175285

9/27/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 705
G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285. September 11, 2013.*
UNICAPITAL, INC., UNICAPITAL REALTY, INC., and

JAIME J. MARTIREZ, petitioners, vs. RAFAEL JOSE
CONSING, JR. and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, BRANCH
168, respondents.
G.R. No. 192073. September 11, 2013.*

RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., petitioner, vs. HON.
MARISSA MACARAIG-GUILLEN, in her capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 60 and UNICAPITAL, INC., respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; Actions;

Words and Phrases; A cause of action is defined as the act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-
settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint.—A cause of action is defined as the
act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is
well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined
by the allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is
said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
512
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Unicapital, Inc. vs. Consing, Jr.
correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.

Thus, if the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, then the same should not be
dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016d71f02c4fc823534e003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/25
Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure to state a cause of action is

properly a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule
16 of the Rules of Court.—As edified in the case of Pioneer
Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, 524 SCRA 153 (2007), citing
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Limited v.
Catalan (HSBC), 440 SCRA 498 (2004): The elementary test for
failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges
facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated
otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts
alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the
veracity of the material allegations. If the allegations in the
complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be
maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the
defense that may be presented by the defendants.
(Emphasis supplied) Stated otherwise, the resolution on this
matter should stem from an analysis on whether or not the
complaint is able to convey a cause of action; and not that the
complainant has no cause of action. Lest it be misunderstood,
failure to state a cause of action is properly a ground for a motion
to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
(Rules), while the latter is not a ground for dismissal under the
same rule.
Same; Same; Motion to Dismiss; It is a standing rule that
issues that require the contravention of the allegations of the
complaint, as well as the full ventilation, in effect, of the main
merits of the case, should not be within the province of a mere
motion to dismiss.—It is a standing rule that issues that require
the contravention of the allegations of the complaint, as well as
the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case,
should not be within the province of a mere motion to dismiss, as
in this case. Hence, as what is only required is that the
allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the Court — in view of the above-stated reasons —
finds that the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et al.’s
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion which would
necessitate the reversal of the CA’s ruling. Verily, for grave abuse
of discretion to exist, the abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross
513
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 513
so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual

refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
Same; Same; Cause of Action; Misjoinder of Causes of Action;
The rule is that a party’s failure to observe the conditions under
Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court results in a misjoinder of
causes of action.—The rule is that a party’s failure to observe the
following conditions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules results
in a misjoinder of causes of action: SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of
action.—A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an
opposing party, subject to the following conditions: (a) The party
joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder
of parties; (b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions
governed by special rules; (c) Where the causes of action are
between the same parties but pertain to different venues
or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the
Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action
falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue
lies therein; and (d) Where the claims in all the causes of action
are principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Docket Fees; It has long been settled that while
the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time
of the filing of the complaint does not automatically cause the
dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are paid within a
reasonable period.—Neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay
the required docket fees lead to the dismissal of his complaint. It
has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the complaint
does not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint
provided that the fees are paid within a reasonable period.
Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s insistence that the stringent
rule on non-payment of docket fees enunciated in the case of
Manchester Development Corporation v. CA, 149 SCRA 562
(1987), should be applied in this case cannot be sustained in the
absence of proof that Consing, Jr. intended to defraud the
government by his failure to pay the correct amount of filing fees.
514
Same; Same; Consolidation of Cases; It is hornbook principle

that when or two or more cases involve the same parties and affect
closely related subject matters, the same must be consolidated and
jointly tried, in order to serve the best interest of the parties and to
settle the issues between them promptly, thus, resulting in a speedy
and inexpensive determination of cases.—It is hornbook principle
that when or two or more cases involve the same parties and
affect closely related subject matters, the same must be
consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interest of
the parties and to settle the issues between them promptly, thus,
resulting in a speedy and inexpensive determination of cases. In
addition, consolidation serves the purpose of avoiding the
possibility of conflicting decisions rendered by the courts in two or
more cases, which otherwise could be disposed of in a single suit.
The governing rule is Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules which
provides: SEC. 1. Consolidation.—When actions involving a
common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it
may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue
in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions and

resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Belo, Gozon, Elma, Parel, Asuncion and Lucila for
Unicapital, Inc., et al.
Gutierrez, Cortes & Partners Law Offices for Rafael
Jose Consing, Jr.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari1 assailing separate issuances of the Court of
Appeals (CA) as follows:
_______________
1 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 35-76; Rollo (G.R. No.
192073), pp. 10-34.
515
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 515

(a) The petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285 filed by

Unicapital, Inc., (Unicapital), Unicapital Realty, Inc. (URI),
and Unicapital Director and Treasurer Jaime J. Martirez
(Martirez) assail the CA’s Joint Decision2 dated October 20,

