, this means the that total outstanding value of VGBs currently
held by commercial banks has been reduced by VND44.2tn in 2019-through-November (about
5.4% of total holdings) thereby reducing the sector wide VGBs to total liabilities from 8.7% to
7.5%.
However, demand The demand picture won’t alter much by the year end or indeed through 2020. Our expectation is
remains extremely that we see an increase in issuance from the middle of 2021 we expect approvals for
strong government related infrastructure projects, and therefore funding requirements, to pick up
substantially from the 2H21.
Figure 23: Banking sector liquid assets (VND bn), at year end
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 (est.) 2020 (est.) 2021 (est.) 2022 (est.)
SBV Bills 138,644 8,000 17,400 - 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000
Government Bonds 583,834 646,474 800,694 841,158 815,246 801,885 826,877 840,299 975,931
Other liquid assests (est.) 213,474 278,348 261,392 367,190 300,000 350,000 400,000 450,000 500,000
Total Liquid Assets 935,952 924,822 1,070,086 1,225,748 1,115,246 1,251,885 1,426,877 1,590,299 1,875,931
Total Liabilities 5,504,457 6,403,829 7,492,741 8,924,285 9,368,392 10,679,967 12,175,162 13,879,685 15,822,841
Liquid Reserve Ratio 17.00% 14.44% 14.28% 13.73% 11.90% 11.72% 11.72% 11.46% 11.86%
On the supply side, as alluded to above, the government appears to be in no hurry to raise the
pace of its issuance in the next 18 months or so. This reflects the slowdown in big infrastructure
project approvals and the consequent decline in the rate of disbursements, leading to an
improvement in the overall state budget.
In its report on the implementation of the state budget for first nine months of 2019, the Ministry
of Finance indicated a surplus of VND64bn may have been achieved. However, clarity is not yet
available, and so our expectations continue to be for a deficit of around 3.5% of GDP for the full
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
year of 2019. As a result, we take the view that there is currently limited pressure on the
government balance sheet.
Foreign capital net inflows can impact bond yields, but this appears not to have been the case
Lower debt issuance this time as depicted in the charts below. The really dynamic factor is onshore foreign investment
has benefitted state via foreign owned insurance companies. The second chart below shows foreign holdings (rather
finances than inward foreign capital) of VGBs against inverted bond yields. Unsurprisingly, there is a good
correlation, especially in recent months.
Figure 25: Foreign capital net inflows and inverted Figure 26: Foreign holdings and inverted bond yields
bond yields
1,500,000 3.0 50,000 3.0
48,000
1,400,000 3.5 3.5
46,000
4.0 44,000 4.0
1,300,000
4.5 42,000 4.5
1,200,000 40,000
5.0 38,000 5.0
1,100,000 36,000
5.5 5.5
1,000,000 34,000
6.0 6.0
32,000
900,000 6.5 30,000 6.5
30/04/2018
31/08/2018
31/12/2018
30/12/2016
28/02/2017
30/04/2017
30/06/2017
31/08/2017
31/10/2017
31/12/2017
28/02/2018
30/06/2018
31/10/2018
28/02/2019
30/04/2019
30/06/2019
31/08/2019
31/10/2019
31/12/2019
31/08/2017
31/08/2018
31/08/2019
30/12/2016
28/02/2017
30/04/2017
30/06/2017
31/10/2017
31/12/2017
28/02/2018
30/04/2018
30/06/2018
31/10/2018
31/12/2018
28/02/2019
30/04/2019
30/06/2019
31/10/2019
31/12/2019
Foreign Capital Flows (LHS - VND bn) 10Y (RHS - %) Adjusted Foreign Holding (LHS VND bn) 10Y (RHS - %)
Globally, we have been in a prolonged period of low interest rates and cheap money and it is
unlikely that this will change in the foreseeable future.
Generally, there are two mainly factors underpinning the structural decline of interest rates. First,
deepening financial markets is resulting in more choices of safe assets and second, monetary
policy has generally become more effective with inflation targeting, keeping inflation low and
steady.
Expect increased In the case of Vietnam, both of the above developments are in evidence, but we also have
infrastructure spending situation where demand for liquid assets is outstripping supply, both from the perspectives of
from mid-2021 which government and corporate bond issuance.
will lead to a pickup in
issuance Increasing disbursement for infrastructure spending (requiring an increase in government bond
issuance) which we anticipate will occur from mid 2021, and/or a global slowdown of
consequence, may change the picture, especially on timings, but we expect Vietnam
government bond yields to remain low throughout 2020 and into 2021.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
We have had excess In the last few weeks, the liquidity situation which we have experienced for much of the year has
liquidity for a while, altered somewhat, underlining the short-term volatility to which the interbank market can be
although short prone.
volatility is now
apparent Typically, open market operations are the most effective and used approach (as opposed to the
use of discount of refinancing rates) by the State Bank of Vietnam; this range is capped using
the reverse repo rate as a ceiling and the treasury bill rate as a floor. Currently the spread
between these two rates is set at 2.25% to 4.0%.
500,000 -
400,000
1.00
300,000
2.00
200,000
100,000 3.00
-
4.00
(100,000)
5.00
(200,000)
(300,000) 6.00
30/12/2016
28/02/2017
30/04/2017
30/06/2017
31/08/2017
31/10/2017
31/12/2017
28/02/2018
30/04/2018
30/06/2018
31/08/2018
31/10/2018
31/12/2018
28/02/2019
30/04/2019
30/06/2019
31/08/2019
31/10/2019
31/12/2019
Interbank Liquidity (LHS VND bn) R.REPO (LHS VND bn)
1W (RHS - %) 1W Outright (RHS - %)
1W R.Repo (RHS - %)
The width or band of this spread gives plenty of flexibility for intervention and sterilization (open
market operations in the US typically have a spread of only 0.25%).
In this context, and according to the latest update from customs, Vietnam achieved a positive
trade balance of USD9.9bn for 2019 and we estimate that the SBV had made net USD
purchases of USD20bn increasing the overall foreign reserve position to USD76bn for 2019.
The net effect is that sterilization operations have meant that about VND500tn has been put into
the banking system via the interbank market. The SBV’s foreign exchange reserves have since
reached USD79bn, or 3.6 months of imports by our estimation.
There are typically additional factors at play in the interbank market at the year end. For example,
A number of factors the remitting of profits by foreign companies and the repatriation of interest and dividend income
have caused short by foreign entities comes towards the financial year end and can impact liquidity. Another factor
rates to rise towards is that domestic savers begin to withdraw money at ahead of the Tet holidays which in this case
the end of the year is in January. A meaningful proportion of these types of seasonal money flows comes at the end
of both the calendar and lunar years which, in turn, has also contributed to the recent rate
volatility.
The state treasury also typically holds a lot of liquidity on behalf of the Ministry of Finance. Much
is invested in liquid assets within the interbank market. Additionally, ‘Circular 58’ has been
introduced to regulate short term money flows – this requires that all deposits should be
The key focus of transferred to the SBV by the end of the day which in turn can create short term volatility as a
monetary policy will result of expiries and rollovers.
remain a stable
currency What all of this means is that we have variable, large scale money flows being directed in out of
the interbank market and which go beyond simple market trading, thereby causing volatility in
interbank rates. This is important for three reasons: First, Interbank rates become hard to
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
anticipate; second, liquidity can swiftly change, which means that as a factor in forecasting stock
market performance the impact of excess money is difficult to predict; and third, the overriding
focus of monetary policy will remain a stable currency, not short term rates.
We think this will continue and are forecasting only limited currency movements.
23,000 7.0
22,500 6.8
6.6
22,000
6.4
21,500
6.2
21,000
6.0
20,500 5.8
20,000 5.6
19,500 5.4
Dec-11 Dec-12 Dec-13 Dec-14 Dec-15 Dec-16 Dec-17 Dec-18 Dec-19
The VND has seen less Relative to other ASEAN currencies, the VND has seen less depreciation that the currencies of
depreciation against the the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. Therefore, it cannot be readily said that the currency is
USD than most other being managed to gain competitive advantage.
ASEAN countries
Figure 30: Regional currency movements versus the USD
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
-15%
-20%
-25%
06/12/2014
06/12/2015
06/12/2016
06/12/2017
06/12/2018
06/12/2019
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
The strong external position (as discussed in the next sections) has permitted reserve
accumulation allowing for studied intervention; monetary policy is geared toward that goal and
the goal of a stable currency, over that of a less directly managed interest rate policy.
We assume the currency will continue to be managed within the trading band of +/-3% set by the
The VND will continue SBV. Annual depreciation has averaged between 1-3%. It is debatable whether this depreciation
to be managed for trend will continue as the attitude of the current US administration requires consideration.
stability
The US position on trade is well known and has led to the US/China trade war from which
Vietnam is benefitting (the impact of which is dealt with in the ‘Trade and FDI’ section of this
report). Part of the equation for this is what the US Treasury Department terms currency
manipulation.
The US considers a country as a currency manipulator if it meets all three of the following criteria
based on four consecutive quarters of trailing data:
a) There is a trade surplus of more than USD20bn with the US (Vietnam’s is currently
USD46bn).
b) There is a positive current account position of more than 2% GDP. We are forecasting a 2.7%
surplus for Vietnam in 2019, but less than 2% in 2020 (the trailing figure used by the US
Treasury in its May 2019 statement was 5.4% as at the end of 2Q18; we have since seen a
very substantial improvement.
Vietnam has seen its USD reserves build-up in recent years; this is a necessity – the International
Monetary Fund recommends 4x import cover, Vietnam is currently at 3.6x – so Vietnam is placed
in a contradictory position in this regard. We are forecasting a foreign exchange reserve position
of USD97bn by the end of this year and expect that to judiciously rise in coming years but within
the context of the US Treasury’s guidance.
It is very important to note that the US Treasury hasn’t designated any country as currency
manipulator since 1994. However, the Trump administration has shown a very particular focus on
China which, since August, has been under “observation and investigation” with regard to its
participation in currency markets.
Although on the US The US officially put Vietnam onto its watch list in May 2019, citing Vietnam’s trade surplus with
watchlist, along with the US as a factor as well as the controlled and prolonged depreciation of the Vietnamese Dong
Germany, Japan and within that. Also included on the watchlist at that time were China, Japan, South Korea, Germany,
the like, Vietnam does Italy, Ireland, Singapore and Malaysia.
not meet the criteria
of a “currency We think there is very little chance of the US acting against Vietnam for several reasons, not least
manipulator” because of the fact Vietnam does not meet all the criteria of being a currency manipulator and is
very unlikely to, regional geopolitics and Vietnam’s importance in it, and respect for the stage that
Vietnam’s economy is at.
Nevertheless, we expect that monetary policy will remain judicious and so we anticipate limited
movement in the currency and certainly not significant deprecation. Our forecast is for less for
than 2% depreciation per annum.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
23,500
23,000
VND per USD
22,500
22,000
21,500
21,000
20,500
Jan-14 Jul-15 Jan-17 Jul-18 Jan-20
Should Vietnam wish to meet the IMF’s recommended target on reserves, then continued
accumulated net buying of the USD may bump up against the US Treasury’s “rules” around USD
acquisition. This is an invidious position to be in, although we expect Vietnam authorities to
continue to manage this tension judiciously.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
100,000 100
80,000 80
60,000 60
40,000 40
20,000 20
0 0
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019e
At end-November 2019, Vietnam’s foreign debt was estimated at USD122bn or 47% of GDP
(source: IMF). At present the government is curbing its offshore borrowing which reflects a slower
A solid debt structure
pace of big infrastructure project approvals as well as domestic demand for domestic debt,
but Private Public
principally corporate bonds.
Partnerships will be
needed to help drive
Going forward, we expect the level of foreign debt to plateau in 2020 and rise again in 2021 as we
infrastructure
see increased approvals and disbursements for infrastructure spending.
spending
We consider the country’s foreign debt structure to be solid – just over half is private, while the
rest is made up of government or government backed debt and all at long maturities which
reflects its use.
We don’t expect the mix to change much in 2020, although we can anticipate an increasing
proportion of private foreign debt from 2021 as Private Public Partnerships help drive
infrastructure spending. Total reserves as a percentage of total debt is currently 64.8% and rising.
This is healthy.
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Government revenues We expect that government revenues will improve in line with the economy and that the tax take
will improve in line with mix will change. At present tax collection is dominated by VAT, corporate income tax and
the economy personal income tax in that order. All are showing strong growth, especially personal income tax;
this is a function of increasing wealth not tax rate rises.
Additionally, excise tax will become increasingly important as trade and FDI boom.
Expenditure is primary focused on recurrent expenditure at @65% of the total. Interest and debt
Longe- term repayments have fallen below 10% of total expenditure in the last two years. This last may
borrowing will reverse as bond issuance increases from 2021, in-line with infrastructure spending, but we remain
increase and so confident that the increased wealth effect will mean that this won’t put undue pressure on the
interest and debt government’s balance sheet.
repayments will rise
once again, but Our expectation is that GDP per capita will continue to rise; as rapidly increasing consumption
increased tax take will and a rising middle class will result in increased tax take. We believe that our forecasts are very
off conservative with regard to the government’s fiscal position.
3,500
3,000 2,750
2,590
2,389
2,500 2,215
2,052 2,109
1,907
2,000 1,748
1,517
1,500 1,273
1,160
1,000
500
0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019e
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Vietnam is vulnerable Of course, as an export economy, Vietnam remains vulnerable to a slowdown in the global macro
to a slower global environment, and there is certainly evidence that this is occurring when we look at economy
macro environment – activity across the globe. However, our job is not to discuss external economies but to focus on
if it occurs how weakening global demand might impact Vietnam.
At present we believe that Vietnam is generally, albeit partially, insulated from a global slowdown,
although recent monthly export growth numbers have come down to 4.7% year on year in
November 2019 from a recent peak of 11.1% growth year on year in July 2019.
300,000 15,000
200,000 10,000
100,000 5,000
USD mn
0 0
-100,000 -5,000
-200,000 -10,000
-300,000 -15,000
-400,000 -20,000
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020F
It is worth noting that the trade balance is currently only USD9.9bn, which is a very small
percentage of total exports. This tells us that the value added component in Vietnam within the
manufacturing process is so far small, which in turn implies that the end products produced are
not especially price sensitive for end users (here we are considering assembled products, low end
manufacturing, fabrics etc.) and that imports tend to mirror exports very closely.
While Vietnam will rise up the value added chain as a result of FDI and government policy
making, at present being an assembler creates some downside protection in a global slowdown.
This has been consistently evident for many years, as depicted by the steady, albeit superior
performance of the economy versus competitors.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
y/y% 6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
Mar-16 Sep-16 Mar-17 Sep-17 Mar-18 Sep-18 Mar-19 Sep-19
Vietnam Thailand Philippines Indonesia Malaysia
Vietnam is a beneficary Furthermore, Vietnam is benefitting from a unique circumstance which is the fallout of the
of the China/US trade China/US trade war. This event has resulted in increased manufacturing being directed towards
war, but tangible positive Vietnam and an acceleration in FDI which we discuss in the next section. The flip side is that
effects will take time to exports to the US have surged as a result, and this is something which needs to be watched…it
emerge was China’s trade surplus (rather than “currency manipulation”) with the US which provoked the
current trade war between the two.
25 25
20 20
%
15 15
10 10
5 5
0 0
Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17 Jan-18 Jan-19
Wood and wooden products Textiles and garments
Foot-wears Comp, electrical products
Telephones, mobile phones Machine, equipment
Others Export to US/ Total Export (%)
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As we discussed in the currency section, we certainly don’t think that Vietnam will in any way fall
Currently just under foul of the US Treasury’s focus on currency manipulation, but there is no doubt that Vietnam
25% of exports go to USD46bn trade surplus with the US stands out; currently, of Vietnam’s total exports, just under
the US, but this will 25%, is to the US.
change
Figure 39: Balance of trade with major partners
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
USD mn
20,000
-20,000
-40,000
-60,000
-80,000
-100,000
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019
US JP CN KR TW ASEAN EU Other
We think it unlikely that Vietnam will face the same trade issues as China for a variety of reasons,
but it is also worth considering what may change the current trade picture.
Expect exports to the The recent signing of the Europe Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) along with The
EU and the Pacific Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) ought to open
Region to steadily more markets to Vietnam exports. This may well diminish the relative importance of the US as an
increase export market and will also help alleviate the impact of the current export slowdown into China.
Longer term solutions are also a possibility – for example, Vietnam’s last multiyear plan for
meeting future energy supply was based around a focus on coal fired plants. The construction of
these plants has fallen behind schedule not least due to environmental concerns.
The alternative power source being discussed is LNG, the technology and raw imports for which
would in large part come from the US, thereby alleviating the issues with the trade balance. Of
course, this is a long term, multi-year solution and remains only a possibility at present, but it does
highlight how Vietnam’s economic development could be of benefit to key trade relationships.
If we look at the import side of the equation there is another story to tell. Korea, and specifically
There is clear evidence Samsung, has long been a big importer into Vietnam, but this was initially just for assembly. While
of supply chain we understand that an ecosystem is being built up in Vietnam for higher value add products
ecosystems are being (Samsung, for instance, now has 60% of Its handset production chain in Vietnam and is setting up
built up – this is good an R&D centre), the real change has been the acceleration in Chinese imports (and FDI) – again,
news a large consideration is the trade war they are fighting with the US; products made in Vietnam do
not attract the same tariffs as those made in China
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
30 30
25 25
20 20
%
15 15
10 10
5 5
0 0
Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17 Jan-18 Jan-19
Emphasis is now shifting While the country has attracted a lot of FDI projects, such as Samsung smartphone production
towards value added facilities, the government’s emphasis is now shifting towards valued added manufacturing taking
manufacturing taking place onshore. This set of dynamics should ensure a continued and widening overall trade
place onshore surplus for the foreseeable future.
We also expect to see a broadening of export markets as a result of recently signed trade
agreements. We expect to see the trade surplus widening to USD16.5bn in 2020 and USD17.4bn
in 2021 versus our 2019 forecast of USD9.9bn.
There is certainly risk from external factors but we feel confident that Vietnam, as a result of the
low base effect at this stage of its economic development, is relatively insulated compared to
much more developed (and expensive export economies). Finally, as we have discussed
elsewhere, Vietnam’s own burgeoning domestic demand will not only have impact on the trade
picture but will also help alleviate pressures related to a slowdown in global growth.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 41: Export growth components (%): Key drivers Figure 42: Import growth components (%): Key drivers
are computer & electrical related products are computer & electrical and machinery & equipment
products
60 60
50 50
50 50
40 40
40 40
30 30 30 30
20 20 20 20
10 10
10 10
0 0
0 0
-10 -10
-10 -10
-20 -20
Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18 Jan-19 Apr-19 Jul-19 Oct-19
Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18 Jan-19 Apr-19 Jul-19 Oct-19
Textiles and Garments Footwear
Machine & Equipment Comp & Electrical Product
Comp & Electrical Product Telephones & Mobile Phones
Fabrics Iron and Steel
Machine & Equipment Others
Telephones & Mobile Phones Others
Export growth (y/y%)
Import growth (y/y%)
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
25,000 25,000
USD mn
20,000 20,000
15,000 15,000
10,000 10,000
5,000 5,000
0 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
25,000
USD mn
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
KR JP SG TW CN/ HK Others
Perhaps a lot of this investment from China stems from pragmatism as products made in Vietnam
don’t attract tariffs but, in reality, Vietnam is simply more competitive when it comes to the
manufacturing of assembly and labour intensive products. Separately China’s focus is to move up
the value chain and so it makes sense to invest in a lower cost production environment.
As an investment At present, Vietnam is attractively positioned; IMA Asia estimates that the manufacturing wages in
destination, Vietnam is China have risen from USD2.0/hr to USD3.9/hr which would imply that labour costs in Vietnam
highly competitive are currently around 45% that of China. Additionally, various property agencies indicate that land
rents for industrial parks in China are USD180/sqm and above. Currently Land prices in Vietnam
are between USD40 and USD120/sqm.
Figure 47: Manufacturing IP & PMI index: PMI is at its Figure 48: …but industrial production continues to
lowest level since November 2015… expand thanks to a resilient electronics sector
50 60 60
50
40 58
40
30
30 56
y/y%
Index
y/y%
20
20 54 10
10 52
-10
-20
0 50 Jan-19 Apr-19 Jul-19 Oct-19
Jan-18 Jul-18 Jan-19 Jul-19
Electronic Components Communication Equipment
Manufacturing IP Vietnam PMI (rhs)
Consumer Electronics Textile, Garment
Source: GSO, Markit, CEIC & HSC Research Source: GSO, CEIC & HSC Research
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 49: FDI registered inflows remain strong… Figure 50: … with the Asian region being the major
source of disbursed FDI
40,000 20,000
30,000
YTD USD mn
YTD USD mn
20,000 10,000
10,000
0 0
Jan-18 Jul-18 Jan-19 Jul-19 Jan-18 Jul-18 Jan-19 Jul-19
Manufacturing Real estate Electricity, gas Wholesale/retail Others* South Korea Japan China Hong Kong Taiwan Thailand Singapore others
Note: Others include Construction, Accommodation, Food Service, Agriculture, Source: GSO, CEIC & HSC Research
Forestry & Fishery, Mining and others
Source: GSO, CEIC & HSC Research
The nature of FDI has also changed significantly over the years, which production increasingly
focused on export markets – this is no surprise and is reflected in the trade numbers which, in
total, now approximate 200% of GDP.
However, it is not all plain sailing – Institutions and policies on foreign investment have not kept
The number of small- pace with development requirements. The number of small-scale, low-tech, labour intensive
scale, low-tech, labour projects remains large.
intensive projects
remains large – this is Therefore, it has become a government focus to refine institutions and policies on foreign
changing investment in order to facilitate new growth models, protection of the environment, the solving of
social problems and improving productivity, quality, efficiency and competitiveness of the
economy.
