ASSIGNMENT

CRIMINAL LAW 2
TOPICS REPORT & CASE DIGESTS
(Article 251 – 350)

Submitted by:
WILLY C. DUMPIT
First Year – LLB

Submitted to:
JUDGE EDILU HAYAG
Professor
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. When, while several persons, not
composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking
each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous
manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted
serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished
by prision mayor.

Elements:
1. That there be several persons.
2. That they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally.
3. That these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a
confused and tumultuous manner.
4. That someone was killed in the course of the affray.
5. That it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased.
6. That the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who
used violence can be identified.

PEOPLE Vs. UNLAGADA

GR No. 141080, Sep 17, 2002

FACTS:

On 27 January 1989 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening Danilo Laurel left
his house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, toattend a public
dance at Rizal St., Mag-asawang Taytay, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. Two (2)
hours later, or around 11:00 o'clock that evening,Danilo asked Edwin to take a short
break from dancing to attend to their personal necessities outside the dance hall.
Once outside, they decided tohave a drink and bought two (2) bottles of Gold Eagle
beer at a nearby store.Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for
a place to relieve himself. According to Edwin, he was only about three (3)
metersfrom Danilo who was relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man
walked past him, approached Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Daniloretaliated by
striking his assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group
of men numbering about seven (7), ganged up onDanilo and hit him with assorted
weapons, i.e., bamboo poles, stones and pieces of wood. Edwin, who was petrified,
could only watch helplessly asDanilo was being mauled and overpowered by his
assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died before he could be given any medical
assistance.Edwin Selda testified that on 29 January 1989 the police invited him to
the Municipal Building of Hinigaran to give his statement regarding thekilling incident
and, if necessary, to confirm the identity of the suspect who was then in their
custody. Thereat, he executed an affidavit andaffirmed before the police authorities
that the man under detention, whom he later identified as accused Anecito
Unlagada, was the same manwho stabbed his friend Danilo.Respondent however
contended that at around 10:00 o'clock in evening of 27 January 1989 while he was
inside the dance hall, an altercationensued near the gate between the gatekeeper
and a group of four (4) individuals who, despite their disruptive behavior, were
eventually allowedto get through the gate. At around 11:00 o'clock, a gunshot
suddenly rang out. From the people around he learned that a rumble had taken
placeand that somebody was killed. But he came to learn the victim's identity only
the following morning when he and a certain Lorenzo Patos werebrought by a police
officer to the Municipal Building for questioning. At the Municipal Building, he heard
somebody asking who "Lapad" was and analleged eyewitness, who later turned out
to be Edwin Selda, pointed to him as the man referred to by that name. Anecito
Unlagada and LorenzoPatos were put in jail and a complaint was filed against them
before the Municipal Trial Court of Hinigaran. Meanwhile the case against
Lorenzowas dismissed leaving Aniceto alone to face the charge of murder.The trial
court dismissed as incredible the alibi of the accused and the testimonies of the
defense witnesses negating Anecito's culpability.Accused Anecito Unlagada now
assails his conviction on the ground that it was error for the trial court to give full faith
and credence to the loneand uncorroborated testimony of witness Edwin Selda, and
in finding that the crime of murder was committed instead of "death caused in
atumultuous affray" under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:  

Whether or not the crime committed was “death caused in a tumultuous

affray" under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.

HELD:

Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. When, while several persons, not
composing groups organized for the common purpose ofassaulting and attacking
each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous
manner, and in the course of theaffray someone is killed, and it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted
serious physicalinjuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished
by prision mayor.A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between
several persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the courseof
which a person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.5
The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct groupof individuals, one of
whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of the killing, as against a
common, particular victim. It is not, as thedefense suggests, a "tumultuous affray"
within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free-
for-all, where severalpersons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one
another in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury
ofone or some of them. WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATION: Accused-appellant ANECITO UNLAGADA y
SUANQUEa.k.a. "Lapad" is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Danilo Laurel
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus moral damages in the reducedamount of
P50,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant

Art. 252. Physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray. When in a tumultuous

affray as referred to in the preceding article, only serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the participants thereof and the person responsible therefor cannot be
identified, all those who appear to have used violence upon the person of the
offended party shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that provided for the
physical injuries so inflicted.

Elements:
1. That there is a tumultuous affray as referred to in the preceding article.
2. That a participant or some participants thereof suffer serious physical
injuries or physical injuries of a less serious nature only.
3. That the person responsible therefor cannot be identified.
4. That all those who appear to have used violence upon the person of the
offended party are known.

Art. 253. Giving assistance to suicide. Any person who shall assist another to
commit suicide shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor,1 if such person lends his
assistance to another to the extent of doing the killing himself, he shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal.9 However, if the suicide is not consummated, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods9 shall be imposed.

Acts punishable as giving assistance to suicide.

1. By assisting another to commit suicide, whether the suicide is
consummated or not.
2. By lending his assistance to another to commit suicide to the extent
of doing the killing himself.

Art. 254. Discharge of firearms. Any person who shall shoot at another with any
firearm shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods,10 unless the facts of the case are such that the act can be held to constitute
frustrated or attempted parricide, murder, homicide, or any other crime for which a
higher penalty is prescribed by any of the articles of this Code.

Elements:
1. That the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person.
 2. That the offender has no intention to kill that person.

GERONIMO DADO v. PEOPLE

GR No. 131421, November 18, 2002

FACTS:
Before us is a petition for review... of the Regional Trial Court... finding
petitioner Geronimo Dado and his co-accused Francisco Eraso guilty of the crime of
homicide. Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three teams to intercept
cattle rustlers from Barangay Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat. The team, composed of
petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Alfredo
Balinas, and Rufo Alga, waited behind a large dike. At around 11:00 of the same
evening, the team saw somebody approaching at a distance of 50 meters. When he
was about 5 meters away from the team,... Alfredo Balinas noticed that Francisco
Eraso, who was on his right side, was making some movements. Balinas told Eraso
to wait, but before Balinas could beam his flash light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite
rifle at the approaching man. Immediately thereafter, petitioner, who was on the left
side of Rufo Alga, fired a single shot. The victim turned out to be Silvestre "Butsoy"
Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not the cattle rustler the team were
ordered to intercept. Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he
sustained. For his part, petitioner testified that on the night of the incident. When he
heard rapid gun bursts, he thought they were being fired upon by their enemies,
thus, he immediately fired a single shot eastward. It was only when accused Eraso
embraced and asked forgiveness from Alfredo Balinas, that he realized somebody
was shot. Trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of
homicide. The aforesaid judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. A petition for review was filed by accused Francisco Eraso but the same
was denied which became final and executory. Hence, as regards Francisco Eraso,
the decision of the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of homicide has become final.

ISSUE:
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed the instant petition contending that the trial
court and the Court of Appeals erred:
(1) in ruling that he acted in conspiracy with accused Francisco Eraso; and
(2) in finding him guilty of homicide on the basis of the evidence presented...
by the prosecution.

HELD:
A reading, however, of the information filed against petitioner will readily show
that the prosecution failed to allege the circumstance of conspiracy.The words
"conspired," "confederated," or the phrase "acting in concert" or "in conspiracy," or
their synonyms or derivatives do not appear in the indictment. The language used by
the prosecution in charging the petitioner and his co-accused contains no reference
to conspiracy which must be alleged, not merely inferred from the information.
Moreover, even if conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the information, the same
cannot be considered against the petitioner. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Although the agreement need not be directly proven, circumstantial
evidence of such agreement must nonetheless be convincingly shown. Indeed, like
the offense itself, conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, it has
been held that neither joint nor simultaneous action is... per se sufficient proof of
conspiracy. In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Eraso's seemingly concerted
and almost simultaneous acts were more of a spontaneous reaction rather than the
result of a common plan to kill the victim. In conspiracy, there should be a conscious
design to perpetrate the offense. Petitioner could not be made to answer for the acts
done by his co-accused, Franciso Eraso, unless it be shown that he participated
directly and personally in the commission of those acts. What is decisive is the result
of the Ballistic Examination. Piedad found that one of said fragments, marked "SB-
1," "is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet and was fired
through the barrel of a caliber 5.56 mm. firearm," and not a part of a .45 caliber
bullet. said metallic fragments cannot be presumed to be particles of a .45 caliber
bullet fired from the .45 caliber pistol of petitioner. Under equipoise rule, where the
evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise
rule finds application if, as in the present case, the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a
conviction. Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic fragments
found in the fatal wound of the victim are particles of a .45 caliber bullet that
emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by petitioner. For this reason, the Court
cannot in good conscience affirm his conviction for the crime of homicide. In the
same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the wound inflicted on the
victim's right outer lateral arm for the same reason that there is no evidence proving
beyond moral certainty that said wound was caused by the bullet fired from
petitioner's .45 caliber pistol. The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that
petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the attendant
circumstances, it appears that there is no evidence tending to prove that. Petitioner
had animus interficendi or intent to kill the victim. Absent an intent to kill in firing the
gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the crime of illegal
discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of
this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another
person; and (2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person. Petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Art. 255. Infanticide. The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder
in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than
three days of age.

Elements of infanticide.
 1. That a child was killed.
2. That the deceased child was less than three days (72 hours) of age.
3. That the accused killed the said child.
Art. 256. Intentional abortion. Any person who shall intentionally cause an
abortion shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal,13 if he shall use any violence upon the
person of the pregnant woman.
2. The penalty of prision mayor,'* if, without using violence, he shall act
without the consent of the woman.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,15
if the woman shall have consented.

Abortion, defined.
Carrara has denned abortion as the willful killing of the foetus in the uterus, or the
violent expulsion of the foetus from the maternal womb which results ih the death of
the foetus. (Guevara)

Ways of committing intentional abortion:

1. By using any violence upon the person of the pregnant woman.
2. By acting, but without using violence, without the consent of the woman.
(By administering drugs or beverages upon such pregnant woman without her
consent.)
3. By acting (by administering drugs or beverages), with the consent of the
pregnant woman.
Elements of intentional abortion:
a. That there is a pregnant woman;
b. That violence is exerted, or drugs or beverages administered, or that the
accused otherwise acts upon such pregnant woman;
c. That as a result of the use of violence or drugs or beverages upon her, or
any other act of the accused, the foetus dies, either in the womb or after
having been expelled therefrom;
d. That the abortion is intended.

Art. 257. Unintentional abortion. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods16 shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause an
abortion by violence, but unintentionally.
Elements:
 1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an
abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after
having been expelled therefrom.

Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself or by her parents. The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods17 shall be
imposed upon a woman who shall practice an abortion upon herself or shall consent
that any other person should do so. Any woman who shall commit this offense to
conceal her dishonor shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods. If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant
woman or either of them, and they act with the consent of said woman for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor, the offenders shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Elements:
1. That there is a pregnant woman who has suffered an abortion.
2. That the abortion is intended.
3. That the abortion is caused by
a. the pregnant woman herself;
b. any other person, with her consent; or
c. any of her parents, with her consent for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor.

Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of

abortives. The penalties provided in Article 256 shall be imposed in their maximum
period, respectively, upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their
scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in causing the same.

Elements:
1. That there is a pregnant woman who has suffered an abortion.
2. That the abortion is intended.
3. That the offender, who must be a physician or midwife, causes, or
assists in causing, the abortion.
4. That said physician or midwife takes advantage of his or her scientific
knowledge or skill.
 As to pharmacists, the elements are:
1. That the offender is a pharmacist.
2. That there is no proper prescription from a physician.
3. That the offender dispenses any abortive.

Art. 260. Responsibility of participants in a duel. The penalty of reclusion

temporal2' shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill his adversary in a duel.

Duel, defined.
It is a formal or regular combat previously concerted between two parties in the
presence of two or more seconds of lawful age on each side, who make the
selection of arms and fix all the other conditions of the fight.
Acts punished in duel.
1. By killing one's adversary in a duel.
2. By inflicting upon such adversary physical injuries.
3. By making a combat although no physical injuries have been inflicted.

Art. 261. Challenging to a duel. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period23 shall be imposed upon any person who shall challenge another, or incite
another to give or accept a challenge to a duel, or shall scoff at or decry another
publicly for having refused to accept a challenge to fight a duel.

Acts punished under Art. 261:

1. By challenging another to a duel.
2. By inciting another to give or accept a challenge to a duel.
3. By scoffing at or decrying another publicly for having refused to accept a
challenge to fight a duel.

Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving
him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.

Two kinds of mutilation:

1. By intentionally mutilating another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of
some essential organ for reproduction.
2. By intentionally making other mutilation, that is, by lopping or clipping off any part
of the body of the offended party, other than the essential organ for reproduction, to
deprive him of that part of his body.

Elements of mutilation of the first kind:

1. That there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for
generation, such as the penis or ovarium.
2. That the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive
the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. (Guevara)

Art. 263. Serious physical injuries. Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault
another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor,3 if in consequence of the physical injuries
inflicted, the injured person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,4 if
in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have
lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an
eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg, or shall have lost the use of any such
member, or shall have become incapacitated for the work in which he was
theretofore habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,5 if
in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have
become deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have
lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance
of the work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than
ninety days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period,6 if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the
illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.
How is the crime of serious physical injuries committed?
It is committed —
(1) by wounding;
(2) by beating; or
(3) by assaulting (Art. 263)
(4) by administering injurious substance. (Art. 264)

UNITED STATES v. SANTOS et al.

553 U.S. 507 (2008)
FACTS:

In an illegal lottery run by respondent Santos, runners took commissions from

the bets they gathered, and some of the rest of the money was paid as salary to
respondent Diaz and other collectors and to the winning gamblers. Based on these
payments to runners, collectors, and winners, Santos was convicted of, inter alia,
violating the federal money-laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. 1956, which prohibited the
use of the "proceeds" of criminal activities for various purposes, including engaging
in, and conspiring to engage in, transactions intended to promote the carrying on of
unlawful activity, 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1956(h). Based on his receipt of a salary, Diaz
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to launder money. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
convictions. On collateral review, the District Court ruled that, under intervening
Circuit precedent interpreting the word "proceeds" in the federal money-laundering
statute, § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) applied only to transactions involving criminal profits, not
criminal receipts. Finding no evidence that the transactions on which respondents'
money-laundering convictions were based involved lottery profits, the court vacated
those convictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Petitioner United States appealed.

ISSUE:

Should the word “proceeds” in the federal money-laundering statute apply only to
transactions involving criminal profits?

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that the rule of lenity required it be interpreted in favor of
defendants as "profits." According to the Court, if "proceeds" meant "receipts," nearly
every illegal-lottery violation would also be money-laundering, as paying a winner
involved receipts intended to promote the lottery. Interpreting it as "profits" eliminated
the merger problem. While it meant the Government had to prove more, it ensured
the severe money-laundering penalties would be imposed only for the removal of
profits from criminal activity, which permitted the leveraging of one criminal activity
into the next. The prosecution had to show only that a single instance of specified
unlawful activity was profitable and gave rise to the money involved in a charged
transaction. The Court concluded that "proceeds" meant "profits" absent contrary
legislative history.

Art. 264. Administering injurious substances or beverages. The penalties

established by the next preceding article shall be applicable in the respective case to
any person who, without intent to kill, shall inflict upon another any serious physical
injury, by knowingly administering to him any injurious substances or beverages or
by taking advantage of his weakness of mind or credulity.

Elements:
1. That the offender inflicted upon another any serious physical injury.
2. That it was done by knowingly administering to him any injurious
substances or beverages or by taking advantage of his weakness of mind or
credulity.
3. That he had no intent to kill.

Art. 265. Less serious physical injuries. Any person who shall inflict upon another
physical injuries not described in the preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate
the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical attendance
for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor.

Matters to be noted in the crime of less serious physical injuries.

1. That the offended party is incapacitated for labor for ten days or more (but
not more than 30 days), or needs medical attendance for the same period of
time.
2. That the physical injuries must not be those described in the preceding
articles.

