The Pacific Review, Vol. 22 No.

2 May 2009: 159–177

Comprehensive security and resilience

in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s approach
to terrorism1

Ralf Emmers

Abstract This paper explores how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) has tackled the threat of terrorism since 9/11 and the Bali bombings. It
claims that ASEAN has applied its traditional approach to security, based on com-
prehensive security and the principle of resilience, when addressing this challenge.
The resilience concept underpins the nexus between national and regional security
and emphasizes domestic regime consolidation re-enforced by regional consulta-
tions. In their pursuit of resilience, member states have sought in various degrees
to address terrorism domestically through a mixture of security, law enforcement,
socio-economic, ideological, and educational policies. It is noted that Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Singapore have tackled terrorism more comprehensively than
Thailand and Malaysia. Reflecting the synergy between national and regional re-
silience, ASEAN has operated as an umbrella organization meant to complement
domestic and sub-regional efforts. It has been committed rhetorically, has produced
frameworks of action, as well as reached agreements with the great powers. The
paper is not overly optimistic, however, about ASEAN’s role in promoting regional
resilience against the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia.

Keywords ASEAN; Southeast Asia; terrorism; comprehensive security; national

and regional resilience.

Ralf Emmers is Associate Professor and Head of Graduate Studies at the S. Rajarat-
nam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU),
Singapore. His publications include Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia
(Routledge, forthcoming 2009), Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN
and the ARF (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) and Non-traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: The
Dynamics of Securitization (Marshall Cavendish, 2004). Dr Emmers is the co-editor of Security
and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime
(Routledge, 2009), Order and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Michael
Leifer (Routledge, 2006), and Understanding Non-traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in
Securitization (Ashgate, 2006).
Address: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University,
Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798. E-mail: isremmers@ntu.edu.sg

The Pacific Review

ISSN 0951-2748 print/ISSN 1470-1332 online

C 2009 Taylor & Francis

http://www.informaworld.com/journals
DOI: 10.1080/09512740902815300
160 The Pacific Review

Introduction
The threat of terrorism is an important issue that needs to be addressed in
the context of Southeast Asian security and the activities of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Militancy and violence related to
the activities of separatist and religious groups have long existed in a num-
ber of Southeast Asian states. The Philippines, Indonesia and other regional
countries have been victims to terror attacks on their territories in the past.
Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have, for ex-
ample, been fighting on the southern islands of the Philippines to create
an independent Islamic state. In Indonesia, Laskar Jihad has been send-
ing radical Muslim militants to Ambon, the provincial capital of Maluku,
where Christian and Muslim communities are in conflict. Although 9/11 led
to a diminished sense of security among many Southeast Asian nations, it
was the Bali bomb blasts on 12 October 2002, with the loss of 202 lives,
which demonstrated the shift from hard to soft targets and highlighted the
threat of radical Islamist terrorism in Southeast Asia. Since 2002, Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) has been identified by some analysts as a significant group-
ing with links to al-Qaeda (Gunaratna 2002, 2007; Ramakrishna 2004).
Founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir in the 1990s, JI is said
to be fighting for the creation of a Daulah Islamiah Nusantara, a pan-Asian
Islamic state that would incorporate Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and
Brunei, as well as parts of Cambodia, the southern Philippines and southern
Thailand (Ramakrishna 2004: 55). JI is considered to be responsible for
an attack against the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia in August 2000,
the 2002 Bali bombings and the bombing of the J. W. Marriott Hotel in
Jakarta in August 2003. More recent attacks have included the September
2004 bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta and the October 2005
attacks in Bali.
This paper explores how in recent years ASEAN has sought to tackle
the threat of terrorism. It focuses on the years that followed 9/11 and the
Bali bombings, as it was during this period that most national, sub-regional
and multilateral efforts were initiated. Its central argument is that the As-
sociation has applied its traditional approach to security, based on com-
prehensive security and the principle of resilience. ASEAN’s security co-
operation is said, therefore, not to have changed fundamentally. National
resilience essentially means that the respective national governments are
expected to promote domestic stability on a comprehensive basis so that
the resultant secure states can withstand internal and external stresses and
thus contribute to the attainment of regional resilience in Southeast Asia.
A bottom-up approach to security progressing from the national to the re-
gional level is implemented. Moreover, the pursuit of national and regional
resilience is perceived as mutually re-enforcing. Indeed, ASEAN seeks to
operate as an umbrella organization where regional consultation is meant
to enhance domestic regime consolidation.
 R. Emmers: Security and resilience in Southeast Asia 161

When applying the concept of resilience, however, the paper identifies

variations in the national responses to terrorism. It argues that Indonesia,
the Philippines and Singapore have tackled the challenge through a
more comprehensive approach in comparison to Thailand and Malaysia.
A complementary cooperative process that includes the participation of
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore has also taken
place. Consultations at the regional level have adopted a comprehensive
approach and have had some political significance. ASEAN has been com-
mitted rhetorically, has produced frameworks of action and cooperation,
as well as reached agreements with the great powers. That said, while
acknowledging the role of the Association, this paper concludes by not en-
gaging in overly optimistic analysis with regards to ASEAN’s role as a pro-
moter of regional resilience against terrorism in Southeast Asia.