The recent resolution brought in on October (‘Resolution 50’) aims to do to just that. The goals
which have been set are the following, the key one of which is point three:
1. Registered FDI: USD30-40 billion per year (2021-2025 period), USD45-50 billion per year
(2026 – 2030 period).
2. Implemented FDI: USD20-30 billion per year (2021-2025 period), USD30-40 billion per year
(2026 – 2030 period).
5. Increasing the proportion of trained workers over total labor from 56% in 2017 to 70% in
2025 and 80% in 2030.
Of course there are Aside from the qualitive nature of FDI which the government is focused on improving in order to
challenges, but we drive Vietnam up the food chain, direct investors have concerns about coming power shortages,
expect implemented FDI infrastructure and the slow pace of regulatory approvals.
to exceed 10% of GDP
over the next five years Notwithstanding these concerns, we fully anticipate that implemented FDI will exceed 10% of
GDP over the next five years.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 51: Vietnam is one of the top FDI destinations in ASEAN, and it’s rising
80,000
40,000
20,000
Achieving this level of investment is not without challenges as Vietnam has become ineligible for
concessional official development assistance and preferential loans from multilateral institutions.
This is a function of its shift to lower-middle income status. The World Bank defines this as gross
national income (GNI) per capita of USD2,400 as of 2018; currently Vietnam’s GNI per capita is
approximately USD4,000.
The private sector has As a consequence, Vietnam is not able to access the World Bank’s International Development
a key role to play in Association (IDA) nor the ADB’s Asian Development Fund (ADF). However, official development
infrastructure and assistance (ODA) offering low interest and long repayment terms from other bilateral donors is
energy investments, still available.
in particular
While public private partnerships (PPP) in infrastructure investment has been increasing in
number, we estimate that 60-70% of total investment in future infrastructure will need to be
raised via the private sector. While it might be fair to say that total investment by domestic
private and foreign investors has reached about 65% of the total for the economy as whole,
specifically for infrastructure and energy, that proportion falls to just over 25%.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 52: Total investment: Private & public Figure 53: Energy and transportation investment: Private
& public
100% 50 100% 500,000
80% 40
80% 400,000
60% 30
60% 300,000
40% 20
40% 200,000
20% 10
20% 100,000
0% 0
0% 0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Investment: State Investment: Non State
Investment: Foreign Total Investment/ GDP (%) (RHS) Energy and Transportation Investment: Non State and other sectors
Energy and Transportation Investment: State
Total Energy and Transportation Investment (VND Bn) (RHS)
Source: CEIC, GSO, HSC Research Source: GSO, CEIC & HSC Research
Key projects need to be Key projects – including parts of the North-South expressway, the Long Thanh New Airport, the
undertaken – they are HCM Ring Roads 3&4 – require a total investment of approximately VND400,000 billion
essential for future (USD17.2 billion) over the next 5-7 years
prosperity
The speed of infrastructure spending has been an issue and is unlikely that this will accelerate
until 2021. At present, government approvals and disbursements have slowed ahead of the
Party Assemblies and Congress due over the next 18 months.
In this context then, if we look at the Vietnam power sector in a little more detail, we can see both
risks to economic growth but also opportunity.
We fully expect the power sector to as it will experience rapid growth over the coming decade, in
terms of consumption, capacity and generation. The country needs to rapidly build up and deploy
generation capacity in order to meet the power needs of an expanding manufacturing sector and
robust economic growth.
14.0%
200,000
12.0%
10.0%
150,000
8.0%
100,000
6.0%
4.0%
50,000
2.0%
- 0.0%
FY17
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY18
Electricity consumption (million kWh) Electricity consumption growth (%) GDP growth (%)
There will be persistent In the country’s latest power development plan, i.e. the revised Power Development Plan VII
electricity shortages for (PDP VII) projected demand for electricity to grow at 10.5% per annum during 2016–2020, and
the foreseeable future 8.5% per annum for the period 2021–2025. Generation capacity roll out was expected to meet
this growth, but there have been delays in the 43.5 GW to be installed by 2025. This means
there will be persistent electricity shortages for the foreseeable future.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
-
FY18
FY19F
FY21F
FY20F
FY22F
FY23F
FY24F
FY25F
(50,000)
Shortages will be addressed by the importation of power, as with increasing demand for raw
material, especially coal, but this then raises questions about energy security generally.
Currently, power production is still dominated by hydropower with a share of 40.1% in electricity
Expectations had generation, followed by coal with 38.1% and coal with 18.5%, and other renewable energy with
been for coal power 3.3%.
plants to meet
essential capacity At this stage, in the revised PDP VII, coal power plants will be the main contributors to the
expansion… essential capacity expansion. However, this comes with challenges.
First, expected fossil resource demand will exceed the domestic supply and Vietnam’s fossil
import dependency will increase. Second, the increasing understanding of the negative impact
that coal power has on the environment and population health is creating greater social
opposition against coal power projects.
… but LNG is also a These are key factors for the government to consider as it reviews its coal-dependence power
realistic proposition strategy in the up and coming PDP VIII (to be published by end-2020). Certainly discussions
around focusing more on LNG are being entertained.
Hydro power projects have reached at the country’s upper capacity limit. Other renewable
energy sources such as wind and solar power, are at an early stage of development and are
held back by the national grid system which at crucial points is overloaded and cannot
accommodate new plants connecting in.
At the same time the current renewable PPA with a “take-and-pay” term puts majority of the risk
on the shoulders of project developers and makes it difficult for them to get financed.
So what will change? An acceleration in approvals from 2021 for one, a shift and improvement
the investment structure for another but the power market restructuring roadmap envisages the
operation of a competition-based generation, wholesale and retail market by 2023. This will
make the power sector more attractive to private and foreign investment going forward.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Political volatility in Vietnam has been markedly lower than that of regional peers, which means
we have limited the risk of personality driven or “strong man” politics. Although single party, the
government will remain consensual in its approach.
While this may mean that the pace of change in areas such as the regulatory environment or
infrastructure spending may never be as fast as some may wish, the quid pro quo is steady
economic performance (rather than spectacular) over prolonged periods.
The chart below is an attempt to show pictorially the stability that Vietnam offers investors even
in the face of external pressures. Suffice it to say, we do not expect the Vietnam political
equation to change anytime soon.
We are about to transition to a new period of government as we move into the next five-year
cycle, which will commence from 2021 and end in 2026. These transitions are invariably
smoothly done. Although not officially confirmed, the current calendar of key dates and events
are expected to be close to the following:
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
We are now entering into • June 2020: 9th session of the 14th National Assembly will take place. We would expect to
an 18 month period of see amendments on the Enterprise law (this will be the time when we get more clarity on
government transition possible changes in foreign ownership structures and the NVDR (non-voting depository
receipt) proposals) as well as the PPP/investment law. The securities law, amended in
November 2019, and the amended enterprise and PPP/investment laws are all expected to
take effect on 1st January 2021.
• Additionally, the amended law on public investment will take effect in January 2020, and
when coupled with the PPP/investment law will have big impact on the efficiency of public
infrastructure investment spending generally.
• January 2021: 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam will take
place. The National Party Congress has been held every five years since 1976. The
congress will elect around 200 members to make up the Party’s Central Committee, which
comprises 180 official and 20 alternate members.
• This new Central Committee will then elect to nominate around 19 members to be members
of the Central Politburo. Included in the nominations are the four most important offices of
state which are the General Secretary, President, Prime Minister and Chairman of the
National Assembly.
• April 2021: Formal Formation of New Leadership. The President, Prime Minister, the
Supreme Court and the Supreme People's Procuracy will all be officially elected during the
final session of the 14th National Assembly.
• June 2021: The Fifteenth National Assembly (2021–2026) will convene. The National
Assembly will consist of around 500 elected deputies. At the start of this new term, the new
Chairman of the National Assembly will officially be elected as well as Vice Chairpersons.
• Key new members of government (ministers) will be selected by the Prime Minister,
proposed to the National Assembly for approval and appointed by the President in the final
session of the 14th National Assembly and the 1st session of the 15th National Assembly.
During this period we The world of politics is never smooth. For example, it might be said that the government’s anti-
can expect decision corruption programme has hindered decision making even more than is usual ahead of the
making to be slower than Government transitions detailed above. Additionally, key projects often require several ministries
usual – the brakes will to cooperate together. Given upcoming events, this co-ordination may also be harder to achieve
come off in 2021 than normal.
Nevertheless, looking at the blend of politics and macroeconomic progress from another
perspective, the World Bank has recently ranked Vietnam 70 th out of 192 countries for Ease of
Doing Business for 2020. This is up from 99th in 2014, and is already a better performance than
Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Greece, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa and Luxembourg for
example. Again, incremental and positive change is on-going.
So why is Vietnam progressing so steadily when many of its neighbors aren’t? Aside from a low
base effect, Vietnam is often said to be closer in business mentality to North Asia than South
Asia and certainly the spirit of the land is much more entrepreneurial than its ASEAN
counterparts, while the national work ethic is more deeply ingrained than in some other
countries.
The regulatroy, Couple the population’s mindset with the government’s overarching policy of running a “Socialist
investment and Orientated Market Economy”, and we can be sure that while the rate of positive change in key
operating environments policy areas may be variable and subject to political events (as with anywhere), the regulatory,
will continue to see slow investment and financial operating environments will continue to improve over time.
and steady positive
change
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 57: Population pyramid: Vietnam 2019 Figure 58: Population pyramid: China 1998
This is clearly not a perfect match, but approximately 58-60% of each country’s working
population was between the ages of 15-64 at these two moments in time.
Demographics will be What a young, well-educated population will do is drive growth momentum for an economy and
the key driver of this is well illustrated in the chart below. From 1998, GDP growth in China accelerated each year
growth for ten years until the Global Financial Crisis and the impact of a steadily aging population took
hold.
11
10
9
8
7
6
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
The current population of Vietnam is estimated to be 97.3mn of which 55% of the population is
under 35 and 45% of the population is currently in the high productivity category of 25 to 54 – it
is these cohorts which are driving the rapid emergence of the middle class.
High educational Education attainment is high which underpins a quality workforce, while gender equality doubles
attainement, gender the productive labour that is available. At present we are forecasting steady GDP growth of 6.7%
equality and mobility are plus for Vietnam in the coming years but we could well be surprised on the upside purely on the
all qualities in what is a basis of stronger than anticipated consumption.
young workforce If we then look at GDP per capita, we see the positive progression you would expect:
3,500
3,000 2,750
2,590
2,389
2,500 2,215
2,052 2,109
1,907
2,000 1,748
1,517
1,500 1,273
1,160
1,000
500
0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019e
5,000
VND thousand
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Whole Country Red River Delta
Northern Midlands & Mountain Areas Northern Central Area & Central Coastal Area
Central Highlands Mekong River Delta
Urban Rural
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The Red River Delta Similarly, looked at purely from the perspective of gross income capita, we see identical, positive
Region is see the growth trends. Broken down regionally, the Red River Delta around Hanoi is in fact seeing higher
biggest increases in income levels and stronger growth that the Mekong River Delta around Ho Chi Minh City, but of
income per capita course income growth in urban areas is the strongest of all.
Urbansiation is low but Urbanization, then, has to be considered a most important factor in stimulating individual
surging – a powerful earnings and as can be seen, at 37%, Vietnam has the lowest urban population in the region
catalyst for growth after India while, along with China, Vietnam has seen the fastest rate of urbanization for the last
decade at 21%. The pace of urbanization in Vietnam unlikely to change and we see this as a
powerful catalyst for continued consumer demand.
Formal wealth is The following table highlights exactly how much is changing and how swiftly – the formation of
increasing – the rise of the middle class is accelerating rapidly. Another key feature is would be the rise of incomes
the middle class facilitated by full employment.
The impact of urbanization can be seen in that overall consumer spending will has grown two
and half times in the space of nine years. The rise of the middle class is a powerful force which
will underpin future growth, even in periods where we are experiencing malaise in the global
economy.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Source: GSO, Bloomberg, CEIC, World Bank, Statista, Knight Frank and HSC Research
The next series of charts indicate how durable domestic consumption trends have been – since
2000 retail sales have risen 24x, and compound annual growth has been 18.5% over this period.
Domestic consumption While the rate of growth has slowed in recent years, recent data continues to point to strong and
trends will continue to steady growth.
remain durable
Underpinning domestic consumption is an increase in tourism – in the last decade we seen the
number of international domestic flights increase by 2.7x to 52mn, while the number of
international visitors has increased by 240%.
We see no reason why these positive trends for domestic consumption and those which are
associated with middle class formation will not continue for the foreseeable future. We still have
a low base effect with disposable income only likely to increase through 2020 and beyond.
Figure 64: Monthly retail sales: Steady & strong growth Figure 65: Retail sales: CAGR of 18.3%....
500,000 500,000 35
30
400,000 400,000
25
VND bn
300,000 300,000
20
y/y%
200,000 200,000 15
10
100,000 100,000
5
0 0 0
Jan-18 Jul-18 Jan-19 Jul-19 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019
Goods Accomodation, Food & Beverage Service Services and Tourism Retail Sales
Retail Sales
Source: GSO, CEIC & HSC Research Source: GSO, CEIC & HSC Research
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Figure 66: Vietnam’s retail sales have increased 24 fold Figure 67: Underpining domestic consumption is a
since 2000 and now accounts for 82% of GDP growing tourism sector
25.0 100 20
14
15.0 60
12
10
10.0 40
8
6
5.0 20
4
2
0.0 0
0
Jan-18 Jul-18 Jan-19 Jul-19
Source: GSO, CEIC & HSC Research Source: GSO, CEIC & HSC Research
The impact of the consumer also flows though into industrial production. Retail consumption now
equates to 82% of GDP. Most noticeable has been the huge increase in cellphone and television
production, in large part for the export market but there has also been near doubling of steel
production and a one and half times increase in electricity generation which reflects the
economic expansion Vietnam has under gone in recent years.
Economic expanison will Again, we see no reason why these positive structural trends should not continue into 2020 and
continue to drive the next decade.
industrial production
Figure 68: Production of goods: A function of export growth and domestic consumption
Unit 2010 2019 % change
Exports USDbn 72 268 271%
Long Steel m MT 5,658,500 10,639,966 88%
Clothes bn Pieces 2,777 5,240 89%
Fabric m m2 1,187 1,861 57%
Liquid Milk Mn lt 521 1,359 161%
Beer Mn lt 2,420 4,636 92%
Electricity mkWh 85,669 212,223 148%
Cellphones no. 11,000,000 198,000,000 1700% (from 2013)
Televisions no. 2,456,370 12,640,383 415%
Coffee M tons 1.10 1.68 53%
Seafood M tons 5.14 8.08 57%
Source: GSO, Bloomberg, CEIC, World Bank, Statista, Knight Frank and HSC Research
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
The US SIF Foundation estimates that in 2018, investors held USD11.6tn in assets chosen
according to ESG criteria, which is up from USD8.1tn in 2016. Furthermore, it has been
suggested that USD30tn in now invested in sustainable funds of one sort or another. In short,
ESG is becoming an increasingly consequential asset class of its own and this will increasingly
impact investment decision making in the Vietnam context.
In very simple terms, environmental criteria consider how a company performs within the
physical world, Social criteria considers how a company looks after its staff, the communities it
operates in and the relationships it may have with suppliers and customers. Governance deals
with leadership, shareholder rights, internal controls and external audits.
We have taken generally applied frameworks and adapted it a little to suit our situation in
Vietnam. We have broken down the three primary areas of ESG into 12 areas and then broken
that down further into 42 key issue areas.
Our analysts made HSC analysts were asked to look at each company under our coverage plus a substantial
assessments on close to number more that we know well. At HSC, our direct universe is 67 stocks presently, and we have
100 companies looked at an additional 30 companies – in this way, every sector has never fewer than three
companies in it.
The analysts were then asked to score each company out of 4, with a score of 4 being the
highest level of attainment. The following guidance notes were used, and once the exercise was
completed, ‘sense checks’ were provided by the senior analysts in the team. If an analyst didn’t
know a company’s positioning around a key issue, or if a key issue wasn’t deemed relevant, then
the analysts didn’t provide a score.
At the headline level then, our universe heat map is the following:
Conglomerates
Transportation
Manufacturing
Infrastructure
Real Estate
Technology
Distribution
Agriculture
Consumer
Utilities
Banks
Retail
Governance 2.5 2.8 2.4 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.3 1.9 1.9 2.5 2.1 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.3
Social 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.7 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.3
Environment 2.7 2.2 2.7 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.4 1.4 2.0
Average 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.2
The immediate conclusion from the table above is as you would expect. Environment criteria are
harder to fulfil satisfactorily; we are an emerging market after all. The next table provides the
detailed breakdown of the core areas and the key issues which the analysts were asked to
score.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 70: ESG Breakdown into core areas and key issues
On the next page are the The notes and guidance below were offered to the analysts in order to help them begin to
guidance notes we used understand the key issues they were expected to address.
to ensure consistency
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Carbon Emissions Some industries will have very low carbon emissions, others will be very high - how is this managed?
Financing impact studies Is the company doing much to mitigate its impact on the environment?
Climate Change Vulnerability Is the company vulnerable to climate change - low lying land, impact agriculture, hydro-electric generation etc.
Water Stress Does the company put pressure on the water ecosystem - eg cattle farming, hydro electricity
Biodiversity & Land Use Impact Is the company causing environmental degradation - intensive agriculture, tourism, mining
Raw Material Sourcing How does the company source raw materials - eg, mining, oil and gas, strip farming etc.
Toxic Emissions & Waste, Does the company produce emissions in its production process? If so, what does it do about managing it?
Packaging Material & Waste Does the company use plastic, biodegradable materials etc?
Electronic Waste If there is electronic waste how does the company dispose of it? Recycling? Landfill?
Opportunities in to use Clean Tech Are there replacement technologies the company could employ? If so, has it or is in the process of doing so?
Green Building How are buildings constructed - use of Solar? Energy efficient office space, design etc.
Renewable Energy Is the company switching to renewable energy either as a producer of electricity or a user?
Labour Management Does the company work with its staff? Is their staff representation? Unions etc.
Health & Safety How well does the company ensure the safety of its staff - construction, manufacturing, agriculture
Supply Chain Labour Standards Does the company ensure that child, indentured or slave labour isn't being used on its supply chain?
Product Safety & Quality Is the product they produce of the requisite standard. Do they meet international standards?
Chemical Safety If a primary manufacturer, do they have effective controls to manage dangerous and polluting substances?
Financial Product Safety If the company is in the financial space, are their products appropriate for their customer base
Responsible Investment Does the company make an effort to ensure responsible investing?
Health & Demographic Risk Is the company at risk from aging populations?
Privacy and Data Security Does the company have suitable and extensive safeguards to protect the data of customers and suppliers?
Controversial Sourcing Does the company have an activist shareholder base concerned about sourcing practices?
Access to Communications Does the company provide access to communications in remote areas, internet etc?
Access to Finance, Does the company provide start up financing to its employees or otherwise
Access to Health Care Does the company provide good quality healthcare etc.
Opportunities in Nutrition & Health Does the company provide health food options? Gym? Sporting activities etc?
Mental Wellbeing Does the company provide suitable access to mental health healthcare professionals?
Board What is the make-up of the board? Family numbers? Number of independents? Mix of experience?
Accounting What is the quality of accounting? Have their own accountants signed off etc.
Business Ethics Does the company stand for something? Does it behave fairly to customers, suppliers, staff etc?
Anti-competitive Practices Does the company try and squeeze out competition by unfair practices?
Tax Transparency Does the company pay its fair share of tax?
Corruption & Instability Can the company be accused of corruption? Are its business practices leading to substandard performance?
Access to Management Can shareholders and analysts access management? Can they do so beyond analyst briefings etc?
English Language Availability Does the company supply none, part or all of its information in English? Does it have an English language website?
Public releases made non-selectively Does the company release information fairly and at the same time to all investors?
Insider Information Leakage Does the company actively try and prevent information / leakage /whispers to the investing community?
Exert undue influence on Analysts Does the company try to exert pressure on the analyst community on content, forecasts, recommendations?
www.hsc.com.vn Page 42
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Broken down by core areas, it is unsurprising that certain specific industries are weakest,
especially in the area of Environment. Additionally, the differences across sectors become quite
pronounced when it comes to corporate governance.
We will be looking for Those industries which are outward facing – by which we mean those business which have large
going forward isnot the foreign shareholdings, limited family ownership and which operate outside of Vietnam – tend to
absolute score but achieve the best scores. Vinamilk, Sabeco and others are already notable for including extensive
change – especially ESG sections in their annual reports.
around governance
At present we are applying much more art than science to our assessments here, but we hope
over time to try and numerically quantify our key issues as much as possible in the future.
The absolute key going forward for all companies is to progress in as many ways as possible – it
does not matter much if a company is currently scoring a 1 or 3 in a particular area, what we
want to see is future improvement. Positive change in this respect will help to inform our
recommendations in the future.
