People Vs Soriano

4/7/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 407
VOL. 407, JULY 29, 2003 367

People vs. Soriano
*
G.R. No. 142565. July 29, 2003.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. NESTOR

G. SORIANO alias “Boy”, appellant.
Criminal Law; Arson; Arson is classified into two kinds: (1)

Destructive Arson (Art. 320) and (2) other cases of arson (PD
1613); Classification is based on the kind, character and location
of the property burned regardless of the value of the damage
caused.—Arson is the malicious burning of property. Under Art.
320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended, and PD 1613,Arson is
classified into two kinds: (1) Destructive Arson (Art. 320) and (2)
other cases of arson (PD 1613). This classification is based on the
kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of
the value of the damage caused.
Same; Same; Evidence; In the crime of arson, the prosecution
may describe the theatre of the crime and the conditions and
circumstances surrounding it.—Although intent may be an
ingredient of the crime of Arson, it may be inferred from the acts
of the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the
natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one
has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound
to produce further evidence of his wrongful intent. If there is an
eyewitness to the crime of Arson, he can give in detail the acts of
the accused. When this is done the only substantial issue is the
credibility of the witness. In the crime of Arson, the prosecution
may describe the theatre of the crime and the conditions and
circumstances surrounding it. Evidence of this type is part of the
res gestae.
Same; Same; Elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2 of PD
1613.—The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are:
(a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally
burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these
elements concur in the case at bar.
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www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000171554901f5538779e9003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/17
* SECOND DIVISION.
368
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Soriano
Same; same; Destructive arson distinguished from simple

arson.—The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from
Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the
criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The
Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes ‘for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.” On the other
hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson
are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that
the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple
Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic,
political and national security implications than Destructive
Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may
nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on
the qualifying circumstances present.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Davao City, Br. 17.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Into, Pantojan & Gonzales Law Offices for accused-
appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
WHAT STARTED OUT AS AN ORDINARY LOVERS’

QUARREL turned out to be a nightmarish inferno for the
residents of Datu Abing Street, Calinan, Davao City. The
unmitigated passion and impulses incessantly burning in
the heat of the moment ignited the series of events that
resulted in the conflagration of 18 September 1998
mercilessly destroying the houses along its path. The age-
old forewarning that “he who plays close to the fire shall
ultimately be consumed by its flames” fits literally and
figuratively into this tragic tale of lust, love, betrayal and
isolation. After the smoke had dissipated and the heat
simmered down, Nestor G. Soriano found himself charged

before the RTC of Davao City with and later convicted of
Destructive Arson penalized under Art. 320 of The Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 1
10, par. 1, RA 7659, and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
_______________
1 Decision penned by Presiding Judge Renato A. Fuentes, RTC-Br. 17,

Davao City, promulgated 3 September 1999; Rollo, pp. 47-48.
369
VOL. 407, JULY 29, 2003 369

People vs. Soriano
The factual backdrop: About midnight of 17 September

onto the early dawn of 18 September 1998 accused-
appellant Nestor G. Soriano was having an argument with
his live-in partner Honey Rosario Cimagala concerning
their son Nestor, Jr., nicknamed “Otoy.” Honey worked as
Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in a Metro Manila beer
house. The disagreement stemmed from the fact that
Honey’s brother, Oscar Cimagala, took their child out
without the consent of accused-appellant who wanted both
Honey and Otoy instead to return with him to Manila. But
Honey refused. As their discussion wore on accused-
appellant intimated to Honey his desire to have sex with
her, which he vigorously pursued the night before with
much success. This time Honey did not relent to the baser
instincts of Nestor; instead, she kicked him as her stern
rebuke to his sexual importuning.
Incensed by her negative response, Nestor nastily
retorted: “[S]he is now arrogant and proud of her 2
brother
who now supported (sic) her and her children.” He added
that since he returned from Manila, the house had become
“unlucky,” referring to that belonging to her aunt Fe
Cimagila then occupied by 3Honey located at Datu Abing
Street, Calinan, Davao City.
In the heated exchanges, Nestor struck Honey in the
forehead. “You are hurting me,” she 4
snapped back, “just
like what you did to me in Manila.”
Nestor then moved away 5
as he muttered: “It is better
that I burn this house,” and then took a match from the
top of a cabinet, lighted a cigarette and set fire to 6 the
plastic partition that served as divider of Honey’s room.
With her naked body precariously draped in a towel,
Honey instinctively took off her covering and doused off the
flame with it. Then she rushed to her cabinet in the room
to get a T-shirt and put it on. But Nestor did his worst; he
went to Honey’s room and set on fire her clothes in the
cabinet.
Honey fled to the ground floor; Nestor followed her. As
the conflagration was now engulfing the second story of the
house, Honey
_______________
2 Id., at p. 23.
3 Id., at p. 22.
4 Id.,,at p. 23.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
370

