Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Handbook

1. This handbook provides basic reference information on Bosnia and

Herzegovina, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and
communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to
familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist
them during their assignment to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. This product is published under the auspices of the U.S. Department of

Defense Intelligence Production Program (DoDIPP) with the Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity designated as the community coordinator for the Country
Handbook Program. This product reflects the coordinated U.S. Defense
Intelligence Community position on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3. Dissemination and use of this publication is restricted to official military and

government personnel from the United States of America, United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia, NATO member countries, and other countries as required
and designated for support of coalition operations.
4. The photos and text reproduced herein have been extracted solely for
research, comment, and information reporting, and are intended for fair use by
designated personnel in their official duties, including local reproduction for
training. Further dissemination of copyrighted material contained in this
document, to include excerpts and graphics, is strictly prohibited under Title 17,
U.S. Code.
Contents

KEY FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S. MISSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
U.S. Embassy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
U.S. Consulate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Entry Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Currency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Customs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Topography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Vegetation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Effects on Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Climate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Rail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Maritime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Radio and Television . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Telephone and Telegraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

iii
Contents (Continued)

CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Education and Literacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Religion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Social Customs and Courtesies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Greetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Gestures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Visiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Eating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Dress Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
War Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Displaced Persons and Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
MEDICAL ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Disease Risk to Deployed Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Medical Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Key Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Summary of Dayton Accord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
National Level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Entity Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Key Government Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
International Community Presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Military Presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Civilian Presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
International Police Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

iv
Contents (Continued)

ECONOMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Industries, Manufacturing, and Agriculture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Reforms and Outlook. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
THREAT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Terrorism and Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Political Instability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Drug Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Land Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
ARMED FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Defense Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
The Vojske Republik Srpska (VRS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
The Vojske Federacije Hrvatska (VF-H) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
The Vojske Federacije Bosne I Herzegovina (VF-B) . . . . . . 63
Train and Equip Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Key Military Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Military Statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Paramilitary and Police Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
RS Police. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Federation Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Brcko Multiethnic Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Bosnia and Herzegovina State Border Service . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Weapons of Mass Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

v
Contents (Continued)

Appendices

A. Equipment Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

B. International Time Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1
C. Conversion Charts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1
D. Holidays. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1
E. Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1
F. Road Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1
G. Deployed Personnel’s Guide to Health Maintenance . . . . . . . . G-1
H. Individual Protective Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-1
I. Dangerous Animals and Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-1
J. International Telephone Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J-1

List of Illustrations
Bosnia and Herzegovina. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
National Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Downtown Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Topography and Drainage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Mountainous Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Steep Terrain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Military Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Sarajevo and Banja Luka Weather Charts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Mostar and Tuzla Weather Charts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Transportation Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Railway Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Sarajevo Airfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Neretva River in Mostar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Ethnic Groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Home Destroyed by War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Returnees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

vi
Contents (Continued)

War-wrecked Home in Stolac. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Princeps Bridge in Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Radovan Karadzic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Mostar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Dayton Peace Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Government Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
SFOR Flag Raising. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Unexploded Ordnance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
SFOR Soldier Working with VF-B Soldier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
SFOR Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Organization of Military and Civilian Operation in Bosnia . . . . . . 53
Land Use. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
VF-H Soldier During Mineclearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
VRS Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Republic of Serbia Police Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Republik Srpska Special Police Patch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Bosnia and Herzegovina Police Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
MEPF Brassard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
IPTF Uniform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

vii
 16° 17° 18° Osijek 19°
Karlovac
Sisak Sa Pakrac
va
CROATIA Vinkovci Novi
Danu Sad
Slunj Slavonski
Brod
Sa
Bosanska va
Bosanski Bosanski
Novi Prijedor
Gradiska
Brod sn Ruma
45°

Bo
Una Omarska Derventa
Bosanska
Bihac Krupa Brcko
Sanski Banja Luka Sabac Sava
Doboj Bijeljina
Most
Bosanski
Petrovac Teslic
Udbina Loznica
Vrba

Lukavac
Tuzla
Zivinice
Drvar Zvornik
Jajce Drina
Gracac
Valjevo
Zenica Kladanj
Vares Vlasenica
Bugojno
Knin 44°

SARAJEVO Titovo
Livno Uzice
Sibenik Visegrad
Sinj
Konjic a
Jablanica
N Dr i n
va Neretv
er e

Vall Foca
t

Split ey
Mostar Pljevlja
Bosnia and Brac

Herzegovina YUGOSLAVIA
Gacko
Hvar
National capital Ploce
City 43°
International
boundary Korcula Bileca
Republic Niksic
boundary Trebinje
Mljet
Expressway Dubrovnik
Major roads
CROATIA
0 2 4 60 km Adri Titograd
atic S (Podgorica)
0 2 40 mi e a Tivat
ALBANIA

Bosnia and Herzegovina

viii
KEY FACTS

Official Name. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, composed of

the Bosniak (refers to Bosnian-Muslims) /Bosnian Croat Federacija
Bosna i Herzegovina (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the
Bosnian-Serb-led Republika Srpska (RS).
Flag. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s flag has a medium-blue background.
Centered on the flag is a yellow isosceles triangle that is situated with a
45-degree angle (nearest hoist side) and its right angle (nearest fly side)
flush to the flag’s top; its other 45-degree angle is at the bottom. To the
left of triangle’s hypotenuse are seven white stars and two white half-
stars; the half stars are at the top and bottom.
Head of State. The Bosnia and Herzegovina presidency is shared by
three members, one Bosniak (a Bosnian Muslim), one Bosnian Croat,
and one Bosnian Serb. Members of the tripresidency rotate as chairman
every 8 months.
Time Zone. GMT+2, EST+7 hours. [NOTE: From last Sunday in
March to the last Sunday in October, it is GMT+3 hours.]
Population. 3,835,777
Languages. Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian (each is a similar dialect of
Serbo-Croatian)

National Flag

1
U.S. MISSION
U.S. Embassy
Ambassador Ambassador Clifford Bond (April 2001)
Location Sarajevo
Mailing Address Alipasina 43, 71000
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Phone [387] (71) 445-700
FAX [387] (71) 659-722

U.S Consulate
The Consular section of the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo is open to the pub-
lic on weekdays, except for national holidays, from 0900 to 1530. In
addition to assisting with emergency situations, the Consulate may assist

Downtown Sarajevo

2
with registration of U.S. citizens; replacement or renewal of passports;
absentee voting assistance; notary services; and various other services.
The U.S. Embassy’s homepage on the Internet, http://www.usis.com.ba/,
provides additional travel information. Current travel advisories are
available from http://travel.state.gov/bosnia-herzegovina.html.

Entry Requirements

A passport is required for U.S. citizens entering Bosnia and Herze-

govina. A visa is not required for tourist stays up to 3 months. Unless
the traveler is staying at a hotel, all foreigners must register with the
local police department. Military personnel enter Bosnia and Herze-
govina with identification card and official orders. Additional infor-
mation is available from the Consular section of the Embassy of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2109 E Street, N.W., Washington, DC
20037, telephone: (202) 337-1500.

Currency

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s currency is the konvertible mark (KM).

The KM can be used throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina with a
value of 1 deutsche mark (DM) = 1 KM. The Eurodollar and the Ger-
man mark are also accepted. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a cash
economy; credit cards are rarely accepted. The central bank in Sara-
jevo has only recently begun accepting traveler’s checks.

Customs

The following goods may be imported in to Bosnia without incurring a

customs duty: 200 cigarettes or 20 cigars or 200g of tobacco; 1 liter of
alcohol; 1 bottle of perfume; and gifts to the value of DM150.

3
GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE
Geography
Bosnia and Herzegovina is in southeast Europe on the Balkan Peninsula,
east of the Adriatic Sea. It has a land area of 51,233 square kilometers,
which is slightly smaller than West Virginia. Like the rest of the Balkans

Warta Vist BELARUS

ula
BERLIN Pripyat'
WARSAW
GERMANY
Od

POLAND Bug
er

KIEV
a
tul

Main PRAGUE UKRAINE

Vis

Elbe
Dn
Da CZECH REPUBLIC est
er
nu
be SLOVAKIA
VIENNA BRATISLAVA
MOLDOVA
LIECH. AUSTRIA BUDAPEST CHISINAU
SWITZ. HUNGARY
SLOVENIA Dra
va
LJUBLJANA
ZAGREB
ROMANIA
Sava
Po
SAN BOSNIA AND BUCHAREST
MARINO HERZEGOVINA BELGRADE
SARAJEVO Danube
CROATIA YUGOSLAVIA
Black
ere

BULGARIA Sea
Tev

Adriatic SOFIA
ROME Sea TITOGRAD SKOPJE
ITALY MACEDONIA Istan
TIRANE

ALBANIA
0 100 200 300 km
GREECE Aegean Sea TURKEY
0 100 200 mi

Eastern Europe

4
region, Bosnia and Herzegovina is subject to earthquakes. Within Bos-
nia and Herzegovina’s recognized borders, the country is divided into a
joint Bosniak/Bosnian Croat Federation (51 percent of the territory) and
the Bosnian Serb-led RS (49 percent of the territory); the region called
Herzegovina borders Croatia and has traditionally been settled by an
ethnic Croat majority.
Land Boundaries (kilometers)
Croatia 932 (to the north and west)
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 527

Topography

The most prominent physical characteristic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

is the rugged mountains and hills of the Dinaric range. The Dinaric
range is the principal mountain chain of the Balkans and parallels, north
to south, the Adriatic coast. The highest peak in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina is Mt. Maglic, which is 2,386 meters above sea level.

The mountains of Bosnia and Herzegovina have rocky, sharply crested

peaks and ridges. Interspersed between them are deep, heavily forested
gorges and shaped valleys. The Dinaric range has numerous flat depres-
sions formed in the limestone hills. The depressions can range from a
few kilometers to more than 30 kilometers in length. This terrain is often
referred to as karst. The surface of the karst area is rocky, featuring
many desolate cliffs that support little vegetation. In the north, the foot-
hills of the Dinarics merge with the northern plains.

Geologic faults are widespread in the mountains of Bosnia and Herze-

govina. Periodic shifts cause earth tremors and occasional earthquakes.
The most vulnerable region to such disturbances lies between Banja
Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Skopje, The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

5
 CROATIA

Prijedor Bosanski
Brod

Bihac
Banja Luka Brcko
Doboj Bijeljina

Teslic
Tuzla

Zvornik
Drvar Zenica
Srebrenica
Bugojno

Livno SARAJEVO
CROATIA

Konjic Gorazde
Foca

Adriatic Mostar
Sea
YUGOSLAVIA
ELEVATION IN METERS
Stolac
2,000+
1,000 - 2,000
500 - 1,000 CROATIA
200 - 500
0 - 200 ALBANIA

Topography and Drainage

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s two main rivers are the Drina and Neretva
Rivers. The Neretva River is the principal source of drainage to the
Adriatic Sea from the mountains of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
Neretva flows through narrow, steep-sided gorges with numerous rapids,
bends and a high velocity. The banks are primarily rocky and high with
more than 46 percent slope. These banks rise more than 152 meters
above the river. The Drina River’s width ranges from 50 to 375 meters.

6
Mountainous Terrain

In the upper reaches, depths are generally 1.2 to 2.4 meters and deeper
than 2.4 meters in the lower reaches. The Drina River valley is also char-
acterized by narrow, steep gorges. In mountainous areas, the river has
high velocity rapids and numerous bends. The hills and mountains are
rocky, high, steep, and may rise to over 300 meters above the river val-
ley. As the Drina River reaches in the northern plains, velocity
decreases, gradients decrease, and the river’s flow is interrupted in
places by deposits. Bank heights along the Drina average between 1.0
and 5.0 meters with banks often exceeding 60 percent slope. High water
for both rivers lasts from early March through June and low water lasts
from mid July to late October. In karst areas, water seeps through the
limestone and creates large underground channels. Occasionally the
underground channels emerge as springs on the surface.

The northern plains are the only extensive lowland area of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The lowlands contain the wide Sava River basin; alluvial
plains; sandy dunes; and low, rolling hills covered with fertile loam.
This area is farmed or used to raise livestock.

7
Steep Terrain

Vegetation
Varying elevations and climate, particularly in the highlands, have
resulted in a mixture of forest types. The forests of Bosnia and Herze-
govina provide the highest quality timber in the Balkans; however, poor
forestry practices are degrading many of the remaining forests. Thick
forests grow at the higher elevations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some
thick forests remain due to their inaccessibility, though excessive log-
ging is a growing problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Evergreen trees
include some fir, pine, and spruce. Deciduous forests are mainly oak and
beech. Brush covers the lower elevations.
Cultivation primarily occurs in the northern plains, which has the most
fertile soil in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The principal crops are wheat

8
and corn, but vegetables and sunflowers are also grown. Orchards and
vineyards are also tended on the northern plains.
Effect on Military Operations
Varying terrain and weather subject military operations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina to difficult conditions. Weather conditions and terrain may
impede road and cross-country movement.The mountains, steep hills,
and rough karst that cover 80 percent of the country have a profound
effect on military activities. Cross-country movement of wheeled and
15° 18° Yugoslav republic names that appear on this map
vary from the
21°native forms generally approved by 24°
Budapest the US Board on Geographic names.
Lake
AUSTRIA Balaton Variant Form Native Form
Bosnia and Hercegovina*..............Bosna i Hercegovina
Croatia...........................................Hrvatska
Macedonai.....................................Makedonija
ITALY Slovenia HUNGARY Montenegro...................................Crna Gora
Serbia............................................Srbija
Slovinia..........................................Slovenija
Ljubljana
Zagreb
0 50 100 Kilometers
Croatia Vojvodina
0 50 100 Miles

Novi Sad 45°

ROMANIA
Belgrade
Bosnia and
Hercegovina
Serbia
Sarajevo
Ad BULG.
ria
tic
Montenegro
Se Pristina
a
Titograd Sofia
Lake Kosovo
ITALY Former Yugoslavia Scutari
42°
National Capital
Plains - 0 to 50 feet above valley Skopje
bottoms; less than 10% slope
Macedonia
Hills - 500 to 2,000 feet above
adjacent valley bottoms; 10% to Tiranë
30% slope
Mountains - Crests greater than Lake
2,000 feet above adjacent valley Ohrid
bottoms; greater than 30% slope *Kosovo and Vojvodina are
Lake GREECE
ALBANIA
autonomous provices within
Prespa
Swamp the Republic of Serbia.

Military Terrain

9
tracked vehicles is complicated in these areas. In the northern plains,
valleys, and adjacent hills in the east, movement is feasible most of the
year. Off-road vehicular movement, in general, would be easier in sum-
mer and autumn than it would be in winter and early spring when the
ground is soft and wet. Heavy rains and spring thaw often flood lowly-
ing areas, particularly in the river valleys.

Climate

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s climate is similar to that in the northern con-

tinental United States; acclimating to conditions should not pose a prob-
lem for most U.S. personnel.

The mean daily summertime temperatures in Bosnia and Herzegovina at

lower elevations range from 70°F to the low 90s, with much cooler tem-
peratures in the mountains. The mean daily winter temperatures at low
elevations range from the mid-teens to the low 50s F, with colder tem-
peratures in the interior highlands and warmer temperatures near the
Adriatic coast. Spring and autumn temperatures are intermediate
between the winter and summer extremes.

Mean annual precipitation varies greatly in the country. Precipitation

ranges from a low of 500 millimeters in the southeast mountain valleys
to more than 4,500 millimeters on south slopes facing the southern
Adriatic Sea. Mean relative humidity is moderate to high in the coastal
areas, with annual averages of 80 to 95 percent in the mornings and 60
to 70 percent in the afternoons at interior locations. The drying effect of
down-slope winds causes annual averages of 60 to 80 percent in the
early mornings and 50 to 70 percent in the afternoons at coastal loca-
tions. Relative humidity is usually highest in autumn and winter and
lowest in summer.

Surface winds are normally light and variable in the country. Gale force
winds (28 knots or greater) have occurred along the coast and in the
highest mountain ranges, especially during winter.

10
 SARAJEVO
o
F TEMPERATURE PRECIPITATION
120
15 Snow
Rain
100

80

10
60
D
A
Y
40 S

20 5
Extreme High
0 Average High
Average Low
Extreme Low

-20
0
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D

BANJA LUKA
o
F TEMPERATURE PRECIPITATION
120
Snow
15 Rain
100

80

60 D 10
A
Y
S
40

20 5
Extreme High
Average High
Average Low
0 Extreme Low

-20 0
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D

Sarajevo and Banja Luka Weather Charts

11
 MOSTAR
o
F TEMPERATURE PRECIPITATION
120
15 Snow
Rain

100

80
10
D
A
60 Y
S

40 5

Extreme High
20 Average High
Average Low
Extreme Low

0 0
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D

TUZLA
o
F TEMPERATURE PRECIPITATION
120
Snow
15 Rain
100

80

60 D 10
A
Y
40 S

20 5
Extreme High
Average High
Average Low
0 Extreme Low

-20 0
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D

Mostar and Tuzla Weather Charts

12
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s mountainous terrain makes lines of commu-

nication in country difficult to establish and maintain. Yugoslavia (for-
merly referred to as Serbia and Montenegro) had begun updating its
transportation systems, though many improvements were undone by the
war. Most areas experienced varying degrees of damage or destruction
to transportation and communication infrastructure.

Transportation
Roads
Most of the roads in Bosnia and Herzegovina's highway system are
asphalt surfaced, have numerous bridges, and traverse rough terrain.
City streets, as well as more remote area roads, typically have uneven or
broken surfaces of cobblestones, tar, or gravel. Most areas of the country
are accessible via asphalt roads. Road conditions are subject to drastic
changes due to weather conditions. Primary routes have numerous
bridges that cross streams. In some of the mountainous areas, bridges
are easily washed out. These significant obstacles are difficult to impos-
sible to bypass because of the rough terrain. Furthermore, hazardous
conditions such as falling rocks, blind curves, frequent blinding rains,
blinding snowstorms, and an occasional violent crosswind (known as
the Bora) can also affect highway travel throughout the country.
Road travel throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina is possible, although
some roads remain impassable due to war damage. Travel by road
should be considered risky, as roads are not well maintained, Bosnian
driving habits are often dangerous, and vehicles are generally in poor
condition. Accidents occur on winding mountain roads when drivers
exceed safe driving speeds. Drunk driving is an increasing cause for
concern in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Due to a lack of street lighting
(except Sarajevo) and poorly marked construction sites, driving at night

13
 16° 17° 18° Osijek 19°
Karlovac
Sisak Sa Pakrac
va
CROATIA Vinkovci Novi
Danu Sad
Slunj Slavonski
Brod
Sa
Bosanska va
Bosanski
Novi Prijedor
Gradiska sn Ruma
Bosanski 45°

Bo
Una Omarska Derventa Brod
Bosanska
Bihac Krupa Brcko
Sanski Banja Luka Sabac Sava
Doboj Bijeljina
Most
Bosanski
Petrovac Teslic
Udbina Loznica
Vrba

Lukavac
Tuzla
Zivinice
Drvar Zvornik
Jajce Drina
Gracac
Valjevo
Zenica Kladanj
Vares Vlasenica
Bugojno
Knin 44°

SARAJEVO Titovo
Livno Uzice
Sibenik Visegrad
Sinj
Konjic a
Jablanica Dr i n
Bosnia and N
va Neretva
er e

Herzegovina
Split
Vall
Foca
t

ey

National capital Mostar Pljevlja

Brac
City
International
Gacko
YUGOSLAVIA
boundary
Hvar
Republic Ploce
boundary 43°
Expressway
Major roads Korcula Bileca
Railroads
Trebinje Niksic
Major airports Mljet
Dubrovnik
Major ports
CROATIA
0 2 4 60 km Adri Titograd
atic S (Podgorica)
0 2 40 mi e a Tivat
ALBANIA

Transportation Network
can be extremely dangerous. Due to a recent trend of carjacking and
poor driving conditions, travelers are encouraged to use convoys and
restrict driving to daytime.
Total roadway 21,846 km
Paved 11,425 km Unpaved 10,421 km

14
Rail
There is a total of 1,021 kilometers of railroad in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, 795 kilometers of which are electrified. The remainder of the rail
system is operating under diesel or steam power until power grids are
repaired). The gauge is standard, 1.435 meter. Large rail segments
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina require repairs.