Figure 72: Strength of ESG criteria broken down by core areas and sectors
Pharmaceuticals
Conglomerates
Transportation
Manufacturing
Infrastructure
Agriculture a
Real Estate
Technology
Distribution
Consumer
Textiles
Utilities
Banks
Retail
Pollution and Waste 2.7 3.0 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.5 2.1
Climate change 3.0 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.0 1.7 2.0 1.5 1.3 2.0
Natural Resource Management 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.7 2.2 1.8 1.7 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.3 1.9
Environmental Opportunities 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.6 1.5 1.8
Average 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 2.0
Pharmaceuticals
Conglomerates
Transportation
Manufacturing
Infrastructure
Agriculture a
Real Estate
Technology
Distribution
Consumer
Utilities
Banks
Retail
Human Capital 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.6 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.3 1.6 2.0 2.5
Social Opportunities 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.6 2.0 2.1 2.4
Product Liability 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.1 1.8 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.9 2.3
Data Security 3.5 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.5 2.2
Stakeholder Opposition 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.7 2.0 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.1
Average 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 2.3
Pharmaceuticals
Conglomerates
Transportation
Manufacturing
Infrastructure
Agriculture a
Real Estate
Technology
Distribution
Consumer
Utilities
Banks
Retail
Corporate Behavior 2.9 2.8 2.8 3.0 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.3 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.4
Shareholder Accessibility 2.9 2.8 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.4 1.9 2.4 1.7 2.1 1.7 1.7 2.3
Corporate Governance 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.9 2.3
Average 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.3
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 73: Strength of ESG criteria broken down by key issues and sectors
Pharmaceuticals
Conglomerates
Transportation
Manufacturing
Infrastructure
Agriculture a
Real Estate
Technology
Distribution
Consumer
Textiles
Utilities
Banks
Retail
Climate Change Vulnerability 3.0 3.0 2.2 3.0 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.3
Opportunities in to use Clean Tech 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.3 1.4 1.0 1.8 2.0 2.2
Toxic Emissions & Waste 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.3 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.3 1.5 2.1
Water Stress 2.7 2.0 2.2 3.0 2.3 2.6 1.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Packaging Material & Waste 3.0 3.0 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.0 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.0 2.1
Financing Impact Studies and Improvement 3.0 1.7 3.0 2.6 1.0 2.2 2.5 2.7 1.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 1.3 1.5 2.1
Green Building 2.5 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 1.4 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.5 2.0
Biodiversty & Land Use Impact 3.0 1.8 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.5 1.9
Electronic Waste 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.5 1.0 1.8 2.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.9
Carbon Emissions 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.7 3.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.8
Product Carbon Footprint 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.7 3.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.8
Raw Material Sourcing 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.4 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7
Renewable Energy 2.0 2.0 1.3 1.0 1.8 1.0 1.6 1.3 2.3 2.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.4
Average 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 2.0
Pharmaceuticals
Conglomerates
Transportation
Manufacturing
Infrastructure
Agriculture a
Real Estate
Technology
Distribution
Consumer
Textiles
Utilities
Banks
Retail
Conglomerates
Transportation
Manufacturing
Infrastructure
Agriculture a
Real Estate
Technology
Distribution
GOVERNANCE
Consumer
Avg
Oil & Gas
Textiles
Utilities
Banks
Retail
Tax Transparency 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.0 3.0 3.0 1.7 2.6 2.0 2.7
Accounting 2.7 2.0 2.8 3.5 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.4 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.5
Exert undue influence on Analysts 3.7 3.0 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.6
Anti-competitive Practises 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 1.5 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.3 2.0 1.4 1.9 2.5
English Language Information Availabilty 2.7 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.0 2.5 3.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 2.4
Ownership Structure 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.5 2.0 2.0 1.3 2.4 1.6 2.3
Public Releases made non-selectively 2.7 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.0 1.0 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.4 2.2
Pay structure 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.2
Access to Management 3.3 3.0 2.0 2.5 1.0 3.0 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.5 2.3 1.3 2.3 1.2 1.9 2.1
Corruption & Instability 3.0 3.0 2.4 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 1.8 2.2
Business Ethics 2.7 2.0 2.6 2.0 3.0 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.6 2.1 2.3
Board 2.7 2.0 2.4 2.5 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2
Insider Information Leakage 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.5 2.5 1.8 1.0 2.0 1.6 1.5 2.0
Average 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.3
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Corporate profitability and economic growth will always be capped so long as access to capital is
stifled. However, this is understood and we are seeing slow and steady improvements in the
regulatory environment. Nevertheless, it is important to note that we don’t expect a big bang type
event – positive change in capital markets will come over years rather than offering a short term
catalyst in coming months.
By extension, restricting lending can act as a cap on economic growth generally – very simply,
companies are tempted to hold cash for future investment rather than pay dividends, thereby
limiting potential returns.
That the Vietnam market’s dividend yield lags that of ASEAN and its frontier market peers
shouldn’t be surprising given that ROEs are comparatively high, and capital is scarce. However,
ROAs are under pressure and can be expected to continue be below average for the region. We
expect this situation to remain so until more efficient financing mechanisms are in place.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 75: High ROEs but disappointing dividend yields and below average ROAs
Dividend Yield (%) ROE% ROA%
2019 est 2020 est 2021 est 2019 est 2020 est 2021 est 2019 est 2020 est 2021 est
Singapore 3.98 4.25 4.40 9.22 9.23 9.82 1.65 2.02 2.19
Malaysia 3.49 3.61 3.81 8.66 9.57 9.73 1.44 1.54 1.60
Thailand 3.26 3.24 3.46 9.28 9.91 10.08 2.41 2.78 2.83
Indonesia 2.40 2.31 3.00 10.6 17.11 17.49 2.80 3.96 4.09
Philippines 1.60 1.75 1.88 11.79 11.68 11.91 2.66 3.65 3.78
India 1.19 1.39 1.58 12.27 13.77 15.62 2.12 2.88 2.77
Vietnam 2.04 1.97 2.32 14.71 18.12 18.58 2.41 2.12 2.31
Financial market The ultimate concern around inefficient or strangled capital markets then, is that earnings growth
restructuring is a can only really accelerate through increased leverage via the banking sector. With the banking
necessity for the future sector undercapitalized, the corporate bond market small, and the IPO market currently stagnant
growth of the country due to the bad performance of 2018’s listings, the long term sustainability of economic and
corporate growth can be called into question.
Needless to say, in this circumstance, any financial market restructuring and regulatory change
is a necessary but positive change.
Figure 76: Credit growth & M2 vs GDP Figure 77: Deposit, credit and M2 growth
172.4% 30
170%
28
160% 26
150% 24
140% 135.8% 22
y/y%
20
130%
18
120%
16
110%
14
100% 12
90% 10
80%
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Credit/GDP M2/GDP Deposit growth Credit growth M2 growth
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
At present the corporate bond market is approximately USD26bn in size of which 70% of
issuance to date (approximately USD18.5bn) has been by the commercial banks as they work
on improving their medium and long-term funding capacity as well as their capital adequacy
position. Half of this amount has come from the top five banks: Vietienbank, VPBank, BIDV, SCB
and SHB.
This means that non-corporate bond issuance, as of today, totals approximately USD7.5bn only,
which is approximately 10% of total government and corporate bond issuance. Of the non-bank
corporate bond issuances, real estate developers are the biggest issuers, with Vingroup the
largest, having issued USD1.8bn to date.
Certainly the non-bank corporate bond market is growing rapidly, at around 50% per year in the
last two years, and are now accounting for up to 50% of very recent new issuance, but this is
obviously off a very low base.
Demand is real and There is definite domestic demand for local bond issuance, the largest investors in corporate
growing… bonds are the banks and then other institutional investors. The number of retail investors is also
growing, but as yet they may only account for 10% of the primary market. There is some
evidence to suggest that retailers are more active in the secondary market.
…but so far At present there is little management appetite to replace bank credit with corporate bond raising.
management teams Moreover, foreign participation remains minimal (this year’s international issuances have
seems reluctant to issue amounted to USD300mn out of the USD2.35bn recently registered) and will continue to be so
debt and foreign without formal corporate credit ratings in place – currently Vietnam has a non-investment grade
particpation remains sovereign credit rating (Ba3 for Moody’s, BB for Fitch and S&P). However, we are confident this
minimal will improve as a result of steadily improving public finances (discussed in the macro section of
this report) and a strengthening of the banking system (as discussed in the banking sector
review section).
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Currently, we estimate that there may be upwards of USD21bn in new IPOs and placements
coming to the market over 2020-21. This would represent more than 12% of the current market
capitalization. Most of this new issuance would be SOE and government mandated issuance –
government decree no26/2019 announced a resumption of SOE privatization and divestments in
93 SOEs in coming years.
Certainly there is a substantially longer list of SOEs that could make our list but the table below
considers potential equity raisings which might possibly come to the market in a two, or possibly
three, year time frame.
USD21bn in IPOs and We expect private companies to resume going public via Upcom or though new listings and
placements in 2020 and placements next year, while M&A deals are likely to be focused on industrial goods, construction
2021? and services, retail and real estate. Education, healthcare, pharmaceuticals and renewable
energy will also remain attractive.
Figure 81: Potential equity raisings, 2020-‘21 (USDmn) Figure 82: Past and future M&A
In principle then we might see a much more active listing market in FY20 and FY21 following the
hiatus in FY19. This deepening and enriching of the equity stock market will be a good thing but
there are plenty of hurdles to overcome before the IPO market really takes off. A difficult IPO
process and prior failures have limited activity while foreign ownership limits have prevented full
and meaningful market participation - however, regulatory changes are afoot.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
It is safe to say that there was some disappointment that the new securities law wasn’t greater in
its scope and that is particularly true around foreign ownership limits. However, this was always
going to be the case as details on FOLs are to be dealt with in the new enterprise law. This is
scheduled, tentatively at least, for discussion at the next National Assembly meeting (from May
to June 2020).
It is most likely that the route taken to increase foreign participation will be along the lines of non-
voting depository receipts (NDVRs), similar to that seen in Thailand. And the new securities law
provides for that approach.
The enterprise law, Essentially what the securities law has done has provided an improved framework for IPOs and
under review, will do in particular has moved the overall regulatory equation slowly but steadily in the right direction.
more to address foreign There were a number of key changes announced:
participation
• In case the issuing securities' price on the securities trading system is lower than its par value,
the issuing company may offer securities at prices lower than its par value.
• The issuing company must have a book value of contributed charter capital of VND30bn
(currently VND10bn) or more at the time of registration for public offering of stocks or bonds.
• For initial public offering of stocks, major shareholders must commit to holding at least 20% of
the issuing company's charter capital for at least one year. Statement of operations for two
consecutive years (currently one year) preceding the year of registration of the offering must
indicate profitability, and there must be no accumulated losses up to the year of registration of
the offering.
• For initial public offering of bonds, issuing companies (regulated under the government
regulation required for credit rating) must have a credit rating result before the IPO.
• Following the initial public offering, securities of issuing company must be listed or registered
for trading at Vietnam Stock Exchange within 30 days from the completion of the offering.
An improved framework • Private placement of securities (including stocks and bonds) of issuers other than public
for IPOs companies need to comply with the provisions of the enterprise law (the amended enterprise
law will be passed by the 14th National Assembly in 2020).
• Participants in the offering must include strategic investors and professional stock investors.
Such regulation is to protect investors and ensure market safety.
• Expanding the general definition for “professional securities investor” to include: Individuals
holding a portfolio with a value of at least VND2bn as certified by a securities company at the
time such individual is identified as a professional securities investor; An individual that has
taxable income of at least VND1 billion in the latest year.
• The transfer of ownership of stocks and convertible bonds is limited for at least three years for
strategic investors and at least one year for professional securities investors.
• The company must have a charter capital of VND30bn (currently VND10bn) or more and at
least 100 investors who are not major shareholders most own at least 10% of the voting
shares.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
• Public companies (not subject to the initial public offering) must register for stock transactions
on the unlisted securities trading system of the Vietnam Stock Exchange within 30 days, from
the date the State Securities Commission confirms the completion of public company
registration.
• A public company that repurchases its own shares must follow procedures for reducing its
charter capital.
• The SSC is still under the Ministry of Finance but is supplemented with more powers to
inspect, supervise and issue legal documents.
In addition to the above, the restructuring and merging of the two existing stock exchanges
(Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh) into a single stock exchange won’t be carried out immediately as there
remains some work to be done in refining the functions and tasks of the Hanoi Stock Exchange
and the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange.
However, it is envisaged that in due course, all bond and derivative securities transactions will be
conducted at the Hanoi Stock Exchange, all stock transactions will be conducted at Ho Chi Minh
Stock Exchange and on that the basis, equity market indices will be unified into single index. The
timing of this remains uncertain.
There is no doubt that Vietnam has work to do in order to meet MSCI criteria for emerging
markets which, in fact, have got harder over the years. MSCI undertakes an annual market
classification review and classifies markets in four groupings: developed, emerging, frontier or
standalone markets. MSCI’s central tenet is that, when it assigns market status it aims “to reflect
the views and practices of the international investment community by striking a balance between
a country’s economic development and the accessibility of its market while preserving index
stability”.
What that actually means in practice is set out in their framework which consists of the following
criteria:
• Size and liquidity requirements: Determines those securities that meet the minimum
investibility requirements of the MSCI Global Standard Indexes.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
As it stands then, economic considerations should not impact on Vietnam with regard to their shift
to emerging market status.
Size and turnover are Additionally, as the following charts would indicate, size and liquidity are not necessarily a
not the issue; market stumbling block. What is preventing Vietnam’s accession is restricted investability and market
accesibility is accessibility.
Figure 83: MSCI emerging market (EM) and frontier market (FM) constituents – market cap. (USDbn)
Again, Vietnam
compares favourably…
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
So where precisely is Vietnam falling down? We are currently rated poorly by the MSCI on
foreign ownership limits, foreign exchange controls, clearing & settlement infrastructure and
equal flow of market information.
Openess to foreign However, the two really key areas which need to be addressed are:
ownership and the
settlement framework • Openess to foreign ownership: It is hoped that the new securities law, discussed above, has
are the two key issues moved the country forward in this regard, but the key legislation will come in the enterprise
which need to be law in the second quarter of 2020. Implementation won’t take place until the first quarter of
addressed FY21 (at the earliest), which means that MSCI emerging market inclusion is theoretically
possible in FY21 but more realistic by FY22. Non-voting depository receipts, as seen in
Thailand, as most likely to be the vehicle used to open up access to the market.
Other concerns centre around ease of capital inflows and outflows, the competitive landscape,
stability of institutional frameworks and corporate governance related issues. As has been proven
in other accessions to the emerging market indices, there is more flexibility in “interpretation”
around these more secondary issues and we are confident that these factors won’t hold back
Vietnam’s inclusion in quite the same way as foreign ownership limits and access for omnibus
accounts has.
Other issues can be Additionally, there are no provisions for stock borrow and short selling, although this is to a large
managed extent true of EM countries generally and we therefore don’t see this as an issue.
To sum up then, we don’t think that MSCI accession is in anyway imminent, but we also think that
by the time that date arrives in 2021-22 (at the earliest), it will be too late – this is because, step
by step, all the necessary changes will have happened by the time of MSCI inclusion.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Accession posible in in The chart below shows market performance of the four markets – Saudi Arabia (May 2019
2021, but more likely in inclusion), Pakistan (May 2017 inclusion), Qatar (May 2014 inclusion) and UAE (May 2014
2022 inclusion) – which have been most recently added to the emerging market index. Suffice it to say,
it’s very clear the right strategy is to buy well ahead of inclusion, not after it.
Figure 86: What happens before and after MSCI Emerging Markets inclusion?
Source: Bloomberg
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
350,000,000
1,100
300,000,000
1,000
250,000,000
200,000,000 900
150,000,000
800
100,000,000
700
50,000,000
0 600
Source: Bloomberg
Favourable liquidity Liquidity conditions are favorable currently, but domestic confidence remains key to outsize
conditiosn but a lack of returns and that is difficult to predict. Domestic investors seem to be led by foreign investors
confidence even though the latter are a relatively small component of market ownership and turnover.
At present, foreign investors remain largely on the sidelines; part of this is because the pace of
change has been slow, whether regulatory or re. MSCI inclusion, external concerns have
weighed heavily and, while more large funds are getting increasingly interested in Vietnam as an
investment story, these longer-term investors have found it hard to access the market, especially
as the IPO market has been so fallow.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Source: SBV, HSX, HSC Research Source: HSX, HNX, HSC Research
We are hopeful that investors will recognize that change is occurring (albeit slowly) in Vietnam; it
is inching to MSCI inclusion, the flow of the global economy is picking up in its favour, and we
can expect more primary activity in 2020 than we saw in 2019. If this is enough to get foreign
participation to increase, we may well see domestic investors return and a climb towards a bull
market and a rerating.
Domestic investor What has not replaced foreign capital this year is domestic participation, despite excess liquidity
participation has been conditions for much of the year (as discussed below). Although retail investors accounted for 80%
lacking this year of market turnover, there appears to be a lack of confidence to invest heavily despite the very
signficant levels of liquidity currently available in the system.
Again, there are a number of reasons which could explain this lack of domestic confidence, but
should trade negotations between China and the US resolve themselves and a potential
slowdown in global growth recede as a major risk, we can anticipate significantly increased
market participation by both domestic and foreign market investors.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Concensus isn’t We are forecasting 1,200 in the VNI index, or 20% upside in the next six months. This would put
expecting much at all us on a PE of 16.1x which is roughly where Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand are trading now
next year; we see 20% (with similar earnings growth forecasted for all four markets in 2020). The risk, of course, is that
upside foreign investors remain sidelined, domestic confidence remains ho hum, and the index ends up
going nowhere – this would in fact be the consensus expectation at present.
Figure 91: Liquidity rebased to 100, Jan 2019 Figure 92: Liquidity rebased to 100, Jan 2017
Source: SBV, HSX, HSC Research Source: HSX, HNX, HSC Research
Unsurprisingly, the domestic money markets, the domestic bond markets and the stock market
are generally closely linked to each other, as shown in the charts below.
Figure 93: Bond and stock market liquidity (VNDbn) Figure 94: Bond and money market liquidity (VNDbn)
0 0 0
13/05/2018
13/07/2018
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Bond Daily Trading 1M Average HSX Daily Trading 1M Average Interbank Liquidity 1M Average (LHS VND bn) Bond Daily Trading 1M Average
Source: SBV, HSX, HSC Research Source: HSX, HNX, HSC Research
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 95: Foreign capital flows and stock market liquidity Figure 96: Money market and stock market liquidity
(VNDbn) (VNDbn)
1,600,000 9,000 400,000 9,000
7,000 7,000
1,400,000 300,000
6,000 6,000
1,300,000 250,000
5,000 5,000
1,200,000 200,000
4,000 4,000
1,100,000 150,000
3,000 3,000
1,000,000 100,000 2,000
2,000
50,000 1,000
900,000 1,000
28/02/2018
30/06/2018
31/10/2018
30/12/2016
28/02/2017
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31/08/2017
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28/02/2019
30/04/2019
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0 0
30/12/16
28/02/17
30/04/17
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31/08/17
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30/04/18
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31/08/18
31/10/18
31/12/18
28/02/19
30/04/19
30/06/19
31/08/19
31/10/19
31/12/19
Adjusted Accumulated Foreign Capital Flows (LHS - VND bn) HSX Liquidity 1M Average Interbank Liquidity 1M Average (LHS VND bn) HSX Liquidity 1M Average
Source: SBV, Customs, GSO, Bloomberg, HSC Research Source: FiinPro, HSC Research
However these relationships can be seen to have broken down recently. Local investors,
especially, began to prefer bonds over equities in 2019 (and indeed bonds over property).
Besides money and bond markets, as mentioned the most influential factor in giving the market
direction remains foreign capital net inflows, so we turn full circle – in the short-term, the stock
market needs a shot of confidence to mirror the excellent long term fundamentals.
These ETFs, issued by domestic funds (VFM and SSIAM), are being set up to attract offshore
money (although local investors are also likely to participate) and are designed to essentially be
a proxy for foreign investors who will gain exposure to stocks which have full or nearly full foreign
ownership limits. Currently, upon issuance, the maximum size of each new ETF is set at
VND50bn as per regulations, or approximately USD2.15mn.
Stumbling blocks will be At present, the proposed ETFs are going through the regulatory channels, with the stumbling
overcome easily enough block said to be around voting rights. For example, it is possible that direct foreign ownership
(reaching a foreign ownership limit of 49%, for example) coupled with further indirect foreign
ownership through the ETFs could result in foreign majority ownership of a company. This issue
is likely to be resolved, perhaps around restrictions of voting rights for offshore buyers of the
ETFs.
The constituents (along with estimated weightings) for the proposed ETFs are shown in the
exhibits below.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 97: VN
VN Diamond Diamond constituents
constituents Figure 98: constituents
VNFIN Lead VNFIN Lead constituents
Outstanding Rounded Outstanding Rounded
No. Ticker Price Weighting No. Ticker Price Weighting
volume (share) free float (%) volume (share) free float (%)
12 FPT 57,000 678,276,312 80% 15.3%
1 VCB 87,500 3,708,877,448 8% 15.3%
11 MWG 114,700 442,689,942 65% 15.2%
2 VPB 19,950 2,437,748,366 70% 14.8%
1 VPB 19,950 2,437,748,366 70% 11.7%
3 MBB 20,950 2,325,679,300 60% 14.7%
9 TCB 23,050 3,500,139,962 65% 11.4%
4 TCB 23,050 3,500,139,962 65% 14.5%
6 MBB 20,950 2,325,679,300 60% 10.3%
5 HDB 27,000 980,999,771 70% 10.0%
5 PNJ 85,800 225,188,176 80% 10.0%
6 STB 10,050 1,803,653,429 100% 9.9%
10 KDH 26,500 544,429,109 60% 5.6% 7 CTG 21,350 3,723,404,556 8% 5.9%
3 REE 36,450 310,050,926 55% 4.0% 8 BID 45,800 4,022,018,040 5% 5.0%
2 TPB 21,150 826,573,150 60% 3.7% 9 EIB 17,500 1,229,432,904 85% 4.6%
7 GMD 22,250 296,924,957 85% 3.6% 10 SSI 18,200 508,054,676 60% 2.7%
14 DXG 13,700 518,796,292 75% 3.4% 11 TPB 21,150 826,573,150 60% 1.3%
13 NLG 26,700 249,702,575 55% 2.4% 12 BVH 67,600 742,322,764 10% 0.7%
2 CTG 21,350 3,723,404,556 8% 2.2% 13 HCM 20,850 305,516,173 40% 0.4%
1 CTD 52,600 76,292,573 45% 1.2% 14 VND 14,300 208,565,370 65% 0.2%
100.0% 100.0%
Source: HSX, HSC Source: HSX, HSC Source: HSX, HSC Source: HSX, HSC
ETFs have been ETFs have been successfully launched before, but none with the focus of providing access to
launched successfully stocks which have reached their foreign limit – by their nature, these types of ETFs will only
before, but none were really appeal to foreign investors. There have been numerous other ETFs launched; the major
solely focussed on FOLs ones are detailed below:
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ETFs create interest in ETFs, when launched, have certainly created interest in the market in the past. The chart below
the market, but columes shows the trading volumes for the VN30 ETF, which is generally seen as the best proxy for the
are low so the biggest ETF space. There have been surges of activity and to a greater or lesser extent this has had an
impact is on sentiment impact on the market; the two most notable periods being in February and March 2018 and in
March and April 2019. The first period of increased activity was more likely a result of the bull
market already underway, but the second notable period may well have had a positive impact on
the market at the margin.