2005 and Resolution3 dated October 25, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 64019 and 64451 which affirmed the Resolution4 dated
September 14, 1999 and Order5 dated February 15, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68
(RTC-Pasig City) in SCA No. 1759, upholding the denial of
their motion to dismiss; and
(b) The petition in G.R. No. 192073 filed by Rafael Jose
Consing, Jr. (Consing, Jr.) assails the CA’s Decision6 dated
September 30, 2009 and Resolution7 dated April 28, 2010 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 101355 which affirmed the Orders dated
July 16, 20078 and September 4, 20079 of the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 60 (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 99-
1418, upholding the denial of his motion for consolidation.
The Facts
In 1997, Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and his
mother, Cecilia Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), obtained an
P18,000,000.00 loan from Unicapital, P12,000,000.00 of
which
_______________
2 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 9-29. Penned by Associate
Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now retired member of the Supreme Court), with
Associate Justices Aurora Santiago Lagman and Sesinando E. Villon,
concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 31-32.
4 Id., at pp. 191-193. Penned by Judge Santiago G. Estrella.
5 Id., at pp. 279-281. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Florito S.
Macalino.
6 Rollo (G.R. No. 192073), pp. 38-49. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias
Dicdican, with Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and
Romeo F. Barza, concurring.
7 Id., at pp. 70-71.
8 Id., at pp. 160-162. Penned by Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen.
9 Id., at pp. 177-178.
516

was acquired on July 24, 1997 and the remaining

P6,000,000.00 on August 1, 1997. The said loan was
secured by Promissory Notes10 and a Real Estate
Mortgage11 over a 42,443 square meter-parcel of land
located at Imus, Cavite, registered in the name of Dela
Cruz as per Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-

687599 (subject property).12 Prior to these transactions,
Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI), a real estate company, was
already interested to develop the subject property into a
residential subdivision.13 In this regard, PBI entered into a
joint venture agreement with Unicapital, through its real
estate development arm, URI. In view of the foregoing, the
loan and mortgage over the subject property was later on
modified into an Option to Buy Real Property14 and, after
further negotiations, Dela Cruz decided to sell the same to
Unicapital and PBI. For this purpose, Dela Cruz appointed
Consing, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact.15
Eventually, Unicapital, through URI, purchased one-
half of the subject property for a consideration of
P21,221,500.00 (against which Dela Cruz’s outstanding
loan obligations were first offset), while PBI bought the
remaining half for the price of P21,047,000.00.16 In this
relation, Dela Cruz caused TCT No. T-687599 to be divided
into three separate titles as follows: (a) TCT No. T-851861
for URI;17 (b) TCT No. T-851862 for PBI;18 and (c) TCT No.
T-851863 which was designated as a road lot.19 However,
even before URI and PBI were able to have the titles
transferred to their names, Juanito Tan Teng
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 88-89.
11 Id., at pp. 90-93.
12 Id., at pp. 357-358.
13 Id., at p. 83.
14 Id., at pp. 84-86.
15 Id., at p. 87.
16 Id., at p. 42.
17 Id., at pp. 345-346.
18 Id., at pp. 347-348.
19 Id., at pp. 349-350.
517
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 517

(Teng) and Po Willie Yu (Yu) informed Unicapital that they

are the lawful owners of the subject property as evidenced
by TCT No. T-114708;20 that they did not sell the subject
property; and that Dela Cruz’s title, i.e., TCT No. T-687599,
thereto was a mere forgery.21 Prompted by Teng and Yu’s
assertions, PBI conducted further investigations on the
subject property which later revealed that Dela Cruz’s title

was actually of dubious origin. Based on this finding, PBI
and Unicapital sent separate demand letters22 to Dela Cruz
and Consing, Jr., seeking the return of the purchase price
they had paid for the subject property.
From the above-stated incidents stemmed the present
controversies as detailed hereunder.
The Proceedings Antecedent to
G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285
On May 3, 1999, Consing, Jr. filed a complaint,
denominated as a Complex Action for Declaratory Relief23
and later amended to Complex Action for Injunctive
Relief24 (Consing, Jr.’s complaint) before the RTC-Pasig
City against Unicapital, URI, PBI, Martirez, PBI General
Manager Mariano Martinez (Martinez), Dela Cruz and
Does 1-20, docketed as SCA No. 1759. In his complaint,
Consing, Jr. claimed that the incessant demands/recovery
efforts made upon him by Unicapital and PBI to return to
them the purchase price they had paid for the subject
property constituted harassment and oppression which
severely affected his personal and professional
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 354-356.
21 Id., at pp. 359-360. See Letter dated April 21, 1999.
22 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 131-132 (Dated April 27,
1999 of PBI); and Rollo (G.R. No. 192073), pp. 112-113 (Dated April 26,
1999 of Unicapital).
23 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 114-123.
24 Id., at pp.149-157. Dated June 16, 1999.
518

