G.R. No. 218425. September 27, 2017.*

 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
WILSON CACHO y SONGCO, accused-appellant.

Criminal Law; Exempting Circumstances; Insanity; In order

for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea
of insanity, he must successfully show that: (1) he was completely
deprived of intelligence; and (2) such complete deprivation of
intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the
commission of the offense.—When the accused raised the defense
of insanity, he is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to
be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on
the issue of guilt, because the accused had already admitted
committing the crime. However, for the defense of insanity to be
successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade criminal liability,
it is necessary that insanity must relate to the time immediately
preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense
with which the accused is charged. Otherwise, he can be held
guilty for the said offense. In short, in order for the accused to be
exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must
successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of
intelligence; and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence
must be manifest at the time or immediately before the
commission of the offense.
Same; Same; Same; Accused-appellant having invoked the
defense of insanity, he is deemed to have admitted the commission
of the crime. As such, he is bound to establish with certainty that
he is completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental
condition or

_______________

*  FIRST DIVISION.

 
 
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People vs. Cacho

illness.—Accused-appellant having invoked the defense of

insanity, he is deemed to have admitted the commission of the
crime. As such, he is bound to establish with certainty that he is
completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental
condition or illness. After the careful review of the records of the
case, We found that the accused-appellant failed to prove that he
is insane immediately prior to or at the time of the commission of
the crime.
Same; Same; Same; Mere prior confinement into a mental
institution does not automatically exonerate the accused-appellant
from criminal liability in the absence of any evidence showing that
accused-appellant was completely deprived of reason immediately
prior to or at the time of the commission of the crime.—Here, while
Dr. Sagun testified that accused-appellant was confined at the
NCMH in 1996 and that accused-appellant was diagnosed with
Major Depression with Psychosis which progressed to Chronic
Schizophrenia, no other evidence was presented to show that
accused-appellant was insane immediately prior to or at the very
moment that the crime was committed. Mere prior confinement
into a mental institution does not automatically exonerate the
accused-appellant from criminal liability in the absence of any
evidence showing that accused-appellant was completely deprived
of reason immediately prior to or at the time of the commission of
the crime. If at all, there is no evidence showing that the mental
illness of the accused-appellant, as narrated by Dr. Sagun,
constitutes insanity, in that, there is complete deprivation of his
intelligence in committing the act.
Same; Murder; Elements of.—In order that a person can be
convicted of the crime of murder, the prosecution must establish
(1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her;
(3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that
the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Same; Same; Qualifying Circumstances; The mere fact that
the accused-appellant pleaded the defense of insanity and as a
consequence admitted the commission of the crime, the same
should not be construed as an abdication of the prosecution’s duty
to prove with certainty the existence of the qualifying
circumstances alleged in the Information.—In the present case, all
the elements of the crime of murder does not exist. It is well-
settled that the qualifying circum-

 
 
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stances must be specifically alleged in the Information and

duly proven with equal certainty as the crime itself. While the
qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and
nighttime were alleged in the Information, the prosecution failed
to prove the same during the trial. In fact, the prosecution failed
to present any evidence showing the existence of the
circumstances which would qualify the crime to murder. The mere
fact that the accused-appellant pleaded the defense of insanity
and as a consequence admitted the commission of the crime, the
same should not be construed as an abdication of the
prosecution’s duty to prove with certainty the existence of the
qualifying circumstances alleged in the Information.
 Same; Arson; Destructive Arson; Article 320 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659,
contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and
private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft,
factories and other military, government or commercial
establishments by any person or group of persons.—Arson is the
malicious burning of property. Under Article 320 of the RPC, as
amended, and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, arson is
classified into two kinds: (1) Destructive Arson (Article 320); and
(2) other cases of arson (P.D. No. 1613). Article 320 of the RPC, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, contemplates the
malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels,
buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other
military, government or commercial establishments by any person
or group of persons.
Same; Same; Murder; In order to determine whether the crime
committed is arson only, or murder, or arson and homicide or
murder, as the case may be, the main objective of the accused is to
be examined.—In order to determine whether the crime
committed is arson only, or murder, or arson and homicide or
murder, as the case may be, the main objective of the accused is to
be examined. If the main objective is the burning of the building
or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson,
the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed.
If, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular
person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted
to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is
murder only. Lastly, if the objective is, likewise, to kill a
particular person, and in fact the

