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142565, July 29, 2003 ]

455 Phil. 77

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 142565, July 29, 2003 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. NESTOR G. SORIANO
ALIAS "BOY," APPELLANT.
DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

WHAT STARTED OUT AS AN ORDINARY LOVERS' QUARREL turned out to be a

nightmarish inferno for the residents of Datu Abing Street, Calinan, Davao City. The
unmitigated passion and impulses incessantly burning in the heat of the moment ignited the
series of events that resulted in the conflagration of 18 September 1998 mercilessly destroying
the houses along its path. The age-old forewarning that "he who plays close to the fire shall
ultimately be consumed by its flames" fits literally and figuratively into this tragic tale of lust,
love, betrayal and isolation. After the smoke had dissipated and the heat simmered down, Nestor
G. Soriano found himself charged before the RTC of Davao City with and later convicted of
Destructive Arson penalized under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 10,
par. 1, RA 7659, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.[1]

The factual backdrop: About midnight of 17 September onto the early dawn of 18 September
1998 accused-appellant Nestor G. Soriano was having an argument with his live-in partner
Honey Rosario Cimagala concerning their son Nestor, Jr., nicknamed "Otoy." Honey worked as
Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in a Metro Manila beer house. The disagreement stemmed from
the fact that Honey's brother, Oscar Cimagala, took their child out without the consent of
accused-appellant who wanted both Honey and Otoy instead to return with him to Manila. But
Honey refused. As their discussion wore on accused-appellant intimated to Honey his desire to
have sex with her, which he vigorously pursued the night before with much success. This time
Honey did not relent to the baser instincts of Nestor; instead, she kicked him as her stern rebuke
to his sexual importuning.

Incensed by her negative response, Nestor nastily retorted: "[S]he is now arrogant and proud of
her brother who now supported (sic) her and her children."[2] He added that since he returned
from Manila, the house had become "unlucky," referring to that belonging to her aunt Fe
Cimagila then occupied by Honey located at Datu Abing Street, Calinan, Davao City.[3]

In the heated exchanges, Nestor struck Honey in the forehead. "You are hurting me," she
snapped back, "just like what you did to me in Manila."[4]

Nestor then moved away as he muttered: "It is better that I burn this house,"[5] and then took a
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match from the top of a cabinet, lighted a cigarette and set fire to the plastic partition that served
as divider of Honey's room.[6]

With her naked body precariously draped in a towel, Honey instinctively took off her covering
and doused off the flame with it. Then she rushed to her cabinet in the room to get a T-shirt and
put it on. But Nestor did his worst; he went to Honey's room and set on fire her clothes in the
cabinet.

Honey fled to the ground floor; Nestor followed her. As the conflagration was now engulfing
the second story of the house, Honey frantically shouted to her uncle Simplicio Cabrera, who
was residing next door, "Boy is setting the house on fire," referring to Nestor.[7]

On the ground floor Nestor grappled with Honey and choked her as he dragged her towards the
kitchen. She told him that it would be better for him to kill her than to set the house on fire as it
would endanger the neighboring houses. After initially pointing a knife at Honey, Nestor finally
laid down his knife and hurriedly went back to the second floor only to see the entire area in
flames. They had no choice but to leave as the fire spread rapidly to the neighboring houses. As
a result, the house occupied by Honey was totally burned together with five (5) neighboring
houses[8] owned individually by Fructuosa Jambo, Ruth Fernandez, Orlando Braña, Simplicio
Cabrera and Perla Clerigo.[9]

Subsequently, on 21 September 1998 an Information was filed against accused-appellant Nestor

G. Soriano alias "Boy" for Arson.[10] On 30 October 1998, the Information was amended to
specify the charge as Destructive Arson[11] under Art. 320, Sec. 10, as amended by RA 7659
and PD 1613. Again on 18 January 1999,[12] upon prior motion of accused through counsel for
reinvestigation, the prosecution filed a second Amended Information charging the accused with
the same crime of arson but "under Art. 320, Sec. 10 as amended by RA 7659 and PD 1744,"
and adding the phrase "motivated by spite or hatred towards the occupant of the property," as a
special aggravating circumstance, further including the name of "Orlando Braña" whose house
worth P1,000,000.00 was also burned.