life.25 He also averred that he was coerced to commit a

violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 2226 as Unicapital and
PBI, over threats of filing a case against him, kept on
forcing him to issue a post-dated check in the amount
sought to be recovered, notwithstanding their knowledge
that he had no funds for the same.27 He further alleged
that Unicapital and URI required him to sign blank deeds
of sale and transfers without cancelling the old ones in
violation of the laws on land registration and real estate
development.28 Likewise, Consing, Jr. added that
Unicapital and PBI’s representatives were “speaking of
him in a manner that [was] inappropriate and libelous,”29

and that some John Does “deliberately engaged in a
fraudulent scheme to compromise [Consing, Jr.’s] honor,
integrity and fortune x x x [consisting of] falsifying or
causing to be falsified, or attempting to present as falsified
certain transfers of Land Titles and Deeds for profit,”30
classifying the foregoing as ultra vires acts which should
warrant sanctions under the corporation law, Revised
Securities Act and related laws.31 Accordingly, Consing, Jr.
prayed that: (a) he be declared as a mere agent of Dela
Cruz, and as such, devoid of any obligation to Unicapital,
URI, and PBI for the transactions entered into concerning
the subject property; (b) Unicapital, URI, and PBI be
enjoined from harassing or coercing him, and from
speaking about him in a derogatory fashion; and (c)
Unicapital, URI, and PBI pay him actual and consequential
damages in the amount of P2,000,000.00, moral damages of
at least P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages of
P1,000,000.00, all per month, reckoned from May 1, 1999
and
_______________
25 Id., at p. 153.
26 “AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK
WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise
known as “The Anti-Bouncing Check Law.”
27 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 153-154.
28 Id., at pp. 154-155.
29 Id., at p. 120.
30 Id.
31 Ibid.
519
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 519

until the controversy is resolved, and attorney’s fees and

costs of suit.32
For their part, Unicapital, URI, and Martirez
(Unicapital, et al.) filed separate Motions to Dismiss33
Consing, Jr.’s complaint (Unicapital, et al.’s motion to
dismiss) on the ground of failure to state a cause of action,
considering that: (a) no document was attached against
which Consing, Jr. supposedly derived his right and
against which his rights may be ascertained; (b) the
demands to pay against Consing, Jr. and for him to tender
post-dated checks to cover the amount due were well within

the rights of Unicapital as an unpaid creditor, as Consing,
Jr. had already admitted his dealings with them; (c) the
utterances purportedly constituting libel were not set out
in the complaint; and (d) the laws supposedly violated were
not properly identified. Moreover, Unicapital, et al. posited
that the RTC-Pasig City did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case given that Consing, Jr. failed to pay the proper
amount of docket fees. In the same vein, they maintained
that the RTC-Pasig City had no jurisdiction over their
supposed violations of the Corporation Code and Revised
Securities Act, which, discounting its merits, should have
been supposedly lodged with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Finally, they pointed out that Consing, Jr.’s
complaint suffers from a defective verification and, thus,
dismissible.34
Similar to Unicapital et al.’s course of action, PBI and its
General Manager, Martinez (Unicapital and PBI, et al.),
sought the dismissal of Consing, Jr.’s complaint on the
ground that it does not state a cause of action. They also
denied having singled out Consing, Jr. because their
collection efforts were directed at both Consing, Jr. and
Dela Cruz, which
_______________
32 Id., at pp. 121-122.
33 Id., at pp. 124-127 (Dated May 24, 1999); and id., at pp. 159-166
(Dated August 23, 1999).
34 Id., at pp. 187-188. See Reply dated September 7, 1999.
520

should be deemed as valid and, therefore, should not be

restrained.35
On September 14, 1999, the RTC-Pasig City issued a
Resolution36 denying the abovementioned motions to
dismiss, holding that Consing, Jr.’s complaint sufficiently
stated a cause of action for tort and damages pursuant to
Article 19 of the Civil Code. It ruled that where there is
abusive behavior, a complainant, like Consing, Jr., has the
right to seek refuge from the courts. It also noted that the
elements of libel in a criminal case are not the same as
those for a civil action founded on the provisions of the
Civil Code, and therefore, necessitates a different
treatment. It equally refused to dismiss the action on the