1100 20
1000
15
900
10
800
700 5
600
0
500
-5
400
300 -10
1/2/2017
2/2/2017
3/2/2017
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10/2/2019
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12/2/2019
VNINDEX VN30 ETF Flows (US$ million, RHS)
Source: Bloomberg
However, as a percentage of total volumes, ETFs are relatively small, so the biggest impact of
these funds can have is on sentiment.
Figure 102: VN30 ETF flows vs total market Figure 103: Major ETF flows –2017-’19 (USDmn)
8,000 1.4% 250
1.2% 198
7,000 200
1.0%
6,000 150
0.8%
4,000 50
0.2% 32
10 4
2
3,000 0.0% 0
-0.2% (19)
2,000 (23) (28)
(50) (39)
-0.4%
1,000
-0.6% (100)
0 -0.8% (120)
(150)
Oct-17
Oct-18
Oct-19
Mar-17
Feb-17
Sep-17
Mar-18
Feb-18
Sep-18
Mar-19
Feb-19
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Jun-19
FTSE Vietnam VNM ETF VN30 ETF iShares MSCI Premia MSCI Total
Index Frontier 100 ETF Vietnam ETF
VNINDEX traded value (US$ million) VN30 ETF Flows/total Market flows (%) FY2017 FY2018 FY2019
Difficult to know if ETFs We can certainly say that the launches of the up and coming ETFs will encourage foreign
will prove to be catalyst interest in the market which may well stimulate domestic demand in turn. It is difficult to know to
for a market rerating on what extent the new ETFs will create a short term catalyst, but their advent will certainly not be a
their own, but their negative or a drag in domestic investor confidence.
introduction is certainly
not a negative
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
At the same we also consider ourselves to have been conservative in our own forecasting
relative to the market, especially so for the property and construction sectors where we see
upside risk to our numbers should difficulties with the HCMC market be resolved, and the retail
sector where stronger than anticipated demand could fuel better earnings growth than currently
forecast.
Similar earnings Our index target for the first six months of the year is 1,200, representing approximately 25%
prospects than Malaysia, upside. This would imply a market PER of 15.8x on 2020 forward earnings, which would then
Thailand and the place the market on approximately the same valuation multiples as Malaysia, Thailand and the
Philippines but trading at Philippines are trading at currently – Forecasted EPS growth for all four markets (Bloomberg
a 20-25% discount consensus) is similar.
While it may it can be argued that a liquidity discount could be applied to Vietnam, superior,
unique and long term, macro-economic prospects must in turn be considered an offsetting factor.
If we accept that the superior macro picture justifies a rerating relative to regional peers, we can
gain further comfort from our target pricing. On the surface, we are forecasting total upside for
our universe of 11%.
However, if we remove the top five largest stocks we have under coverage (BIDV, VietCom
Bank, Vin Group, VinaMilk and PV Gas), our total universe performance rises to 25%. The
upside performance for our top picks is 35%. Of course, what this highlights is exactly how
important stock picking is in this market.
Figure 104: Regional markets – 2020 forward P/Es and EPS growth rates
25.0 50.0%
20.0 40.0%
30.0%
15.0
20.0%
10.0
10.0%
5.0 0.0%
0.0 -10.0%
It is also instructive to look at Vietnam’s valuation relative to its frontier market peer group. Again,
it can be argued that Vietnam looks comparatively cheap.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 105: Vietnam index – forward P/E Figure 106: MSCI frontier markets – forward P/E
22
21 19
20
18
19
18
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16 16
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12
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VN index Fwd PE PE +1Std PE -1Std
On a relative performance basis, Vietnam has persistently outperformed the MSCI Frontier
Market Peer group which reflects Vietnam’s long-term growth and investment story. However,
2019 was a relatively tougher year; from a relative perspective versus recent global Frontier
Market performance, the recent correction may have provided us with a good buying opportunity.
Figure 107: VN index Vs MSCI Frontier Markets, from 2017 Figure 108: VN index Vs MSCI Frontier Markets from
2019
190
120
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160
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Earnings, valuations and We have a long-term positive outlook on the market, but take a view that stock picking remains
coporate governence essential. As highlighted elsewhere in this report, we acknowledge that ESG considerations, and
inform our top picks especially corporate governance, are becoming increasingly important with regard to investment
decisions. Our top picks reflect that as much as their long-term earnings prospects.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 109: HSC universe – Sector EPS growth (%) & P/E (x), 2020F
We expect the index to trade up 25%, reaching 1,200 by the middle of 2020. In this context our
key sector and stock calls are as follows.
We go into more individual stock and sector thematic details in the next section of this report.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
VNDbn USDmn VND VND 2019F 2020F 2019F 2020F 2019F 2020F 2019F 2020F
JSC Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam VCB 333,428 14,403 89,900 Hold 91,400 1.7% 4.1 3.9 20.8 16.6 0.9% 0.9% 26% 23%
Bank of Invesment & Development of Vietnam BID 187,828 8,114 46,700 Reduce 32,000 -31.5% 2.4 2.3 33.4 26.8 0% 0% 12% 11%
Vietnam JSC Bank For Industrial And Trade CTG 79,309 3,426 21,300 Add 25,200 18.3% 1.1 0.9 0.1 8.2 0% 0% 13% 15%
Vietnam Prosperity JSC Bank VPB 49,098 2,121 20,400 Buy 25,800 26.5% 1.2 1.0 6.5 5.2 0% 0% 20% 20%
Military JSC Bank MBB 49,421 2,135 21,250 Buy 33,300 56.7% 1.4 1.1 6.4 5.4 2.8% 2.8% 20% 20%
Ho Chi Minh City Development JSC Bank HDB 27,027 1,167 27,550 Add 31,000 12.5% 1.5 1.3 8.6 7.5 3.6% 3.6% 19% 18%
Vietnam Technological JSC Bank TCB 84,440 3,648 23,650 Buy 35,000 48.0% 1.4 1.1 8.7 7.5 0% 0% 17% 16%
Asia JSC Bank ACB 38,100 1,646 23,000 Buy 34,000 47.8% 1.3 1.1 5.6 4.9 4.3% 4.3% 24% 22%
Vietnam International JSC Bank VIB 15,586 673 17,500 Suspended N/A N/A 1.3 1.0 5.7 4.5 3.1% 3.1% 5% 5%
VietNam Export - Import JSC Bank EIB 21,208 916 17,250 Reduce 15,100 -12.5% 1.3 1.2 26.8 25.6 0% 0% 25% 26%
Lien Viet Post JSC Bank LPB 6,661 288 7,500 Buy 17,600 137.8% 0.5 0.5 4.8 4.2 0% 0% 13% 12%
120
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Despite worries from the beginning of 2019 about a lower credit quota (14% y/y) and new,
stricter regulations proposed in some draft circulars, listed banks reported strong results in the
period.
Indeed, we estimate that banks in our coverage universe – the top three state-owned
commercial banks (SOCBs) and another six private banks – will see aggregated growth of
21.5% y/y in PBT in 2019 (9M19: +22.5% y/y growth in PBT); this is far higher than our initial
forecast of only 16.7% y/y (published in our Jan. 2019 annual strategy report).
Notably, our recently updated forecasts were mainly driven by better than expected results from
VCB and CTG, whose earnings contributed to nearly 40% of the total.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
BID
VIB
VCB
ACB
MBB
CTG
VPB
TCB
HDB
2018 2019F 2020F 2021F
• We forecast that the nine banks will see aggregated 13.9% y/y growth for customer
loans in 2019, 12.6% y/y for 2020, and 12.5% y/y for 2021. This said, private banks will
always see higher growth than SOCBs, in our view, and even far higher growth than other
OTC operators thanks to: (1) their higher CAR, especially under Basel 2 regulations; (2) their
better asset quality and, subsequently, lower NPLs; and (3) their smaller size (gains here are
less likely to bring pressure to overall sector credit quota).
80.00% 35.00%
30.00% 27.0%
60.00%
37.9%
25.00% 22.5%
40.00% 33.2% 20.1%
23.2% 21.5% 22.3% 20.00%
18.1% 19.4%
20.00% 10.8%
15.00% 13.5% 13.9%
3.9% 15.7% 12.6% 12.5%
14.9%
0.00% 12.9%
10.00%
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19F
FY20F
FY21F
0.00%
-40.00%
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19F
FY20F
FY21F
-60.00%
Aggregated 9 banks 3 SOCBs 6 Private banks Aggregated 9 banks 3 SOCBs 6 Private banks
• Banks are expected to see a continuing moderate growth in NIMs. Amongst them, the
SOCBs will see stronger growth in NIMs than private banks. The SOCB’s aggregated NIMs
was still low, at around 2.8%, due to their lower lending rate (100-150 bps lower than private
banks). Thus, they still have much room to improve their NIMs, especially via boosting their
retail operations by 8-12 bps per annum. Meanwhile, we forecast that aggregated NIMs in
private banks will rise slightly – around 4 bps y/y – over the period 2019-2021.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19F
FY20F
FY21F
0.00% -10.00% -7.7%
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY21F
FY19F
FY20F
-20.00%
Aggregated 9 banks 3 SOCBs 6 Private banks Aggregated 9 banks 3 SOCBs 6 Private banks
Source: Company data, (F): HSC Research Source: Company data, (F): HSC Research
• We forecast that both SOCBs and private banks will see moderate growth for non-NII
from 2019 onwards. Especially, after one year seeing a drop in total non-NII due to the lack
of big one-off income from bancassurance upfront fees or from subsidiaries divestment
profits, private banks will gain back the growth momentum from more sustainable
businesses such as transactions & services fees and bancassurance annual commissions.
Figure 120: Non-NII growth Figure 121: Net fee income/total assets
3 0.90% Title:
Source:
0.80% 0.75%
2.5
0.70% Dimension:
0.61%
2 0.60%
0.50% Please fill in the values above to have them entered in your0.47%
report
1.5
0.40% 0.39% 0.37%
0.30% 0.31% 0.32%
0.30% 0.28% 0.27%
1 0.27%
60.8% 0.20%
50.1%
0.5
21.6% 28.4% 0.10%
7.1% 8.2% 2.3% 13.7% 12.0%
18.1%
0 0.00%
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19F
FY20F
FY21F
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19F
FY20F
FY21F
-0.5
Aggregated 9 banks 3 SOCBs 6 Private banks Aggregated 9 banks 3 SOCBs 6 Private banks
Source: Company data, (F): HSC Research Source: Company data, (F): HSC Research
• We also forecast the sustainable growth of operating expenses for listed banks will be
around 14.5% y/y in 2020 and 15.0% y/y in 2021 – with the faster growth in SOCBs. We
think the banking sector will invest more capex in digital transformation in order to improve
client service and experience.
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY21F
FY19F
FY20F
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19F
FY20F
FY21F
-5.00%
-10.00%
Aggregated 9 banks 3 SOCBs 6 Private banks Aggregated 9 banks 3 SOCBs 3 SOCBs-adjusted for BWF 6 private banks
Source: Company data, (F): HSC Research Source: Company data, (F): HSC Research
• Last but not least, our forecasts for lower growth in provision expenses (+5.4% y/y in
2020 and +0.4% y/y in 2021) will play very crucial role in supporting predicted earnings
growth. Actually, the listed banks saw a slowdown in provision expenses growth in 2018
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
(+9.5% y/y, vs. A full 40.0% y/y in 2017); however, provision expenses in both CTG and BID
surged in 2019 due to some uncovering of hidden NPLs. However, we believe that from
2020 onwards, the provision expenses in SOCBs will drop sharply, leading to the relatively
flat growth of the whole sector.
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19F
FY20F
FY21F
40.0%
40.00% -20.00% -12.79%
22.6% 24.0% 21.2%
14.4% 19.1% 9.5%
20.00% 5.4%
7.9% -40.00%
0.4% -40.86%
0.00%
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19F
FY20F
FY21F
-60.00%
-20.00%
-40.00% -80.00%
Aggregated 9 banks 3 SOCBs 6 Private banks Aggregated 9 banks 3 SOCBs 6 private banks
Source: Company data, (F): HSC Research Source: Company data, (F): HSC Research
Mild dilution risk on the The impressive profit earnings growth we are forecasting translates into 12.7% y/y growth in
horizon 2020’s EPS and 19.6% y/y growth in 2021’s EPS – assuming potential dilutions from some
private placements which have been planned for 2019 might instead be brought along to
2020 – including those for MBB, VCB, VIB. In addition, BID and CTG also can restart new
rounds of capital raising to comply with CAR under Basel 2. Reflecting all dilution risk, we are
comfortable predicting that the banking sector can maintain EPS growth of c.13-15% y/y for for
next two years.
Cir 22 & 18 give smooth Following decisions on rate cuts for both deposits and loans, the SBV recently announced two
transitional period important circulars which both will come to effect from 1 January 2020 as follows: (1) circular
22/2019/TT-NHNN replaces circular 36/2014/TT-NHNN and related revisions which regulate
operational safety ratios in the banking sector; and (2) circular 18 is a revision and amendment
of circular 43 which regulates the consumer finance business.
From our point of view, we believe that both regulations are far more relaxed than initial draft
proposals (from the beginning of 2019). Both banks and finance companies will have reasonable
transitional periods to deal with any changes. Indeed, we think that circulars 22 & 18 should be
viewed positively – they are reaffirming efforts by the authorities to strengthen bank operations
without causing any shocks to the whole system.
Private banks that have already complied with Basel 2 in CAR calculations and have <80% LDR
will benefit the most from circular 22. However, SOCBs or non-compliant Basel 2 banks will meet
some difficulties. We also believe that VPB will be the biggest beneficiary from cir. 18 given its
very high cash loan weighting at around 83% at the end of 3Q19. However, according to cir. 18,
its cash loan will be around 59% only and far lower than the cap of 70% since 1 January 2021.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
• An extremely competitive environment in the life insurance segment, especially via the
bancassurance channel, which has led to very high commission expenses and operating
costs. Notably BVH, who doesn’t have a strong bancassurance network, is losing market
share here. The same situation is also happening in the non-life segment, and is pushing up
the claim ratios in some top players;
• The burden of mathematical reserve expenses remains high, driven by still-low valuation
rates due to the ‘new bottom’ of government bonds yields. We expect that this situation will
continue throughout 2020; and
• Poor results from investment portfolios in life insurers, mainly due to low interest rates.
Bao Viet Holding Company BVH 50,923 2,200 68,600 Reduce 68,000 -0.9% 3.2 2.7 41.4 36.5 1.5% 1.5% 9% 9%
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
120
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12/19
BVH VN Non-life Peer Index VNINDEX
There are more and more life insurers active in the bancassurance channel, as it’s seen as the
‘fast and furious’ way to acquire market share. These new players have the potential to
significantly change the landscape of the life insurance distribution channel, in our view.
Unavoidably, insurers without strong bancassurance channels, such as BVH, will lose market
share.
As can be seen in the Figure below, for the period of 2010-2016, the whole market saw only
seven deals regarding bancassurance agreements. However, over the last two years, there were
10 deals re. bancassurance which have mainly been exclusive deals involving big banks.
Specifically, some amongst the top five insurance companies have signed exclusive
bancassurance agreements with big banks in order to boost sales (including Prudential, Manulife,
AIA, and Dai-ichi Life). And there are more to come, we think. For example, it has been
suggested in the market that FWD will sign a deal with VCB (one of the biggest State-owned
commercial banks of Vietnam); meanwhile, Sun Life Group also paired with TPB recently.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Meanwhile, the burden of mathematical reserve expenses has remained high due to still-low
valuation rates. Yields for 10-year government bonds and longer than 10-year government
bonds were used as the major anchors for valuation rates and they have declined significantly in
2H19. This will lead to only moderate growth of mathematical reserve expenses instead of a big
recovery in income (as was expected last year). Finally, stable-low government bonds yields also
have led to the poor performance of investment portfolios. As a result, there is more than one
headwind for BVH.
Non-life insurance: Moderate premium growth vs. high commissions and claim ratios
Non-life insurance premium growth has been quite modest with total direct premium CAGR for
period 2013-2018 only 13.8% for non-life, vs. 30.0% for life. Growth in non-life premia was
mainly driven by three products: Health insurance, auto insurance, and fire & explosion
insurance, with 2013-2018 CAGRs of 23.2%, 16.1%, and 19.0%, respectively.
8.0% Fire,Explosion
36,607
20,000
32,143
10.4%
27,507
6.0%
24,455
15,000
10,000 4.0%
2.0% Property &
5,000
Casualty 14.9%
0 0.0%
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Heath 29.1%
For 9M19, aggregated non-life premium was estimated to have grown 12% y/y to VND37,300bn,
which was similar to the growth seen in the past two years. Growth drivers for the three main
segments mentioned above will likely continue to be favourable, such as increasing improving
GDP per capita, still-low penetration rates, growing car ownership, and increasing awareness
regarding health care risks. For the medium-term, we have yet to see any particularly strong
catalyst that can facilitate growth much higher than the current level. Thus, our estimation for
non-life insurance premium growth for 2019-2021 stays in the range 12-15% per annum.
While top line growth has been moderate, bottom line growth has been even more modest. The
poor performance can be explain by the following factors:
• A highly competitive environment with numerous players, which has led to higher
commission expenses and operating costs, and to unfair competition; and
• Very high claim ratios for key producs, namely auto and health insurance, due to ineffective,
decentralized claim payment control and still-high levels of insurance fraud.
These factors have together led to lower bottom line growth for most listed insurers.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 133: Market share Figure 134: Top line and bottom line growth
Direct
PBTTitle: PBT 9M18 (VND PBT 9M19 (VND
Source:premium YoY
27.0% 29.1%
CAGR 12-18 bn) bn)
30.9% 33.5% 36.6% 38.2% 37.8%
CAGR 12-18
2.9% 3.2%
PVI 5.2% 6.2% 595 795 33.6%
8.7% 3.6%
8.1% 7.8%
4.0%
4.0%
PTI* 16.7%
Please fill in23.0% 69 entered in your report
the values above to have them 63 -8.7%
7.0% 3.9% 3.8%
10.0% 9.4% 6.8% 6.3% 6.0% PGI 5.1% 7.2% 131 140 6.9%
9.5% 8.8%
7.2% 6.0% 8.5% 8.2% 7.6% BMI 11.1% 9.1% 204 165 -19.1%
6.3% 7.7%
8.5% 7.8% 8.9% BIC 10.5% 17.6% 173 214 23.7%
20.5% 20.9% 21.2% 20.8% 17.8% 16.2% 14.7%
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
BVH PVI PTI BMI PGI BIC Others
Source: IAV, HSC Research Source: Company data, IAV, HSC Research
The Amended Securities Law was passed in November 2019 and will take effect on 1 January
2021. The new law forces new requirements for public companies, notably the limit up-lift to
minimum charter capital and the strengthening of corporate governance. Unfortunately, only
general indications were suggested re. foreign ownership limits – one of the most pressing
concerns of foreign investors regarding investing in the Vietnam market.
In other words, the bright future contemplated for the VNIndex as a full member in the MSCI
Emerging Markets Index might be delayed. Meanwhile, negative impacts from the present US-
China trade war and concerns of a coming global recession have together led to average trading
volumes of the VNIndex shrinking gradually and, subsequently, total margin loan books being
reduced.
The competition amongst brokers is becoming more and more brutal than ever before, not only
in margin books but also in trading fees being cut. Specifically, local brokers with higher funding
costs are losing market share to Korea- and Taiwan-owned brokers who can acquire very cheap
funding from their offshore parents. Besides, after circular 128/2018/TT-BTC was enacted in
1Q19, many players have reduced or even eliminated trading fees from the previous level of
0.15%. Finally, there were only a minimal number of IB deals completed successfully in 2019.
As a result of all these factors, PBT of local brokers dropped by an average of 30-50% y/y from
the peak in 2018 while, at the same time, Korean brokers reported slight earnings growth. We
anticipate these trends will continue in the next several years.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 135: Brokers: Profit before tax Figure 136: Margin loan book
VNDmn
6,000,000 300,000
5,000,000 5,000,000
VNDmn
4,000,000 200,000
4,000,000
3,000,000 100,000
2,000,000 3,000,000
-
1,000,000
- (100,000) 2,000,000
1Q16
2Q16
3Q16
4Q16
1Q17
2Q17
3Q17
4Q17
1Q18
2Q18
3Q18
4Q18
1Q19
2Q19
3Q19
1,000,000
-
1Q16
2Q16
3Q16
4Q16
1Q17
2Q17
3Q17
4Q17
1Q18
2Q18
3Q18
4Q18
1Q19
2Q19
3Q19
Daily market turnover (LHS) SSI
HCM VCI
VND MBS SSI HCM VCI VND
Mirae Asset KBSV MBS Mirae Asset KBSV KIS
Only local brokers with professional leadership, diversified business models, well-prepared
technology infrastructure, proactive cost control and international standard risk management
policies are likely to be prepared enough to resist the ever increasing incursion of global players.