In the trial, Honey Rosario Cimagala, Oscar Cimagala, Fructuosa Jambo, Ruth Fernandez,
Orlando Braña, Simplicio Cabrera and Perla Clerigo, among others, were presented as witnesses
for the prosecution.

Accused-appellant was the lone witness for his defense.

On 3 September 1999, the RTC of Davao City, Branch 17, found Nestor G. Soriano alias Boy
guilty of Destructive Arson as charged pursuant to RA 7659, Sec. 10, par. 1, as amended, and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The court a quo also ordered him to pay the complainants
whose houses were likewise burned together with that of Fe Cimagala in the following manner:
Fructuosa Jambo, Simplicio Cabrera, Perla Clerigo, Orlando Braña and Oscar Cimagala
P1,000,000.00 each as estimated value of their respective houses, including another amount of
P100,000.00 each as moral damages and P50,000.00 each by way of exemplary damages, and
the costs of suit.

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Arson is the malicious burning of property. Under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and PD 1613, Arson is classified into two kinds: (1) Destructive Arson (Art. 320) and
(2) other cases of arson (PD 1613). This classification is based on the kind, character and
location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused.

Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious
burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft,
factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group
of persons.[13] The classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively
discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of
properties and protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves
only destruction and despair in its wake; hence, the State mandates greater retribution to authors
of this heinous crime. The exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this crime takes into
consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by the malicious burning of these
structures; the danger to property resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is normally
difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the
perpetrators; and, the greater impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the
nation.

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art. 320, death should
result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code
remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning of
public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA
7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, government
buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial
establishments.[14] Although the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high
incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction, protect the national economy and
preserve the social, economic and political stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty
to be meted to offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need to
lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed, depending on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case.

Under Sec. 4 of PD 1613, if special aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of
Simple Arson, the penalty under Sec. 3 shall be imposed in its maximum period: (a) If
committed with intent to gain; (b) If committed for the benefit of another; (c) If the offender is
motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned; and, (d) If
committed by a syndicate, or group of three (3) or more persons. If by reason, or on the
occasion of Simple Arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed.

Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of Arson, it may be inferred from the acts of
the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act; and
when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to
produce further evidence of his wrongful intent.[15] If there is an eyewitness to the crime of
Arson, he can give in detail the acts of the accused. When this is done the only substantial issue
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is the credibility of the witness.[16] In the crime of Arson, the prosecution may describe the
theatre of the crime and the conditions and circumstances surrounding it. Evidence of this type
is part of the res gestae.[17]

It is well settled in our jurisdiction that the factual findings of the court a quo as well as the
conclusions on the credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed. We have no cogent
reason to deviate from this rule in the case at bar.

On the basis of the categorical testimony of Honey Rosario Cimagala positively identifying
accused-appellant as the one responsible for the burning of the house of Fe Cimagala in the
early morning of 18 September 1998, the trial court found the accused Nestor G. Soriano guilty
as charged.

The accused's denial of the crime cannot be an adequate defense against the charge. In People v.
Mahinay[18] we held that mere denial by witnesses particularly when not corroborated or
substantiated by clear and evidencing evidence cannot prevail over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Denial being in the nature of negative and self-
serving evidence is seldom given weight in law. Positive and forthright declarations of
witnesses are even held to be worthier of credence than a self-serving denial.

We agree with the court a quo that the quantum of proof required to convict an accused in a
criminal case has been satisfied in the present dispute. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean such a degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.[19]

The legal basis of the trial court for convicting accused-appellant is Art. 320, par. 1, of The
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, Sec. 10, par. 1. Under this provision, a person
found guilty of Destructive Arson is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death where the
burning affects one (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or
as a result of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or different occasions.

However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613,
[20] which imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of
arson as the properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses,
contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as
alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses rather
than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613,
and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it
is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and literally in
favor of the accused.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and
(b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements
concur in the case at bar.