Railway Line

15
Air

Bosnia and Herzegovina has numerous airfields but only nine have
paved runways. Of the paved airfields only two are designated interna-
tional airports, Sarajevo and Mostar. The Bosnia and Herzegovina
Department of Civil Aviation (BHDCA) is the central body for all civil
aviation matters in Bosnia. The United States Federal Aviation Admin-
istration has not assessed the BHDCA for compliance with international
aviation safety standards.

There is limited commercial air service between Sarajevo and major

regional airports.
Total airfields with paved runways 9
2,438 to 3,047 m 4
1,524 to 2,437 m 2
914 to 1,523 m 1
under 914 m 2
Total airfields with unpaved runways 16
1,524 to 2,437 m 1
914 to 1,523 m 7
under 914 m 8

Sarajevo Airfield

16
 Airfields
NAME LATITUDE LONGITUDE LENGTH/ AIRCRAFT
WIDTH (m)
Banja Luka 44.56N 017.18E 8,213/148 N/A
Mostar 43.17N 017.51E 7,874/158 N/A
Sarajevo 43.49N 018.20E 8,530/147 C-5, 17,130,141
Sarajevo-
Butmir 43.49N 018.20E 3,940/260 N/A
Tuzla 44.27N 018.43E 8,153/148 C-5, 17,130,141
Maritime

Most waterways in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not navigable due to

inadequate depth and dangerous rapids. Inland ports, such as Bosanska
Gradiska, Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Samac, and Brcko are not opera-

Neretva River in Mostar

17
tional because of wartime damages. Additionally, downed bridges, silt,
and debris block large sections of the Sava River.
Ports and harbors: Bosanska Gradiska, Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Samac,
and Brcko [NOTE: all are inland waterway ports on the Sava River,
none is fully operational], and Orasje.

Communication
Radio and Television
Numerous radio and television stations operate in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina. Though nationalist parties control some of these stations, many are
working to establish media free from government control.

Telephone and Telegraph

By the end of the 1980s, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a highly digitized
telephone network. The Post Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) Company
was the state-controlled, monopoly operator of the network. The tele-
communications system in Bosnia and Herzegovina was severely dam-
aged during the war, particularly along the Inter-Entity Boundary Line
(IEBL). While reconstruction has progressed since the signing of the
Dayton Accord (see History section for a summary of accord), the tele-
communications system is rudimentary compared to its pre-war status.
Estimates of war damage exceeded US$220 million. Damaged and
destroyed facilities include transmission and switching equipment,
buildings, microwave towers, and overhead and underground cables.
Exacerbating the telecommunication problem is a lack of trained
repair personnel; many became casualties or refugees during the war.
Though repair and upgrade projects continue, the telecommunica-
tions system is unable to provide adequate service, particularly dur-
ing bad weather.
The former PTT system has been split into three regional sub-networks,
each operated by PTT. There are two PTTs operating in the Federation

18
and one in the Republik of Srpska. PTT BiH is the largest of the three
companies and operates from Sarajevo. PTT BiH handles all interna-
tional calls for the Federation. HPT Mostar is a joint venture with the
Croatian HPT and operates from Mostar. Telekom Srpske (TS) serves
the RS. TS is a limited network with poor service. All international calls
for the RS are routed through Yugoslavia.

CULTURE

Population

According to a July 2000 estimate, the population of Bosnia and

Herzegovina is 3,835,777. The ethnic composition of the population
is 40 percent, Serb; 38 percent, Muslim; and 22 percent, Croat
[NOTE: The Croats claim they now comprise only 17 percent of the
total population.]

According to the 1974 Constitution, the three official languages of

former Yugoslavia were Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian.
Serbo-Croatian is written in the Latin alphabet in Croatia and in the
Cyrillic alphabet in Yugoslavia. The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina
speak Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian (essentially dialects of Serbo-
Croatian); the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets are used.

Education and Literacy

Children of Bosnia and Herzegovina begin primary school at age 7,

and continue for the next 8 years — further education is not manda-
tory. Education is free to citizens at all levels, but those who can
afford to pay may enroll above the normal entrance quotas. A unified
curriculum is being developed, with international assistance, to pro-
vide history and cultural classes for the population. The adult literacy
rate is 98 percent.

19
 16° 17° 18° Osijek 19°
Karlovac
Sisak Sa Pakrac
va
CROATIA Vinkovci Novi
Sad
Slavonski Danu
Slunj
Brod
Sa
Bosanska va
Bosanski Gradiska Bosanski
Novi Prijedor Ruma
Brod 45°
Derventa sn
Una Omarska

Bo
Bosanska
Bihac Krupa Brcko
Sanski Banja Luka Doboj Sabac Sava
Most Bijeljina
Bosanski
Petrovac Teslic
Udbina Loznica
Vrba

Lukavac
Tuzla
Zivinice
Drvar Zvornik
Jajce Drina
Gracac
Valjevo
Zenica Kladanj
Vares Vlasenica
Bugojno
Knin 44°

SARAJEVO Titovo
Livno Uzice
Sibenik Visegrad
Sinj
Konjic a
Jablanica Dr i n
Neretv Foca
Split

Mostar Pljevlja
Bosnia and Brac

Herzegovina Gacko YUGOSLAVIA

Hvar
National capital Ploce
City 43°

Serb Korcula Bileca

Croat Niksic
Trebinje
Bosnia Mljet
Dubrovnik
Other
0 2 4 60 km Adri CROATIA Titograd
atic S (Podgorica)
0 2 40 mi e a Tivat
ALBANIA

Ethnic Groups

Religion

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s people are religiously affiliated as follows:

Muslim - 40 percent; Orthodox - 31 percent; Catholic - 15 percent; Prot-
estant - 4 percent; and others 10 percent

20
Religious affiliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is closely linked with
the politics of nationality. Bosnian Serbs are predominantly Eastern
Orthodox, while Bosnian Croats are mostly Roman Catholic. The Bos-
niak are Bosnians who have chosen Islam as their religion. Religious
animosity among the three major denominations remains a divisive cul-
tural and political factor.

Social Customs and Courtesies

Greetings
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, people generally shake hands in greeting
and often say “dobro jutro” (good morning), “dobar dan” (good day), or
“dobro vecer” (good evening). The informal greeting, “zdravo” (hi) is
also used. It is also common for Bosniak or Bosnian Croat friends to
kiss one another once on each cheek; Bosnian Serbs will kiss a total of
three times. It is customary for younger people to greet older people
first. It is also custom for women to offer a handshake to men first,
except women adhering to strict Islamic customs. Covered Bosniak
(Muslim) women should not be addressed or offered a handshake.
When addressing a Bosnian, “Gospadin” (Mr.) and “Gospodja/Gos-
podijica” (Mrs./Miss) are the accepted titles. Bosnians also use the
informal “Ti” (you) when conversing among peers. Friends and family
call each other by first name. When writing the name, it is common to
use the surname before the given name.

Gestures
Friends often greet each other across a short distance with a wave; how-
ever, shouting in public and beckoning with the finger is considered rude.
Most Bosnians smoke despite laws that prohibit smoking in public. When
crossing streets in Bosnia and Herzegovina, caution must be taken since
most Bosnian drivers do not allow pedestrians to cross. In contrast, Bos-
nians are respectful of elders, and will offer their seats on public transpor-
tation. Bosnians expect eye contact prior to the giving of a toast.

21
 Vogosca
Sarajevo

a
Bosn
873
Lepenica Center 880
Sarajevo
Rajlovac
Airfield Rajlovac
683
Novo
494 Sarajevo
jac
Mi

ka Stari
l

Novi
Grad Grad
Do
brin 969
ja

670

Ilidza 1432
Dobrinja
Sarajevo 678
International
Airport 510 Spot elevations in meters
0 1 2 3 km
Ze

Butmir
le
znica

Airfield 0 1 2 mi

Sarajevo

Visiting

Bosnian family and friends visit each other regularly. Visits are usually
unannounced and take place during the weekend. Guests often bring a small
gift of flowers, coffee, wine, or candies; a gift is expected of first-time
guests. Flowers are given in even numbers since odd numbers are reserved
for funerals. Roses are given as gifts either singularly or in bunches. When
entering a Bosnian home, it is customary to remove the shoes and replace
them with slippers. Hosts will normally serve coffee at the beginning and
end of each visit. During formally arranged visits, hosts will prepare meze,

22
which is a variety of fried pies, dried meats, salads, and cheeses. Unan-
nounced visits are expected during the time of funerals and weddings.
Eating
Bosnians normally begin their day with strong coffee – breakfast is
eaten mid-morning. Lunch, eaten in the mid-afternoon, is the largest
meal of the day. This meal usually includes soup, meat, vegetable, salad,
bread, and a dessert. Dinner is most commonly served around 2000
hours. When eating, Bosnians eat with the fork in the left hand and knife
in the right hand. Bosnians from rural areas eat some foods with their
fingers. Talking with a mouth full of food is considered rude, but sharing
food from the same plate is acceptable.
Hosts offer abundant food, but overeating is considered impolite. Hosts
will also plead with guests to eat more food, while guests should decline
several times before accepting. While dining in restaurants, one person
should pay the entire bill. Tipping is not necessary, but this practice is
increasing in popularity throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Dress Standards
Most Bosnians wear Western-style clothing. Residents of the larger cit-
ies, particularly young people, seem more conscious of their attire than
rural people. Cotton and wool are more commonly found than synthetic
fibers, though wealthier people often wear silk and furs which are
imported. Many Bosnian women dye their hair.
In rural areas, many people combine modern and traditional attire, such
as dimije (wide Turkish pants ideal for outdoor work) and a t-shirt.
Some Bosnians wear opanke (rubber shoes with upturned toes). Bosnian
Serb women usually wear a nosnja (long white skirt and cotton blouse)
for special occasions; Bosnian Croat women wear white skirts, and
embroidered white blouse and an apron. Bosniak men commonly wear
berets, while Bosniak women wear headscarves. Bosniak women adher-
ing to strict Islamic guidelines wear long skirts covered with long coats
and full headscarves.

23
War Crimes
In both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the internationally con-
demned tactic commonly known as “ethnic cleansing” was used. Intimi-
dation, violence, and rape were employed to force members of other
ethnic groups from regions under a dominant ethnic group’s control.
Along with violence, the destruction of churches, mosques, libraries,
and other cultural buildings was used to intimidate and eradicate cul-
tural gatherings. In response to reports of ethnic “cleansing” in the Bal-
kans, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on 22 February 1993. Multi-
ple indictments have been handed down from ICTY against civil and
military leaders of all sides of the conflict, charging them with war
crimes, atrocities, and crimes against humanity.
By July 2000, 40 persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs) were in
custody. Including persons on sealed indictments, the ICTY states about
40 more indictments remain open. Additionally, ICTY is still conduct-

Home Destroyed by War

24
ing several investigations. Unfortunately, many PIFWCs go into hiding
to avoid arrest.
Displaced Persons and Refugees
More than 2.3 million people became refugees in foreign nations or dis-
placed within Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of ethnic unrest in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the beginning of 2000, more than half of
these displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees (DPREs) still have not
returned to their pre-war homes. This seemingly slow process of return
is due to several factors. Many DPREs do not wish to return to an area in
which they will be an ethnic minority. When DPREs attempt returning
to regions dominated by another ethnic group, they are often met with
obstruction from the local population, employers, and local government
officials who are responsible for the returns process. Additionally, many
DPREs have also made a profit from what is referred to as “double

Returnees

25
War-wrecked Home in Stolac

occupancy.” An individual is able to rent-out their pre-war home, while

occupying another home illegally. According to the UNHCR, approxi-
mately 435,000 registered DPREs have returned to their homes since the
implementation of the Dayton Accord.

MEDICAL ASSESSMENT

Disease Risks to Deployed Personnel

Food- or Waterborne Diseases
Diarrheal diseases caused by bacteria, protozoa, and viruses are the
greatest risk to deployed forces. Risk of hepatitis A has increased due to
declining hygienic practices.

26
Rodent-associated Diseases
Hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome, leptospirosis, and tularemia are
reported with periodic epidemics. Risk is elevated by the loss of public
health infrastructure and rodent control programs.

Insect-, Tick-, and Miteborne Diseases

Risk is least in winter and increases the rest of the year. Diseases with
peak vector activity from March through September include Crimean-
Congo hemorrhagic fever, tick-borne encephalitis, West Nile fever,
Sindbis virus disease, Tahnya virus fever, and Lyme disease. Diseases
with peak vector activity from May through October include sandfly
fever, leishmaniasis, and Boutonneuse fever. Control methods and cli-
mate variations impact local vector numbers and thus potential risk.

Sexually transmitted and/or bloodborne Diseases

Diseases including gonorrhea, syphilis, hepatitis B/D, and HIV/AIDS,
are a risk.

Respiratory-borne Diseases
Acute respiratory infections are a risk, particularly in crowded living
conditions. Risk of acute respiratory infections such as colds, bronchitis,
influenza, pharyngitis, and pneumonia increases November through
March. Tuberculosis levels have been increasing, associated with
degraded and crowded living conditions. Meningococcal meningitis is a
risk; groups A and B predominate regionally.

Animal-associated Diseases
Risk from brucellosis and Q fever has increased over the last 6 years
because of importation of infected animals. Brucellosis occurs in live-
stock and potentially is spread to humans by consumption of unpasteur-
ized milk products. Q fever is commonly contracted by airborne
contaminated dust particles. Rabies and anthrax are low risks.

27
Medical Capabilities
Health care services in Bosnia and Herzegovina are below U.S. and
Western European standards. Ethnic conflict, destruction of health care
infrastructure, and widespread population displacements have disrupted
the health care organization and the economy necessary for its support.
Hospitals and public health programs depend on international humani-
tarian assistance.
Health care services generally are on par with those of Croatia and Serbia,
both of which have had significant economic and infrastructure losses
during the same period. Physicians usually speak Bosnian and Serbo-
Croatian but also may speak Albanian and other European languages.
Most physicians have some knowledge and understanding of English but
often not enough to communicate effectively with American patients.
Hospitals are poorly equipped and supplied by Western standards. Most
services are available, and the supply of pharmaceuticals and equipment
is usually adequate. Support from Stabilization Force (SFOR) field hos-
pitals is sufficient for most trauma care, disease treatment, and evacua-
tion requirements. Cooperation between SFOR medical personnel and
local facilities is good. Local blood supplies are not uniformly safe, but
adequately tested blood can be obtained. Bosnia does not have a signifi-
cant production capability and depends on imports for most medical
supplies and equipment. Not all frequently used Western pharmaceuti-
cals are routinely available. Local health care is improving with the
assistance of international humanitarian organizations.
Key Medical Facilities
Kosovo Clinical Hospital (University Hospital)
Location Mose Pijade 25, Sarajevo
Coordinates 43-52-13N 018-24-50E
Telephone 518-044
Type Government
Beds 700

28
Capabilities Medical--internal medicine, cardiology, gastroenterol-
ogy, neurology; surgical--general, orthopedic, trauma,
neurosurgery, urology, cardiothoracic surgery, OB/
GYN; ancillary services--blood bank, CT scanner,
burn unit, laboratory, x-ray.
Comments Water and power supplies are not reliable. Equipment
may not be functional.
State Hospital (formerly Yugoslav Army Hospital; locally known as
French Hospital; also called City or Muslim Hospital)
Location Kranjcevica 12, Sarajevo
Coordinates 43-51-33N 018-24-25E
Telephone 66 47 24, 663 701
Type Government
Beds 200 to 300
Capabilities Medical--internal medicine, infectious diseases; surgi-
cal--general, ophthalmology; ancillary services--blood
bank, pharmacy, burn unit, laboratory, x-ray.
Comments Water and power supplies are not reliable. Equipment
may not be functional.

HISTORY

Islam, Catholicism, and Eastern Orthodoxy have influenced the history

of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The mixture of these diverse beliefs has
resulted in the intricate political, religious, economic, and social charac-
ter of modern Bosnia and Herzegovina. Religious and cultural animosi-
ties have developed over centuries and are deeply ingrained among the
various warring factions. Violence has been, and will likely remain,
prevalent throughout the Balkans.

Although most of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia come from a

common Slavic ancestry, they have been divided by history, religion,

29
and geography into distinctive ethnic groups. The Slovenes, Croats,
Serbs, Bosniaks, Montenegrins, and Macedonians all have their separate
histories, languages, legends, and aspirations; the centuries are marked
by conquest and subjugation as much as by mutual cooperation. The
Balkans region has been affected by: Rome, the Frankish Kingdom,
Byzantium, the Venetian state, France, Austria-Hungary, and Germany.

The Slavic peoples began to settle the Balkan region between the eastern
and western Roman Empires in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. They
formed a series of independent and thriving kingdoms. Two separate
kingdoms were established in the region: Serbia (southeast Bosnia) and
Croatia (in the western Balkans). Around 1200 A.D., Bosnia gained its
independence, and fought off Serbian, Croatian, and Hungarian incur-
sions. The Bosnian population consisted of Catholics (majority), East-
ern Orthodox, and members of the Bosnian Bogomil Church.

By the 14th century the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire began its conquest of
the Balkans region. At the height of Serb power, the Turks defeated the
Serb army at the Battle of Kosovo Polje on 28 June 1389. Serbia quickly
capitulated and became part of the expanding Ottoman Empire. Bosnia
maintained its independence until 1463, when it also fell under Ottoman
rule. During this time, many Slavic people converted to Islam. During
the Ottoman rule, many Muslim Bosnians became members of the Otto-
man elite as soldiers, politicians, and Islamic scholars. Within Bosnia, a
Bosnian Islamic culture formed — this included unique architecture, lit-
erature, and customs. Bosnia remained a key province of the Ottoman
Empire for more than 400 years. The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina are now referred to as Bosniaks, Croats maintain Catholicism, and
Serbs hold their Eastern Orthodox faith.

After the Russians defeated the Ottoman Empire at war in 1878, Turkish
rule in the Balkans weakened. The Ottoman Empire was eventually par-
titioned by Europe — Austria-Hungary gained administrative responsi-
bility for Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria
gained their independence at the insistence of Russia. The new Austro-

30
Hungarian administration immediately set to improving the Bosnian
infrastructure through the construction of roads, railroads, public build-
ings, schools, and industries. As European influence began to spread in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, nationalism grew. Talk of a greater Serbia among
Bosnian Serb nationalists was promoted by Serbia and Russia. Bosniaks
disliked the prospect of living within a Serb-dominated state, as most
Bosniaks promoted a state for all Balkan peoples.

Austria-Hungary officially annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. This

act fueled Serb nationalist plans to overthrow Austro-Hungarian rule in
the Balkans. Gavrilo Princip, a Serb nationalist, assassinated the heir to
the Austro-Hungarian throne on 28 June 1914. This act was a catalyst
for the beginning of World War I.

Serbia became one of the main battlegrounds of World War I. Half its
male population was killed, wounded, or missing. The collapse and dis-
solution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 left a power vacuum,
which Italy rushed to fill. In an effort to forestall Italian seizure of Dal-
matia, the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was proclaimed
on 1 December 1918, and recognized by the Paris Peace Conference in
May 1919. Prince Regent Aleksandar Karadjordjevi of Serbia became
king. He assumed dictatorial powers from 1929 through 1931 and
changed the name of the country to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (the
land of the south Slavs). During the 1920s and 1930s, Serb and Croat
nationalists dominated Balkan politics.