Meanwhile, Korean firms, sooner or later, must pay more attention to enhancing their currently
thin profitability and credit risk controls – instead of focusing solely on market expansion, as is
the case at the moment.
Mirae Asset Securities Co.Ltd Korea Self-established legal entity Mirae Asset Securities Vietnam Dec-07 n/a 4,300,000
Korea Investment & Securities Co., Ltd Korea EPS Securities Corporation KIS Vietnam Securities Corporation Dec-10 n/a 1,897,011
Shinhan Securities Co.Ltd Korea Nam An Securities Ltd. Co Shinhan Securities Vietnam Jul-15 146,000 812,600
KB Securities Co.Ltd Korea Maritime Securities Inc. KB Securities Vietnam Oct-17 300,000 1,675,021
NH Investment & Securities Co.,Ltd Korea Woori CBV NH Securities Vietnam Nov-17 25,000 735,000
Yuanta Securities Co.Ltd Taiwan FSC Securities Corporation Yuanta Securities Vietnam Dec-17 300,000 1,000,000
Hanwha Investment & Securities Co., Ltd, Korea HFT Securities Corporation Pinetree Securities Vietnam Apr-19 100,000 615,000
Kiwoom Securities Co.Ltd Korea ACBS n/a Tentative 1,500,000 n/a
• MBB follows a universal banking model and incorporates commercial banking, consumer
finance, life and non-life insurance and brokerage.
• We believe that MBB will continue to grow at an above average pace given a superior
balance sheet and dynamic management.
• Their strong presence in the retail and SME market is backed by low cost deposits; They
have one of the highest current and savings account (CASA) to total deposit ratios in the
sector at around 30%.
• The bank has always been disciplined in its lending practices and quick to write-off NPLs.
Therefore, it has been able to enjoy strong prudential ratios enabling it to grow credit faster
than most of its competition
• We forecast 2019 and 2020 PBT growth at 23.6% y/y and 19.5% y/y, respectively.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 138: MBB selected financials Figure 139: MBB – Operating income breakdown
Market Cap, USDmn 2,111
MBB 2018 2019F 2020F
Sales VNDbill 32,935 40,551 47,974
Sales Growth % 33.8% 23.1% 18.3%
Net Profit VNDbill 6,113 7,609 8,868
Net Profit Growth % 73.7% 24.5% 16.5%
EPS VND 2,704 3,311 3,858
EPS Growth % 74.6% 22.4% 16.5%
P/E X 7.7 6.3 5.4
P/B X 1.4 1.2 1.0
ROE % 20.1% 20.4% 19.7%
Div Yield % 2.4% 2.9% 2.9%
• VPB is a unique bank which includes the number one finance company (FE Credit).
• FE Credit dominate the unsecured consumer finance market with around 55% market share
with a high concentration of cash loans. FE credit contributes nearly 50% to group profit.
• However, thanks to the recent issuance of circular 18/2019/TT-NHNN which relaxes the cap
for cash loan weightings, an equilibrium between the risk and the return might be achievable
in the medium term. However, this requires close attention.
• The parent bank has also steadily improved its asset quality by completely clearing all VAMC
bonds in 2019. NPLs remain well controlled at < 3%.
• VPB has a tentative plan to partly exit from FE Credit, possibly in 2020. Although we don’t
have details for the divestment progress, we believe that, if done successfully, divestment
will significantly improve VPB’s CAR ratio.
• We forecast 2020 and 2021 PBT growth at 24.2% y/y and 13.0% y/y, respectively.
Figure 140: VPB selected financials Figure 141: VPB – Operating income breakdown
Market Cap, USDmn 2,107
VPB 2018 2019F 2020F
Sales VNDbill 48,871 57,879 64,604
Sales Growth % 21.3% 18.4% 11.6%
Net Profit VNDbill 7,356 7,656 9,349
Net Profit Growth % 14.2% 4.1% 22.1%
EPS VND 3,032 3,127 3,884
EPS Growth % -34.3% 3.1% 24.2%
P/E X 6.6 6.4 5.1
P/B X 1.4 1.3 1.1
ROE % 22.8% 21.6% 23.5%
Div Yield % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
• TCB is a well-positioned retail bank with a focus on mortgages and a very strong ecosystem
with leading real estate developers.
• TCB focuses mainly on affluent and mass affluent markets. The strategy is to offer various
products and services to a selective, existing customer base, rather than acquire new
customers.
• Currently TCB is the most efficient bank with the highest ROA and one of the lowest cost to
income ratios (CIR) in the sector.
• Clean balance sheet and strong growth of CASA will help lower funding costs and will lead to
NIM improvement.
• We forecast 2019 and 2020 PBT growth at 12.3% y/y and 15.0% y/y, respectively.
Figure 142: TCB selected financials Figure 143: TCB – Operating income breakdown
Market Cap, USDmn 3,496
TCB 2018 2019F 2020F
Sales VNDbill 29,289 32,552 38,467
Sales Growth % 13.9% 11.1% 18.2%
Net Profit VNDbill 8,485 9,579 11,020
Net Profit Growth % 31.6% 12.9% 15.0%
EPS VND 2,527 2,732 3,143
EPS Growth % -1.8% 8.1% 15.0%
P/E X 9.1 8.4 7.3
P/B X 1.6 1.3 1.1
ROE % 21.6% 16.9% 16.5%
Div Yield % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Looking forward, we see the development of ‘satellite’ urban cities/townships surrounding large
metropolitan areas as potentially the most interesting ‘emerging’ real estate segment in Vietnam.
Moreover, this segment should be helped by improving transportation and logistics infrastructure
in the country. In this sub-segment, we prefer ‘affordability factor’ over ‘location’ as a more
pressing investment theme – though we do see the potential for better prices here (given low
base effect).
We also think that the residential real estate market will be governed more strictly in the future by
the government both via credit limits and through more stringent legal regulations. Messages
being sent are quite clear: “…[For sustainable development], it is time to do things properly!”.
Below, we talk through several key ‘items of interest’ for 2020. Related to residential real estate,
these include a possible pickup in the inventory cycle, ‘sentiment leading earnings’ in 2020,
opportunities for developers and investors in ‘satellite cities’ as well as in affordable to mid-level
housing, and new regulations. We also briefly discuss retail real estate and industrial parks; we
continue to feature these in the context of Vietnam’s still strong macro picture:
www.hsc.com.vn Page 76
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
More ‘clean’ projects have now been rolled out, mostly located outside of the HCMC CBD.
Despite the somewhat less favorable location in general, some projects have received a 90%
take-up rate – this suggests the emergence of an underserved market. As the government’s
regulatory review has been carrying on now for nearly two years, we think some developers
have been able to better time their launch activities with market movements. Indeed, it appears
to us that more launches will come in 2020 and onwards by developers that are following a more
prudent and structured path.
Due to the typical lag of 6-12 months for low-rise residential developments and 18-24 months for
high-rise residential projects of inventory cycle vs. earnings cycle (obviously, with the former
leading), we expect this pick up in inventory accumulation will only clearly reflect on earnings of
developers from 2021 onwards. The 2020 earnings outlook looks like more of a mixed picture, in
our view, due to the ‘quiet’ period of launches in 2017-2018.
We remind readers that the slowdown in project launches was a result of a more stringent
regulatory environment in HCMC, which started in late 2017 and carried on through 2018 and
early 2019. Though the earnings pickup from property development might only be seen clearly
from 2021 onwards, we look forward to more good news on the progress of new project
approvals from 2H20. Any such news will improve consensus views towards the sector thus an
upgrade in earnings forecasts and from market weight might be considered in the 2H20.
Amidst hardship in the HCMC residential RE market – much of this related to difficulties around
the transfer of land ownership of several projects approved in the past, coupled with limited
availability of landbank (at reasonable cost) in the central areas of the city – we will continue to
see rising the popularity of satellite cities in nearby provinces which are within one hour of HCMC
(as illustrated below). We predict that in the next 2-4 years, the growth in demand for these fully
developed mini-urban developments will constitute a key theme.
We see that several choices of location have been made by developers, but all share some
things in common: (1) projects are in the suburbs of large metropolitan areas, with the support of
existing or future infrastructure developments; and (2) projects are in areas where industrial
proliferation happens, and commute times to big cities are 1-2 hours, e.g. Binh Duong, Long An,
Dong Nai provinces.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
We believe that a sub-trend, related to this, has be a shift towards the ‘affordability factor’ and a
move away from ‘location’. As the result of the recent government led regulatory review on land,
the duration of capital being tied-up in projects unexpectedly lengthened leading to higher costs
of financing As a result, housing prices spiked up to compensate for the heightened opportunity
cost.
Many HCMC-based developers now appear to be seeking large-scale land bank outside of
HCMC, this is because of lower land costs, a ‘healthier’ regulatory environment due to less
active historic real estate activity and the underserved nature of locations.
As a value-added benefit project cycles are shorter; the development process in the suburbs is
significantly shorter than in metropolitan areas due to faster approval processes and the smaller
amount of capital required for development in less-developed rural areas. Notable developers
involved in the decentralized development projects include:
• Nam Long Group (HSX: NLG, Buy): Market leader known for its affordable product
offerings. NLG started to develop a large land bank in Long An in 2019; first launches of
more than 700 units were made in 4Q19, with pricing around USD1,000 per square meter for
low rise units. We expect this project will continue to be NLG’s key focus in 2020.
• Dat Xanh Group (HSX: DXG, Buy): The leading real estate broker and now a rising
property developer targeting mid-end segments. DXG has added projects in Binh Duong and
Dong Nai to its pipeline. These include a 92 ha land plot project near Long Thanh Airport
and Opal Cityview, and Opal Skyline projects in Binh Duong. Earnings contributions from
these projects should commence from 2021.
• NovaLand (HSX: NVL, Hold): A mid-end developer, with an in-house real estate brokerage,
NVL has since expanded its business to Dong Nai province with its mega project Aqua City.
Their portfolio includes several hospitality projects including the large-scale NovaWorld
project in Vung Tau.
www.hsc.com.vn Page 78
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
We see growing demand in the affordable to mid-end segment driven by fast growing income per
capita, “golden” demographics and high urbanization rates. Moreover, we expect demand will be
further supported by a shift in culture: Vietnam’s household size has been shrinking, as we see
an increase in the number of new households forming as the concept of multi-generations living
under one roof fades away.
Currently, and going forward, we see a high take-up rate of affordable and mid-end segment
units, mainly consisting of real home occupiers rather than investors/speculators. In HCMC,
Lovera Vista’s first phase recorded a 100% take up rate due to its affordability. The project is
located outside the CBD but still within the city environs of HCMC. Thus, we favor developers
that can successfully capture the potentially huge demand for affordable to mid end property.
In the long-term, we see that the residential property segment will and should be heavily
governed by proper regulations both via credit limits and completion frameworks. The aim would
be to sustain a healthy development cycle for the market in order to avoid a bubble.
The purpose of the move is to cool down recently observed speculative activities in the real
estate market by preventing banks from ‘hiding’ real estate loans in consumer loans, which
receive a lower risk weighting ratio. Another notable part of Circular 22 is that it sets a new cap
on short-term funding used for medium- and long-term loans at 30%, from the current weight of
40%. This might be also interpreted as aiming to limit credit to the real estate sector, in which
loans are normally long-term in nature.
Source: SBV
www.hsc.com.vn Page 79
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
We also favor the retail leasing business in terms of macro perspectives: Vietnam has seen
middle class income growth; the proportion of middle-class citizens is expected to reach 26% of
the population by 2026 from 13% currently (source: World Bank). Shopping centers such as
Vincom, Lotte and Aeon Mall have long been the favored destinations for a family night out,
combining food experiences, shopping and entertainment.
Although e-commerce has grown in prominence lately, we think digital retail will not yet have a
negative impact on traditional brick-and-mortar shopping in Vietnam given the “entertainment”
value provided and prevailing supply and demand characteristics. However, we remain
cognizant of the impact of digital retail in developed markets
Figure 149: International brands entering Vietnam in 2019 or announcing their intentions
All this points to strong demand for retail space leasing in the future. Vacancy rates will continue to
drop while modern retail formats will increase penetration across the country thus benefiting the
whole segment.
Industrial Parks: ‘Sweet spot’ still there, but mind the headwinds
2019 will likely be the second consecutive year where we see industrial leases benefiting from
both rental price increases and rising leasing area. Average rental price (ARP), across all
industrial areas of Vietnam, increased 6.7% y/y in 9M19 per the estimates of industry consultancy
JLL. Our calculation, however, suggested a much higher 13.5% rise in ARP for our covered, listed
players for the period up to 9M19.
This difference could possibly reflect a premium achieved by coverage names as they have better
execution records (like KBC) and more favorable positions (like LHG’s zones). All in all, we expect
these positive trends to continue, or even improve, in 2020. The rewards now will come to those
who are well-prepared.
www.hsc.com.vn Page 80
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 150: Estimated increase in ARP YTD in 9M19 Figure 151: 11M19 monthly disbursed FDI (VNDmn)
140 30%
25.0% 2,500
120 25%
13.6% 13.3%
80 12.3% 15%
10.7%
VNDmn
9.6%
1,500
60 7.1% 10%
40 5%
1,000
20 0%
KBC VGC LHG PHR IDC SZC KSB BCM
• Minimum wages in China continued to grow. Current minimum wages in some key
industrial regions of China reported to be around USD318 per month, equal to 1.76x that of
Vietnam’s. However, this is just part of the labor cost story in China as a major part of
workers employed by foreign companies have been paid three to four times the minimum
wages, according to some research.
• Rental price is much higher than that of Vietnam. We understand that current ARPs in
key zones in China may range from USD180-300 per sqm (CEIC) while current ARP in
Vietnam’s more dynamic manufacturing areas range from USD90-120 per sqm. Lower ARPs
are a significant plus in attracting tenants out of China and into Vietnam.
• Political uncertainty in China remains a factor. In addition to the current trade war, key
political events include government transition in 2022 or early 2023; and/or the US elections
in late 2020.
For Vietnam FDI remains strong, seeing a 3.1% y/y increase in registered FDI (versus 2018’s
high base) and an average of 12.2% increase in disbursed FDI on a monthly basis up until
November 2019. We expect Vietnam’s stable macro environment, it’s cost advantages and build
up of supply chains to be a key driver for growth in key industrial hubs.
However, Vietnam’s infrastructure system is still relatively poor compared to China – significant
investment is required. We anticipate this to kick start again in 2021 which will provide long-term
stimulus to industrial park demand.
• A prolonged approval process is our current greatest concern. This might lead to
delays of new supply such as Nam Tan Uyen 3 (NTC), Nam Son Hap Linh and Trang Due 3
(KBC). Opportunities can be missed as a result. While regulatory easing will continue to
occur, the speed and timing is difficult to ascertain.
www.hsc.com.vn Page 81
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
• At present of the total available area for industrial park development (7,118 ha) only 33.0%
(2,364 ha) is currently approved for development and of that only about 18.0% (428 ha) is
located in prime locations. This suggests a temporary shortage of supply – an acceleration in
approvals while play an important role in driving the industrial park sector.
Figure 153: 9M19 leasing revenue growth Figure 154: 9M19 gross leasing margin
53.6%
79.3%
64.3%
18.4%
15.2% 13.8% 51.9% 54.2% 53.0%
13.2% 49.3%
10.5% 16.8% 46.2%
7.0%
2.8% 33.6% 33.3%
KBC NTC LHG SZC IDC SZL SIP D2D KBC VGC NTC LHG SZC IDC SZL SIP D2D
9M19 leasing sales y/y growth 9M19's avg. growth 9M19 9M18
www.hsc.com.vn Page 82
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
We prefer companies that have significant land bank in prime locations and/or have, in our view,
a higher possibility of bringing new zones into play from a development standpoint.
Consequently, we like KBC (one of our top picks), given its huge land bank and good leasing
track record; and PHR which, following a strategic shift, is leveraging its underperforming rubber
land bank into low cost industrial land. Meanwhile, VGC remains interesting given its large land
bank in the north (although in less favorable locations). We also think BCM, the southern
region’s largest player, has potential on a longer-term view when considering its enormous
assets and possible listing on HSX in Jan. 2020.
• KDH is benefiting from limited supply in HCM City. The company successfully launched
three projects in 2018-2019 amid a stringent regulatory environment with very good take up
rates and higher selling prices than expected.
• Prospects for FY20 look strong, and we forecast bottom line growth of 19.3% y/y mainly
driven by the recognition of units in Venita Park and Safira apartments.
• KDH has a large remaining land bank in the southwest region of HCMC (600 ha).
• The company is well positioned financially with VND1,005bn cash on hand and a low total
debt/equity ratio of 0.11x (as of 3Q19) compared to 0.33x for its peers.
• On valuation we apply a DCF methodology to calculate the value of projects that are under
development while we use comparative valuation methods for projects that we don’t yet
have detailed development plans for.
• We note that those projects which currently lack development plans provide large upside to
our target price given the limited available land bank in HCMC.
Figure 155: KDH selected financials Figure 156: KDH revenue breakdown from key projects
Market Cap, USDmn 625
VND mn FY19F FY20F FY21F
KDH 2018 2019F 2020F
Sales VNDbill 2,917 2,614 2,935 Sales 2,189,003 3,424,617 6,096,374
Sales Growth % -4.5% -10.4% 12.3% Jamila 874,800 - -
Net Profit VNDbill 805 914 1,090
Safira - 1,186,920 1,824,890
Net Profit Growth % 60.3% 13.6% 19.3%
EPS VND 1,485 1,604 1,903 The Venita Park 1,314,203 2,237,697 -
EPS Growth % 5.0% 8.0% 18.6% Lovera Vista - - 1,218,000
P/E X 17.8 16.5 13.9
Binh Trung - - 3,053,484
P/B X 2.1 2.0 1.9
ROE % 13.3% 13.0% 14.5% Gross profit 1,286,962 2,103,002 2,956,570
Div Yield % 1.9% 3.8% 3.8% Jamila 349,644 - -
Safira - 507,029 779,557
The Venita Park 937,318 1,595,973 -
Lovera Vista - - 517,139
Binh Trung - - 1,659,874
Source: HSC Research Source: HSC Research
www.hsc.com.vn Page 83
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
• NLG has been highly successful in the affordable housing segment, and offers a range of
products that includes apartments, townhouses and land plots for sale.
• As central HCMC gets more competitive and less affordable, the NLG’s strategy is to
develop new townships in adjacent provinces which is likely to prove to be very fruitful, in our
view.
• Access to more capital thanks to the cooperation with a handful of Japanese investors
should lead to an increased ability of NLG to do more launches while still maintaining a low
gearing ratio and a strong financial position.
• Sound corporate governance as we see an effective BOD structure and a transparent and
effective information sharing process.
• Most of the projects are developed under JVs with Japanese investors helps reduce
cashflow management risk. NLG also has a good corporate social responsibility in the way
that they are one of very few large corporates that develop social housing products.
• Sales of stakes in several projects are expected to boost the bottom line in 2020 – we are
forecasting a 16.6% net profit growth.
• The company is in a healthy financial situation, with VND1,530bn cash on hand and a low
total debt/equity ratio at 0.16x (as of 3Q19) compared to 0.33x of average peer.
• Our rating on NLG is Buy, and our TP of VND39,700. Valuation looks cheap with a forward
P/E of 7.7x and a 48.7% discount to our RNAV. However, FOL is full.
Figure 157: NLG selected financials Figure 158: NLG revenue breakdown from key projects
Market Cap, USDmn 289
NLG 2018 2019F 2020F
Sales VNDbill 3,480 3,345 4,081
Sales Growth % 10.1% -3.9% 22.0%
Net Profit VNDbill 763 919 1,071
Net Profit Growth % 42.7% 20.3% 16.6%
EPS VND 3,253 3,587 4,255
EPS Growth % 32.7% 10.3% 18.6%
P/E X 8.2 7.4 6.3
P/B X 1.4 1.3 1.1
ROE % 20.3% 19.0% 19.5%
Div Yield % 3.1% 2.8% 2.7%
• DXG is the leading property broker in Vietnam with an approximate 30% market share in its
core segment.
• The company has successfully branched out into development projects mostly focused on
the affordable and mid-end segments.
• DXG has shown an ability to translate their brokerage know how into building and selling
products carefully tailored to what the market likes.
www.hsc.com.vn Page 84
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
• DXG now has a solid project pipeline in HCM City and adjacent provinces, with a total of
around 132 ha for primary development.
• The successful development of the newly acquired land bank (92 ha) near the Long Thanh
New Airport in HCMC should prove to be a significant catalyst for earnings and for the stock,
in our view.
• For FY20, we are forecasting 25.3% y/y growth in the bottom line to VND1,636bn.
• Although, along with other developers in HCMC, the company has been facing tougher
regulatory and legal issues, leading to longer than expected times to complete legal
procedures before launching, we think that the stock is oversold.
Figure 159: DXG selected financials Figure 160: DXG’s pipeline for FY20
Market Cap, USDmn 308
DXG 2018 2019F 2020F
Sales VNDbill 4,645 4,851 5,778
Sales Growth % 61.3% 4.4% 19.1%
Net Profit VNDbill 1,178 1,306 1,636
Net Profit Growth % 56.9% 10.8% 25.3%
EPS VND 3,221 2,704 2,959
EPS Growth % 38.3% -16.1% 9.4%
P/E X 4.3 5.1 4.6
P/B X 1.3 1.0 0.9
ROE % 21.7% 17.6% 17.0%
Div Yield % 7.2% 3.6% 3.6%
• VRE is Vietnam’s largest and fastest growing retail developer, owner, and operator and is
the only stock in the VN30 that offers exposure to the retail real estate sector.
• A proven track record in developing malls has helped VRE attract a diversified and high-
quality portfolio of tenant-customers, now consisting of over one thousand international and
local brands.
• VRE’s multi-format model provides flexibility for expansion to provinces across the country; it
is now present in 39 of 63 provinces around the country.
