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    Alejandro Vs Geraldez Digest

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    Sanjay Figueroa
    This case involves a dispute over a deed of donation executed in 1949 whereby Gavino Diaz and Severa Medoza donated several lots of land to their children. After the deaths of both donors, a dispute arose between the donees over ownership of two of the lots. The Supreme Court ruled that the 1949 donation was a valid donation inter vivos, not mortis causa, because ownership of the properties passed to the donees immediately upon execution of the deed, as evidenced by the granting, acceptance, and reservation clauses. The Court found the donation was effective during the lifetime of the donors and did not contemplate their death. Therefore, the donation was valid as an inter vivos transfer, not an invalid mortis

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    Alejandro Vs Geraldez Digest

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    Sanjay Figueroa
    401 views3 pages
    This case involves a dispute over a deed of donation executed in 1949 whereby Gavino Diaz and Severa Medoza donated several lots of land to their children. After the deaths of both donors, a dispute arose between the donees over ownership of two of the lots. The Supreme Court ruled that the 1949 donation was a valid donation inter vivos, not mortis causa, because ownership of the properties passed to the donees immediately upon execution of the deed, as evidenced by the granting, acceptance, and reservation clauses. The Court found the donation was effective during the lifetime of the donors and did not contemplate their death. Therefore, the donation was valid as an inter vivos transfer, not an invalid mortis

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    Alejandro vs Geraldez digest

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    This case involves a dispute over a deed of donation executed in 1949 whereby Gavino Diaz and Severa Medoza donated several lots of land to their children. After the deaths of both donors, a dispute arose between the donees over ownership of two of the lots. The Supreme Court ruled that the 1949 donation was a valid donation inter vivos, not mortis causa, because ownership of the properties passed to the donees immediately upon execution of the deed, as evidenced by the granting, acceptance, and reservation clauses. The Court found the donation was effective during the lifetime of the donors and did not contemplate their death. Therefore, the donation was valid as an inter vivos transfer, not an invalid mortis

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    401 views3 pages

    Alejandro Vs Geraldez Digest

    Uploaded by

    Sanjay Figueroa
    This case involves a dispute over a deed of donation executed in 1949 whereby Gavino Diaz and Severa Medoza donated several lots of land to their children. After the deaths of both donors, a dispute arose between the donees over ownership of two of the lots. The Supreme Court ruled that the 1949 donation was a valid donation inter vivos, not mortis causa, because ownership of the properties passed to the donees immediately upon execution of the deed, as evidenced by the granting, acceptance, and reservation clauses. The Court found the donation was effective during the lifetime of the donors and did not contemplate their death. Therefore, the donation was valid as an inter vivos transfer, not an invalid mortis

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    Alejandro vs Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1997)

    G.R. No. L-33849 August 18, 1977

    TEODORICO ALEJANDRO, IRENEO POLICARPIO, VIRGINIA ALEJANDRO, MARIA ALEJANDRO, SALUD


    ALEJANDRO, EMILIA ALEJANDRO, FLORENCIO ALEJANDRO and DIONISIA ALEJANDRO, petitioners,

    vs.

    HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta.
    Maria, ANDREA DIAZ and ANGEL DIAZ, respondents.

    G.R. No. L-33968 August 18, 1977

    ANDREA DIAZ, petitioner,

    vs.

    HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
    Bulacan, Branch V, TEODORICO ALEJANDRO, IRENEO POLICARPIO, VIRGINIA ALEJANDRO, MARIA
    ALEJANDRO, EMILIA ALEJANDRO, FLORENCIO ALEJANDRO and DIONISIA ALEJANDRO, respondents.

    Transfers in Contemplation of Death, Art. 728-731

    All provisions of a deed of donation should be construed together in case of conflicting statements in
    order to determine whether it is inter vivos or mortis causa.

    Facts: Petition for review on certiorari of the decisions of the CFI of Bulacan

     This is a case about donations inter vivos and mortis causa.


     The bone of contention is Lot No. 2502 of the Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate with an area of 5,678
    sq. meters situated in Sta. Maria Bulacan.
     Sps. GAvino Diaz and Severa Medoza executed a Deed of Donation in favor of their children,
    Olimpia, Angel, Andrea Diaz, and daughter-in-law Regina Fernando. In the deed of donation, the
    Sps. Donated 8 lots, with reservation on crtain lots, to their children and daughters-in-law and
    with conditions that they are not allowed to alienate the same to 3rd persons while the couple
    are still alive and that they shall continue to administer the same until their death. The donees
    manifested their acceptance in the same deed of donation. When Gavino died, Severa executed
    a deed of donation in favor of Angel and Andrea, giving the sibling each a ½ portion of Lot 2377-
    A.
     When Severa died, Andrea sued her brother Angel for the partition of Lots 2377-A and 2502.
    Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving spouse of Olimpia, moved to intervene claiming 1/3 portion
    of Lot 2502.
     In his answer, Angel alleged that he had been occupying his share of Lot 2502 for more than 20
    years. The intervenors claimed that the 1949 donation was a void mortis causa disposition.
     The CFI ruled that the donation was a donation mortis causa because the ownership of the
    properties donated did not pass to the donees during the donors lifetime but was transmitted to
    the donees only – upon the death of the donors. It, however, sustained the partition of Lot 2502
    since it was an extrajudicial partition. Both parties appealed to the SC, Andrea contending that it
    is a donation inter vivos while Alejandro contending it to be mortis causa.

    Issue: Whether or not the donation is a donation inter vivos or mortis causa

    Held: Donation inter vivos

     An inter vivos donation of real property must be evidenced by a public document and should be
    accepted by the done in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument. In the latter
    case, the donor should be notified of the acceptance in an authentic form and that step should
    be noted in both instruments.
     On the other hand, a transfer mortis causa should be embodied in a last will and testament (Art.
    728). It should not be called donation mortis causa. It is in reality a legacy. If not embodied in a
    valid will, the donation is void.
     The donation in the instant case is inter vivos because it took effect during the donor’s lifetime,
    or immediately after the execution of the deed, as shown by the granting, habendum and
    warranty clause of the deed. In that clause it is stated that, in consideration of the affection and
    esteem of the donors for the donees and the valuable services rendered by the donees to the
    donors, the latter, by means of the deed of donation, wholeheartedly transfer and
    unconditionally give to the donees the lots mentioned and described in the early part of the
    deed, free from any kind of all liens and debts.
     The acceptance clause is another indication that the donation is inter vivos. Donations mortis
    causa, being in the form of a will, are never accepted by the donees during the donor’s lifetime.
    Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.
     In the reddendum or reservation clause of the deed of donation, it is stipulated that the donees
    would shoulder the expenses for the illness and the funeral of the donors and that the donees
    cannot sell to a third person the donated properties during the donors’ lifetime but if the sale is
    necessary to defray the expenses and support of the donors, then the sale is valid.
     The limited right to dispose of the donated lots, which the deed gives to the donees, implies that
    ownership had passed to them by means of the donation and that, therefore, the donation was
    already effective during the donor’s lifetime. That is a characteristic of a donation inter vivos.
     Our conclusion is that the aforequoted paragraph 3 of the reservation clause refers to the
    beneficial ownership (dominium utile) and not to the naked title and that what the donors
    reserved to themselves, by means of that clause, was the management of the donated lots and
    the fruits thereof. But, notwithstanding that reservation, the donation, as shown in the
    habendum clause, was already effective during their lifetime and was not made in
    contemplation of their death because the deed transferred to the donees the naked ownership
    of the donated properties.
     The trial court’s conclusion that the said deed of donation although void as a donation
    intervivos, is valid “as an extrajudicial partition among the parents and their children” is not
    well-taken. Article 1080 of the Civil Code provides that “should a person make a partition of his
    estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
    prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.”
     We have already observed that the said donation was not a partition of the entire estate of the
    Diaz spouses since, actually, only five of the eight lots, constituting their estate, were
    partitioned. Hence, that partition is not the one contemplated in article 1080.

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