1. LIMJOCO V.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PIOFRAGANTE, 80 PHIL 776

FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. His intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued
a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased through its special or judicial
administrator appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction to maintain and operate the
said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention
of law.

ISSUE: W/N the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality

HELD: Yes, because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as
artificial juridical person for the purpose of settlement and distribution of his properties.”
Fragante has rights and fulfillment of obligation which survived after his death. One of those
rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the PSC. The state or the
mass of property, rights left by the decedent, instead of heirs directly, become vested and
charged with his rights and obligations. Under the present legal system, rights and obligations
which survived after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased.

4. G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912

JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee, vs.

ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
TRENT, J.:

FACT

Testator Pioquinto Paguio for some fourteen of fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered
from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became
impaired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his
head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right hand,
however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate
his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.

At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four testamentary witnesses,
Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Señor Marco, and one
Florentino Ramos. Anacleto Paguio and the attorney have since died, and consequently their
testimony was not available upon the trial of the case in the lower court. The other three
testamentary witnesses and the witness Florentino Ramos testified as to the manner in which
the will was executed. According to the uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will was
executed in the following manner:

Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the
disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Señor Marco, who
transcribed them and put them in form.

The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which the notes were written are delivered
to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to the testator asking if they were his
testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time with an affirmative movement
of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a
loud voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Señor Marco gave the
document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in the presence of the
four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of the testator and
each other.

This brings us now to a consideration of appellants' assignment of error, viz, the testator's
alleged mental incapacity at the time of the execution of the will.

Upon this point considerable evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the attesting witnesses
testified that at the time of the execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, and that
although he was seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were.
Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether decedent had the
full use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for some years, and that he (the
witnesses) was not a physician.

The other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for the
opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of the testator. The only
reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the
fact that he was unable to speak. The witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he
verified his own signature as a subscribing witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not weakness of mind and body induced by age and disease render a person
incapable of making a will

SC RULING. NO

There can be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is
quite evident that his mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life.
However, we can not include from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to
dispose of his property by will.

The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under such circumstances,
but the weight of the authority is in support if the principle that it is only when those seeking to
overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will
intervene to set aside a testamentary document of this character.

In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and
the burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of testamentary capacity.

The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the
testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent
jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to
overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do.

There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have
repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not
render a person incapable of
making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and
use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the
legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting
requirements.

The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right
which a person may exercise and this right should not be nullified unless mental incapacity is
established in a positive and conclusive manner.

In discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume 28, 70, of the
American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that
—

Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is not essential
to testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental
weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in law of executing a valid
will. (See the numerous cases there cited in support of this statement.)

The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity, section 365, and
quoted with approval in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:

To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be
wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the
testator should be in the full possession of his reasoning faculties.

In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:

The question is not so much, that was the degree of memory possessed
by the testator, as, had he a disposing memory? Was he able to remember
the property he was about to bequeath, the manner of disturbing it, and the
objects of his bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently
sound to enable him to know and understand the business in which he was
engaged at the time when he executed his will. (See authorities there
cited.)

The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last years
of his life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain
doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the statements of the
witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the conduct of the testator at that
time all indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on
this occasion.

At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct was irrational
in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the
business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and
execution of the will occupied a period several hours and that the testator was present
during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case
at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person.

For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.

5. Ecarma vs CA G.R. No. 193374 | June 08, 2016

CASE DIGEST
Ecarma vs CA
G.R. No. 193374 | June 08, 2016 Topic: Partition and distribution of estate under Art. 1078 and
1081 of NCC;
Facts:

Spouses Natalio and Arminda owned 4 properties designated as Kitanlad, Cuyapo and Lala
consisting of 2 lots. They have 7 children among them were Gerry Ecarma and private respondent
Renato Ecarma. Natalio predeceased Arminda, and therefater their children executed
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate. No physical division of properties was effected and they
remained in co-ownership even after the death of Arminda. Renato Ecarma as the Special
Administrator in the intestate proceedings filed a Project of Partition because of the conflict
between Gerry and the other heirs over actual division of their inherited properties. The legal heirs
except Gerry expressed their desire to have the property partitioned.

Gerry objected because the proposed partition is not feasible, impractical and detrimental. The
planned partition is not accordance with the wishes of decedents, but however, it was denied by
the lower court. He brought up the case to the CA but before the controversy has been settled,
he died. Therefore, the heirs of Gerry Ecarma filed their Appellant’s Brief in substitution of the
deceased.

Issue:

1. WON the Order of Partition is proper where one of the co - owners refuse to accede to such
proposed partition on the ground that it is not feasible, impractical and detrimental. - YES

Held:

1. Upon Arminda's death, her heirs' rights to the succession (covering Arminda's share in the
subject properties) vested and their co-ownership over the subject properties has consolidated
by operation of law. Effectively, without a valid will of Arminda, and as Arminda's compulsory
heirs, herein parties (specifically Gerry Ecarma prior to his death and substitution by herein
petitioners) all ipso facto co-owned the subject properties in equal proportion being compulsory
heirs of the deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda.

Their objection to the actual partition notwithstanding, herein petitioners and even Rodolfo
Ecarma cannot compel the other co-heirs to remain in perpetual co-ownership over the subject
properties. Article 494, in relation to Article 1083, of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding
ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate unless the testator should
have expressly forbidden its partition, in which case the period of indivision shall not exceed
twenty years as provided in Article 494. This power of the testator to prohibit division applies to
the legitime.
Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership terminates when any of the causes for
which partnership is dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for compelling reasons that
division should be ordered, upon petition of one of the co-heirs.
Ineluctably, therefore, herein petitioners' absolute opposition to the partition of the subject
properties which are co-owned has no basis in law. As mere co-owners, herein petitioners,
representing the share of the deceased Gerry Ecarma, cannot preclude the other owners likewise
compulsory heirs of the deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda, from exercising all incidences
of their full ownership.