Qualified less serious physical injuries.

(1) A fine not exceeding P500, in addition to arresto mayor, shall be imposed
for less serious physical injuries when
(a) there is a manifest intent to insult or offend the injured person, or
(b) there are circumstances adding ignominy to the offense.
(2) A higher penalty is imposed when the victim is either
(a) The offender's parents, ascendants, guardians, curators or teachers; or
(b) Persons of rank or persons in authority, provided the crime is not direct
assault.

Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:
 1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which
shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall
require medical attendance during the same period;
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the
offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party
from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance;
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos
when the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury.

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Republic Act No. 8353 which
took effect on October 22,1997).

PEOPLE vs. ORITA

G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990

FACTS:

•    March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old freshman student
at the St. Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house after her classmates
brought her home from a party.  She knocked at the door of her boarding house
when a frequent visitor of another boarder held her and poked a knife to her neck. 
Despite pleading for her release, he ordered her to go upstairs with him.  Since the
door which led to the 1st floor was locked from the inside, they used the back door to
the second floor. With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand
poking a "balisong" to her neck, he dragged her up the stairs. When they reached
the second floor, he commanded herwith the knife poked at her neck, to look for a
room. They entered Abayan's room. He then pushed her hitting her head on the
wall.  With one hand holding the knife, he undressed himself. He then ordered her to
take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra, pants and panty.   He
ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his
penis and insert it in her vagina. Still poked with a knife, she did as told but since she
kept moving, only a portion of his penis entered her.  He then laid down on his back
and commanded her to mount him. Still only a small part of his penis was inserted
into her vagina. When he had both his hands flat on the floor. She dashed out to the
next room and locked herself in. When he pursued her and climbed the partition, she
ran to another room then another then she jumped out through a window.

•    Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the
boarding house and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran
around the building and knocked on the back door.  When the policemen who were
inside the building opened the door, they found her naked sitting on the stairs crying.
Pat. Donceras, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. Pat. Donceras and two
other policemen rushed to the boarding house  where they heard and saw somebody
running away but failed to apprehend him due to darkness.  She was taken to
Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined.
•    Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.

•    RTC: frustrated rape

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is frustrated rape?

HELD:

NO. RTC MODIFIED. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of
P30,000
•    Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted and
consummated stages apply to the crime of rape.

•   Requisites of a frustrated felony are:

o    (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony

o    (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's
will

•    attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force
or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he
has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence,
which acts it is his intention to perform
o    If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the
crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt.
•    in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished.  Any penetration of the female
organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female
organ
•    The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on
the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out
penetration of the genital organ of the victim.

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days;
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female, or a public officer.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives
the latter of his liberty.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present:
(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;
(b) That it is committed simulating public authority;
(c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d) That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a
public officer, (cited in People vs. Mercado, 131 SCRA 501)
 PEOPLE vs. GUNGON
G.R. No. 119574 March 19, 1998

FACTS:

It was about 3:30 in the afternoon of 12 January 1994. Agnes Guirindola, a

20-
year old De La Salle University student, was driving a red Nissan Sentra car along
Panay Avenue, Quezon City,on her way to a bookstore, and thereafter, to fetch her
mother from work when a man, passing himself off as a traffic enforcement officer
and wearing a “PNP” reflectorized vest, flagged her down and motioned her to
execute a U-turn towards him. She complied. She came to know that it was
Venancio Roxas who said that she had wrongly traversed a one-way street where,
barely two days ago, a little girl had figured in an accident. Agnes surrendered her
driver’s license. Roxas told her to open the door. He came on board the car and
directed Agnes to proceed to the next intersection where Roxas motioned her to turn
left. After executing a left turn, she stopped and handed over to him a fifty pesos
(P50.00) bill which he accepted. He then returned her license. Agnes asked Roxas
where she could drop him off, instead, he suddenly pointed a gun at her and
switched off the engine, saying, “Miss kailangan ko lang ito,” referring to the car.
Roxas unlocked the rear door to let another man in. Roberto Gungon, immediately
reclined her seat and pulled her over to the back seat by her arms while Roxas
promptly slid into the driver’s seat. Momentarily, Roxas pulled over and alighted
from the vehicle while Gungon held Agnes and poked a gun at her. When Roxas
returned, he had with him a bottle of softdrink and skyflakes which he offered to
Agnes. Agnes refused to drink after seeing some tablets floating inside the bottle.
The car stopped a second time to load gas at a gasoline station. Once again,
Gungon insisted that she take the drink. Fearing his menacing look and the gun
pointed at her. She took a sip from the bottle. She was, still later, also forced to
swallow two tablets which Roxas gave to Gungon. She took the tablets but had them
under her tongue. Agnes noticed the address on the signboard reading, “Sto Tomas
Batangas and then she lost consciousness. It was about 9:30 p.m. when she found
herself lying at the back seat with her legs on the lap of Gungon. She noticed that
her pieces of jewelry, bracelets, earrings, ring, necklace and a wristwatch, as well as
cash, were missing and that her pair of shoes had been removed. She was told that
the items were just being meanwhile kept for her. The pair of shoes, however, were
returned to her. By this time, a third man was already seated in front of the car with
Roxas. Roxas stopped the car at a deserted area. Gungon escorted her to a place
not far away from the car and there she was shot. When she came to, Roxas,
Gungon, and the third man, as well as the car, were nowhere insight. She managed
to get up and slowly walked down the road until she reached a small house. She was
bleeding profusely from the neck and face. She looked around the house but not
finding anyone, she went to the sala to lie down. People soon arrived on a vehicle.
She again lost consciousness and regained it only at the Batangas Regional Hospital
and later transferred to a Manila hospital. NBI agent Feneza met with and talked to
Agnes at the V. Luna Medical Center, and showed her about 3 or 4 pictures from his
files. Agnes had thereby positively identified Roberto Gungon. Gungon could not be
arrested sooner. Based on information given to the NBI, he and his live-in partner
had left Manila by car on a Wednesday, passed through Catbalogan Samar, and
were bound for Davao. The agents located the arrested him and detained him at
their Regional Office in Davao. They flew him back to Manila of the first available
flight on Monday.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gungon is guilty of robbery. WON Gungon is guilty of Anti-

Carnapping Act?

HELD:

Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code defines robbery to be one committed
by any“ person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to
another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force
upon anything xxx.” Robbery may thus be committed two ways: (a) with violence, or
intimidation of persons and (b) by the use of force upon things. To be then liable for
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, the following elements must
concur.

1) that there be personal property belonging to another;

2) that there is unlawful taking of that property;
3) that the taking must be with intent to gain; and
4) that there is violence against or intimidation of any person or use of force upon
things.

It would appear that the taking of the victim’s jewelry and cash came only by
way of an afterthought on the part of the appellant. The taking was not attended by
violence or intimidation upon the person of Agnes. The absence, however, of
violence or intimidation did not exculpate appellant from liability for the crime of theft,
punishable by Article 308, in relation to Article 309, of the Revised Penal Code.
“Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is committed by any person who, with
intent to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon
things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.”
“Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
“1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum ans medium periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if
the value of the things stolen exceed the latter amount, the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years.” Since the value of the personal property taken from
the victim amounted to P38,000.000 the penalty imposable is the maximum period of
the penalty prescribed by Article 309 which is the maximum of prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods plus one year for the additional ten thousand pesos in
excess of P22,000.00. Lastly, appellant contends that he should not have been
convicted of violation of Republic No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping
Act, because the taking of the subject motor vehicle. Roxas had already acquired
effective possession of the subject vehicle. This would have been consequential had
there been no finding of conspiracy between appellant and Venancio Roxas. In
conspiracy, to once again stress it, the act of the other co- conspirator and, therefore
it is of no moment that an accused had not taken part in the actual commission of
every act constituting the crime each of the conspirators being held in the same
degree of liability as the others.

Art. 268. Slight illegal detention. The penalty of reclusion temporal2 shall be
imposed upon any private individual who shall commit the crimes described in the
next preceding article without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated therein.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives him of
his liberty.
3. That the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal.
4. That the crime is committed without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated in Art. 267.

Art. 269. Unlawful arrest. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, in any case other than those
authorized by law, or without reasonable ground therefor, shall arrest or detain
another for the purpose of delivering him to the proper authorities.

Elements:
1 That the offender arrests or detains another person.
2. That the purpose of the offender is to deliver him to the proper
authorities.
3. That the arrest or detention is not authorized by law or there is no
reasonable ground therefor.

Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua* shall be imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody
of a minor person, shall deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or
guardians. (As amended by Republic Act No. 18)

Elements:
1. That the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person (whether
over or under 7 years but less than 21 years of age).
 2. That he deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or
guardians.

Art. 271. Inducing a minor to abandon his home. The penalty of prision
correccional5 and a fine not exceeding seven hundred pesos shall be imposed upon
anyone who shall induce a minor to abandon the home of his parents or guardians or
the persons entrusted with his custody.

Elements:
1. That a minor (whether over or under seven years of age) is living in the
home of his parents or guardian or the person entrusted with his custody.
2. That the offender induces said minor to abandon such home.

Art. 272. Slavery. — The penalty of prision mayor1 and a fine of not exceeding
10,000 pesos shall be imposed upon anyone who shall purchase, sell, kidnap, or
detain a human being for the purpose of enslaving him.

Elements:
1. That the offender purchases, sells, kidnaps or detains a human being.
2. That the purpose of the offender is to enslave such human being.

Art. 273. Exploitation of child labor. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed
upon anyone who, under the pretext of reimbursing himself of a debt incurred by an
ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted with the custody of a minor, shall, against
the tatter's will, retain him in his service.
Elements:
1. That the offender retains a minor in his service.
2. That it is against the will of the minor.
3. That it is under the pretext of reimbursing himself of a debt incurred by an
ascendant, guardian or person entrusted with the custody of such minor.

Art. 274. Services rendered under compulsion in payment of debt. The penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon any person who, in order to require or enforce the payment of
a debt, shall compel the debtor to work for him, against his will, as household servant
or farm laborer.
 Elements:
1. That the offender compels a debtor to work for him, either as household
servant or farm laborer.
2. That it is against the debtor's will.
3. That the purpose is to require or enforce the payment of a debt.

Art. 275. Abandonment of persons in danger and abandonment of one's own

victim. The penalty of arresto mayor1 shall be imposed upon:
1. Anyone who shall fail to render assistance to any person whom he shall
find in an uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying, when he can
render such assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission
shall constitute a more serious offense;
2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom he has
accidentally wounded or injured;
3. Anyone who, having found an abandoned child under seven years of age,
shall fail to deliver said child to the authorities or to his family, or shall fail to
take him to a safe place.

ANTONIO A. LAMERA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 93475 June 5, 1991

FACTS:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street,
Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and
bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle
and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal.As a consequence thereof, two
informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code and (b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2
of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim. On
June 1987 the MTC of Pasig rendered its decision in finding the petitioner guilty of
the crime of Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized under paragraph
2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed from said Decision
to the RTC of Pasig. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was arraigned for
violation of Article 365. He entered a plea of not guilty. He filed a petition for review
in the CA but which was denied. He raised before the SC that that he cannot be
penalized twice for an “accident” and another for “recklessness.” He maintained that
since he is facing a criminal charge for reckless imprudence, which offense carries
heavier penalties under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, he could no longer
be charged under Article 275, par. 2, for abandonment for failing to render to the
persons whom he has accidentally injured.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code is a bar to prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the same
Code because it constitutes double jeopardy?
HELD:
No, the SC affirmed that the Articles penalize different and distinct offenses.
The rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does not,
therefore, apply pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be
dismissed for lack of merit. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment,
(b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused. He is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised
Penal Code. In People vs. Doriquez, the SC held that it is a cardinal rule that the
protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or
identical offenses.  Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines
two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other. The two informations
filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses. The first, for reckless
imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title
Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. The second, for
Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes
Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of
Book Two of the same Code. Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by
means of culpa. Crimes against Security are committed by means of dolo.
Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the
same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of
the offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the
subsequent offenses charged.

Art. 276. Abandoning a minor. The penalty of arresto mayor2 and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon anyone who shall abandon a child
under seven years of age, the custody of which is incumbent upon him.

Elements:
1. That the offender has the custody of a child.
 2. That the child is under seven years of age.
3. That he abandons such child.
4. That he has no intent to kill the child when the latter is abandoned.

Art. 277. Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his custody;

indifference of parents. — The penalty of arresto mayor5 and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos shall be imposed upon anyone who, having charge of the rearing or
education of a minor, shall deliver said minor to a public institution or other persons,
without the consent of the one who entrusted such child to his care or, in the
absence of the latter, without the consent of the proper authorities.

Elements of abandonment of minor by one charged with the rearing or

education of said minor.
a. That the offender has charge of the rearing or education of a minor.
b. That he delivers said minor to a public institution or other persons.
c. That the one who entrusted such child to the offender has not consented to
such act; or if the one who entrusted such child to the offender is absent, the
proper authorities have not consented to it.

Elements of indifference of parents:

a. That the offender is a parent.
b. That he neglects his children by not giving them education.
c. That his station in life requires such education and his financial condition
permits it.

Art. 278. Exploitation of minors. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods6 and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who shall cause any boy or girl under sixteen years of age to
perform any dangerous feat of balancing, physical strength, or contortion.
2. Any person who, being an acrobat, gymnast, ropewalker, diver, wild-animal
tamer or circus manager, or engaged in a similar calling, shall employ in
exhibitions of these kinds, children under sixteen years of age who are not his
children or descendants.
3. Any person engaged in any of the callings enumerated in the next
preceding paragraph who shall employ any descendant of his under twelve
years of age in such dangerous exhibitions.
4. Any ascendant, guardian, teacher, or person entrusted in any capacity with
the care of a child under sixteen years of age, who shall deliver such child
 gratuitously to any person following any of the callings enumerated in
paragraph 2 hereof, or to any habitual vagrant or beggar.

Art. 279. Additional penalties for other offenses. The imposition of the penalties
prescribed in the preceding articles, shall not prevent the imposition upon the same
person of the penalty provided for any other felonies denned and punished by this
Code.

Art. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. — Any private person who shall enter the
dwelling of another against the latter's will, shall be punished by arresto mayor1 and
a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Elements of trespass to dwelling.

1. That the offender is a private person.
2. That he enters the dwelling of another.
3. That such entrance is against the latter's will.

Art. 281. Other forms of trespass. — The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who shall enter the
closed premises or the fenced estate of another, while either of them is uninhabited,
if the prohibition to enter be manifest and the trespasser has not secured the
permission of the owner or the caretaker thereof.

Elements:
1. That the offender enters the closed premises or the fenced estate of
another.
2. That the entrance is made while either of them is uninhabited.
3. That the prohibition to enter be manifest.
4. That the trespasser has not secured the permission of the owner or the
caretaker thereof.

Art. 282. Grave threats. Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction
upon the person, honor, or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong
amounting to a crime, shall suffer:
1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime
he threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the threat
demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful,
and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not
have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be
imposed.
If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the
threat shall not have been made subject to a condition.