People vs. Soriano
frantically shouted to her uncle Simplicio Cabrera, who

was residing next door,
7
“Boy is setting the house on fire,”
referring to Nestor.
On the ground floor Nestor grappled with Honey and
choked her as he dragged her towards the kitchen. She told
him that it would be better for him to kill her than to set
the house on fire as it would endanger the neighboring
houses. After initially pointing a knife at Honey, Nestor
finally laid down his knife and hurriedly went back to the
second floor only to see the entire area in flames. They had
no choice but to leave as the fire spread rapidly to the
neighboring houses. As a result, the house occupied by
Honey was totally8 burned together with five (5)
neighboring houses owned individually by Fructuosa
Jambo, Ruth Fernandez,
9
Orlando Braña, Simplicio Cabrera
and Perla Clerigo.
Subsequently, on 21 September 1998 an Information
was filed against
10
accused-appellant Nestor G. Soriano alias
“Boy” for Arson On 30 October 1998, the Information 11
was
amended to specify the charge as Destructive Arson under
Art. 320, Sec. 10, as amended12
by RA 7659 and PD 1613.
Again on 18 January 1999, upon prior motion of accused
through counsel for reinvestigation, the prosecution filed a
second Amended Information charging the accused with
the same crime of arson but “under Art. 320, Sec. 10 as
amended by RA 7659 and PD 1744,” and adding the phrase
“motivated by spite or hatred towards the occupant of the
property,” as a special aggravating circumstance, further

including the name of “Orlando Braña” whose house worth
Pl,000,000.00 was also burned.
In the trial, Honey Rosario Cimagala, Oscar Cimagala,
Fructuosa Jambo, Ruth Fernandez, Orlando Braña,
Simplicio Cabrera and Perla Clerigo, among others, were
presented as witnesses for the prosecution.
Accused-appellant was the lone witness for his defense.
_______________
7 Ibid.
8 Id., at p. 24.
9 Id., at p. 33.
10 Id., at p. 8.
11 Id., at p. 9.
12 Id., at p. 11.
371
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People vs. Soriano
On 3 September 1999, the RTC of Davao City, Branch 17,

found Nestor G. Soriano alias Boy guilty of Destructive
Arson as charged pursuant to RA 7659, Sec. 10, par. 1, as
amended, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The
court a quo also ordered him to pay the complainants
whose houses were likewise burned together with that of
Fe Cimagala in the following manner: Fructuosa Jambo,
Simplicio Cabrera, Perla Clerigo, Orlando Braña and Oscar
Cimagala P1,000,000.00 each as estimated value of their
respective houses, including another amount of
P100,000.00 each as moral damages and P50,000.00 each
by way of exemplary damages, and the costs of suit.
Arson is the malicious burning of property. Under Art.
320 of j The Revised Penal Code, as amended, and PD 1613,
Arson is classified into two kinds: (1) Destructive Arson
(Art. 320) and (2) other cases of arson (PD 1613). This
classification is based on the kind, character and location of
the property burned, regardlessof the value of the damage
caused.
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by
RA 7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures,
both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains,
vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government
or commercial
13
establishments by any person or group of
persons. The classification of this type of
_______________
13 Under Art. 320, as amended, the enumeration of the instances for

Destructive Arson is exclusive: (a) one (1) or more buildings or edifices,
consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous
burning, or committed on several or different occasions; (b) any building of
public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where
people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not
limited to, official governmental function or business, private transaction,
commerce, trade workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely
incidental to a definite purpose, such as but not limited to, hotels, motels,
transient dwellings, public conveyance or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said
building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of
whether the building is actually inhabited or not; (c) any train or
locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or
conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure; (d) any building,
factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are
devoted to the service of public utilities; (e) any building the burning of
which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another
violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding
creditors or to
372

People vs. Soriano
crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is punishable

by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is
self-evident: to effectively discourage and deter the
commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the
destruction of properties and protect the lives of innocent
people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only
destruction and despair in its wake; hence, the State
mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous
crime. The exceptionally severe punishment imposed for
this crime takes into consideration the extreme danger to
human lives exposed by the malicious burning of these
structures; the danger to property resulting from the
conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt
precautions against its commission, and the difficulty in
pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the greater impact on
the social, economic, security and political fabric of the
nation.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under Art. 320, death should result, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to