Though a popular endeavor among south Slav intellectuals, those who

created Yugoslavia disregarded fundamental differences among the
country’s 12 million inhabitants. Many considered the new government
and its laws as alien and secondary to kinship loyalties and traditions.
Strife among ethnic groups, religious rivalry, language barriers, and cul-
tural conflicts were characteristic of the new Yugoslav state. Worsening
social and economic conditions and an increasingly totalitarian govern-
ment caused feelings of contempt among non-Serbs. Soon extremist

31
Princeps Bridge in Sarajevo (Site of Archduke Ferdinand’s Assassination)

groups, such as the Ustasha (fascist group supported by Italy) and Yugo-
slav Communist Party, began to attract followers.

In 1941, Nazi Germany overran Yugoslavia. The country was parti-

tioned amongst Germany and other Axis countries (Italy, Hungary, and
Bulgaria) into ruled zones of occupation or annexed territories. In addi-
tion, the fascist Independent State of Croatia was created of Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina and ruled by the Ustasha. The Ustasha began tar-
geting and, in mass, murdering Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, and political ene-
mies. Bosniaks were not, however, considered enemies of the fascist
state. Many Serbs who did not support the Axis joined a Serb national-
ist/monarchist group known as the Chetniks; Colonel Mihajlovic led the
group. The Yugoslav Communists, led by Josip Brod Tito, organized
their own multiethnic resistance group to fight against the Chetniks,
Ustasha, and Nazis. Each group gained reputations for ruthless behavior
against portions of the civilian population. Soon, a bitter civil war was

32
fought by the Axis occupying forces, the Ustasha, Bosniak supporters of
the Axis, Josip Broz Tito’s communist partisans, and the Chetniks. Each
faction fought for its own agenda. Largely centered in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the conflict cost the Yugoslavs approximately 1.8 million
lives, or 10.9 percent of the population.
The communists emerged from the war as the sole rulers of Yugoslavia,
with Tito as head of the provisional government. Following the war, the
communists executed thousands of surrendering Slovenes and Croats.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established on 29
November 1945. Tito began instituting restrictions on nationalism, pub-
lic worship, and religious customs and promoting socialist unity among
the Yugoslav peoples. During this time, the Bosniak’s separate identity
was recognized. The regime created six federal republics, loosely based
on geography and historic precedent:
■ Serbia (including autonomous Vojvodina and Kosovo),
■ Croatia,
■ Slovenia,
■ Bosnia and Herzegovina,
■ Montenegro, and
■ Macedonia.
Bosnia and Herzegovina obtained pre-war 1918 borders; however, these
were administrative divisions and did not reflect the boundaries of
Yugoslavia's diverse ethnic groups.
Soon after World War II, Tito broke his allegiance with Stalin. This
gained him Western diplomatic and economic support. In the early
1970s, Yugoslavia experienced economic growth fueled by loans from
the West. Most of Yugoslavia experienced this growth, but Serbia
claimed it did not receive a fair share of the amenities.
With Tito's death in 1980, it became increasingly difficult to keep the
country united. A committee composed of the presidents of the six

33
republic and two autonomous regions attempted to govern the country.
Members rotated through the position of federal president. The econ-
omy stalled. Resentment of centralized federal control fed growing
nationalism and demands for greater autonomy. By the late 1980s, dete-
riorating economic conditions and demands for political reform
increased tensions among ethnic groups. Nationalist movements in the
other federal republics mirrored Serb nationalism, fueled by Serb
Republic President Slobodan Milosevic. Fears of Serb domination
accelerated calls for increased autonomy and independence among the
republics. During the first multiparty elections in 1990, the Communist
Party only carried Serbia and Montenegro. Parties with platforms call-
ing for extended autonomy or independence gained the majority
throughout the remainder of Yugoslavia.

In June 1991, Slovenia declared its independence. This action proved

successful because Slovene authorities were prepared to defend their
country and had no significant ethnic minorities to complicate the situa-
tion. The Serb-dominated Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA), after losing a
series of skirmishes, elected not to become heavily involved in a conflict
with Slovenia and a withdrawal of forces was negotiated. Slovenia has
not been involved in any of the subsequent conflicts.

Croatia also declared independence in June 1991, but was not as pre-
pared militarily and had a significant ethnic Serb population within its
borders. A protracted conflict resulted, during which Croatian Serbs
seized control of 30 percent of Croatia's territory and proclaimed the
Republic of Serb Krajina. During September 1991, the UN imposed an
arms embargo against all of former Yugoslavia to contain the fighting.
After the JNA agreed to withdraw from Croatia at the end of 1991, the
establishment of UN protected areas helped stabilize the situation, but
left the conflict unresolved. Croatia reestablished its rule over most of
its territories through military action in 1995, and later negotiated for
the return of Eastern Slavonia.

34
Bosnia and Herzegovina began
seeking independence toward the
end of 1991. Fearing a Muslim-
dominated government, Bosnian
Serb nationalist leaders, led by
Radovan Karadzic, proclaimed a
Bosnian Serb state within Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Despite Bos-
nian Serb nationalist threats of
violence and boycott, Bosnia and
Herzegovina voted to secede
from the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in April
1992. During the vote, 70 per-
cent of the voting population
Radovan Karadzic
(including many Bosnian Serbs)
voted in favor of independence.
Once Bosnia and Herzegovina moved toward independence, JNA units
began to withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina, but Bosnian Serb sol-
diers were allowed to stay behind with their weapons and equipment.
After the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliament declared independence,
multiethnic citizens of Sarajevo petitioned politicians to maintain peace
during a mass demonstration on 5 April 1992. Bosnian Serb snipers
(former JNA soldiers) and Bosnian Serb paramilitary members killed and
wounded numerous unarmed demonstrators. On 6 April 1992, JNA units
began the siege of Sarajevo, while additional Bosnian Serb JNA reinforce-
ments from Serbia invaded eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the same
day, the European Community (EC) recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina
as an independent nation. The Bosnian Serb forces became known as the
Bosnian Serb Army (BSA). The BSA, and affiliated paramilitary forces,
fell under the command of General Ratko Mladic.
Bosnian Croats, comprising 17 percent of the population, organized
themselves as the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna and contested

35
control of territory among the Serbs and Bosniaks. Bosnian Croat sol-
diers leaving the service of the JNA formed the Croatian Defense Coun-
cil (HVO), which was supported by the Republic of Croatia’s military.

Intense fighting between the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH)

and the BSA took place during summer 1992 across Bosnia and Herze-
govina. In May 1992, Bosniak President Alija Izetbegovic was taken
hostage by BSA forces in Sarajevo — he was released the following day
through a UN arranged agreement. On 30 May 1992 the UN imposed
sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro for aiding the BSA war effort.
Despite this, BSA artillery and mortars sporadically shelled Sarajevo
throughout the summer, resulting in numerous civilian casualties. Else-
where in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the BSA defeated the ABiH, and
captured all BSA objectives by autumn 1992. By the end of 1992, the
BSA secured 70 percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory. The
BSA secured an ethnic Serb heartland and supply links with Serbia and
the Serbs of Croatia. During its campaign, the BSA expelled most non-
Serbs. The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina sustained these
losses due to a fragmented military effort. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
defenses were composed of the ABiH, the HVO, and a variety of mili-
tias, each with varying objectives.

In summer 1992, the United Nations established UNPROFOR II within

Bosnia and Herzegovina to guarantee the delivery of relief supplies, in
addition to performing other humanitarian and peacekeeping duties. In
January 1993, international mediators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen
revealed a plan to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina into 10 semi-autono-
mous ethnically based cantons. Even though Radovan Karadzic signed
the plan, Bosnian Serb politicians rejected the Vance-Owen Plan in May
1993 in favor of an independent Serb nation. During April and May
1993, the UN Security Council declared six safe areas: Sarajevo, Tuzla,
Bihac, Srbrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde. Also in April, NATO jets began
patrolling Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce the no-fly zone. Later in
1993, another plan was proposed to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina into

36
separate countries based on military gains — the Bosniaks rejected this
plan. The Geneva Peace talks finally collapsed in November 1993.

While the UN proposed plans to end the fighting in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, fighting between the ABiH and HVO began. Both armies were
attempting to secure areas of ethnic purity in the remaining 30 percent
of Bosnia and Herzegovina not controlled by the BSA. The most intense
fighting took place in Mostar. War crimes were not uncommon during
the HVO/ABiH conflict. On 9 November 1993 Croat artillery destroyed
the centuries-old Mostar Bridge.

Heavy fighting throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina continued during

the beginning of 1994, while Bosnian Serbs intensified shelling of Sara-
jevo. In response to NATO air strike threats, Bosnian Serbs bartered for
the introduction of Russian peacekeepers. On 20 February 1994, the
BSA began removing artillery from the hills surrounding Sarajevo as

Mostar

37
Russian peacekeepers arrived. In March, the U.S. brokered a deal
between the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks, which ended their bitter
yearlong conflict. Throughout 1994, the UN used air strikes against
BSA forces on the offensive in the “safe areas” of Bihac and Gorazde.
Bosnian Serb forces responded by shelling the “safe areas” and taking
UN peacekeepers hostage.
The year of 1995 began with a 4-month, U.S.-brokered ceasefire; how-
ever, the ceasefire ended in May. BSA forces began shelling of “safe
areas” once again while UN planes bombed BSA ammunition depots. In
retaliation, the Bosnian Serbs took more UN peacekeepers hostage. On
11 July 1995 Bosnian Serb forces overran the “safe area” of Srbrenica.
Over the next 2 days, 20,000 women, children, and elderly refugees
from Srbrenica arrived in Tuzla with reports of Bosnian Serb war
crimes. By July 17, only 4,000 Bosniak men reached Tuzla; Red Cross
later estimated 8,000 men were missing. Later in July, the BSA seized
the “safe area” of Zepa, resulting in thousands more refugees. Also in
July, ICTY indicted Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for genocide
and crimes against humanity. In September 1995, the warring factions
agreed to maintain the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but divide it
ethnically. While officials agreed to peace talks, ABiH and HVO offen-
sives seized lands in central and western Bosnia and Herzegovina.
On 1 November 1995, a peace conference began between Croatian
President Franjo Tudjman, Bosnia and Herzegovina President Alija
Izetbegovic, and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Dayton,
Ohio. With the initialing of the Dayton Accords on 5 November 1995,
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Bosniak and Bosnian
Croat alliance) came to control slightly more than 50 percent of the
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the Bosnian Serbs holding
the balance. On 4 December 1995, British and US peace implementa-
tion forces began arriving in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 14 Decem-
ber 1995, the Bosnia Peace Agreement was signed in Paris, France.
Estimates state 146,817 people died and another 175,198 people were
injured due to the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina from

38
April 1992-December 1995. Furthermore, 2.3 million displaced per-
sons and refugees resulted from the war.

Summary of Dayton Accord

■ Bosnia and Herzegovina will remain a single state within its current
borders. It will be a unified state composed of two political entities: a
Muslim-Croat federation and a Bosnian Serb republic, Republika
Srpska. Under the agreement, both sides must give up territory.
■ Bosnia and Herzegovina will have a central government in Sarajevo.
■ The former warring factions (FWF) will cease all hostilities and
withdraw behind a 2-kilometer zone of separation (ZOS).
■ Within territory that is being transferred from one party to another,
the withdrawing party has 45 days to withdraw all troops, weapons,
mines, and obstacles.
■ Within 120 days, the parties pledge to withdraw all heavy weapons
and forces to locations identified by the SFOR commander. Excess
personnel are to be demobilized and prohibited from participating in
any further military training.
■ Free and democratic elections will be held throughout Bosnia and
Herzegovina. People displaced by war will have the right to vote in
their original place of residence if they choose.
■ The parties agreed to a constitution that creates a presidency, a
bicameral legislature, and a constitutional court.
■ All of Bosnia’s people can move freely throughout the country with-
out harassment or discrimination. Refugees and displaced persons
will have the right to return home or obtain compensation.
■ The agreement commits Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina to cooperate fully with the prosecution of war criminals and vio-
lations of international and humanitarian law.
■ All non-local forces and equipment are to be withdrawn from Bosnia
and Herzegovina.

39
 SLOVENIA HUNGARY
ZAGREB

CROATIA
Vukovar l

Dayton
Agreement
Line
YUGOSLAVIA

BOSNIA SARAJEVO
CROATIA AND
HERZEGOVINA

Adriatic
Sea
Ploce

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Dayton Agreement Line
Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina
Muslim
Kotor
Croat Bay
Republika Srpska
Boundary representations are not necessarily ALBANIA
Serb
authoritative.

Dayton Peace Agreement

During the war, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was openly
sympathetic to the cause of the ethnic Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Although officially uninvolved in the conflict, it provided
assistance to the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the
form of supplies and volunteers. The FRY continues supporting Bosnian
Serb officials, and remains a factor in continuing instability in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.

40
Chronology
5th-6th cent AD Slavic peoples migrate into the Balkans
Circa 1200 Bosnia gains independence
28 June 1389 Serbian army defeated by the Ottomans at the
Battle of Kosovo Polje
1463 Bosnia falls under Ottoman rule
1908 Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia
28 June 1914 Assassination of Archduke Ferdinand
1 December 1918 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia) proclaimed
1941 Nazi Germany overruns Yugoslavia
29 November 1945 Josef Broz Tito establishes the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia
1980 Tito dies and Yugoslavia begins to experience
social and economic problems
June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declare independence
5 April 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina declares independence
6 April 1992 The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina begins with
the siege of Sarajevo
April-May 1993 UN declares six safe areas
March 1994 Fighting between Bosnian Croats and
Bosniaks ends
11 July 1995 Bosnian Serb forces overrun Srbrenica and con-
duct thorough ethnicity-driven attacks
5 November 1995 Factions sign Dayton Peace accord in Ohio
4 December 1995 U.S. and British peacekeepers enter Bosnia and
Herzegovina
14 December 1995 Bosnia Peace Agreement signed in Paris

41
January 1996 Implementation Force (IFOR) arrives in Bosnia to
keep the peace (60,000 troops) divided in to three
Divisions led by the United States, Great Britain
and France
December 1996 IFOR hands over peacekeeping duties to Stabilization
Force (SFOR), troop number decreases to 30,000.
Tasked to assist with security for free elections.
Spring 1999 NATO launches air war over Kosovo, tensions
throughout Bosnia rise.
December 1999 Croatian President Franco Tudjman dies
SFOR continues to play a part in almost every
aspect of BiH life. Troop strength gradually
declines by a third
October 2000 Bosniak President Alija Izabegovic resigns
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is driven
from power, replaced by popularly elected coali-
tion government.
November 2000 Bosnia holds national elections. Ten-party Alli-
ance for Change coalition is created. Goals
include economic reforms and a political arena
devoid of hard line nationalist fervor.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Government
Prior to declaring independence in 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina
existed as a republic in Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina was
divided by the war from 1992-1995, during which competing ethnic
governments contested control of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton
Accord established the current Bosnia and Herzegovina government.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a single country composed of two entities:

42
 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BOSNIAK

Council of
PRESIDENCY Ministers

BOSNIAN BOSNIAN
SERB CROAT
HOUSE OF HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES PEOPLES
STATE LEVEL

FEDERATION REPUBLIKA SRPSKA

ENTITY LEVEL
CABINET CABINET
PRESIDENCY PRESIDENCY

BOSNIAK CROAT VICE

PRESIDENT

HOUSE OF HOUSE OF NATIONAL

REPRESENTATIVES PEOPLES ASSEMBLY

CANTON MUNICIPAL

MUNICIPAL

TOWN
LOW LEVEL

PEOPLE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE

FEDERATION REPUBLIKA SRPSKA

Government Organization

43
The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the RS. Dayton retained
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s exterior border and created the joint multieth-
nic democratic government. Additionally, the Dayton Accord requires
the Bosnia and Herzegovina government to provide:
■ A Constitutional Court,
■ A Human Rights Commission,
■ A Commission for Displaced Persons,
■ A central bank,
■ Allowance for public corporations to manage transportation and
communications systems,
■ A Commission to Preserve National Monuments, and
■ A system of arbitration between the Federation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina and the RS.
The management of foreign trade is also the responsibility of the Bosnia
and Herzegovina government.
National Level
Executive Branch. A tripartite presidency heads the central government
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with one member from each of the three
major ethnic groups. Elections for the Bosnia and Herzegovina presidency
are held every 4 years — next elections are due by September 2002.
Legislative Branch. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legislative branch is
composed of a bicameral Parliamentary Assembly that consists of the
National House of Representatives (Vijece Opcina) and the House of
Peoples (Vijece Gradanstvo). The House of Representatives has 42 seats
and the House of Peoples has 15 seats — two-thirds of members are
elected from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a third
from the RS. During legislation, a valid majority is obtained through at
least a third of the members representing each entity.
Bosnia and Herzegovina also maintains a small council of ministers,
which is headed by two co-chairmen and a vice-chairman, nominated by

44
the presidency. Three departmental ministers were approved by the Bos-
nia and Herzegovina Parliament in February 1999. Each departmental
minister has two deputies.
Judicial Branch. The judicial branch is composed of the Supreme
Court and the Constitutional Court, both of which are supervised by the
Ministry of Justice.

Entity Governments
The Dayton Accord established the entity government structures of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the RS. The Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and RS governments are responsible for entity-
internal functions.
Both entities have presidency positions. The central government of Fed-
eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina is led by a Bosnian Croat/Bosniak
presidency. One ethnic group will hold the presidency while the other
holds the vice-presidency. These positions will rotate halfway through
terms. The RS presidency and vice-presidency is held by Bosnian Serbs.
Both the RS and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina maintain a
legislative branch. The legislative branch of the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina is the 140-seat House of Representatives. The legis-
lative branch of the RS is the 83-seat Republika Srpska National
Assembly (RSNA).
The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is administratively divided
into 10 cantons, which are governed by powerful cantonal governments.
A governor and council of ministers controls each of the cantons.
Key Government Officials (as of May 2001)
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Tripartite Presidency Member Beriz Belic (Bosniak)
Tripartite Presidency Member Jozo Krizanovic (Croat)
Tripartite Presidency Member Zivko Radisic (Bosnian Serb)

45
 National Government Co-Chairman Haris Silajdzic (Bosniak)
National Government Co-Chairman Svetozar Mihajlovic
National Government Vice-Chairman Neven Tomic
Minister of Civil Affairs and Marko Asanin (Bosnian Serb)
Communications
Minister of Foreign Affairs Jadranko Prlic (Bosnian Croat)
Minister of Foreign Trade and Mirsad Kurtovic
Economic Relations
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
President Karlo Filipovic (Bosnian Croat)
Vice-President Safet Halilovic (Bosniak)
Prime Minister Alijah Behmen (Bosniak)
Minister of Defense Mijo Anic (Bosnian Croat)
Minister of Interior Mehmed Zilic (Bosniak)
Republika Srpska
President Mirko Sarovic (Bosnian Serb)
Vice-President
Prime Minister Mladen Ivanic (Bosnian Serb)
Minister of Defense Slobodan Bilic (Bosnian Serb)
Minister of Interior Perica Bundalo (Bosnian Serb)
Politics
Since its independence, Bosnia and Herzegovina nationalist parties have
retained the most power throughout the region. The primary nationalist
parties are:
■ The Party for Democratic Action or the SDA (Bosniak),
■ The Serb Democratic Party or the SDS (Bosnian Serb), and
■ The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the
HDZ-Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian Croat).
Former Communist Party members created the Bosniak SDA, a Muslim
nationalist party. The SDA is the current Muslim ruling party, and is the
largest party in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The party promotes Islamic
values and culture and advocates a powerful centralized government.