• VRE plans to add approximately 250,000-275,000 sqm per annum in GFA into their system
of malls in the next two years, including those from the three Vincom Mega malls that stand
as integrated parts of Vingroup’s next mega residential projects.
• We forecast that revenues and net profit will increase at a CAGR of 15.3% and 20.6%,
respectively, over FY19F-FY22F.
• Our rating on VRE is Buy, and our TP of VND42,800. Prospects for FY20-22F look great and
at the current price, the stock offers decent upside at 27.2%.
www.hsc.com.vn Page 85
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 161: VRE selected financials Figure 162: Leasing revenue and NOI margin
Market Cap, USDmn 3,313
9 73.0%
VRE 2018 2019F 2020F
Sales VNDbill 9,124 9,042 10,218 8 71.0%
Sales Growth % 65.3% -0.9% 13.0%
7 69.0%
Net Profit VNDbill 2,404 2,764 3,314
Net Profit Growth % 18.6% 15.0% 19.9% 6 67.0%
EPS VND 1,032 1,187 1,423
VND trn
5 65.0%
EPS Growth % 56.6% 15.0% 19.9%
P/E X 32.6 28.3 23.6 4 63.0%
P/B X 2.8 2.7 2.6
3 61.0%
ROE % 8.8% 9.6% 11.3%
Div Yield % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2 59.0%
1 57.0%
- 55.0%
FY17 FY18 FY19F FY20F
• KBC is one of Vietnam’s largest industrial park developers, with 2,282 ha of total site area, of
which 1,415 ha is leasable. It has a very good track record of leasing out industrial area for
foreign electronics and high-tech companies in the industrial heartland of the north.
• KBC’s zones are well located in Bac Ninh & Hai Phong provinces. The company is favored
for FDI given its proven workforce & specialized input providers.
• Booming demand has led to a 15-20% increase in rental prices. Recently, we’ve learned that
Foxconn is expanding and Goertek is starting up in KBC’s zones.
• Upcoming projects include Trang Due 3 industrial park (687 ha), Trang Due Urban area (42
ha) and Phuc Ninh phase 2 (26 ha sellable); these will underpin long-term earnings.
• KBC’s capital structure has improved, though there is still some work to do. The company’s
total debt/equity ratio decreased to 0.21x at the end of 3Q19, from 0.3x at the end of FY17,
thanks to healthier cash received from IP leases in the past two years.
• We are forecasting for 15.1% and 7.8% growth in net profit in FY19 and FY20, respectively.
• Our current rating on KBC is Add, and our TP of VND17,500 offers upside of 13.3% using
the RNAV method.
Figure 163: KBC selected financials Figure 164: Leasing revenue and NOI margin
Market Cap, USDmn 307
KBC 2018 2019F 2020F
Sales VNDbill 2,491 3,447 3,329
Sales Growth % 97.7% 38.4% -3.4%
Net Profit VNDbill 746 859 926
Net Profit Growth % 27.7% 15.1% 7.8%
EPS VND 1,588 1,828 1,970
EPS Growth % 27.7% 15.1% 7.8%
P/E X 9.5 8.3 7.7
P/B X 0.8 0.8 0.7
ROE % 8.6% 9.3% 9.6%
Div Yield % 0.1% 6.7% 6.7%
www.hsc.com.vn Page 86
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
In terms of other stock views, Vietnam Dairy Products JSC (VNM; Hold, VND129,600 TP) looks
to be slowing, as a consequence of slower top line growth and rising raw milk costs, while
prospects relating to Masan Group (MSN; Hold, VND60,800 TP) look uncertain. Meanwhile,
KIDO Group (KDC; Hold, VND21,893 TP), a smaller player, will likely see lots of improvement in
its core business but it may have to book a big loss related its investment in Lavenue JSC, a
property developer, which could weigh negatively on the share price.
All key F&B segments within the broader category saw better sales growth during this period. In
2Q19, meanwhile, ‘beverage’ was the fastest-growing segment at 11.9% y/y, while ‘milk-based’
had the slowest growth, at 4.3% y/y.
Figure 166: FMCG sales growth Figure 167: Key F&B segments saw good growth
6.4
0.0%
5.3 5.5
3Q17
4Q17
1Q18
2Q18
3Q18
4Q18
1Q19
2Q19
4.8
4.4
3.8
2.7 2.7 -5.0%
2.3
-10.0%
www.hsc.com.vn Page 87
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 168: GDP per capita maintains healthy growth Figure 169: Urbanization brings rural consumer closer
to urban
100% Title:
2021F 3142
Source:
2020F 2929 31.8% 32.2% 33.1% 33.9% 34.4% 35.0% 35.7%
80% 40.0%
2019F 2728
60.0%
2018 2,590 60%
Please fill in the values above to have them entered in your report
2017 2,389
2013 1,898
0%
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2025E 2040E
2012 1,755
Average growth in our coverage universe of listed consumer stocks should grow stronger
than the industry in 2020. We forecast that the five listed consumer stocks (SAB, VNM, MSN,
QNS and KDC) in our coverage will have weighted average net sales growth of 10.2% in 2020,
higher than the whole FMCG industry. Amongst them, SAB, MSN and QNS are expected to
perform better than the others. For MSN, we expect its new chilled meat product will contribute
VND5,527bn of net sales, helping it to achieve a net sales growth of 23.1%. For SAB, we expect
it will gain market share in key business areas and deliver a net sales growth of 8.9%.
Meanwhile, due to the slowdown of dairy segment, VNM’s net sales is forecast to grow at 6.9%,
underperforming the sector.
EPS is forecast to grow at an average of 10.1% for our coverage (before considering
impacts from the Masan-VinCommerce transaction). Excluding KDC, which is expected to
see dramatic growth of 77% from a very low base in 2018, we expect SAB will be the best
performer, and a key driver of sector performance, with EPS growth of 25% y/y. At the other end,
VNM’s EPS growth will likely be modest – we estimate just 5.1% – following only single-digit top
line growth and rising raw milk costs.
Meanwhile, MSN is a special case. We forecast that MSN’s EPS will drop by 11.4%, due to lack
of extraordinary profit. We note that our forecasts on MSN do not incorporate the impact from its
recent combination with VinCommerce; these are presently unknown, but more likely to result in
near-term reductions in earnings, in our view. Therefore, it is possible that the sector average
EPS growth, taking into account the likely negative impact of VinCommerce consolidation on
MSN earnings, will fall below 10.1%.
Reasonable rather than exciting valuations. The average FY20 P/E of the five consumer
stocks looks only reasonable at 19.2x on a background of high ROE (average ROE of 34.2%)
and moderate dividend yield (at 2.8% on average). Our top stock picks are SAB and QNS.
www.hsc.com.vn Page 88
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
• Other industry drivers: Drinking age population growth of 3% p.a; eating out habits; more
restaurants/pubs/bars; long-established drinking culture.
• We forecast the beer industry to grow at 5.3% p.a in volume terms and 7.5% in value terms
from 2019-2021.
• We believe that SAB can gain market share thanks to rising investment in brands. Selling
expenses will increase by 37% in 2020, according to our forecasts.
• Profit margins will improve significantly due to a better product mix, a higher ASP and
efficiency gains in several areas of the business.
• We forecast that gross margins will improve from 22.5% in 2018 to 31.2% in 2021.
• Consequently, net profit will grow strongly at a CAGR of 25.4% from 2019-2021.
Figure 171: SAB selected financials Figure 172: SAB margin expansion
Market Cap, USDmn 6,218 31.2%
SAB 2018 2019F 2020F 28.7%
Sales VNDbill 35,949 39,344 42,838
25.6%
Sales Growth % 5.1% 9.4% 8.9%
Net Profit VNDbill 4,177 5,402 6,770 22.5% 22.2%
Net Profit Growth % -11.3% 29.3% 25.3% 19.6%
EPS VND 6,190 7,917 9,921 16.7%
EPS Growth % -13.4% 27.9% 25.3% 14.1%
P/E X 36.2 28.3 22.6
P/B X 9.5 8.5 7.4
ROE % 29.4% 33.8% 37.1%
Div Yield % 2.7% 2.2% 2.7%
www.hsc.com.vn Page 89
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
• Having 84% market share, QNS is the leading player in packaged soy milk with two well-
known brands: Fami and Vinasoy.
• Soy milk generates 77% of the company profit and we expect this segment can maintain
double-digit earnings growth in 2020 and 2021, due to active product launches.
• The sugar business, which contributes 5% to the company profit, should recover in 2020 as
selling prices will move up from a very low base in 2019.
• The stock is cheap with a forward P/E of 6.3x and a dividend yield of 5.1%.
Figure 173: QNS selected financials Figure 174: Sales breakdown by business line
Market Cap, USDmn 420
QNS 2018 2019F 2020F 6,000
Sales VNDbill 8,029 8,283 9,225
Sales Growth % 5.2% 3.2% 11.4% 5,000
Net Profit VNDbill 1,238 1,265 1,408
Net Profit Growth % 20.6% 2.2% 11.3% 4,000
EPS VND 4,175 4,218 4,670
EPS Growth % 22.6% 1.0% 10.7% 3,000
P/E X 6.5 6.4 5.8
2,000
P/B X 1.2 1.3 1.2
ROE % 25.2% 22.1% 21.6%
1,000
Div Yield % 5.5% 5.5% 5.5%
0
FY20F
FY18
FY19F
Soymilk Sugar Others
www.hsc.com.vn Page 90
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Vietnam retail sales have grown steadily, and this trend is expected to continue. From
2012 to 2019, Vietnam’s retail sales grew at a CAGR of 11.5% y/y. We believe retail sales will
continue to grow at double digit rates in 2020 and 2021.
Consumers’ preference for convenience has been supporting ‘modern retail’. Notably,
household size in Vietnam has become smaller (at 3.5 persons in 2020, down from 4.6 persons
in 2000), while average wages have risen nearly six times during that same period. We are also
seeing longer working hours and a higher female labor force participation rate (at nearly 80%).
All these factors have been contributing to strong demand for convenience products and
shopping. Modern retail, represented by supermarkets, minimarts, convenience stores and
specialty stores, has benefited from this trend. These retail formats are considered as
“convenient to get to, easy to find what consumers want and always available in stock”.
Given this, modern retail has been outgrowing traditional retail. FMCG sales through the
modern channel rose at 18% y/y, outpacing sales growth via traditional channels at 4% y/y,
based on Nielsen retail audit data from July 2018 to June 2019.
Modern retail has been seeing strong store expansion, driven by minimart. As of June
2019, modern retail stores totaled 5,598, up 25.6% y/y – a booming of the minimart concept was
the key driver here. From July 2018 to June 2019, minimart store count grew by 40.2% y/y and
accounted for 57.9% of total modern trade store count. This was because shoppers were looking
too “little” and “often” shopping.
Figure 176: Vietnam retail sales of goods Figure 177: Modern retail store expansion
4,000 5,594 5,551 5,598
3,729 Title: 5,267 5,312 5,399
5,136
3,329 4,593
Source:4,721 4,832
3,500 4,458 4,526
2,967
3,000 991 908 878
2,649 972 974 977
969
2,404 943 966
2,500 915 916 927
Please fill in the values above to have them entered in your report
VND trillion
2,189
1,965
2,000 1,740 2,980 3,137 3,172 3,239
2,793 2,891 2,911
2,311 2,358 2,405 2,492 2,534
1,500
1,000
May-19
Jul-18
Oct-18
Feb-19
Mar-19
Apr-19
Nov-18
Dec-18
Aug-18
Sep-18
Jan-19
Jun-19
500
0
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019E
We forecast that the listed retail companies in our coverage will continue to see strong
sales growth in 2020. We forecast the three listed retail companies will have average net sales
growth of 23.0% next year. Amongst them, MWG will likely be the best performer in terms of
sales, as it is gaining market share in consumer electronics (through its Dien May Xanh chain)
and opening a great number of minimarts (its Bach Hoa Xanh chain).
www.hsc.com.vn Page 91
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
EPS growth forecast to be 23.7% y/y, in-line with sales growth. We expect to see stable
profit margins within the retail companies.
Attractive valuation for a fast-growing sector. Retail stocks are trading at an average FY20
P/E of 11.7x which is cheap for an average EPS growth of 23.6%. However, the setback is that
foreign ownership for MWG and PNJ is full and foreign investors have to buy them at premiums.
Our top stock picks are MWG and PNJ.
• Leading retailer in Vietnam with 1,000 mobile phones stores (TGDD chain), 937 consumer
electronics stores (DMX chain) and 866 groceries stores (BHX chain).
• Near-term growth will be supported by the DMX consumer electronics chain with strong
earnings growth in 2019-2021, given operational optimization and continued store openings.
• Long term growth driver is the BHX groceries chain. BHX is expanding rapidly and we expect
to see profitability by 2020.
• We anticipate that the BHX groceries chain will have 1,000 stores opened by end of 2019,
1,800 stores by end of 2020 and 2,640 stores by end of 2021.
• Consequently, we believe MWG will continue to see double-digit earnings growth in the next
five years.
• We forecast 2019 and 2020 net profit growth at 32.8% y/y and 28.0% y/y, respectively.
www.hsc.com.vn Page 92
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 179: MWG selected financials Figure 180: Net profit by chain (in VNDbn)
Market Cap, USDmn 2,200
MWG 2018 2019F 2020F
7000
Sales VNDbill 86,516 102,758 124,634
Sales Growth % 30.4% 18.8% 21.3% 6000
Net Profit VNDbill 2,879 3,823 4,854
Net Profit Growth % 30.5% 32.8% 27.0% 5000
EPS VND 6,301 8,245 10,163
EPS Growth % 17.3% 30.8% 23.3% 4000
P/E X 18.2 13.9 11.3
P/B X 5.7 4.2 3.2 3000
ROE % 38.7% 35.8% 33.3%
2000
Div Yield % 1.3% 1.3% 1.3%
1000
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
(1000)
• Unique and leading position in Vietnam’s jewelry market with a vertically integrated business
model from manufacturing to retailing.
• PNJ is in an excellent position for the foreseeable future, as demand for branded jewelry is
rising following the emergence of high- and middle-income earners, and the consequent
demand for premium products.
• PNJ has no serious competitors in the branded jewelry retail space in Vietnam in term of
retail store count, sophisticated designs, skillful handicraft, new collections, and brand
awareness.
• The new ERP (enterprise resource planning) system that was applied since April 2019 will
help PNJ to optimize efficiencies and improve margins.
• A store expansion plan to 500 stores by 2022 from current 348 stores supports future growth.
Figure 181: PNJ selected financials Figure 182: Net profit by chain (in VNDbn)
Market Cap, USDmn 837
PNJ 2018 2019F 2020F
7000
Sales VNDbill 14,571 16,443 19,945
Sales Growth % 32.7% 12.8% 21.3% 6000
Net Profit VNDbill 960 1,183 1,492
Net Profit Growth % 32.4% 23.3% 26.1% 5000
EPS VND 4,148 5,050 6,367
EPS Growth % 28.5% 21.7% 26.1% 4000
P/E X 20.7 17.0 13.5
P/B X 3.8 3.8 3.0 3000
ROE % 28.7% 26.9% 26.1%
2000
Div Yield % 1.9% 1.6% 2.1%
1000
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
(1000)
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Rice volumes and prices are expected to remain flat. We expect that Vietnam rice sales will
be stable at around USD2.6-2.7mn, with flat volume (6mn tonnes) and prices. We have observed
some short-term dynamics in the world market, such as the on-going release of inventories in
China (estimated at 111.6mn tonnes, equivalent to 70% of world rice stocks) that has led to
short-term price decreases.
Going forward, we expect that China will again build-up its inventories and prices will recover
accordingly but this is likely to be let more in 2021. In general, we expect not much change in
global supply and demand of rice in 2020. Vietnam is the world’s second largest rice exporter
and we believe that its export volume and pricing will stay at historically relatively low 2019 levels.
In terms of our covered companies, we expect Loc Troi Group (LTG; Add, TP VND27,024 – one
of our top picks), operating in rice and crop protection chemicals (CPC), will see flat rice sales in
2020.
Figure 184: Price forecasts of key agri-commodities in Figure 185: Vietnam average export prices of rice and
the world market rubber from 2014 to 2019
450 2.1 1,800 Title: 520
1,600
Source:
500
400 2
1,400
480
1,200
US$/metric tons
350 1.9
US$/ton
1,000 Please fill in the values above to have them entered in your report 460
US$/kg
0 380
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
9M2019
150 1.5
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Rice, Thailand, 5% Urea, E. Europe, bulk Rubber, Malaysian Rubber (US$/ton) Rice (US$/ton)
Source: World Bank Commodity Outlook, October 2019 Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Both prices and volumes of fertilizers are suffering. Prices of fertilizer and other chemical
agriculture inputs in the world market are expected to be lower in 2020 as prices of natural gas
and coal, their key raw materials, are likely to fall on a weaker global economic outlook.
In this context, the fertilizer industry in Vietnam will likely see another tough year with (1) weak
selling prices and (2) declining demand for fertilizer which will be dragged down by low rice
prices and less cultivated area due to the increasing trend of switching agriculture land to
residential, industrial, and/or commercial land use.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Petrovietnam Fertilizer and Chemicals Corporation (DPM; Add, TP VND14,700), the fertilizer
player may be best placed in 2020. They will likely have a strong y/y increase of 33.3% in sales
volume this year as its factory will have a full year of operations (in 2019, it was shut down for 72
days for a major overhaul). We expect DPM’s sales volume of urea in 2020 at 800,000 tonnes,
back to its normal level.
Prices of natural rubber should increase slightly on supply shortages. Global sales of
passenger vehicles are expected to continue to fall in 2020, with particularly large declines in
China, due to trade tensions and a weaker economy outlook. Thus, we will see less the demand
for natural rubber, especially in China. This said, we may also see lower supply from key export
countries – including Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia – who are witnessing a serious disease
on their rubber plantations. Given all this, we expect Vietnam’s natural rubber price will increase
slightly, at 3% y/y. Dong Phu Rubber (DPR; Hold, TP VND38,297), the major listed rubber
company, will benefit from this.
Our covered agriculture companies are forecast to generate average sales growth of 8.2%
in 2020. We have excluded DPM, the fertilizer player, in this calculation due to the abnormal
increase in sales. Growth for the remaining companies are quite similar, ranging from 5.6% to
10.7%, and reflect the industry picture. LTG’s sales is forecast to grow at 5.6% thanks to new
product introduction in the CPC segment while its rice sales is looking flat. VHC will likely see
sales growth of 8.3% with better demand in key markets. DPR sales growth, meanwhile, is
forecast at 10.7%, supported by a price increase of 3% and higher production volumes in
subsidiaries.
Excluding DPM, average EPS growth of our covered agriculture companies is forecast at
3.5% in 2020, and this justifies low valuation. Agriculture stocks are trading at average FY20
P/E of 6.2x and EV/EBITDA of 5.0x, while they offer an average dividend yield of 6.7% (DPR has
the highest yield, at 13.4%). In our view, even at such low valuations, an EPS growth of 3.5% in
2020 is not attractive enough for a cyclical and risky sector. All in, we recommend Underweight
for Agriculture sector; our top stock picks are VHC and LTG.
• Leading Vietnamese pangasius exporter with 13.3% global market share and 50% US
market share in 9M 2019.
• Pangasius business will recover in 2020 thanks to more orders from the US, where
inventories have been cleared, and rising demand in China and Europe.
• Collagen and gelatin sales has been improving significantly since 2018. This business
carries high gross margin at 35% and we expect it will contribute 14% to VHC bottom line in
2020.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
• We expect in 2020 the capacity of collagen and gelatin will be expanded by 75% to 3,500
tons per year from current level of 2,000 tons per year.
• Given that we forecast VHC net operating profit will grow by 7.4% y/y in 2020. VHC has a
one-off gain of VND104bn from selling stake in its affiliate Van Duc Tien Giang. Hence EPS
2020 will be almost flat y/y (-0.5% y/y).
• VHC is cheap with a FY20 P/E of 5.9x and dividend yield of 5.0%.
Figure 187: VHC selected financials Figure 188: 13.3% Export market Share
Market Cap, USDmn 307
VHC 2018 2019F 2020F
Sales VNDbill 9,271 8,174 8,851
Sales Growth % 13.7% -11.8% 8.3%
Net Profit VNDbill 1,442 1,269 1,263
Net Profit Growth % 138.5% -12.0% -0.5%
EPS VND 7,817 6,865 6,833
EPS Growth % 23.5% -12.2% -0.5%
P/E X 5.0 5.7 5.7
P/B X 1.8 1.6 1.4
ROE % 41.5% 29.7% 26.4%
Div Yield % 10.3% 0.0% 10.3%
Loc Troi Group – Top agriculture player with a complete value chain
(LTG, TP VND27,000, upside 33%)
• The foremost provider of crop protection chemicals (CPC) domestically and has a market
share of 20%.
• LTG is also the largest fully-vertically-integrated producer and distributor of rice in Vietnam.
• LTG ranks first in the commercial corn seed and watermelon seed segments and second in
the overall seed sector with a 9.2% market share.
• We expect the company will maintain revenue growth of 4.5% pa and NPAT growth of 3.4%
pa over the next 5 years.
• The company also plans to list on HoSE, the main exchange, in early 2020.
• DPS has remained high the over last few years and we expect to see a sustained dividend
yield of over 6.5% in the next couple of years.
• Stock is trading cheaply at FY19 P/E of 4.3x and FY20 P/E of 4.9.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Construction material producers, including steel and plastic manufacturers, both experienced
solid growth in sales volume in the early months of the 2019 before sales decelerated towards
the later months of the year. Indeed, in some specific months, such as September and October,
both of these construction materials sub-sectors delivered a negative growth rate y/y (though this
was mainly due to a slowdown in disbursements of public investment and a delay in the
construction of several new real estate projects).