Comprehensive security and the principle of resilience

ASEAN has adopted the concept of comprehensive security since its early
years. The concept had first been formulated in Japan in the 1970s and
focused on political, economic and social problems at different levels of
analysis. It thus offered an alternative to concepts of security based on
national defence against external military threats. Comprehensive security
was recognized by some Southeast Asian states in the 1970s, primarily
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and incorporated in their security doc-
trines. In contrast to the Japanese interpretation of the concept, however,
the approach adopted by the ASEAN states was inward-looking. When
discussing ASEAN’s comprehensive approach, Lizée and Peou explain
that it was ‘based on the proposition that national security does not only
reside in the absence of external military hostility but also in the presence
of socio-economic development within national boundaries’ (Lizée and
Peou 1993: 2).
The inward-looking approach to domestic regime security and regional
stability was introduced in ASEAN through the principles of national
and regional resilience. The notion of resilience entered the ASEAN
vocabulary as a translation of an Indonesian term, Ketahanan Nasional.
Influenced by Indonesia’s socio-economic vulnerability and struggle for
independence, the term was advanced by the new military leadership in
Jakarta when it came to power in 1965 and was officially endorsed as
a national security doctrine in 1973. At a seminar organized in Jakarta
in October 1974, Indonesian President Suharto stated that national re-
silience ‘covers the strengthening of all the component elements in the
development of a nation in its entirety, thus consisting of resilience in
the ideological, political, economic, social, cultural and military fields’
(Suharto 1975: 8). Rather than focusing on external military threats, the
principle of national resilience favoured a non-traditional and inward-
looking approach to security. It registered an ambition to underpin
162 The Pacific Review

domestic and regional stability through the use of economic and social
development. By improving the living conditions of local populations,
ASEAN leaders had expected to check subversive influences (Antolik
1990: 98). It was also anticipated that resilient states would lead to
regional resilience, which would constitute a foundation against internal
and external threats in the long run (Huxley 1993: 4). Suharto argued in
October 1974 that if ‘each member-country develops its own “national
resilience”, gradually a “regional resilience” may emerge, i.e. the ability of
member-countries to settle jointly their common problems and look after
their future and well-being together’ (Suharto 1975: 8). One should note,
therefore, the underlying premise of the synergy between national and
regional resilience.
The principle of resilience was officially introduced in the ASEAN
rhetoric at the first summit of ASEAN heads of state and government held
in Bali in 1976. At the opening of the summit, President Suharto declared:
‘Our concept of security is inward-looking, namely, to establish an orderly,
peaceful and stable condition within each territory, free from any sub-
versive elements and infiltration, wherever their origins may be’ (Suharto
1976). The Bali Summit of February 1976 led to two statements: the Dec-
laration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
(TAC) in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN Concord is particularly relevant for
this paper. It formally proposed the principle of resilience as a shared ap-
proach to domestic and regional security. It affirmed that the ‘stability of
each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution
to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to elimi-
nate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national
and ASEAN resilience’ (ASEAN 1976). The Concord formalized political
cooperation within the ASEAN framework and called for a ‘strengthen-
ing of political solidarity by promoting the harmonization of views, coor-
dinating positions and, where possible and desirable, taking common ac-
tions’ (ASEAN 1976). It also excluded military cooperation on an ASEAN
basis. In short, the Concord provided ASEAN with a shared approach
to security, emphasizing domestic regime consolidation and regional
consultation.
This ASEAN approach to security has been translated into policy pre-
scription. Individual member states are responsible for their own security
and the preservation of national sovereignty. The achievement of national
resilience is expected to be translated into reduced intra-regional tensions
and regional vulnerabilities, thus contributing to regional resilience. Simi-
larly, ASEAN enhances regional stability through its informal process of
interaction, enabling member countries to concentrate on their domestic
development. It is interesting to note, however, that the notion of resilience
is less commonly used today in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, ow-
ing to its association with the Suharto regime. Still, clearly in line with the
spirit of the resilience principle, the ASEAN Charter signed at the summit
 R. Emmers: Security and resilience in Southeast Asia 163

in Singapore in November 2007 reaffirmed that the Southeast Asian nations

‘share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social
stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national
development’ (ASEAN 2007a).
This paper thus argues that ASEAN’s approach to security has not
fundamentally changed. It asserts that this consensual approach to security
has been applied to ASEAN’s handling of terrorism since 9/11. This claim is
based on the assumption that terrorism in Southeast Asia remains primar-
ily a domestic source of insecurity that challenges national institutions and
political regimes. It is indeed regarded by the affected ASEAN countries
as a home-grown problem with complex and local roots. To operational-
ize the concept of resilience, the following section examines how national
governments have sought domestically to address the threat of terrorism
in comprehensive ways before considering the role of regional consulta-
tions in seeking to re-enforce and complement national and sub-regional
efforts. Beyond the strengthening of national capabilities and the use of di-
rect counter-terrorism measures, attention is also given to wider policies as
part of the resilience strategy. Reactive military and law enforcement re-
sponses against terrorist cells and their leaders as well as more long-term
policies dealing with the root causes of the threat are thus considered.