Elements of grave threats where offender attained his purpose:

a. That the offender threatens another person with the infliction upon the
latter's person, honor or property, or upon that of the latter's family, of any
wrong.
b. That such wrong amounts to a crime.
c. That there is a demand for money or that any other condition is imposed,
even though not unlawful.
d. That the offender attains his purpose.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHERRY BONDOC Y LIWANAG,

BELLOSILLO, J.
G.R. No. 98400, May 23, 1994

FACTS:

On 6 October 1989, Lucita Romero Corpuz went to the Manila City Jail
bringing her 1 year and 4 months old daughter, Carla May, with her to visit her
husband, Antonio Corpuz, but was not allowed this time to bring her daughter
inside. Cherry Bondoc, appellant, who was standing in front of the gate
approached her and volunteered take care of the child while Lucita visits her
husband. After Bondoc’s explanation of her good intentions, Lucita entrusted
her child to her but after fifteen minutes both Bondoc and the child were
nowhere to be found and a woman told Lucita that the appellant had left with
the child; fearing that her child was kidnapped, Lucita reported the kidnapping
to the WPD, which was recorded in the police blotter and then published in
the People’s Journal. Appellant was then placed under arrest for kidnapping,
and on 19 Jan. 1990 an information for kidnapping for the purpose of selling
was filed against her but she denied the charges,nevertheless, trial court
convicted her, hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court is right in convicting the appellant of

kidnapping defined and penalized under Art. 270 of The Revised PenalCode?
 HELD: “The trial court observed that Lucita, testifying before the court in a
spontaneous, straightforward and candid manner, pointed to and identified
appellant as the person to whom she entrusted Carla May and who later
absconded with her child; that prior to Lucita's identification in court she had
immediately pointed to the appellant as the kidnapper of her child on the day
she 241.
2. saw appellant at the Herbosa police station when Carla May was
presented.”1 “The bare denial of appellant that Lucita was not the one who
entrusted Carla May to her constitutes self-serving negative evidence which is
not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of Lucita. As the denial of
appellant was weak, uncorroborated and inherently improbable, the clear and
straightforward testimony of the prosecution witnesses should prevail. Even if
there is no evidence to show appellant's intention to sell the young girl for
profit, the two elements of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Art.
270 of The Revised Penal Code are already present, namely: (a) The offender
has been entrusted with the custody of a minor person, and (b) The offender
deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardian. 10 With the
positive testimony of Lucita, the prosecution has proved the presence of the
above elements to establish the criminal liability of appellant. Moreover,
appellant has admitted the existence of the two elements by testifying that
after having been given custody of the child, she kept the latter in her sister's
house for three (3) or four (4) days without seeking any assistance from the
police authorities so that the child could be immediately returned to her
mother. This admission shows the falsity of her claim of innocence. Instead, it
affirms her deliberate refusal to return the child to her mother.”2 Cruz, Davide,
Jr., Quiason and Kapunan,JJ.,concur. 31 Phil. 509 [G.R. No. 10331
September 27, 1915.

Art. 283. Light threats. A threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime, made in
the manner expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article, shall be
punished by arresto mayor.

Elements:
1. That the offender makes a threat to commit a wrong.
2. That the wrong does not constitute a crime.
3. That there is a demand for money or that other condition is imposed, even
though not unlawful.
4. That the offender has attained his purpose or, that he has not attained his
purpose.

Art. 284. Bond for good behavior. In all cases falling within the two next preceding
articles, the person making the threats may also be required to give bail not to
molest the person threatened, or if he shall fail to give such bail, he shall be
sentenced to destierro.

In what cases may a person be required to give ball not to molest another?
1. When he threatens another under the circumstances mentioned in Art. 282.
2. When he threatens another under the circumstances mentioned in Art. 283.

Art. 285. Other light threats. The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period12
or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next
preceding article, shall threaten another with a weapon, or draw such weapon
in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense;
2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with
some harm not constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts shows that
he did not persist in the idea involved in his threat, provided that the
circumstances of the offense shall not bring it within the provisions of Article
282 of this Code;
3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not
constituting a felony.
Acts punished as other light threats.
1. By threatening another with a weapon, or by drawing such weapon in a
quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense.
2. By orally threatening another, in the heat of anger, with some harm (not)
constituting a crime, without persisting in the idea involved in his threat.
Note: The word "not" in this paragraph is enclosed in parenthesis, because
the inclusion of that word in paragraph 2 of Art. 285 is a mistake.
3. By orally threatening to do another any harm not constituting a felony.

Art. 286. Grave coercions. The penalty of prision correccional13 and a fine not
exceeding six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without
authority of law, shall, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent another
from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against
his will, whether it be right or wrong.

Elements of grave coercions:

The three elements of the crime of grave coercions are:
 1. That a person prevented another from doing something not prohibited by
law, or that he compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or
wrong;
2. That the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, threats or
intimidation; and
3. That the person that restrained the will and liberty of another had not the
authority of law or the right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint shall
not be made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.

Art. 287. Light coercions. Any person who, by means of violence, shall seize
anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the payment
of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period15 and a
fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.

Elements:
1. That the offender must be a creditor.
2. That he seizes anything belonging to his debtor.
3. That the seizure of the thing be accomplished by means of violence
or a display of material force producing intimidation.
4. That the purpose of the offender is to apply the same to the payment
of the debt.

Art. 288. Other similar coercions - (Compulsory purchase of merchandise and

payment of wages by means of tokens). The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine
ranging from 200 to 500 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person, agent, or
officer of any association or corporation who shall force or compel, directly or
indirectly, or shall knowingly permit any laborer or employee employed by him or by
such firm or corporation to be forced or compelled, to purchase merchandise or
commodities of any kind.

Acts punished as other similar coercions:

1. By forcing or compelling, directly or indirectly, or knowingly permitting the
forcing or compelling of the laborer or employee of the offender to purchase
merchandise or commodities of any kind from him.
2. By paying the wages due his laborer or employee by means of tokens or
objects other than the legal tender currency of the Philippines, unless
expressly requested by such laborer or employee.
Elements of No. 1:
a. That the offender is any person, agent or officer of any association or
corporation.
 b. That he or such firm or corporation has employed laborers or employees.
c. That he forces or compels, directly or indirectly, or knowingly permits to be
forced or compelled, any of his or its laborers or employees to purchase
merchandise or commodities of any kind from him or from said firm or
corporation.
Elements of No. 2:
a. That the offender pays the wages due a laborer or employee employed by
him by means of tokens or objects.
b. That those tokens or objects are other than the legal tender currency of the
Philippines.
c. That such employee or laborer does not expressly request that he be paid
by means of tokens or objects.

LEE vs. CA
G.R. No. 93695, February 4, 1992

FACTS: 

A complaint for a sum of money was filed by the International Corporate Bank,
Inc. against the private respondents who, in turn, filed a third party complaint against
ALFA and the petitioners. The trial court issued an order requiring the issuance of
an alias summons upon ALFA through the DBP as a consequence of the petitioner's
letter informing the court that the summons for ALFA was erroneously served upon
them considering that the management of ALFA had been transferred to the DBP.
The DBP claimed that it was not authorized to receive summons on behalf of ALFA
since the DBP had not taken over the company which has a separate and distinct
corporate personality and existence. Subsequently, the trial court issued an order
advising the private respondents to take the appropriate steps to serve the summons
to ALFA. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration submitting that Rule 14,
section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable since they were no longer
officers of ALFA and that the private respondents should have availed of another
mode of service under Rule 14, Section 16 of the said Rules, i.e., through publication
to effect proper service upon ALFA. The private respondents argued that the voting
trust agreement dated March 11, 1981 did not divest the petitioners of their positions
as president and executive vice-president of ALFA so that service of summons upon
ALFA through the petitioners as corporate officers was proper. The trial court upheld
the validity of the service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners. A second
motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners reiterating their stand that by
virtue of the voting trust agreement they ceased to be officers and directors of ALFA,
hence, they could no longer receive summons or any court processes for or on
behalf of ALFA and in support thereof, they attached a copy of the voting trust
agreement between all the stockholders of ALFA and the DBP whereby the
management and control of ALFA became vested upon the DBP. The trial court then
reversed itself and declared that service upon the petitioners cannot be considered
as proper service of summons on ALFA. The case was elevated to the CA which
reversed the above-mentioned Orders holding that there was proper service of
summons on ALFA through the petitioners.

ISSUE:
(1)   Whether or not the execution of the voting trust agreement by a stockholder
whereby all his shares to the corporation have been transferred to the trustee
deprives the stockholder of his position as director of the corporation;

(2)   Whether or not the service of summons on ALFA effected through the

petitioners, as president and vice-president, of the subject corporation after the
execution of the voting trust agreement valid and effective;

HELD

1.     Yes. By its very nature, a voting trust agreement results in the separation of the
voting rights of a stockholder from his other rights. The execution of a voting trust
agreement, therefore, may create a dichotomy between the equitable or beneficial
ownership of the corporate shares of stockholders, on the one hand, and the legal
title thereto on the other hand. In the instant case, the petitioners maintain that with
the execution of the voting trust agreement between them and the other stockholders
of ALFA, as one party, and the DBP, as the other party, the former assigned and
transferred all their shares in ALFA to DBP, as trustee and thus, they can no longer
be considered directors of ALFA. Under the old Corporation Code, the eligibility of a
director, strictly speaking, cannot be adversely affected by the simple act of such
director being a party to a voting trust agreement inasmuch as he remains owner
(although beneficial or equitable only) of the shares subject of the voting trust
agreement pursuant to which a transfer of the stockholder's shares in favor of the
trustee is required. No disqualification arises by virtue of the phrase "in his own right"
provided under the old Corporation Code. With the omission of the phrase "in his
own right" the election of trustees and other persons who in fact are not beneficial
owners of the shares registered in their names on the books of the corporation
becomes formally legalized. Hence, this is a clear indication that in order to be
eligible as a director, what is material is the legal title to, not beneficial ownership of,
the stock as appearing on the books of the corporation. The facts of this case show
that the petitioners, by virtue of the voting trust agreement executed in 1981
disposed of all their shares through assignment and delivery in favor of the DBP, as
trustee. Consequently, the petitioners ceased to own at least one share standing in
their names on the books of ALFA as required under Section 23 of the new
Corporation Code. They also ceased to have anything to do with the management of
the enterprise. The petitioners ceased to be directors. Hence, the transfer of the
petitioners' shares to the DBP created vacancies in their respective positions as
directors of ALFA. Considering that the voting trust agreement between ALFA and
the DBP transferred legal ownership of the stock covered by the agreement to the
DBP as trustee, the latter became the stockholder of record with respect to the said
shares of stocks. Both parties, ALFA and the DBP, were aware at the time of the
execution of the agreement that by virtue of the transfer of shares of ALFA to the
DBP, all the directors of ALFA were stripped of their positions as such. There can be
no reliance on the inference that the five-year period of the voting trust agreement in
question had lapsed in 1986 so that the legal title to the stocks covered by the said
voting trust agreement ipso facto reverted to the petitioners as beneficial owners
 pursuant to the 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new Corporation Code which
reads:
"Unless expressly renewed, all rights granted in a voting trust agreement shall
automatically expire at the end of the agreed period, and the voting trust certificate
as well as the certificates of stock in the name of the trustee or trustees shall thereby
be deemed cancelled and new certificates of stock shall be reissued in the name of
the transferors."

On the contrary, it is manifestly clear from the terms of the voting trust agreement
between ALFA and the DBP that the duration of the agreement is contingent upon
the fulfillment of certain obligations of ALFA with the DBP. There is evidence on
record that at the time of the service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners on
August 21, 1987, the voting trust agreement in question was not yet terminated so
that the legal title to the stocks of ALFA, then, still belonged to the DBP.

2.     No. Under section 13, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is provided that:
"Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the
defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a
partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors."

It is a basic principle in Corporation Law that a corporation has a personality

separate and distinct from the officers or members who compose it. Thus, the above
rule on service of processes of a corporation enumerates the representatives of a
corporation who can validly receive court processes on its behalf. Not every
stockholder or officer can bind the corporation considering the existence of a
corporate entity separate from those who compose it. The petitioners in this case do
not fall under any of the enumerated officers. The service of summons upon ALFA,
through the petitioners, therefore, is not valid. To rule otherwise, as correctly argued
by the petitioners, will contravene the general principle that a corporation can only be
bound by such acts which are within the scope of the officer's or agent's authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

Art. 289. Formation, maintenance, and prohibition of combination of capital or

labor through violence or threats. The penalty of arresto mayor11 and a fine not
exceeding 300 pesos shall be imposed upon any persons who, for the purpose of
organizing, maintaining, or preventing coalitions of capital or labor, strike of laborers,
or lockout of employers, shall employ violence or threats in such a degree as to
compel or force the laborers or employers in the free and legal exercise of their
industry or work, if the act shall not constitute a more serious offense in accordance
with the provisions of this Code.

Elements:
1. That the offender employs violence or threats, in such a degree as to
compel or force the laborers or employers in the free and legal exercise of
their industry or work.
 2. That the purpose is to organize, maintain or prevent coalitions of capital or
labor, strike of laborers or lockout of employers.

"Mortera et. Al v Atty Pagatpatan

A.C. No. 4562 June 15, 2005

FACTS:
From the execution of a judgment in a civil action for rescission of
contracts,the complainants, then the plaintiffs, secured judgment under which the
defendant in that case was to pay them P155,000 for the property. The plaintiff’s
counsel, Atty. Pagatpatan, agreed with Aguilar (defendant in civil action),
toacceptP150,000 as partial payment of the judgment sum, issuing a receipt for
theamount.He then deposited the money in his personal bank account without
theknowledge of complainants. Until now, respondent adamantly refuses tosurrender
the money to complainants, despite the successive Orders of the RTCand the Court
of Appeals. Hence, this present case for disbarment.Respondent admits his secret
agreement with and receipt of the money from Aguilar, saying that his clients would
not have paid him his fees had he not donewhat he did. Respondent narrated his
years of service as counsel for thecomplainants and their mother. He alleged the
amounts they owed him althoughhe presented no evidence of any agreement
between him and the complainantsfor the exact amount of his compensation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is proper for an attorney to appropriate for himself the
judgment sum due to his clients considering the latter’s non payment of fees for
services previously rendered by the former?
HELD:
No. Respondents responsibility to the complainants is unequivocally stated
inCanons 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The four rules
governing this situation were: he owed candor to his clients; he was bound to
account for whatever money he received for and from them; as a lawyer, he was
obligated to keep his own money separate from that of his clients; and, although he
was entitled to a lien over the funds in order to satisfy his lawful fees, he was also
bound to give prompt notice to his clients of such liens and to deliver the funds to
them upon demand or when due. Respondent violated each and every one of these
rules. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for two years."

Art. 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence. The penalty

of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods1 and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos shall be imposed upon any private individual who, in order to discover
secrets of another, shall seize his papers or letters and reveal the contents thereof.
 Elements:
1. That the offender is a private individual or even a public officer not in the
exercise of his official function.
2. That he seizes the papers or letters of another.
3. That the purpose is to discover the secrets of such another person.
4. That offender is informed of the contents of the papers or letters seized.
(People vs. Singh, C.A., 40 O.G., Supp. 5, 35)

Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. The penalty of arresto mayor
and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee,
or servant who, in such capacity, shall learn the secrets of his principal or master
and shall reveal such secrets.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a manager, employee or servant.
2. That he learns the secrets of his principal or master in such capacity.
3. That he reveals such secrets.

Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods4 and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be
imposed upon the person in charge, employee, or workman of any manufacturing or
industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal the
secrets of the industry of the latter.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a person in charge, employee or workman of a
manufacturing or industrial establishment.
2. That the manufacturing or industrial establishment has a secret of the
industry which the offender has learned.
3. That the offender reveals such secrets.
4. That prejudice is caused to the owner.

Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take
any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery.

Robbery, defined.
Robbery is the taking of personal property, belonging to another, with intent to gain,
by means of violence against, or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything.

Elements of robbery in general.

a. That there be (1) personal property; (2) belonging to another;
b. That there is (3) unlawful taking of that property;
c. That the taking must be (4) with intent to gain; and d. That there is (5)
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon anything.
Elements of robbery in general.

PEOPLE vs. SALAS

G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986
FACTS:
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI Cebu but before
he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As
a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail
recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in
progress, the prisoner, escaped. The judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled
the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's rearrest. Abong, however, was gone.
Nonetheless (Bernardo Salas), the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in
accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain
circumstances. the judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all
proceedings until the return of the accused. The order of the trial court is before the
Supreme Court on certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE: 
Whether Abong may be tried in absentia, in light of his escape?