 
 
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offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a

means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and
distinct crimes committed — homicide/murder and arson. Aside
from the fact that accused-appellant already admitted to the
commission of the crime of destructive arson due to his plea of
insanity, which as We discussed above was not successfully
proven, the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove that the
accused-appellant burned the house of the victim in order to hide
or conceal the commission of the crime. It was established that
accused-appellant first beheaded the victim before setting the
latter’s house on fire. Therefore, two separate crimes were
committed by the accused-appellant, homicide and arson.
Same; Homicide; Penalties; Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), a person convicted of the crime of homicide shall be
punished with reclusion temporal.—Article 249 of the RPC, a
person convicted of the crime of homicide shall be punished with
reclusion temporal. In this case, due to the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period, which is fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months.
 Same; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law; Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), if the offense is punished by the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), an indeterminate penalty shall be
imposed on the accused, the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the RPC, and the minimum term of
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense without first considering any
modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime.
—Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is
punished by the RPC, an indeterminate penalty shall be imposed
on the accused, the maximum term of which shall be that which,
in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the RPC, and the minimum term of which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense without first considering any modifying
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by the law to the
sound discretion of the court and can be anywhere within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree without considering the
periods into which it might be subdivided. The penalty

 
 
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next lower in degree is prisión mayor. Hence, applying the

Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prisión mayor as minimum to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum for the crime of Homicide.
Same; Destructive Arson; Insofar as the crime of Destructive
Arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659, accused-appellant should
be sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the
RA No. 9346, prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty.—
Insofar as the crime of Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the
RPC as amended by R.A. No. 7659, accused-appellant should be
sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the
R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty.

AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
   Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.

TIJAM, J.:
 
For automatic review is the Decision1 dated July 1, 2014
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
06123 which affirmed the Decision2 dated October 8, 2012
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal,
Branch 76, in Criminal Case Nos. 7522 and 7523 finding
Wilson Cacho y Songco (accused-appellant) guilty of the
crimes of Murder and Destructive Arson.

_______________

1   Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, concurred in by

Associate Justices Leoncia R. Dimagiba and Carmelita Salandanan-
Manahan; Rollo, pp. 2-9.
2  Penned by Judge Josephine Zarate-Fernandez; CA Rollo, pp. 42-49.

 
 
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People vs. Cacho

Accused-appellant is charged with the crime of Murder

under the following Information, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 7522

That on or about the 1st day of January 2004, in the
Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, while armed with a bladed deadly weapon, with intent to
kill, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery,
evident premeditation and nighttime which changes the nature of
the felony to a Heinous crime of Murder, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hack
with said weapon and behead one MARIO BALBAO y ADAMI,
which resulted in his death soon thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3

 
Likewise, accused-appellant is charged with the crime of
Destructive Arson under the following Information:

Criminal Case No. 7523

That on or about the 1st day of January 2004, in the
Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, with the deliberate intent to cause destruction to the
house of MARIO BALBAO y ADAMI, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously set fire to and burn the said house
causing its total destruction for the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence of the commission of the crime of Murder
with attendant special aggravating circumstance that the
offender was motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner of
the property in the commission of the felony.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4

_______________

3  Id., at p. 42.
4  Id., at pp. 42-43.

 
 

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People vs. Cacho

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not

guilty to the crimes charged. Trial ensued.
The following undisputed facts as summarized by the
CA are as follows:

On January 2, 2004, at around 8:10 o’clock in the morning,

PO2 Emelito Salen (PO2 Salen) and SPO4 Onofre Tavas (SPO4
Tavas) of the Rodriguez Police Station received a report from a
certain Willy Cacho about a fire in Sitio Catmon, Brgy. San
Rafael, Rodriguez, Rizal. PO2 Salen and SPO4 Tavas, who were
accompanied by members of the Bureau of Fire Protection,
namely: SFO1 Damasa Viscara and FO2 Casiple, went to Sitio
Catmon to verify said report.
Upon arriving in Sitio Catmon, the police officers saw a burned
house, which was owned by a certain Boy who was later identified
as Mario Balbao. Upon investigation, they discovered a burned
body of a headless man underneath an iron sheet. Willy Cacho
informed the police officers that it was his brother, [accused-
appellant], who killed Boy. [Accused-appellant’s] wife likewise
told the police officers that her husband was a patient of [the]
National Center for Mental Health and has a recurring mental
illness.
Thereafter, the police officers went to the house of [accused-
appellant] where they saw a shallow pit measuring one (1) foot in
diameter and five (5) inches deep with a steel peg standing at the
center, which they believed was used to burn a head because
there were traces of ash and a human skull on top of the heap of
charcoal. The police officers then saw [accused-appellant] in his
backyard. Upon introducing themselves as police officers,
[accused-appellant] acted strangely and exhibited signs of mental
illness. According to SPO4 Tavas, [accused-appellant] admitted
killing Boy and burning the latter’s house but did not say why he
did it.
When they tried to arrest him, [accused-appellant] became
wild. The police officers sought help from other people to subdue
[accused-appellant] and to place him in-