326-B of The Revised Penal Code remains the governing
law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the
malicious burning of public and private structures,
regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by
RA 7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These
include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms,
mills, plantations, railways, bus stations,14airports, wharves
and other industrial establishments. Although the
purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high
incidence of fires and other
_______________
collect from insurance; (f) when committed by two (2) or more persons,
regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the
building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission
of another violation of law; (g) any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or
military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives or
general museum of the Government; (h) in an inhabited place, any
storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive material.
14 Sec. 3 of PD 1613 enumerates the Other Cases of Arson which are
punishable by the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua: (a)
Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies; (b)
Any inhabited house or dwelling; (c) Any industrial establishment,
shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel; (d) Any plantation,
farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or
forest; (e) Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill, or mill central; and, if) any
railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
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VOL. 407, JULY 29, 2003 373

People vs. Soriano
crimes involving destruction, protect the national economy

and preserve the social, economic and political stability of
the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to
offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson
recognizes the need to lessen the severity of punishment
commensurate to the act or acts committed, depending on
the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
Under Sec. 4 of PD 1613, if special aggravating
circumstances are present in the commission of Simple
Arson, the penalty under Sec. 3 shall be imposed in its
maximum period: (a) If committed with intent to gain; (b) If
committed for the benefit of another; (c) If the offender is
motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant
of the property burned; and, (d) If committed by a

syndicate, or group of three (3) or more persons. If by
reason, or on the occasion of Simple Arson death results,
the penalty of reclusion perpetuato death shall be imposed.
Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of
Arson, it may be inferred from the acts of the accused.
There is a presumption that one intends the natural
consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has
deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not 15
bound to produce further evidence of his wrongful intent.
If there is an eyewitness to the crime of Arson, he can give
in detail the acts of the accused. When this is done 16the only
substantial issue is the credibility of the witness. In the
crime of Arson, the prosecution may describe the theatre of
the crime and the conditions and circumstances
surrounding
17
it. Evidence of this type is part of the res
gestae.
It is well settled in our jurisdiction that the factual
findings of the court a quo as well as the conclusions on the
credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed. We
have no cogent reason to deviate from this rule in the case
at bar.
On the basis of the categorical testimony of Honey
Rosario Cimagala positively identifying accused-appellant
as the one responsible for the burning of the house of Fe
Cimagala in the early morning of 18 September 1998, the
trial court found the accused Nestor G. Soriano guilty as
charged.
_______________
15 Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Arson (1st ed., 1986), Sec. 283 at p.
303.
16 Id., Sec. 287 at p. 307.
17 Id., Sec. 302 at p. 323.
374

People vs. Soriano
The accused’s denial of the crime cannot be an 18adequate

defense against the charge. In People v. Mahinay we held
that mere denial by witnesses particularly when not
corroborated or substantiated by clear and evidencing
evidence cannot prevail over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Denial being
in the nature of negative and self-serving evidence is
seldom given weight in law. Positive and forthright

declarations of witnesses are even held to be worthier of
credence than a self-serving denial.
We agree with the court a quo that the quantum of proof
required to convict an accused in a criminal case has been
satisfied in the present dispute. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only
moral certainty is required, or that degree of 19
proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
The legal basis of the trial court for convicting accused-
appellant is Art. 320, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659, Sec. 10, par. 1. Under this provision,
a person found guilty of Destructive Arson is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death, where the burning affects one
(1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single
act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, or
committed on several or different occasions.
However, we believe that the applicable20
provision of law
should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other
cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-
appellant are specifically described as houses,
contemplating inhabited houses ordwellingsunder the
aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second
Amended Information particularly refer to the structures
as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The
applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD
1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal
_______________
18 G.R. No. 125311,17 March 1999, 304 SCRA 767.

19 Sec. 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
20 The relevant provision of PD 1613 states:
“Sec. 3. Other Cases of Arson.—The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion

Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following x x x x
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling x x x x”
375
VOL. 407, JULY 29, 2003 375

People vs. Soriano
Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it

is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly
against the government, and literally in favor of the

accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613
are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from
Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of
the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of
The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes ‘for being grievous, odious
and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent
or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity
are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency
21
and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society.” On the other hand, acts committed under
PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser
degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes
with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic,
political and national security implications than
Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple
Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive
Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-
appellant neither appears to be heinous nor represents a
greater degree of perversity and viciousness as
distinguished from those acts punishable under Art. 320 of
The Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was
established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The
special aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant
was ‘‘motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or
occupant of the property burned” cannot be appreciated in
the present case where it appears that he was acting more
on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real
spite or hatred
22
that impelled him to give vent to his
wounded ego. Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover
or a disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances
that surrounded the burning of the Ci-
_______________
21 See Preamble, RA 7659.