HELD:
Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that "In all criminal
prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." The purpose of
this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the
past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the
defendant's escape. The old case of People v. Avanceña (32 OG 713) required his
presence at certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to be discontinued as
long as the defendant had not reappeared or remained at large.
As his right tobe present at these stages was then held not waivable even by
his escape, such escape thus operated to the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery
of the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been
recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19,
which now allows trial in absentia,
Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution
and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he
has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. Thus, the
right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where
the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. Under
Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the
inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from
continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same
fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by
escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.

Art 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death,2 when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed; or
when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson;
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua,3 when by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the
physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been
inflicted;
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal,* when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted;
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its medium period,5 if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission
of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the
commission of the crime, or when in the course of its execution, the offender
shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of
the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263;
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period in other cases. (As amended by Republic Act No. 7659).

PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. l-6025, May 30, 1964

FACTS:

This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal
Case No. 15841, People vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No.
15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-
6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies. The
appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado
Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson
and Andres Baisa, Jr. were among those sentenced in the judgment appealed from,
but they have withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026)
the charge is for rebellion with murders, arsons and kidnappings. The accused are
Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed but Andres
Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal. A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the
court rendered the decision subject of the present appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants-appelants are liable for the crime of conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection under Art. 136 of the RPC?

HELD:

The court found defendants-appellants Hernandez, member of the Communist Party

of the Philippines, President of the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), had
close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous
communications with its leaders and its members, and others, guilty as principal of
the crime charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount
of the costs. In the testimonies shown in court, it further appears that Taruc and
other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant Hernandez, who in turn issued
press releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts in this respect
belong to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his
actions as a Communist. However, in their appeal, defendants-appellants Amado V.
Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved
from the charges contained in the information, with their proportionate share of the
costs de oficio.
But other defendants-appellants, namely, Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas,
Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio were found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to
commit rebellion, as defined and punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code,
and each and everyone of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five
years, four months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay their
proportional share of the costs. Advocacy of Communism put into Action.
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be
considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an
advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or
principle is insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and
positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement
forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow
constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is
actually advocated or intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist,
merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does not yet
advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is
not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment.
Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise,
does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion. Legal considerations on
the Appeal of the defendant-appellants. All the other defendants were found guilty as
accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in the information and were each
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and one day of prision mayor, with the
accessories provided by law, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs. Legal
Considerations — Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other
defendants, it is believed useful if not necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or
facts that may be determinative of their criminal responsibility or the existence or
nature thereof. To begin with, as We have exhaustively discussed in relation to the
appeal of Hernandez, we do not believe that mere membership in the Communist
Party or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or of conspiracy to
commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implies
advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any action being induced thereby;
and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or
advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or
acts conducive thereto or evincing the same. On the other hand, membership in the
HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising or rebellion to secure,
as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from thraldom.
By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force,
and by such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the
ends of the party. Such membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more,
renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion punishable by law.

Art. 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place

and by a band, or with the use of firearm on a street, road or alley. If the
offenses mentioned in subdivisions three, four, and five of the next preceding article
shall have been committed in an uninhabited place or by a band or by attacking a
moving train, street car, motor vehicle or airship, or by entering the passengers'
compartments in a train or, in any manner, taking the passengers thereof by surprise
in the respective conveyances, or on a street, road, highway, or alley, and the
intimidation is made with the use of a firearm, the offender shall be punished by the
maximum period of the proper penalties. (As amended by Republic Act No. 12, Sec.
2, and Republic Act No. 373)

When is robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons qualified?

 If any of the offenses denned in subdivisions 3, 4 and 5 of Art. 294 is
committed
1 in an uninhabited place, or
(2) by a band,or
(3) by attacking a moving train, street car, motor vehicle, or airship, or
(4) by entering the passengers' compartments in a train, or in any manner
taking the passengers thereof by surprise in the respective conveyances, or
(5) on a street, road, highway, or alley, and the intimidation is made with the
use of firearms, the offender shall be punished by the maximum periods of the
proper penalties prescribed in Art. 294.

PEOPLE vs. SALVILLA

184 SCRA 671 (1990)

FACTS:
The accused Bienvenido Salvilla together with his co-accused armed with
homemade guns and hand grenade robbed Rodita Habiero in the latter’s office.  In
the office of Rodita; her two daughters Mary and Mimmie were also inside.  One of
the accused asks Mary to get the paper bag which contained money.  All accused
held victims as hostage when the police and military authorities had surrounded the
lumber yard.  After the negotiation fails to proceed, the police makes their move in
assaulting the robbers thus Mary and Mimmie are injured as well the accused also
got an injury.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of robbery was consummated?
HELD:
            From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the
culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.

Art. 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof.
When more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery,
it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. When any of the arms used in
the commission of the offense be an unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed
upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum period of the corresponding penalty
provided by law, without prejudice to the criminal liability for illegal possession of
such unlicensed firearm.
Outline of the provisions.
 1. When at least four armed malefactors take part in the commission of a
robbery, it is deemed committed by a band.
2. When any of the arms used in the commission of robbery is not licensed,
the penalty upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of the
corresponding penalty provided by law, without prejudice to the criminal
liability for illegal possession of such firearms.
3. Any member of a band who was present at the commission of a robbery by
the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by
the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.

PEOPLE vs. PANCHO PELAGIO Y. ALFONSO

G.R. No. L-16177, May 24, 1967

FACTS:
Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo and Jose Guico to death for the crime of
robbery with homicide Jose Guico, an ex-convict, and Evelyn Villanueva lived in
common law relationship Pancho Pelagio Pancho Pelagio came to see the spouses
Guico and Villanueva.  Pelagio's wife had just delivered a child and he wanted to
borrow money for the hospital expenses. Armando Manalang, taking advantage of
the said visit, informed Pancho Pelagio of a robbery he, Manalang, was planning
with some other friends who later were revealed by Manalang to be Jose Guico,
Oscar Caymo and Arcadio Balmeo. Jose Guico's participation in the first meeting is
unclear... arch 24, 1955, Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo, Armando Manalang and
Arcadio Balmeo set out for the execution of their plan. Aling Nena's residence.
Caymo ordered Manalang to hail and hold a taxi which the latter did. At the gate,
however, they failed to find Pancho Pelagio. They found Armando Manalang waiting
for them in a taxi. Caymo and Balmeo then rode on it. When the stranger was very
near the taxi already. Manalang instructed Caymo to shoot at the man as the latter
was a police officer. Patrolman Francisco Trinidad of the Pasay Police Department,
fell dead. Caymo and Balmeo proceeded to a house in Blumentritt where they met
Pancho Pelagio. He latter explained that he had to scamper away before Caymo and
Balmeo had gone down because he, Pelagio, saw someone slip out of the house
apparently to summon the police.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant the accused should only be convicted for simple
robbery and not for robbery with homicide?

HELD:
Court finds appellant Oscar Caymo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide attended by the aggravating circumstances, all
recited in the information and proven at the trial, of nocturnity and use of a motor
vehicle without any compensating mitigating circumstances.  On the other hand,
appellant Pancho Pelagio is hereby determined to be guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of simple robbery under Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code,
attended by the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and recidivism, having been
at the time of the trial, as recited in the information and proven at the trial, previously
convicted for robbery.  There is no mitigating circumstance appreciable in his
favor.  For both appellants, therefore, the penalties prescribed by law should be
imposed in their maximum period, although appellant Pancho Pelagio is still qualified
to avail of the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.  For the reasons given
above, appellant Jose Guico should be, as he is hereby acquitted. WHEREFORE,
this Court affirms the decision under appeal insofar as it imposes the death penalty
on appellant Oscar Caymo, but modifies the conviction of appellant Pan-
cho Pelagio from robbery with homicide to simple robbery under Article 294,
paragraph 5, R.P.C., with the aforementioned aggravating
circumstances.  Accordingly, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the said
appellant is hereby sentenced to a prison term of from four years and two months
of prision correccional to eight years and one day
of prision mayor.  The abovenamed appellants, moreover, are hereby ordered to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended parties named in the decision under
appeal the sums therein stated.  The indemnity for the death of Pat. Francisco
Trinidad, payable to his heirs, should be raised from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 and
charged alone against appellant Oscar Caymo.  Finally, the conviction of appellant
Jose Guico is hereby set aside and let judgment be entered acquitting him for the
reasons given above.  Costs against the appellants.

Art. 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain

circumstances. When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated
robbery a homicide is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be
punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua,6 unless
the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this
Code.

Art. 298. Execution of deeds by means of violence or intimidation.— Any

person who, with intent to defraud another, by means of violence or intimidation,
shall compel him to sign, execute, or deliver any public instrument or document, shall
be held guilty of robbery and punished by the penalties respectively prescribed in
this Chapter.

Elements:
1. That the offender has intent to defraud another.
2. That the offender compels him to sign, execute, or deliver any public
instrument or document.
 3. That the compulsion is by means of violence or intimidation.

Art. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted

to worship. — Any armed person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house
or public building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished by
reclusion temporal,1 if the value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if
—
(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery is
committed, by any of the following means:
1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress;
2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window;
3. By using false keys, picklocks, or similar tools;
4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.
Or if
(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:
1. By breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or
sealed furniture or receptacle;
2. By taking such furniture or objects away to be broken or forced open
outside the place of the robbery.

PEOPLE V. TAYAG
G.R. No. 40512, March 3, 1934

FACTS:

On September 12, 1933, a little after two o'clock on the morning, of the said
twoappellants, armed with a bolo and a screw driver, went to Juan Nicasio Go
Cuay'sstore/dwelling (with a little more than P40 in cash and merchandise valued at
aroundP1,000) at No. 325-A, San Marcelino Street, Manila. Believing that they
were unnoticed,they proceeded to open one of the doors of the said store with the
tools bolo and screwdriver which they then carried and which, of course, were not
the proper means for thatpurpose. After they had succeeded in loosening one of the
bars of the door and uponbecoming aware that the inhabitants of the store had been
awakened, they tried to escapebut policemen A. Santos, J. Rubic and G. Malap, who
up to that time had been watchingthem, detained and placed them under arrest. The
lower court convicted the accused withattempted robbery.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime committed is attempted robbery?

HELD:
No. The act committed by the appellants simply constitutes the crime of
trespasscommitted by means of violence, as defined in article 280 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code.In the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay there were, at that time, a
little more than P40 incash, which represented the proceeds of his sales the day
before, and merchandise valuedat around P1,000. However, there is absolutely
nothing of record to show that the saidappellants' intention on that occasion was to
commit robbery, or that they somehow knewthat they would find money amounting to
P40 therein.In every criminal proceeding, the guilt of the accused must be proven by
means ofcompetent and conclusive evidence and should never be based on mere
inferences,however reasonable these may be, particularly when there still remains,
as in this case, asufficient indication of the existence of an intention different from
that of committing robbery.It would be arbitrary, not to say absurd, to suppose that
had the appellants succeeded inentering the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay,
they would have carried away all the goodstherein, because they would not have
been able to do so by themselves, not having anyvehicle at their disposal.

Art. 300. Robbery in an uninhabited place and by a band. The robbery mentioned
in the next preceding article, if committed in an uninhabited place and by a band,
shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided therefor.

Art. 301. What is an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to

religious worship and their dependencies. Inhabited house means any shelter,
ship, or vessel constituting the dwelling of one or more persons, even though the
inhabitants thereof shall temporarily be absent therefrom when the robbery is
committed.

Art. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building. Any robbery

committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than those mentioned in the
first paragraph of Article 299, if the value of the property taken exceeds 250 pesos
shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,10
provided that any of the following circumstances is present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for
entrance or egress;
2. If any wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window has been broken;
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks,
or other similar tools;
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle
has been broken;
 5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, has been removed, even if the same be broken open elsewhere.

Elements:
1. That the offender entered an uninhabited place or a building which was not
a dwelling house, not a public building, or not an edifice devoted to religious
worship.
2. That any of the following circumstances was present:
a. The entrance was effected through an opening not intended for entrance or
egress;
b. A wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window was broken;
c. The entrance was effected through the use of false keys, picklocks or other
similar tools;
d. A door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle
was broken; or
e. A closed or sealed receptacle was removed, even if the same be broken
open elsewhere.
3. That with intent to gain, the offender took therefrom personal property
belonging to another.

Art. 303. Robbery of cereals, fruits, or firewood in an uninhabited place or

private building. In the cases enumerated in articles 299 and 302, when the
robbery consists in the taking of cereals, fruits, or firewood, the culprit shall suffer the
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.
Art. 304. Possession of picklocks or similar tools. Any person who shall, without
lawful cause, have in his possession picklocks or similar tools specially adopted to
the commission of the crime of robbery, shall be punished by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.

Elements of illegal possession of picklocks or similar tools.

1. That the offender has in his possession picklocks or similar tools.
2. That such picklocks or similar tools are specially adopted to the
commission of robbery.
3. That the offender does not have lawful cause for such possession.

Art. 305. False keys. The term "false keys" shall be deemed to include:
 1. The tools mentioned in the next preceding article;
2. Genuine keys stolen from the owner;
3. Any keys other than those intended by the owner for use in the lock forcibly
opened by the offender.

PEOPLE vs. MARK DELA CRUZ

G.R. NO. 181545, October 8, 2008

FACTS:
Appellant Mark Dela Cruz was found guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 after he allegedly sold prohibited drugs to the
poseur-buyer. The prohibited drugs were handed to appellant by companions
identified to be an alias Amay and an alias Tabo. Appellant denied the charge and
said that he was arrested after refusing to give information about Amay, whom the
police were after. His testimony was corroborated by other witnesses. Lower court
gave weight to the testimony by the poseur-buyer and upheld the presumption of
regularity in the operation conducted by the officers. Appellant appealed, questioning
the identity of the shabu allegedly confiscated from him in view of Section 21 (1) of
RA No. 9165 (inventory of seized drugs) and Section 21 (3) of the same law
(certification of the forensic laboratory examination results).

ISSUE:
Whether Mark de la Cruz is guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the
identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus
delicti. Citing jurisprudence, the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in
the custody of the seized drugs raised doubt as to its origins. The chain of custody
rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to
be. TheCourt believed that the prosecution failed to clearly establish the chain of
custody of the seized plastic sachets, containing shabu from the time they were first
allegedly received until they were brought to the police investigator. There were no
records to show that the procedural requirements in Section 21 were complied with.
The presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the constitutional right of
presumption of evidence in view of the circumstances. “The presumption of regularity
is merely just that--a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.” The appellant was
acquitted.

Art. 306. Who are brigands. When more than three armed persons form a band of
robbers for the purpose of committing robbery in the highway, or kidnapping persons
for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom or for any other purpose to be
attained by means of force and violence, they shall be deemed highway robbers or
brigands.

There is brigandage when:

1. There be at least four armed persons.
2. They formed a band of robbers.
3. The purpose is any of the following:
a. To commit robbery in the highway; or
b. To kidnap persons for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom; or
c. To attain by means of force and violence any other purpose.

Art. 307. Aiding and abetting a band of brigands. Any person knowingly and in
any manner aiding, abetting, or protecting a band of brigands as described in the
next preceding article, or giving them information of the movements of the police or
other peace officers of the Government (or of the forces of the United States Army,
when the latter are acting in aid of the Government), or acquiring or receiving the
property taken by such brigands, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period.

Elements:
1. That there is a band of brigands.
2. That the offender knows the band to be of brigands.
3. That the offender does any of the following acts:
a. He in any manner aids, abets or protects such band of brigands; or
b. He gives them information of the movements of the police or other peace
officers of the Government; or
c. He acquires or receives the property taken by such brigands.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent
to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to
the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another,
shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him;
and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner,
shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest
or farm products.

