CASE 1

G.R. No. 122846               January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.

DECISION

Tinga, J.:

With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is confronted
anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal
tension between law and morality.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels
and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-
motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as
pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our
sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the
present petition.

This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision3 in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774
entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of
Manila" (the Ordinance).

I.

The facts are as follows:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is
reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best
interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.

SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted
terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in
the City of Manila.

SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than
twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be
concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same
meaning.

SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon
conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not
exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of
[a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable:
Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty
party shall automatically be cancelled.

SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this measure or
any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.

SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.

Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.

Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.

On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory
relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO)5 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City)
represented by Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of
the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a
short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa
Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-
intervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels
and motels in Manila.8 The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and
operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9

On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of
the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to
withdraw as plaintiff.11

On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw.12 The RTC issued a TRO on January 14,
1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January
22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.14

On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement
of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the
Ordinance is constitutional.

During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the
case involved a purely legal question.16 On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance
null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and
void.

Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded
by the Constitution."18 Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and
the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the
observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by
simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,19 where the legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be
effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition
for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.21

Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the
power:

[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.22

The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the
Revised Manila Charter, thus:

"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred
pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.23

Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the
freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.24 First, it
held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the
owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless
reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful
objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-
being of its constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of
Manila, liberty is regulated by law.

TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.25 In their petition and Memorandum,
petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed
Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.

II.

We must address the threshold issue of petitioners’ standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments
offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners
also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter
is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal
protection rights.

Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from
the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of
standing is built on the principle of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or
invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.

The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution.27 The
constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of
precise definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious
cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court
reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and
redressability in Allen v. Wright.30
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer
suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.31

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are
appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of
litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must
have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in
dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third
party's ability to protect his or her own interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are
likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which
appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of
such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also
be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit.34

American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or
invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by
state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to
challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the
constitutional protections available to their patients. The Court held that:

"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are
considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them."36

An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United States Supreme Court held
that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a
statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The
United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third
parties who seek access to their market or function."38

Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of
the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government
action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the
freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally
guaranteed rights.39 In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to
liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from
overbreadth.

We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their
establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.

III.

To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but
our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of
Manila.40 Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal
information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a
motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed
harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban
on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance
in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.

The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the
localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating
public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the
middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these
establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State
can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable.41

The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a
room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local
government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.

A.

Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant.42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people.43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The
awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our
nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and,
sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.

Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection
questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they
exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another
form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that
motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the
third political branch of government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as
judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development
of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-
reaching constitutional questions of the day.

B.

The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as
a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the
guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on
government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the
procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.49 Procedural due
process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into
the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.

If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary
government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection
envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a
person of life, liberty, or property.50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in
progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally
awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality
though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to
achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State.
Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged
to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.

C.

The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed
with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products.51 Footnote 4 of
the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a
discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right."52 Consequently, two
standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting
the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.

A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court
for evaluating classifications based on gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.56 While the test may have first been
articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process
cases as well.

We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.57 Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
interest.58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less
restrictive measures is considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality
and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms.60 Strict scrutiny is
used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.61 The United States Supreme Court
has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,62 judicial access63 and
interstate travel.64

If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act
upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most
deferential standard – the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to
invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time
access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.

Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn
of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel
the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial"
yet fundamental freedoms – which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their
constitutional consequence – that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally
incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may
or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big
Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by
them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.

D.

The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right
to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[65] In accordance
with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will;
to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of
liberty.[66]

The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:

While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution
for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.67 [Citations omitted]

It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City
asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery
and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit
and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’"68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-
scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting
single adults which is constitutionally protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our
holding therein retains significance for our purposes:

The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:

Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible;
indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon
the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of
that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the
will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in
any real sense free.

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be
justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.70

We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very
legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to
choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers
who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels.
Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with
purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a
convenient alternative.

E.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.72

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or
property is affected.73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power
whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.74

Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates, this Ordinance is
a blunt and heavy instrument.75 The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged
in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit
activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification
of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the
unjustified prohibition.

The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home,76 and it is
skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city – the Pearl of the Orient – as a modern-day Sodom or
Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will
have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities
such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The
solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather,
cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of
individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.

The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished
simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug
dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement
of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion
on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can
easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit
activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging
their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

IV.

We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a
day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the
judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.77 The notion that the
promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle.78 The advancement of moral relativism as
a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which
particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens
could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation
of different interests.79

To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as
a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts
to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong.80 Our penal
laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions
between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction,
but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is
distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and
immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected
by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as
the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of
office, and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.81

Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative
is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may often be
left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more
judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 2

G.R. No. L-24693             July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.

J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether
Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court held that it is and
adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such
judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the
president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who
was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It
was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of
its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by
both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500
person and representing an investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963,
the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then
Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).

After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its
being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels,
on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels;
that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due
process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class
motels; that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or
letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open
to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth,
the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if
any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate
as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally
filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the
premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City
Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due
process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and
uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination;
that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of
certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and
laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a
conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that
the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being
accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful
guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such
establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due
process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar
as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the
automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss
of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.

There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance
null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding the
respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of
Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged
ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise
of the police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged
invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the
preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of
the petition.

Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28,
1964, which reads:

1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila, while
the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor
Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;

2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City
of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give
the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;

3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate
and Ermita districts in Manila;

4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was
approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the
absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the
compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This
ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th
Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);

5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed
ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;

6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the
105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila.1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the presumption
of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on
the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a
memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely
two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set
forth in the petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a
judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and referring to the
alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being
purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit
the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties,
the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as
is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to
regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would
be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against
respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.

As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged
ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards
of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of
validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The
presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly
set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well
being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.2

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been
nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the
American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute
here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on
the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due
process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the
pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the
ordinance set aside.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to
the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does
not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been
properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all
the great public needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the
state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts,
speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part
to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and
thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check
the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests
to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients
and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the
ordinance, argues eloquently for it.

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing
vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating the maintenance
or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of
panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and
prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is
smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police
power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process,
equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar
as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police
power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the question of due
process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity
sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official
action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process
is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom
from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for
justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of
fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception
with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close
and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It
would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to
govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the
challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even
attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of
Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and
hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for
hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a
P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as
1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular
enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes
only.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are
also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and
regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in
this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal
ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere
with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage
in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind
of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld,
especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared
unreasonable.23

Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the
American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this
Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities
and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so
levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.25

As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for
revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a
police power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from
another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the
ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in
the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of
which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some
individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations
which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these
occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power."27

Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn
or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases
full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a
transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was
intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according
to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a
correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at
correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of
liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all
these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint
by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public
health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."28

A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said
law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of
liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.29

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to
contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to
some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but
where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is
wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the principles of
vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of
the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or
companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or
companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room
With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections
which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its
owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate
of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be
asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To
ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle
has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either
forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove
illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such
vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success.
Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this
Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.
CASE 3

G.R. No. 179554               December 16, 2009

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,

vs.
TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISING, VENDING AND PROMOTIONS, INC., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This case concerns whether the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) could unilaterally dismantle
the billboards, signages and other advertizing media in the structures of the Metro Rail Transit 3 (MRT3) installed by
respondent advertising company by virtue of its existing contract with the owner of the MRT3.

The trial and appellate courts ruled that MMDA did not have the authority to dismantle. MMDA is now before the
Court to assail such adverse ruling.

Antecedents

In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications, entered into a build-
lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to
the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer
to the Government.

The BLT agreement stipulated, among others, that MRTC could build and develop commercial premises in the
MRT3 structures, or obtain advertising income therefrom, viz:

16.1. Details of Development Rights. DOTC hereby confirms and awards to Metro Rail the rights to (a) develop
commercial premises in the Depot and the air space above the Stations, which shall be allowed to such height as is
legally and technically feasible, (b) lease or sub-lease interests or assign such interests in the Depot and such air
space and (c) obtain any advertising income from the Depot and such air space and LRTS Phase I….