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity
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or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised
Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society."[21] On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are
crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser
penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts
falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on
the qualifying circumstances present.

In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous nor
represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from those acts
punishable under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was
established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating circumstance
that accused-appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the
property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting
more on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him
to give vent to his wounded ego.[22] Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover or a
disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances that surrounded the burning of the
Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson penalized under
Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling.

In addition, we find that there exists a mitigating circumstance that should have been
appreciated by the trial court in determining the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant:
a circumstance similar and analogous to passion and obfuscation.[23] An impulse of invidious or
resentful feelings contemplates a situation akin to passion and obfuscation. This circumstance is
mitigating since, like passion and obfuscation, the accused who acts with these feelings suffers a
diminution of his intelligence and intent, a reduction in his mental and rational faculties.

It has been satisfactorily shown by the court a quo that the lovers' quarrel between Nestor
Soriano and Honey Rosario Cimagala ignited the chain of events that led to the conflagration
that occurred in the early dawn of 18 September 1998. Passions were inflamed in the evening of
17 September 1998 due to the impending return of Soriano to Manila the following day with the
prospect of leaving behind in Davao his son Otoy who bears his namesake "Nestor Jr." But
reason, unfortunately, did not prevail; emotions took control of the events that were to unfold.
His efforts went to naught; his attempts to win back his forbidden love were likewise thwarted.
Verily, the resentment accused-appellant felt came from the realization that he may never see his
son again once he left Davao; that his utter frustration in trying to convince Honey Rosario
Cimagala to return to Manila with their son brought with it a reduction of his rational faculties
within that moment in time. Although emanating from lawful sentiments, the actuations of
accused-appellant led to his criminal act of burning the Cimagala home, and other neighboring
houses. In other words, accused-appellant was in a state of extreme emotional stress.

Mr. Justice Adam C. Carson, in his concurring opinion in United States v. Butardo,[24] gives his
view on the graduation of penalties for the crime of Arson under the Spanish Penal Code. In the
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old law on which The Revised Penal Code is based, he comments that the authors clearly had in
mind certain considerations in imposing penalties of exceptional severity in the various cases of
arson. The observations of Mr. Justice Carson in Butardo are thus still relevant in our
contemporary interpretation of criminal law:

The authors of the Spanish Penal Code, in imposing penalties of exceptional severity
in certain cases of arson, clearly had in mind:

First. The extreme danger to which human lives may be exposed by the malicious
burning of dwelling houses and the like;

Second. The danger to property resulting from widespread conflagrations;

Third. The fact that it is extremely difficult to adopt precautions against the
commission of the crime, and to discover the perpetrators after its commission.

Formerly, where these elements marked the commission of the crime, the single
penalty prescribed by law was that of death, but this severity was finally relaxed, and
while exceptionally severe penalties are still imposed in such cases, the authors of
the Penal Code appear to have endeavored to graduate these penalties in
accordance with the degree of danger to life and property, resulting from the
commission of the crime.

To this end the severest penalties are prescribed for the malicious burning of edifies
in which large numbers of persons are assembled. Less harsh, but still very severe
penalties are imposed on those setting fire to dwelling houses and other buildings
more or less permanently occupied. Less severe penalties on those guilty of burning
unoccupied dwellings, the penalty being more or less severe as the house appeared
to be situated so as to make a widespread conflagration more or less probable. And
finally, sufficient, but not notably harsh penalties are prescribed in cases where the
property of others is set on fire under conditions which do not suggest special
danger to human life or the likelihood of considerable destruction of property.

In a concurring opinion, this time in U.S. v. Burns, Mr. Justice Ignacio Villamor explains the
rationale behind the penalties for Arson:[25]

In the opinion of Groizard, one of the most famous commentators on the Spanish
Penal Code, of which ours is but a copy, "it is the potential damage that is
considered here in fixing the grave penalty of cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
The risk which a person runs who may be found in a place that is burned, whether it
be a building, a farm-house, a hut or shelter, or a vessel in port, is what constitutes
the gravity which is the object of this crime; just as the damaging intent of the agent,
manifested by his setting fire to a place where he knows there is one or more
persons, gives an idea of his subjective perversity."

The same author adds: "In the classification of the crime attention must be given to
the intention of the author. When fire is used with the intent to kill a determined
person who may be in a shelter, and that object is secured, the crime committed is
not that defined herein, but that of murder, penalized in article 418 (art. 403 of the
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Penal Code of the Philippines), with the penalty of cadena temporal in its maximum
degree to death" (Groizard, Vol. 8, p. 45).

Accused-appellant is undoubtedly responsible for the fire that occurred in the wee hours of 18
September 1998 that razed to the ground the Cimagala home and a number of other houses in
the vicinity. Still, we believe that the record shows that the elements discussed by Mr. Justice
Carson in his separate concurring opinion in Butardo are wanting. We are therefore not
adequately convinced that imposing the exceptionally severe penalty of reclusion perpetua is
proper in the case at bar.

First. There appears to be no reckless disregard for human lives indicative of a cold, calculating,
wicked and perverse intention to burn the Cimagala home. The action of accused-appellant was
the result of a lovers' tiff between him and Honey over their son, Otoy, and concerning the
future of their unbridled relationship. His spontaneous, albeit criminal, act was carried out
without any intention to exterminate human lives. His purpose in going to Davao was to
convince his lover to move back with him to Manila and bringing along their son Otoy.

Second. Neither was there any reckless disregard for the rights of the neighboring property
owners. The criminal act of burning the Cimagala home was carried out by accused-appellant in
a diminished emotional state, which mitigates his criminal liability to a lesser degree of
criminality.

Third. The testimony of Honey clearly points to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime. However, the conduct of accused-appellant after he consummated the crime, i.e., when
he set fire to the clothes of Honey, is material in determining the severity of the penalty to be
imposed. After his impulsive act of setting fire to both the plastic partition of the room and
Honey's clothes, he attempted to mend his ways immediately by attempting to put out the
flames although it was too late. His act of burning Honey's clothes set in motion a chain of
events that spun out of control and led to the blaze that destroyed houses in its path. However,
despite the mayhem caused by accused-appellant, he never fled the scene of the crime; in fact,
he watched helplessly as the flames consumed the Cimagala home and the neighboring houses.
He did not resist the police authorities when he was invited for questioning at the police station
to shed light on the incident.

Thus, applying Mr. Justice Carson's exceptional severity standard as regards the imposition of
penalties for the crime of Arson, the degree of criminality involved in the accused-appellant's
act is lessened by the fact that he acted on an impulse that diminished his reasoning faculties,
thus mitigating the punishment to be imposed. The proper penalty to be imposed should
therefore take into consideration the analogous mitigating circumstance to passion and
obfuscation under Art. 13, par. 10, as discussed above, in relation to Art. 64, par. 2, of The
Revised Penal Code.[26]

Under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, in relation to Art. 64, par. 2, of The Revised Penal Code, the
imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua the range of
which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree to the imposable penalty is prision mayor the
range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years in any of its periods. Under
the circumstances, it is believed that an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years four (4)
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months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum as minimum to fourteen (14) years two
(2) months and ten (10) days of the minimum of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua as
maximum may be imposed on the accused.

As to the award of damages, this Court has consistently held that proof is required to determine
the reasonable amount of damages that may be awarded to the victims of conflagration. As a
rule, therefore, actual or compensatory damages must be proved and not merely alleged. We
believe that the records do not adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual
damages to the offended parties. The court a quo granted the award solely on the bare assertions
of the complaining witnesses. Moral damages cannot be awarded in this case, as there is no
evidentiary basis to justify it. However, accused-appellant's civil liability is beyond cavil; what
needs to be resolved is the amount of indemnity he should pay to the owners of the burned
houses for the damage caused. In lieu thereof, this Court may award temperate or moderate
damages to the victims of the conflagration in accordance with Art. 2224 of the Civil Code.
Indeed, the records evince that the victims suffered some pecuniary loss although the amount
thereof cannot be proved with certainty. Consequently, temperate damages in the amount of
P250,000.00 which is considered reasonable under the circumstances should be awarded to each
of the complaining witnesses or their heirs as the case may be.

Exemplary or corrective damages should likewise be awarded as a way to correct future conduct
of this nature and preserve the public good. Such damages are designed to reshape behavior that
is socially deleterious in its consequences.[27] Hence, exemplary or corrective damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 for each of the above-mentioned complaining witnesses or their heirs is
fair and just under the premises.

It must be noted that accused-appellant became an unwitting victim of his own extra-marital
indiscretions. His flawed emotional disposition coupled with a lapse in judgment became his
own undoing as he now languishes in jail for choosing the road to perdition. Although he has no
one to blame but himself for his vicissitudes, we believe that the lessons to be learned from this
sad and miserable chapter of his life are more than adequate from which he can gain insight and
wisdom, while he sits patiently in his prison cell waiting for the day when he can once again
breathe the invigorating air of freedom.

WHEREFORE, Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City finding accused-appellant
Nestor G. Soriano guilty of Destructive Arson is MODIFIED to Simple Arson under Sec. 3, par.
2, of PD 1613, and the penalty imposed on him REDUCED to an indeterminate prison term of
six (6) years four (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum as minimum to
fourteen (14) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal minimum as
maximum. Temperate damages in the amount of P250,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P50,000.00 are AWARDED to each of complaining witnesses Fructuosa L. Jambo, Simplicio B.
Cabrera, Francisco Clerigo, Orlando Braña and Oscar T. Cimagala. Costs against accused-
appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.

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[1]Decision penned by Presiding Judge Renato A. Fuentes, RTC-Br. 17, Davao City,
promulgated 3 September 1999; Rollo, pp. 47-48.

[2] Id. at 23.

[3] Id. at 22.

[4] Id. at 23.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Id at 24.

[9] Id. at 33.

[10] Id. at 8.

[11] Id. at 9.

[12] Id. at 11.

[13] Under Art. 320, as amended, the enumeration of the instances for Destructive Arson is
exclusive: (a) one (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or
as a result of simultaneous burning, or committed on several or different occasions; (b) any
building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people
usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official
governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade workshop, meetings
and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose, such as but not limited to, hotels,
motels, transient dwellings, public conveyance or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the
offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on
fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not; (c) any train or
locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for
public use, entertainment or leisure; (d) any building, factory, warehouse installation and any
appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of public utilities; (e) any building the
burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of
law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from
insurance; (f) when committed by two (2) or more persons, regardless of whether their purpose
is merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the
commission of another violation of law; (g) any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military
powder or fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives or general museum of the
Government; (h) in an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive
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material.

[14]Sec. 3 of PD 1613 enumerates the Other Cases of Arson which are punishable by the
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua: (a) Any building used as offices of the
government or any of its agencies; (b) Any inhabited house or dwelling; (c) Any industrial
establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel; (d) Any plantation, farm,
pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest; (e) Any rice mill,
sugar mill, cane mill, or mill central; and, (f) any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or
warehouse.

[15] Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Arson (1st ed., 1986), Sec. 283 at 303.

[16] Id., Sec. 287 at 307.

[17] Id., Sec. 302 at 323.

[18] G.R. No. 125311, 17 March 1999, 304 SCRA 767.

[19] Sec. 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court.

[20]The relevant provision of PD 1613 states:

"Sec. 3. Other Cases of Arson. - The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall
be imposed if the property burned is any of the following x x x x

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling x x x x"

[21] See Preamble, RA 7659.

[22] See People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 100699, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 70.

[23] Art. 13, par. 10, The Revised Penal Code.

[24] 11 Phil. 60, 62 (1908). See Carson, J., concurring.

[25] 41 Phil. 418, 440 (1921). See Villamor, J., concurring.

[26]"Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. - In cases in
which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible
penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in
accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the following rules, according to whether
there are or are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances x x x x 2. When only a mitigating
circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its
minimum period x x x x"

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[27] Tolentino,Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V (2d
Ed., 1992), p. 663, citing cases.

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