Besides the slowdown in demand for construction materials in recent months, an adverse
movement in prices of input materials for the steel sector also negatively impacted margins in the
period. This said, we note that the difference in technologies of factories amongst the various
construction steel producers in Vietnam means that impacts are not uniform.
In Vietnam, 60% of steel production is done using EAF (electric-arc furnace) technology with
scrap as a key input material; producers here include Pomina and Vinakyoei. Meanwhile, HPG
employs a BOF (blast oxygen furnace) as its primary technology in its facilities, with iron ore and
coking coal as key input materials.
Given this, the rocketing iron ore price has clearly had a negatively impact on margins of HPG in
2019. For example, iron ore prices (62% Fe) jumped to USD126/tonne in July (due to an
accident at miner Vale, which happened in 1Q19) from just USD70/tonne in the beginning of the
year. Currently, iron ore is trading at about USD92/tonne, recovering from a recent low of
USD79/tonne in November.
Coking coal prices, in the meantime, declined to USD135/tonne from USD190/tonne. The
decline in coking coal prices were partly offset by the surge in iron ore. Meanwhile, the selling
price of construction steel products declined by 8.1% YTD. As is normal, the construction steel
price was positively correlated with scrap prices in 2019. During this period, scrap prices
declined to USD240/tonne in October from USD344/tonne, before recovery to USD290/tonne
currently.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 192: Construction steel sales volume (tonne) Figure 193: Steel sheet and steel pipe sales volume
(tonne)
Thanks to the correction in iron ore prices, as well as the relatively stable coking coal price and a
recovery of 10% in scrap prices, the selling price of construction steel has recovered somewhat.
For 2019, we forecast total construction steel and steel sheet & steel pipe consumption of
10.4mn tonnes (+4.3% y/y) and 6.1mn tonnes (-1.6% y/y), respectively. The recovery in both
demand and selling prices will boost the earnings for steel producers (which use BOF
technology) in 4Q this year, we believe, and also suggests at least a good start to 2020.
As a reminder, ‘safeguard taxes’ for long steel (including billet and construction steel) will expire
in March 2020. This said, we believe that the government will continue to protect the local
products by extending the protection scheme for long steel products. Consolidation will likely
continue, and this should allow the ‘winners’ to gain further market share in the future.
On 16 December 2019, the US Department of Commerce (DOC) announced five affirmative final
anti-dumping duty (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) circumvention determinations involving
steel products produced in Korea and Taiwan. These products are shipped to Vietnam for minor
processing, before being exported to the US as corrosion-resistant steel products (CORE) and
cold-rolled steel (CRS) – in circumvention of an existing order. The applicable cash deposit rates
will be as high as 456.2%, depending on the origin of the substrate and the type of steel product
exported to the US. Recall that, DOC also imposed AD and CVD taxes on CORE and CRS
products, which both used materials originating in China, of 238.48% and 456.2%, respectively,
on May 16th 2019.
This most recent DOC decision was not surprising news. Faced with the potential of this
situation, Vietnamese CORE and CRS producers have found alternative production strategies in
order to avoid significant impacts. To meet the standard of origin for US orders, Vietnamese
producers of CORE and CRS products must also ensure that they source materials that do not
originate from China, Korea and Taiwan for use in their steel products.
Among listed companies, HSG and NKG are the two biggest players to export these products to
the US market. However, their exposure to the US market accounts for a small portion of their
total export sales volume (around 10%). As a result, we expect the impact to be minimal at this
stage. Meanwhile, the potential demand for Vietnamese hot-rolled coil (HRC), which still meets
requisite US origin standards, may be another positive catalyst for HPG (Buy, TP of VND28,288)
once they successfully launch their first HRC products in 2H20.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
In conclusion, we believe that the leading players, who have economies of scale, the lowest
production costs, nationwide distribution networks and strong brand names, will benefit from
likely underlying trends in 2020. We like HPG and BMP (Add, TP of VND63,096) on the
consolidation theme.
Meanwhile, for the steel sheet segment, more and more entrants are participating in the market,
including both HPG and POM. This will increase the competition for the existing players such as
HSG and NKG, which are on restructuring programs.
The delay in license approvals nationwide and the still-slow disbursements of public investments
for infrastructure have put the market demand on construction materials under pressure for
years. Based on this issue, we believe that once the progress of license approval is solved and
disbursement for infrastructure projects is back to normal, the consumption of construction
materials (including steel and plastic products) will rebound strongly.
Automobiles segment:
2019 has been a strong turnaround year for autos, and underlying trends and demographics
point to a good 2020 as well. Through 11M19, total Vietnam sales volumes of autos were posted
at 274,613 units (+12.4% y/y), according to the Vietnam Association of Auto Manufactures
(VAMA). Breaking this down:
• Passenger cars performed strongly, showing a growth of 21.5% y/y to 205,475 units.
• Commercial vehicles sales volume, on the other hand, declined by 5.2% y/y to 66,129 units.
This was mainly due to a 20.2% decrease in buses, a 45.5% drop in special purpose
vehicles, and a flat sales volume of trucks.
We forecast FY19 auto sales volume of 310,000 units (+12.0% y/y). For FY20, we forecast total
auto consumption will increase by 10% y/y to 341,000 units. In FY19, the CBU (completely built-
up) sub-segment doubled y/y thanks to the 0% import tax from ASEAN countries (including
Indonesia, Thailand, etc.)
Meanwhile, CKD (completely knocked-down) vehicles, on the other hand, decreased by 12.4%
y/y. Looking at FY20, we expect the CKD sub-segment will turnaround to deliver positive growth
as we understand that Toyota and Honda will begin assembling some popular models
domestically in Vietnam. CKD margins are normally higher than those for CBU products. Based
on these assumptions, we expect the business of auto companies – those that have better
product mixes (with a higher contribution from CKD products) – will improve going forwards.
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Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 195: Auto sales volume (units) Figure 196: Motorbike sales volume (units)
Demand for cars among young families and car consumption is expected to increase strongly. A
strongly growing middle class, increases in per capita income, a low penetration of car
ownership, and infrastructure improvements will all be the key drivers for the automobile industry
going forward. With an increase in income, a ‘golden demographic’ could be emerging, with the
number of people having good earnings now accounting for 52% of the population.
With respect to the outlook for commercial vehicles, we believe that the demand for road
transportation cargo services has been impacted negatively to a degree by very strong demand
for air transportation services over the past three years. The launch of the low-cost carrier (LCC)
segment has clearly helped to reduce the cost of shipping through air transport.
Thanks to inherent ‘time’ advantages that air transport has versus road transportation, special
cargo (that which are light in weight, luxury in value, time sensitivity) will likely shift further away
from road transportation going forward. This said, following three consecutive years of
contraction (from 2016’s record sales volumes), the launch of more efficient Euro4-model trucks
should lead to positive growth gradually returning in the next 2-3 years.
Motorbikes segment:
Sales volume through 9M19 experienced a 4.8% y/y decline to 2,334,890 units and, for FY19 as
a whole, we forecast total motorbike sales volume will be at 3,250,000 units (-4.0% y/y). Notably,
this is the first year of contraction after four consecutive years with a decent growth (rates ranged
from 3.5% to 9.5% in the FY15-FY18 period).
Despite the drop in sales volumes of motorbikes in 2019, scooter sales volumes continued to
increase their proportion of total motorbike sales volume – to 52-55%, from 45% in the past –
and this better product mix is also leading to an improvement in the overall margins of the
motorbike makers. Amongst the five biggest players in this segment, Honda continued to expand
its market share to 78.9% in 9M19 from 75.9% in FY18. For FY20, we forecast a 2% y/y increase
in sales to 3,315,000 units, and we expect that Honda’s market share will exceed 80%.
Supporting industries:
Industry supporting the automotive sector remains underdeveloped in Vietnam, and this –
together with a low localization ratio and ineffective tax policies – is helping to lead to too-high
car prices in the country, in our view. This has negatively affected the development of the whole
automobile industry. Currently, local suppliers only make simple accessories such as body
shells, cabin shells, gear boxes, car seats, brakes, storage batteries and tires – generally, with
low technology content and value-added. A consequence of this has been that the automotive
supporting industry sector is poorly represented on the stock markets .
Nevertheless, with the bright prospects of automobiles, we expect the listed companies which
produce storage batteries and tires to deliver better earnings in 2020. Tire producers had a
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
turnaround year in 2019, thanks to strong demand from export markets and favorable
movements in input materials prices (mainly natural rubber). With huge orders made from the
US, Brazil and India, together with recovering demand for truck tires domestically, we expect
local tire producers will have a good year in 2020. With this expectation, we like DRC (Buy, TP of
VND30,074) with its turnaround story.
The storage battery is another accessory that local companies can produce for cars and
motorbikes; PAC (Add, TP of VND30,080) is the only listed company in this sub-sector. While a
fire in its Dong Nai 2 factory impacted production and sales activities in 3Q19, PAC should be
back to normal business from 4Q19 and beyond. This said, capacity constraints will likely limit
the growth for both top line and the bottom line of the company in FY20.
According to Vietnam Textile & Apparel Association (Vitas), the export value of Vietnam’s textile
& apparel industry in 2019 is estimated to have been USD39bn (+7.6% y/y), below the target of
USD40bn (+10.3% y/y). Growth was slower compared to the two previous years – 10.8% y/y in
2017, and 16.4% y/y in 2018 – due to the global economic slowdown and trade war
consequences, in our view.
We expect that the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) will come into force from July
2020, after being ratified by the EU Parliament in February 2020 and Vietnam National Assembly
in May-June 2020. Under the EVFTA, there are to be four categories of tariff reductions on
Vietnamese textiles and clothing exports to the EU, including A, B3, B5 and B7. These
categories set out different implementation timelines; i.e., the customs duties on A category good
are to be eliminated from the date of entry into force (we assume July 2020), while other
categories’ import tariffs will be removed gradually over a 3-7 year period.
Despite long-term opportunities, we see insubstantial benefits from the FTA to Vietnam’s
textile and apparel industry in 2020. The reasons are set out as below:
• In 2020, goods in A category will benefit the most from EVFTA thanks to tariff elimination.
However, goods in B category will have negligible benefit with a small reduction in import
tariff to 9.0% from 9.6%. Moreover, goods in group B5 and B7 will gain no benefit from
EVFTA. This is because Vietnam is currently benefiting from the so-called Generalized
Scheme of Preferences (GSP), an arrangement of the EU for low and lower-middle income
countries. Therefore, main tariffs on Vietnamese clothing imported to the EU is currently at
9.6%, which is lower than the rates applied under EVFTA for B5 and B7 categorizes in the
first year of entry into force (10.0% and 10.5% respectively). As a result, group B5 and B7
will still apply the old tariff rates under GSP and have no benefit from EVFTA in 2020.
• Key export products of Vietnam’s textile and garment industry are t-shirts, jackets and
trousers. While a few types of the products are arranged in the A category, most of the
products are classified into B3 and B5 categories. Therefore, in general Vietnam’s textile and
garment industry will not gain much benefit from EVFTA in 2020. The industry will start
gaining more considerable benefits from the FTA from January 2021, when all import tariffs
will be lower than the current rates.
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 198: Tariff reduction process on major Vietnamese textile and clothing products under
the EVFTA
Type Base rate under EVFTA Main rate under GSP Entry into force (2020) 1/1/2021 1/1/2022 1/1/2023 1/1/2024 1/1/2025 1/1/2026 1/1/2027
A 12% 9.6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
B3 12% 9.6% 9.0% 6.0% 3.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
B5 12% 9.6% 10.0% 8.0% 6.0% 4.0% 2.0% 0% 0% 0%
B7 12% 9.6% 10.5% 9.0% 7.5% 6.0% 4.5% 3.0% 1.5% 0%
On the other hand, in February 2020, the EU Commission will take a decision on whether or not
to temporarily withdraw Cambodia’s ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) trade preferences. Losing the
privilege would mean that the majority of Cambodia’s textile and apparel exports to the EU will
face a tariff rate of approximately 12% instead of their current duty-free access. As Cambodia is
the 5th largest textile and apparel exporter into the EU, with 3.5% market share in 2018, Vietnam
would be a potential beneficiary from the EBA withdraw. In 2018, Vietnam held 3.3% market
share of textile and apparel exports into the EU, making it the 6th largest exporter.
Taking all this into account, we are looking for moderate (single digit) growth in the
industry in 2020. We saw a decreasing growth trend in the export value of Vietnam’s textile and
garment industry in the last months of 2019. Moreover, according to Vitas, many Vietnam
garment companies are experiencing a decline in orders for 2020. Coupling with sluggish
demand prospects in Vietnam’s main importing countries (the US, the EU, Japan) due to
economic slowdowns, we forecast export value of Vietnam textile and apparel industry in 2020
will grow by 7.0% y/y to USD41.7bn. However, if Cambodia’s EBA is withdrawn, we would
expect a higher growth of 8.0-9.0% y/y thanks to the market share gained in the EU market.
Among listed companies in Vietnam’s textile and garment industry, we like TCM (Add, TP of
VND24,274 – a top pick) the most, while unrated MSH may also be interestingly positioned. TCM
is one of a few companies in Vietnam that has a full supply chain, from yarn to garment.
Therefore, TCM will likely be a direct beneficiary from the FTAs thanks to their origin
requirements. MSH, meanwhile, is one of the largest garment companies in Vietnam; it has good
earnings prospects thanks to a strategy to shift from CMT (cut – make – trim) to FOB (free on
board), thus should be able to improve profit margins in the coming years.
• Recent turnaround in earnings were mainly thanks to the higher demand from export
markets with sharp expansion in margins.
• Higher utilization rate and better cost management helped DRC to expand its Radial tire
margins.
• New products, namely LTR, which will be launched next year. Solid demand from auto
makers will be the key driver for DRC in the upcoming years.
• Machinery installed at Radial factory (Phase 1) will be fully depreciated by the end of FY20.
The depreciation decline will translate directly to the bottom line.
• Dividend yield is expected to improve for the upcoming years especially after FY21 once the
depreciation cost drops.
• We forecast the company will pay FY19-23 cash dividend in range of VND1,000-2,500/share
and giving us a dividend yield range of 4.4-11.0% in the same period.
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 199: DRC selected financials Figure 200: Margins and sales
Market Cap, USDmn 125 GPM (%) 1Q FY19 2Q FY19 3Q FY19
DRC 2018 2019F 2020F
Sales VNDbill 3,551 4,024 4,383 Bias tires 20.7% 25.3% 26.6%
Sales Growth % -3.2% 13.3% 8.9% Radial tires 1.2% 6.8% 12.0%
Net Profit VNDbill 141 219 249
Bicycle 5.2% 12.4% 11.5%
Net Profit Growth % -15.1% 55.2% 14.0%
EPS VND 1,080 1,676 1,911 Motorbike 10.0% 16.0% 14.9%
EPS Growth % -16.9% 55.2% 14.0% GPM 9.7% 14.4% 16.7%
P/E X 22.5 14.5 12.7
P/B X 1.9 1.8 1.7
ROE % 9.3% 14.0% 15.3% Export activities 1Q FY19 2Q FY19 3Q FY19
Div Yield % 4.5% 4.1% 6.2% Export sales (US$ '000) 14,871 19,879 19,947
Radial export value (US$ '000) 10,424 15,038 15,824
Radial export volume (tires) 70,556 104,304 105,355
Growth (%) 1Q FY19 2Q FY19 3Q FY19
Export sales (US$ '000) 20.6% 28.7% 48.5%
Radial export value (US$ '000) 39.4% 55.9% 69.7%
Radial export volume (tires) 45.2% 69.6% 71.3%
Source: HSC Research Source: HSC Research
• We believe that negative sentiment regarding the bottom line in FY19 has been discounted.
• Structurally we continue to see HPG as the main beneficiary of: (1) the expansion in
Vietnam’s industrial space which is leading to demand for new types of steel, (2) an import
substitution strategy, especially in flat steel products and (3) ongoing consolidation in the
industry where they remain the lowest cost producer.
• HSC expects that the company to resume double-digit profit growth in 2020 thanks to a full-
year contribution from the Dung Quat factory, coupled with tax incentives that start from this
year.
• The Dung Quat factory will be the key driver for HPG in the next 3 years.
• Valuation is cheap. Cash dividend will resume being paid next year.
Figure 201: HPG selected financials Figure 202: Capacity and sales
Market Cap, USDmn 2,871 Capacity (tonne) FY17 FY18 FY19F FY20F
HPG 2018 2019F 2020F Construction steel 2,150,000 2,960,000 4,860,000 4,860,000
Sales VNDbill 55,836 62,941 81,080 % y/y 7.5% 37.7% 64.2% 0.0%
Sales Growth % 21.0% 12.7% 28.8% Steel pipe 600,000 700,000 800,000 900,000
Net Profit VNDbill 8,573 7,765 9,346
% y/y 20.0% 16.7% 14.3% 12.5%
Net Profit Growth % 7.1% -9.4% 20.4%
Steel sheet 400,000 400,000 400,000
EPS VND 3,835 2,672 3,216
% y/y 0.0% 0.0%
EPS Growth % -32.8% -30.3% 20.4%
P/E X 6.3 9.0 7.5 HRC 2,500,000
P/B X 1.3 1.4 1.3 % y/y n/a
ROE % 23.6% 17.6% 18.9% Sales volume (tonne) FY17 FY18 FY19F FY20F
Div Yield % 0.0% 8.3% 8.3% Construction steel 2,180,566 2,377,788 2,689,124 3,199,517
% y/y 20.9% 9.0% 13.1% 19.0%
Steel pipe 581,000 653,900 751,985 827,184
% y/y 21.0% 12.5% 15.0% 10.0%
Steel sheet 200,000 156,000 150,000 200,000
% y/y -3.8% 33.3%
HRC 500,000
% y/y n/a
Source: HSC Research Source: HSC Research
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
• Leading plastic pipe company with highest quality of products and lowest cost of production.
Nationwide distribution network.
• Automation in production will be the key driver in the future for BMP to gain further market
share and improve its efficiency of operation.
• Despite seeing single-digit growth in both FY19 and FY20, we believe that BMP will remain
the main beneficiary of: (1) the long term requirement to increase infrastructure investment in
Vietnam, (2) some economies of scale, and a strong balance sheet, coupled with a very solid
management team and (3) industry consolidation.
• We have seen several positive influences from its controlling stake in Nawaplastics - BMP’s
position in the market is being enhanced.
• Valuation looks reasonable with an attractive dividend yield, which are expected to be stable
at 7.5%. This underpins solid returns for value investors over the long-run.
• Earnings from associates (including Honda, Toyota and Ford) are the key contributors to
VEA.
• VEA holds a dominant position in both the motorbike market (via Honda) and the automobile
market (via the combination of its joint ventures with Toyota, Honda and Ford).
• In the short-term, a weakening in the motorbike market will have a negative impact on the
top line of the Honda JV, but continued expansion in margins thanks to a better product mix
will be the key driver for the bottom line.
• Toyota businesses are improving steadily thanks to a very strong increase in sales volume
coupled with an expansion in market share. Earnings are expected to continue grow nicely in
the next 3 years.
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
1Q FY18
2Q FY18
3Q FY18
4Q FY18
1Q FY19
2Q FY19
3Q FY19
Motorbike sales volume Honda market share
• We forecast FY19 net profit will decline 22.0% y/y due to the poor performance of yarn
segment given low demand from China as a result of trade war.
• Low productivity of the new factory (Trang Bang factory) which was put into operation from
October 2018 has been corrected – this will lead to improved margins.
• For FY20, we are forecasting 11.6% growth in net profit thanks to growth in sales volumes of
garment (+7.0% y/y) and fabric segments (+5.0% y/y).
• The Thanh Cong Tower 1 project will be another catalyst for TCM as the revaluation process
could bring around VND130bn in non-cash gains for the company.
• In the long-term, TCM is one of a few Vietnamese companies that can satisfy the rules of
origin under free trade agreements. Thus, it will be a direct beneficiary from the FTAs.
Figure 207: TCM selected financials Figure 208: A rebound in the share price?
Market Cap, USDmn 49 TCM Common (TCM)
TCM 2018 2019F 2020F Closing price Relative To VNIndex (RHS)
Sales VNDbill 3,662 3,700 4,011 34,500 141
Sales Growth % 14.1% 1.0% 8.4%
Net Profit VNDbill 259 202 226 29,500 105
Net Profit Growth % 35.2% -22.0% 11.6%
EPS VND 4,069 3,046 3,305 24,500 69
EPS Growth % 28.7% -25.1% 8.5%
P/E X 4.8 6.4 5.9 19,500 33
P/B X 0.8 0.8 0.7
ROE % 22.1% 15.2% 15.5% 14,500 -3
Div Yield % 2.5% 6.1% 6.1%
9,500 39
15
10
Vol mn
5
12/14
10/15
8/16
6/17
4/18
2/19
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
In 11M19, total international visitors into Vietnam increased by 15.4% y/y to 16.3mn pax. For
FY19, we expect international visitor arrivals to have reached 17.9mn pax (+15.6% y/y). Day by
day, more direct flights to Vietnam are being scheduled, especially from China, Korea, Japan
and Taiwan.
Going forward, we believe that the relaxation for the establishment of new airlines – decree No
89/2019/ND-CP – will lead to increased industry growth. Currently, Vietnam has a total of five
carriers, including Vietnam Airlines, Vietjet, Jetstar, Bamboo Airways and Vasco. In 2H20, we
expect to welcome four new players, including Vietstar Airlines, KiteAir, Vinpearl and Vietravel
Airlines.
More competition in the aviation industry should result in lower ticker fares and more capacity for
new potential passengers to shift from railway and car transportation to air transportation. Based
on this assumption, we can expect to see a sharp increase air transportation around the country.
With help from the apparent shift of preference of Chinese tourists away from traditional hot
spots such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, Vietnam is expected to welcome more international
visitors in 2020. We expect to see an overall 10% growth in international visitors into Vietnam in
2020 to 19.7mn arrivals for the full year.