The pursuit of resilience against terrorism

National resilience
When examining national responses to terrorism in Southeast Asia,
it is important to focus on several key countries; namely, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia. Their national governments
continue to fear the threat of terrorism and the challenge of radicalism.
Simon points out that because ‘terrorists operate both within and among
states, effective counter-terror cooperation must begin with strong domes-
tic legislation and enforcement capacity’ (Simon 2006: 101, emphasis in
original). This section considers whether and how national governments
have attempted to address terrorism comprehensively, essentially through a
mixture of security, law and order, socio-economic, ideological, and educa-
tional policies. It argues that the affected ASEAN countries have in varying
degrees adopted such an approach. A significant variation in national strate-
gies is noted, however. While, by and large, Indonesia, the Philippines and
Singapore have tackled the challenge in comprehensive ways, Thailand and
Malaysia have relied more generally on direct counter-terrorism measures.
Indonesia’s President Megawati Sukarnoputri travelled to Washington
shortly after 9/11 and promised support in its anti-terrorism campaign. Yet
domestic politics, public sentiment and her own ambivalence prevented
her from taking effective steps. Moreover, the fall of the Suharto regime
in 1998 and the brief term of B. J. Habibie as president had not only
164 The Pacific Review

transformed Indonesia’s domestic political environment but also resulted

in the return of exiled radical Muslims demanding political space. Until
the Bali bombings of October 2002, the government had denied the
existence of a terrorist network within Indonesia. The Bali blasts changed
the country’s perception, however. Leo Suryadinata explains that the
‘Indonesian government, which had continued to deny that there was a
terrorist network in Indonesia, now had to openly admit its existence’
(Suryadinata 2004: 90). Following the bombings, the anti-terrorism law was
rapidly revised, leading to the arrest of suspected militants. Yet the light
sentencing of Abu Bakar Bashir, regarded internationally as the spiritual
leader of JI, was criticized in the region and beyond.
Indonesia’s first-ever direct presidential election in 2004 led to the victory
of former security minister and retired three-star general Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono. He has, since his election, adopted a series of measures aimed
at curbing domestic violence. A major development towards the end of sep-
aratist violence in Indonesia was the signing of a memorandum of under-
standing between the Indonesian government and the rebel group GAM
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or Free Aceh Movement) in August 2005 in
Helsinki. The signing of the peace agreement followed both the tsunami
disaster of 26 December 2004 and the tedious peace talks led by former
Finnish president Martti Ahtisari (Lanti 2006: 96). Adopting a comprehen-
sive approach, Jakarta relied on a so-called ‘Special Autonomy’ package
when negotiating with GAM, which offered the region significant auton-
omy to run its economy as well as special religious laws.
While the danger of separatism has diminished, the threat of terrorism
has remained significant. A new series of bombings in Bali on 1 October
2005 killed at least twenty-six people. In March 2007, anti-terrorism raids
led to the arrest and killing of suspected JI militants, the seizure of bombs
and weapons to be used in future attacks, as well as charts mapping the
structure of the extremist group (The Straits Times 2007a). The Indonesian
police also struck a major blow against JI in June 2007 with the arrest of
Abu Dujana, a leader of the terror group (The Economist 2007: 56). It is
worth noting that Indonesia’s effective police work in 2007 was led by its
Counter Terrorism Task Force Detachment 88, an elite police group under
the leadership of Surya Dharma and trained by US and Australian advisors.
Overall, Indonesia has arrested over 400 terror suspects and prosecuted
more than 200 militants since the 2002 Bali bombings (Van Zorge Report
on Indonesia 2007: 6).
Beyond its attempt at strengthening national capabilities and the use
of direct counter-terrorism measures against terrorist cells, Indonesia has
sought to introduce ideological and educational responses to the threat of
terrorism. Jakarta has attempted, for example, to implement a so-called ‘de-
radicalization’ programme. Initiated in early 2007, its purpose is to offer a
comprehensive and holistic approach that goes beyond police surveillance,
the arrest of suspected militants, and the implementation of new security
 R. Emmers: Security and resilience in Southeast Asia 165