46
The SDA has done exceptionally well in elections since the war, and the
party claims to be the single representative of the Bosniak people. The
Bosnian Serb nationalist SDS was founded by Radovan Karadzic in
1989 and continues to be the ruling party of the RS. The SDS promotes
RS autonomy and a possible union with Yugoslavia; therefore, the SDS
is the strongest in the eastern RS. Staunch SDS member are often criti-
cal of the international community and SFOR. The HDZ-Bosnia and
Herzegovina is the Bosnia and Herzegovina arm of Croatia’s nationalis-
tic HDZ party. The Bosnian Croat HDZ-Bosnia and Herzegovina
attempts to be the protector of all Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and often utilizes strong-arm nationalist tactics to maintain its seat of
power in Bosnian Croat dominated Cantons. Some of the more rigid
HDZ-Bosnia and Herzegovina members seek the creation of a Bosnian
Croat “Third Entity” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The nationalist parties are opposed by moderate, and until recently less
popular parties. After the nationalist parties, the Bosnian Social Demo-
crats Party (SDP) is the most powerful party in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The SDP is multiethnic and supports a united Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The SDP is modeled on the values of social democracy and is the suc-
cessor to the League of Communists. The Coalition for Integral and
Democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina (KCD-Bosnia and Herzegovina) is a
coalition led by the nationalist SDA. Although not a moderate coalition,
the KCD-Bosnia and Herzegovina represents non-Serbs in the RS gov-
ernment. The Sloga coalition was primarily composed of the RS Social-
ist Party (SPRS), Serbian National Alliance (SNS), and the Party of
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD). Sloga is led by the SNSD, the
most liberal of the Bosnian Serb parties. The SPRS split in early 2000
between Sloga loyal moderates and a Belgrade loyal faction. The Sloga
leaning loyalists have formed a new party, the Democratic Socialist
Party of the RS (DSSRS). Sloga is the main opposition to RS nationalist
parties and supports the Dayton Accord. The opposition parties are
slowly gaining voter support; however, most Bosnians seem attached to
their respective cultural and ethnic parties.

47
National elections held in November 2000 led to the creation of a 10-
party coalition (“Alliance for Change”) whose goal is to create a politi-
cal arena devoid of hard line nationalists who many believe are responsi-
ble for impeding reforms in the economy, judiciary, and government.

International Community Presence

Military Presence

Immediately following the signing of the Bosnia Peace Agreement,

NATO launched the largest military operation ever undertaken. Opera-
tion JOINT ENDEAVOR began on 16 December 1995. Based on UN
Security Council Resolution 1031, NATO was given a 1-year mandate
to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement. This mission
was given to the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR). IFOR was
given the responsibility to implement Annex 1A (military aspects) of the
Dayton Accord. Maintaining the cessation of hostilities; separating the
Entity Armed Forces (EAF); transferring areas between the two entities;
and moving the entities’ forces and heavy weapons into storage sites
accomplished peace implementation. The secure environment IFOR
established allowed civilian organizations to implement the civil aspects
of the Dayton Accord.

SFOR Flag Raising

48
NATO approved the organization of the Stabilization Force (SFOR),
which was activated on 20 December 1996; the day the IFOR mandate
expired. The role of IFOR was to implement the peace — the role of
SFOR is to stabilize the peace. Under UN Security Council Resolution
1088 of 12 December 1996, SFOR was authorized to implement the
military aspects of the Dayton Accord. Like IFOR, SFOR operates
under Chapter VII (Peace Enforcement) of the UN Charter. The primary
mission of SFOR is to contribute to the secure environment necessary
for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its specific tasks are:
■ Deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to the peace.
■ Consolidate IFOR’s achievements and promote a climate the peace
process can continue to move forward.
■ Provide support to civilian organizations within its capabilities.

SFOR has a unified command and is under the direction and control of
NATO. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe maintains overall

Unexploded Ordnance

49
military authority. Every NATO nation, and some non-NATO nations,
has committed troops to SFOR.
SFOR is active in nearly all aspects of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s day-
to-day events. SFOR provides assistance to local and national level gov-
ernments through ensuring a secure environment and infrastructure sup-
port and repair. Operation HARVEST is an SFOR-led effort to collect
weapons and mines from the community. SFOR maintains a close rela-
tionship with the militaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina by presiding
over the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM), which
maintains a forum between SFOR and the Entity Armed Factions
(EAF). SFOR also conducts inspections of EAF units to ensure compli-
ance with the Dayton Accord and downsizing policies.
NATO nations participating: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland (medical support),
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Tur-
key, United Kingdom, and the United States.
Non-NATO nations participating: Albania, Austria, Argentina, Bulgaria,
Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Romania, Russia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Ukraine.
Civilian Presence
Since the signing of the Dayton Accord, numerous UN-based organiza-
tions, non-government organizations (NGOs), foreign government
agencies, police forces (IPTF) and a peacekeeping/stabilization force
(SFOR) have assisted Dayton implementation and the development of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Dayton Accord established the Office of the High Representa-
tive, a senior foreign diplomat responsible for monitoring Dayton
implementation and orchestrating international operations in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which
includes Dayton signatories, comprises the High Representative’s
(HR) chief advisors. The HR also works closely with SFOR and the

50
SFOR Soldier Working with VF-B Soldier (Operation HARVEST)

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The

HR can impose laws and decisions and dismiss officials who
obstruct Dayton implementation. The international community, led
by the HR, seeks to weaken the hardline officials’ power base. In
March 1999, the HR removed RS President Nikola Poplasen for anti-
Dayton activities. Throughout late 1999 and early 2000, the HR and
OSCE minimized anti-Dayton politician and party participation in
elections. Parties with obstructionist officials on their ticket were not

51
 SACEUR
Balkans Strategic
Reserve Force
COMSFOR

Aviation Task Multinational

AIRSOUTH STRIKEFORSOUTH Force Specialized
Unit
NAVSOUTH Support
Command

Multinational Division Multinational Division Multinational Division

(North) (Southwest) (Southeast)
Lead Nation: United States Lead Nation: United Kingdom Lead Nation: France

Operational Control Direct support by elements of NATO’s Allied Forces,

Southern Europe

Outside Bosnia Inside Bosnia

LEGEND
AIRSOUTH - Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe
COMSFOR - Commander, Stabilization Force
NAVSOUTH - Allied Naval Forces, Southern Europe
SACEUR - Supreme Allied Commander Europe
STRIKEFORSOUTH - Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe
NOTE: The Aviation Task Force is a dual function unit that provides SFOR operational reserve for all of
Bosnia and sector support for the U.S.-led Multinational Division (north).

SFOR Organization

permitted to register for the elections. This tactic omitted the Serbian
Radical Party of the RS (SRS-RS) from participation in the April
2000 municipal elections. The HR has also been responsible for the
removal of several obstructionist officials — these politicians were
also banned from future elections. In November 1995, the Bosnia
and Herzegovina tripresidency members agreed to the New York

52
Declaration. The New York Declaration initiated the establishment
of a State Border Service, the introduction of new election laws,
emphasis on faster DPRE returns, and improvement of entity mili-
tary relations. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliament refused to

NATO PIC Steering United World Bank Bilateral

NAC OSCE Board Nations European Union Donors
IMF EBRD

SHAPE

Economic
OSCE High UNHCR UNMIBH Reconstruction
SFOR Representative
Mission Projects
Ground
Operations Reconstruction
CIMIC and Return IPTF
Task Force
Ground Elections Civil
Operations Other Working Affairs
Groups
Human
Ground Rights
Operations Brcko
Supervisor
Democracy
Building

Arms
Control

Authority Coordination Outside Bosnia Inside Bosnia

LEGEND
CIMIC - Civil Military Cooperation OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation
EBRD - European Bank for Reconstruction in Europe
and Development SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
IMF - International Monetary Fund UNMIBH - United Nations Mission in Bosnia
IPTF - International Police Task Force and Herzegovina
NAC - North Atlantic Council UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner
PIC - Peace Implementation Council for Refugees
NOTE: Coordination in Bosnia occurs at all levels among these organizations

Organization of Military and Civilian Operation in Bosnia

53
endorse the New York Declaration; however, the HR imposed the
law by decree in January 2000.
International Police Task Force
In accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement, the UN established
the International Police Task Force (IPTF) as a UN Civil Police opera-
tion to assist in establishing a safe and secure environment by main-
taining law enforcement agencies which respect internationally
recognized standards of human rights and freedoms. The IPTF’s mis-
sion includes:
■ Monitoring, observing, and inspecting law enforcement activities
and facilities;
■ Advising and training law enforcement personnel;
■ Facilitating the entities’ law enforcement activities and accompany-
ing the entities’ law enforcement personnel to assist them in their
duties; and
■ Advising authorities on the organization of effective civilian law
enforcement agencies.
The IPTF has areas of responsibilities that are divided into three
regions: Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Banja Luka. The UN has opened numer-
ous district and local offices.
The following countries have participated in the IPTF:
Argentina Austria Bangladesh Bulgaria Canada
Denmark Egypt Estonia Finland France
Germany Ghana Greece Hungary India
Indonesia Ireland Jordan Malaysia Nepal
Netherlands Nigeria Pakistan Poland Portugal
Russia Senegal Spain Sweden Switzerland
Tunisia Turkey Ukraine United States

IPTF members wear their national police uniforms with UN blue berets.
IPTF monitors do not carry weapons.

54
ECONOMY

Statistics
Gross Domestic Product $4.3 billion
Inflation rate/ Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Consumer price index 1.5 percent
RS: 15 percent
Unemployment rate 40 percent (RS slightly higher than Fed-
eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
Per Capita Income N/A
Balance of Trade Imports: $2,500 million
Exports: $750 million
Major Imports Food, machinery, miscellaneous manufac-
tures (including clothing), and chemicals
Major Exports Manufactured products, raw materials,
and clothing
Exchange Rate 1.9 KM to the US$
2000 figures in US$

Industries, Manufacturing, and Agriculture

Current industry output is a fraction of pre-war production, primarily
due to destruction of facilities. Manufacturing consists mostly of wood
processing, clothing, raw material (metals) production, and chemical
production. Construction has slowed since the immediate post-war
reconstruction boom. Construction sector growth depends on future
international investment in reconstruction projects. Agriculture com-
prises 10 percent of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s econ-
omy, while agriculture and forestry comprise more than 30 percent of
the RS economy.
Natural Resources include coal, iron, bauxite, manganese, forests, cop-
per, chromium, lead, zinc, and hydropower.

55
 CROATIA

Prijedor Bosanski
Brod

Bihac
Brcko
Doboj Bijeljina
Banja Teslic
Luka
Tuzla

Zvornik
Drvar Zenica
Srebrenica
Bugojno

CROATIA Livno

SARAJEVO
Konjic Gorazde
Foca

Adriatic Mostar
Sea

YUGOSLAVIA
Tobacco
Forest Stolac
Pastures and
valley farming
Permanent crops
(olives, grapes, citrus) CROATIA
Mixed farming (grains,
vineyards, livestock)
Field crops (wheat,
corn, sunflowers) ALBANIA

Land Use

Reforms and Outlook

The trade deficit is decreasing; imports have decreased since the war
and export business is growing slowly. The economy depends
heavily on foreign loans, largely in the form of long-term multilat-
eral loans. Foreign investment as another source of revenue has been
less than sufficient. Despite international efforts to improve the

56
investing environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina, many potential
foreign investors have abandoned investment in Bosnia and Herze-
govina due to several factors, such as a small domestic market, an
unpredictable economy, lack of a unified stable government, and a
complicated privatization process.

Economic reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina now depends largely on

privatization of businesses and the banking sector. Only a small number
of the approximately 3,000 firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been
privatized, largely due to local obstruction and growing lack of invest-
ment interest. The banking sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina is in dras-
tic need of improvement. Most banking is still controlled by the
government, and banking privatization is proving to be complicated and
slow. The three ethnically based and controlled payment bureau systems
maintain a monopoly over payment transactions. Privatization of busi-
nesses and the banking sector have drawn suspicion of possible corrup-
tion. These suspicions are the cause of insufficient foreign investment
and waning international loans and grants.

THREAT

Crime

Although street crime rates are relatively low and violent crimes are
rare, petty street crimes such as pickpocketing and breaking into parked
cars occur. Organized crime, often involving high profile officials,
remains a problem throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Organized
crime activities include prostitution, smuggling black-market goods,
illegal arms deals, and stolen car smuggling. These crimes can become
violent when rival groups or gangs conflict. Crime is rarely directed
against SFOR members; however, SFOR members may become victims
as bystanders.

57
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s porous borders facilitate smuggling of vari-
ous goods. Smuggling black market items across Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina borders has been a lucrative activity since the beginning of the war.
The most commonly smuggled items are imitations of brand name ciga-
rettes and alcoholic beverages. According to officials in the RS, between
150 and 180 tons of cigarettes are smuggled into the RS every month.

Smuggling illegal immigrants across Bosnia and Herzegovina’s borders is

becoming more frequent. Most of the illegal immigrants originate from
Asia and use Bosnia and Herzegovina as a transition point to enter west-
ern Europe or other Balkan countries. Some of the illegal immigrants
smuggled through the Balkans industry are victims of slavery; these peo-
ple are usually young females who have been forced into prostitution.

Terrorism and Insurgency

Though the number of attacks has decreased, illegal local militia groups
have conducted attacks using small arms, grenades, and RPGs against
SFOR and international community (IC) assets; grenade attacks against
IC property are more frequent than other types of attack. These attacks
are usually the result of DPRE returns, political events, or the arrest of
PIFWCs. Vying ethnic groups and rival gangs often employ terrorist
type attacks against the local population. Grenade attacks, arson, and
land mines are commonly used to obstruct the return of minority
DPREs. Rival organized crime groups commonly act against members
or property of one another using violent attacks, often with SFOR per-
sonnel in the vicinity.

Political Instability

Strong nationalist tendencies still dominate local politics; however, at

the national level a movement towards multiethnic alliances is gaining
support. In spring 2001 national elections, the 10-party Alliance for
Change coalition won the majority of seats in the parliament.

58
Drug Trafficking
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s geographic location as a crossroads between
Europe and Asia and its porous borders facilitate drug trafficking. Illegal
drugs in the region are transported from Afghanistan through Bulgaria,
Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Additionally, a large quantity of illegal
drugs is produced locally. Marijuana most often originates from Albania,
while heroin and cocaine are produced in Afghanistan. Bosnia and Herze-
govina primarily serves as a transition point for marijuana, heroin, and
cocaine; however, illicit drug sales and production are increasing in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. Government officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the entities recognize the growing problem and are strengthening bor-
der control and increasing police forces’ drug control capabilities.
Land Mines
The warring factions in Bosnia and Herzegovina placed 1 to 2 mil-
lion antipersonnel and antitank mines during the war. Estimates state
as many as 1 million lethal land mines are still scattered throughout
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since 1996, more than 300 people have
been killed and 1,000 people have been wounded by land mines.
According to the International Fund for Demining and Help to Mine
Victims, the removal of mines in Bosnia and Herzegovina may take
15 years. Total funding for this project has not been determined;
however, the United States dedicated $14 million for 2000 toward
the effort.

ARMED FORCES

Defense Organization
The military defense forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina are not inte-
grated. As a result of the Dayton Accord, the Bosnia and Herzegovina
military is currently composed of three separate, ethnically based
armies. The RS maintains its own army, which is called the Vojske

59
VF-H Soldier During Mine Clearing
Republik Srpska (VRS). The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
maintains a joint army composed of Bosnian-Croat units and Bosniak
units, which are only ethnically integrated above corps level. The armies
of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are called the Vojske Fed-
eracije Hrvatska (VF-H—Bosnian Croat) and the Vojske Federacije
Bosne I Herzegovina (VF-B—Bosniak). Within the VRS and the VF, air
and air defense are subordinate commands.

The military doctrine of the three entities was based on the concept of
total national defense. This doctrine required the former Yugoslav Peo-
ples Army (JNA) to slow the enemy's attack to gain time for the Territo-
rial Defense Force (TDF) to be mobilized. As long as JNA units retained
combat capability, the TDF would operate in conjunction with them.
However, it was recognized the TDF and surviving elements of the JNA
would be forced to break into smaller units to conduct partisan warfare
throughout the country indefinitely. Partisan warfare involves the use of

60
small units to conduct limited attacks, sabotage, ambush, assassination,
and reconnaissance throughout enemy-occupied territory, avoiding
major engagements with superior forces. However, partisan forces retain
the ability to form larger groups to conduct major operations. The
mountains and forest areas of the Adriatic coast and southern Yugosla-
via (present-day Bosnia, Montenegro, southern Serbia, and Kosovo)
formed the main areas for planned partisan resistance activities.
The ethnic warfare that accompanied the break-up of the former Yugo-
slavia prevented development of a new military doctrine. When con-
fronted by an exterior military threat, the doctrine of total national
defense, in varying degrees, provided the doctrinal basis for the conduct
of military actions by the various republics and factions.
The former JNA and TDF shifted from a force structure based on divi-
sions and regiments to one based on corps and brigades in the mid-
1980s. Each of the Bosnian armies generally retains this force structure
as the basis of their armed forces. However, TDF forces no longer exist,
having been absorbed into the regular army and reorganized into light
infantry or reserve units. Reserve forces are now performing the mis-
sions and roles formerly assigned to the TDF.
Combat in Bosnia and Herzegovina generally involved attacks by multi-
ple, company-sized, or battalion-sized groupings of light infantry and
tanks, supported by heavy indirect fires and direct fires from light and
medium caliber AAA auto-cannon and antitank weapons. Mines, booby
traps, snipers, and harassing mortar fires were a constant threat. Unex-
ploded ordnance and mines remain a danger.
Fully coordinated, multibrigade operations were uncommon, but recent
training has revealed a change in doctrine using larger, coordinate opera-
tions. Attacks by groups from bands of 10-20 men were common during
the war; however, multiple battalion or full brigade-sized operations have
become more frequent. Offensive operations are usually immediately pre-
ceded by massed preparatory fires, followed by attacks by company-size
groupings of infantry, supported by tanks, AAA, and other heavy weapons.

61
The Vojske Republik Srpska (VRS)
The VRS evolved from the pre-war Yugoslav federal forces stationed in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which consisted of five corps. The Bosnian
Serbs view their military as a guarantee for survival of the Serb Republic.
They believe their military must maintain a state of combat readiness to
respond to hostilities as necessary. Most VRS brigades have downsized
personnel and entire subordinate units; however, these personnel can be
recalled on short notice. This is particularly true in key areas such as
Brcko. The VRS currently maintains four corps, but continues to down-
size personnel in accordance with agreements. The four corps are strategi-
cally arrayed throughout the RS and are responsible for a particular area
of the country. Most of the units within the corps are primarily infantry
units with assigned artillery, and sometimes attached armor elements.
The VRS uses an annual conscription cycle to fill its ranks. According
to the VRS Chief of the General Staff, the peacetime forces are intended

VRS Infantry

62
to endure the initial attack, thus enabling mobilization of wartime
reserve forces. The VRS adheres to an active training cycle; however,
according to reports alcoholism and pay problems are negatively
impacting VRS readiness.

Current agreements with the OSCE allows the VRS to maintain 21 com-
bat aircraft, seven attack helicopters, unlimited transport helicopters,
and unlimited air defense missiles.

The Vojske Federacije Hrvatska (VF-H)

The VF-H was formed from the wartime Croatian Defense Council
(HVO), which protected four districts. These four districts still exist for
the four active guards brigades. Following the war, these four brigades
were augmented by at least 25 home defense units (reserve militias) —
many of which have been recently deactivated or downsized. These
troops can be recalled rapidly in the event of resumed hostilities. Until
the beginning of 2000, the former HVO and VF-H was funded by
Croatia. This support diminished significantly with the election of a
moderate government in Croatia. The reduced support has resulted in
housing, pay, and training fund problems within the VF-H, and may
reduce the VF-H’s force down to one brigade.

