Defence Diplomacy in South Asia

S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Report Part Title: DEFENCE DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: TRENDS, PROSPECTS AND
CHALLENGES
Report Part Author(s): Evan A. Laksmana
Report Title: FROM ‘BOOTS’ TO ‘BROGUES’

Report Subtitle: THE RISE OF DEFENCE DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Report Editor(s): Bhubhindar Singh, See Seng Tan
Published by: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (2011)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05908.10
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7
Defence Diplomacy
in Southeast Asia
Trends, Prospects and Challenges
Evan A. Laksmana
T
his chapter seeks to describe and assess key trends in defence
diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Specifically, it seeks to highlight
key issues and trends in multilateral defence diplomacy under the
auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since 1994. In addition, to complement
the discussion, this chapter will also use the case of Indonesia’s bilateral
defence diplomacy to highlight how bilateral defence relations among
and between Southeast Asian states remain a crucial part of regional
security architecture. By highlighting key trends in multilateral and
bilateral defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia (at least from Jakarta’s
point of view), this chapter seeks to achieve two main goals: first, to
make sense of the flurry of defence and security-related informal and
formal meetings in Southeast Asia in recent years; and second, to infer
key policy lessons for future regional architecture building in the region.
On the multilateral front, between 2000 and 2009, ASEAN and
the ARF held, on average, 15 formal and informal meetings annually
involving defence and security officials. This is in addition to the vari-
ous multilateral security cooperation activities organised by the United
States, Japan, China, or those under the “ASEAN-Plus 1” umbrella. Most
recently, the advent of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)
and ADMM-Plus 8 has been seen as a crucial milestone of regional
security building. Meanwhile, bilaterally, defence relations among South-
east Asian states have also gradually improved as the number of office
exchanges, joint exercises and patrols and others has increased.
These developments are significant when we consider the fact that
for the first four decades of ASEAN’s existence, security issues are still
considered “off limits” among regional countries and the prospect of
71
RSIS Monograph No. 21
From ‘Boots’ to ‘Brogues’: The Rise of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia
open armed conflict was a possibility. Also, officials often explain away
this lack of security and defence meetings by arguing that ASEAN is
neither a military alliance nor a security organisation. A related puzzle
deals with momentum: why has defence diplomacy risen in the past
decade, and not before? This is puzzling because in the past decade,
fault lines of major conflict in Southeast Asia as a region have been less
visible than previous periods. Indeed, the region has been more stable
and peaceful than during the Cold War when ideological rivalries and
regional tensions run high. If anything, therefore, defence diplomacy as
a confidence building measure should have been more active during the
Cold War when the prospect of inter-state conflict and war was near and
as regional armaments grew rapidly between the 1960s and 1980s.
Furthermore, as we shall see below, defence diplomacy within the
Southeast Asian context has many layers—ranging from formal ones,
such as the ADMM, to informal ones, such as the ASEAN Chief of
Defence Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM) and Shangri-La Dialogue—
and is initiated by both ASEAN as well as extra-regional powers such
as China, Japan and the United States. This chapter, however, will only
focus on ASEAN-centred defence diplomacy to avoid analytical confu-
sion—extra-regional initiated defence cooperation are not only difficult
to measure, but they do not always reflect the goals and interest of
Southeast Asian states, nor have they changed the basic regional security
architecture. Furthermore, given the early stages of research regarding
the subject, this chapter takes a narrow view of dividing defence diplo-
macy in Southeast Asia into two categories: (i) bilateral (among two
Southeast Asian states), and (ii) multilateral defence diplomacy (through
the ARF and ASEAN-related events).1
This chapter argues that defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia cannot
be assessed entirely in the multilateral arena alone. Instead, multilateral
defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia has to be seen in conjunction with
developments in the bilateral defence relations between key Southeast
Asian states. Furthermore, bilateral and multilateral defence diplomacy
in Southeast Asia—at least seen from Jakarta—are two sides of the same
coin serving two different goals. Bilateral defence diplomacy appears
1 There are other defence diplomacy activities in Southeast Asia outside the two—
such as the trilateral joint security cooperation between Singapore, Malaysia and
Indonesia over the Malacca Strait.
72
7 • Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia
focused on key states—major powers or neighbours—that have been

the traditional concerns of the respective countries, while multilateral
defence diplomacy focuses more on “soft balancing” the major powers,
while “enmeshing” them into regional norms and order.
In terms of security issues meanwhile, as we shall see below, this
chapter argues that the increasing importance of non-traditional security
issues, such as terrorism, illegal fishing and climate change, are com-
plicating, and in some cases exacerbating, traditional regional strategic
challenges such as border disputes. This is also reflected in the dominant
discourse of non-traditional security in ASEAN-related documents. This
coincides with the critical “shock therapy” of the 1997 Asian financial
crisis that drove the point home for Southeast Asian states: the time has
come to start tackling security issues more seriously. The 2003 ASEAN
Community project (Political Security, Economic and Socio-Cultural)
provided further impetus for this growing awareness in the region.
The Rise of Southeast Asian Defence Diplomacy:

The View from Jakarta
Since the 1990s, militaries and their defence ministries have taken on a
growing range of peacetime cooperative tasks. Defence diplomacy—the
peacetime cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure as
a tool of foreign and security policy—is among the primary activities in
this regard.2 Defence diplomacy is also a process that may involve state
officials (politicians, security personnel and intelligence services) as well
as non-governmental organisations, think tanks and civil society. This
view of defence diplomacy is broader than “military diplomacy” that
focuses only on “the use of the military to advance diplomacy and its
engagement in various security arrangements”.3 As such, defence diplo-
macy, when aimed at improving relations through informal and formal
channels using government and non-government resources, provides
2 Cottey, A., & Forster, A. Reshaping defence diplomacy: New roles for military
cooperation and assistance. Adelphi Paper No. 365, London: Routledge for IISS,
2004, p. 6.
3 Military diplomacy here is defined by Sachar, B. S. “Military diplomacy through
arms transfers: A case study of China.” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28 No. 2 (2004),
p. 290.
73
a low-cost, low-risk “continuation of dialogue by other means”.4 There

are a number of defence diplomacy activities that a government could
undertake in this regard (see Table 1).
Table 1
Defence diplomacy activities
Bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military and civilian defence
officials
Appointment of defence attachés to foreign countries
Bilateral defence cooperation agreements
Training of foreign military and civilian defence personnel
Provision of expertise and advice on the democratic control of armed forces, defence
management, and military technical areas
Contacts and exchanges between military personnel and units, and ship visits
Placement of military or civilian personnel in partner countries’ defence ministries
or militaries
Deployment of training teams
Provision of military equipment and other material aid
Bilateral or multilateral military exercises for training purposes
Source: Cottey, A., & Forster, A. Reshaping defence diplomacy: New roles for military
cooperation and assistance. Adelphi Paper No. 365, London: Routledge for IISS, 2004.
These numerous defence diplomacy activities have been dubbed as

“the new defence diplomacy” that not only strengthens cooperation, but
also allow major powers such as China, the United States and the United
Kingdom to “shape and influence” domestic developments of lesser
powers (e.g. support for democracy, human rights) and to help them
handle their own security challenges.5 Specifically, this “new defence
diplomacy” comes with three main roles: (i) strategic engagement as a
means of reducing the likelihood of conflict between former and poten-
tial enemies, (ii) promoting democratic civil-military relations, and (iii)
supporting other states in developing peacekeeping capabilities.
For the purposes of our discussion however, the last two roles are less
4 See Mulloy, G. “Japan’s defence diplomacy and ‘Cold Peace’ in Asia.” Asia Journal
of Global Studies, Vol. 1 No. 1 (2007), p. 3.
5 Mulloy, “Japan’s defence diplomacy”, p. 8; see also Hills, A. “Defence diplomacy
and security sector reform.” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 21 No. 1 (2000),
pp. 46–67.
74
relevant. This is especially true when we consider that bilateral and multi-
lateral defence diplomacy among “equally weak” regional countries such as
those in Southeast Asia having a different origin, rationale and trajectory.
In this regard, the first role of defence diplomacy as an instrument of con-
flict prevention is more germane to our discussion. Defence diplomacy as a
conflict prevention mechanism works in a number of ways (see Table 2).
Table 2
Defence diplomacy as conflict prevention
Military cooperation can act as a symbol of willingness to pursue broader
cooperation, mutual trust and commitment to work to overcome or manage
differences
Military cooperation can be a means of introducing transparency into defence
relations, especially with regards to states’ intentions and capabilities
Defence diplomacy can be a means of building or reinforcing perceptions of
common interests
Military cooperation might also change over time the mindsets of partner states’
militaries
Military cooperation can support specific, concrete defence reforms in the
partnering state
Defence assistance may be used as an incentive to encourage cooperation in other
areas
Source: Cottey, A., & Forster, A. Reshaping defence diplomacy: New roles for military
cooperation and assistance. Adelphi Paper No. 365, London: Routledge for IISS, 2004.
Despite these potentials of defence diplomacy, scholars have gen-