"LRTS Phase I" means the rail transport system comprising about 16.9 line kilometers extending from Taft Avenue,
Pasay City, to North Avenue, Quezon City, occupying a strip in the center of EDSA approximately 10.5 meters wide
(approximately 12 meters wide at or around the Boni Avenue, Santolan and Buendia Stations), plus about 0.1 to 0.2
line kilometers extending from the North Avenue Station to the Depot, together with the Stations, 73 Light Rail
Vehicles and all ancillary plant, equipment and facilities, as more particularly detailed in the Specifications.

16.2. Assignment of Rights. During the Development Rights Period, Metro Rail shall be entitled to assign all or any
of its rights, titles and interests in the Development Rights to bona fide real estate developers. In this connection,
Metro Rail may enter into such development, lease, sub-lease or other agreements or contracts relating to the
Depot and the air space above the Stations (the space not needed for all or any portion of the operation of the
LRTS) for all or any portion of the Development Rights Period….

In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a
contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and
other advertizing media in the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to
dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertizing media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby
MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in
any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the
request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar forms of advertisement.
On March 1, 2002, Trackworks filed against MMDA in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City an injunction suit
(with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order [TRO] and preliminary injunction), docketed as Civil
Case No. 68864.

On March 6, 2002, the RTC (Branch 155) issued a TRO, enjoining MMDA from dismantling or destroying
Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertizing media. On March 25, 2002, the RTC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction for the same purpose.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration to challenge the RTC’s issuances, MMDA brought a petition for certiorari
and prohibition before the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 70932, but the CA denied the
petition and affirmed the RTC on August 31, 2004. The CA ultimately denied MMDA’s motion for reconsideration
through its resolution issued on March 14, 2005.

Thence, MMDA appealed to this Court (G.R. No. 167514), which denied MMDA’s petition for review on October 25,
2005.1

Ruling of the RTC

In the meanwhile, on October 10, 2005, the RTC (Branch 155) rendered its decision permanently enjoining MMDA
from dismantling, removing or destroying the billboards, signages and other advertizing media installed by
Trackworks on the interior and exterior structures of the MRT3.2

Ruling of the CA

MMDA appealed the RTC’s decision to the CA.

On April 30, 2007, the CA denied the MMDA’s appeal,3 holding that Trackworks’ right to install billboards, signages
and other advertizing media on the interior and exterior structures of the MRT3 must be protected by a writ of
permanent injunction; and that MMDA had no power to dismantle, remove or destroy Trackworks’ billboards,
signages and other advertizing media.4

MMDA moved for reconsideration, but the CA resolution denied the motion for reconsideration on September 3,
2007.5

Hence, this appeal by petition for review.

Issues

MMDA claims that its mandate under its charter6 of formulating, coordinating and monitoring of policies, standards,
progress and projects for the use of thoroughfares and the promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons
and goods prompted its issuance of MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, which reads in part:

h. ) It is unlawful for any person/s, private or public corporations, advertising and promotions companies, movie
producers, professionals and service contractors to post, install, display any kind or form of billboards, signs,
posters, streamers, professional service advertisements and other visual clutters in any part of the road, sidewalk,
center island, posts, trees parks and open space.

MMDA avers that the conversion of the center island of Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) into the carriageway
of the MRT3 line did not exempt the EDSA center island from the coverage of the MMDA regulation;7 that the
Government’s grant of development rights to MRTC was not an abdication of its right to regulate, and, therefore, the
development of the MRT3 remained subject to all existing and applicable national and local laws, ordinances, rules
and regulations;8 that MMDA was merely implementing existing and applicable laws;9 that Trackworks’ advertising
materials were placed indiscriminately and without due regard to safety, and as such might be classified as
obstructions and distractions to the motorists traversing EDSA;10 and that the interests of a few should not prevail
over the good of the greater number in the community whose safety and general welfare MMDA was mandated to
protect.11
Trackworks maintains, on the other hand, that MMDA’s petition was defective for its failure to raise any genuine
question of law; and that the CA’s decision dated April 30, 2007 was valid and correct.12

Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertizing media in the MRT3 from
MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain
advertising income therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3
for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.

Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this case, and until this
date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership
by the former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending
& Promotions, Inc.,13 this Court expressly recognized Trackworks’ right to install the billboards, signages and other
advertising media pursuant to said contract. The latter’s right should, therefore, be respected.

It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks’ billboards, signages
and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards,
signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,14 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron
Transportation Co., Inc.,15 and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin,16 the Court had the occasion to
rule that MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No.
7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.17

Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:

xxx The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority". It is an agency created for the purpose
of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s organizations,
non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in
the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the
charter itself, viz:

Sec.2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.- xxx.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory
and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the
autonomy of local government units concerning purely local matters.18

The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No.
88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against
posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but
MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of
the areas as to which the prohibition applied. Moreover, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to
Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising media in MRT3, because it did not specifically cover MRT3,
and because it was issued a year prior to the construction of MRT3 on the center island of EDSA. Clearly, MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have included MRT3 in its prohibition. 1avvphi1

MMDA’s insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096 (Building Code) and its
implementing rules and regulations is not persuasive. The power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was
lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA, considering the law’s following
provision, thus:

Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement. –

The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code including the imposition of penalties for
administrative violations thereof is hereby vested in the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary."

There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to implement the Building Code.

WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review, and affirm the decision dated April 30, 2007 and the resolution dated
September 3, 2007.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 4

G.R. No. 127820 July 20, 1998

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE, Petitioner, v. V.M. REALTY

CORPORATION, Respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Parañaque, cannot authorize an
expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The
Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the
purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal
Council will not suffice. On the other hand, the principle of res judicata does not bar
subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the legal
requirements for its valid exercise are complied with.

Statement of the Case

These principles are applied by this Court in resolving this petition for review
on certiorari of the July 22, 1996 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA GR CV No.
48048, which affirmed in toto 3 the Regional Trial Court's August 9, 1994
Resolution. 4 The trial court dismissed the expropriation suit as follows:

The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain is not disputed. However, such right may be
exercised only pursuant to an Ordinance (Sec. 19, R.A No. 7160). In the instant case, there is no such ordinance
passed by the Municipal Council of Parañaque enabling the Municipality, thru its Chief Executive, to exercise the power
of eminent domain. The complaint, therefore, states no cause of action.

Assuming that plaintiff has a cause of action, the same is barred by a prior judgment. On September 29, 1987, the
plaintiff filed a complaint for expropriation involving the same parcels of land which was docketed as Civil Case No.
17939 of this Court (page 26, record). Said case was dismissed with prejudice on May 18, 1988 (page 39, record).
The order of dismissal was not appealed, hence, the same became final. The plaintiff can not be allowed to pursue the
present action without violating the principle of [r]es [j]udicata. While defendant in Civil Case No. 17939 was Limpan
Investment Corporation, the doctrine of res judicata still applies because the judgment in said case (C.C. No. 17939)
is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest (Vda. de Buncio vs. Estate of the late Anita de
Leon). The herein defendant is the successor-in-interest of Limpan Investment Corporation as shown by the "Deed of
Assignment Exchange" executed on June 13, 1990.

WHEREFORE, defendant's motion for reconsideration is hereby granted. The order dated February 4, 1994 is vacated
and set aside.

This case is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 5

Factual Antecedents

Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, 6 the Municipality

of Parañaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation 7 against
Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-
B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a combined area of about 10,000 square
meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila, and covered by
Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was filed "for the purpose
of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the
homeless through a socialized housing project." 8 Parenthetically, it was also for this
stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577,
Series of 1991, 9 previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property
with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. 10

Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 134, issued an Order dated January 10, 1994, 11 giving it due course.
Acting on petitioner's motion, said court issued an Order dated February 4,
1994, 12 authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit
with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value
based on its current tax declaration.