The Vojske Federacije Bosne I Herzegovina (VF-B)

The VF-B originated from the wartime Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(ABiH), which was almost entirely Bosniak. The ABiH was formed
around the former territorial defense brigades. These brigades were
equipped and commanded by local politicians. The VF-B has undergone
changes since the signing of the Dayton Accord. The Army was not for-
mally recognized until 1996. Prior to this, the army was composed mostly
of paramilitary groups, who were later given unit designations. The VF-B
currently maintains three corps and two smaller independent units.

63
Train and Equip Program

The Train and Equip program is a multinational aid program designed

to adjust the balance of the former warring factions. Specifically, this
program addresses the equipment and training shortfalls of the VF.
The VF-B has gained the most from the program. A U.S. civilian con-
tract company, Military Professional Incorporated (MPRI), imple-
ments the program, which is directed by the United States State
Department. The training seeks to build a professional army and teach
a defensive doctrine. Some of the equipment provided includes
M60A3 tanks, AMX-30 tanks, M113 personnel carriers, light antitank
weapons, M16s, and M60 machineguns.

Key Military Personnel

Republik Srpska Minister
of Defense Slobodan Bilic
Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina Minister of Defense Mijo Anic (Bosnian Croat)
VRS Chief of General Staff Colonel General Novica Simic
VF Commander (Chief of Staff) General Atif Dudakovic

Military Statistics
Total Manpower ABiH: 41,000
HVO: 15,000
VRS: 10,000
Paramilitary Forces Numerous paramilitary forces existed
during and immediately following the
war; however, the International Commu-
nity and SFOR have marginalized
their existence.
Manpower Availability males age 15-49: 951,541 (1999 est.)
Defense Budget No accurate figures are available

64
Equipment
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

[NOTE: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Army Equipment,

derived from CSBM Treaty compliance database]
Type Quantity
Battle Tanks 204
T-34 20
T-54 14
T-55 68
ACV 173
BRDM-2 0
OT M-60 30
OT M-60 PB 8
ACVLAL 4
M-3 VAT 0
M-3 VPC 0
M-3 VTS 0
MTLB 1V13/16 1
SNAR-10 0
ATGM 8
POLO 9P122 4
POLO 9P133 1
POLO M-83 3
Artillery 932
MB-120-mm M-75 341
MB-120-mm UBM-52 15
T-130-mm M-46 22
T-130-mm M-82 13
VBR 128-mm M-63 2
VBR 128-mm M-91 32
VLR 107-mm Tip 63 29

65
Republic Srpska Army
Battle Tanks 230 (including T-34s, T-55s, and M-84s; number
approximate)
Artillery approx. 300 (to include approx. 20 x 122mm 2S1 SP
and approx. 400 mortars)
Antitank approx. 300 AT-3 Sagger
Air Defense SA-2/3/6/7B/9/14
Army Aviation 12 Mi-8; 12 SA-341

Paramilitary and Police Forces

All of the ethnic groups have municipal, military, and internal security
police forces based on the ex-Yugoslav model. Their duties include
basic law enforcement, counterterrorism, and internal security missions.

Municipal police forces are among the least professional and carry out
local law enforcement duties, including traffic enforcement, minor crim-
inal investigations, and other routine activities associated with peace-
time police work.

Military police are found at corps and brigade level and have many of
the same rear-area security functions as NATO military police.

MUP (Ministry of Internal Security) special police or internal security

forces are more elite, heavily armed paramilitary forces that conduct
special protection details and counterterrorism and could be used to con-
duct military operations.

Because soldiers continue to be demobilized and integrated as part of

their civil police forces, current force structures and personnel strengths
for civil police forces are unclear. Many reports exist indicating soldiers
leave the military to be placed directly into police units. The militaries
have used soldiers as civil police to maintain military readiness.

66
RS Police

The RS police units consist of three entities: Regular Police, Depart-

ment for State Security, and the Special Police Service.

The RS Regular Police (RJB) is primarily responsible for control of the

general public, traffic control, criminal investigations, and day-to-day

Republic of Serbia Police Force

67
security operations throughout the RS. The RJB is directly subordinate
to the Ministry of the Interior and maintains nine subordinate centers of
Public Security (CJB) within the RS: Bijeljina, Doboj, Zvornik, Banja
Luka, Mrkonjic Grad, Prijedor, Rogatica, Srbinje, and Trebinje. The
RJB is currently facing the challenge of downsizing and restructuring.
The RJB is also experiencing problems with hiring a multiethnic force
throughout the RS.

The RS Special Police Service (SPS) is responsible for riot/crowd con-

trol, counterterrorism, VIP protection, building security, and emer-
gency assistance. This force is composed of elite, well trained, and
experienced troops. The SPS was designated as a military unit due to
its military vehicles and weapons, which subjected it to SFOR policies
and inspections for compliance. The SPS transferred from the military
portion of the Dayton to the civilian police section in July 2000. So far
the SPS has met all requirements set forth by the international commu-
nity and SFOR. After downsizing, the SPS forces number 269. The
SPS is directly subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior; it is now
observed and controlled by the IPTF. It maintains six detachments in
the following cities:
■ Janja,
■ Bratunac (Center for Breeding and Training horses and dogs),
■ Doboj,
■ Sekovici,
■ Banja Luka, and
■ Srbinje.

The RS Department for State Security (RDB) is the RS version of the

United States’ FBI. In June 1998, the RS National Assembly passed a
law placing the RDB under control of the RS president. This law was
reversed in July 1999 when the RS National Assembly gave control of
the RDB to the RS prime minister.

68
 Republik Srpska Special
Police Patch

Federation Police

Federation police forces consist of the cantonal police and the special
police. Unlike the RS, the Federation’s police units are subordinate to
the cantonal governments (ten cantons total). The canton police are
responsible for policing the general public, traffic control, criminal
investigations, and day-to-day security of the Federation.

During the war, the Federation Special Police was subordinate to the
Ministry of the Interior. This unit was immediately disbanded after the
war, but incorporated into the canton police. The special police dis-
banded the anti-terrorist unit territorial forces and then fell under the
jurisdiction of the civilian portion of Dayton. The special police unit
continues to reduce its forces. The primary missions of the special
police are riot/crowd control, hostage rescue, counterterrorism, and
physical protection of buildings and ministries. The Federation Special
Police have received training in the United States.

69
 Boznia-Herzegovina
Police Force

Brcko Multiethnic Police

The Brcko Multiethnic Police
Force (MEPF) became active on
20 January 2000. A police chief
and two deputies command the
MEPF — one from each ethnic
group. The MEPF consists of
about 320 policemen, whose
selection is based on qualifica-
tions and current ethnic struc-
ture of Brcko. The MEPF MEPF Brassard
operates under the control of the
Brcko District, and is supervised by the UN Mission in Brcko and IPTF.
The sections within the MEPF are as follows: uniform police, traffic
police, criminal investigation, border police, and internal affairs.

70
Bosnia and Herzegovina State Border Service
The Bosnia and Herzegovina
Tripresidency approved the estab-
lishment of a State Border Service
(SBS) in November 1999. This plan
was rejected by the Bosnia and
Herzegovina Parliament, but was
unilaterally imposed by High Rep-
resentative Petritsch. The SBS is a
multiethnic border police, which is
centrally controlled by the Bosnia
and Herzegovina government. The
initial stations established are in
Zvornik, Sarajevo airport, Capljina,
and Izacic. The primary roles of the
SBS are prevention of illegal
imports and crossborder black mar-
ket activity, and the regulation of
border crossing points. The SBS
has a 10-kilometer area within the
Bosnia and Herzegovina border as
their area of operations. Upon com-
pletion, the SBS will consist of
approximately 3,000 police officers
guarding more than 240 border
crossing points. Bosnia and Herze-
govina is also planning an academy
IPTF Uniform to train potential police officers for
the SBS.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Neither the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina nor the RS has weap-
ons of mass destruction or the means to produce them.

71
APPENDIX A:
Equipment Recognition

INFANTRY WEAPONS
PPSH-41/43

Maximum Effective Range 200 m

Caliber 7.62 x 25-mm
System of Operation Blowback, selective fire
Overall Length 33.15 in.
Feed Device 71-rd drum or 35-rd box
Weight (Loaded) 11.99 lbs (drum) 9.26 lbs (box)

7.62-mm Zastava M69/66A1

Maximum Effective Range 400 m

Caliber 7.62 x 39-mm
System of Operation Gas, semiautomatic
Overall Length 40.16 in.
Magazine Capacity 10-round, staggered row, non-detachable
box magazine
Weight (Loaded) 8.7 lbs

A-1
 7.62-mm AK-47/AKM

Maximum Effective Range 400 m

Caliber 7.62 x 39-mm
System of Operation Gas, selective-fire
Overall Length 34.25 in.
Magazine Capacity 30-rd, staggered row detachable box magazine
Weight (Loaded) 8.7 lbs

A-2
 7.62-mm Zastava M76 Sniper Rifle

Maximum Effective Range 800 m

Caliber 7.62 x 54-mm
System of Operation Gas, semiautomatic
Overall Length 48.2 in.
Magazine Capacity 10-rd, staggered row detachable box magazine
Weight (Loaded) 9.5 lbs

A-3
 7.62-mm M72B1/AB1

Maximum Effective Range 800 m

Caliber 7.62 x 39-mm
System of Operation Gas, selective fire
Overall Length 48.2 in.
Magazine Capacity 40-rd, staggered row detachable box magazine or
75-rd drum magazine. Can also use 30-rd AK
magazine
Weight (Loaded) 1.13 kg (40-rd box) 2.1 kg (75-rd drum)

A-4
 7.62-mm Zastava M84

Maximum Effective Range 800 m

Caliber 7.62 x 54-mm
System of Operation Gas, automatic
Overall Length 47.2 in.
Magazine Capacity 100, 200, or 250-rd metallic link belt
Weight 19.8 lbs

A-5
 7.92-mm Zastava M53

Maximum Effective Range 800 m

Caliber 7.62 x 54-mm
System of Operation Gas, automatic
Overall Length 47.2 in.
Magazine Capacity 100, 200, or 250-rd metallic link belt
Weight 19.8 lbs

A-6
 12.7-mm NSV

Maximum Effective Range 2,000 m

Caliber 12.7 x 107-mm
System of Operation gas, automatic only
Overall Length 1.56 m
Feed 50-rd linked belt
Weight 57.9 kg

A-7
 RT20 20-mm Anti-materiel Rifle

Maximum Effective Range 1,800 m.

Caliber 20-mm.
System of Operation bolt action, single shot.
Overall Length 1.33 m.
Weight (Loaded) 19.2 kg.

A-8
 50-mm M-8 Mortar

Maximum Effective Range 480 m.

Rate of Fire 25-30 rds/min.
Caliber 50-mm.
Weight (Firing Position) 7.3 kg.

A-9
ARMOR
T-34/85

Crew 4
Armament 1 x 85-mm gun w/56 rds
2 x 7.62-mm MG w/2,500 rds
Maximum Speed 55 km/h
Maximum Range 300 km
Night Vision no
NBC no
Fording 1.3 m
Gradient 60%
Vertical Obstacle 0.73 m
Trench 2.3 m

A-10
 T-54/55

Crew 4
Armament 1 x 100-mm D10T2S gun w/43 rds
1 x 7.62-mm SMGT coaxial w/3,500 rds
1 x 12.-7-mm DShK antiaircraft w/500 rds
Maximum Speed 50 km/h
Maximum Range 460 km (650 km w/long range tanks)
Fuel Capacity 960 liters
Combat Weight 36,000 kg
Length 9.0 m
Width 3.76 m
Height 3.03 m
Night Vision Yes
NBC Yes
Fording 1.4 m
Gradient 60%
Vertical Obstacle 0.8 m
Trench 2.7 m

A-11
 T-72

Crew 3
Armament 1 x 125-mm 2A46 smoothbore gun w/45 rds (incl. 6 x
ATGW)
1 x 7.62-mm PKT MG (coaxial) w/2,000 rds
1 x 12.7-mm NSVT MG (antiaircraft) w/300 rds
Maximum Speed 60 km/h
Maximum Range 480 km
Fuel Capacity 1,000 liters
Combat Weight 46,500 kg
Length 9.533 m (gun forward)
Width 3.59 m (over track skirts)
Height 2.228 m (turret top)
Fording 1.8 m
Gradient 60%
Vertical Obstacle 0.85 m
Trench 2.8 m
NBC yes
Night Vision yes

A-12
 AMX-30

Crew 4
Armament 1 x 105-mm smoothbore gun w/47 rds.
1 x 20-mm cannon w/480 rds or
1 x 12.7-mm MG w/1,050 rds. (coaxial).
1 x 7.62-mm MG w/2,050 rds.
Night Vision yes.
NBC Capable yes.
Maximum Range 450 km (road).
Maximum Speed 65 km/h.
Fuel Capacity 970 liters.
Combat Weight 36,000 kg.
Height 2.29 m (turret top).
Length 9.48 m (gun forward).
Width 3.1 m.
Fording 1.3 m (without preparation) 2.2 m (with preparation)
4 m (with snorkel).
Gradient 60%.

A-13
 M60A1

Crew 4.
Armament 1 x 105-mm M68 rifled gun w/63 rds.
1 x 7.62-mm MG w/6,000 rds (coaxial).
1 x 12.7-mm MG w/900 rds (AA).
Night Vision yes.
NBC Capable yes.
Maximum Range 500 km.
Maximum Speed 48.28 km/h.
Fuel Capacity 1,420 liters.
Combat Weight 52,617 kg.
Height 3.27 m.
Length 9.436 m (gun forward).
Width 3.631 m.
Fording 1.219 m.
Gradient 60%.

A-14
 M47

Crew 4
Armament 1 X 105-mm M68 rifled gun w/54 rds
1 x 7.62-mm Coaxial MG
2 x 7.62-mm Antiaircraft MG
Maximum Speed 48.8 km/h
Maximum Range 499 km
Fuel Capacity 1,420 liters
Combat Weight 48,987 kg
Length 9.3 m (gun forward)
Width 3.631 m
Height 3.08 m
Night Vision yes
NBC yes
Fording 1,219 m
Gradient 60%
Vertical Obstacle 0.915 m
Trench 2.59 m

A-15
 M-80

Crew/Passengers 3 + 7.
Type tracked.
Armament 1 x 20-mm cannon w/400 rds.
1 x 7.62-mm coaxial MG w/2,250/rds.
4 x Sagger.
Maximum Speed 60 km/h.
Maximum Range 500 km.
Fuel Capacity
Combat Weight 13,700 kg.
Length 6.4 m.
Width 2.59 m.
Height 2.5 m (over missile launcher).
Night Vision yes
NBC yes
Fording amphibious.
Gradient 60%.
Vertical Obstacle 0.8 m.
Trench 2.2 m.

A-16
 AML-90

Crew 3
Configuration Wheeled (4 x 4)
Armament (Main) 1 x 90-mm gun w/20 rds
(Coaxial) 1 x 7.62-mm MG w/2,000 rds
(Smoke) 2 smoke grenade launchers on either side of turret
with 16 grenades
Night Vision Optional
NBC Capable Optional
Maximum Range (Road) 600 km
Maximum Speed 90 km/h
Fuel Capacity 156 liters
Combat Weight 5,500 kg
Height 2.07 m
Length (Gun forward) 5.11 m
Width 1.97 m
Fording 1.1 m (Amphibious w/kit)
Gradient 60%
Vertical Obstacle 0.3 m
Trench 0.8 m

A-17
 BRDM-2

Crew/Passengers 4
Type 4x4
Armament 1 x 14.5-mm KPVT w/500 rds
1 x 7.62-mm PKVT w/2000 rds
Maximum Speed 100 km/h
Maximum Range 750 km
Fuel Capacity 290 liters
Combat Weight 7,000 kg
Length 5.75 m
Width 2.35 m
Height 2.31 m
Night Vision yes
NBC yes
Fording amphibious
Gradient 60%
Vertical Obstacle 0.4 m
Trench 1.25 m

A-18
 BTR-40

Crew/Passengers 2+8
Type 4x4
Armament 1 x 7.62-mm SGMB w/1,250 rds
Maximum Speed 80 km/h
Maximum Range 285 km
Fuel Capacity 120 liters
Combat Weight 5,300 kg
Length 5m
Width 1.9 m
Height 1.75 m
Night Vision no
NBC no
Fording 0.8 m
Gradient 60%
Vertical Obstacle 0.47 m
Trench 0.7 m

A-19
 BTR-152

Crew/Passengers 2 + 17
Type 6x6
Armament 1 x 7.62-mm SGMB w/1,250 rds
Maximum Speed 75 km/h
Maximum Range 600 km
Fuel Capacity 300 liters
Combat Weight 8,950 kg
Length 6.55 m
Width 2.32 m
Height 2.36 m
Night Vision no
NBC no
Fording 0.8 m
Gradient 55%
Vertical Obstacle 0.6 m
Trench 0.69 m

A-20
 M113

Crew 2 + 11
Configuration Tracked
Armament 1 x 12.7-mm MG
Night Vision Yes
NBC Capable Yes
Maximum Range 480 km
Maximum Speed 60.7 km/h
Fuel Capacity 360 liters
Combat Weight 11,070 kg
Height 1.85 m
Length 4.863 m
Width 2.686 m
Fording Amphibious
Gradient 60%
Vertical Obstacle 0.61 m
Trench 1.68 m

A-21
 M-60P

Crew/Passengers 3 + 10.
Type tracked.
Armament 1 x 12.7-mm M2 HB MG (AA).
1 x 7.92-mm MG (bow).
Maximum Speed 45 km/h.
Maximum Range 400 km.
Fuel Capacity 150 liters.
Combat Weight 11,000 kg.
Length 5.02 m.
Width 2.77 m.
Height 2.385 m (including MG).
Night Vision yes.
NBC no.
Fording 1.35 m.
Gradient 60%.
Vertical Obstacle 0.6 m.
Trench 2 m.

A-22
 2S1P 122-mm SPH

Crew 4
Armament 1 x 122-mm 2A31 howitzer w/40 rds
Maximum range: 15,200 m
Rate of Fire: 5 rds/min
Maximum Speed 61.5 km/h
Cruising Range 500 km
Combat Weight 15,700 kg
Length 7.26 m
Width 2.85 m
Height 2.732 m
Fording amphibious
Gradient 77%
Vertical Obstacle 0.7 m
NBC yes
Night Vision yes (limited range, commander and driver only)

A-23
ARTILLERY
M48 76-mm Mountain Gun

Crew 6.
Maximum Range 8,750 m.
Rate of Fire 25 rds/min.
Combat Weight 705 kg. (firing).
Length 2.42 m (travelling).
Width 2.65 m (firing).
Height 1.22 m (travelling).
Prime Mover 4 x 4 truck.

A-24
 L118 105-mm Howitzer

Maximum Range 17,200 m.

Rate of Fire 12 rds/min for 1 minute.
6 rds/min for 3 minutes.
3 rds/min sustained.
Length 7.01 m (firing position with gun at 0 degrees).
Width 1.778 m.
Height 2.63 m (travelling with tube forward).
Prime Mover 6 x 6 truck.

A-25
 M56 105-mm Howitzer

Crew 7.
Maximum Range 13,000 m.
Rate of Fire 16 rds/min.
Combat Weight 2,060 kg. (firing).
Length 5.46 m (firing).
Width 2.15 m (firing).
Height 1.56 m (travelling).
Prime Mover 4 x 4 truck.