Elements of theft:
1. That there be taking of personal property.
2. That said property belongs to another.
3. That the taking be done with intent to gain.
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner.
5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. (U.S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000;
People vs. Yusay, 50 Phil. 598)
Note: In the case of U.S. vs. De Vera, supra, the phrase "taking away" is used
in stating one of the elements of theft. But in the case of People vs. Yusay,
supra, citing Viada, the word "away" is not used in connection with the taking
of personal property.

PEOPLE v. ISAGANI GULINAO Y ALZONA

GR No. 82264-66, December 04, 1989

FACTS:
On March 3, 1987, at about 9:00 P.M., Dr. Chua, appellant Gulinao (driver-
bodyguard of Dr. Chua), Virgilio Caguioa (secretary of Dr. Chua), Vice Mayor Teofilo
Reyes of Malabon, Dante Reyes (nephew... of Vice Mayor Reyes), Boy Salazar and
other politicians were having a caucus in the house of a certain Torre in Acacia,
Malabon.  After the caucus at about 11:00 P.M., the group of Dr. Chua boarded Dr.
Chua's car and that of Vice Mayor Reyes and proceeded to the Bar-Bar Disco House
along McArthur Highway, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. "Upon arriving at the disco
house, Gulinao, who had in his possession an Ingram machine pistol, swapped the
same with a .45 caliber pistol in possession of Dante Reyes.  Gulinao then tucked
the .45 caliber pistol in his right waist. "Inside the disco house, Dr. Chua, Gulinao
and companions occupied 2 tables which were joined together near the stage. 
Later, Gulinao went to the comfort room and cocked the .45 caliber... pistol.  He then
returned to his seat beside Dr. Chua (pp. 14-15 TSN May 18, 1987). "While Dr. Chua
was watching the floor show, Gulinao stood up and shot him on the head at close
range with the .45 caliber pistol (pp. 16-17 TSN May 22, 1987).  When Gulinao was
about to leave the disco house, he turned back to Dr. Chua and took the latter's gold
ring embedded with 12 diamonds. Thereupon, Gulinao rushed outside the disco
house to the car of Dr. Chua. "Poking the gun at Caguioa who was inside the car,
Gulinao ordered the former to leave the car.  While Caguioa was getting out of the
car, Gulinao fired at him but missed (pp. 27-29 TSN April 6,... 1987).  On the other
hand, Dante Reyes tried to fire at Gulinao with the Ingram machine pistol, but the
Ingram jammed.  (pp. 16-17 TSN May 18, 1987). "Gulinao drove the car towards
Monumento (p. 29 TSN April 6, 1987).  However, he was constrained to leave the
car and take a taxi when the car he was driving figured in an accident in Malabon .
"Dr. Chua, who sustained gunshot wounds on the head, was brought to the nearby
Our Lady of Fatima Hospital where he died on arrival.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Guinao is guilty of illegal possession of firearm, murder and

theft?

HELD:

As stated by the court a quo, there is no possibility of double jeopardy, as the

possession there of had taken place in two separate and distinct places and jurisdiction and the
two information state different dates of commission. As the trial court itself noted, on the basis of
Patino's testimony, the taking of the ring of Dr. Chua was merely an afterthought. The force
employed in the killing of Dr. Chua has no bearing on the taking of his ring. Gulinao's contention in
his fourth assignment of error that there was no proof of intent to gain in the taking of Dr. Chua's
car is bereft of merit. Intent to gain, being an internal act, is presumed from the
unlawful taking of the car. This presumption was unrebutted. In view of the foregoing, the appealed
Decision dated Nov. 23,1987, with respect to the cases for "Illegal Possession of Firearm with
Murder" (and "Carnapping" (Crim. Is affirmed it being in accordance with the law and evidence.
With respect to the case for "Robbery" (Crim. Case No. 8017V- 871), par. 2 of the dispositive
portionof the appealed Decision is MODIFIED to the effect that Gulinao is convicted of the crime of
Theft and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4
years, 9months and 10 days of prision correccional as minimum and 7 years, 4 months and 1
day to 8 yearsand 8 months of prision mayor, as maximum.

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods,1 if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall
be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph and one year of each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,2 if
the value of the property stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed
12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,3 if
the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000
pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period,4 if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200
pesos.
5. Arresto mayor in its full extent,3 if such value is over 5 pesos but does not
exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,6 if such value does not
exceed five pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed
under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article
and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds
said amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made
applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos,
when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have
acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for
the support of himself or his family.

Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article,
if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the
property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts
taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (As amended by Batas
Pambansa Big. 71, approved May 1,1980)
Theft is qualified:
1. If the theft is committed by a domestic servant.
2. If the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence.
3. If the property stolen is a (a) motor vehicle, (b) mail matter, or (c) large
cattle.
4. If the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a
plantation.
 5. If the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery.
6. If property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERLINDA A. SISON

G.R. No. 187160, August 9, 2017

FACTS: 
Casuera and Magalona met appellant and the latter briefed Castuera on the
requirements for working as a fruit picker in Australia. She introduced Castuera to
another man who related that he was able to go to Australia with her help. She also
showed Castuera pictures of other people she had supposedly helped to get
employment in Australia. Appellant further narrated that a couple she had helped
had given her their car as payment. Because of her representations, Castuera
believed in her promise that she could send him to Australia. Appellant asked
Castuera for ₱180,000 for processing his papers.
Appellant, however, failed to secure an Australian visa for Castuera. Together
with Dedales and Bacomo, appellant convinced Castueara that that it was difficult to
get an Australian visa in the Philippines so they had to go to Malaysia or in Indonesia
to get one. Subsequently, Castuera's application for an Australian visa in Indonesia
was denied. Dedales asked for US$1,000 for the processing of his U.S. visa, which
he paid. However, when his U.S. visa came, Castuera saw that it was in an
Indonesian passport bearing an Indonesian name. Because of this, Castuera
decided to just return to the Philippines.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not appellant is guilty of syndicated estafa?

HELD:
Yes. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.
Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority commits illegal recruitment
for overseas employment in two ways: (1) by any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad,
whether for profit or not; or (2) by undertaking any of the acts enumerated under
Section 6 of RA 8042.
In this case, appellant herself admits that she has no license or authority to
undertake recruitment and placement activities. Since it was proven that the three
accused were acting in concert and conspired with one another, their illegal
recruitment activity is considered done by a syndicate, making the offense illegal
recruitment involving economic sabotage.

Art. 311. Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum. If
the property stolen be any property of the National Library or of the National
Museum, the penalty shall be arresto mayor8 or a fine ranging from 200 to 500
pesos, or both, unless a higher penalty should be provided under other provisions of
this Code, in which case, the offender shall be punished by such higher penalty.

Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property.

Any person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take
possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to
another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him,
shall be punished by a fine of from 50 to 100 per centum for the gain which he shall
have obtained, but not less than 75 pesos.
Elements:
a. That the offender takes possession of any real property or usurps any real
rights in property.
b. That the real property or real rights belong to another.
c. That violence against or intimidation of persons is used by the offender in
occupying real property or usurping real rights in property.
d. That there is intent to gain.

Art. 313. Altering boundaries or landmarks. Any person who shall alter the
boundary marks or monuments of towns, provinces, or estates, or any other marks
intended to designate the boundaries of the same, shall be punished by arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 100 pesos, or both.
Elements:
1. That there be boundary marks or monuments of towns, provinces, or
estates, or any other marks intended to designate the boundaries of the
same.
2. That the offender alters said boundary marks.

Art. 314. Fraudulent insolvency. Any person who shall abscond with his property
to the prejudice of his creditors, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor1 if he be a
merchant, and the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period,2 if he be not a merchant.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a debtor; that is, he has obligations due and payable.
 2. That he absconds with his property.
3. That there be prejudice to his creditors.

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its minimum period,1 if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be;
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,2
if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period,3 if such amount is over 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods,4 if such amount
does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the
fraud be committed by any of the following means:
With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
(a) By altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything of value which
the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such
obligation be based on an immoral or illegal consideration;
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods or any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation
be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received
such money, goods, or other property;
(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank,
and by writing any document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice
of the offended party or any third person.
By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or
by means of other similar deceits.
 b) By altering the quality, fineness, or weight of anything pertaining to his art
or business.
(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice
to the action for calumny, which the offended party may deem proper to bring
against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty.
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein
were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer
of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three
(3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/ or the payee or holder that
said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be
prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
(As amended by Rep. Act No. 4885, approved June 17,1967)
(e) By obtaining any food, refreshment or accommodation at a hotel, inn,
restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, or apartment house and the like
without paying therefore, with intent to defraud the proprietor or manager
thereof, or by obtaining credit at a hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house,
lodging house, or apartment house by the use of any false pretense, or by
abandoning or surreptitiously removing any part of his baggage from a hotel,
inn, restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, or apartment house after
obtaining credit, food, refreshment, or accommodation therein without paying
for his food, refreshment, or accommodation. (As amended by Com. Act No.
157)
3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:
(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document;
(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling
game;
(c) By removing, concealing, or destroying, in whole or in part, any court
record, office files, document, or any other papers.

Elements of estafa in general:

1. That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by
means of deceit; and
2. That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.

CHUA-BURCE vs. CA
G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000

FACTS:
 Ramon Rocamora, manager of Metrobank, requested FructuosoPenaflor,
Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of cash inside the vault, which
should total to P4 million. They found out that there was a shortage of P150,000.
After 4 investigations conducted by the bank and NBI, the reports concluded that
Cristeta Chua-Burce, Cash Custodian, was primary responsible for the shortage.
Unable to explain the shortage, the services of the accused was terminated. Chua-
Burce, together with her husband Antonio Burce, were charged with the crime of
estafa. A civil case was also instituted. The accused prayed for suspension of
criminal case due to a prejudicial question. It was first granted but denied by the CA.
The CRIMINAL and CIVIL cases continued. The CRIMINAL CASE ruled that she
was guilty of estafa. CIVIL CASE also found her liable for the shortage of P150,000.
She appealed both rulings to the CA but the court affirmed the two TC rulings. Hence
this case.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not there was a valid trial?
(2) Whether or not the elements of estafa were proven beyond reasonable
doubt?

HELD:

(1) Yes, there was a valid trial. The accused allege that the public prosecutor
did not intervene with the case (violation of Sec 5 RULE 110 ) and did not
present evidence for the criminal case (no evidence for the accused to be
convicted). But the fact showed that the public prosecutor actively participated
with the criminal case. And both parties, during the pre-trial, agreed to adopt
their respective evidences in the CIVIL CASE to the CRIMINAL CASE. The
agreement was reduced into writing, inconformity with the Rules of Court.
Being bound by the pre-trial agreement, it is now too late in the day to
challenge its contents.
(2) No, the crime of estafa was not proven. The elements of Estafa, ART. 315
(1) (b), are the following:
a) The personal property is received in trust, on commission, for
administration, or any other circumstances, with the duty return.
b) There is a conversion/diversion of such property or denial that he received
it.
c) Such conversion/diversion is to the injury of another
d) There is demand for such property
The 1st element is absent. The 1st element gives the tranferee both material
and juridical possession of the personal property. Juridical possession means
the transferee has a right over the thing which he may even set up against the
owner.The possession of the accused of the money had no juridical
possession. Being a cash custodian, her possession is akin to that of a bank
 teller. And possession of a bank teller is possession of the bank. she was a
mere custodian.
*She should have been charged with qualified theft, but double jeopardy is
already in play.
*Difference between an agent and teller. TELLER – payment to the teller is a
payment to the bank, he is a mere custodian. AGENT – he can assert his
independent, autonomous right to retain money, even against the owner.

Art. 316. Other forms of swindling. The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods9 and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused
and not more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who, pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall
convey, sell, encumber, or mortgage the same;
2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose
of the same, although such encumbrance be not recorded;
3. The owner of any personal property who shall wrongfully take it from its
lawful possessor, to the prejudice of the latter or any third person;
4. Any person who, to the prejudice of another, shall execute any fictitious
contract;
5. Any person who shall accept any compensation given him under the belief
that it was in payment of services rendered or labor performed by him, when
in fact he did not actually perform such services or labor;
6. Any person who, while being a surety in a bond given in a criminal or civil
action, without express authority from the court or before the cancellation of
his bond or before being relieved from the obligation contracted by him, shall
sell, mortgage, or, in any other manner, encumber the real property or
properties with which he guaranteed the fulfillment of such obligation.

Elements:
1. That the thing be immovable, such as a parcel of land or a building.
2. That the offender who is not the owner of said property should
represent that he is the owner thereof.
3. That the offender should have executed an act of ownership (selling,
leasing, encumbering or mortgaging the real property).
4. That the act be made to the prejudice of the owner or a third person.

Art. 317. Swindling a minor. Any person who, taking advantage of the inexperience
or emotions or feelings of a minor to his detriment, shall induce him to assume any
obligation or to give any release or execute a transfer of any property right in
consideration of some loan of money, credit, or other personal property, whether the
loan clearly appears in the document or is shown in any other form, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor10 and a fine of a sum ranging from 10 to 50 per cent of the
value of the obligation contracted by the minor.

Elements:
1. That the offender takes advantage of the inexperience or emotions or
feelings of a minor.
2. That he induces such minor (1) to assume an obligation, or (2) to give
release, or (3) to execute a transfer of any property right.
3. That the consideration is (1) some loan of money, (2) credit, or (3) other
personal property.
4. That the transaction is to the detriment of such minor

Art. 318. Other deceits. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than
the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be
imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit
not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.

Other deceits are:

1. By defrauding or damaging another by any other deceit not mentioned in
the preceding articles.
2. By interpreting dreams, by making forecasts, by telling fortunes, or by
taking advantage of the credulity of the public in any other similar manner, for
profit or gain.

VICENTE VILLAFLOR
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NASIPIT LUMBER CO., INC. 
G.R. No. 95694 October 9, 1997

FACTS:

The Petitioner bought a large tract of land containing one hundred forty (140)
hectares to four (4) different owners in 1940. The land was part of the public domain,
but the petitioners predecessor in interest over which he acquired the property, have
been in open, exclusive and notorious possession of the same for sometime. After
acquisition, petitioner asserts exclusive rights thereof for more than fifty (50) years.

In 1946, petitioner entered into a lease agreement with respondent Nasipit

Lumber Co.Inc. However, an “Agreement for the Relinquishment of Rights” was
entered into by both parties in 1950. The respondent having complied all the
requirements agreed upon, assumed ownership and possession of the property
since then. Respondent corporation likewise filed a sales application in 1950 over
the property to bolster his claim which the Bureau of Land otherwise granted on the
same year as proof of an “Order of Award” issued.
In 1974 or twenty four (24) years had passed, when petitioner, questioned and made
several collateral and extraneous claims against the respondent. However, the
Bureau of Lands dismissed the claim, arguing that petitioner no longer has any
substantial rights to question the validity of acquisition of the respondent and the
subsequent issuance of free patent by the Bureau of Lands. Unperturbed, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration at the Ministry of Natural Resources which likewise
dismissed the petition.

On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint in the trial court for “Declaration of Nullity
of Contract ( Deed of Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two
parcels of land subject of the contract), and Damages” at about the same time that
he appealed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources to the Office of the
President. On January 28, 1983, petitioner died. Petitioner’s heir substituted in his
behalf to pursue the claim. The trial court in Butuan City who initially take cognizance
of the case ordered the case dismissed, on the grounds that: (1) petitioner admitted
the due execution and genuineness of the contract and was estopped from proving
its nullity, (2) the verbal lease agreements were unenforceable under Article 1403 (2)
(e) of the Civil Code, and (3) his causes of action were barred by extinctive
prescription and/or laches.

The heirs appealed to the CA which likewise rendered judgment of dismissal by

upholding the lower court’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale is valid?