On February 21, 1994, private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative
defenses and a counterclaim, 13 alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state
a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance
as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if
any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondent's motion, its
Answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. 14 On March 24, 1991, 15 petitioner filed its
opposition, stressing that the trial court's Order dated February 4, 1994 was in accord
with Section 19 of RA 7160, and that the principle of res judicata was not applicable.

Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 Resolution 16 nullifying its February
4, 1994 Order and dismissing the case. Petitioner's motions for reconsideration and
transfer of venue were denied by the trial court in a Resolution dated December 2,
1994. 17 Petitioner then appealed to Respondent Court, raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Resolution of the Parañaque Municipal Council No. 93-95, Series of 1993 is a substantial
compliance of the statutory requirement of Section 19, R.A. 7180 [sic] in the exercise of the power of eminent domain
by the plaintiff-appellant.

2. Whether or not the complaint in this case states no cause of action.

3. Whether or not the strict adherence to the literal observance to the rule of procedure resulted in technicality
standing in the way of substantial justice.

4. Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to the present case. 18

As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision.
Respondent Court, in its assailed Resolution promulgated on January 8, 1997, 19 denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, this appeal. 20

The Issues

Before this Court, petitioner posits two issues, viz.:

1. A resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not
deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public interest is primarily
involved. 21

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

First Issue:

Resolution Different from an Ordinance

Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose
of initiating an expropriation case "substantially complies with the requirements of the
law" 22 because the terms "ordinance" and "resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose
of bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief executive to
initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent
domain." 23 Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides. "If the
LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through
purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of
the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation
proceedings." 24 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and
public utilities. 25 An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and
restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." 26 In
this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent
domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows:

Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has
been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government
unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based
on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for
the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the
power of eminent domain:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other
pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but
said offer was not accepted. 27

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent
domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance
with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner
cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals 28 to show that a resolution may suffice to
support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. 29 This case, however, is not in point
because the applicable law at that time was BP 337, 30 the previous Local Government
Code, which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise
eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160, 31 the present Local Government Code which was
already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an
ordinance for this purpose.

We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and
"ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of
a lawmaking body on a specific matter. 32 An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are
enacted differently - a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. 33

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere

resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government
Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government
Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act
pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to
only where a literal interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation
would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." 34 In the instant
case, there is no reason to depart from this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is
not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.

Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a

fundamental or private right of the people. 35 Accordingly, the manifest change in the
legislative language - from "resolution" under BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 -
demands a strict construction. "No species of property is held by individuals with greater
tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to
the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right and, for
greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the
plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation." 36

Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced,
because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which
merely seeks to implement it. 37 It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is
controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in
the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires
that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU act
pursuant to an ordinance.

In this ruling, the Court does not diminish the policy embodied in Section 2, Article X of
the Constitution, which provides that "territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy
local autonomy." It merely upholds the law as worded in RA 7160. We stress that an
LGU is created by law and all its powers and rights are sourced therefrom. It has
therefore no power to amend or act beyond the authority given and the limitations
imposed on it by law. Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an
LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" domain, since it must conform to the limits
imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent
domain. 38 Indeed, "the national legislature is still the principal of the local government
units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it." 39

Complaint Does Not

State a Cause of Action

In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner argues that its Sangguniang
Bayan passed an ordinance on October 11, 1994 which reiterated its Resolution No. 93-
35, Series of 1993, and ratified all the acts of its mayor regarding the subject
expropriation. 40

This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place, petitioner merely alleged the
existence of such an ordinance, but it did not present any certified true copy thereof. In
the second place, petitioner did not raise this point before this Court. In fact, it was
mentioned by private respondent, and only in passing. 41 In any event, this allegation
does not cure the inherent defect of petitioner's Complaint for expropriation filed on
September 23, 1993. It is hornbook doctrine that

. . . in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question
submitted before the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those
allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue rather
is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint? 42

The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for
expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance
authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's Decision which
dismissed the expropriation suit.

Second Issue:

Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals 43 and the trial court, 44 all the requisites for
the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final
judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject
matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds
application in generally all cases and proceedings, 45 cannot bar the right of the State or
its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an
inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute
and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is
plenary and, like police power, can "reach every form of property which the State might
need for public use." 46 "All separate interests of individuals in property are held of the
government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the
grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property,
remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign
capacity; and they have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever
the public interest requires it." 47 Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be
forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance
with any legal requirement.

While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise
eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. For
example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was
no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar the
State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law,
and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. 48 By
the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of
eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar
proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are
properly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also true
of the principle of "law of the case." In Republic vs. De Knecht, 49 the Court ruled that
the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the
mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has become
the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still
subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal
requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the
power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's proper

exercise of its power of eminent domain over subject property. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 5

June 7, 2017

G.R. No. 205428

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
(DPWH), Petitioners
vs
SPOUSES SENANDO F. SALVADOR and JOSEFINA R. SALVADOR, Respondents

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August 23, 2012
Decision   and the January 10, 2013 Order   of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 270, Valenzuela City, in Civil
1 2

Case No. 17 5-V-11 which directed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) to pay respondents spouses
Senando F. Salvador and Josefina R. Salvador consequential damages equivalent to the value of the capital gains
tax and other taxes necessary for the transfer of the expropriated property in the Republic's name.

The Antecedent Facts

Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land with a total land area of 229 square meters, located in
Kaingin Street, Barangay Parada, Valenzuela City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.V-77660.  3

On November 9, 2011, the Republic, represented by the Department of - Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed
a verified Complaint   before the RTC
4

for the expropriation of 83 square meters of said parcel of land (subject property), as well as the improvements
thereon, for the construction of the C-5 Northern Link Road Project Phase 2 (Segment 9) from the North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX) to McArthur Highway.  5

On February 10, 2012, respondents received two checks from the DPWH representing 100% of the zonal value of
the subject property and the cost of the one-storey semi-concrete residential house erected on the property
amounting to ₱l61,850.00   and ₱523,449.22,  respectively.   The RTC thereafter issued the corresponding Writ of
6 7 8

Possession in favor of the Republic. 9

On the same day, respondents signified in open court that they recognized the purpose for which their property is
being expropriated and interposed no objection thereto.   They also manifested that they have already received the
10

total sum of ₱685,349.22 from the DPWH and are therefore no longer intending to claim any just compensation.  11

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision12 dated August 23, 2012, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Republic condemning t1Je
subject property for the purpose of implementing the construction of the C-5 Northern Link Road Project Phase 2
(Segment 9) from NLEX to McArthur Highway, Valenzuela City.  13

The RTC likewise directed the Republic to pay respondents consequential damages equivalent to the value of the
capital gains tax and other taxes necessary for the transfer of the subject property in the Republic's name. 
14

The Republic moved for partial reconsideration,   specifically on the issue relating to the payment of the capital
15

gains tax, but the RTC denied the motion in its Order16 dated January 10, 2013 for having been belatedly filed. The
RTC also found no justifiable basis to reconsider its award of Consequential damages in favor of respondents, as
the payment of capital gains tax and other transfer taxes is but a consequence of the expropriation proceedings. 17
As a result, the Republic filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the RTC's August 23, 2012
Decision and January 10, 2013 Order.

Issues

In the present Petition, the Republic raises the following issues for the Court's resolution: first, whether the RTC
correctly denied the Republic's Motion for Partial Reconsideration for having been filed out of
time;   and second, whether the capital gains tax on the transfer of the expropriated property can be considered as
18

consequential damages that may be awarded to respondents.  19

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

"Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if a pleading is filed by registered mail, x x x the date of
mailing shall be considered as the date of filing. It does not matter when the court actually receives the mailed
pleading." 20

In this case, the records show that the Republic filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration before the RTC via
registered mail on September 28, 2012.  Although the trial cou1treceived the Republic's motion only on October 5,
21

2012,  it should have considered the pleading to have been filed on September 28, 2012, the date of its mailing,
22

which is clearly within the reglementary period of 15 days to file said motion,   counted from September 13, 2012, or
23

the date of the Republic's receipt of the assailed Decision. 24

Given these circumstances, we hold that the RTC erred in denying the Republic's Motion for Partial Reconsideration
for having been filed out of time. 1âwphi1

We likewise rule that the RTC committed a serious error when it directed the Republic to pay respondents
consequential damages equivalent to the value of the capital gains tax and other taxes necessary for the transfer of
the subject property.