ground of non-payment of docket fees, despite Consing,
Jr.’s escalated claims for damages therein, as jurisdiction
was already vested in it upon the filing of the original
complaint. Moreover, it resolved to apply the liberal
construction rule as regards the subject complaint’s
verification and certification, despite its improper wording,
considering further that such defect was not raised at the
first opportunity. Consequently, it ordered Unicapital and
PBI, et al. to file their Answer and, in addition, to submit
“any Comment or Reaction within five (5) days from receipt
hereof on the allegations of [Consing, Jr.] in [his] rejoinder
of September 9, 1999 regarding the supposed filing of an
identical case in Makati City,”37 i.e., Civil Case No. 99-
1418. Unperturbed, Unicapital and PBI, et al. moved for
reconsideration therefrom which was, however, denied by
the RTC-Pasig City in an Order38 dated February 15, 2001
for lack of merit. Aggrieved, they elevated the denial of
their motions to dismiss before the CA via a petition for
certiorari
_______________
35 Id., at pp. 128-130 (Dated May 26, 1999); id., at pp. 167-168 (Dated
August 27, 1999).
36 Id., at pp. 191-193. See also id., at p. 86.
37 Id., at p. 193.
38 Id., at pp. 279-281.
521
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 521

and prohibition,39 docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 64019

and 64451.
On October 20, 2005, the CA rendered a Joint Decision40
holding that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
the RTC-Pasig City in refusing to dismiss Consing, Jr.’s
complaint. At the outset, it ruled that while the payment of
the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, its
non-payment will not automatically cause the dismissal of
the case. In this regard, it considered that should there be
any deficiency in the payment of such fees, the same shall
constitute a lien on the judgment award.41 It also refused to
dismiss the complaint for lack of proper verification upon a
finding that the copy of the amended complaint submitted
to the RTC-Pasig City was properly notarized.42 Moreover,
it upheld the order of the RTC-Pasig City for Unicapital

and PBI, et al. to submit their comment due to the alleged
existence of a similar case filed before the RTC-Makati
City.43
Anent the substantive issues of the case, the CA
concurred with the RTC-Pasig City that Consing Jr.’s
complaint states a cause of action. It found that Unicapital
and PBI, et al.’s purportedly abusive manner in enforcing
their claims against Consing, Jr. was properly constitutive
of a cause of action as the same, if sufficiently proven,
would have subjected him to “defamation of his name in
business circles, the threats and coercion against him to
reimburse the purchase price, fraud and falsification and
breach of fiduciary obligation.” It also found that the fact
that Consing Jr.’s complaint contains “nebulous”
allegations will not warrant its dismissal as any vagueness
therein can be clarified through a motion for a bill of
particulars.”44 Furthermore, it noted that Consing, Jr. does
_______________
39 Id., at pp. 282-315. Dated March 28, 2001.
40 Id., at pp. 83-103.
41 Id., at pp. 92-95.
42 Id., at pp. 100-101.
43 Id., at pp. 101-102.
44 Id., at pp. 98-99.
522

not seek to recover his claims against any particular

provision of the corporation code or the securities act but
against the actions of Unicapital and PBI, et al.; hence,
Consing, Jr.’s complaint was principally one for damages
over which the RTC has jurisdiction, and, in turn, there
lies no misjoinder of causes of action.45
Dissatisfied, only Unicapital, et al. sought
reconsideration therefrom but the same was denied by the
CA in a Resolution46 dated October 25, 2006. Hence, the
present petitions for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos.
175277 and 175285.
The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. No. 192073
On the other hand, on August 4, 1999, Unicapital filed a
complaint47 for sum of money with damages against
Consing, Jr. and Dela Cruz before the RTC-Makati City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1418, seeking to recover (a)

the amount of P42,195,397.16, representing the value of
their indebtedness based on the Promissory Notes (subject
promissory notes) plus interests; (b) P5,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages; (c) attorney’s fees; and (d) costs of
suit.48
PBI also filed a complaint for damages and attachment
against Consing, Jr. and Dela Cruz before the RTC of
Manila, Branch 12, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95381,
also predicated on the same set of facts as above
narrated.49 In its complaint, PBI prayed that it be allowed
to recover the following: (a) P13,369,641.79, representing
the total amount of installment payments made as actual
damages plus interests; (b) P200,000.00 as exemplary
damages; (c) P200,000.00 as moral damages; (d) attorney’s
fees; and (e) costs of suit.50 Civil Case
_______________
45 Id., at pp. 99-100.
46 Id., at pp. 105-106.
47 Rollo (G.R. No. 192073), pp. 124-135. Dated July 28, 1999.
48 Id., at p. 133.
49 Id., at pp. 21-22, and 205.
50 Id., at pp. 207-209.
523
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 523

No. 99-95381 was subsequently consolidated with SCA No.