laws. The programme is said to involve the deployment of Islamic schol-

ars and teachers from moderate Islamic schools to conflict zones, like Poso
and the Maluku, to help counter the spread of radical extremist ideolo-
gies in such areas.2 These efforts are tied to development aid programmes
and the provision of financial assistance to impoverished communities.
That said, while the ‘de-radicalization’ programme has been approved by
parliament through its Commission on Defence and Foreign Affairs, the
complete details of the initiative have not been made public. Little infor-
mation is available on its actual implementation on the ground, thereby
making it particularly difficult to assess the impact and usefulness of the
programme.
Another aspect of Indonesia’s counter-ideological response is a long-
term strategy aimed at winning over Islamic hardliners and convicted
terrorists. The reformed radicals have cooperated with the Indonesian po-
lice in providing information against JI militants, building up a network of
paid informants as well as persuading hardliners to reject the use of vio-
lence. Reformed radicals have included the Bali bombers Ali Imron and
Murabok (Van Zorge Report on Indonesia 2007). Once, a JI commander,
Nasir Abas, even testified against his own brother-in-law, Ali Ghufron,
better known as Mukhlas. The latter was later sentenced to death for the
Bali bombings and executed in November 2008. The policy of bringing
over senior JI members, in addition to moderate Muslim clerics, to as-
sist in counter-ideological efforts has been successful and rather unique to
Indonesia.3 As a result of the comprehensive response as well as ideological
rifts within the organization, Sidney Jones refers to JI as ‘a highly fractured
movement which for now is weakened in capacity but in a constant state of
flux, mutation and realignment’ (quoted in Mydans 2008).
Philippine president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was quick after 9/11
to describe Abu Sayyaf as an international terrorist movement and to
accept from Washington a US$100 million military aid package and direct
military assistance to eliminate its fighters on Basilan Island (Kristof 2002).
The Bush administration deployed, under the umbrella of the Balikatan
military exercises, around 1,000 US troops to the southern Philippines
in January 2002 for a period of six months to train, advise and provide
logistical assistance to the Philippine army combating Abu Sayyaf. The
Philippines is the only Southeast Asian nation that has so far welcomed
US soldiers on its territory since 9/11. This reliance on external assistance
was criticized by some ASEAN members, particularly Malaysia and
Indonesia. Then Malaysian foreign minister Syed Hamid Albar declared:
‘We have always thought that the best way of handling internal or regional
problems is between regional countries’ (Richardson 2002). In conjunction
with the principle of regional resilience, Indonesia has also traditionally
aspired to a regional order based on the exclusive managerial role of the
Southeast Asian nations. In addition to the deployment of foreign troops,
the Philippine authorities formed an anti-terrorism task force in March
166 The Pacific Review

2004 to coordinate national efforts. Through ‘Operation Ultimatum’,

the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were also able to sustain a
successful operational response against terrorist cells. It is worth noting
that the operation was supported by American forces that provided critical
intelligence. Nonetheless, the MILF, defined by Collier as ‘Southeast
Asia’s strongest secessionist group’ (Collier 2006: 30), remains a significant
guerrilla force. Moreover, Abu Sayyaf has continued to carry out bomb
attacks, including some in Manila in February 2005, and fuelled the level of
violence and lawlessness in the Sulu archipelago, as demonstrated in April
2007 by the beheading of seven captive workers (The Straits Times 2007b).
The Philippines has also relied on socio-economic policies and on de-
velopment programmes financed by the United Nations, the United States
and Australia, among others, to tackle the wider root causes of terrorism in
the region of Mindanao. The national government in Manila has explicitly
linked terrorism with poverty. President Arroyo declared in February 2005
that ‘the spread of terrorism which means the recruitment of the hatchet
men has a great deal to do with poverty’ and therefore vowed to ‘wage the
fight against terror alongside the war against poverty’ (Valisno 2005). As
part of this strategy, Arroyo has pledged to reduce the level of poverty in
the Philippines by the end of her term in office in 2010 as well as to energize
the economy and stamp out corruption.
The reliance on socio-economic initiatives to counter terrorism in the
Philippines is not new. The severe socio-economic circumstances facing
the Muslim communities of Mindanao have long been recognized as per-
petuating conflict. Established in 1969 by Nur Misuari, for nearly three
decades the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was the primary sub-
versive and separatist force in the southern Philippines. The MNLF even-
tually signed a peace accord with the Fidel Ramos government in 1996
that led to the creation of a semi-autonomous area, the Autonomous Re-
gion of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). A Special Zone of Peace and De-
velopment (SZOPAD), covering provinces and cities with a Moro Mus-
lim population, was also established. As part of the peace accord, in 1996
the Philippine government pledged US$16 million to the area for educa-
tion and health development projects as well as approximately US$100 mil-
lion annually to govern SZOPAD. In addition, the United Nations and the
World Bank committed a sum of US$500 million to enhance economic de-
velopment in Mindanao (Cragin and Chalk 2003: 17). The impact of such
projects has been questioned, however. Cragin and Chalk write, for exam-
ple, that most ‘social and economic development projects in the South-
ern Philippines have had a minimal effect on inhibiting terrorist activity
in Mindanao’ (Cragin and Chalk 2003: 21). Significantly, the MILF and
Abu Sayyaf had rejected the 1996 peace agreement. The former eventu-
ally signed a ceasefire with the Philippine government in Kuala Lumpur in
August 2001. Economic benefits have since been promised to the MILF as
part of the ongoing peace process.
 R. Emmers: Security and resilience in Southeast Asia 167