"Just compensation [is defined as] the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated.x x x The
measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. [The compensation, to be just,] must be fair not only to the
owner but also to the taker."25

In order to determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the property by
considering the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the
particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon.   if as a result of the
26

expropriation, the remaining lot suffers from an impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be
awarded by the trial court, provided that the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation do not
exceed said damages suffered by the owner of the property.  27

While it is true that "the determination of the amount of just compensation is within the court's discretion, it should
not be done arbitrarily or capriciously. [Rather,] it must [always] be based on all established rules, upon correct legal
principles and competent evidence."   The court cannot base its judgment on mere speculations and surmises. 
28 29

In the present case, the RTC deemed it "fair and just that x x x whatever is the value of the capital gains tax and all
other taxes necessary for the transfer of the subject property to the [Republic] are but consequential damages that
should be paid by the latter."  The RTC further explained in its assailed Order that said award in favor of
30

respondents is but equitable, just, and fair, viz.:

As aptly pointed out by [respondents], they were merely forced by circumstances to be dispossessed of [the] subject
property owing to the exercise of the State of its sovereign power to expropriate. The payment of capital gains tax
and other transfer taxes is a consequence of the expropriation proceedings. It is in the sense of equity, justness and
fairness, and as upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Capitol Subdivision, Inc. vs. Province of Negros
Occidental, G.R. No. L-16257, January 31, 1963 that the assailed consequential damages was awarded by the
court. 
31
This is clearly an error. It is settled that the transfer of property through expropriation proceedings is a sale or·
exchange within the meaning of Sections 24(D) and 56(A) (3) of the National Internal Revenue Code, and profit
from the transaction constitutes capital gain.   Since capital gains tax is a tax on passive income, it is the seller, or
32

respondents in this case, who are liable to shoulder the tax.  33

In fact, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), in BIR Ruling No. 476-2013 dated December 18, 2013, has
constituted the DPWH as a withholding agent tasked to withhold the 6% final withholding tax in the expropriation of
real property for infrastructure projects. 11ms, as far as the government is concerned, the capital gains tax in
expropriation proceedings remains a liability of the seller, as it is a tax on the seller's gain from the sale of real
property. 34

Besides, as previously explained, consequential damages are only awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the
remaining property of the owner suffersfrom an impairment or decrease in value.   In this case, no evidence was
35

submitted to prove any impairment or decrease in value of the subject property as a result of the expropriation. More
significantly, given that the payment of capital gains tax on the transfer· of the subject property has no effect on the
increase or decrease in value of the remaining property, it can hardly be considered as consequential damages that
may be awarded to respondents.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Decision dated August 23, 2012 and the
Order dated January 10, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 270, Valenzuela City, in Civil Case No. 175-V-11,
are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of consequential damages is DELETED. In addition, spouses Senando F.
Salvador and Josefina R. Salvador are hereby ORDERED to pay for the capital gains tax due on the transfer of the
expropriated property.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 6

[G.R. No. 189127 : April 25, 2012]

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES BERNARDO AND

MINDALUZ SALUDARES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This Rule 45 Petition questions the 21 July 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA),[1] which
affirmed the 10 September 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),[2] Branch 31, Tagum
City.  The RTC had ruled that respondent spouses are entitled to P4,920,750 as just
compensation for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by petitioner National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR). cralaw

Sometime in the 1970s, NAPOCOR constructed high-tension transmission lines to implement the
Davao-Manat 138 KV Transmission Line Project.[3] These transmission lines traversed a 12,060-
square meter portion of a parcel of agricultural land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-15343 and owned by Esperanza Pereyras, Marciano Pereyras, Laureano Pereyras and
Mindaluz Pereyras.

In 1981, NAPOCOR commenced expropriation proceedings covering TCT No. T-15343 in National
Power Corporation v. Esperanza Pereyras, Marciano Pereyras, Laureano Pereyras and Mindaluz
Pereyras.[4] These proceedings culminated in a final Decision ordering it to pay the amount of
P300,000 as just compensation for the affected property.[5]

The trial court issued an Order[6] subrogating Tahanan Realty Development Corporation to the
rights of the defendants in National Power Corporation v. Pereyras. Pursuant to this Order,
NAPOCOR paid the corporation the judgment award of P300,000[7] and Tahanan Realty
Development Corporation executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the former.[8] This Deed
covered Lot 481-B, Psd-11012718, which was a portion of Lot 481, Cad. 276 of Barrio Magugpo,
Municipality of Tagum, Davao.[9]

Respondent Spouses Bernardo and Mindaluz Pereyras-Saludares are registered owners of a

6,561-square-meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109865,[10] more particularly described
as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot 15, Pcs-11-000704, Amd.), being a portion of Lots 481-D, Psd-11-012718;
480-B, Psd-51550; H-148559 & 463-A-2 (LRC) Psd-150796, situated in the Barrio of Magugpo,
Mun. of Tagum, Province of Davao, Island of Mindanao. x x x[11]

On 19 August 1999, respondents filed the instant Complaint against NAPOCOR and demanded
the payment of just compensation. They alleged that it had entered and occupied their property
by erecting high-tension transmission lines therein and failed to reasonably compensate them for
the intrusion.[12]
Petitioner averred that it already paid just compensation for the establishment of the
transmission lines by virtue of its compliance with the final and executory Decision in National
Power Corporation v. Pereyras. Furthermore, assuming that respondent spouses had not yet
received adequate compensation for the intrusion upon their property, NAPOCOR argued that a
claim for just compensation and damages may only be filed within five years from the date of
installation of the transmission lines pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6395.
[13]

Pretrial terminated without the parties having entered into a compromise agreement.
[14]
 Thereafter, the court appointed Lydia Gonzales and Wilfredo Silawan as Commissioners for
the purpose of determining the valuation of the subject land.[15] NAPOCOR recommended Loreto
Monteposo as the third Commissioner,[16] but later clarified that its conformity to the
appointment of commissioners was only for the purpose of determining the exact portion of the
subject land, and that it was not admitting its liability to pay just compensation.[17]

After the proceedings, the Commissioners recommended the amount of ?750 per square meter
as the current and fair market value of the subject property based on the Schedule of Market
Values of Real Properties within the City of Tagum effective in the year 2000.[18]

Trial on the merits ensued.  On 10 September 2002, the Court rendered judgment in favor of
respondent spouses, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, and
against the defendant-National Power Corporation, ordering the latter to pay the plaintiffs the
Just Compensation as herein fixed which they claimed for the use, occupation and utilization of
their land from which it benefited and profited since January 1982, as follows:

First: To pay plaintiff Spouses Bernardo and Mindaluz Saludares as just compensation of their
6,561 square meters, more or less, titled land covered by TCT No. T-109865 of the Registry of
Deeds of Davao del Norte hereby fixed in the amount of FOUR MILLION NINE HUNDRED TWENTY
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY (P4,920,750.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, plus interest
at the rate of 12% per annum reckoned from January 01, 1982, until said amount is fully paid,
or deposited in Court;

Second: To pay plaintiffs-spouses Bernardo and Mindaluz Saludares attorney’s fees of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, plus appearance fee of P2,000.00 per
appearance and litigation expenses which shall be supported in a Bill of Costs to be submitted
for the Court’s approval;

Third. – To pay the costs of the suit.

Fourth. – For utter lack of merit, the counterclaim is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.[19]

NAPOCOR appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA.[20] After a review of the respective
parties’ Briefs, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision on 21 July 2009, denying
NAPOCOR’s appeal and affirming the trial court’s Decision, but reducing the rate of interest to
6% per annum.[21]
Aggrieved, petitioner then filed the instant Rule 45 Petition before this Court.

The Issues

The pivotal issues as distilled from the pleadings are as follows:

1. Whether NAPOCOR has previously compensated the spouses for establishing high-tension
transmission lines over their property;

2. Whether the demand for payment of just compensation has already prescribed;

3. Whether petitioner is liable for only ten percent of the fair market value of the property or
for the full value thereof; and

4. Whether the trial court properly awarded the amount of ?4,920,750 as just compensation,
based on the Approved Schedule of Market Values for Real Property in Tagum City for the
Year 2000.

The Court’s Ruling

We uphold the Decisions of the CA and the RTC.

I
NAPOCOR failed to prove that it had adequately compensated respondents for the
establishment of high tension transmission lines over their property

NAPOCOR argues that the parcel of land involved in the instant Petition had already been
expropriated in National Power Corporation v. Pereyras.[22] In support of this argument, it alleges
that one of the sources of the spouses’ TCT No. T-109865 is TCT No. 39660; and that TCT No.
39660 is a transfer from TCT No. T-15343, the subject land in National Power Corporation v.
Pereyras.[23] Thus, having paid just compensation to Tahanan Realty Development Corporation,
the successor-in-interest of defendants Pereyras in the aforementioned case, petitioner submits
that it should no longer be made to pay just compensation in the present case.

We disagree.

While it is true that respondent spouses’ TCT No. T-109865 was indeed indirectly sourced from
TCT No. T-15343, the CA correctly ruled that NAPOCOR failed to prove that the lands involved
in National Power Corporation v. Pereyras and in the instant Petition are identical. One cannot
infer that the subject lands in both cases are the same, based on the fact that one of the source
titles of TCT No. T-109865 happens to be TCT No. T-38660, and that TCT No. T-38660 itself was
derived from T-15343.

Furthermore, the evidence before us supports respondent spouses’ contention that the lands
involved in both cases are different. National Power Corporation v. Pereyras involved Lot 481-B,
Psd-11012718, which was a portion of Lot 481, Cad. 276 of Barrio Magugpo, Municipality of
Tagum, Davao.[24] On the other hand, the instant Petition involves Lot 15, Pcs-11-000704, Amd.,
which is a portion of Lots 481-D, Psd-11-012718; 480-B, Psd-51550; H-148559 and 463-A-2
(LRC), Psd-150796, in Barrio Magugpo, Municipality of Tagum, Davao. Clearly, these lots refer to
different parcels of land.[25]

We rule, therefore, that NAPOCOR failed to prove its previous payment of just compensation for
its expropriation of the land in question.

II
The demand for payment of just compensation
has not prescribed

Petitioner maintains that, in the event respondent spouses have not been adequately
compensated for the entry into their property, their claim for just compensation would have
already prescribed,[26] pursuant to Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended by Presidential
Decrees Nos. 380, 395, 758, 938, 1360 and 1443. This provision empowers the NAPOCOR to do
as follows:

x x x [E]nter upon private property in the lawful performance or prosecution of its business or
purposes, including the construction of the transmission lines thereon; Provided, that the owner
of such private property shall be paid the just compensation therefor in accordance with the
provisions hereinafter provided; Provided, further, that any action by any person claiming
compensation and/or damages shall be filed within five (5) years after the right-of-
way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities shall have been
established; Provided, finally, that after the said period no suit shall be brought to question the
said right-of-way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities nor the amounts of
compensation and/or damages involved. (Emphasis supplied.)

NAPOCOR’s reliance on this provision is misplaced.

The right to recover just compensation is enshrined in no less than our Bill of Rights, which
states in clear and categorical language that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.”[27] This constitutional mandate cannot be defeated by statutory
prescription.[28] Thus, we have ruled that the prescriptive period under Section 3 (i) of R.A. No.
6395 does not extend to an action to recover just compensation.[29] It would be a confiscatory
act on the part of the government to take the property of respondent spouses for a public
purpose and deprive them of their right to just compensation, solely because they failed to
institute inverse condemnation proceedings within five years from the time the transmission
lines were constructed. To begin with, it was not the duty of respondent spouses to demand for
just compensation. Rather, it was the duty of NAPOCOR to institute eminent domain proceedings
before occupying their property. In the normal course of events, before the expropriating power
enters a private property, it must first file an action for eminent domain[30] and deposit with the
authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property.
[31]
 Due to its omission, however, respondents were constrained to file inverse condemnation
proceedings to demand the payment of just compensation before the trial court. We therefore
rule that NAPOCOR cannot invoke the statutory prescriptive period to defeat respondent
spouses’ constitutional right to just compensation.

III
NAPOCOR is liable to pay the full market value
of the affected property
NAPOCOR submits that it should pay for only ten percent (10%) of the fair market value of the
landowners’ property because, under its Charter,[32] it is only authorized to acquire easements of
right-of-way over agricultural lands.[33]

Petitioner’s arguments fail to convince.

We have ruled that “when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is
liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts.”[34]

In National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez,[35] the petitioner likewise argued that it should only
be made to pay easement fees instead of the full market value of the land traversed by its
transmission lines. In striking down its argument and ruling that the property owners were
entitled to the full market value of the land in question, we ruled:

x x x While it is true that plaintiff [is] only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless
perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by
the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3)
meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said
transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot
altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while
the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property.[36]

Similarly, in this case, while respondent spouses could still utilize the area beneath NAPOCOR’s
transmission lines provided that the plants to be introduced underneath would not exceed three
meters,[37] danger is posed to the lives and limbs of respondents’ farm workers, such that the
property is no longer suitable for agricultural production.[38] Considering the nature and effect of
the Davao-Manat 138 KV transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NAPOCOR perpetually
deprives respondents of the ordinary use of their land.

Moreover, we have ruled that Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding upon this
Court.[39] “[T]he determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function and . . . any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only
as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not
substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at
such amount.”[40]

We therefore rule that NAPOCOR is liable to pay respondents the full market value of the
affected property as determined by the court a quo.

IV
The trial court did not err in awarding just compensation based on the Approved
Schedule of Market Values for Real Property for the Year 2000

As its final argument, petitioner contends that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial
court is unjust, unlawful and contrary to existing jurisprudence, because just compensation in
expropriation cases must be determined from the time of the filing of the complaint or the time
of taking of the subject property, whichever came first.[41] It therefore posits that since the
taking of the property happened in the 1970s, the trial court erred in fixing the amount of just
compensation with reference to real property market values in the year 2000.[42]
Petitioner’s contention holds no water.

We have ruled in  National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay [43] that the
reckoning value of just compensation is that prevailing at the time of the filing of the inverse
condemnation proceedings for the following reason:

[c]ompensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC
entered x x x would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to
the owners by NPC's entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land x x x.
NPC's entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the

owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with
the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due
process of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them,
therefore, reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these
inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted.

Indeed, respondent spouses would be deprived of their right to just compensation if the value of
the property is pegged back to its value in the 1970s. To reiterate, NAPOCOR should have
instituted eminent domain proceedings before it occupied respondent spouses’ property.
Because it failed to comply with this duty, respondent spouses were constrained to file the
instant Complaint for just compensation before the trial court. From the 1970s until the present,
they were deprived of just compensation, while NAPOCOR continuously burdened their property
with its transmission lines. This Court cannot allow petitioner to profit from its failure to comply
with the mandate of the law. We therefore rule that, to adequately compensate respondent
spouses from the decades of burden on their property, NAPOCOR should be made to pay the
value of the property at the time of the filing of the instant Complaint when respondent spouses
made a judicial demand for just compensation. cralaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED, and the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81098 dated 21 July 2009 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 7

G.R. No. 161656               June 29, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL ROMEO ZULUETA, COMMODORE EDGARDO GALEOS,

ANTONIO CABALUNA, DOROTEO MANTOS & FLORENCIO BELOTINDOS, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE G. LIM, respondent.

RESOLUTION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Justice is the first virtue of social institutions.1 When the state wields its power of eminent domain, there arises a
correlative obligation on its part to pay the owner of the expropriated property a just compensation. If it fails, there is
a clear case of injustice that must be redressed. In the present case, fifty-seven (57) years have lapsed from the
time the Decision in the subject expropriation proceedings became final, but still the Republic of the Philippines,
herein petitioner, has not compensated the owner of the property. To tolerate such prolonged inaction on its part is
to encourage distrust and resentment among our people – the very vices that corrode the ties of civility and tempt
men to act in ways they would otherwise shun.

A revisit of the pertinent facts in the instant case is imperative.

On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil action for expropriation
with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the
Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine
Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921
with an area of 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia Denzon and covered by TCT No.
12560 consisting of 13,164 square meters.

After depositing ₱9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to the Order of the CFI dated October 19,
1938, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision
ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of ₱4,062.10 as just compensation.

The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of
judgment was made on April 5, 1948.

In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals
for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to the
Office of then President Carlos Garcia who wrote the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National
Defense to expedite action on said claim. On September 6, 1961, Lt. Manuel Cabal rejected the claim but
expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.

For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons’ successors-in-
interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio,2 filed with the same CFI an action for
recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in
possession of the property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-7208.

In the interim or on November 9, 1961, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932 and 939 were issued in the
names of Francisca Valdehueza and Josefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated thereon was the phrase "subject to
the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous
payment of a reasonable market value."

On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the
owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republic’s failure to pay the
amount of ₱4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land
titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. In view of "the differences in money
value from 1940 up to the present," the court adjusted the market value at ₱16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest
per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full payment.

After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza and Panerio appealed from the CFI Decision, in view
of the amount in controversy, directly to this Court. The case was docketed as No. L-21032.3 On May 19, 1966, this
Court rendered its Decision affirming the CFI Decision. It held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered
owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. Apparently, this
Court found nothing in the records to show that the Republic paid the owners or their successors-in-interest
according to the CFI decision. While it deposited the amount of ₱9,500,00, and said deposit was allegedly
disbursed, however, the payees could not be ascertained.

Notwithstanding the above finding, this Court still ruled that Valdehueza and Panerio are not entitled to recover
possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value, ratiocinating as follows:

"Appellants would contend that: (1) possession of Lots 932 and 939 should be restored to them as owners of the
same; (2) the Republic should be ordered to pay rentals for the use of said lots, plus attorney’s fees; and (3) the
court a quo in the present suit had no power to fix the value of the lots and order the execution of the deed of sale
after payment.

It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having been a transfer of said lots in favor
of the Government. The records do not show that the Government paid the owners or their successors-in-interest
according to the 1940 CFI decision although, as stated, ₱9,500.00 was deposited by it, and said deposit had been
disbursed. With the records lost, however, it cannot be known who received the money (Exh. 14 says: ‘It is further
certified that the corresponding Vouchers and pertinent Journal and Cash Book were destroyed during the last
World War, and therefore the names of the payees concerned cannot be ascertained.’) And the Government now
admits that there is no available record showing that payment for the value of the lots in question has been
made (Stipulation of Facts, par. 9, Rec. on Appeal, p. 28).

The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have
been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they
were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the Government. In fact, the
abovementioned title certificates secured by plaintiffs over said lots contained annotations of the right of
the National Airports Corporation (now CAA) to pay for and acquire them. It follows that both by virtue of
the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates,
plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots – which are still devoted to the
public use for which they were expropriated – but only to demand the fair market value of the same."

Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent,4 as security
for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No.
23934 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 63894 was issued in his name.

On August 20, 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 10, Cebu City, against General Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as Commander of Naval District V of the Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna, Doroteo
Mantos and Florencio Belotindos, herein petitioners. Subsequently, he amended the complaint to implead the
Republic.

On May 4, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, thus:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Vicente Lim and against all defendants, public and
private, declaring plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No. 932 with all the rights of
an absolute owner including the right to possession. The monetary claims in the complaint and in the counter
claims contained in the answer of defendants are ordered Dismissed.

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. CV No. 72915. In its
Decision5 dated September 18, 2003, the Appellate Court sustained the RTC Decision, thus:
"Obviously, defendant-appellant Republic evaded its duty of paying what was due to the landowners. The
expropriation proceedings had already become final in the late 1940’s and yet, up to now, or more than fifty
(50) years after, the Republic had not yet paid the compensation fixed by the court while continuously
reaping benefits from the expropriated property to the prejudice of the landowner. x x x. This is contrary to
the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for
the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while
being made to wait for a decade or more, in this case more than 50 years, before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with the loss. To allow the taking of the landowners’ properties, and in the
meantime leave them empty-handed by withholding payment of compensation while the government
speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse, for government to subsequently decide
to abandon the property and return it to the landowners, is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain that must never be sanctioned. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404).

xxxxxx

An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to
real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or equitable title or interest in the real
property, which is the subject matter of the action. Also the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being
alleged as cloud on plaintiff’s title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy (Robles vs. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 97). In view of the foregoing
discussion, clearly, the claim of defendant-appellant Republic constitutes a cloud, doubt or uncertainty on
the title of plaintiff-appellee Vicente Lim that can be removed by an action to quiet title.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the appealed May 4, 2001 Decision of
Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-12701, the said decision is UPHELD AND
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit."

Undaunted, petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari alleging that the Republic has remained the owner of Lot 932 as held by this Court in Valdehueza vs.
Republic.6

In our Resolution dated March 1, 2004, we denied the petition outright on the ground that the Court of Appeals did
not commit a reversible error. Petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration but we denied the same with
finality in our Resolution of May 17, 2004.

On May 18, 2004, respondent filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an entry of judgment. We only noted the
motion in our Resolution of July 12, 2004.

On July 7, 2004, petitioners filed an urgent plea/motion for clarification, which is actually a second motion for
reconsideration. Thus, in our Resolution of September 6, 2004, we simply noted without action the motion
considering that the instant petition was already denied with finality in our Resolution of May 17, 2004.

On October 29, 2004, petitioners filed a very urgent motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of our
Resolution dated September 6, 2004 (with prayer to refer the case to the En Banc). They maintain that the
Republic’s right of ownership has been settled in Valdehueza.

The basic issue for our resolution is whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to
pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI
rendered as early as May 14, 1940.

Initially, we must rule on the procedural obstacle.

While we commend the Republic for the zeal with which it pursues the present case, we reiterate that its urgent
motion for clarification filed on July 7, 2004 is actually a second motion for reconsideration. This motion is prohibited
under Section 2, Rule 52, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:
"Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. – No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution
by the same party shall be entertained."

Consequently, as mentioned earlier, we simply noted without action the motion since petitioners’ petition was
already denied with finality.

Considering the Republic’s urgent and serious insistence that it is still the owner of Lot 932 and in the interest of
justice, we take another hard look at the controversial issue in order to determine the veracity of petitioner’s stance.

One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property
without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be
just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use.7 Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our
Constitution mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-
interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The length of time and the manner with which it evaded
payment demonstrate its arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory attitude. The final judgment in the
expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No. 781) was entered on April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has
passed, yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed. Undoubtedly, over 50 years
of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair. This is more so when such delay is accompanied by
bureaucratic hassles. Apparent from Valdehueza is the fact that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest were given a
"run around" by the Republic’s officials and agents. In 1950, despite the benefits it derived from the use of the two
lots, the National Airports Corporation denied knowledge of the claim of respondent’s predecessors-in-interest.
Even President Garcia, who sent a letter to the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National
Defense to expedite the payment, failed in granting relief to them. And, on September 6, 1961, while the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots, nothing happened. lawphil.net

The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to the rules of fair play, as "just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the
land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered ‘just.’" In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated
property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in
a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.8

Corollarily, in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya,9 similar to the present case, this Court
expressed its disgust over the government’s vexatious delay in the payment of just compensation, thus:

"The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to be paid for their land which was taken for
use as a public high school. As a matter of fair procedure, it is the duty of the Government, whenever it takes
property from private persons against their will, to supply all required documentation and facilitate payment of just
compensation. The imposition of unreasonable requirements and vexatious delays before effecting payment
is not only galling and arbitrary but a rich source of discontent with government. There should be some
kind of swift and effective recourse against unfeeling and uncaring acts of middle or lower level
bureaucrats."

We feel the same way in the instant case.

More than anything else, however, it is the obstinacy of the Republic that prompted us to dismiss its petition outright.
As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-
interest the sum of ₱16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did not
comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s mandate. Such prolonged obstinacy
bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the rule of law, which we cannot countenance. It is tantamount to
confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and
the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however, the
Constitution guarantees that when this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by
compensation.10 From the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there
arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss.11
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but
a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary
exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the individual’s rights. Given this function, the provision should
therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property
owner.12

Ironically, in opposing respondent’s claim, the Republic is invoking this Court’s Decision in Valdehueza, a Decision it
utterly defied. How could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just
compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated
shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on
this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. In Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. et al., vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 13 thus:

"Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the
judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor’s title relates back to the date on
which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner’s report under the Local Improvement Act, is
filed.

x x x Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to
the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to
the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniform to this
effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, it was held that ‘actual payment to the owner of the condemned
property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State’ albeit ‘not to
the appropriation of it to public use.’ In Rexford v. Knight, the Court of Appeals of New York said that the
construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation
although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further
said that ‘both on principle and authority the rule is . . . that the right to enter on and use the property is
complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but
that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to
him."

Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, that:

‘If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be
apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute
reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until
compensation is paid...’"(Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the
expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republic’s acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of just
compensation within a reasonable time.14

Significantly, in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia15 this Court ruled that the expropriation of lands consists of two
stages, to wit:

"x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to
be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to
be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint" x x x.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. x x x.
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. In Republic v.
Salem Investment Corporation,16 we ruled that, "the process is not completed until payment of just compensation."
Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years
rendered the expropriation process incomplete.

The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to recover possession of Lot 932 but
only to demand payment of its fair market value. Of course, we are aware of the doctrine that "non-payment of just
compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the
expropriated lots." This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.,17 and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority.18 However, the facts of the present case do not justify its application.
It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation
proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but
construe the Republic’s failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such
circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of
possession may be had when property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act
under the power of eminent domain19 or where a rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses to
pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed upon;20 or fails or refuses to have the compensation
assessed and paid.21

The Republic also contends that where there have been constructions being used by the military, as in this case,
public interest demands that the present suit should not be sustained.

It must be emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived of his property for the public
convenience.22 In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,23 we
ruled:

"One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the
end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means
employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional
shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need,
subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no
exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a
majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.

The right covers the person’s life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which
reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

The Republic’s assertion that the defense of the State will be in grave danger if we shall order the reversion of Lot
932 to respondent is an overstatement. First, Lot 932 had ceased to operate as an airport. What remains in the site
is just the National Historical Institute’s marking stating that Lot 932 is the "former location of Lahug Airport."
And second, there are only thirteen (13) structures located on Lot 932, eight (8) of which are residence
apartments of military personnel. Only two (2) buildings are actually used as training centers. Thus, practically
speaking, the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent will only affect a handful of military personnel. It will not result to
"irreparable damage" or "damage beyond pecuniary estimation," as what the Republic vehemently claims.

We thus rule that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover possession of the
expropriated lot from the Republic. Unless this form of swift and effective relief is granted to him, the grave injustice
committed against his predecessors-in-interest, though no fault or negligence on their part, will be perpetuated. Let
this case, therefore, serve as a wake-up call to the Republic that in the exercise of its power of eminent domain,
necessarily in derogation of private rights, it must comply with the Constitutional limitations. This Court, as the
guardian of the people’s right, will not stand still in the face of the Republic’s oppressive and confiscatory taking of
private property, as in this case.

At this point, it may be argued that respondent Vicente Lim acted in bad faith in entering into a contract of mortgage
with Valdehueza and Panerio despite the clear annotation in TCT No. 23934 that Lot 932 is "subject to the priority
of the National Airports Corporation [to acquire said parcels of land] x x x upon previous payment of a
reasonable market value."
The issue of whether or not respondent acted in bad faith is immaterial considering that the Republic did not
complete the expropriation process. In short, it failed to perfect its title over Lot 932 by its failure to pay just
compensation. The issue of bad faith would have assumed relevance if the Republic actually acquired title over Lot
932. In such a case, even if respondent’s title was registered first, it would be the Republic’s title or right of
ownership that shall be upheld. But now, assuming that respondent was in bad faith, can such fact vest upon
the Republic a better title over Lot 932? We believe not. This is because in the first place, the Republic has no
title to speak of.

At any rate, assuming that respondent had indeed knowledge of the annotation, still nothing would have prevented
him from entering into a mortgage contract involving Lot 932 while the expropriation proceeding was pending. Any
person who deals with a property subject of an expropriation does so at his own risk, taking into account the
ultimate possibility of losing the property in favor of the government. Here, the annotation merely served as
a caveat that the Republic had a preferential right to acquire Lot 932 upon its payment of a "reasonable market
value." It did not proscribe Valdehueza and Panerio from exercising their rights of ownership including their right to
mortgage or even to dispose of their property. In Republic vs. Salem Investment Corporation,24 we recognized the
owner’s absolute right over his property pending completion of the expropriation proceeding, thus:

"It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. Moreover, it is
only upon payment of just compensation that title over the property passes to the government. Therefore, until the
action for expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated
remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an
owner, including the right to dispose of his property subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it
through expropriation.

It bears emphasis that when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to respondent in 1964, they were still the
owners thereof and their title had not yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never did. Such title or
ownership was rendered conclusive when we categorically ruled in Valdehueza that: "It is true that plaintiffs are
still the registered owners of the land, there not having been a transfer of said lots in favor of the
Government."

For respondent’s part, it is reasonable to conclude that he entered into the contract of mortgage with Valdehueza
and Panerio fully aware of the extent of his right as a mortgagee. A mortgage is merely an accessory contract
intended to secure the performance of the principal obligation. One of its characteristics is that it
is inseparable from the property. It adheres to the property regardless of who its owner may subsequently
be.25 Respondent must have known that even if Lot 932 is ultimately expropriated by the Republic, still, his right as a
mortgagee is protected. In this regard, Article 2127 of the Civil Code provides:

"Art. 2127. The mortgage extends to the natural accessions, to the improvements, growing fruits, and the rents or
income not yet received when the obligation becomes due, and to the amount of the indemnity granted or owing
to the proprietor from the insurers of the property mortgaged, or in virtue of expropriation for public use, with the
declarations, amplifications, and limitations established by law, whether the estate remains in the possession of
the mortgagor or it passes in the hands of a third person.

In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the
private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,26 however, in cases where the government failed
to pay just compensation within five (5)27 years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in
consonance with the principle that "the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment."28 To be
sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in
keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private
persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals,29 we
defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but
also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just."

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72915 is AFFIRMED in toto.
The Republic’s motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated March 1, 2004 is DENIED with FINALITY. No
further pleadings will be allowed.

Let an entry of judgment be made in this case.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 8

G.R. No. 176625              

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, Petitioners,

vs.
BERNARDO L. LOZADA, SR., and the HEIRS OF ROSARIO MERCADO, namely, VICENTE LOZADA, MARIO
M. LOZADA, MARCIA L. GODINEZ, VIRGINIA L. FLORES, BERNARDO LOZADA, JR., DOLORES GACASAN,
SOCORRO CAFARO and ROSARIO LOZADA, represented by MARCIA LOZADA GODINEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse, annul, and set
aside the Decision1 dated February 28, 2006 and the Resolution2 dated February 7, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) (Cebu City), Twentieth Division, in CA-G.R. CV No. 65796.

The antecedent facts and proceedings are as follows:

Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017 square meters, more or less,
located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation
proceedings, initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the then Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. The case was filed with the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, and docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881.