1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig City.51
For his part, Consing, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil
Case No. 99-1418 which was, however, denied by the RTC-
Makati City in an Order52 dated November 16, 1999.
Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Consolidation53 (motion
for consolidation) of Civil Case No. 99-1418 with his own
initiated SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig City.
In an Order54 dated July 16, 2007, the RTC-Makati City
dismissed Consing, Jr.’s motion for consolidation and, in so
doing, ruled that the cases sought to be consolidated had no
identity of rights or causes of action and the reliefs sought
for by Consing, Jr. from the RTC-Pasig City will not bar
Unicapital from pursuing its money claims against him.
Moreover, the RTC-Makati City noted that Consing, Jr.
filed his motion only as an afterthought as it was made
after the mediation proceedings between him and
Unicapital failed. Consing, Jr.’s motion for reconsideration

therefrom was denied in an Order55 dated September 4,
2007. Hence, he filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101355, ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC-Makati City in
refusing to consolidate Civil Case No. 99-1418 with SCA
No. 1759 in Pasig City.
On September 30, 2009, the CA rendered a Decision56
sustaining the Orders dated July 16, 2007 and September
4, 2007 of the RTC-Makati City which denied Consing, Jr.’s
motion for consolidation. It held that consolidation is a
matter
_______________
51 Id. at 146-150. See Order in Civil Case No. 99-95381 dated October
8, 2001. Penned by Judge (now Associate Justice of the CA) Rosmari D.
Carandang.
52 Id., at pp. 403-407. Signed by Acting Presiding Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda.
53 Id., at pp. 153-159. Dated June 18, 2007.
54 Id., at pp. 160-162. Dated July 16, 2007.
55 Id., at pp. 177-178. Dated September 4, 2007.
56 Id., at pp. 38-49.
524

of sound discretion on the part of the trial court which

could be gleaned from the use of the word “may” in Section
1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. Considering that
preliminary steps (such as mediation) have already been
undertaken by the parties in Civil Case No. 99-1418
pending before the RTC-Makati City, its consolidation with
SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig City “would
merely result in complications in the work of the latter
court or squander the resources or remedies already
utilized in the Makati case.”57 Moreover, it noted that the
records of the consolidated Pasig and Manila cases, i.e.,
SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 99-95381, respectively,
had already been elevated to the Court, that joint
proceedings have been conducted in those cases and that
the pre-trial therein had been terminated as early as
October 23, 2007. Therefore, due to these reasons, the
consolidation prayed for would be impracticable and would
only cause a procedural faux pas.
Undaunted, Consing, Jr. filed a motion for

reconsideration therefrom but was denied by the CA in a
Resolution58 dated April 28, 2010. Hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 192073.
The Proceedings Before the Court
After the filing of the foregoing cases, the parties were
required to file their respective comments and replies.
Further, considering that G.R. No. 192073 (Makati case)
involves the same parties and set of facts with those in
G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285 (Pasig case), these cases were
ordered consolidated per the Court’s Resolution59 dated
November 17, 2010. On March 9, 2011, the Court resolved
to give due course to the
_______________
57 Id., at p. 47.
58 Id., at pp. 70-71.
59 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p. 562; and Rollo (G.R. No.
192073), p. 495.
525
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 525

instant petitions and required the parties to submit their

respective memoranda.60
The Issues Before the Court
The essential issues in these cases are as follows: (a) in
G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285, whether or not the CA erred
in upholding the RTC Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et
al.’s motion to dismiss; and (b) in G.R. No. 192073, whether
or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Makati City’s
denial of Consing, Jr.’s motion for consolidation.
The Court’s Ruling
A. Propriety of the denial of
Unicapital, et al.’s motion
to dismiss and ancillary
issues.
A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by
which a party violates a right of another.61 It is well-settled
that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint.62 In this relation, a complaint
is said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting
what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the relief prayed for.63 Thus, if the
allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint
can be maintained, then the same should not be dismissed,

regardless of the defenses
_______________
60 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 566-567; and Rollo (G.R. No.
192073), pp. 530-531. Court Resolution dated March 9, 2011.
61 See Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
62 Peltan Dev., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 824, 833; 270 SCRA
82, 91 (1997).
63 See Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Davao City, Br. 8, G.R. No. 147058, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 272, 281.
526

that may be averred by the defendants.64 As edified in the

case of Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro,65 citing
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Limited v.
Catalan66 (HSBC):
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action

is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would
justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court
render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The
inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the
material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint
furnish sufficient basis on which it can be
maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of
the defense that may be presented by the
defendants.67 (Emphasis supplied)
Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should

stem from an analysis on whether or not the complaint is
able to convey a cause of action; and not that the
complainant has no cause of action. Lest it be
misunderstood, failure to state a cause of action is properly
a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule
1668 of the Rules of Court (Rules), while the latter is not a
ground for dismissal under the same rule.
_______________
64 The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 274
Phil. 947, 955; 197 SCRA 663, 669 (1991).
65 G.R. No. 154830, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 153.
66 483 Phil. 525, 538; 440 SCRA 498, 510-511 (2004).
67 Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, supra note 65, at p.