In Singapore, the arrest of JI militants in December 2001 and the discov-

ery of bomb plots fuelled the city-state’s own sense of vulnerability. The
Singaporean government fears the domestic consequences that a terrorist
act perpetrated by an extreme Muslim group could have on the country’s so-
cial fabric. In response to this threat it ‘has spared little effort in heightening
national security’ (Chong 2006: 270). Singapore has traditionally relied on
a holistic and comprehensive approach to national security. In 1984, it had
already endorsed the doctrine of Total Defence covering the military, eco-
nomic, civil, social and psychological dimensions of national resilience. In
response to 9/11 and the Bali bombings, the city-state promulgated the doc-
trine of ‘homeland security’ in line with its long-term adoption of compre-
hensive security. The doctrine included the setting up of the National Secu-
rity Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) in July 2004 to improve inter-agency
and inter-ministerial cooperation and to facilitate intelligence assessment
and policy formulation. It is overseen by the Permanent Secretary for Na-
tional Security and Intelligence Coordination (NSIC) and reports directly
to Singapore’s prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, via the Coordinating
Minister for National Security. Since 2001 the city-state has also detained
terrorist suspects under its Internal Security Act (ISA). The Internal Secu-
rity Department (ISD) arrested thirty-six people under the ISA between
December 2001 and August 2002, out of which thirty-one alleged JI mem-
bers were eventually detained (Ministry of Home Affairs 2003). In addition
to the adoption of domestic counter-terrorism measures, Singapore was the
first Asian country to sign the Declaration of Principles for the Container
Security Initiative (CSI) with the United States in September 2002 and to
join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) core group in March 2004.
Beyond the setting up of new security structures and the arrest of
JI militants under the ISA, the Singapore government has introduced
ideological, educational and financial responses to the threat of terrorism.
Significantly, most of these measures have been initiated directly through
the Muslim community (Hassan 2007). Following the 2001 arrests, mod-
erate Muslim scholars and teachers were encouraged by the government
to address the wider Muslim community and speak out against religious
extremism. In April 2003, the Religious Rehabilitation Group was es-
tablished to better understand JI’s ideology, produce counter-ideological
materials and conduct public education on religious affairs and radicalism
(Hassan 2007: 149). Such comprehensive efforts were supported by Muslim
civil society groups, which collectively condemned terrorism in a public
statement. Since 2001 Muslim organizations have also organized public
talks and disseminated written material in an attempt to counter religious
extremism. For example, in September 2003 the Singapore Association
of Muslim Scholars and Teachers (Pergas) organized a Convention of
Ulama (Muslim scholars). The proceedings of the conference were pub-
lished in a volume entitled Moderation in Islam in the Context of Muslim
Community in Singapore, which offered guidelines in the practice of Islam
168 The Pacific Review

(Hassan and Pereire 2006: 465). In February 2006 the government also
launched the Community Engagement Programme to enhance inter-faith
dialogue in Singapore. Finally, with the support of the ISD, Muslim
organizations have provided financial and psychological assistance to the
families of JI detainees. Hassan explains that ‘it was particularly important
to minimize the risk of the children being radicalized in the future by
the detention of their fathers or by economic marginalization’ (Hassan
2007: 149).
In contrast to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore, Thailand and
Malaysia have relied primarily on a direct security response to counter the
threat of terrorism. Since 2004, Thailand has had to face the escalation of
Islamic militancy in its three southern provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and
Yala. The area has traditionally been affected by the long-running insur-
rection led by the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO). The
conflict escalated in January 2004 after a raid on a Thai army camp in the
province of Narathiwat led to the imposition of martial law and the de-
ployment of additional troops. The former government of Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra, overthrown by a military coup in September 2006,
was criticized at that time for mishandling the crisis and exacerbating the
grievances of the local Muslim population (Pongsudhirak 2006: 293). The
wave of violence that erupted in southern Thailand during Thaksin’s years
in office led largely to a security-related response. The situation on the
ground has since been characterized by an intensification of the conflict and
the insurgency further employing terrorist tactics. Little attention has been
given to wider comprehensive policies. Some financial incentives have been
given out but then primarily to villages that have directly cooperated with
the security forces. The manner in which the situation in southern Thailand
ought to be handled continues to be a highly debated issue in Bangkok.
No united stand existed within the democratically elected government of
Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej that came to power in January 2008.
When Interior Minister Chalerm Yoonbamrung proposed autonomy for
the southern Thai provinces in February 2008, he was immediately criticized
by his own prime minister for articulating such a policy statement. Rather
than moving towards regional autonomy, some governmental officials have
instead argued that the army should be given full control in tackling the
violence.
In Malaysia, then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed took advantage of
9/11 to discredit the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) by portraying it as
a party of Islamic militants. As a result, he succeeded temporarily in ex-
tending the dominance of his own political platform, the United Malays
National Organization (UMNO) (Jayasankaran and Holland 2001). The
Malaysian government also brought into play the fight against terrorism as
a way of justifying the expulsion of thousands of Filipino workers from the
state of Sabah. The latter was said to be used by terrorist groups as a base
to prepare attacks in the Philippines. In terms of its immediate response
 R. Emmers: Security and resilience in Southeast Asia 169