 
 

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People vs. Cacho

side the mobile car. [Accused-appellant] was then brought to the

prosecutors [sic] office for inquest proceedings. After the inquest,
[accused-appellant] was brought to the National Center for
Mental Health for confinement.5

 
After trial, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of
the crimes of Murder and Destructive Arson, in its
Decision6 dated October 8, 2012, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 7522, finding [accused-appellant]
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages. No pronouncement as to cost.
2. In Criminal Case No. 7523, finding [accused-appellant]
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Destructive
Arson (Article 320 par[.] 5 RPC as amended by Sec[.] 10 of R[.]A[.
No.] 7659) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. No pronouncement as to cost.
[Accused-appellant] is hereby ordered to be committed to the
National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City for service of sentence.
[Accused-appellant] is to be credited for the time spent for his
preventive detention in accordance with Art[.] 29 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by R.A. 6127 and E.O. 214.
SO ORDERED.7

_______________

5  Rollo, pp. 2-3.

6  CA Rollo, pp. 42-49.
7  Id., at pp. 48-49.

 
 

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The RTC only dealt with the issue of insanity. Since the
accused-appellant raised the defense of insanity, the RTC
ruled that he already admitted the commission of the
crime. Thus, accused-appellant was tried on the issue of
insanity alone.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment of
conviction of the accused-appellant of the crimes charged in
its Decision8 dated July 1, 2014, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is

DISMISSED. The decision dated October 8, 2012 of the [RTC] of
San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.9

 
Issues
 
The issues to be resolved in this case are: 1) whether the
accused-appellant sufficiently proved his defense of
insanity; and 2) whether the crimes of Murder and
Destructive Arson were sufficiently proved.
 
Ruling of the Court
 
At the outset, appeal in criminal cases throws the whole
open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to
correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed
judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.10 After
a careful review and scrutiny of the records, We hold that
the accused-appellant can only be convicted of Homicide
and Destructive Arson.

_______________

8   Rollo, pp. 2-9.

9   Id., at p. 8.
10  People v. Dahil, 750 Phil. 212, 225; 745 SCRA 221, 233 (2015).

 
 
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Accused-appellant was
not able to sufficiently
prove his defense of
insanity.
 
Accused-appellant alleges that he was diagnosed with
Major Depression with Psychosis in 1996 for which he was
admitted at the National Center for Mental Health
(NCMH) for two (2) months. Thereafter, he was discharged
when there were no longer any symptom that was
observed. Then on January 7, 2004, he was again admitted
to the NCMH and it was discovered that his Major
Depression with Psychosis had already progressed to
Chronic Schizophrenia. Thus, his defense of insanity was
sufficiently proved by his medical record with the NCMH
as well as the expert testimony of Dr. Sagun.11
In the case of People v. Isla,12 it stated that:

Article 12 of the [RPC] provides for one of the circumstances

which will exempt one from criminal liability which is when the
perpetrator of the act was an imbecile or insane, unless the latter
has acted during a lucid interval. This circumstance, however, is
not easily available to an accused as a successful defense. Insanity
is the exception rather than the rule in the human condition.
Under Article 800 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that every
human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing
evidence. It is in the nature of confession and avoidance. An
accused invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime
but claims that he or she is not guilty because of insanity. x x x.13
(Citation omitted)

_______________

11  CA Rollo, p. 27.

12  699 Phil. 256; 686 SCRA 267 (2012).
13  Id., at pp. 266-267; p. 277.