erally hesitated to give enough credit to any Southeast Asian security
initiatives. Not only because the region itself is very diverse and the role
of ASEAN as the sole regional institution seems rather limited, but also
because there is no major power in the region and that extra-regional
powers such as China, the United States, Japan, India and others have
all shaped the region more than its own members. This is perhaps why
most scholars previously seem to consider Southeast Asian security poli-
cies as more reactive than proactive; responding to major power policies
more than initiating actions.6 Recently, however, Goh argued that key
6 Simon, S. W. “Southeast Asia’s defence needs: Change or continuity?” In A. J.

Tellis & M. Wills (Eds.), Strategic Asia 2005–6: Military modernization in an era
of uncertainty. Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005, p. 271.
75
Southeast Asian states do have strategic preferences and have actively

sought to influence the shaping of a new regional order.7 In this respect,
untangling the web of defence and security cooperation in Southeast Asia
becomes an analytical imperative before we can argue whether regional
defence diplomacy is significant and why we should explain it.
Overall, there are four major patterns of security cooperation in
Southeast Asia.8 The first pattern comprises multilateral defence coop-
eration between external powers and individual Southeast Asian states
designed to address specific security concerns. The second pattern
involves American-led defence and security cooperation with treaty
allies, strategic partners and others in the region. The third pattern cen-
tres on Chinese-led multilateral efforts to bind ASEAN to a structure
of East Asian regional security cooperation with a major focus on non-
traditional security issues. The final pattern involves ASEAN-centred
multilateral efforts to promote security cooperation both among its
members and dialogue partners and among ARF members. For the
purposes of this chapter, however, we will only focus on bilateral defence
diplomacy between two Southeast Asian states—specifically between
Indonesia and another country—and multilateral defence diplomacy
under ASEAN and the ARF.
Multilateral Defence Diplomacy

As recent as five years ago, one prominent scholar of Southeast Asian
security affairs proclaimed that “in fact, there are no multilateral defence
arrangements among Southeast Asian states”.9 While this may be true
when one defines “multilateral defence arrangements” by NATO-like
standards—e.g. joint operational command, joint institutional links—
the reality is more complex. First, ASEAN was never conceived as a
multilateral defence venue or as a replacement of traditional bilateral
security arrangements. Second, while defence-related topics have not
been discussed until recently, multilateral cooperation in transnational
and non-traditional security issues has been progressing.
7 Goh, E. “Great powers and hierarchical order in Southeast Asia.” International

Security, Vol. 32 No. 3 (Winter 2007/8), p. 119.
8 See Thayer, C. A. Southeast Asia: Patterns of security cooperation. Canberra:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2010.
9 Simon, “Southeast Asia’s defence needs”, p. 299.
76
Since its formation, ASEAN has established a dense network of

structures at the ministerial-level downward to deal with transnational
issues, including the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational
Crime (AMMTC), the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANAPOL),
the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drugs Matters and the ASEAN Finance
Ministers Meeting.10 ASEANAPOL was the longest-standing (established
in 1981) multilateralism security mechanism dealing with transnational
threats. Additionally, the ASEAN Ministers of Home Affairs/Interior
first met as a body in December 1997 and adopted the ASEAN Declara-
tion on Transnational Crime. But it was not until the 2006 ADMM that
defence ministers began to handle those threats as well.
More importantly, the creation of the ARF in 1994 started a new
“web of multilateral security interactions” between ASEAN and its
partners. The ARF itself to date is best conceptualised as a mechanism
for consultation between Southeast Asian states, their neighbours and
other significant states in order to identify and address common security
interests. In terms of regional security, three significant results are note-
worthy here.11 First, the ARF is predicated on the norms of behaviour
stemming from the “ASEAN Way”. Consequently, the ARF has become an
important vehicle in the spread of regional norms and identity sharing.
Second, the ARF is the only regional institution in the world that includes
the United States, Europe, China and others. This has contributed to the
further consolidation of Southeast Asian states and has provided ASEAN
and its neighbours with diplomatic tools to manage change peacefully.
Third, while the ARF is ASEAN-driven, other member states have been
allowed to make significant contributions.
Put it differently, the ARF is ASEAN’s way of pushing strategic
engagement and confidence building measures (CBMs) within Southeast
Asia and with its partners. To push its CBM agenda forward, the ARF has
had crowded programmes of inter-sessional meetings on CBMs, Search
and Rescue Co-ordination, Peacekeeping Operations, and Disaster Relief.
These have developed into practical and co-operative measures, which
have included, among others: (i) annual defence policy statements and
the increased publication of Defence White Papers that serve to reinforce
10 Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of security cooperation, p. 22.