to the challenge posed by terrorism, in recent years the Malaysian govern-

ment has concentrated primarily on the operational front. Welsh explains
that from 2001 onwards ‘Malaysia began to exercise a more vigorous en-
forcement role in addressing terrorist issues’ (Welsh 2004: 143). In 2003
the government passed a series of new counter-terrorism laws while the
Malaysian security services have generally relied on the country’s Internal
Security Act to arrest suspected militants. This started with the arrest of
suspected members of the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) in
December 2001 and April 2002. Yet, similar to Indonesia, Malaysia has
had to balance the demands of its Muslim majority while ensuring its en-
gagement in the international anti-terrorism campaign. It is said that the
Malaysian government has introduced some counter-ideological initiatives,
although these have not been publicized.4
Besides national efforts, collaboration has occurred at the bilateral and
trilateral level in Southeast Asia. Most attention here has been given to
the sharing of intelligence, judiciary cooperation, and capacity building.
Singapore and Malaysia exchanged information during and after their re-
spective arrests of suspected militants in December 2001. Both countries
have also repeatedly shared information with Indonesia. The Philippines
and Malaysia cooperated successfully on the deportation of Nur Misuari,
leader of the MNLF, from Malaysia in January 2002 to face trial in the
Philippines. Indonesia deported Mas Selamat Kastari to Singapore in 2006.
Considered to be the former head of JI’s Singapore cell, Kastari had been
arrested by the Indonesian police on the island of Bintan in January 2006
after fleeing the city-state in December 2001. The deportation was per-
ceived as a good example of information sharing among intelligence officers
and bilateral judiciary cooperation.5 In April 2007 Singapore and Indonesia
even signed an Extradition Treaty through which terrorist suspects could
be handed over from one country to the other. The treaty still needs to be
ratified by the Indonesian parliament, however. Despite these examples of
bilateral cooperation, Simon reminds us that Southeast Asian states ‘resist
sharing sensitive information on domestic matters that could embarrass or
challenge the political positions of ruling elites’ (Simon 2006: 101). At the
trilateral level, it is worth noting the Agreement on Information Exchange
and Establishment of Communication Procedures signed by the foreign
ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines in Malaysia in May
2002. Cambodia and Thailand adhered to the Agreement at the ASEAN
Summit in Phnom Penh in August 2002. This accord focuses on intelligence
sharing, better collaboration and coordination among security forces, and
the holding of joint police operations.

Nexus between national and regional resilience

As part of the underlying premise of synergy between national and regional
resilience, multilateral consultations have sought to build on and re-enforce
170 The Pacific Review

the domestic and sub-regional efforts against terrorism undertaken by the

ASEAN member states. The Association relies, therefore, on its traditional
bottom-up approach to security, as illustrated by its resilience principle.
National resilience is meant to be achieved first before it can be trans-
lated into wider regional resilience. In light of this consensual approach to
security, ASEAN has been an instrument to complement the strategies of
its respective members in a comprehensive way by developing structures of
joint cooperation and capacity building as well as reaching out to the dia-
logue partners, primarily the United States and China. Most attention has
thus been given to sending a collective signal to the region and the wider in-
ternational community condemning terrorism but also to addressing coop-
eratively the operational challenge that this threat poses to Southeast Asia
and defining a common position on the issue towards the external powers.
In recent years the ASEAN states have formulated a common rhetorical
position and indicated their willingness to work together to combat terror-
ism. Joint declarations have included the Declaration on Joint Action to
Counter Terrorism issued in November 2001 (ASEAN 2001) and a sec-
ond Declaration on Terrorism adopted at the ASEAN Summit in Phnom
Penh in early November 2002 (ASEAN 2002). Other declarations have
been signed by the ASEAN countries in connection with the subsequent
terror attacks in Bali and Jakarta (ASEAN 2005; Lengsavad 2004). With
only limited relevance in terms of counter-terrorism, such declarations still
have some symbolic and political value (Ramakrishna 2005). In addition to
their intra-mural significance, they send signals to the international commu-
nity and act as a regional voice on the issue of terrorism.
Beyond the formulation of a common stand, the ASEAN states have
also attempted to address the operational challenge posed by the threat
of terrorism. Set up in December 1997 (ASEAN 1997), the ASEAN Min-
isterial Meeting on Trans-national Crime (AMMTC) brings together the
respective home ministers and constitutes the core of ASEAN’s counter-
terrorism collaboration. The AMMTC held a Special Meeting on Terrorism
in May 2002. Special areas for more intensive regional cooperation were
highlighted, including intelligence, extradition, law enforcement, airport
security, bomb detection, the formation of national anti-terrorism units,
and curbing arms smuggling and drug cartels (AMMTC 2002). ASEAN
also stated the need to endorse measures against money laundering and
the financing of terrorism. The necessity of adopting a joint approach to
counter-terrorism was repeated at the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh
in November 2002. However, the more recent AMMTC meetings have
been disappointing, failing to contribute to the fight against terrorism. Their
joint communiqués readopted well-known rhetorical stands and repeated
formerly made commitments without introducing new cooperative mea-
sures (AMMTC 2004a, 2005). As a result it seems that ASEAN ‘is unable
to achieve a coordinated response among its entire membership’ (Collins
2003: 207).
 R. Emmers: Security and resilience in Southeast Asia 171