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
As mentioned above, air traffic will continue to be supported by a combination of local and
international visitors. However, the sharp rise in the number of air passengers within, and to,
Vietnam has put enormous strain on Tan Son Nhat (TIA) and Noi Bai (NIA) international airports.
The country’s aviation facilities are not at a level to match the growth of the industry. This leaves
the facilities in a serious state of degradation. The upgrading of two main runways in TIA and
NIA for four months over August-October 2020 will have a short-term impact on aviation traffic.
However, once the maintenance is done, we believe that double digit growth in air traffic will be
restored.
In the air aviation area, ACV (Buy, TP of VND95,000) is our top pick for the time being due to its
monopoly position in air transport and strong fundamentals.
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
The US-China trade war and global economic slowdown has had a negative short-term impact
on Vietnam’s seaport industry in 2019. For the first nine months of 2019, the total throughput of
Vietnam’s container seaports grew only 6% y/y, well below a CAGR of 16.1% seen over the
2015-2018 period; this was a result of decelerating growth in total Vietnam exports and imports.
For FY19 as a whole, we estimate throughput volumes of Vietnam’s container seaports will grow
5.6% y/y to 19.1mn TEUs.
We maintain our positive view regarding the long-term prospects of Vietnam’s seaport industry
thanks to likely strong growth in FDI inflows. Notably, in FY19 FDI commitments grew strongly -
this growth mainly came from the trend towards factory relocations – out of China and into
Vietnam – to avoid the trade war and to take advantage of cheaper costs for assembly.
Therefore, we expect that once the new wave of factories commence their operations (mostly, in
2H20), throughput volumes for Vietnam’s seaports should recover strongly. Indeed, for 2020, we
forecast Vietnam’s container seaport throughput volumes will increase by 10% y/y to 20.9mn
TEUs.
Figure 213: Vietnam container throughput volumes Figure 214: Container throughput by port
Source: Vinamarine, HSC Research Source: Vinamarine, Maritime Administration of Haiphong, HSC Research
The potential beneficiaries from the recovery in seaport throughput volume in FY20 including
VSC (Buy, TP of VND33,099) and GMD (Add, TP of VND28,372).
We view VSC as a value stock instead of a growth stock. The company is expected to pay back
total long-term debts by mid-FY20 at the latest, therefore it should have very strong cash flows in
coming years. Moreover, despite a contraction in net profit in FY19, we forecast earnings will
turnaround in FY20 thanks to lower interest expenses and an absence of one-off expenses
relating to tax arrears and penalties.
We like GMD’s long-term prospects thanks to its seaport projects, including Gemalink (expected
to commence operations by end-FY20) and Nam Dinh Vu phase 2. GMD has the best location
among container terminals in the Cai Mep Thi Vai area, which has experienced strong growth in
throughput volumes in recent years given its ability to accommodate large vessels up to 200,000
DWT. Furthermore, Nam Dinh Vu phase 2, with expected operations from 2Q21, will help GMD
sustain growth in the north as the Phase 1 project will likely reach full capacity from FY21.
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
• ACV operates 21 key airports across Vietnam and has a monopoly position in this industry.
• The air traffic sector will continue to deliver a strong growth in the future thanks to a
increasing demand from both international visitors and local travelers.
• We see a lot of room for ACV to improve its efficiency in operations. The possible removal of
the cap on non-aeronautical charges will give ACV a great opportunity to improve its margins.
• Tan Son Nhat Terminal 3 and Long Thanh International Airport will be the key driver for ACV
in the next 5 years.
Figure 215: ACV selected financials Figure 216: Vietnam tourism growth
Market Cap, USDmn 6,978 100,000 60.0%
ACV 2018 2019F 2020F Vietnam tourism industry
Sales VNDbill 16,090 17,711 19,408 50.0%
Sales Growth % 16.3% 10.1% 9.6% 80,000
Net Profit VNDbill 6,135 7,212 7,851 40.0%
Net Profit Growth % 49.6% 17.5% 8.9% 60,000
EPS VND 2,630 3,081 3,354 30.0%
EPS Growth % 54.8% 17.1% 8.9% 40,000
P/E X 28.1 24.0 22.1 20.0%
P/B X 5.2 4.5 3.9
ROE % 21.1% 21.7% 20.5% 20,000 10.0%
Div Yield % 1.2% 1.2% 1.2%
- 0.0%
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
Domestic trippers ('000) International visitors ('000)
Dom visitor growth rate (%) Int'l visitor growth rate (%)
Source: HSC Research Source: HSC Research
• We are forecasting that FY19 net profit will decline 27.1% y/y due to one-off expenses from
tax arrears and associated penalties and that gross margins will have declined to scheduling
issues at VSC’s ports.
• We are forecasting FY20 net profit growth of 15.0% y/y thanks to an absence of the one-off
expenses as booked in FY19, decrease in interest expenses as bank borrowings will drop
significantly in FY20 and a slight improvement margins thanks to a decline in outsourcing
volumes.
• VSC will pay total long-term debts by mid-FY20 at the latest, in our view.
• We forecast cash dividend payment will be at least VND2,500 per share in the 2020-2023
period, equivalent to a dividend yield of 10.3% on the current share price.
• We believe the negative sentiment relating to poor performances in FY19 has been
discounted in stock price.
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
Figure 217: VSC selected financials Figure 218: Bad news discounted
Market Cap, USDmn 66 VSC Common (VSC)
VSC 2018 2019F 2020F Closing price Relative To VNIndex (RHS)
Sales VNDbill 1,694 1,815 1,842 56,000 200
Sales Growth % 30.1% 7.1% 1.5%
Net Profit VNDbill 300 219 252 51,000 171
Net Profit Growth % 26.6% -27.1% 15.0% 46,000 143
EPS VND 5,575 3,718 4,114
EPS Growth % 15.4% -33.3% 10.7% 41,000 114
P/E X 4.9 7.4 6.7 36,000 86
P/B X 0.8 0.8 0.8
ROE % 19.3% 12.6% 13.3% 31,000 57
Div Yield % 7.3% 9.1% 10.9% 26,000 29
21,000 0
6
4
Vol mn
2
12/14
10/15
8/16
6/17
4/18
2/19
Source: HSC Research Source: HSC Research
• Gemalink will commence operating from the end-3Q20 while Nam Dinh Vu phase 2 broke
ground in November 2019 and is expected begin operating from 2Q21.
• We are forecasting core PBT will see CAGR of 6.9% in the period FY19-FY21. Single-digit
growth will reflect the ramp up in utilization rates of new projects.
• However, the outlook is good: Gemalink will be the key driver for long-term growth of GMD
as it has the best location among container terminals in the Cai Mep Thi Vai area and while
strong growth in throughput volumes of this area (CAGR of 27.1% in the previous 5 years
are set to continue.
• Nam Dinh Vu phase 2 will help GMD sustain growth in the North as Phase 1 will reach full
capacity from 2021.
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
We believe that the key ‘big picture’ themes in Vietnam’s energy markets include: the (negative)
impact that Vietnam’s aging oil fields are having on production; the (negative) impact that
slowing/declining capex – exacerbated by the China-Vietnam territorial dispute – is having on
proven reserves; the fact that key oil and gas projects are being delayed; the fact that Vietnam’s
self-sufficiency in gas has come to an end; and the likelihood of more electricity shortages.
In spite of these largely negative headlines, we expect that the country’s leading players –
including PVS, PVD and PVT – will still find their way through the tough seas and enjoy some
stock price recovery from current low levels.
Indeed, PetroVietnam (PVN), the state-owned corporation in charge of oil & gas exploration and
production on behalf of Vietnam government, estimates that crude oil production will continue to
decline during 2020-2025 due to the aging of existing production fields, declining proven
reserves, and investment shortages. Such declining production output together with unstable
crude oil prices then leaves oil & gas operators a thin cash position to invest in further
exploration for new oil & gas reserves.
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
-
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19E
FY20F
Crude oil (mn toe) Natural gas (mn toe)
Vietnam has a large oil & gas potential with estimated geological reserves coming in at around
10bn tonnes of oil equivalent (toe), with proven reserves coming at 1.3bn toe as of early 2019.
Vietnam is currently the third largest holder of proven reserves in Asia, behind China and India.
However, since 2015, Vietnam’s oil & gas proven reserves have been declining as the reserves
of new oil & gas discoveries have been lower than production output. This is the direct
consequence of lower investment in upstream activities in Vietnam waters over the last few
years, in our view.
During 2016-2019, PVN spent only USD3.6bn on exploration and production (E&P) activities,
about 80% lower than that for the 2011-2015 period (Figure 2). Following this, PVN was able to
add only 25.6mn toe to the country's proven reserves, compared to a total of 207.5mn toe added
to proven reserves during 2011-2015.
The territorial dispute between Vietnam and China is also preventing upstream activities.
Recently, China increased its maritime militia activities in and around Vietnamese territorial
waters. This is unsettling for oil & gas operators in Vietnam waters and makes it difficult for
Vietnam to call for investment in its oil & gas projects.
The decline of E&P capex during 2016-2019 was mainly because three years of low crude oil
prices during 2015-2017 had cleaned out domestic oil & gas producers’ retained earnings. This
meant there was little re-investment in exploration given that the sustainable break-even price,
i.e. the price that covers production costs and all other costs prior plus post production costs was
around USD55/bbl.
With the oil price level forecasted to be stable around USD60 for 2020, we believe total E&P
capex in Vietnam water will remain small as domestic oil & gas operators don’t have the money
to restart any important E&P programmes.
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
60 5
5
50
4
4
40
3
30 3
2
20
2
1
10
1
- -
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19E
FY20F
New proven reserve added (million toe) Total E&P capex (USD bn)
Vietnam’s key upcoming upstream projects, Block B and Blue Whale (see table below), have
been delayed for an extended period. The Block B project has been delayed for about five years
now, mainly due to disagreements between the Vietnamese government and the gas field
owners over natural gas prices.
This has led to delays in gas field development, the laying of gas transportation pipelines, and
the building of downstream facilities, including the O Mon gas-turbine thermal power plants III
and IV.
The Blue Whale project, meanwhile, has been delayed for more than a year as Exxon Mobile,
the biggest stakeholder with a 64% working interest in the project, is putting pressure on PVN
(which has a 36% interest and is the gas buyer at the same time) to increase gas selling price
from what was previously offered. No information about gas prices or annual volumes has been
confirmed.
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
The limited availability of domestic gas resources, and the projected dependence on gas
imports, has been changing the pricing of domestic natural gas – it is becoming more market
driven.
Prior to January 2019, the price of natural gas at take-or-pay volumes for power plants was
regulated by the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT), and a price above take-or-pay volumes
was floated at 46% of monthly average furnace oil prices in the Singaporean market (MFO) plus
transportation fees and distribution fees. Now all natural gas for power plants is floated based on
46% MFO plus transportation fees and distribution fees.
As a consequence of the abovementioned matter, all six of the gas-turbine thermal power plants
approved in the Vietnam Power Development Plant VII have been delayed due to the delay of
related gas projects (see table below).
Figure 225: Gas-fired power projects 2018-‘25, as scheduled in revised PDP VII
Timeline as
Possible
Capacity scheduled in
# Project Investor deployment Reason for delay
(MW) the revised
time
PDP VII
1 Nhon Trach gas-turbine plant III & IV 2x750 PVN 2020 - 2021 2023 - 2024 Delay of LNG import facility
2 Son My gas-turbine plant I, II, III 3x750 PVN 2023 - 2025 2026 - 2028 Delay of LNG import facility
3 Kien Giang gas-turbine plant I & II 2x750 PVN 2020 - 2021 N/A No natural gas supply
4 Central gas-turbine plant I & II 2x750 PVN 2023 - 2024 2024 - 2025 Delay of Blue Whale project
5 O Mon gas-turbine plant III & IV 2x750 EVN 2020 - 2021 2024 - 2025 Delay of Block B project
6 Dung Quat gas-turbine plant I & II 2x750 EVN 2023 - 2024 2024 - 2026 Delay of Blue Whale project
We forecast that in FY20 Vietnam will be short of 8.2bn kWh, compared to the shortage of about
5.4mn kWh in FY19 (chart below). To manage the electricity shortage, EVN will have to: (1)
encourage existing power plants to produce more by increasing its purchasing price in the
competitive generation market; (2) import electricity from Laos and China; and (3) limit power
supply for residential uses during peak hours.
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
-
FY18
FY19F
FY20F
FY21F
FY22F
FY23F
FY24F
FY25F
(50,000)
Thoughts on stocks
We believe that Vietnam’s leading oil & gas players, including PVD, PVS, and GAS, should be
able to safely navigate their way through this tough time. We also expect some stock price
recovery as these stocks are trading quite far below their regional peers.
PVD aims to focus on getting jobs for its rigs in foreign waters, instead of Vietnam offshore, to
avoid any potential troubles when operating in the disputed areas. The company will also benefit
from the recovery in regional upstream markets. For FY20, we forecast PVD will enjoy a net
profit growth of 70.3% y/y, driven by a 5.4% increase in the daily rate for jack up rigs.
PVS just dissolved its loss making seismic survey services business and now relies on on-shore
projects to support its earnings. For FY20, we forecast PVS will post a net profit growth of 7.4%
as there will be no loss incurred from seismic survey services which has been a great burden for
several years.
Meanwhile PVT will enjoy strong FY20 supported by higher charter fees as from January 1, 2020
Sulphur limits for all marine vessels will be reduced to 0.50% m/m from current 3.50%. All PVT’s
vessels for international routes are compliant. For FY20, we forecast PVT will post a net profit
growth of 10.1% thanks to improved charter fee as mentioned above.
Power stocks like POW will likely benefit from the electricity shortage of Vietnam. Earnings of
power companies like POW should be supported by higher sales volumes and better average
selling prices as EVN must encourage power plants to generate more output during times of
electricity shortage. For FY20, we forecast POW will post a net profit growth of 12.0%, driven by
3.0% growth in sales volumes and 0.5% increase in ASP.
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
• Strong medium-term prospects supported by higher charter fees as from 1 January 2020.
Sulphur limits for all marine vessels will be reduced to 0.50% m/m from current 3.50%. All
PVT’s vessels for international routes are compliant.
• PVT’s longer-term prospects will be supported by increased demand from new refinery
capacity including Nghi Son, Dung Quat (expansion), and Long Son and thermal power
capacity following Power Development Plan VII.
• PVT’s capex spend is expected to be in the region of USD300-350mn for the 2019-2021
period. Funds will be used to purchase additional shipping capacity while also replacing
older vessels.
• PVT will have to raise funds by raising debt and retaining a high level of earnings by
reducing payout ratios and/or paying stock dividends instead of cash dividends.
Figure 227: PVT selected financials Figure 228: Revenue by segment (VNDbn)
Market Cap, USDmn 202
PVT 2018 2019F 2020F 10,000
Sales VNDbill 7,523 7,891 8,779 9,000
Sales Growth % 22.4% 4.9% 11.3% 8,000
Net Profit VNDbill 652 710 782
7,000
Net Profit Growth % 44.9% 8.9% 10.1%
EPS VND 2,183 2,371 2,611 6,000
EPS Growth % 44.7% 8.6% 10.1% 5,000
P/E X 7.6 7.0 6.4 4,000
P/B X 0.9 0.8 0.8 3,000
ROE % 13.3% 13.2% 13.3%
2,000
Div Yield % 6.0% 6.0% 6.0%
1,000
-
FY19F
FY20F
FY21F
FY17
FY16
FY18
• Positive FY20 outlook: Current constraint on coal supply for power generation will be solved
as POW will import coal directly from 2020. Sales volume will increase by 3.0%.
• However, FY21 is challenging: Overhaul of Ca Mau 1&2 and Vung Ang 1 will lead to a 3.6%
decline in sales volume.
• Longer term prospects are positive: new capacity of 1,500MW will come online in 2022 and
2023, adding about 9,000mn kWh to POW’s output, an increase of about 40% from current
levels.
• Total capex for the two plants is estimated at USD1.4bn, 70% of which is to be funded with
debt, with construction expected to be completed in 2023 and 2024.
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
• POW will have to raise funds for this new capacity, including raising debt, as well as using
retaining more earnings. This will result in the payment of stock dividends instead of cash
dividends during 2019 - 2023.
Figure 229: POW selected financials Figure 230: Sales volumes by plant (kWh)
Market Cap, USDmn 1,152
POW 2018 2019F 2020F
25,000
Sales VNDbill 32,662 35,550 36,893
Sales Growth % 9.9% 8.8% 3.8%
Net Profit VNDbill 1,921 2,430 2,722
20,000
Net Profit Growth % -14.0% 26.5% 12.0%
EPS VND 820 1,037 1,162 15,000
EPS Growth % -20.0% 26.5% 12.0%
P/E X 13.8 10.9 9.8 10,000
P/B X 1.0 0.9 0.8
ROE % 7.0% 8.6% 8.8% 5,000
Div Yield % 3.9% 0.0% 0.0%
-
FY19F
FY20F
FY21F
FY16
FY17
FY18
Ca Mau 1 & 2 Nhon Trach 1 Nhon Trach 2 Nam Cat
Hua Na Dakrinh Vung Ang 1
Source: HSC Research Source: HSC Research
• The only domestic provider of technical services (excluding drilling services) for the oil & gas
industry with majority market shares in all segment.
• Medium-term prospects are dull: E&P activities offshore Vietnam are uncertain due to
territorial disputes between Vietnam and China and the thin cash position of PVN.
• Delayed or pending projects: Su Tu Trang phase 2, Ca Voi Xanh, Block B-O Mon.
• For FY20, we forecast PVS will post a net profit growth of 7.4% as there will be no losses
incurred from the seismic survey services (shut down in FY19) which has been a drag on
earnings for several years.
Figure 231: PVS selected financials Figure 232: Revenue by segment (VNDbn)
Market Cap, USDmn 393
25,000
PVS 2018 2019F 2020F
Sales VNDbill 14,667 17,569 18,205
Sales Growth % -12.8% 19.8% 3.6% 20,000
Net Profit VNDbill 1,023 1,031 1,108
Net Profit Growth % 27.8% 0.8% 7.4%
EPS VND 2,076 2,093 2,248 15,000
EPS Growth % 28.9% 0.8% 7.4%
P/E X 9.2 9.1 8.5
P/B X 0.7 0.7 0.7 10,000
ROE % 8.4% 8.3% 8.6%
Div Yield % 5.6% 5.3% 5.3%
5,000
-
2016 2017 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
We talk through our ‘big picture’ themes below; these touch on ‘the rise of digital’, growth in the
DX market, opportunities in the DX market for various players, and the Vietnam advantage in IT
services and DX. Our top pick in the sector, FPT Corporation (HSX: FPT, Buy).
Companies now need to cater to the individual in every aspect of their lives. The imperative of
digital transition, therefore, continues to press on various levels in society, including within
corporations. According to IDG, the world’s leading technology media, data and marketing
services company, in its 2018 survey, 90% of organizations and enterprises have planned,
developed and implemented digital transformation (DX) into their daily business operations; we
believe that much opportunity remains to deepen and broaden this.
According to Gartner, the world’s leading research and advisory company in technology, the DX
services market is currently worth USD1.2trn, and this will rise to USD2.3trn by 2023; this implies
an annual growth rate of 18%, approximately 4x higher than that of the regular IT service market.
2000
1500
1000
500
0
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
FY21
FY22
FY23
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
Strategy Report 13 January 2020
The findings drawn from the latest report of Forrester, one of the most influential research and
advisory firms in technology in the world, revealed the fact that DX projects have gradually
shifted from time-consuming and large-implementation in orientation into small-scale, result-
oriented and consecutive transitions.
This opens opportunities for all IT services companies, regardless of scale or experience, to
launch digital transformation initiatives and offer digital transformation solutions/products to the
business world. In the DX world; the only things that matter are the DX products and solutions.
Vietnam has a strong IT engineer labor pool. According to estimates from the Ministry of
Education and Training, the number of graduated IT engineers will be around 100,000 in 2020,
with 10% annual growth in each of the coming five years.
Meanwhile, salaries for IT engineers in Vietnam are about 40% lower than a same-level engineer
in India, and about 30% lower than that in China – this is a key competitive advantage for
Vietnam’s IT services companies.
Moreover, IT services companies are granted long tax holidays; they are free of corporate
income tax (CIT) in the first four years, pay CIT of just 5% for the next nine years, pay CIT of
only 10% for next two years after this, before paying normal CIT of 20% from that point forward.
• FPT is shifting from being an IT service provider to a global digital transformation service
provider.
• FPT enjoys major competitive advantages due to its low-cost base, strong IT systems, a
well-integrated business model with a presence in almost every major IT segment and
visionary management.
• Digital transformation is the driver for growth and margins going forward.
• Strong growth prospects are expected for the 2018-2021 period: 3-year CAGR of 19.3% in
sales, 3-year NPATMI CAGR of 26.7%, while overall margins are forecast to increase to
43.2% in FY21 from 37.6% in FY18.
Figure 235: FPT selected financials Figure 236: Revenue by segment (VNDbn)
Market Cap, USDmn 1,675 8,000
FPT 2018 2019F 2020F
7,000
Sales VNDbill 23,214 27,707 32,919
6,000
Sales Growth % -45.6% 19.4% 18.8%
Net Profit VNDbill 2,615 3,405 4,274 5,000
Net Profit Growth % -10.8% 30.2% 25.5% 4,000
EPS VND 3,897 5,062 6,323 3,000
EPS Growth % -24.0% 29.9% 24.9%
2,000
P/E X 14.6 11.3 9.0
1,000
P/B X 2.8 2.4 2.1
ROE % 21.9% 25.4% 27.1% -
FY19F
FY20F
FY21F
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
Please refer to the disclosures of potential conflict of interest and the disclaimer at the end of this report
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