11 Bellamy, A. J. “Security.” In M. Beeson (Ed.), Contemporary Southeast Asia.
Second Edition, London: Palgrave Macmmillan, 2009.
77
transparency and openness in a region where such abstractions are not

the general culture or tradition; (ii) military exchanges, including staff
college training; and (iii) the growing involvement and participation
of defence officials in the work and activities of the ARF.12 Through its
annual ministerial meetings, the Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs), inter-
sessional activities, and the numerous Track 1 and Track 2 meetings, the
ARF has created a series of networks that form “social capital”, a stock of
trust, and ease and comfort.
Indeed, as time passes, the ARF has dominated the multilateral
security activities of ASEAN member states more than the group’s own
activities. This includes the ARF ministerial meeting, ARF Senior Offi-
cials’ Meeting (ARF SOM), ARF Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence
Building Measures (ARF-ISG-CBMs), ARF Security Policy Conference
(ASPC), and the ARF Defence Officials’ Dialogue (ARF DOD). Out of 177
events since 1994 until 2009, ARF-related events consist of the majority
(72 per cent) of Southeast Asia’s multilateral defence diplomatic events
(see Figure 1).
Figure 1
Southeast Asia’s multilateral defence diplomacy venues
7.50%
ARF-related events
20.50%
ASEAN-related events
72% Others
Source: Indonesian Foreign Ministry, ASEAN Secretariat.
Among the most significant ARF-related defence diplomacy is the

defence officials’ dialogues that has regularly been held after the endorse-
12 See Caballero-Anthony, M. “Partnership for peace in Asia: ASEAN, the ARF, and
the United Nations.” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24 No. 3 (2002), p. 536.
78
ment of a concept paper on ARF Defence Dialogue in 2002.13 This gather-

ing appears to provide an opportunity for defence officials to exchange
views on regional security and defence outlook and to discuss issues of
mutual concern. It is also worth mentioning that the Beijing-initiated
ARF Security Policy Conference (held simultaneously as the ARF SOM),
involving senior defence and security officials, also has significant impli-
cations for regional security building. The concern is of course that the
idea and support came from Beijing.
That said, the ARF appears just like ASEAN before it seems to have
been making more headway with non-traditional security issues. In 2002,
the ARF established an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism
(CT) and Transnational Crime, which developed a multi-faceted and far-
reaching work plan that spawned numerous practical CT proposals.14 In
2005, following the 2004 Tsunami, the ARF reinstated the Inter-Sessional
Meeting on Disaster Relief. The ARF also approved the ARF Statement
on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, adopted the ARF
General Guidelines on Disaster Relief Cooperation and is currently draft-
ing the ARF Disaster Relief Standard Operating Procedures. In 2009, the
ARF approved two new working groups—the Inter-Sessional Meeting on
Maritime Security, and the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament.15
Meanwhile, the second largest multilateral venue for Southeast Asian
defence diplomacy is ASEAN-related events. On average, between 2000
and 2009, ASEAN, formally and informally, organised 15 meetings a year
to address traditional and non-traditional security challenges (see Figure
2).16 This includes the ADMM and ACDFIM. Indonesian defence officials
have also been involved in the annual ASEAN Special Senior Officials’
Meeting (ASEAN Special SOM), ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral
13 Capie, D., & Taylor, B. “The Shangri-La Dialogue and the institutionalization of
defence diplomacy in Asia.” The Pacific Review, Vol. 23 No. 3 (2010), p. 372.
15 See Indonesian Foreign Ministry Website, “2nd ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on
Maritime Security held in Auckland”, accessed on 20 September 2010 at www.
deplu.go.id/Pages/Embassies.aspx?IDP=1497&l=en.
16 It should be noted, however, that given the spotty recordings of some of the
informal meetings, at least in the early to mid-2000s, the dataset is yet to be fully
completed. Figures cited in this chapter represent around 95 per cent of all the
events noted by the media or ASEAN countries.
79
Meeting, ASEAN Navy Interaction, ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Confer-

ence, ASEAN Military Intelligence Meeting, and ASEAN Armies Rifles
Meet.17
Figure 2
Southeast Asian multilateral defence diplomacy
25 21
20
18 19
20 16 16
14
15
10
8 8 8
10
6 6
5
5
1 1
0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: Indonesian Foreign Ministry, ASEAN Secretariat.
This flurry of regional multilateral security seems to have been

spawned by the 1996 Asian financial crisis that threw Southeast Asia’s
chemistry out of balance.18 As such, Southeast Asian countries have
appeared to be more willing to engage in formal and informal multilateral
meetings to discuss the region’s current and future strategic challenges,
from disaster relief to terrorism. Indeed, the first security dialogue at
the ASEAN-level began in 1996 at the annual ASEAN Special SOM,
which brought together ASEAN defence officials and their foreign affairs
counterparts.19 In 2000, the ASEAN Chiefs of Army began meeting infor-
mally, followed by other service chiefs and heads of intelligence. Senior
intelligence officials from Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore,
Thailand and Indonesia met multilaterally for the first time in May 2000
in Bangkok to exchange information on regional security and regularise
the meetings as an annual event.20
17 The Rifles Meet was apparently the earliest ASEAN-wide defence related
activities (established in 1991).
18 Vatikiotis, M. “Indonesia’s revived role in world affairs.” New Straits Times, 2
November 2004.
20 Karniol, R. “Meeting sets up wider exchange of intelligence.” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 24 May 2000.
80
After the goal of creating an ASEAN Political-Security Community

(APSC) came about in 2003, ACDFIM came into the fray—though it
remains not yet under the official ASEAN structure. The APSC also
led to the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action that called for
increased cooperation in the following areas: political development
(peaceful settlement of intra-regional differences, promotion of human
rights); shaping and sharing norms (code of conduct in the South China
Sea); conflict prevention (greater transparency through CBMs, more
military-to-military interaction, regional arms register); and post-conflict
peace-building (humanitarian crisis centre, educational exchanges).21
Out of all these activities, the ADMM (and recently, ADMM+8)
has been seen as the most significant development. Originating in the
2003 Indonesian proposal for an ASEAN Security Community, the 38th
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2005 eventually agreed to convene
the ADMM for the first time in 2006 at Kuala Lumpur. While it is per-
haps too early to fully assess the full extent of its impact, the ADMM is
supposed to provide a much needed platform for open and constructive
dialogue on strategic issues at the ministerial level as well as a platform
to promote practical cooperation among the ASEAN armed forces.22 The
ADMM is supposed to strengthen defence and security cooperation on
three levels: (i) promoting practical cooperation at the operational level
among ASEAN militaries through a rolling two-year work plan drawn
up by the ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces, (ii) ASEAN’s engagement
with non-ASEAN countries in non-traditional and trans-boundary
issues, and (iii) reinforce ASEAN’s centrality in Southeast Asia’s security
architecture.23
Nevertheless, ASEAN-related events, though largely informal in
nature, have been considered a step forward in improving regional
confidence-building measures. Indeed, according to Indonesia’s former
Minister of Defence, ASEAN’s multilateralism and regional community
building have allowed the creation of a “strategic space” needed to boost
domestic economic and political development while accommodating the
21 For more details, see ASEAN Secretariat Website, “ASEAN Security Community
Plan of Action”, accessed on 27 September 2010 at www.aseansec.org/16826.htm.
22 Cited from Capie & Taylor, “The Shangri-La Dialogue”, p. 372.
81
interests of extra-regional powers.24 This implies the need for Indonesia

to sustain their multilateral engagement of extra-regional powerhouses
like China, and recently, Russia and the United States. Also, at the same
time, it reflects the realisation on the part of policymakers that, given
the region’s changing strategic environment, there is a need to engage
regional neighbours in difficult security issues—in a gradual, manageable
way; hence, the informal nature of many of the ASEAN or ARF security
and defence-related meetings.
Bilateral Defence Diplomacy

Scholars of Southeast Asian international relations have generally agreed
that multilateral defence or military interactions were “regarded with sus-
picion”, while bilateral ones focusing on specific, functional problems are
the most effective form of regional security cooperation.25 One scholar
dubbed this as ASEAN’s “spider web defence bilateralism” which consists
of intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training activities, and others.26
Bilateral military exercises, for example, take place between Indonesia
and Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia, Malaysia and Brunei, Sin-
gapore and Brunei, and Thailand and Brunei.
For Indonesia meanwhile, there are three types of bilateral defence
diplomacy: (i) defence diplomacy for confidence-building measures, (ii)
defence diplomacy for defence capabilities enhancement, and (iii) defence
diplomacy for defence industrial development.27 The term “defence diplo-
macy” itself implies that the leading agency in the events or activities were
the military (TNI) or Ministry of Defence (MoD)—suggesting once again
24 Sudarsono, J. “Indonesia, the region, and the world.” Summary of presentation to

the U.S. Department of Defence Capstone Exercise, Jakarta, 11 August 2010.
25 Capie & Taylor, “The Shangri-La Dialogue”, p. 360; Simon, S. “Southeast Asian
international relations: Is there institutional traction?” In N. Ganesan & R. Amer
(Eds.), International relations in Southeast Asia: Between bilateralism and
multilateralism. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010, p. 55.
26 See Acharya, A. “Regional institutions and Asian security order: Norms, power,
and prospects for peaceful change.” In M. Alagappa (Ed.), Asian security order:
Instrumental and normative features. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2003, p. 221.
27 Adapted from Syawfi, I. Aktifitas diplomasi pertahanan Indonesia dalam
pemenuhan tujuan-tujuan pertahanan Indonesia (2003–2008). Master’s thesis,
University of Indonesia, 2009.
82
the crucial role of the military (who dominates MoD positions as well) in
shaping Indonesia’s foreign policy and global clout. CBMs usually include
state visits, dialogues and consultations, information sharing, strategic
partnerships, officer exchanges, and joint-military exercises. Meanwhile,
defence diplomacy for defence capabilities generally includes military
assistance, weapons procurements, acquisitions line of credit, and so forth.
Defence diplomacy for defence industrial development generally includes
transfer of technology, research and development (R&D) cooperation,
investment in joint ventures, and so forth.
Between 2003 and 2008, Indonesia has conducted 88 defence diplo-
macy activities (see Figure 3), the majority of which were designed for
CBMs.28 In total, Indonesia also engaged 32 countries in its defence
diplomacy; the top 10 being the country’s most crucial security partners
and potential rivals. When we consider the fact that over the past decade
following Suharto’s downfall, the Indonesian government has yet to be
Figure 3
Indonesia’s bilateral defence diplomacy (2003–2008)
70
58
60
50
40
30
20 17
13
10
0
Confidence-building measures Defence capability Defence industrial
Source: Syawfi, I. Aktifitas diplomasi pertahanan Indonesia dalam pemenuhan

tujuan-tujuan pertahanan Indonesia, 2003–2008. University of Indonesia, 2009.
able to fulfil the defence requirements asked by TNI, it is only natural
28 Indonesia’s bilateral defence diplomacy figures are adapted from Syawfi, Aktifitas
diplomasi pertahanan Indonesia.
83
that defence diplomacy becomes the “first line of defence”. Specifically,

defence diplomacy is more oriented towards building a more amicable
working relationship with partners and rivals so as to prevent major
conflicts from erupting in the future—at least in theory.
The composition of the countries that Indonesia has been engaged
with (see Figure 4) also suggests the growing need for the country to
reduce its security dependence and diversify its strategic partners. The
United States, Australia and China represent the big major powers that
Indonesia is most concerned with. The United States and China had both
in the past threatened the country’s domestic stability and territorial
integrity, while Australia had the unfortunate label as the country that
led the UN peacekeeping force in East Timor in 1999. These countries
however, along with Russia, France, South Korea and the Netherlands, are
also Indonesia’s biggest source—in the past and perhaps in the future—of
main weapons systems and platforms. Apart from the various bilateral
defence diplomacy activities with these powers, Indonesia has also signed
strategic partnership agreements with nearly all of them.
Meanwhile, Singapore and Malaysia represents the country’s closest
neighbour and potential rival—partly because Indonesia often had acri-
monious relations with the two over various issues and partly because of
historical reasons during the infamous “Confrontation” of the 1960s that
Figure 4
RI’s top 10 targets for defence diplomacy (2003–2008)
14 13
12
10 9
8
6 6
6 5 5 5
3 3 3
4
2
0
United States
Australia
Malaysia
Russia
China
France
Singapore
The Netherlands
India
South Korea
Source: Syawfi, I. Aktifitas diplomasi pertahanan Indonesia dalam pemenuhan tujuan-

tujuan pertahanan Indonesia, 2003–2008. University of Indonesia, 2009.
84
saw Indonesia rallying against the destruction of the two countries.29 This
also highlights the role of Indonesia’s defence diplomacy in safeguarding
the country’s territorial integrity while simultaneously ensuring regional
security in Southeast Asia. Aside from Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesia
conducted bilateral defence diplomacy with nearly all Southeast Asian
countries (see Figure 5).
Figure 5
Bilateral amity events, RI–Southeast Asia (2003–2008)
14
14
12
10
8 7
6
4
4 3 3
2 2
2 1
0
Malaysia
Thailand
Singapore
Vietnam
Philippines
Myanmar
Brunei
Cambodia
Source: Syawfi, I. Aktifitas diplomasi pertahanan Indonesia dalam pemenuhan

tujuan-tujuan pertahanan Indonesia, 2003–2008. University of Indonesia, 2009.
The above analysis and data suggest that Indonesia’s bilateral defence
diplomacy is: (i) mainly focused in increasing regional stability through
confidence-building measures, and (ii) targeted at a select few of the
most important regional neighbours (Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia)
and the biggest powerhouses (the United States, China, India, Australia
and Russia) seen to be crucial in safeguarding the country’s territorial and
national integrity, and potential suppliers of domestic weapons systems.
29 For details on Indonesia’s “Confrontation” with Malaysia, Singapore and

Brunei, see Mackie, J. A. C. Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia dispute,
1963–1966. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974; Jones, M. Conflict and
confrontation in Southeast Asia: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the
creation of Malaysia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
85
The Focus of Defence Diplomacy

A good indicator of the kinds of topics and issues that ASEAN and its
related institutions wish to address through multilateral defence diplo-
macy lies in the focus or orientation of the produced documents. In total,
a recent study by the University of Indonesia shows that from 1967 to
2009, ASEAN and its related institutions produced over 270 documents;
mainly in the forms of Declarations, Joint Communiqués, Chairman
Statements, Statements, Plans of Action, Annual Reports, and others
(see Figure 6).30
Figure 6
Majority types of ASEAN documents (1967–2009)
Plan of action 11
Treaty 13
Annual report 19
Joint communique 30
Statement 32
Declaration 52
Chairman statement 67
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Source: Widjajanto, A., Prasetyono, E., & Syawfi, I. Penguatan komunitas keamanan
ASEAN untuk menopang integrasi nasional Indonesia. Jakarta: University of Indone-
sia, 2009.
Furthermore, the same study notes that a majority of the docu-

ments produced consist mainly of non-traditional security issues (51
per cent) with 136 documents, while not neglecting traditional and
organisational matters (see Figure 7). Also, from those documents
produced that dealt with non-traditional security issues, ASEAN
appears to be focusing primarily on issues of development, conflict
30 See Widjajanto, A., Prasetyono, E., & Syawfi, I. Penguatan komunitas keamanan
ASEAN untuk menopang integrasi nasional Indonesia. Jakarta: University of
Indonesia, 2009.
86
resolution and human security affairs. It should be noted though that

non-traditional security issues would only take shape more explicitly
in the regional discourse by the 1990s.
Figure 7
Focus of ASEAN documents (security issues), 1967–2009
11%
Non-traditional security
51% Traditional security
38% Organisational issues
Source: Widjajanto, A., Prasetyono, E., & Syawfi, I. Penguatan komunitas keamanan
ASEAN untuk menopang integrasi nasional Indonesia. Jakarta: University of Indone-
sia, 2009.
It is also interesting to note that the focus on non-traditional security

issues coincides with the expansion of ASEAN and its related institutions
such as the ARF, ASEAN-Plus 1, ASEAN-Plus 3, and others. This could
indicate the realisation among policymakers in Southeast Asian countries
that engaging extra-regional powers such as China, Russia, India, Japan,
and others would be extremely difficult had ASEAN immediately focused
on traditional security issues through formal multilateralism. Indeed,
when it comes to engaging China, a recent study noted that ASEAN’s
cooperation with Beijing in non-traditional security issues creates politi-
cal partnership and a sub-regional security complex, and when viewed in
tandem with the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, may be part of the most
advanced and comprehensive working model of regionalism in East Asia.31
31 See Arase, D. “Non-traditional security in China-ASEAN cooperation: The

institutionalization of regional security cooperation and the evolution of East
Asian regionalism.” Asian Survey, Vol. 50 No. 4 (2010), pp. 808–833.
87
Conclusion
Our preceding analysis highlights several key trends regarding ASEAN’s
multilateral defence diplomacy. First, while ASEAN was not originally
conceived as a purely defence and security institution, the advent of the
ARF has expanded the group’s security cooperation and relation. This
could be interpreted as a logical consequence of moving beyond ASEAN’s
borders and engaging extra-regional powers such as China, Japan, India,
and others in an effort to build deeper relations. In fact, the ARF has
taken up the majority of ASEAN’s multilateral defence diplomacy.
Second, due to the arrival of the ARF and the expansion of ASEAN’s
security relations beyond its borders, our previous analysis has shown
that this has brought non-traditional security issues into more promi-
nence in regional discourse of security cooperation. Although upon
closer look, this discourse mainly reflects non-legally binding decla-
rations and statements. Furthermore, when we consider the fact that
ASEAN’s multilateral defence diplomacy also consists of informal meet-
ings (primarily involving military officers), it is not farfetched to argue
that the trend in Southeast Asian multilateral defence diplomacy seems
to be heading or geared towards a norms-based community. This could
be seen in a “half full half empty” lens—it could be a good thing for the
region as it might shape a common identity, or it could be a bad thing as
it means nothing more than a “talk shop”.
Meanwhile, regarding bilateral defence diplomacy, the case of
Indonesia’s relations suggests several patterns as well. First, the focus
of bilateral defence diplomacy in recent years remains focused on
confidence-building measures—though defence industrial development
is increasingly following suit. Second, bilateral defence diplomacy is
still discriminate in that it focuses on a select key states—primarily, the
closest neighbouring countries and extra-regional powerhouses such as
China, the United States, India, Japan and South Korea. Third, while mul-
tilateral defence diplomacy is increasing in frequency in Southeast Asia,
the significance of the previously established web of bilateral defence
relations will not likely diminish any time soon; especially for countries
preoccupied with internal threat and which possess an acrimonious his-
tory with its neighbours.
Finally, in terms of the issues of focus in Southeast Asia’s defence
diplomacy, it appears that on the multilateral front—that expanded
88
beyond the region with the arrival of the ARF—non-traditional security

issues are more prominent in the past decade or so, while on the bilateral
front, traditional issues of defence cooperation is still a mainstay. This
could suggest that Southeast Asian countries tend to leave “less signifi-
cant” non-traditional security issues to multilateralism—which is also
more convenient in terms of engaging extra-regional powerhouses—
while critical traditional security issues are handled or addressed through
bilateral defence relations. Furthermore, as multilateral defence diplo-
macy seems more manifested in regional non-binding discourses, while
bilateral defence diplomacy is more “concrete”, new initiatives such as
the ADMM and ADMM-Plus need to be further developed and institu-
tionalised.
89

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S.

Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Report Title: FROM ‘BOOTS’ TO ‘BROGUES’

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,

focused on key states—major powers or neighbours—that have been

The Rise of Southeast Asian Defence Diplomacy:

a low-cost, low-risk “continuation of dialogue by other means”.4 There

These numerous defence diplomacy activities have been dubbed as

Despite these potentials of defence diplomacy, scholars have gen-

6 Simon, S. W. “Southeast Asia’s defence needs: Change or continuity?” In A. J.

Southeast Asian states do have strategic preferences and have actively

Multilateral Defence Diplomacy

7 Goh, E. “Great powers and hierarchical order in Southeast Asia.” International

Since its formation, ASEAN has established a dense network of

10 Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of security cooperation, p. 22.

transparency and openness in a region where such abstractions are not

Source: Indonesian Foreign Ministry, ASEAN Secretariat.

Among the most significant ARF-related defence diplomacy is the

ment of a concept paper on ARF Defence Dialogue in 2002.13 This gather-

Meeting, ASEAN Navy Interaction, ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Confer-

Source: Indonesian Foreign Ministry, ASEAN Secretariat.

This flurry of regional multilateral security seems to have been

After the goal of creating an ASEAN Political-Security Community

interests of extra-regional powers.24 This implies the need for Indonesia

Bilateral Defence Diplomacy

24 Sudarsono, J. “Indonesia, the region, and the world.” Summary of presentation to

Source: Syawfi, I. Aktifitas diplomasi pertahanan Indonesia dalam pemenuhan

able to fulfil the defence requirements asked by TNI, it is only natural

that defence diplomacy becomes the “first line of defence”. Specifically,

Source: Syawfi, I. Aktifitas diplomasi pertahanan Indonesia dalam pemenuhan tujuan-

Source: Syawfi, I. Aktifitas diplomasi pertahanan Indonesia dalam pemenuhan

29 For details on Indonesia’s “Confrontation” with Malaysia, Singapore and

The Focus of Defence Diplomacy

Furthermore, the same study notes that a majority of the docu-

resolution and human security affairs. It should be noted though that

51% Traditional security

38% Organisational issues

It is also interesting to note that the focus on non-traditional security

31 See Arase, D. “Non-traditional security in China-ASEAN cooperation: The

beyond the region with the arrival of the ARF—non-traditional security

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