Furthermore, attention has been given to intelligence sharing both within

and outside an ASEAN framework. ASEAN heads of state and govern-
ment agreed in November 2001 to exchange information, to strengthen
cooperation between their respective security forces, and to increase
consultation and coordination in fighting terrorism. The military intelli-
gence directors of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Brunei
met in Kuala Lumpur in late January 2002 to informally discuss the shar-
ing of intelligence and the danger of regional terrorism posed by militant
Islamic groups (Lau 2002; Richardson 2002). They agreed to hold a series of
informal meetings on those questions and to address security threats. This
first gathering of security officials represented a new form of multilateral
cooperation in Southeast Asia. In addition, the ASEAN foreign ministers
met in Thailand in February 2002 for a two-day retreat to intensify regional
collaboration against terrorism. Finally, the 22nd Meeting of the ASEAN
Chiefs of National Police (ASEANOPOL), held in Phnom Penh in May
2002, focused on finding new ways to address terrorism and other forms
of transnational crime. Consecutive meetings, held in Chiang Mai, Bali
and Singapore in August 2004, May 2005 and June 2007, respectively, fo-
cused on the same objective. Nonetheless, Huxley points out that counter-
terrorism cooperation in Southeast Asia has ‘remained patchy, and based
essentially on bilateral rather than region-wide intelligence links’ (Huxley
2005: 12).
The ASEAN Security Community (ASC) is a cooperative project linked
partly to the challenge posed by terrorism. Indonesia suggested at the 36th
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), in Phnom Penh in June 2003, the es-
tablishment of an ASC in Southeast Asia by 2020, following a Singaporean
proposal to establish an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The ASC
was later endorsed at the ASEAN Summit in Bali in October 2003. The
establishment of an ASEAN Community was eventually brought forward
to 2015 at the ASEAN Summit in Cebu in January 2007 (ASEAN 2007b).
The ASC stresses the willingness of the ASEAN members to ‘rely exclu-
sively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences’
(ASEAN 2003). Huxley notes that it reflects, therefore, the Association’s
‘established collective emphases on comprehensive security and the prin-
ciple of non-interference’ (Huxley 2005: 18). The project is an attempt by
ASEAN countries to respond more effectively to a series of non-traditional
security threats facing Southeast Asia today, ranging from terrorism, sea
piracy, undocumented migration and pandemics to environmental degrada-
tion. The ASC refers, for instance, to the formulation of an ASEAN Con-
vention on counter-terrorism. Eventually adopted by the ASEAN leaders
in January 2007, the document encourages the members to become par-
ties to the various international counter-terrorism conventions and pro-
tocols and refers to a series of obligations (ASEAN 2007c), but it still
needs to be ratified by some of the respective national parliaments. Finally,
the ASC initiative indicated Indonesia’s re-engagement with ASEAN after
172 The Pacific Review

having been absorbed with domestic difficulties since 1998. Simon explains
that the ‘proposal is designed to restore Jakarta to ASEAN leadership by
acknowledging the importance of fighting terrorism trans-nationally to the
association’s future’ (Simon 2006: 105).
It is too early to assess the institutional strength of the ASC or its possible
impact on the threat of terrorism. The operationalization of the ASC is still
being negotiated by the ASEAN members, and the community is not ex-
pected to be established before 2020. Yet the regional response to seventy
proposals put forward by Indonesia to forge an ASC may be an indication
of its future institutional limitations and restraints. The proposed plan of
action included a call for the establishment of an ASEAN peacekeeping
force, the setting up of an anti-terrorism centre, as well as the promotion of
democracy and human rights. Proposals related to domestic political gover-
nance were flatly rejected by Vietnam, Myanmar and other members, which
undermined the so-called Indonesian leadership in ASEAN (Weatherbee
2005: 163). A watered-down version of the ASC Plan of Action was even-
tually agreed to by the 2004 AMM and later adopted at the ASEAN Sum-
mit in Vientiane in November 2004 (ASEAN 2004). The plan no longer
included the idea of introducing a more flexible application of the non-
interference principle and other controversial points.
Finally, ASEAN has succeeded in defining a common position towards
the external powers on the issue of terrorism. On 1 August 2002 the ten
ASEAN members and the United States signed a Joint Declaration for
Cooperation to Combat Terrorism. The agreement was a political state-
ment that confirmed ASEAN’s commitment to the war against terrorism.
It stipulated ‘the importance of having a framework for cooperation to pre-
vent, disrupt and combat international terrorism through the exchange and
flow of information, intelligence and capacity building’ (ASEAN–US 2002).
The signatories were asked to improve intelligence sharing and collabora-
tion among their law enforcement agencies, provide assistance on border
surveillance, immigration and financial issues, and comply with UN reso-
lutions on terrorism. Stubbs argues that the agreement provided Southeast
Asian states with ‘the structure for intelligence sharing with the Americans’
(Stubbs 2004: 5). Yet the declaration was a non-binding agreement compa-
rable to the anti-terrorism accord reached by Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines in May 2002. Concern over US interference in domestic affairs
was also translated into the agreement. The latter did not refer to military
operations or the deployment of American troops in Southeast Asia. Prior
to its adoption, Vietnam and Indonesia had rejected any clause that might
be regarded as allowing the involvement of US forces in the region and thus
undermining the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention in
the affairs of other states.
Besides the United States, ASEAN has sought collaboration with China
on a wider spectrum of challenges. At the Sixth ASEAN–China Sum-
mit in November 2002 the Association signed a joint declaration with
 R. Emmers: Security and resilience in Southeast Asia 173

China on non-traditional security issues (ASEAN–China 2002) and a first

Informal AMMTC Plus China Consultation meeting was organized in
Hanoi in November 2005 to promote cooperation against terrorism and
transnational crime (ASEAN–China 2005). At the East Asian level, a joint
ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Meeting on Trans-national Crime was held in
Bangkok in January 2004. The participants agreed that cooperation should
be based on the following principles: ‘consensus through consultation on
the basis of equality, mutual respect for sovereignty, gradual process, and
flexibility and effectiveness in our cooperation’ (AMMTC 2004b). Finally,
ASEAN countries have sought to build ties with the European Union.
A Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism was signed at
the Fourteenth ASEAN–EU Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in January
2003, in which all parties reaffirmed their commitment to fight terrorism
(ASEAN–EU 2003).

Conclusion
ASEAN’s security model has been defined by an inward-looking approach
to security and regional stability. Rather than concentrating on external mil-
itary threats, ASEAN members have favoured a comprehensive security
agenda. Members have enhanced their security through domestic socio-
economic development and an informal process of regional interaction.
This has led to reduced intra-regional tensions and regional vulnerabili-
ties. It has been argued that ASEAN’s bottom-up approach to security
has been applied to the threat of terrorism since 9/11. Terrorism remains
primarily a domestic source of instability for Southeast Asian states. In
their pursuit of national resilience, governments have relied to various de-
grees on a mixture of security, law enforcement, socio-economic, ideolog-
ical, and educational policies. Comparatively, Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Singapore have tackled terrorism more comprehensively than Thai-
land and Malaysia. As expected, national and bilateral efforts have mat-
tered most when seeking to counter the threat of terrorism. In light of
these circumstances, what role has ASEAN played as a promoter of re-
gional resilience? The Association has acted in Southeast Asia and be-
yond primarily as a platform for collaboration and a regional voice on
the issue of terrorism. Seeking to complement and re-enforce national ef-
forts, regional consultations have focused on adopting a common rhetori-
cal stand, setting up frameworks of cooperation and action, and engaging
dialogue partners. In their cooperative response, the ASEAN states have
collectively condemned terrorism, indicated their willingness to work to-
gether, and defined a common position vis-à-vis the great powers on this
issue.
Nonetheless, it is difficult at this stage to be overly optimistic with re-
gards to ASEAN’s ability to promote regional resilience against terrorism.
The Association has served primarily to complement national and bilateral
174 The Pacific Review

efforts rather than contributing effectively as a regional organization to the

attainment of regional resilience. When assessing ASEAN’s response to
this problem, it is important to apply the right kind of criteria. The As-
sociation offers the region some institutional capacity to cooperate. The co-
operative process has been uneven, however, and it has lacked mechanisms
for implementation and sanctions in the event of non-compliance. More-
over, the lack of a strong coordinated response against terrorism across
Southeast Asia also derives from the fact that the individual members ex-
perience different levels of threat. Some countries are not directly affected
by terrorism and are therefore less inclined to devote resources and make
it a national, and hence a regional, priority. The Association is therefore
simply not equipped to offer a sustained response to terrorism. As a re-
sult, strengthening its own operational capacities through the realization of
the ASEAN Security Community should be the Association’s primary chal-
lenge in the years to come.
Besides its own structural and institutional limitations, ASEAN’s ap-
proach to terrorism has been restricted by a series of domestic and regional
constraints. In most cases the national base has remained fragile. The ability
of various Southeast Asian countries to deal comprehensively with terror-
ism has been restricted by insufficient national capabilities as well as wider
domestic circumstances. Counter-terrorism measures have been affected
by porous borders and weak capacity in terms of police and intelligence
agencies. Corruption and poorly financed law enforcement agencies have
further undermined attempts to combat terrorism domestically. Reforms in
the security sector, particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines, are there-
fore necessary to address the terrorism threat more effectively. Beyond the
issue of national capabilities, however, the links between domestic political
factors, communal instability, and civil conflicts need to be remembered.
Most Southeast Asian countries have remained states that suffer from deep
socio-economic problems and inequalities as well as, in some cases, civil
conflicts. Moreover, intra-ASEAN relations are still influenced by feelings
of suspicion and competition. Such an environment limits collaboration and
intelligence sharing, which are key elements in the fight against terrorism.
These difficulties derive from domestic and regional circumstances that are
largely external to the structures and modalities of the Association. They
still help us understand, however, the problems facing ASEAN in its efforts
to promote regional resilience against the threat of terrorism in Southeast
Asia.

Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Jürgen Rüland, Anja Jetschke and the anony-
mous referees for their valuable comments as well as Katherine Quah and
Caleb Liu for their editorial assistance.
 R. Emmers: Security and resilience in Southeast Asia 175

Notes
1 This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the ‘40 Years of ASEAN:
Performance, Lessons and Perspectives’ conference, organized jointly by the
BMW Foundation Herbert Quandt, Munich, Germany and the Department of
Political Science of the University of Freiburg, 10–11 May 2007.
2 Interview of Evan Abelard Laksmana conducted at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS), Singapore on 18 February 2008. The interviewee is
an analyst at the RSIS Indonesia Program.
3 Interview of Jolene Jerard conducted at RSIS, Singapore on 25 February 2008.
The interviewee is a research analyst, International Centre for Political Violence
and Terrorism Research, RSIS.
4 Interview of Jolene Jerard conducted on 25 February 2008.
5 Mas Selemat Kastari later escaped from the Whitley Road Detention Centre in
Singapore on 27 February 2008.

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