22 See People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 100699, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 70.
376
People vs. Soriano
magala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty

of Simple Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613
for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house or
dwelling.
In addition, we find that there exists a mitigating
circumstance that should have been appreciated by the
trial court in determining the penalty to be imposed on the
accused-appellant: a circumstance
23
similar and analogous to
passion and obfuscation. An impulse of invidious or
resentful feelings contemplates a situation akin to passion
and obfuscation. This circumstance is mitigating since, like
passion and obfuscation, the accused who acts with these
feelings suffers a diminution of his intelligence and intent,
a reduction in his mental and rational faculties.
It has been satisfactorily shown by the court a quo that
the lovers’ quarrel between Nestor Soriano and Honey
Rosario Cimagala ignited the chain of events that led to the
conflagration that occurred in the early dawn of 18
September 1998. Passions were inflamed in the evening of
17 September 1998 due to the impending return of Soriano
to Manila the following day with the prospect of leaving
behind in Davao his son Otoy who bears his namesake
“Nestor Jr.” But reason, unfortunately, did not prevail;
emotions took control of the events that were to unfold. His
efforts went to naught; his attempts to win back his
forbidden love were likewise thwarted. Verily, the
resentment accused-appellant felt came from the
realization that he may never see his son again once he left
Davao; that his utter frustration in trying to convince
Honey Rosario Cimagala to return to Manila with their son
brought with it a reduction of his rational faculties within
that moment in time. Although emanating from lawful
sentiments, the actuations of accused-appellant led to his
criminal act of burning the Cimagala home, and other
neighboring houses. In other words, accused-appellant was
in a state of extreme emotional stress.
Mr. Justice Adam C. Carson,24 in his concurring opinion
in United States v. Butardo, gives his view on the
graduation of penalties for the crime of Arson under the
Spanish Penal Code. In the old law on which The Revised
Penal Code is based, he comments that the authors clearly
had in mind certain considerations in imposing penalties of
exceptional severity in the various cases of arson. The
_______________
23 Art. 13, par. 10, The Revised Penal Code.

24 11 Phil. 60, 62 (1908). See Carson, J., concurring.
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People vs. Soriano
observations of Mr. Justice Carson in Butardo are thus still

relevant in our contemporary interpretation of criminal
law:
The authors of the Spanish Penal Code, in imposing penalties of

exceptional severity in certain cases of arson, clearly had in mind:
First. The extreme danger to which human lives may be
exposed by the malicious burning of dwelling houses and the like;
Second. The danger to property resulting from widespread
conflagrations;
Third. The fact that it is extremely difficult to adopt
precautions against the commission of the crime, and to discover
the perpetrators after its commission.
Formerly, where these elements marked the commission of the
crime, the single penalty prescribed by law was that of death, but
this severity was finally relaxed, and while exceptionally severe
penalties are still imposed in such cases, the authors of the Penal
Code appear to have endeavored to graduate these penalties in
accordance with the degree of danger to life and property, resulting
from the commission of the crime.
To this end the severest penalties are prescribed for the
malicious burning of edifies in which large numbers of persons
are assembled. Less harsh, but still very severe penalties are
imposed on those setting fire to dwelling houses and other
buildings more or less permanently occupied. Less severe
penalties on those guilty of burning unoccupied dwellings, the
penalty being more or less severe as the house appeared to be
situated so as to make a widespread conflagration more or less
probable. And finally, sufficient, but not notably harsh penalties
are prescribed in cases where the property of others is set on fire
under conditions which do not suggest special danger to human
life or the likelihood of considerable destruction of property.
In a concurring opinion, this time in U.S. v. Burns, Mr.