A-26
 M114 155-mm Howitzer

Crew 11
Maximum Range 14,600 m
Rate of Fire 40 rds/h
Combat Weight 5,760 kg
Length 7.315 m
Width 2.438 m
Height 1.803 m
Prime Mover 6x6

A-27
 D-30 122-mm Howitzer

Crew 7
Maximum Range 1,000 m (direct fire) 15,300 m (conventional) 21,900 m (RAP)
Rate of Fire 6 rds/min
Combat Weight 3,210 kg
Length 5.4 m
Width 1.95 m
Height 1.66 m
Prime Mover 6 x 6 truck

A-28
 130-mm M46 Field Gun

Crew 8
Maximum Range 27,150 m
Rate of Fire 6 rds/min
Combat Weight 7,700 kg
Length 11.73 m
Width 2.45 m
Height 2.55 m
Prime Mover 6x6

A-29
 D-20 152-mm Howitzer

Crew 10
Maximum Range 17,410 m (conventional) 24,000 m (RAP)
Rate of Fire 6 rds/min
Combat Weight 5,700 m
Length 8.69 m
Width 2.40 m
Height 1.92 m
Prime Mover 6 x 6 truck

A-30
 M-84 152-mm Howitzer

Crew 9.
Maximum Range 27,000 m (base-bleed projectile).
Rate of Fire 6 rds/min.
Combat Weight 7,080 kg.
Length 9.67 m (firing).
Width 5.73 m (firing).
Height 2.16 m (travelling).
Prime Mover 6 x 6 truck.

A-31
 M-63 Plamen (Flame) MRL

Crew 7.
Armament 32 128-mm rockets.
Maximum Range 12,800 m. (M-87 HE rocket).
Reload Time 5 min.
Combat Weight 2,134 kg. (firing position).
Length 3.65 m (firing).
Width 2.212 m (travelling).
Height 1.278 m (travelling).
Primary Mover 4 x 4 truck.

A-32
 M-71 Partizan

Crew 3.
Armament 128-mm rocket.
Maximum Range 8,564 m.
Combat Weight 45 kg.
Length 1.13 m (firing).

A-33
 M-77 Oganj (Fire) MRL

Crew 5.
Armament 32 x 128-mm rockets
Max range 20,600 m.
Rate of Fire 2 min. (automatic).
Maximum Speed 80 km/h.
Maximum Range 600 km.
Combat Weight 22,400 kg.
Length 8.4 m (travelling).
Width 2.49 m (travelling).
Height 3.1 m (travelling).

A-34
 M-87 Orkan (Hurricane) MRL

Crew 5.
Armament 12 262-mm rockets.
Max range 50,000 m.
Rate of Fire 1 rocket/2.3-4 sec.
Maximum Speed 80 km/h.
Maximum Range 600 km.
Combat Weight 32,000 kg.
Length 9.00 m.
Width 2.64 m.
Height 3.84 m.
Fording 1.2 m.
Gradient 60%.
Trench 1.8 m.

A-35
 BT-82 M60A 82-mm RCL

Crew 5.
Maximum Range 700 m (HEAT against moving targets).
Weight 122 kg.
Length 2.2 m.
Prime Mover 4 x 4 truck.

A-36
 M79 82-mm RCL

Crew 4.
Maximum Range 2,700 m (HE).
Rate of Fire 5-6 rds/min.
Combat Weight 41.35 kg.
Length 1.785 m.

A-37
 CAI Armbrust Rocket Launcher

Maximum Range 1,500 m.

Penetration 300 mm.
Overall Length 850 mm.
Weight 6.3 kg.

M79 90-mm Rocket Launcher

Maximum Effective Range 1,960 m.

Armor Penetration 400 mm.
Caliber 90-mm.
Overall Length 1.432 m.

A-38
 RBR-M80 64-mm LAAW

Maximum Effective Range 1,280 m.

Caliber 64-mm.
Overall Length 1.2 m (firing).
Armor Penetration 300 mm.

A-39
 RPG-22 Neto

Maximum Effective Range 150 - 200 m (combat)

Caliber 72.5-mm
Overall Length 685 mm (folded) 850 mm (extended)
Armor Penetration 400 mm

RBR-M90 120-mm Rocket Launcher

Maximum Effective Range 250 m (effecxtive).

Caliber 120-mm.
Overall Length 1.3 m.
Armor Penetration 800 mm RHA.

A-40
 AT-4 Spigot

Type Wire-guided SACLOS

Maximum Range 70 - 2,000 m (9M111) 70 - 2,500 m (9M111-2)
Launch Weight 12.5 kg
Armor Penetration 400 mm (9M111) 460 mm (9M111-2)

A-41
 AT-6

Type radio-controlled SACLOS

Maximum Range 400 - 5,000 m
Launch Weight 31.4 kg
Armor Penetration 600 mm

A-42
 M75 20-mm

Crew 4-6.
Maximum Range 5,500 m (horizontal) 4,000 m (vertical).
Rate of Fire 700 rds/min (cyclic).
Combat Weight 260 kg.
Barrel Length 1.956 m.
Width 1.51 m.

A-43
 M55 20-mm

Crew 6.
Maximum Range 5,500 m (horizontal) 4,000 m (vertical under 80 degrees).
Rate of Fire (Per Barrel) 700 rds/min (cyclic).
Combat Weight 1,100 kg.
Length 4.3 m (travelling).
Width 1.27 m (travelling).
Height 1.47 m (travelling).

A-44
 ZU-23 23-mm

Crew 5
Maximum Range 7,000 m (horizontal) 5,100 m (vertical)
Rate of Fire (Per Barrel) 200 - 800 rds/min
Combat Weight 950 kg
Length 4.37 m
Width 1.83 m
Height 1.87 m

A-45
 S-60 57-mm

Crew 7
Maximum Range 12,000 m (horizontal) 8,800 m (vertical)
Rate of Fire 100 - 120 rds/min
Combat Weight 4,500 kg
Length 8.6 m
Width 2.054 m
Height 2.46 m

A-46
 SA-7 Grail

Type 1
Guidance Passive IR
Maximum Range 3,200 m
Combat Weight 9.15 kg
Length 1.49 m

A-47
ROTARY AIRCRAFT
Mi-24 Hind

Type Twin-turbine gunship/transport helicopter

Crew 4
Armament 1 x 4-barrel 12.7-mm MG mounted in chin turret
Assorted rockets, missiles, gun pods
Payload 8 combat troops
Maximum Speed 172 kts
Maximum Range 243 nm
Rotar Diameter 17.30 m
Length 17.51 m
Height 3.97 m

A-48
 Mi-8/17

Crew 4
Armament Assorted Rockets, Missiles, and Gun Pods
Maximum Speed 135 kts
Maximum Range 307 nm
Rotar Diameter 21.29 m m
Length 25.33 m
Height 5.54 m

A-49
 UH-1H

Crew 3
Armament Assorted guns, rockets, and/or missiles
Maximum Speed 128 kts
Maximum Range 400 km
Length 12.98 m
Height 3.87 m

SA-342

Crew 1
Armament 2 x forward firing 7.62-mm MG
Assorted missiles or rockets
Maximum Cruising Speed 140 kt
Maximum Range 361 nm
Rotar Diameter 10.50 m
Length 11.97 m (rotors turning)
Height 3.19 m

A-50
APPENDIX B:
International Time Zones

B-1
APPENDIX C:
Conversion Charts

When You Know

Units of Length Multiply by To find
Millimeters 0.04 Inches
Centimeters 0.39 Inches
Meters 3.28 Feet
Meters 1.09 Yards
Kilometers 0.62 Miles
Inches 25.40 Millimeters
Inches 2.54 Centimeters
Feet 30.48 Centimeters
Yards 0.91 Meters
Miles 1.61 Kilometers
Units of Area

Sq. Centimeters 0.16 Sq. Inches

Sq. Meters 1.20 Sq. Yards
Sq. Kilometers 0.39 Sq. Miles
Hectares 2.47 Acres
Sq. Inches 6.45 Sq. Cm
Sq. Feet 0.09 Sq. Meters
Sq. Yards 0.84 Sq. Meters
Sq. Miles 2.60 Sq. Km
Acres 0.40 Hectares
Units of Mass and Weight
Grams 0.035 Ounces
Kilograms 2.21 Pounds
Tons (100kg) 1.10 Short Tons
Ounces 28.35 Grams
Pounds 0.45 Kilograms
Short Tons 2.12 Tons

C-1
Units of Volume Multiply by To find
Milliliters 0.20 Teaspoons
Milliliters 0.06 Tablespoons
Milliliters 0.03 Fluid Ounces
Liters 4.23 Cups
Liters 2.12 Pints
Liters 1.06 Quarts
Liters 0.26 Gallons
Cubic Meters 35.32 Cubic Feet
Cubic Meters 1.35 Cubic Yards
Teaspoons 4.93 Milliliters
Tablespoons 14.78 Milliliters
Fluid Ounces 29.57 Milliliters
Cups 0.24 Liters
Pints 0.47 Liters
Quarts 0.95 Liters
Gallons 3.79 Liters
Cubic Feet 0.03 Cubic Meters
Cubic Yards 0.76 Cubic Meters
Units of Speed
Miles per Hour 1.61 Km per Hour
Km per Hour 0.62 Miles per Hour

C-2
Temperature
To convert Celsius into degrees Fahrenheit, multiply Celsius by 1.8 and
add 32. To convert degrees Fahrenheit to Celsius, subtract 32 and divide
by 1.8.

Celsius Fahrenheit
oC oF

100 212 ➞ Boiling Point of Water

Heat Wave ➞ 40 105
98.6 ➞ Normal Body Temperature
36.9
35
90

A Hot Summer Day ➞ 30

80
25
70 ➞ A Mild Spring Day
20
60
15

A Warm Winter Day ➞ 10

50

5 40

0 32
30
➞ Freezing Point of Water
—5
20
— 10
10
— 15
0
— 20

Temperature Chart

C-3
APPENDIX D:
Holidays

1 January New Year (Western Christian)

7 January Christmas Day (Orthodox)
14 January New Year (Orthodox)
1 March Independence Day
6 May St. George’s Day (Orthodox)
28 June Vivovdan (Orthodox)
12 July Petrovdan (Orthodox)
2 August Ilindan (Orthodox)
15 August Velika gospa — Assumption (Western Christians)
28 August Velika gospojina — Assumption (Orthodox)
8 September Mala gospa — Nativity of the Virgin Mary
(Western Christian)
21 September Mala gospa — Nativity of the Virgin Mary
(Orthodox)
1 November All Saints’ Day (Western Christian)
2 November All Souls’ Day (Western Christian)
8 November Mitrovdan (Orthodox)
25 November National Day
25 December Christmas Day (Western Christians)

Muslim Holidays
The dates of Muslim holidays vary with the Islamic calendar.
Ramadan, the Month of Fasting. Fasting is obligatory for most Muslims
during Ramadan. Fasting is observed during daylight hours.
Begins: 2002 5 November 2004 14 October
2003 26 October 2005 4 October

D-1
Eid al-Fitr, the Festival of the Fast Breaking, the celebration immedi-
ately following Ramadan. The giving of charity during this 3-day holi-
day is obligatory.
Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca. Obligatory at least once in a Muslim’s
life. The Hajj begins on 14 February 2002. The most important day of
the pilgrimage is the Day of Arafat where pilgrims spend the afternoon
of the ninth day of the Islamic month Dhul-Hijjah on the Plain of Arafat
praying for God’s forgiveness and mercy.
Eid al-Adha, the Festival of the Sacrifice. This festival immediately fol-
lows the Day of Arafat. The festival commemorates the prophet Abra-
ham’s willingness to sacrifice everything for God. The festival lasts for
4 days and, in 2002, began 23 February.
Islamic New Year was on 15 March in 2002.

D-2
APPENDIX E:
Language

Guide to Pronunciation

E-1
Basic Phrases/Expressions

E-2
E-3
Numbers

Military Phrases

E-4
Interogation

Commands/Direction

E-5
Medical/Sanitation

E-6
E-7
Clothing/Distribution

E-8
E-9
E-10
APPENDIX F:
International Road Signs

40
Crossroads Maximum speed No through road Road narrows

S TO P

Fallen/falling rock No entry for Motorway Stop and give way

vehicular traffic

O N E W AY Tourist
information

Low flying aircraft or One way street Tourist

sudden aircraft noise No left turn information point

Cable height
Traffic signals No u-turn 16’ - 6”

Overhead cables, Failure of

Maximum height traffic light signals

Sharp deviation

F-1
APPENDIX G:
Deployed Personnel’s Guide to Health Maintenance

DoD-prescribed immunizations and medications, including birth control

pills, should be brought in sufficient quantity for deployment’s duration.

Only food, water, and ice from approved U.S. military sources should be
consumed. Consuming food or water from unapproved sources may
cause illness. Food should be thoroughly cooked and served hot.

Thorough hand-washing before eating and after using the latrine is

highly recommended, as is regular bathing. Feet should be kept dry and
treated with antifungal powder. Socks and underwear should be changed
daily; underwear should fit loosely and be made of cotton fiber.

Excessive heat and sunlight exposure should be minimized. Maintaining

hydration is important, as are following work-rest cycles and wearing
uniforms properly. Sunglasses, sunscreen (SPF 15 or higher), and lip
balm are recommended. Drinking alcohol should be avoided. Personnel
with previous heat injuries should be closely monitored.

Uniforms should be worn properly (blouse boots). DEET should be

applied to exposed skin and uniforms treated with permethrin; per-
methrin is not intended for use on skin. Proper treatment and wear of
uniform, plus application of DEET to exposed skin, decreases the risk of
diseases transmitted by biting insects.

Overcrowded living areas should be avoided. Ventilated living areas and

avoiding coughing or sneezing toward others will reduce colds and other
respiratory infections. Cots or sleeping bags should be arranged “head
to toe” to avoid the face-to-face contact that spreads germs.

Contact with animals is not recommended. Animals should not be kept

as mascots. Cats, dogs, and other animals can transmit disease. Food
should not be kept in living areas as it attracts rodents and insects, and
trash should be disposed of properly.

G-1
Hazardous snakes, plants, spiders, and other insects and arthropods such
as scorpions, centipedes, ants, bees, wasps, and flies should be avoided.
Those bitten or stung should contact U.S. medical personnel.
All sexual contact should be avoided. Properly used condoms offer some
protection from sexually transmitted diseases but not full protection.
Stress and fatigue can be minimized by maintaining physical fitness,
staying informed, and sleeping when the mission and safety permits.
Alcohol should be avoided as it causes dehydration, contributes to jet
lag, can lead to depression, and decreases physical and mental readi-
ness. Separation anxiety, continuous operations, changing conditions,
and the observation of human suffering will intensify stress. Assistance
from medical personnel or chaplains is available.

Additional Information
Water
If unapproved water, as found in many lakes, rivers, streams, and city
water supplies must be used in an emergency, the water may be disin-
fected by:
■ Adding calcium hypochlorite at 5.0 ppm for 30 minutes;
■ Adding Chlor-Floc or iodine tablets according to label instructions;
■ Heating water to a rolling boil for 5 to 10 minutes; or
■ Adding 2 to 4 drops of ordinary chlorine bleach per quart of water
and waiting 30 minutes before using it.
Either U.S. military preventive medicine or veterinary personnel should
inspect bottled water supplies. Bottled water does not guarantee purity;
direct sunlight on bottled water supplies may promote bacterial growth.
Water in canals, lakes, rivers, and streams is likely contaminated; unnec-
essary bathing, swimming, and wading should be avoided. If the tactical
situation requires entering bodies of water, all exposed skin should be
covered to protect from parasites. Following exposure, it is important to
dry vigorously and change clothing.

G-2
Rodents
Rodents should not be tolerated in the unit area; they can spread serious
illness. Diseases may be contracted through rodent bites or scratches,
transmitted by insects carried on rodents (such as fleas, ticks, or mites),
or by contamination of food from rodent nesting or feeding. Personnel
can minimize the risk of disease caused by rodents by:
■ Maintaining a high state of sanitation throughout the unit area;
■ Sealing openings 1/4 inch or greater to prevent rodents from entering
unit areas;
■ Avoiding inhalation of dust when cleaning previously unoccupied
areas (mist these areas with water prior to sweeping; when possible,
disinfect area using 3 ounces of liquid bleach per 1 gallon of water).
■ Promptly removing dead rodents. Personnel should use disposable
gloves or plastic bags over the hands when handling any dead animal
and place the dead rodent/animal into a plastic bag prior to disposal.
■ Seeking immediate attention if bitten or scratched by a rodent or if
experiencing difficulty breathing or flu-like symptoms.
Insects
Exposure to harmful insects, ticks, and other pests is a year-round,
worldwide risk. The following protective measures reduce the risk of
insect and tick bites:
■ Use DoD-approved insect repellents properly;
■ Apply DEET on all exposed skin;
■ Apply permethrin on clothing and bed nets;
■ Tuck bed net under bedding; use bed net pole;
■ Avoid exposure to living or dead animals;
■ Regularly check for ticks;
■ Discourage pests by disposing of trash properly; eliminate food stor-
age in living areas; and
■ Cover exposed skin by keeping sleeves rolled down when possible,
especially during peak periods of mosquito biting (dusk and dawn);
keep undershirts tucked into pants; tuck pant legs into boots.

G-3
Uniforms correctly treated with permethrin, using either the aerosol spray-
can method (reapply after sixth laundering) or with the Individual Dynamic
Absorption (IDA) impregnation kit (good for 6 months or the life of the uni-
form) will help minimize risks posed by insects. The date of treatment
should be labeled on the uniform.
Bed nets should be treated with permethrin for protection against biting
insects using either the single aerosol spray can method (treating two bed
nets) or the unit’s 2-gallon sprayer. All personnel should sleep under
mosquito nets, regardless of time of day, ensure netting is tucked under
bedding, and use poles to prevent bed nets from draping on the skin.
DoD-approved insect repellents are:
IDA KIT: NSN 6840-01-345-0237
Permethrin Aerosol Spray: NSN 6840-01-278-1336
DEET Insect Repellent: NSN 6840-01-284-3982

Hot Weather
If heat is a threat in the area, personnel should:
■ Stay hydrated by drinking water frequently;
■ Follow work-rest cycles;
■ Monitor others who may have heat-related problems;
■ Wear uniforms properly;
■ Use a sun block (SPF 15 or higher), sunglasses, and lip balm;
■ During hot weather, wear natural fiber clothing (such as cotton) next
to the skin for increased ventilation;
■ Seek immediate medical attention for heat injuries such as cramps,
exhaustion, or stroke. Heat injuries can also occur in cold weather;
■ Avoid standing in direct sunlight for long periods; be prepared for
sudden drops in temperature at night, and construct wind screens if
necessary to avoid blowing dust or sand.
Sunscreens:
Sunscreen lotion: NSN 6505-01-121-2336
Non-alcohol lotion base sunscreen: NSN 6505-01-267-1486

G-4
WORK/REST TABLE
EASY MODERATE HARD
WORK WORK WORK
WBGT Water Water Water
Heat Index Work / Intake Work / Intake Work / Intake
Cat (o F) Rest (Qt/Hr) Rest (Qt/Hr) Rest (Qt/Hr)
1 78 – 81.9 NL 1/2 NL 3/4 40/20 min 3/4
2 82 – 84.9 NL 1/2 50/10 min 3/4 30/30 min 1
3 85 – 87.9 NL 3/4 40/20 min 3/4 30/30 min 1
4 88 – 89.9 NL 3/4 30/30 min 3/4 20/40 min 1
5 > 90 50/10 min 1 20/40 min 1 10/50 min 1
The work/rest times and fluid replacement volumes will sustain performance
and hydration for at least 4 hours of work in the specific heat category. Individual
water needs will vary +/- (plus/minus) 1/4 qt/hr.
NL = no limit to work time per hour. Rest means minimal physical activity (sitting
or standing) and should be accomplished in shade if possible.
Caution: Hourly fluid intake should not exceed 1 ½ quarts. Daily fluid intake
should not exceed 12 quarts. Note: MOPP gear adds 10o to WBGT Index.
Food
High risk food items such as fresh eggs, unpasteurized dairy products,
lettuce or other uncooked vegetables, and raw or undercooked meats
should be avoided unless they are from U.S. military approved sources.
Those who must consume unapproved foods should choose low risk
foods such as bread and other baked goods, fruits that have thick peels
(washed with safe water), and boiled foods such as rice and vegetables.
Human Waste
Military-approved latrines should be used when possible. If no latrines
are available, personnel should bury all human waste in pits or trenches.