 
 

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 People vs. Cacho

When the accused raised the defense of insanity, he is

tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to be sane, a
judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the
issue of guilt, because the accused had already admitted
committing the crime.14
However, for the defense of insanity to be successfully
invoked as a circumstance to evade criminal liability, it is
necessary that insanity must relate to the time
immediately preceding or simultaneous with the
commission of the offense with which the accused is
charged. Otherwise, he can be held guilty for the said
offense. In short, in order for the accused to be exempted
from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must
successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of
intelligence; and (2) such complete deprivation of
intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately
before the commission of the offense.15
Accused-appellant having invoked the defense of
insanity, he is deemed to have admitted the commission of
the crime. As such, he is bound to establish with certainty
that he is completely deprived of intelligence because of his
mental condition or illness.
After the careful review of the records of the case, We
found that the accused-appellant failed to prove that he is
insane immediately prior to or at the time of the
commission of the crime.
Dr. Sagun testified as to accused-appellant’s mental
condition as follows:

_______________

14  People v. Roa, G.R. No. 225599, March 22, 2017, 821 SCRA 453.
15   Verdadero v. People, G.R. No. 216021, March 2, 2016, 785 SCRA
490, 502, citing People v. Isla, supra note 12.

 
 

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People vs. Cacho

Atty. Censon:
x x x x
Q. Madam Witness, do you know one Wilson Cacho or have you
happened to know a person named Wilson Cacho?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. On what occasion did you meet this person named Wilson
Cacho?
A. I was able to examine the said patient on July 23 on his third
consult at the forensic pavilion and then I was the one who
admitted the patient on November 23, 2007, sir.
x x x x
Q. What was on your finding on Wilson Cacho when he consulted
you on July 23, 2007?
A. As per our records, the patient had been ill since he was 17
years old. His first consult was on July 15, 1996 and was
 admitted for two (2) months and was discharged on September
1996. A follow-up after a month, he was in the out-patient and
then he was lost for follow-up for eight (8) years. He consulted
again on January 7, 2004 where he was admitted and confined
for five (5) days and after that two (2) years again, he consulted
at the out-patient, now at the forensic pavilion. This was in
November 24, 2006 and another consultation at our forensic
pavilion on December 18, 2006. And on July 23, was our first
consult in the out-patients and in November 24, that was the
time we admitted the patient, sir.
x x x x
Q. Madam Witness, you said that Mr. Wilson Cacho has been
consulting with the National Center for Mental Health since he
was 17 years of age, and do you know what was the finding
that made him to be admitted for two (2) months?
A. Based on our records, he was diagnosed with major depression
with psychosis in 1996 and then after

 
 

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People vs. Cacho

three (3) months, his first consult at the out-patient, he was

diagnosed now with psychosis and in the second admission in
January 7, 2004, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia, sir.
x x x x
Q. You said that accused Wilson Cacho was admitted for two (2)
months in the year 1996 and you said he was discharged, for
what reason he was [sic] discharged?
A. Basing from the presenting complaint when he was admitted
there where remissions, there were no symptoms seen or
observed so he was discharged and was requested to have
regular follow-ups, sir.
Q. In his history was he given or recommended to take medicines?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, what medicine was recommended for him to take when he
was discharged for the first time in 1996?
A. He was given anti-psychotic and anti-depressant, sir.
x x x x
Q. Awhile ago I asked you what will happen to a person who have
been prescribed these medicines and he fails to take them?
A. Most of them will have relapse. The symptoms would go back,
sir.
Q. Do you know the cost of these medicines if you take it
regularly?
A. At that time I cannot recall but at this present time,
halluperidol can cost from P20.00 to P50.00 a day and the anti-
depression can cost P20.00 to P100.00 a day, sir.
Q. Can you consider that affordable to persons who even fails to
eat three (3) times a day?
A. No, sir.

 
 

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People vs. Cacho

Q. Can you please tell the date again when this patient consulted
again to your hospital?
A. He came back on January 7, 2004 after eight (8) years of
follow-up, sir.
Q. For what reason was he made to consult your hospital?
A. Based on our records, the presenting complaint is that
‘‘nagwawala, nanghahabol ng itak,” sir. 16

 
In People v. Estrada,17 We held that to ascertain a
person’s mental condition at the time of the act, evidence as
to his mind condition is necessary, thus:

To ascertain a person’s mental condition at the time of the act,

it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind
within a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct
testimony is not required. Neither are specific acts of
derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense.
Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the
unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts.18

 
Here, while Dr. Sagun testified that accused-appellant
was confined at the NCMH in 1996 and that accused-
appellant was diagnosed with Major Depression with
Psychosis which progressed to Chronic Schizophrenia, no
other evidence was presented to show that accused-
appellant was insane immediately prior to or at the very
moment that the crime was committed. Mere prior
confinement into a mental institution does not
automatically exonerate the accused-appellant from
criminal liability in the absence of any evidence showing
that accused-appellant was completely deprived of reason
immediately prior to or at the time of the commission of the
crime. If at all, there is no evidence showing that the
mental illness of

_______________

16  TSN, March 24, 2011, pp. 4-7.

17  389 Phil. 216; 333 SCRA 699 (2000).
18  Id., at p. 233; pp. 713-714.

 
 

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the accused-appellant, as narrated by Dr. Sagun,

constitutes insanity, in that, there is complete deprivation
of his intelligence in committing the act.
We therefore find no cogent reason to reverse the RTC
and the CA in its finding that accused-appellant was not
able to prove his defense of insanity. However, We hold
that accused-appellant can only be convicted of the crime of
Homicide for failure of the prosecution to prove the
existence of any of the qualifying circumstance provided for
under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as charged in the
Information.
 
Accused-appellant is liable
for the crime of Homicide.
 
Article 248 of the RPC provides that:

Art. 248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling within the

provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck,
stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street
car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great
waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public
calamity.

 
 

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People vs. Cacho

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting
the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse.

 
Under the above provision in order that a person can be
convicted of the crime of murder, the prosecution must
establish (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused
killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any
of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of
the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.19
In the Information, it was alleged that the
circumstances of treachery, and evident premeditation
qualified the crime to murder.
In People v. Zulieta,20 the Court held that:

‘‘There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes

against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.” ‘‘The essence of treachery is that
the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.” Otherwise
stated, an unexpected and sudden attack which renders the
victim unable and unprepared to put up a defense is the essence
of treachery.21

 
While, in Isla,22 the Court ruled that for evident
premeditation to be considered as a qualifying
circumstance, it is necessary that:

_______________

19  People v. Lagman, 685 Phil. 733, 743; 669 SCRA 512, 522 (2012).
20  720 Phil. 818; 709 SCRA 202 (2013).
21  Id., at p. 826; pp. 210-211.
22  People v. Isla, supra note 12.

 
 
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(1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2)

overt act/acts manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to
commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow
accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. x  x  x The
essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the
criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon
the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during the space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. x x x.23

 
In the present case, all the elements of the crime of
murder does not exist. It is well-settled that the qualifying
circumstances must be specifically alleged in the
Information and duly proven with equal certainty as the
crime itself.24 While the qualifying circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation and nighttime were
alleged in the Information, the prosecution failed to prove
the same during the trial. In fact, the prosecution failed to
present any evidence showing the existence of the
circumstances which would qualify the crime to murder.
The mere fact that the accused-appellant pleaded the
defense of insanity and as a consequence admitted the
commission of the crime, the same should not be construed
as an abdication of the prosecution’s duty to prove with
certainty the existence of the qualifying circumstances
alleged in the Information.
Since the prosecution was not able to prove the existence
of the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation and nighttime, accused-appellant can only
be convicted of the crime of Homicide and not murder.

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 23  Id., at p. 270; pp. 280-281.
24  People v. Garcia, 722 Phil. 60, 73; 710 SCRA 571, 584-585 (2013).

 
 

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Accused-appellant is
liable for a separate
crime of Destructive
Arson.
 
Accused-appellant further claims that he should have
been convicted only of the crime of murder and not both
crimes of murder and arson since the finding that the
burning of the house was an attempt to conceal the killing
has no factual basis.
Arson is the malicious burning of property. Under
Article 320 of the RPC, as amended, and Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,25 arson is classified into two kinds:
(1) Destructive Arson (Article 320); and (2) other cases of
arson (P.D. No. 1613).
Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7659,26 contemplates the malicious burning of
structures,

25  AMENDING THE LAW ON ARSON. Approved on March 7, 1979.

26   Section 10. Article 320 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Art. 320. Destructive Arson.—The penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one
single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous
burnings, committed on several or different occasions;
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the
public in general or where people usually gather or
congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to,
official governmental function or business, private
transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and
conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such
as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings,
public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons
in said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire

 
 

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People vs. Cacho

both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains,

vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government
or commercial establishments by any person or group of
persons.
In order to determine whether the crime committed is
arson only, or murder, or arson and homicide or murder, as
the case may be, the main objective of the accused is to be
examined. If the main objective is the burning of the
building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the
occasion of ar-

_______________

and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or

not;
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane,
devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public use,
entertainment or leisure;
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any
appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of public
utilities;
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of
concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for
the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to
collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be
imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more
persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is
merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes
an overt act in the commission or another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon
any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or
fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives or general
museum of the Government;
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of
inflammable or explosive materials. If as a consequence of the
commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death
results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

 
 

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People vs. Cacho

son, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide

is absorbed. If, on the other hand, the main objective is to
kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice,
when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such
goal the crime committed is murder only. Lastly, if the
objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact
the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a
means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate
and distinct crimes committed — homicide/murder and
arson.27
Aside from the fact that accused-appellant already
admitted to the commission of the crime of destructive
arson due to his plea of insanity, which as We discussed
above was not successfully proven, the prosecution was
able to sufficiently prove that the accused-appellant burned
the house of the victim in order to hide or conceal the
commission of the crime. It was established that accused-
appellant first beheaded the victim before setting the
latter’s house on fire.28 Therefore, two separate crimes
were committed by the accused-appellant, homicide and
arson.
 
Penalty
 
29
Article 249 of the RPC, a person convicted of the crime
of homicide shall be punished with reclusion temporal. In
this case, due to the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in
its medium period, which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months.

_______________

27  People v. Baluntong, 629 Phil. 441, 446-447; 615 SCRA 455, 461-462
(2010).
28  Records, p. 10.
29   Art. 249. Homicide.—Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any
of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be
deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

 
 

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People vs. Cacho

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,30 if the offense

is punished by the RPC, an indeterminate penalty shall be
imposed on the accused, the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the RPC, and
the minimum term of which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense without first considering any modifying
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime.
The determination of the minimum penalty is left by the
law to the sound discretion of the court and can be
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree without considering the periods into which it might
be subdivided.31
The penalty next lower in degree is prisión mayor.
Hence, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-
appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum for the
crime of Homicide.
Insofar as the crime of Destructive Arson under Article
320 of the RPC as amended by R.A. No. 7659, accused-
appellant should be sentenced with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in

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30  Section 1, Act No. 4103:

Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by
any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same.
31  Sim, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 472 Phil. 503, 516-517; 428 SCRA 459,
470 (2004).

 
 

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People vs. Cacho

view of the R.A. No. 9346,32 prohibiting the imposition of

the death penalty.
 
Damages
 
In view of the prevailing jurisprudence,33 in Criminal
Case No. 7522, accused-appellant is directed to pay the
heirs of the victim with P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
In Criminal Case No. 7523, the accused-appellant is
directed to pay the heirs of the victim with P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Further, We impose a six percent (6%) legal interest on
the total amounts awarded to the heirs of the victim
counted from the date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Decision
dated July 1, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 06123 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7522, accused-appellant
Wilson Cacho y Songco is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs
of the victim Mario Balbao y Adami the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages. A legal interest of six per-
 _______________

32  AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE

PHILIPPINES. Approved on June 24, 2006.

33  People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331.

 
 
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People vs. Cacho

cent (6%) per annum is likewise imposed on the total

amount of damages counted from the finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
2. In Criminal Case No. 7523, accused-appellant
Wilson Cacho y Songco is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Destructive Arson
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ordered to
pay the heirs of the victim Mario Balbao y Adami the
amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00
as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages. A legal interest of six percent (6%) per
annum is likewise imposed on the total amount of
damages counted from the finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro and Del

Castillo, JJ., concur.
Carpio,** J., On Official Leave.

Judgment affirmed with modifications.

Notes.—In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by

proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been
intentionally caused. (People vs. Murcia, 614 SCRA 741
[2010])
Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence; Insanity presupposes that the accused
was completely deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime.
(People vs. Bulagao, 658 SCRA 746 [2011])
 
——o0o——

_______________

** Designated additional member per Raffle dated August 23, 2017 vice
Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.

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