162.
68 Section 1. Grounds.—Within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss
may be made on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
x x x x
527
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 527

In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.’s

complaint in SCA No. 1759 properly states a cause of action
since the allegations therein sufficiently bear out a case for
damages under Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil Code.
Records disclose that Consing, Jr.’s complaint contains
allegations which aim to demonstrate the abusive manner
in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. enforced their demands
against him. Among others, the complaint states that
Consing, Jr. “has constantly been harassed and bothered by
[Unicapital and PBI, et al.;] x x x besieged by phone calls
from [them]; x x x has had constant meetings with them
variously, and on a continuing basis[,] [s]uch that he is
unable to attend to his work as an investment banker.”69 In
the same pleading, he also alleged that Unicapital and PBI,
et al.’s act of “demand[ing] a postdated check knowing fully
well [that he] does not have the necessary funds to cover
the same, nor is he expecting to have them [is equivalent
to] asking him to commit a crime under unlawful coercive
force.”70 Accordingly, these specific allegations, if
hypothetically admitted, may result into the recovery of
damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code which
states that “[e]very person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.” As explained in the HSBC case:
[W]hen a right is exercised in a manner which does

not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal
because [it is] recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate

exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
_______________
69 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p. 153.
70 Id., at p. 153-a.
528

prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with

negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is
exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring
another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with
the purpose for which it was established, and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
injure another.71 (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, Consing, Jr.’s complaint states a cause of

action for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code which
provides that:
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,

personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause
of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical
defect, or other personal condition.
The rationale therefor was explained in the case of

Manaloto v. Veloso III,72 citing Concepcion v. CA,73 to wit:
The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity

for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission
stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality
must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a
concomitant consideration of every plan
_______________
71 Supra note 66, at pp. 538-539; p. 511. (Citation omitted)
72 G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 347.

73 381 Phil. 90; 324 SCRA 85 (2000).
529
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 529

for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of

law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how
far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a
person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human
personality is not exalted — then the laws are indeed
defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are
amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of
a person’s dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.74
To add, a violation of Article 26 of the Civil Code may

also lead to the payment of moral damages under Article
2219(10)75 of the Civil Code.
Records reveal that Consing, Jr., in his complaint,
alleged that “[he] has come to discover that [Unicapital and
PBI, et al.] are speaking of him in a manner that is
inappropriate and libelous[;] [and that] [t]hey have spread
their virulent version of events in the business and
financial community such that [he] has suffered and
continues to suffer injury upon his good name and
reputation which, after all, is the most sacred and valuable
wealth he possesses — especially considering that he is an
investment banker.”76 In similar regard, the hypothetical
admission of these allegations may result into the recovery
of damages pursuant to Article 26, and even Article
2219(10), of the Civil Code.
Corollary thereto, Unicapital, et al.’s contention77 that
the case should be dismissed on the ground that it failed to
set out the actual libelous statements complained about
cannot
_______________
74 Supra note 72, at pp. 365-366.
75 Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases:
x x x x
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34, and 35.
x x x
76 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p. 154.
77 Id., at pp. 61-64.
530

be given credence. These incidents, as well as the specific

circumstances surrounding the manner in which
Unicapital and PBI, et al. pursued their claims against
Consing, Jr. may be better ventilated during trial. It is a
standing rule that issues that require the contravention of
the allegations of the complaint, as well as the full
ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should
not be within the province of a mere motion to dismiss,78 as
in this case. Hence, as what is only required is that the
allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint
can be maintained, the Court — in view of the above-stated
reasons — finds that the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of
Unicapital, et al.’s motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action was not tainted with grave
abuse of discretion which would necessitate the reversal of
the CA’s ruling. Verily, for grave abuse of discretion to
exist, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross so
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.79 This the Court does not perceive in
the case at bar.
Further, so as to obviate any confusion on the matter,
the Court equally finds that the causes of action in SCA
No. 1759 were not — as Unicapital, et al. claim —
misjoined even if Consing, Jr. averred that Unicapital and
PBI, et al. violated certain provisions of the Corporation
Law and the Revised Securities Act.80
The rule is that a party’s failure to observe the following
conditions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules results in a
misjoinder of causes of action:81
_______________
78 NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited v. Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Company, G.R. No. 175799, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 328,
347.
79 De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 506,
514-515.
80 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 64-68.
81 See Perez v. Hermano, G.R. No. 147417, July 8, 2005, 463 SCRA 90,
104.
531
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 531

SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action.—A party may in one

pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party,
subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply
with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions
governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same
parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the
Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of
action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and
the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are
principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied)
A careful perusal of his complaint discloses that

Consing, Jr. did not seek to hold Unicapital and PBI, et al.
liable for any specific violation of the Corporation Code or
the Revised Securities Act. Rather, he merely sought
damages for Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s alleged acts of
making him sign numerous documents and their use of the
same against him. In this respect, Consing, Jr. actually
advances an injunction and damages case82 which properly
falls under the jurisdiction of
_______________
82 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p. 156. In his complaint,
Consing, Jr. essentially seeks that Unicapital, et al.: (a) “should be
restrained from harassing plaintiff by threats of criminal prosecution, or
any other coercive demand, or any other threats by reason of the
transactions over the property in question”; (b) “should be forever barred
from speaking about [him] in a derogatory fashion in so far as the
surrounding circumstances of the transfers of property in question”; (c)
pay him “x x x actual damages and consequential damages in the sum of
P2,000,000.[00] continuing at the same rate per month for the whole
period from May 1, 1999 until the controversy is resolved”; (d) pay him
“x x x moral damages in the amount of at least
532

the RTC-Pasig City.83 Therefore, there was no violation of

Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules, particularly, paragraph (c)
thereof. Besides, even on the assumption that there was a
misjoinder of causes of action, still, such defect should not
result in the dismissal of Consing, Jr.’s complaint. Section
6, Rule 2 of the Rules explicitly states that a “[m]isjoinder
of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an
action” and that “[a] misjoined cause of action may, on
motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be
severed and proceeded with separately.”
Neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required
docket fees lead to the dismissal of his complaint. It has
long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the
complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the
complaint provided that the fees are paid within a
reasonable period.84 Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s
insistence that the stringent rule on non-payment of docket
fees enunciated in the case of Manchester Development
Corporation v. CA85 should be applied in this case cannot
be sustained in the absence of proof that Consing, Jr.
intended to defraud the government by his failure to pay
the correct amount of filing fees. As pronounced in the case
of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor:86
_______________
[P1,000,000.00] per month from May 1, 1999 until the controversy is
resolved”; (e) pay him “x x x exemplary damages punitive in nature in the
amount of at least [P1,000,000.00] per month from May 1, 1999 until the
controversy is resolved; and (f) pay him “x x x attorney’s fees, costs of suit
and any other reliefs that may be equitable in the premises.”
83 See Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129.
84 See Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v. Alonzo-
Legasto, G.R. No. 169108, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 339, 347.
85 G.R. No. L-75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562.
86 495 Phil. 422; 455 SCRA 460 (2005).
533
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 533

Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is

a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the
time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of

the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party
involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules
prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing
fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there
was no intention to defraud the government, the
Manchester rule does not apply.87 (Emphasis and italics
in the original)
Indeed, while the Court acknowledges Unicapital, et al.’s

apprehension that Consing, Jr.’s “metered” claim for
damages to the tune of around P2,000,000.00 per month88
may balloon to a rather huge amount by the time that this
case is finally disposed of, still, any amount that may by
then fall due shall be subject to assessment and any
additional fees determined shall constitute as a lien
against the judgment as explicitly provided under Section
2,89 Rule 141 of the Rules.
Finally, on the question of whether or not Consing, Jr.’s
complaint was properly verified, suffice it to state that
since the copy submitted to the trial court was duly
notarized by one Atty. Allan B. Gepty and that it was only
Unicapital, et al.’s copy which lacks the notarization, then
there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of
the rules on pleadings.90
_______________
87 Id., at p. 436; p. 475.
88 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p. 69.
89 SEC. 2. Fees in lien.—Where the court in its final judgment
awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that
claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional fees
which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien.
The clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.
90 See Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 100-101.
534

In fine, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of

the CA in sustaining the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of
Unicapital et al.’s motion to dismiss. As such, the petitions
in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285 must be denied.
B. Propriety of the denial of
Consing, Jr.’s motion for
consolidation.
The crux of G.R. No. 192073 is the propriety of the RTC-
Makati City’s denial of Consing, Jr.’s motion for the
consolidation of the Pasig case, i.e., SCA No. 1759, and the
Makati case, i.e., Civil Case No. 99-1418. Records show
that the CA upheld the RTC-Makati City’s denial of the
foregoing motion, finding that the consolidation of these
cases was merely discretionary on the part of the trial
court. It added that it was “impracticable and would cause
a procedural faux pas” if it were to “allow the [RTC-Pasig
City] to preside over the Makati case.”91
The CA’s ruling is proper.
It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases
involve the same parties and affect closely related subject
matters, the same must be consolidated and jointly tried, in
order to serve the best interest of the parties and to settle
the issues between them promptly, thus, resulting in a
speedy and inexpensive determination of cases. In addition,
consolidation serves the purpose of avoiding the possibility
of conflicting decisions rendered by the courts in two or
more cases, which otherwise could be disposed of in a single
suit.92 The governing rule is Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules
which provides:
_______________
91 Rollo (G.R. No. 192073), pp. 47-48.
92 Steel Corporation of the Philippines v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc.,
G.R. Nos. 190462 and 190538, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 403, 415-
416.
535
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 535