HELD:

No. The provision of the law is specific that public lands can only be acquired
in the manner provided for therein and not otherwise (Sec. 11, CA. No. 141, as
amended). In his sales application, petitioner expressly admitted that said property
was public land. This is formidable evidence as it amounts to an admission against
interest. The records show that Villaflor had applied for the purchase of lands in
question with this Office (Sales Application V-807) on 2 December 1948. There is a
condition in the sales application to the effect that he recognizes that the land
covered by the same is of public domain and any and all rights he may have with
respect thereto by virtue of continuous occupation and cultivation are relinquished to
the Government of which Villaflor is very much aware. It also appears that Villaflor
had paid for the publication fees appurtenant to the sale of the land. He participated
in the public auction where he was declared the successful bidder. He had fully paid
the purchase price thereof. It would be a height of absurdity for Villaflor to be buying
that which is owned by him if his claim of private ownership thereof is to be believed.
The area in dispute is not the private property of the petitioner.

It is a basic assumption of public policy that lands of whatever classification belong

to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the
same as dominus. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied from the government. It is indispensable then that there be
showing of title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.
Such sales applicant manifestly acknowledged that he does not own the land and
that the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to
which the application was submitted, all of its acts prior thereof, including its real
estate tax declarations, characterized its possessions of the land as that of a “sales
applicant”. And consequently, as one who expects to buy it, but has not as yet done
so, and is not, therefore, its owner.

The rule on the interpretation of contracts (Article 1371) is used in affirming, not
negating, their validity. Article 1373,which is a conjunct of Article 1371, provides that,
if the instrument is susceptible of two or more interpretations, the interpretation which
will make it valid and effectual should be adopted. In this light, it is not difficult to
understand that the legal basis urged by petitioner does not support his allegation
that the contracts to sell and the deed of relinquishment are simulated and fictitious.
Simulation occurs when an apparent contract is a declaration of a fictitious will,
deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in order to produce, for the purpose
of deception, the appearance of a juridical act which does not exist or is different
from that which was really executed. Such an intention is not apparent in the
agreements. The intent to sell, on the other hand, is as clear as daylight. The fact,
that the agreement to sell (7 December 1948) did not absolutely transfer ownership
of the land to private respondent, does not how that the agreement was simulated.
Petitioner‟s delivery of the Certificate of Ownership and execution of the deed of
absolute sale were suspensive conditions, which gave rise to a corresponding
obligation on the part of the private respondent, i.e., the payment of the last
installment of the consideration mentioned in the Agreement. Such conditions did not
affect the perfection of the contract or prove simulation Nonpayment, at most, gives
the vendor only the right to sue for collection. Generally, in a contract of sale,
payment of the price is a resolutory condition and the remedy of the seller is to exact
fulfillment or, in case of a substantial breach, to rescind the contract under Article
1191 of the Civil Code. However, failure to pay is not even a breach, but merely an
event which prevents the vendor‟s obligation to convey title from acquiring binding
force.

The requirements for a sales application under the Public Land Act are: (1) the
possession of the qualifications required by said Act (under Section 29) and (2) the
lack of the disqualifications mentioned therein (under Sections 121, 122,and 123).
Section 121 of the Act pertains to acquisitions of public land by a corporation from a
grantee: The private respondent, not the petitioner, was the direct grantee of the
disputed land. Sections 122 and 123 disqualify corporations, which are not
authorized by their charter, from acquiring public land; the records do not show that
private respondent was not so authorized under its charter.

Art. 319. Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property. The penalty of arresto
mayor1 or a fine amounting to twice the value of the property shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who shall knowingly remove any personal property mortgaged under
the Chattel Mortgage Law to any province or city other than the one in which it was
located at the time of the execution of the mortgage, without the written consent of
the mortgagee or his executors, administrators, or assigns.
2. Any mortgagor who shall sell or pledge personal property already pledged, or any
part thereof, under the terms of the Chattel Mortgage Law, without the consent of the
mortgagee written on the back of the mortgage and noted on the record thereof in
the office of the register of deeds of the province where such property is located.

Elements of knowingly removing mortgaged personal property:

a. That personal property is mortgaged under the Chattel Mortgage Law.
b. That the offender knows that such property is so mortgaged.
c. That he removes such mortgaged personal property to any province or city
other than the one in which it was located at the time of the execution of the
mortgage.
d. That the removal is permanent.
e. That there is no written consent of the mortgagee or his executors,
administrators or assigns to such removal.

Art. 320. Destructive arson. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death1 shall be
imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of
burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or
different occasions;
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general
or where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as,
but not limited to official governmental function or business, private
transaction, commerce, trade workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely
incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels,
transient dwellings, public conveyance or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or
edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building
is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to
transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation, and any appurtenances
thereto, which are devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of
concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
PEOPLE vs. MACABANDO
G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013
FACTS:
At 4:00pm on December 21, 2001, appellant broke bottles on the road holding
G.I. pipe, andshouted that he wanted to get even (“ manabla ko ”).  Afterwards, he
uttered that he would burn his house.
 At 6:35 pm, Cornelio saw smoke coming from appellant’s house. He got a pail of
water, and poured itscontents into the fire. Eric Quilantang, a neighbor, ran to the
barangay headquarters to get a fireextinguisher. When Eric approached the burning
house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bagand a gun, told him not to
interfere; the appellant then fired 3 shots in the air. The appellant also told thepeople
around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed.
 Appellant’s Defense: He admitted that he felt angry because one of his radio
cassettes for sale had beenstolen. He appellant claimed that he went to sleep after
looking for his missing radio cassette, and thatthe fire had already started when he
woke up. He denied making a threat to burn his house andmaintained that he did not
own a gun. He added that the gunshots came from the explosion offirecrackers that
he intended to use during the New Year celebration.The prosecution charged the
appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC.The RTC
found him guilty and sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
CA affirmed
ISSUE:
Whether or not he was guilty?
HELD:
Yes. The following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain of
circumstantial events that leads toan unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to
the exclusion of others, set fire to his house. Thecombination of these
circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the appellant set fireto
his house.
We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his neighbors
from putting out the firein his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had
nothing to do with the crime. The first impulseof an individual whose house is on fire
is to save his loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to humannature, reason
and natural order of things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the
firein his burning property. By carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant
showed hisdetermination to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to note, too,
is the fact that the appellantcarried a traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind,
showed deliberate planning and preparednesson his part to flee the raging fire; it
likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside hishouse when the fire
broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the
appellant’sindifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the
people who tried to put out the fire,coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning
house, belied his claim of innocence.ISSUE: What is the crime he is guilty of? Arson
under PD 1613.HELD: Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures,
both public and private, hotels,buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories
and other military, government or commercialestablishments by any person or group
of persons.
PD 1613 governs simple arson
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson . The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion
Perpetua shall beimposed if the property burned is any of the following: 2.  Any
inhabited house or dwelling  ;
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures,
regardless of size, notincluded in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659. This law punishes simplearson with a lesser penalty because the acts
that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversityand viciousness.  Simple arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, andnational
security implications than destructive arson."

Art. 321. Other forms of arson. When the arson consists in the burning of other
property and under the circumstances given hereunder, the offender shall be
punished:
1. By reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua:
(a) If the offender shall set fire to any building, farmhouse, warehouse, hut,
shelter, or vessel in port, knowing it to be occupied at the time by one or more
persons;
(b) If the building burned is a public building and the value of the damage
caused exceeds 6,000 pesos;
(c) If the building burned is a public building and the purpose is to destroy
evidence kept therein to be used in instituting prosecution for the punishment
of violators of the law, irrespective of the amount of the damage;
(d) If the building burned is a public building and the purpose is to destroy
evidence kept therein to be used in any legislative, judicial or administrative
proceedings, irrespective of the amount of the damage: Provided, however,
That if the evidence destroyed is to be used against the defendant for the
prosecution of any crime punishable under existing laws, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua;
(e) If the arson shall have been committed with the intention of collecting
under an insurance policy against loss or damage by fire.
2. By reclusion temporal:3
(a) If an inhabited house or any other building in which people are
accustomed to meet is set on fire, and the culprit did not know that such
house or building was occupied at the time, or if he shall set fire to a moving
freight train or motor vehicle, and the value of the damage caused exceeds
6,000 pesos.
Art. 322. Cases of arson not included in the preceding articles. Cases of arson
not included in the next preceding articles shall be punished:
1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods,10 when the
damage caused does not exceed 50 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period,11 when the damage caused is over 50 pesos but does not
exceed 200;
3. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,12 if the
damage caused is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 1,000; and
4. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,13 if it is over
1,000 pesos.

Art. 323. Arson of property of small value. The arson of any uninhabited hut,
storehouse, barn, shed or any other property the value of which does not exceed 25
pesos, committed at a time or under circumstances which clearly exclude all danger
of the fire spreading, shall not be punished by the penalties respectively prescribed
in this chapter, but in accordance with the damage caused and under the provisions
of the following chapter.14

Art. 324. Crimes involving destruction. Any person who shall cause destruction by
means of explosion, discharge of electric current, inundation, sinking or stranding of
a vessel, intentional damaging of the engine of said vessel, taking up the rails from a
railway track, maliciously changing railway signals for the safety of moving trains,
destroying telegraph wires and telegraph posts, or those of any other system, and, in
general by using any other agency or means of destruction as effective as those
above enumerated, shall be punished by reclusion temporal15 if the commission has
endangered the safety of any person; otherwise, the penalty of prision mayor16 shall
be imposed.

Elements of crimes involving destruction:

1. The offender causes destruction.
2. Destruction is caused by any of the following means:
a. explosion
b. discharge of electric current
c. inundation, sinking or stranding of a vessel, or intentional damaging of the
engine of said vessel
d. taking up the rails from a railway track
e. maliciously changing railway signals for the safety of moving trains
f. destroying telegraph wires and telegraph posts, or those of any other
system
 g. using any other agency or means of destruction as effective as those above
enumerated

Art. 325. Burning one's own property as a means to commit arson. Any person
guilty of arson or causing great destruction of property belonging to another shall
suffer the penalty prescribed in this chapter, even though he shall have set fire to or
destroyed his own property for the purpose of committing the crime.

Art. 326. Setting fire to property exclusively owned by the offender. If the
property burned shall be the exclusive property of the offender, he shall be punished
by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period,17 if the arson shall have been committed for the purpose of defrauding or
causing damage to another, or prejudice shall actually have been caused, or if the
thing burned shall have been a building in an inhabited place. (As amended by Rep.
Act No. 5467)

Art. 327. Who are liable for malicious mischief. Any person who shall deliberately
cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next
preceding chapter, shall be guilty of malicious mischief.
Elements of malicious mischief:
1. That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another.
2. That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction.
3. That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of
damaging it.
Note: This third element presupposes that the offender acted due to hate, revenge or
other evil motive.

YOLANDA CABALLES vs. DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON

T. ALVAREZ and BIENVENIDO ABAJON
G.R. No. L-7821405 December 1988

FACTS:
Macario Alicaba & Millenes family, predecessors-in-interest of petitioner,
agreed to lease to private respondent Abajon a portion of subject land to construct
the latter’s house & to plant corns & bananas. They agreed to a monthly rental
ofPHP2.00 & 50-50 share of crops.
   Petitioner Caballes & her husband acquired, through a deed of sale, the whole
land which includes the portion occupied byprivate respondent. They informed
private respondent of their intention to build a poultry close to his house &
persuadedhim to transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the land.
On his part, private respondent offered to payrent on the land occupied by his house,
but such offer was not accepted.
   Later, the spouses asked private respondent to vacate the premises, saying that
they needed the property. But he refused.Despite the confrontation before the Brgy.
Captain, the parties failed to reach an agreement. All efforts by the landownersto
oust private respondent were in vain as the latter simply refused to budge.
   Petitioner then filed a criminal case for malicious mischief against private
respondent, alleging that the latter maliciouslycut down the banana plants worth
P50.00, (note: all banana plants, were planted by Abajon).
   Pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered the referral of the case to the
regional office of Ministry of Agrarian Reform(MAR) to determine the relationship of
the parties. As a result, MAR issued an order declaring the existence of a
tenancyrelationship between Caballes & Abajon. It also declared the criminal case
for malicious mischief filed by petitioner againstprivate respondent as not proper for
trial; since such case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his farm.
   On appeal, then DAR Minister Conrado Estrella reversed the certification and
declared the criminal case as proper for trial,since the land involved is a residential
lot consisting only of 60-sq. m.
   On motion for reconsideration, herein respondent and new Minister of DAR,
Heherson Alvarez issued an order finding thecriminal case as not proper for trial due
to the existence of tenancy relations between the parties. o   Private respondent
invoked Sec. 10 of RA 3844, which provided that new owners are bound to respect
the tenancyregardless of the size of the land being tilled.

ISSUE :
Whether or not Abajon is a tenant of spouses Caballes?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that Abajon only occupied a miniscule portion of
the lot. RA 3844, as amended. The 60-sq. m.cannot be considered as an economic
family-size farm protected by the aforementioned law. Planting camote, bananas,
&corn on a 60-sq. m. land cannot produce an income sufficient to provide a modest
standard of living to meet the farm family’s basic needs.
     The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
1.   The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2.   The subject is agricultural land;
3.   There is consent;
4.   The purpose is agricultural production;
5.   There is personal cultivation; and6.   There is sharing of harvests"
Art. 328. Special cases of malicious mischief. — Any person who shall cause
damage to obstruct the performance of public functions, or using any poisonous or
corrosive substance; or spreading any infection or contagion among cattle; or who
causes damage to the property of the National Museum or National Library, or to any
archive or registry, waterworks, road, promenade, or any other thing used in
common by the public shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,1 if the value of the
damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor,2 if such value does not exceed the above-mentioned amount
but is over 200 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor, if such value does not exceed 200 pesos.

Art. 329. Other mischiefs. The mischiefs not included in the next preceding article
shall be punished:
1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods,3 if the value of the
damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,4 if such value is
over 200 pesos but does not exceed 1,000 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor or fine of not less than the value of the damage caused
and not more than 200 pesos, if the amount involved does not exceed 200
pesos or cannot be estimated. (As amended by Com. Act No. 3999)

Art. 330. Damage and obstruction to means of communication. The penalty of

prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods5 shall be imposed upon
any person who shall damage any railway, telegraph or telephone lines.

Art. 331. Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments, or paintings. Any

person who shall destroy or damage statues or any other useful or ornamental public
monuments, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period.

Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No criminal, but only civil liability
shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same
line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the
deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of
another; and
 3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living
together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers
participating in the commission of the crime.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA CARUNGCONG

vs. PEOPLE
G.R. 181409, February 11, 2010

FACTS:
Mediatrix Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of
petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. De
Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law, William
Sato, a Japanese national. It was alleged that the said accused feloniously induced
Manolita Gonzales, the owner of the estate and herein deceased, to sign and thumb
mark a special power of attorney (in the pretense of presenting a document
pertaining to taxes) which authorized the sale, assignment, transfer and disposition
of the latter’s properties. In relation to this, the accused moved for the dismissal of
the case.

As a defense against his arrant prosecution, the accused here applies Art 332 of the
Revised Penal Code. He cites that he falls under the enumeration of those relatives
who shall be exempt from criminal prosecution. Being a relative by affinity, he cannot
be held liable for the crime of estafa as stated in the law. He further counters that the
same law makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of
death of spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, the death of
his spouse Zenaida Carungcong Sato though dissolved the marriage with the
accused, did not on the other hand dissolve the mother in-law and son-law
relationship between Sato and his wife’s mother, Manolita. He then cannot be
removed from the protective mantle of Art 332.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the death of William’s wife and Manolita’s daughter, Zenaida,
extinguished the relationship by affinity between William and Manolita.

2. Whether or not William should be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his
relationship to Manolita.

HELD:
1. No. Relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the
deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse,
regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not.

2. No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only
applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said
provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right
to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party
with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.

However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned
therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows
that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is
complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification.

Sato, the accused, could not avail of the beneficial application of ART 332
considering that the crime he committed falls under the nature of a complex crime
which is the crime estafa through falsification of public document and does not
anymore concern private relations of family members. He then can be held criminally
liable.

Art. 333. Who are guilty of adultery. Adultery is committed by any married woman
who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who
has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be
subsequently declared void.

Adultery shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum

periods

If the person guilty of adultery committed this offense while being abandoned without
justification by the offended spouse, the penalty next lower in degree2 than that
provided in the next preceding paragraph shall be imposed.

Elements of adultery:

(1) That the woman is married;

(2) That she has sexual intercourse with a man not her husband;
(3) That as regards the man with whom she has sexual intercourse, he must
know her to be married.

ARROYO, JR. vs. CA

G.R. No. 96602, December 18, 2018
FACTS:
Dr. Jorge Neri filed a criminal complaint against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and
Eduardo Arroyo for adultery. In November 1982, Ruby went to Baguio with Mrs. Sare
and witness Jabunan. They stayed at the Neri spouses’ Mines View Park
Condominium. Arroyo arrived at 7:00 p.m. at the condominium. Jabunan said he
opened the door for Arroyo and knocked on Ruby Neri’s door. Ruby then asked Mrs.
Sare, who was in the room with her, to leave her and Arroyo alone. The two were left
alone in the room and went out 45 minutes later. In December 1982, Dr. Neri then
found incriminating pictures of his wife and Arroyo in bed. When questioned by her
husband, Ruby admitted that she and Arroyo slept together in Baguio.
On August 26, 1991, Dr. Neri filed a manifestation, praying that the case against his
wife and Arroyo be dismissed because he had tacitly consented to his wife’s
infidelity. Ruby moved for reconsideration, contending that pardon had been
extended by her husband and that Dr. Jorge Neri had married another woman with
whom he is cohabiting. Both Arroyo and Ruby Neri filed their respective motions
praying for the dismissal of their cases based on Dr. Neri’s manifestation.
Arroyo and Ruby used Dr. Neri’s affidavit to cast doubts on the doctor’s credibility as
witness.

ISSUE:
1. Is Dr. Neri’s affidavit of desistance sufficient to cast reasonable doubts on his
credibility?
2. Had Mrs. Neri’s constitutional right against self-incrimination been violated?
3. Does Dr. Neri’s alleged extra-marital affair preclude him from filing the criminal
complaint on the ground of pari delicto?
4. Is Dr. Neri’s manifestation a sufficient basis for granting a new trial?

HELD:
1. No. It has been the Court’s constant holding that in certiorari proceedings, the
findings of fact of the lower court as well as its conclusions on the credibility of
witnesses are generally not disturbed.
2. No. As held in Gamboa v. Cruz, “the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confession or admissions from respondent-accused.” Because Dr.
Neri is not an investigating officer, Mrs. Neri’s confession to her husband could not
be rejected by the court. As held in Aballe v. People,
“The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may
be given in evidence against him. The rule is that any person, otherwise competent
as witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to substance of
what he heard if he heard and understood all of it.”
3. No. The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code but only in
Article 1411 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the said article relates only to contracts
with illegal consideration. The case at bar does not involved any illegal contract.
4. No. Dr. Neri’s manifestation amounts in effect to an attempted recantation of
testimony given by him before the trial court. It is settled that not all recantations by
witnesses should result in the granting of a new trial.

Art. 334. Concubinage. Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a
woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
Three ways of committing the crime of concubinage:
1. By keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling; or
2. By having sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman
who is not his wife; or
3. By cohabiting with her in any other place.
Elements:
(1) That the man must be married.
(2) That he committed any of the following acts:
a. Keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling,
b. Having sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with a woman
who is not his wife;
c. Cohabiting with her in any other place.
(3) That as regards the woman, she must know him to be married.

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity. In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner’s
wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned
the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman
named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage. The petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of
Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination
of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of

marriage based on psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question that should
merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage?

RULING:

The Supreme Court finds the contention of the petitioner without merit. The

pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.

Elements:

1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness of lewdness;

2. That the act of lasciviousness is committed against a person of either sex;

3. That it is done under any of the following circumstances;

a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

 c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authoity;

d. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.

PEOPLE vs. PEREZ

831 P.2d 1159 (1992)
FACTS:

On September 30, 1988, Mr. Perez (Defendant) parked his car near the
house of Victoria Mesa. He surreptitiously entered the house while Mesa was
warming her car. Defendant beat Mesa and then stabbed her multiple times with a
steak knife from Mesa’s kitchen. After the steak knife broke, Defendant found
another knife in the kitchen, which he used to inflict additional wounds on Mesa.
Mesa died as a result of the attack. The only connection between Defendant and
Mesa was that they had gone to high school together ten years earlier. Defendant
was found guilty of first degree, premeditated and deliberate murder. Defendant
appealed, and the court of appeals reduced his conviction to second-degree murder.
The prosecution challenged the court of appeals’ decision.

ISSUE:

Whether combined evidence of planning activity, motive, and manner of killing

supports a finding of first degree murder where any one category of evidence on its
own would be insufficient to prove that the homicide was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated.

HELD:

Yes. The court of appeals’ ruling is reversed. First-degree murder includes

killings that are willful, deliberate, premeditated, and perpetrated with express malice
aforethought.

First-degree murder includes killings that are willful, deliberate, premeditated,

and perpetrated with express malice aforethought. This means that a defendant
commits first degree murder where he kills intentionally, after carefully considering
the consequences of his actions. To determine whether sufficient evidence has been
presented to support a conviction for deliberate and premeditated murder, courts
typically consider three categories of evidence: planning activity, motive, and manner
of killing. This list of considerations is nonexclusive. Here, the evidence is sufficient
to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. First, evidence of planning
activity can be found in the following: Defendant did not park his car in Mesa’s
driveway; he entered Mesa’s home surreptitiously; and he obtained the murder
weapon from Mesa’s kitchen. Second, evidence of motive may be inferred from the
fact that Defendant and Mesa knew each other from high school, which means that
Mesa could have easily identified Defendant to law enforcement if she survived.
Third, evidence of the manner of killing suggests that Mesa’s death was deliberate
and premeditated to the extent that Defendant sought out a second knife from the
kitchen after the steak knife broke. Although no one of these factors is sufficient on
its own to sustain a finding that Defendant acted deliberately and with premeditation
when he killed Mesa, their combination provides sufficient support for such a finding.

Art. 337. Qualified seduction. The seduction of a virgin over twelve years and
under eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public authority, priest,
house servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity,
shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

Two classes of qualified seduction:

(a) Seduction of a virgin over 12 years and under 18 years of age by certain persons,
such as, a person in authority, priest, teacher, etc.; and

(b) Seduction of a sister by her brother, or descendant by her ascendant, regardless

of her age or reputation.

Elements of qualified seduction of a virgin:

1. That the offended party is a virgin, which is presumed if she is unmarried

and of good reputation.

2. That she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age.

3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with her.

4. That there is abuse of authority, confidence or relationship on the part of

the offender.

PEOPLE vs. ALFONSO FONTANILLA Y OBALDO

GR No. 177743, January 25, 2012

FACTS:
At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was  walking along the
provincial road in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla
suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais fell
facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of
stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez
and Tirso Abunan, the  sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run
away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where
Olais was pronounced dead on arrival. On April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of La Union filed an information for murder against Fontanilla in the RTC.
The accused pleaded not guilty.
The State presented Marquez and Abunan as its witnesses. They claimed
that they were only several meters away from Olais when Fontanilla struck him; that
they shouted at Fontanilla, who fled because of them; and that they were able to see
and to identify Fontanilla as the attacker of their father-in-law because the area was
then well-lighted. Dr. Felicidad Leda, the physician who conducted the autopsy on
the cadaver of Olais, attested that her post-mortem examination showed that Olais
had suffered a fracture on the left temporal area of the skull, causing his death. She
opined that a hard object or a severe force had hit the skull of the victim more than
once, considering that the skull had been already fragmented and the fractures on
the skull had been radiating.
At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the
incident, he had been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a
nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that although
he had then talked to Olais nicely,... the latter had continued hitting him with his fists,
striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with
both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone
with which he had hit the right side of the victim's... head, causing the latter to fall
face down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon
seeing that Olais was no longer moving. Fontanilla's daughter Marilou corroborated
her father's version. On June 21, 2001, the RTC declared Fontanilla guilty as
charged. The RTC rejected Fontanilla's plea of self-defense by observing that he had
"no necessity to employ a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound
causing his death" due to the victim attacking him only with bare hands. It noted that
Fontanilla did not suffer any injury despite his claim that the victim had mauled him;
that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested to
any injury he might have suffered, having been immediately released from the
hospital that Fontanilla's failure to give any statement at the time he surrendered to
the police was inconsistent with his plea of self-defense and that the manner of
attack against Olais established the attendance of treachery.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC. Fontanilla did not establish the
indispensable element of unlawful aggression; that his failure to report the incident to
the police at the earliest opportunity, or even after he was taken into custody,
negated the plea of self-defense; and that the nature of the victim's injury was a
significant physical proof to show a determined effort on the part of Fontanilla to kill
him, and not just to defend himself.

ISSUE:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE. EVEN GRANTING THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT KILLED THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WHEN
THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE SPECIAL PRIVILEGE[D]
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AND THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.

HELD:
We affirm the conviction. Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-
defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the
indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the
victim is established self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel. The
character of the element of unlawful aggression is aptly explained as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no
justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression
under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril
the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an
imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the
concurrence of three elements of unlawful... aggression, namely: (a) there must be a
physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at
least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. Unlawful aggression
is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful
aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical
force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is
impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening
attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong
(like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making
a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a
revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to
throw a pot.
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that
caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for
murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he
assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the
justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one,
Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla's
act of hitting the victim's head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not
proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victim's fistic attack
and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some
injury from the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity
was found on the person of Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital;
hence, the attending physician of the hospital did not issue any medical certificate to
him. Nor was any medication applied to him.
In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had
been hit on the head more than once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for
the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted
on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack
from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds... manifested
the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006 by the Court
of Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATION of the civil damages, by ordering accused
Alfonso Fontanilla y Obaldo to pay to the heirs of Jose Olais P25,000.00 as
temperate damages... and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the
P50,000.00 as death indemnity and the P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus interest
of 6% per annum on such amounts from the finality of the judgment.The accused
shall pay the costs of suit.

Art. 338. Simple seduction. The seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of
good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age, committed by means
of deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor.3

Elements:

1. That the offended party is over 12 and under 18 years of age.

2. That she must be of good reputation, single or widow.

3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with her.

4. That it is committed by means of deceit.

UNITED STATES vs. HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 9405. December 24, 1914

FACTS:
An informant and a DEA agent posing as his wife met the defendant in a
coffee shop, during which the two testified there was talk of a cocaine transaction.
The two later met the defendant at a service station and followed him to his tire shop.
At that time, two packages of cocaine were presented, and the defendant was
arrested on the way to the place where payment was to be made. At trial, the
prosecution elicited testimony, over the defendant’s objection, from the DEA agent,
that an investigation had been opened as a result of a tip from another federal
agency that defendant was a drug smuggler. The testimony was reiterated and
embellished during closing argument. Defendant appealed on the grounds that the
testimony was inadmissible.
ISSUE:
Whether the statements by the agent that another agency had tipped off the
DEA that the defendant was drug smuggler constituted reversible error?

HELD:

Yes. The statements were made out of court by someone other then the
declarant, and they were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. They were
not offered to prove state of mind, which was irrelevant, but rather to show that the
defendant was, in fact, a drug smuggler. These statements were inadmissible under
Federal Rules of Evidence (“F.R.E.”) Rules 802, 403 and 404(b). The statements
made by someone else to the DEA agent were out of court statements offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Even if it were accepted that the statements
were offered for some non-hearsay reason, the statements were still overly
prejudicial as compared to their probativeness, failing the F.R.E. Rule 403 balancing
test. Moreover, evidence of past crimes to show propensity was inadmissible under
F.R.E Rule 404(b). As a result, the statements constituted reversible error and the
conviction was overturned.

Art. 339. Acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party. The
penalty of arresto mayor* shall be imposed to punish any other acts of
lasciviousness committed by the same persons and under the same circumstances
as those provided in Articles 337 and 338.

Elements:

1. That the offender commits acts of lasciviousness or lewdness.

2. That the acts are committed upon a woman who is virgin or single or widow
of good reputation, under 18 years of age but over 12 years, or a sister or
descendant regardless of her reputation or age.

3. That the offender accomplishes the acts by abuse of authority, confidence,

relationship, or deceit.

Art. 340. Corruption of Minors. Any person who shall promote or facilitate the
prostitution or corruption of persons under age to satisfy the lust of another, shall be
punished by prision mayor5 and if the culprit is a public officer or employee, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, he shall also suffer the
penalty of temporary absolute disqualification.6 (As amended by BJ*. Big. 92,
approved on Dec. 24,1980)

Art. 341. White slave trade. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods1 shall be imposed upon any person who, in any manner, or under
any pretext, shall engage in the business or shall profit by prostitution or shall enlist
the services of women for the purpose of prostitution. (As amended by BJ*. Big. 186,
March 16,1982)

Acts penalized as white slave trade.

They are:

1. Engaging in the business of prostitution.

2. Profiting by prostitution.

3. Enlisting the services of women for the purpose of prostitution.

Art. 342. Forcible abduction. The abduction of any woman against her will and with
lewd designs shall be punished by reclusion temporal.

The same penalty shall be imposed in every case, if the female abducted be under
twelve years of age.

Elements of forcible abduction:

1. That the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status,
or reputation.

2. That the abduction is against her will.

3. That the abduction is with lewd designs.

REPUBLIC vs. CAYANAN

G.R. 181796, November 7, 2017

FACTS:

Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the RTC alleging that Pablo, her
husband, was being illegally detained by the Director/Head of the CIDG. She
contended that a group of armed men identifying themselves as operatives of the
CIDG, led by Pascua, had forcibly arrested Pablo without any warrant of arrest, and
had then detained him at the office of the CIDG in Camp Crame; and that despite
repeated demands, the CIDG operatives had not produced the body of Pablo. The
CIDG received the petition for habeas corpus brought in behalf of Pablo. The CIDG
filed its return on the writ wherein it denied having the custody of Pablo or having
detained him. It prayed for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus. Regina,
albeit reiterating the allegations of the petition for habeas corpus, amended her
petition to now seek instead the issuance of a writ of amparo. The RTC issued the
writ of amparo. Regina moved ex parte for the issuance of a temporary protection
order and witness protection order, and it was granted. Pascua did not appear in the
proceedings in the RTC. He tendered explanations for his non-appearance.

The RTC issued an order maintaining the writ of amparo; ordering the CIDG
to continue its investigation into the disappearance of Pablo; directing respondent
SPO1 Pascua to appear before the proper forum; making the temporary protection
order permanent; and upholding the enrollment of Regina in the Witness Protection
Program of the Department of Justice. The CIDG filed an MR, but it was denied.
Hence, the CIDG filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC. It contended
that there was no sufficient evidence to support the writ of amparo; and that a mere
accusation accompanied by inherently hearsay evidence is not sufficient ground for
the court to issue a writ of amparo or allow its continued effectivity. Pascua, on his
part, contended that Regina failed to establish by the required burden of proof that
he caused the “forced disappearance” of Pablo Cayanan within the ambit protected
by the rule on the writ of ampar; that following Mexico’s Amparo, it is [an] essential
requirement for the supposed victim to establish where he is being held; that
Philippine rule on amparo specifically covers “public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity,” which evidently precludes a government
institution/instrumentality, such as CIDG-PNP; and that enforced or forced
disappearance means that it must be established that agents of the state perpetrated
its commission.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not sufficient evidence supported the grant of the writ of amparo by the
RTC?

2. Whether or not the CIDG already discharged its duty as required by the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo?

3. Whether or not the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo was defective?

4. Whether or not the issuance of the writ of amparo by the RTC impaired Pascua’s
right to the presumption of his innocence?

HELD:

            Although a Petition for Review on Certiorari is usually limited to the

determination of questions of law, Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo explicitly allows the review by the SC of questions of fact or of law or of
both. 
1. Yes, the SC held that Substantial evidence is sufficient in proceedings involving
petitions for the writ of amparo. The respondent must show in the return on the writ
of amparothe observance of extraordinary diligence. Once an enforced
disappearance is established by substantial evidence, the relevant State agencies
should be tasked to assiduously investigate and determine the disappearance, and,
if warranted, to bring to the bar of justice whoever may be responsible for the
disappearance.

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.  Here, Regina fully discharged her duty to
present substantial evidence in support of her petition for the issuance of the writ
of amparo.

Firstly, the sinumpaang salaysay before the NBI, whereby an eyewitness detailed

the events of the abduction of Pablo in mid-afternoon was consistent and credible in
itself. 

Secondly, Pascua himself expressly admitted the abduction of Pablo, albeit asserting
himself as another victim of the same abduction. Yet, he did not furnish details of the
abduction that would have given to the investigators firm leads to quickly corner the
perpetrators as well as to determine and locate the whereabouts of Pablo. His
omission was fatal to his credibility. He could not simply belie his part in the
abduction by issuing a blanket denial. It is significant that his denial was already
doubtful in light of Perez’s sinumpaang salaysay positively identifying of him as the
leader of the perpetrators of the abduction.

Thirdly, Pascua’s version of being a victim of the same abduction deserved no

consideration. For one, he could not even mention the type and the color of the
vehicle that he and Pablo were supposedly ordered to board. Such inability was
uncharacteristic of a veteran police officer like him.

Fourthly, Regina presented other witnesses to corroborate the allegation on the

occurrence of the abduction. Such other witnesses also identified Pascua as the
person leading the abductors of Pablo and Perez.

2. No, the SC held that the CIDG did not observe the required extraordinary
diligence. The allegation that the CIDG had continuously searched for Pablo among
its various operating divisions similarly constituted a general denial because the
CIDG did not thereby indicate who had conducted the search, and how thoroughly
the allegedly continuous searches had been conducted.

Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the
investigations conducted by the CIDG and the NBI in a manner that would enable
the RTC to judiciously determine whether or not the efforts to ascertain Pablo’s
whereabouts had been sincere and adequate. The return by the CIDG was non-
compliant in that regard. 
3. No, the SC held that the petition for the writ of amparo was not defective. Section
5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo lists the matters to be alleged in the petition for
the writ of amparo. The said section did not require e petition to state the probable
whereabouts of the victim.

The SC clarified that the application and implementation of the rule

of amparo adopted in Mexico or in any other country could only be persuasive at
best. Despite its being patterned after the rules on the writ of amparo of other
countries, particularly those in Latin-American, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo promulgated by the Court should not be wholly dependent on how those
other rules of amparo have operated, or have been implemented. Such operation
and implementation, if worthy of emulation, are only best practices to be considered
and optionally relied upon, if at all. 

4. No, the SC held that the issuance of the writ of amparo did not impair Pascua’s
right to the presumption of innocence. The proceedings taken under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo are not akin or similar to those in criminal prosecutions. In the former,
the guilt or innocence of the respondents is not determined, and no penal sanctions
are meted. The proceedings only endeavor to give the aggrieved parties immediate
remedies against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty or security. The
presumption of innocence is never an issue. In the latter, the prosecution of the
accused with due process of law is the object of the proceedings. The presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused is always the starting point. Hence, the need for
the State to adduce proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.

Art. 343. Consented abduction. The abduction of a virgin over twelve and under
eighteen years of age, carried out with her consent and with lewd designs, shall be
punished by the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.2

Elements.

1. That the offended party must be a virgin.

2. That she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age.

3. That the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after
solicitation or cajolery from the offender.

4. That the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs.

RUSTAN ANG v. CA
G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010

FACTS:
 Irish Sagud and Rustan Ang became "on-and-off" sweethearts until Irish
decided to break up with Rustan after learning that he had taken a live ‐in partner
whom he had gotten pregnant. Before Rustan got married, he tried to convince Irish
to elope with him. Irish, however, rejected his proposal. She changed her cellphone
number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages.
He used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages. Irish replied to his text
messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone. On June 5, 2005, Irish received
through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with her
face superimposed on the figure. The sender's cellphone number was one of the
numbers that Rustan used. After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text
messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly
scandalous pictures of her. He also threatened to spread the picture through the
internet. Irish sought the help of the police in apprehending Rustan. Under police
supervision, she contacted Rustan and asked him to meet her at the Lorentess
Resort.

When Rustan came, police officers intercepted and arrested him. They

searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish:
"Malandi ka kasi!". Rustan claims that he went to meet Irish because she asked him
to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages.
Rustan got the sender's number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person.
Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he
forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. According to him, this explained why the
obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan
claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture to him.

The RTC found Irish's testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. The trial court found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section
5(h) of R.A. 9262. The CA affirmed the RTC decision and denied Rustan’s MR.
Rustan filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this

term is defined in R.A. 9262; and

2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in
this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

HELD:

1. YES. Section 3 (e) of R.A. 9262 taken together with Sec 5(h) indicate that
the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:

a. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended

woman;
 b. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of
acts of harassment against the woman; and

c. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological

distress to her.

Section 3(a) of RA 9262 provides that a "dating relationship" includes a

situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing
basis during the course of the relationship. The law did not use in its provisions the
colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. Rather, it used the noun
"romance" to describe a couple's relationship, i.e., "a love affair. The law itself
distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Section 3(e) defines
"dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to
a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child."
The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a
sexual intercourse taking place between those involved. An "away‐bati" or a fight‐
and‐kiss thing between two lovers does not mean that the romantic relation between
the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.

2. YES. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that
constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment,
which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect
women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed
would license isolated ones. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman
can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here,
the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish's head and
face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one.
Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be
scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further
terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in
the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.

Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,

abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
spouse.

Prosecution of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of

lasciviousness.

1. Adultery and concubinage must be prosecuted upon complaint signed by

the offended spouse.

2. Seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness must be prosecuted

upon complaint signed by —
 a. offended party,

b. her parents,

c. grandparents, or

d. guardians in the order in which they are named above.

PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA

G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989

FACTS:

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen)

and respondent and respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were
married at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and
had a child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling. The private respondent
initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The local court
in Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouse. On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a
trial court in Manila. After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed
the complaint for adultery before the prosecutor of Manila alleging that the petitioner
had an affair William Chia and Jesus Chua while they were still married. Petitioner
filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed against
her and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution
directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action tenable?

HELD:

Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon sworn written filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting
at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is
logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent
where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. It is indispensable that the
status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action
be definitely established and, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the
time he initiates the action. Thus, the divorce decree is valid not only in his country,
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned – in
view of the nationality principle under the Civil Code on the matter of civil status of
persons. Private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal
standing to commence the adultery case. The criminal case filed against petitioner is
dismissed.

Art. 345. Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity. Persons
guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction, shall also be sentenced:

1. To indemnify the offended woman;

2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so
doing;

3. In every case to support the offspring

Art. 346. Liability of ascendants, guardians, teachers, or other persons

entrusted with the custody of the offended party. The ascendants, guardians,
curators, teachers, and any person who, by abuse of authority or confidential
relationship, shall cooperate as accomplices in the perpetration of the crimes
embraced in chapters second, third and fourth of this title, shall be punished as
principals.

Persons who cooperate as accomplices but are punished as principals in

rape, seduction, abduction, etc.

They are:

(1) Ascendants,

(2) Guardians,

(3) Curators,

(4) Teachers, and

(5) Any other person, who cooperates as accomplice with abuse of authority
or confidential relationship.

Art. 347. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another, and
concealment or abandonment of a legitimate child. The simulation of births and
the substitution of one child for another shall be punished by prision mayor1 and a
fine of not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Acts punished under Art. 347.

 1. Simulation of births.

2. Substitution of one child for another.

3. Concealing or abandoning any legitimate child with intent to cause such

child to lose its civil status.

Facts:
At around 6am of June 9, 1968, Ricardo Cortez left his nipa hut located at Sitio
Adlas, Barrio Biluso,
Silang, Cavite to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora Sarno, his wife, was
left inside the hut.
While he was on top of the tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a volley of shots.
He fell to the ground at
the base of the coconut tree.
Meanwhile, while inside their hut, Flora, wife of Ricardo, heard three successive
shots coming from
the south of their hut. She went out, and from a distance of about 25 meters saw five
men armed with
long firearms firing at her husband who was already lying on the ground at the foot of
the coconut tree.
She saw that the five men were about 5 meters away from him. Looking at the five
men, Flora
recognized one of them as Laureano Sangalang, a childhood acquaintance, and the
others as Conrado
Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom. Flora ran towards
them and shouted why
they were shooting her husband. As she continued to approach them, the five men
fired shots at Flora.
Because of this she retreated to their hut for cover. She heard more shots were fired,
and after about 5
minutes, the five men left the place.
Another witness to the event was Ricardo Sarno, brother of Flora Cortez, who lived
in a hut about 20
meters aways from the hut of the Cortez’s. When the incident happened he and his
family were having
breakfast, when he suddenly heard shots. He came out of his hut and saw his
brother-in-law being shot
by the five men he also knew as Laureano Sangalang, Conrado Gonzales, Irineo
Canuel, Perino Canuel, and
Eleuterio Cuyom. He saw Sangalang using a grand carbine to shoot Ricardo Cortez,
as he was on top of
the coconut tree, and he also saw him fall to the ground and being fired at again
while lying helpless on
the ground. He saw his sister attempting to approach the five men, and he saw them
fire shots at her.
He wanted to join her, but he was also fired upon by the five men, so he retreated to
his own hut.
When the five men left, Ricardo went to Flora’s hut and saw her sitting in the hut. He
followed her
as she returned to the spot where her husband was, they both saw that he was
already dead. Noticing
this, Ricardo he gathered his family and brought them to Sitio Biga, and reported the
killing to the chief of
police who went to the scene of the crime with some policemen and Constabulary
men.
The necropsy report of Ricardo Cortez showed that he sustained 23 gunshot wounds
on different
parts of his body. Fourteen of these wounds were bullet entry wounds, while the
other nine were bullet
exit wounds. Cause of death-multiple gunshot wounds.
Sangalang’s alibi: He declared that in the afternoon of June 8, 1968 he and Crispulo
Mendoza went to
the house of Julian Gatdula at Dapitan Street, Sampaloc, Manila. He arrived at
Gatdula's place at six
o'clock. He wanted to borrow money from Gatdula to defray the matriculation fees of
his children. As
Facts:
At around 6am of June 9, 1968, Ricardo Cortez left his nipa hut located at Sitio
Adlas, Barrio Biluso,
Silang, Cavite to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora Sarno, his wife, was
left inside the hut.
While he was on top of the tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a volley of shots.
He fell to the ground at
the base of the coconut tree.
Meanwhile, while inside their hut, Flora, wife of Ricardo, heard three successive
shots coming from
the south of their hut. She went out, and from a distance of about 25 meters saw five
men armed with
long firearms firing at her husband who was already lying on the ground at the foot of
the coconut tree.
She saw that the five men were about 5 meters away from him. Looking at the five
men, Flora
recognized one of them as Laureano Sangalang, a childhood acquaintance, and the
others as Conrado
Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom. Flora ran towards
them and shouted why
they were shooting her husband. As she continued to approach them, the five men
fired shots at Flora.
Because of this she retreated to their hut for cover. She heard more shots were fired,
and after about 5
minutes, the five men left the place.
Another witness to the event was Ricardo Sarno, brother of Flora Cortez, who lived
in a hut about 20
meters aways from the hut of the Cortez’s. When the incident happened he and his
family were having
breakfast, when he suddenly heard shots. He came out of his hut and saw his
brother-in-law being shot
by the five men he also knew as Laureano Sangalang, Conrado Gonzales, Irineo
Canuel, Perino Canuel, and
Eleuterio Cuyom. He saw Sangalang using a grand carbine to shoot Ricardo Cortez,
as he was on top of
the coconut tree, and he also saw him fall to the ground and being fired at again
while lying helpless on
the ground. He saw his sister attempting to approach the five men, and he saw them
fire shots at her.
He wanted to join her, but he was also fired upon by the five men, so he retreated to
his own hut.
When the five men left, Ricardo went to Flora’s hut and saw her sitting in the hut. He
followed her
as she returned to the spot where her husband was, they both saw that he was
already dead. Noticing
this, Ricardo he gathered his family and brought them to Sitio Biga, and reported the
killing to the chief of
police who went to the scene of the crime with some policemen and Constabulary
men.
The necropsy report of Ricardo Cortez showed that he sustained 23 gunshot wounds
on different
parts of his body. Fourteen of these wounds were bullet entry wounds, while the
other nine were bullet
exit wounds. Cause of death-multiple gunshot wounds.
Sangalang’s alibi: He declared that in the afternoon of June 8, 1968 he and Crispulo
Mendoza went to
the house of Julian Gatdula at Dapitan Street, Sampaloc, Manila. He arrived at
Gatdula's place at six
o'clock. He wanted to borrow money from Gatdula to defray the matriculation fees of
his children. As
PEOPLE VS LAUREANO SANGALANG
GR NO. L-32914
Aug. 30, 197

Art. 348. Usurpation of civil status. The penalty of prision mayor3 shall be
imposed upon any person who shall usurp the civil status of another, should he do
so for the purpose of defrauding the offended party or his heirs; otherwise, the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods4 shall be
imposed.

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor1 shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

Elements:

1. That the offender has been legally married.

 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code.

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO MENDOZA

G.R. No. 220759, July 24, 2017 

FACTS: 
During a buy-bust operation, PO2 Ricote, together with the CI, met the
appellant in a sari-sari store and the CI introduced P02 Ricote as a buyer of
marijuana. Appellant then told PO2 Ricote that the price per teabag of marijuana
was ₱50.00 to which the latter agreed to buy 4 teabags. Appellant then took out from
his right pocket the four teabags of suspected dried marijuana leaves and handed
them to PO2 Ricote who, in tum, gave the marked two pieces of one hundred peso
bills to the former. PO2 Ricote then scratched his head as a pre-arranged signal, and
PO3 Parena, who was inside a parked vehicle which was three meters away from
the sari-sari store, immediately run to help in arresting appellant.
Appellant denied the charges and claimed that he, together with friends, were along
the road, repairing a pedicab. When they all went to a sari-sari store to rest, they
were joined by a certain Andy Makabenta. He then saw the arrival of a white vehicle
and a motorcycle with two people riding on it. A person alighted from the motorcycle
and held the wrist of Makabenta, while another police officer alighted from the
vehicle and pointed to him saying "you also apprehend that.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of illegal sale of marijuana?

HELD:
Yes. In every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, the following
elements must be proved: (1) the identities of the buyer and. the seller, the object,
and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.34
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of evidence of corpus delicti.
In this case, PO2 Ricote, the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the
seller of the four teabags of suspected marijuana and to whom he handed the
marked two pieces of one hundred peso bills as payment therefor. The substance
sold by appellant to PO2 Ricote was sent for analysis and upon the examination, it
showed that the four teabags yielded a positive result for marijuana, a dangerous
drug. The marijuana was presented to the court and was identified by PO2 Ricote to
be the marijuana he bought from appellant based on the markings he made thereon.

Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods2 shall be imposed upon any
person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article,
shall contract marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been
complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment.

If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of
violence, intimidation, or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph.

Elements:

1. That the offender contracted marriage.

2. That he knew at the time that —

a. the requirements of the law were not complied with; or

b. the marriage was in disregard of a legal impediment.