G-5
 Cold Weather
If cold weather injuries are a threat in the area, personnel should:

■ Drink plenty of fluids, preferably water or other decaffeinated beverages;

■ Closely monitor others who have had previous cold injuries;
■ Use well-ventilated warming tents and hot liquids for relief from the
cold. Watch for shivering and increase rations to the equivalent of
four MREs per day;
■ Not rest or sleep in tents or vehicles unless well ventilated; tempera-
tures can drop drastically at night;
■ Dress in layers, wear polypropylene long underwear, and use sun-
glasses, scarf, unscented lip balm, sunscreen, and skin moisturizers;
■ Insulate themselves from the ground with tree boughs or sleeping
mats and construct windscreens to avoid unnecessary heat loss; and
■ Remember that loss of sensitivity in any body part requires immediate
medical attention.

G-6
 First Aid
Basic Lifesaving
Those caring for injured persons should immediately:
■ Establish an open airway,
■ Ensure the victim is breathing,
■ Stop bleeding to support circulation,
■ Prevent further disability,
■ Place dressing over open wounds,
■ Immobilize neck injuries,
■ Splint obvious limb deformities, and
■ Minimize further exposure to adverse weather.

Injuries and Care

Shock
■ Symptoms:
❏ Confusion
❏ Cold, clammy skin
❏ Sweating
❏ Shallow, labored, and rapid breathing
❏ Rapid pulse
■ Treatment:
❏ An open airway should be maintained.
❏ Unconscious victims should be placed on their side.
❏ Victims should be kept calm, warm, and comfortable.
❏ Lower extremities should be elevated.
❏ Medical attention should be sought as soon as possible.

G-7
Abdominal Wound
■ Treatment:
❏ Exposed organs should be covered with moist, clean dressing.
❏ Wound should be secured with bandages.
❏ Organs that have been displaced should never be reintroduced to
the body.
Bleeding
■ Treatment:
❏ Direct pressure with hand should be applied; a dressing should be
used if available.
❏ Injured extremity should be elevated if no fractures are suspected.
❏ Pressure points may be used to control bleeding.
❏ Dressings should not be removed; additional dressings may be
applied over old dressings.
■ Tourniquet:
❏ NOTE: Tourniquets should only be used when an injury is life
threatening.
❏ A 1-inch band should be tied between the injury and the heart, 2 to
4 inches from the injury, to stop severe bleeding; wire or shoe
strings should not be used.
❏ Band should be tight enough to stop bleeding and no tighter.
❏ Once the tourniquet is tied, it should not be loosened.
❏ The tourniquet should be left exposed for quick visual reference.
❏ The time that the tourniquet is tied and the letter “T” should be
written on the casualty’s forehead.
Eye Injury
Treatment:
■ Embedded objects should not be removed; dressings should secure
objects to prohibit movement.
■ Bandages should be applied lightly to both eyes.
■ Patients should be continuously attended.

G-8
Chest Wound
Symptoms:
■ Sucking noise from chest
■ Frothy red blood from wound
Treatment:
■ Entry and exit wounds should be identified; wounds should be cov-
ered (aluminum foil, ID card).
■ Three sides of the material covering the wound should be taped, leav-
ing the bottom untaped.
■ Victim should be positioned to facilitate easiest breathing.
Fractures
Symptoms:
■ Deformity, bruising
■ Tenderness
■ Swelling and discoloration
Treatment:
■ Fractured limb should not be straightened.
■ Injury should be splinted with minimal movement of injured person.
■ Joints above and below the injury should be splinted.
■ If not in a chemical environment, clothing should be removed from
injured area.
■ Rings should be removed from fingers.
■ Pulse should be checked below injury to determine blood flow
restrictions.
Spinal, Neck, Head Injury
Symptom:
■ Lack of feeling and/or control below neck

G-9
Treatment:
■ Conscious victims should be cautioned to remain still.
■ Airway should be checked without moving injured person’s head.
■ Victims who must be moved should be placed, without bending or
rotating victim’s head and neck, on a hard surface that would act as a
litter (door, cut lumber).
■ Head and neck should be immobilized.

Heat Injuries
Heat Cramps: Symptoms
■ Spasms, usually in muscles or arms
■ Results from strenuous work or exercise
■ Loss of salt in the body
■ Normal body temperature

Heat Exhaustion: Symptoms

■ Cramps in abdomen or limbs
■ Pale skin
■ Dizziness, faintness, weakness
■ Nausea or vomiting
■ Profuse sweating or moist, cool skin
■ Weak pulse
■ Normal body temperature
Heat Stroke: Symptoms
■ Headache
■ Dizziness
■ Red face/skin
■ Hot, dry skin (no sweating)
■ Strong, rapid pulse
■ High body temperature (hot to touch)

G-10
Treatment:
■ Victim should be treated for shock.
■ Victim should be laid in a cool area with clothing loosened.
■ Victim can be cooled by sprinkling with cool water or fanning
(though not to the point of shivering).
■ If conscious, victim may drink cool water (2 teaspoons of salt to one
canteen may be added).
■ Medical attention should be sought immediately; heat stroke can
result in death.
Burns
Burns may be caused by heat (thermal), electricity, chemicals, or radia-
tion. Treatment is based on depth, size, and severity (termed degree of
burn). All burn victims should be treated for shock and seen by medical
personnel.
Thermal/First Degree: Symptoms
■ Skin reddens
■ Painful
Treatment:
■ Source of burn should be removed.
■ Cool water should be applied to the affected area.
Thermal/Second Degree: Symptoms
■ Skin reddens and blisters
■ Very painful
Treatment:
■ Source of burn should be removed.
■ Cool water should be applied to the affected area.
■ Blisters should not be broken.
■ A dry dressing should cover the affected area.

G-11
Thermal/Third Degree: Symptoms
■ Charred or whitish looking skin
■ May burn to the bone
■ Burned area not painful; surrounding area very painful
Treatment:
■ Source of burn should be removed.
■ Clothing that adheres to burned area should not be removed.
■ A dry dressing should cover the affected area.

Electrical Burns
Treatment:
■ Power source must be off.
■ Entry and exit wounds should be identified.
■ Burned area should be treated in accordance with its severity.
Chemical Burns
Treatment:
■ Skin should be flushed with a large amount of water; eyes should be
flushed for at least 20 minutes.
■ Visible contaminants should be removed.
■ Phosphorus burns should be covered with a wet dressing (prevents air
from activating the phosphorous)

Cold Injuries
Hypothermia: Symptoms
■ Body is cold under clothing
■ Victim may appear confused or dead

G-12
Treatment:
■ Victim should be moved to a warm place.
■ Wet clothing should be removed; victim should be dressed in warm
clothing or wrapped in a dry blanket.
■ Body parts should not be rubbed.
■ Victims must not consume alcoholic beverages.
Frostbite: Symptoms
■ Skin appears white or waxy
■ Skin is hard to the touch
Treatment:
■ Victim should be moved to a warm place.
■ Affected area should be warmed in 104 to 108° F (40° C) water for
15 to 30 minutes (NOT hot water).
■ Affected area should be covered with several layers of clothing.
■ Affected area must not be rubbed.
■ Victim must seek medical attention.

Emergency Life-Saving Equipment

Equipment may be improvised when necessary. Following is a list of
possible uses for commonly found items.
Shirts = Dressings/Bandages
Belts, Ties = Tourniquets, Bandages
Towels, Sheets = Dressings/Bandages
Socks, Panty Hose, Flight cap = Dressings/Bandages
Sticks or Tree Limbs = Splints
Blankets = Litters, Splints
Field Jackets = Litters
BDU Shirts = Litters/Splints
Ponchos = Litters/Bandages
Rifle Sling = Bandages
M-16 Heat Guards = Splints

G-13
APPENDIX H:
Individual Protective Measures

Security Threats
Individual protective measures are the conscious actions which people
take to guard themselves against physical harm. These measures can
involve simple acts such as locking your car and avoiding areas where
crime is rampant. When physical protection measures are combined
they form a personal security program, the object of which is to make
yourself a harder target. The following checklists contain basic individ-
ual protective measures that, if understood and followed, may signifi-
cantly reduce your vulnerability to the security threats overseas (foreign
intelligence, security services, and terrorist organizations). If you are
detained or taken hostage, following the measures listed in these check-
lists may influence or improve your treatment.

Foreign Intelligence and Security Services

■ Avoid any actions or activities that are illegal, improper, or indiscreet.
■ Guard your conversation and keep sensitive papers in your custody at
all times.
■ Take it for granted that you are under surveillance by both technical
and physical means, including:
❏ Communications monitoring (telephone, telex, mail, and radio)
❏ Photography
❏ Search
❏ Eavesdropping in hotels, offices, and apartments
■ Do not discuss sensitive matters:
❏ On the telephone
❏ In your room
❏ In a car, particularly in front of an assigned driver

H-1
■ Do not leave sensitive personal or business papers:
❏ In your room
❏ In the hotel safe
❏ In a locked suitcase or briefcase
❏ In unattended cars, offices, trains, or planes
❏ Open to photography from the ceiling
❏ In wastebaskets as drafts or doodles
■ Do not try to defeat surveillance by trying to slip away from follow-
ers or by trying to locate “bugs” in your room. These actions will
only generate more interest in you. If you feel you are under surveil-
lance, act as naturally as possible, go to a safe location (your office,
hotel, U.S. Embassy), and contact your superior.
■ Avoid offers of sexual companionship. They may lead to a room raid,
photography, and blackmail. Prostitutes in many countries report to
the police, work for a criminal organization, or are sympathetic to
insurgent or terrorist organizations; in other words, are anti-U.S. Oth-
ers may be employed by an intelligence service.
■ Be suspicious of casual acquaintances and quick friendships with
local citizens in intelligence/terrorist threat countries. In many
countries, people tend to stay away from foreigners and do not
readily or easily make contact. Many who actively seek out friend-
ships with Americans may do so as a result of government orders or
for personal gain.
In your personal contacts, follow these guidelines:
■ Do not attempt to keep up with your hosts in social drinking.
■ Do not engage in black market activity for money or goods.
■ Do not sell your possessions.
■ Do not bring in or purchase illegal drugs.
■ Do not bring in pornography.

H-2
■ Do not bring in religious literature for distribution. (You may bring one
Bible, Koran, or other religious material for your own personal use.)
■ Do not seek out religious or political dissidents.
■ Do not take ashtrays, towels, menus, glasses, or other mementos from
hotels or restaurants.
■ Do not accept packages, letters, etc., from local citizens for delivery
to the U.S.
■ Do not make political comments or engage in political activity.
■ Do not be lured into clandestine meetings with would-be informants
or defectors.
■ Be careful about taking pictures. In some countries it is unwise to
take photographs of scenes that could be used to make unfavorable
comparisons between U.S. and local standards of living or other cul-
tural differences. Avoid taking any photographs from moving buses,
trains, or aircraft.
The following picture subjects are clearly prohibited in most coun-
tries where an intelligence or terrorist/insurgent threat is evident:
❏ Police or military installations and personnel
❏ Bridges
❏ Fortifications
❏ Railroad facilities
❏ Tunnels
❏ Elevated trains
❏ Border areas
❏ Industrial complexes
❏ Port complexes
❏ Airports

H-3
Detention

Most intelligence and security services in threat countries detain persons

for a wide range of real or imagined wrongs. The best advice, of course,
is to do nothing that would give a foreign service the least reason to pick
you up. If you are arrested or detained by host nation intelligence or
security, however, remember the following:
■ Always ask to contact the U.S. Embassy. You are entitled to do so
under international diplomatic and consular agreements, to which
most countries are signatories.
■ Phrase your request appropriately. In Third World countries, how-
ever, making demands could lead to physical abuse.
■ Do not admit to wrongdoing or sign anything. Part of the detention
ritual in some threat countries is a written report you will be asked or
told to sign. Decline to do so, and continue demanding to contact the
Embassy or consulate.
■ Do not agree to help your detainer. The foreign intelligence or security
service may offer you the opportunity to help them in return for releas-
ing you, foregoing prosecution, or not informing your employer or
spouse of your indiscretion. If they will not take a simple no, delay a
firm commitment by saying that you have to think it over.
■ Report to your supervisor immediately. Once your supervisor is
informed, the Embassy or consulate security officer needs to be
informed. Depending on the circumstances and your status, the
Embassy or consulate may have to provide you assistance in depart-
ing the country expeditiously.
■ Report to your unit’s security officer and your service’s criminal inves-
tigative branch upon returning to the U.S. This is especially important
if you were unable to report to the Embassy or consulate in country.
Remember, you will not be able to outwit a foreign intelligence organi-
zation. Do not compound your error by betraying your country.

H-4
Foreign Terrorist Threat
Terrorism may seem like mindless violence committed without logic or
purpose, but it is not. Terrorists attack soft and undefended targets, both
people and facilities, to gain political objectives they see as out of reach
by less violent means. Many of today’s terrorists view no one as inno-
cent. Thus, injury and loss of life are justified as acceptable means to gain
the notoriety generated by a violent act in order to support their cause.
Because of their distinctive dress, speech patterns, and outgoing person-
alities, Americans are often highly visible and easily recognized when
they are abroad. The obvious association of U.S. military personnel with
their government enhances their potential media and political worth as
casualties or hostages. Other U.S. citizens are also at risk, including
political figures, police, intelligence personnel, and VIPs (such as busi-
nessmen and celebrities).
Therefore, you must develop a comprehensive personal security pro-
gram to safeguard yourself while traveling abroad. An awareness of the
threat and the practice of security procedures like those advocated in
crime prevention programs are adequate precautions for the majority of
people. While total protection is impossible, basic common sense pre-
cautions such as an awareness of any local threat, elimination of predict-
able travel and lifestyle routines, and security consciousness at your
quarters or work locations significantly reduce the probability of suc-
cess of terrorist attacks.
To realistically evaluate your individual security program, you must
understand how terrorists select and identify their victims. Terrorists
generally classify targets in terms of accessibility, vulnerability, and
political worth (symbolic nature). These perceptions may not be based
on the person’s actual position, but rather the image of wealth or impor-
tance they represent to the public. For each potential target, a risk versus
gain assessment is conducted to determine if a terrorist can victimize a
target without ramifications to the terrorist organization. It is during this

H-5
phase that the terrorist determines if a target is “hard or soft.” A hard
target is someone who is aware of the threat of terrorism and adjusts his
personal habits accordingly. Soft targets are oblivious to the threat and
their surroundings, making an easy target.
Identification by name is another targeting method gathered from air-
craft manifests, unit/duty rosters, public documents (Who’s Who or the
Social Register), personnel files, discarded mail, or personal papers in
trash. Many targets are selected based upon their easily identifiable
symbols or trademarks, such as uniforms, luggage (seabags or duffle
bags), blatant national symbols (currency, tatoos, and clothing), and
decals and bumper stickers.

Travel Security
Travel on temporary duty (TAD/TDY) abroad may require you to stay
in commercial hotels. Being away from your home duty station
requires increasing your security planning and awareness; this is espe-
cially important when choosing and checking into a hotel and during
your residence there.
The recent experiences with airport bombings and airplane hijacking
suggest some simple precautions:
■ You should not travel on commercial aircraft outside the continental
U.S. in uniform.
■ Prior to traveling by commercial aircraft, you should screen your
wallet and other personal items, removing any documents (that is,
credit cards, club membership cards, etc.) which would reveal your
military affiliation.
NOTE: Current USMC policy requires service members to wear two
I.D. tags with metal necklaces when on official business. Also, the
current I.D. card must be in possession at all times. These require-
ments include travel to or through terrorist areas. In view of these
requirements, the service member must be prepared to remove and

H-6
 conceal these and any other items which would identify them as mil-
itary personnel in the event of a skyjacking.
■ You should stay alert to any suspicious activity when traveling.
Keep in mind that the less time spent in waiting areas and lobbies,
the better. This means adjusting your schedule to reduce your wait at
these locations.
■ You should not discuss your military affiliation with anyone during
your travels because it increases your chances of being singled out as
a symbolic victim.
■ In case of an incident, you should not confront a terrorist or present a
threatening image. The lower profile you present, the less likely you
will become a victim or bargaining chip for the terrorists, and your
survivability increases.

Hostage Situation
The probability of anyone becoming a hostage is very remote. However,
as a member of the Armed Forces, you should always consider yourself
a potential hostage or terrorist victim and reflect this in planning your
affairs, both personal and professional. You should have an up-to-date
will, provide next of kin with an appropriate power-of-attorney, and take
measures to ensure your dependents’ financial security if necessary.
Experience has shown that concern for the welfare of family members is
a source of great stress to kidnap victims.
Do not be depressed if negotiation efforts appear to be taking a long time.
Remember, chance of survival actually increases with time. The physical
and psychological stress while a hostage could seem overpowering, but
the key to your well-being is to approach captivity as a mission. Main-
taining emotional control, alertness, and introducing order into each day
of captivity will ensure your success and survival with honor.
During interaction with captors, maintaining self respect and dignity can
be keys to retaining status as a human being in the captor’s eyes. Com-
plying with instructions, avoiding provocative conversations (political,

H-7
religious, etc.), and establishing a positive relationship will increase sur-
vivability. Being polite and freely discussing insignificant and nonessen-
tial matters can reinforce this relationship. Under no circumstance
should classified information be divulged. If forced to present terrorist
demands to the media, make it clear that the demands are those of the
captor and that the plea is not made on your behalf. You must remember
that you are an American service member; conduct yourself with dignity
and honor while maintaining your bearing.
Hostages sometimes are killed during rescue attempts; consequently,
you should take measures to protect yourself during such an action.
Drop to the floor immediately, remain still and avoiding any sudden
movement; select a safe corner if it offers more security than the floor.
Do not attempt to assist the rescuing forces but wait for instructions.
After the rescue, do not make any comment to the media until you have
been debriefed by appropriate U.S. authorities.

H-8
APPENDIX I:
Dangerous Plants and Animals

Dangerous Snakes
Sand or Horned Viper
Description:
Adult length usually
0.6 to 0.7 meter, maxi-
mum of 0.9 meter.
Background color usu-
ally ash grey in males
and grey brown or
brick-red in females,
but much variation. Belly yellow, brownish or pinkish with small dark
spots or blotches. Body stout, usually with prominent black or brown
zigzag dorsal stripe. Tip of tail pink or red. Distinctive snout, terminat-
ing in a strongly upturned, horn-like appendage.
Habitat:
Found in various habitats from lower plains to elevations up to 2,500
meters, most often at moderately high elevations in dry terrain with scat-
tered bushes. Seeks gravelly, rock hills with slopes facing the sun. Fre-
quently found in open areas with few tree and bushes or in rock
formations near cultivated fields.
Activity and Behavioral Patterns
Primarily terrestrial, although occasionally climbs into bushes. Most
active in the evening, except in colder weather. Generally sluggish and
slow-moving. Not very aggressive. When annoyed, hisses loudly but
usually does not bite unless disturbance continues, then will strike and
bite quickly.

I-1
Venom characteristics:
Extremely potent hemotoxin. Symptoms may include ecchymosis, pro-
gressive swelling, lymphedema, shortness of breath, marked limb stiff-
ness, nausea, local hemorrhage, and internal bleeding. Fatalities
recorded. Fangs unusually long: may be up to 12 millimeters.
Common Adder
Alternate Names:
European Viper
Description:
Adult length usually 0.5
to 0.6 meter; maximum
of 0.9 meter. Stout
snake with slightly flat-
tened body. Back-
ground color varies by geographic location. Dorsal color varies from
grey to copper to brown or uniformly black with dark, heavy zig-zag
strip pattern on back. Belly grey, grey brown, or black; sometimes
marked with white spots. Tip of tail yellow, orange, or reddish orange.
Snout broadly rounded but not clearly upturned as in some other Euro-
pean vipers. May have X-shaped or inverted V-shaped mark on head.
Habitat:
Diverse habitats. Found in rocky or bushy hillsides, open fields, woods.
shady areas, moors, swamps, marshes, and bogs. In northern parts of
range, found mainly at sea level; may be found up to 2,700 meters in
lakes and rivers. Can tolerate coldest environment of any viper species.
Activity and Behavioral Patterns:
Active during the day in colder months; largely nocturnal during
warmer months. Generally timid disposition; not vicious or aggressive.
Tends to freeze when danger is present; however, easily alarmed and
bites if threatened or stepped on. Usually occurs in colonies near suit-
able hibernation site.

I-2
Venom characteristics:
Hemotoxic; also some neurotoxic activity. Envenomation causes sharp
pain or severe burning at site of bite, followed by swelling and inflam-
mation of lymph system. Victim usually develops nausea, headaches,
vomiting, chest pain, and labored breathing. Fatalities reported.
Orsini’s viper
Alternate names:
Steppe viper
Description:
Adult length usually 0.4
to 0.5 meter; maximum
of 0.65 meter. Back-
ground color grey, yel-
lowish, greenish, or
light brown. Belly usu-
ally light or dark grey,
sometimes with yellow markings. Completely black specimens
reported. Dark, wavy, zig-zag line with black edges down center of back
from head to tail; may be discontinuous. Head oval, narrower than that
of other vipers; distinct from neck. Snout rounded, slightly upturned.
Dark line extending from each eye to corner of mouth.
Habitat:
Dry plains, flatlands with few trees or bushes; more common at some-
what higher elevations. Also found on wooded hillsides in mountainous
regions. Generally seeks open areas near dry clay or loamy soil. Hides
in rodent dens and small animal burrows.
Activity and Behavioral Patterns:
Primarily diurnal, but may be nocturnal during hot summers months.
More active than other vipers; can move rapidly. Hibernates during win-
ter months. Not aggressive; avoids human confrontation. Seldom bites,
even when bothered, but will bite if continuously disturbed, stepped on,
or handled roughly.

I-3
Arthropods
Other invertebrate include centipedes, scorpions, and black and brown
widow spiders.
Plants
Monkshood
Other Name(s):
Wolfsbane, Aconite,
Bihk, Badger’s bane.
Mechanism(s) of
toxicity/injury:
Toxic (whole plant) by
ingestion or percutane-
ous absorption. Aconite
is a medicinal made
from the dried root con-
taining “ an extremely
toxic” alkaloid known as aconitine (a steroid alkaloid); may also have
quinoline alkaloids. Root has been fatally mistaken as horseradish. Can
cause instantaneous death in high doses. Fatal cardiac dysrhythmias
have occurred after ingestion of one teaspoonful of dried root. Quickly
fatal potential. Percutaneous absorption has resulted in paresthesias of
the lips followed by cardiac toxicity.
Ingestion is followed almost immediately by orophyaryngeal pain and
burning. Can cause dermatitis, but this is not the main concern.
Extracts have been used in arrow poison.
Comments:
Genus includes 100 northern temperate species, Presumably all contain
alkaloids. Monkshood is a northern European species; a perrenial herb, 2
to 6 feet in height, with thick, black, tuberous rootstock; bears blue flow-
ers. Found in fields, woods, and roadsides and cultivated in gardens. Seed
pods with numerous tiny seeds. Bikh is found in northern India. Badger’s

I-4
bane is an herb with tuberous roots known in subtropical and temperate
areas of China, where it is used as a medicinal despite the toxicity.
Cohosh/Baneberry
Other Name(s):
White, black, and red
cohosh/baneberry,
Grapewort, Snake-
berry, Necklace weed,
Doll’s eyes.
Mechanism(s) of
toxicity/injury:
All parts contain an
innocuous glycoside
that is metabolized to
form the aglycone pro-
toanemonin, a volatile,
irritant oil. As few as six
berries have caused severe symptoms (gastroenteritis, hematuria, and
occasional circulatory collapse) for many hours. Handling can cause
irritant dermatitis with vesiculation, severe eye iritation; ingestion can
result in death.
Comments:
Perennial herbs having a berry-like fruit found in fields, deciduous for-
ests, and roadsides.
Chervil
No Picture Available
Mechanism(s) of toxicity/injury:
Poisoning similar to hemlock and “fool’s parsley;” piperdine colatile
alkaloids (e.g. coniine, which exhibits nicotinic activity and has a
curare-like effect).

I-5
Comments:
Drying of the plant results in decreased toxicity. Poisoning has occurred
by mistaking the plant for parsley.
Horse Chestnut
Other Name(s):
Buckeye.
Mechanism(s) of
toxicity/injury:
A saponin, aesculin, (a
hydroxy derivative of
coumarin) is found in
leaves, bark, and seeds.
Some groups have eaten
the ripe nuts after roast-
ing and treatment in
lime water (absorption
of the toxins is ineffi-
cient), but children have
died after ingesting the
nuts or drinking tea
made from the leaves.
Bruised branches used
as a fish intoxicant.
Honey made from the
flowers is toxic.
Comments:
There are 13 species of Aesculus; large trees with showy flowers and
seed pods, which may be smooth and leathery, or warty. Small to
medium trees or shrubs. The brown nuts are held in a spiny green cap-
sule. Bark has been used as a yellow dye.

I-6
Fool’s Parsley
Mechanism(s) of
toxicity/injury:
All parts are toxic, pos-
sibly due to a cicutoxin-
like substance and
traces of coniine. Symp-
toms of toxicity resem-
ble the syndrome
following Cicuta spp.
(viz.) poisoning (pro-
fuse salivation, dia-
phoresis, gastroenteritis,
seizures, coma). Children have died by mistaking the plant for parsley and
the roots for turnips or radishes and eating it.
Comments:
A carrot-like annual herb up to 2 feet tall.
Belladonna
Other Name:
Nightshade
Mechanism(s) of
toxicity/injury:
Berries, leaves, and
roots contain tropane
alkaloids that can
cause death from anti-
cholinergic poisoning.
Comments:
Perennial plants to 3 feet high. Native to Eurasia and north Africa.

I-7
Poison Hemlock
Common Name(s):
Spotted hemlock,
fool’s parsley
Mechanism(s) of
toxicity/injury:
Quickly fatal potential.
The leaves and unripe
fruits have the piperide
alkaloids coniine and
coniceine with highest concentrations in the seeds and roots. Drying of
the plant results in decreased toxicity. One mouthful of the root has
caused death after a period of nervousness (within 30 minutes), nausea
and vomiting, diarrhea, respiratory failure.
Comments:
A biennial herb that resembles a carrot; smooth, spotted stems; foul
odor. Naturalized in waste and marshy areas; native in temperate Eur-
asia. Poison hemlock appears to be an unspotted version of the former;
noted in South Africa.
Croton
Common Name(s):
Ciega-vista, purging
croton.
Mechanism(s) of
toxicity/injury:
Long-lasting vesicular
dermatitis results from
contact with the toxic
resin. The cathartic and
purgative properties of
the toxins (croton oil, a "phorbol," in leaves, stems, and seeds) causes

I-8
severe gastroenteritis, even death; 20 drops potentially lethal (the oil
applied externally will blister the skin). Many members covered with
hundreds of sticky hairs that cling to the skin if contacted. Contact with
the eyes can be very serious.
Comments:
Croton is a wooly-haired annual herb, or evergreen bush, or small tree
with smooth ash-colored bark, yellowish-green leaves, small flowers,
and fruit.
Spindle Tree
Other Names:
Burning bush, Wahoo.
Mechanism(s) of
toxicity/injury:
Spindle tree is the most toxic
member of the genus. The
flowers are yellowish-green; the
attractive pink (or orange-red)
drupes are enticing but have
phyllorhodin, several cardiac
glycosides, and other unknown
substances as the toxic princi-
ples, which result in sysmptoms
10-12 hours after ingestion -
bloody diarrhea, nausea and
vomitting, fever, hallucina-
tions, somnolence, eventual
coma and seizures.
Comments:
Deciduous or evergreen shrubs or trees; fruit a three- to five- valved,
brightly colored capsule dehiscing to expose bird-dispersed to scarlet to
orange seeds. Until further data is available, the other species of this
group should be considered toxic.

I-9
Mole Plant
Other Name(s):
Caper spurge, Mexican
fire plant, milkweed,
red spurge, poison
spurge, mala mujer,
cypress spurge, cat’s
milk, wartwort, sun
spurge, candelabra cac-
tus, Indian spurge tree,
milkwood, pencil tree,
pencil cactus, rubber euphorbia.
Mechanism(s) of toxicity/injury:
Herbs, often with colored or milky sap, containing complex terpenes;
irritate the eyes, mouth, and gastrointestinal tract, and many cause der-
matitis by direct irritation. In some cases rain water dripping from the
plant will contain enough toxic principle to produce dermatitis and kera-
toconjunctivitis; can blind. Some contain urticating hairs (skin contact
breaks off ends and toxic chemicals are injected). The caper spurge has
killed those who mistook the fruit for capers. The Mexican fire plant
was known for medicinal properties in the first century and has killed
children. Red spurge causes dermatitis. The pencil cactus has an abun-
dant, white, acrid sap extremely irritating to the skin; has caused tempo-
rary blindness when accidentally splashed in the eyes, and has killed as
a result of severe gastroenteritis after ingestion.
Comments:
2,000 species of extremely variable form; may appear as herbs, shrubs
or trees — many are cactus-like. Fruit is usually a capsule opening in
three parts, each one seeded; sometimes a drupe.

I-10
Snake’s Head
No Photo Available
Other Names:
Guinea flower, Crown imperial.
Mechanism(s) of toxicity/injury:
Many contain veratrum alkaloids, used in some areas as medicinals.
Comments:
This genus has 100 species from western Europe and the Mediterranean
to eastern Asia, but only a few have been clearly implicated as etiology
of dermititis.
Heliotrope
Other Name(s):
Cherry pie, scorpion’s tail, Indian helio-
trope.
Mechanism(s) of
toxicity/injury:
Contains pyrrolizidine alkaloids. Cause
of large epidemics (Afghanistan, India) of
illness following ingestion of bread made
with flour contaminated with members of
this genus. The pathologic effects (Budd-
Chiari syndrome) take weeks to months,
and death comes slowly over years.
Chronic copper poisoning has occurred
associated with this plant.
Comments:
A large genus of worldwide distribution (250 tropical and temperate
trees and shrubs).

I-11
Christmas Rose
Other Name(s):
Hellebore, Stinking
Helleborus, Bear’s
Foot, Green Hellebore.
Mechanism(s) of
toxicity/injury:
An ancient medicinal,
reportedly used as a
chemical weapon hun-
dreds of years BC.
Alkaloids are very toxic and have a burning taste. The rootstocks and
leaves contain cardiac and saponin glycosides and protoanemonin as the
main toxic elements.
Comments:
The hellebores are native to Europe but are naturalized in many other areas.
Cow Parsnip
Common name(s):
Wild rhubarb, Giant hogweed,
Hogweed.
Mechanism(s) of
toxicity/injury:
Many species within this genus
contain furocoumarins; roots
and rind have phototoxic sap
resulting in acute bullous derma-
titis a few hours to two days after
contact if then exposed to the
sun, followed by pigmentation
(may take months to years to disappear).

I-12
Black Henbane
Other Names
Insane root, Fetid night-
shade.
Mechanism(s) of
toxicity/injury:
Old well-known medic-
inal and deadly poison
(hyoscyamine, atropine)
with many uses in many
cultures. Tropan alka-
loids in the seeds (in a
pod); has resulted in
death; dermatitis (low risk); has killed.
Comments:
Erect, hairy annual with coarse, hairy stems 1-5 feet tall, native to Europe.
Found in "weed communities" along roadsides on nutrient-rich sandy
soils and loam. Dirty yellow flowers with violet veins. Fruits are a cap-
sule with many black seeds (can be confused with the poppy plant seeds).
Golden Chain/Rain
Mechanisms of Toxic-
ity/Injury:
All parts of this species
ar epoisonous. Beans
are cooked for food
(boiled with several
changes of water) in the
tropics. Cytisine is the
toxic principle, particu-
larly concentrated in

I-13
the seeds and bark. Excreted in cow’s milk — poisoning may occur after
milk ingestion. Has proven fatal.
Comments:
Cultivated ornamental trees and shrubs with timber as hard as ebony.
Native to southern Europe.
Annual/French Mercury
No Picture Available
Other Name(s):
Dog’s Mercury
Mechanisms of Toxicity/Injury:
Native to Europe; entire plant is toxic. Has been mistaken for edible
greens. Emetic and purgative. Has proven fatal.
Comments:
Dye source; carpeting rhizome herb often characteristic of disturbed
woodland.
Coffeeberry
Other Name(s):
Alder buckthorn, com-
mon buckthorn, cascara.
Mechanism(s) of
Toxicity/Injury:
The fresh bark is recog-
nized as a particularly
strong laxative. There
are reports of deaths in
children after ingesting
buckthorn berries.
Comments:
Cascara bark is source of American cascara. Of low relative toxicity,
requires chronic use to result in chronic diarrhea and/or melanin pig-

I-14
mentation of the mucous membranes of the colon. Freshly prepared cas-
cara products contain anthrones and can lead to severe vomiting and
intestinal cramping. The bark should be stored for at least a year before
use or detoxified by heating (in air) to reduce the presence of anthrones.
Poison Ivy
Other Name(s):
Manzanillo, western
poison oak, eastern poi-
son oak, poison sumac,
Chinese/Japanese lac-
quer tree, Japanese tal-
low or wax tree, scarlet
rhus, sumac
Mechanism(s) of
toxicity/injury:
All contain allergenic nonvolatile oils known as urushiols in the resin
canals; these oils are highly sensitizing (delayed, type IV sensitivity) for
some individuals
Comments:
All species are deciduous, and the leaves turn red before being shed.
Poison ivy is a climbing or trailing vine with trifoliate, alternate leaves
smooth above and hairy beneath. Poison oak is never a climbing shrub,
alternately three-leafed, smooth above and hairy beneath. Found in dis-
turbed areas and along trails in North America and is a common source
of dermatitis. Poison sumac is a shrub or small tree with 7 to 13 alter-
nate leaflets, and is found in swampy areas of North America. Very few
cases of dermatitis are caused by this species because it inhabits isolated
areas and few people are exposed to it. Some individuals suffer intense,
debilitating reactions from contact with the sensitizing chemicals.

I-15
Burn Bean
No Picture Available
Other Name:
Colorines, mescal bean, red hots, necklacepod sophora, silverbush,
pagoda tree.
Mechanism(s) of toxicity/injury:
Dark to bright red beans in woody pods are hallucinogenic; used by
American Indians before peyote was discovered. Seeds and flowers
are very poisonous, causing convulsions; has caused death. One seed
can kill a child. Cytisine acts much like a nicotinic ganglionic stimu-
lationg agent.
Comments:
Fruit is source of a yellow dye. Dried flowers are sold as medicinal in
Indonesia; used for bleeding problems.
Black Nightshade
Other Name:
Deadly nightshade,
common nightshade,
horse nettle, bittersweet,
Jerusalem cherry, nipple
fruit, quena, potato
buch, wild tomato,
apple of Sodom, white-
edged nightshade.
Mechanisms of
Toxicity/Injury:
The fruit of the Jerusalem cherry is a black berry; the fully ripe berries
are eaten; unripe berries contain solanine alkaloids, which can cause
gastroeritis, weakness, circulatory depressin. Can kill

I-16
Comments:
Approaching 2,000 species of herbs, vines, shrubs covered with small
star-shaped hairs. Perfect white, yellow, or blue flowers. Berries have
dry or juicy pulp and several seeds.
English Yew
Other Name(s):
Ground hemlock, Amer-
ican yew, Japanese yew.
Mechanism(s) of
Toxicity/Injury:
Taxine A and B,
classed as steroid alka-
loids, are present in all
plant parts except the
aril. A single chewed seed is deadly. An hour after ingestion, nausea,
dizziness, and abdominal pain begin. This is followed by reddening of
the lips, dilatation of the pupils, shallow breathing, tachycardia, and
coma. Then the pulse slows, blood pressure drops, and death occurs
through respiratory paralysis. No proven treatment exists. Emptying the
stomach hours after ingestion may be helpful as leaves may not pass
through the GI tract expeditiously. Various clinical measures (circula-
tory stimulants, artificial respiration, cardiac pacemaker) have not pre-
vented death in suicide cases.
Comments:
An evergreen shrub or small tree bearing a characteristic fleshy, red,
sweet-tasting aril with a single green to black, partly exposed, hard-
shelled seed within. In North America, the Japanese yew, the toxicity of
which may exceed that of the English yew, has repeatedly caused fatal
animal poisonings. Was known as the “tree of death” in antiquity.

I-17
Stinging Nettle
Common Name(s):
Roman nettle, Roman nettle, dog
or small nettle.
Mechanism(s) of
Toxicity/Injury:
Brushing against the plant shears
off a protective cap from special-
ized silicaceous stinging hairs,
allowing skin puncture. After
puncture, an irritant liquid is
released that can contain several
pro-inflammatory mediators
including alkaloids, histamine,
acetylcholine, and 5 hydrox-
ytryptamine. These substances
cause the immediate reaction
after a nettle sting. The term
"urticaria," describing the characteristic skin eruption, is derived from
the genus name. Thought to be a defense against browsing animals; usu-
ally does not involve a hypersensitivity reaction. Stinging can persist at
the site for more than 12 hours after clinical features of urticaria have
disappeared. This persistence of symptoms is due to secondary release
of inflammatory mediators, or persistence of implanted hairs.
Comments :
Genus of 30 species, usually perennial, single-stalked herbs less than
0.3 meter (1 foot) in height, found mainly in northern temperate areas.
The tender tips are used as a leafy vegetable in some locales; simmering
in water renders the stingers ineffective.

I-18
Herb Paris
No Picture Available
Mechanisms of Toxicity/Injury:
Narcotic in large doses, producing abdominal pain, delirium, seizures;
has caused fatalities in children.
Comments:
Common in Europe.
Whorled Solomon’s Seal
No Picture Available
Mechanism(s) of Toxicity/Injury:
Although not known as a highly toxic group, they contain saponins. vol-
atile oils, and tannic acid. Dernatitis is the most common symptom after
handling or eating. Fruits are toxic (saponins), similar to herb Paris.
Ingestion results in vomiting, oral pain, and diarrhea.

I-19
APPENDIX J:
International Telephone Codes

International Telephone Codes

Algeria 213 Malta 356
Australia 61 Mexico 52
Austria 43 Morocco 212
Bahrain 973 Netherlands 31
Belgium 32 Nigeria 234
Brazil 55 New Zealand 64
Canada 1 Norway 47
China 86 Oman 968
Cyprus 357 Philippines 63
Denmark 45 Portugal 351
Djibouti 253 Qatar 974
Egypt 20 Republic of Korea 82
Ethiopia 251 Saudi Arabia 966
Finland 358 Senegal 221
France 33 Seychelles 248
Gabon 241 Singapore 65
Germany 49 Somalia 252
Greece 30 South Africa 27
Hawaii 1 Spain 34
Hong Kong 852 Sweden 46
Indonesia 62 Switzerland 41
Iran 98 Syria 963
Iraq 964 Taiwan 886
Ireland 353 Tanzania 255
Israel 972 Thailand 66
Ivory Coast 225 Tunisia 216
Japan 81 Turkey 90
Jordan 962 UAE 971
Kenya 254 United Kingdom 44
Kuwait 965 United States 1
Libya 218 Yemen 967
Madagascar 261 Zambia 260
Malaysia 60 Zimbabwe 263

AT&T (public phones) 0072-911 On-base 550-HOME or

or 0030-911 550-2USA

J-1
Notes
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Notes