SEC. 1. Consolidation.—When actions involving a

common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the
matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs
or delay.
In the present case, the Court observes that the subject

cases, i.e., SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 99-1418,
although involving the same parties and proceeding from a
similar factual milieu, should remain unconsolidated since
they proceed from different sources of obligations and,
hence, would not yield conflicting dispositions. SCA No.

1759 is an injunction and damages case based on the Civil
Code provisions on abuse of right and defamation, while
Civil Case No. 99-1418 is a collection and damages suit
based on actionable documents, i.e., the subject promissory
notes. In particular, SCA No. 1759 deals with whether or
not Unicapital and PBI, et al. abused the manner in which
they demanded payment from Consing, Jr., while Civil
Case No. 99-1418 deals with whether or not Unicapital
may demand payment from Consing, Jr. based on the
subject promissory notes. Clearly, a resolution in one case
would have no practical effect as the core issues and reliefs
sought in each case are separate and distinct from the
other.
Likewise, as the CA correctly pointed out, the RTC-
Makati City could not have been faulted in retaining Civil
Case No. 99-1418 in its dockets since pre-trial procedures
have already been undertaken therein and, thus, its
consolidation with SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-
Pasig City would merely result in complications on the part
of the latter court or squander the resources or remedies
already utilized in Civil Case No. 99-1418.93 In this light,
aside from the perceived improbability of having conflicting
decisions, the con-
_______________
93 Rollo (G.R. No. 192073), p. 47.
536

solidation of SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 99-1418

would, contrary to its objective, only delay the proceedings
and entail unnecessary costs.
All told, the Court finds the consolidation of SCA No.
1759 and Civil Case No. 99-1418 to be improper, impelling
the affirmance of the CA’s ruling. Consequently, the
petition in G.R. No. 192073 must also be denied.
WHEREFORE the petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277,
175285 and 192073 are DENIED. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals’ Joint Decision dated October 20, 2005 and
Resolution dated October 25, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
64019 and 64451 and the Decision dated September 30,
2009 and Resolution dated April 28, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 101355 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Perez,

JJ., concur.
Petitions denied.
Notes.—Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only

upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee; Payment of
docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.
(Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development
Corporation vs. Formaran III, 578 SCRA 283 [2009])
Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
dismissal. (Ada vs. Baylon, 678 SCRA 293 [2012]).
——o0o——
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9/27/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 705

G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285. September 11, 2013.*

UNICAPITAL, INC., UNICAPITAL REALTY, INC., and

G.R. No. 192073. September 11, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; Actions;

512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Unicapital, Inc. vs. Consing, Jr.

correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure to state a cause of action is

VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 513

Unicapital, Inc. vs. Consing, Jr.

so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual

514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Unicapital, Inc. vs. Consing, Jr.

Same; Same; Consolidation of Cases; It is hornbook principle

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions and

VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 515

(a) The petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285 filed by

(Martirez) assail the CA’s Joint Decision2 dated October 20,

516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

was acquired on July 24, 1997 and the remaining

Cruz as per Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-

VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 517

(Teng) and Po Willie Yu (Yu) informed Unicapital that they

subject property which later revealed that Dela Cruz’s title

518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

life.25 He also averred that he was coerced to commit a

him in a manner that [was] inappropriate and libelous,”29

VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 519

until the controversy is resolved, and attorney’s fees and

post-dated checks to cover the amount due were well within

520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

should be deemed as valid and, therefore, should not be

treatment. It equally refused to dismiss the action on the

VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 521

and prohibition,39 docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 64019

it upheld the order of the RTC-Pasig City for Unicapital

522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

not seek to recover his claims against any particular

docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1418, seeking to recover (a)

VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 523

No. 99-95381 was subsequently consolidated with SCA No.

Unicapital failed. Consing, Jr.’s motion for reconsideration

524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

of sound discretion on the part of the trial court which

Undaunted, Consing, Jr. filed a motion for

VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 525

instant petitions and required the parties to submit their

can be maintained, then the same should not be dismissed,

526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

that may be averred by the defendants.64 As edified in the

The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action

Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should

67 Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, supra note 65, at p.

VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 527

In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.’s

[W]hen a right is exercised in a manner which does

should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate

528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED