G.R. No.

149723             October 27, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the August 31,
2001 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 20431 which granted the Motion for
Bail2 of accused-appellant, herein respondent Victor Keith Fitzgerald, (Fitzgerald).

The facts are of record.

An Information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, Olongapo City and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 422-94, charged Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with Violation of Art. III, Section 5,
paragraph (a), subparagraph (5) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610,3 allegedly committed as follows:

That sometime in the month of September 1993, in the City of Olongapo, Zambales, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD,
actuated by lust, and by the use of laced drugs ("vitamins") willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
induced complainant "AAA,"4 a minor, 13 years of age, to engage in prostitution by then and
there showering said "AAA" with gifts, clothes and food and thereafter having carnal knowledge
of her in violation of the aforesaid law and to her damage and prejudice.5

After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a Decision dated May 7, 1996, the decretal portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Victor Keith Fitzgerald GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Violation of Section 5, Paragraph (a) sub-paragraph 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, with all the accessory penalties attached therewith; and to indemnify
the private complainant "AAA" the amounts of P30,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

The Lingap Center of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in Olongapo
City shall hold in trust the said awards and dispose the same solely for the rehabilitation and
education of "AAA", to the exclusion of her mother and her other relatives.

The accused under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code shall be credited in full of his preventive
imprisonment if he has agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise to only 4/5 thereof.
 Upon completion of the service of his sentence, the accused shall be deported immediately and
forever barred from entry to the Philippines.

In Criminal Case No. 419-94 for Rape, the accused is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.6

Fitzgerald applied for bail which the RTC denied in an Order dated August 1, 1996, which reads:

xxxx

In fine, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the Prosecution during the hearing on the bail
petition, the Court is of the considered view that the circumstances of the accused indicate
probability of flight and that there is undue risk that the accused may commit a similar offense,
if released on bail pending appeal.

WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Petition for Bail pending appeal
is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.7

Fitzgerald appealed to the CA which, in a Decision8 dated September 27, 1999, affirmed the RTC
Decision, thus:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, with the modification that the penalty imposed on the accused-appellant is
imprisonment of Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal to
Twenty (20) years and One (1) day of Reclusion Perpetua, the decision of the court a quo is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.9

Fitzgerald filed a Motion for New Trial10 and a Supplemental to Accused's Motion for New Trial11 on the
ground that new and material evidence not previously available had surfaced. The CA granted the
Motion for New Trial in a Resolution dated August 25, 2000, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appellant's Motion for New Trial dated October 14, 1999 is GRANTED. The
original records of this case is hereby REMANDED to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City Branch 75 who is DIRECTED to receive the new evidence material to
appellant's defense within sixty days from receipt and thereafter to submit to this Court the
said evidence together with the transcript of stenographic notes together with the records of
the case within ten (10) days after the reception of evidence. The Motion to Transfer appellant
to the National Penitentiary is DENIED.12 (Emphasis ours)

The People (petitioner) filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 from the August 25, 2000 CA Resolution
while Fitzgerald filed a Motion to Fix Bail with Manifestation.14 Both Motions were denied by the CA in
its November 13, 2000 Resolution.15 In denying Fitzgerald's bail application, the CA held:
 [T]his Court hereby RESOLVES to:

xxxx

2. DENY accused-appellant's Motion to Fix Bail with Manifestation, pursuant to the provisions of
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which provides:

"Sec. 7. – Capital Offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

In the case at bar, the maximum imposable penalty in accordance with Republic Act 7610
otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act is reclusion perpetua. As it is, the evidence of guilt is strong, hence, We hold
that his motion for bail cannot be granted at this point.

With regard to his alleged physical condition, let it be stressed that accused-appellant is not
precluded from seeking medical attention if the need arises provided the necessary
representations with the proper authorities are made.

SO ORDERED.16 (Emphasis ours)

The People filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari17 docketed as G.R. No. 146008
questioning the August 25, 2000 and November 13, 2000 CA Resolutions. The petition was dismissed in
a Resolution18 dated January 15, 2001, which became final and executory on May 2, 2001.19

Meanwhile, on December 3, 2000, Fitzgerald filed with the CA a Motion for Early Transmittal of the
Records and for the Re-Examination of the Penalty Imposed, and a Motion for Bail.20 The People filed its
Comment21 to both Motions.

On August 31, 2001, the CA issued the herein assailed Resolution22 granting Fitzgerald's bail application,
thus:

xxxx

Be that as it may, while We maintain that, as it is, the evidence of guilt is strong, We have
taken a second look at appellant's plea for temporary liberty considering primarily the fact that
appellant is already of old age23 and is not in the best of health. Thus, it is this Court's view that
appellant be GRANTED temporary liberty premised not on the grounds stated in his Motion for
Bail but in the higher interest of substantial justice and considering the new trial granted in this
case. Accordingly, appellant is hereby DIRECTED to post a bail bond in the amount
of P100,000.00 for his temporary liberty provided he will appear in any court and submit himself
to the orders and processes thereof if and when required to do so. The appellant is likewise
refrained from leaving the country now or in the future until this case is terminated.
Accordingly, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is ORDERED to include appellant in its
hold departure list xxx.
 xxxx

SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis ours)

Thereafter, the RTC ordered Fitzgerald's temporary release on

September 4, 2001 upon his filing a cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00.25

Hence, the People filed this Petition to have the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution annulled and set aside.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail despite the fact
that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of his guilt is
strong.26 It also questions the jurisdiction of the CA to act on said Motion, considering that the case had
been remanded to the RTC for new trial.27

In his Comment and Memorandum, respondent counters that the grant of new trial negated the
previous findings of the existence of strong evidence of his guilt;28 and justifies his provisional release on
humanitarian grounds, citing as an extraordinary circumstance his advanced age and deteriorating
health.29

The petition is meritorious.

We resolve first the preliminary question of whether the CA, after issuing its August 25, 2000 Resolution
granting a new trial, still had jurisdiction to act on respondent's Motion to Post Bail. Our ruling on this
matter, however, shall be limitted to the effect of the August 25, 2000 CA Resolution on the latter's
jurisdiction; it shall have no bearing on the merits of said Resolution as this has been decided with
finality in G.R. No. 146008.

According to petitioner, considering that the August 25, 2000 CA Resolution, referring the case to the
RTC for new trial, had become final and executory on May 2, 2001 when this Court denied its petition for
review in G.R. No. 146008, then, when the CA issued the August 31, 2001 Resolution granting
respondent bail, it had been stripped of jurisdiction over the case.30

Petitioner is mistaken.

When this Court grants a new trial, it vacates both the judgment of the trial court convicting the
accused31 and the judgment of the CA affirming it,32 and remands the case to the trial court for reception
of newly-discovered evidence and promulgation of a new judgment,33 at times with instruction to the
trial court to promptly report the outcome.34The Court itself does not conduct the new trial for it is no
trier of facts.35

However, when the CA grants a new trial, its disposition of the case may differ, notwithstanding Sec.
1,36 Rule 125 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides for uniformity in appellate criminal
procedure between this Court and the CA. Unlike this Court, the CA may decide questions of fact and
mixed questions of fact and law.37Thus, when it grants a new trial under Sec. 14, Rule 124, it may either
(a) directly receive the purported newly-discovered evidence under Sec. 12,38 or (b) refer the case to the
court of origin for reception of such evidence under Sec. 15.39 In either case, it does not relinquish to the
trial court jurisdiction over the case; it retains sufficient authority to resolve incidents in the case and
decide its merits.

Now then, the CA, in its August 25, 2000 Resolution, ordered: first, the remand of the original records of
the case to the RTC; second, that the RTC receive the new evidence material to appellant's defense
within 60 days from receipt of the original records; and third, that the RTC submit to it the said evidence
together with the transcript of the case within 10 days after reception of evidence.40 From the foregoing
dispostion, it is evident that the CA retained appellate jurisdiction over the case, even as it delegated to
the RTC the function of receiving the respondent's newly-discovered evidence. The CA therefore
retained its authority to act on respondent's bail application. Moreso that the the original records of the
case had yet to be transmitted to the RTC when respondent filed his bail application and the CA acted on
it.

With that procedural matter out of the way, we now focus on the substantive issue of whether the CA
erred when it allowed respondent to bail.

The right to bail emenates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the
custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys,41 be allowed
provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required
under specified conditions.42

Implementing Sec. 13,43 Article III of the 1987 Constitution, Sections 444 and 5, Rule 114 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth substantive and procedural rules on the disposition of bail
applications. Sec. 4 provides that bail is a matter of right to an accused person in custody for an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,45 but a matter of discretion on the
part of the court, concerning one facing an accusation for an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of his guilt is strong.46 As for an accused already
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied or revoked
based on prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the circumstances under Sec. 5, paragraphs
(a) to (e), to wit:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary  – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and
resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice
to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-
recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
 reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense
while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case
indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may
commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (Emphasis supplied)

It will be recalled that herein respondent was charged with violation of Section 5, par. (a), sub-paragraph
(5), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a crime which carries the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was
later convicted by the RTC for a lesser crime which carried a sentence of imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

These circumstances are not altered when the CA granted a new trial.47 As already discussed, the CA
retained appellate jurisdiction over the case even as it ordered the remand of the original records
thereof to the RTC for reception of evidence. In retaining appellate jurisdiction, it set aside only its own
September 27, 1999 Decision but left unaltered the May 7, 1996 RTC Decision. In fact, in its August 31,
2001 Resolution, the CA emphasized:

As we have pointed out earlier, the propriety of appellant's conviction of the offense charged as
well as the penalty imposed thereto should be resolved during the appreciation of the new trial
after considering the new evidence which appellant insist would prove his innocence.48

The May 7, 1996 RTC Decision, therefore, remained operative. And under said Decision, respondent
stood sentenced to an imprisonment term exceeding six years.

Moreover, both the RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of the existence of strong evidence of
the guilt of respondent.49 These findings were not overturned when the CA granted a new trial. Under
Section 6 (b), Rule 121, the grant of a new trial allows for reception of newly-discovered evidence but
maintains evidence already presented or on record. And if there has been a finding that evidence is
strong and sufficient to bar bail, that too subsists unless, upon another motion and hearing, the
prosecution fails to prove that the evidence against the accused has remained strong.50 In the present
case, no new evidence had since been introduced, nor hearing conducted as would diminish the earlier
findings of the RTC and CA on the existence of strong evidenc against respondent.

In sum, the circumstances of the case are such, that for respondent, bail was not a matter of right but a
mere privilege subject to the discretion of the CA to be exercised in accordance with the stringent
requirements of Sec. 5, Rule 114. And Sec. 5 directs the denial or revocation of bail upon evidence of the
existence of any of the circumstances enumerated therein 51 such as those indicating probability of flight
if released on bail or undue risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

As it is, however, the CA, in its August 31, 2001 Resolution, admitted respondent to bail based, "xxx not
on the grounds stated in his Motion for Bail xxx," but "xxx primarily [on] the fact that [he] is already of
old age and is not in the best of health xxx," and notwithstanding its finding that "xxx as it is, the
evidence of guilt is strong xxx."52 The Resolution disregarded substantive and procedural requirements
on bail.

It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated in the Motion filed by
respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere claim of the latter's illness. Bail is not a sick pass
for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim
of illness is not a ground for bail.53 It may be that the trend now is for courts to permit bail for prisoners
who are seriously sick.54 There may also be an existing proposition for the "selective decarceration of
older prisoners" based on findings that recidivism rates decrease as age increases.55 But, in this
particular case, the CA made no specific finding that respondent suffers from an ailment of such gravity
that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. It
merely declared respondent not in the best of health even when the only evidence on record as to the
latter's state of health is an unverified medical certificate stating that, as of August 30, 2000,
respondent's condition required him to "xxx be confined in a more sterile area xxx."56 That medical
recommendation was even rebuffed by the CA itself when, in its November 13, 2000 Resolution, it held
that the physical condition of respondent does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while
confined in prison.57

Moreover, there is a finding of record on the potential risk of respondent committing a similar offense.
In its August 1, 1996 Order, the RTC noted that the circumstances of respondent indicate an undue risk
that he would commit a similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal.58 The RTC explained its
findings thus:

Dr. Aida Muncada, a highly competent Psychiatrist, testified that phedophilia is a state of sexual
disorder and sexual dysfunction. It is intense and recurrent. The possibility of the commission of
a similar offense for which the accused was convicted is great if the accused will be exposed to
"stress" and if an opportunity to commit it lurks.59

The foregoing finding was not traversed or overturned by the CA in its questioned Resolution. Such
finding, therefore, remains controlling. It warranted the outright denial of respondent's bail application.
The CA, therefore, erred when it granted respondent's Motion for Bail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The bail bond posted by respondent is CANCELLED. Let an ORDER OF ARREST ISSUE against the
person of the accused, Victor Keith Fitzgerald.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr.,, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.