Justice Ignacio Villamor
25
explains the rationale behind the
penalties for Arson:
In the opinion of Groizard, one of the most famous commentators

on the Spanish Penal Code, of which ours is but a copy, “it is the
potential damage that is considered here in fixing the grave
penalty of cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. The risk which a
person runs who may be found in a place that is burned, whether

it be a building, a farmhouse, a hut or shelter, or a vessel in port,
is what constitutes the gravity which is the object of this crime;
just as the damaging intent of the agent, manifested
_______________
25 41 Phil. 418, 440 (1921). See Villamor, J., concurring.
378

People vs. Soriano
by his setting fire to a place where he knows there is one or more

persons, gives an idea of his subjective perversity.”
The same author adds: “In the classification of the crime
attention must be given to the intention of the author. When fire
is used with the intent to kill a determined person who may be in
a shelter, and that object is secured, the crime committed is not
that defined herein, but that of murder, penalized in article 418
(art. 403 of the Penal Code of the Philippines), with the penalty of
cadena temporal in its maximum degree to death” (Groizard, Vol.
8, p. 45).
Accused-appellant is undoubtedly responsible for the fire

that occurred in the wee hours of 18 September 1998 that
razed to the ground the Cimagala home and a number of
other houses in the vicinity. Still, we believe that the
record shows that the elements discussed by Mr. Justice
Carson in his separate concurring opinion in Butardo are
wanting. We are therefore not adequately convinced that
imposing the exceptionally severe penalty of reclusion
perpetua is proper in the case at bar.
First. There appears to be no reckless disregard for
human lives indicative of a cold, calculating, wicked and
perverse intention to burn the Cimagala home. The action
of accused-appellant was the result of a lovers7 tiff between
him and Honey over their son, Otoy, and concerning the
future of their unbridled relationship. His spontaneous,
albeit criminal, act was carried out without any intention
to exterminate human lives. His purpose in going to Davao
was to convince his lover to move back with him to Manila
and bringing along their son Otoy.
Second. Neither was there any reckless disregard for the
rights of the neighboring property owners. The criminal act
of burning the Cimagala home was carried out by accused-
appellant in a diminished emotional state, which mitigates
his criminal liability to a lesser degree of criminality.
Third.The testimony of Honey clearly points to accused-

appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. However, the
conduct of accused-appellant after he consummated the
crime, i.e., when he set fire to the clothes of Honey, is
material in determining the severity of the penalty to be
imposed. After his impulsive act of setting fire to both the
plastic partition of the room and Honey’s clothes, he
attempted to mend his ways immediately by attempting to
put out the flames although it was too late. His act of
burning Honey’s clothes set in motion a chain of events
that spun out of
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VOL. 407, JULY 29, 2003 379

People vs. Soriano
control and led to the blaze that destroyed houses in its

path. However, despite the mayhem caused by accused-
appellant, he never fled the scene of the crime; in fact, he
watched helplessly as the flames consumed the Cimagala
home and the neighboring houses. He did not resist the
police authorities when he was invited for questioning at
the police station to shed light on the incident.
Thus, applying Mr. Justice Carson’s exceptional severity
standardas regards the imposition of penalties for the
crime of Arson, the degree of criminality involved in the
accused-appellant’s act is lessened by the fact that he acted
on an impulsethat diminished his reasoning faculties, thus
mitigating the punishment to be imposed. The proper
penalty to be imposed should therefore take into
consideration the analogous mitigating circumstance to
passion and obfuscation under Art. 13, par. 10, as
discussed above, in26 relation to Art. 64, par. 2, of The
Revised Penal Code.
Under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, in relation to Art. 64,
par. 2, of The Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty
for simple arson is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua
the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty next lower in degree to the imposable
penalty is prision mayor the range of which is six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years in any of its periods.
Under the circumstances, it is believed that an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years four (4) months
and twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum as
minimum to fourteen (14) years two (2) months and ten
(10) days of the minimum of reclusion temporal to reclusion

perpetua as maximum may be imposed on the accused.
As to the award of damages, this Court has consistently
held that proof is required to determine the reasonable
amount of damages that may be awarded to the victims of
conflagration. As a rule, therefore, actual or compensatory
damages must be proved
_______________
26 “Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three
periods.—In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three
periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three
different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with
the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the following rules, according to
whether there are or are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances x x x
x 2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of
the act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period x x x x”
380

People vs. Soriano
and not merely alleged. We believe that the records do not

adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of
actual damages to the offended parties. The court a quo
granted the award solely on the bare assertions of the
complaining witnesses. Moral damages cannot be awarded
in this case, as there is no evidentiary basis to justify it.
However, accused-appellant’s civil liability is beyond cavil;
what needs to be resolved is the amount of indemnity he
should pay to the owners of the burned houses for the
damage caused. In lieu thereof, this Court may award
temperate or moderate damages to the victims of the
conflagration in accordance with Art. 2224 of the Civil
Code. Indeed, the records evince that the victims suffered
some pecuniary loss although the amount thereof cannot be
proved with certainty. Consequently, temperate damages
in the amount of P250,000.00 which is considered
reasonable under the circumstances should be awarded to
each of the complaining witnesses or their heirs as the case
may be.
Exemplary or corrective damages should likewise be
awarded as a way to correct future conduct of this nature
and preserve the public good. Such damages are designed
to reshape behavior
27
that is socially deleterious in its
consequences. Hence, exemplary or corrective damages in
the amount of P50,000.00 for each of the above-mentioned

complaining witnesses or their heirs is fair and just under
the premises.
It must be noted that accused-appellant became an
unwitting victim of his own extra-marital indiscretions. His
flawed emotional disposition coupled with a lapse in
judgment became his own undoing as he now languishes in
jail for choosing the road to perdition. Although he has no
one to blame but himself for his vicissitudes, we believe
that the lessons to be learned from this sad and miserable
chapter of his life are more than adequate from which he
can gain insight and wisdom, while he sits patiently in his
prison cell waiting for the day when he can once again
breathe the invigorating air of freedom.
WHEREFORE, Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City finding accused-appellant NESTOR G.
SORIANO guilty of Destructive Arson is MODIFIED to
Simple Arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, and the
penalty imposed on him REDUCED to an
_______________
27 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the

Philippines, Vol. V (2d Ed., 1992), p. 663, citing cases.
381
VOL. 407, JULY 29, 2003 381

People vs. Pateño
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years four (4) months

and twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum as
minimum to fourteen (14) years two (2) months and ten
(10) days of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum.
Temperate damages in the amount of P250,000.00 and
exemplary damages of P50,000.00 are AWARDED to each
of complaining witnesses Fructuosa L. Jambo, Simplicio B.
Cabrera, Francisco Clerigo, Orlando Braña and Oscar T.
Cimagala. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and

Tinga, JJ., concur.
Judgment modified.
Note.—While it is not necessary to inquire into an

accused’s motive for doing a criminal act, especially where
he admits his transgression, it is important to know the

reason for the commission of the crime if only to gain
judicial perspective of the case. (People vs. Patalinghug,
318 SCRA 116 [1999])
——o0o——
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4/7/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 407

VOL. 407, JULY 29, 2003 367

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. NESTOR

Criminal Law; Arson; Arson is classified into two kinds: (1)

368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Soriano

Same; same; Destructive arson distinguished from simple

APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

WHAT STARTED OUT AS AN ORDINARY LOVERS’

simmered down, Nestor G. Soriano found himself charged

1 Decision penned by Presiding Judge Renato A. Fuentes, RTC-Br. 17,

VOL. 407, JULY 29, 2003 369

The factual backdrop: About midnight of 17 September

370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

frantically shouted to her uncle Simplicio Cabrera, who

property,” as a special aggravating circumstance, further

VOL. 407, JULY 29, 2003 371

On 3 September 1999, the RTC of Davao City, Branch 17,

13 Under Art. 320, as amended, the enumeration of the instances for

372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is punishable

On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to

VOL. 407, JULY 29, 2003 373

crimes involving destruction, protect the national economy

of the property burned; and, (d) If committed by a

374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The accused’s denial of the crime cannot be an 18adequate

seldom given weight in law. Positive and forthright

18 G.R. No. 125311,17 March 1999, 304 SCRA 767.

“Sec. 3. Other Cases of Arson.—The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling x x x x”

VOL. 407, JULY 29, 2003 375

Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it

against the government, and literally in favor of the

21 See Preamble, RA 7659.

376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Soriano

magala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty

23 Art. 13, par. 10, The Revised Penal Code.

VOL. 407, JULY 29, 2003 377

observations of Mr. Justice Carson in Butardo are thus still

The authors of the Spanish Penal Code, in imposing penalties of

In a concurring opinion, this time in U.S. v. Burns, Mr.

In the opinion of Groizard, one of the most famous commentators

person runs who may be found in a place that is burned, whether

25 41 Phil. 418, 440 (1921). See Villamor, J., concurring.

378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

by his setting fire to a place where he knows there is one or more

Accused-appellant is undoubtedly responsible for the fire

Third.The testimony of Honey clearly points to accused-

VOL. 407, JULY 29, 2003 379

control and led to the blaze that destroyed houses in its

(10) days of the minimum of reclusion temporal to reclusion

380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and not merely alleged. We believe that the records do not

the amount of P50,000.00 for each of the above-mentioned

27 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the

VOL. 407, JULY 29, 2003 381