As early as 1947, the lots were already occupied by the U.S. Army. They were turned over to the Surplus Property
Commission, the Bureau of Aeronautics, the National Airport Corporation and then to the CAA.

During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88
from Deiparine. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9045 was issued in Lozada’s name.

On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic and ordered the latter to pay
Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at ₱3.00 per square meter, with consequential damages by
way of legal interest computed from November 16, 1947—the time when the lot was first occupied by the airport.
Lozada received the amount of ₱3,018.00 by way of payment.

The affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal, the Air Transportation Office (ATO), formerly CAA, proposed a
compromise settlement whereby the owners of the lots affected by the expropriation proceedings would either not
appeal or withdraw their respective appeals in consideration of a commitment that the expropriated lots would be
resold at the price they were expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug Airport, pursuant to
an established policy involving similar cases. Because of this promise, Lozada did not pursue his appeal.
Thereafter, Lot No. 88 was transferred and registered in the name of the Republic under TCT No. 25057.

The projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was not pursued.

Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera, Jr., requesting to repurchase the
lots, as per previous agreement. The CAA replied that there might still be a need for the Lahug Airport to be used as
an emergency DC-3 airport. It reiterated, however, the assurance that "should this Office dispose and resell the
properties which may be found to be no longer necessary as an airport, then the policy of this Office is to give
priority to the former owners subject to the approval of the President."

On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued a Memorandum to the Department of
Transportation, directing the transfer of general aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan International
Airport before the end of 1990 and, upon such transfer, the closure of the Lahug Airport.
Sometime in 1990, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6958, entitled "An Act Creating
the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, Transferring Existing Assets of the Mactan International Airport and
the Lahug Airport to the Authority, Vesting the Authority with Power to Administer and Operate the Mactan
International Airport and the Lahug Airport, and For Other Purposes."

From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the present, the public purpose of the said
expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated, realized, or implemented. Instead, the old
airport was converted into a commercial complex. Lot No. 88 became the site of a jail known as Bagong Buhay
Rehabilitation Complex, while a portion thereof was occupied by squatters.3 The old airport was converted into what
is now known as the Ayala I.T. Park, a commercial area. 1avvphi1

Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance of
ownership of Lot No. 88. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-18823 and was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 57, Cebu City. The complaint substantially alleged as follows:

(a) Spouses Bernardo and Rosario Lozada were the registered owners of Lot No. 88 covered by TCT No.
9045;

(b) In the early 1960’s, the Republic sought to acquire by expropriation Lot No. 88, among others, in
connection with its program for the improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport;

(c) A decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance in favor of the Government and against the land
owners, among whom was Bernardo Lozada, Sr. appealed therefrom;

(d) During the pendency of the appeal, the parties entered into a compromise settlement to the effect that
the subject property would be resold to the original owner at the same price when it was expropriated in the
event that the Government abandons the Lahug Airport;

(e) Title to Lot No. 88 was subsequently transferred to the Republic of the Philippines (TCT No. 25057);

(f) The projected expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport did not materialize;

(g) Plaintiffs sought to repurchase their property from then CAA Director Vicente Rivera. The latter replied by
giving as assurance that priority would be given to the previous owners, subject to the approval of the
President, should CAA decide to dispose of the properties;

(h) On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino, through a Memorandum to the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), directed the transfer of general aviation operations at the
Lahug Airport to the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority;

(i) Since the public purpose for the expropriation no longer exists, the property must be returned to the
plaintiffs.4

In their Answer, petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of the complaint. They specifically denied that the
Government had made assurances to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that the property would no
longer be needed for airport operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was
unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property notwithstanding
non-use or abandonment thereof.

After pretrial, but before trial on the merits, the parties stipulated on the following set of facts:

(1) The lot involved is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 of the Banilad Estate, situated in the City of Cebu, containing
an area of One Thousand Seventeen (1,017) square meters, more or less;

(2) The property was expropriated among several other properties in Lahug in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines by virtue of a Decision dated December 29, 1961 of the CFI of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-1881;
 (3) The public purpose for which the property was expropriated was for the purpose of the Lahug Airport;

(4) After the expansion, the property was transferred in the name of MCIAA; [and]

(5) On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Department of Transportation
and Communication to transfer general aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority and to close the Lahug Airport after such transfer[.]5

During trial, respondents presented Bernardo Lozada, Sr. as their lone witness, while petitioners presented their
own witness, Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority legal assistant Michael Bacarisas.

On October 22, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Bernardo L.
Lozada, Sr., and the heirs of Rosario Mercado, namely, Vicente M. Lozada, Marcia L. Godinez, Virginia L. Flores,
Bernardo M. Lozada, Jr., Dolores L. Gacasan, Socorro L. Cafaro and Rosario M. Lozada, represented by their
attorney-in-fact Marcia Lozada Godinez, and against defendants Cebu-Mactan International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) and Air Transportation Office (ATO):

1. ordering MCIAA and ATO to restore to plaintiffs the possession and ownership of their land, Lot No. 88
Psd-821 (SWO-23803), upon payment of the expropriation price to plaintiffs; and

2. ordering the Register of Deeds to effect the transfer of the Certificate of Title from defendant[s] to plaintiffs
on Lot No. [88], cancelling TCT No. 20357 in the name of defendant MCIAA and to issue a new title on the
same lot in the name of Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. and the heirs of Rosario Mercado, namely: Vicente M.
Lozada, Mario M. Lozada, Marcia L. Godinez, Virginia L. Flores, Bernardo M. Lozada, Jr., Dolores L.
Gacasan, Socorro L. Cafaro and Rosario M. Lozada.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.6

Aggrieved, petitioners interposed an appeal to the CA. After the filing of the necessary appellate briefs, the CA
rendered its assailed Decision dated February 28, 2006, denying petitioners’ appeal and affirming in toto the
Decision of the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu City. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied in the
questioned CA Resolution dated February 7, 2007.

Hence, this petition arguing that: (1) the respondents utterly failed to prove that there was a repurchase agreement
or compromise settlement between them and the Government; (2) the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was
absolute and unconditional, giving title in fee simple to the Republic; and (3) the respondents’ claim of verbal
assurances from government officials violates the Statute of Frauds.

The petition should be denied.

Petitioners anchor their claim to the controverted property on the supposition that the Decision in the pertinent
expropriation proceedings did not provide for the condition that should the intended use of Lot No. 88 for the
expansion of the Lahug Airport be aborted or abandoned, the property would revert to respondents, being its former
owners. Petitioners cite, in support of this position, Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan,7 which declared that the
Government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title
over the properties—

If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or
abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or
abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If x x x land is expropriated for a public street
and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course, when
the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory provision
to the contrary. x x x. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title,
then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or
municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the
expropriation proceedings. x x x.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain
or by purchase, the former owner retains no right in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land
may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the
former owner. x x x.8

Contrary to the stance of petitioners, this Court had ruled otherwise in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea v.
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority,9 thus—

Moreover, respondent MCIAA has brought to our attention a significant and telling portion in the Decision in Civil
Case No. R-1881 validating our discernment that the expropriation by the predecessors of respondent was ordered
under the running impression that Lahug Airport would continue in operation—

As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding, it cannot now be doubted. Although Mactan Airport is
being constructed, it does not take away the actual usefulness and importance of the Lahug Airport: it is handling
the air traffic both civilian and military. From it aircrafts fly to Mindanao and Visayas and pass thru it on their flights to
the North and Manila. Then, no evidence was adduced to show how soon is the Mactan Airport to be placed in
operation and whether the Lahug Airport will be closed immediately thereafter. It is up to the other departments of
the Government to determine said matters. The Court cannot substitute its judgment for those of the said
departments or agencies. In the absence of such showing, the Court will presume that the Lahug Airport will
continue to be in operation (emphasis supplied).

While in the trial in Civil Case No. R-1881 [we] could have simply acknowledged the presence of public purpose for
the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to
do so but instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that "Lahug Airport will continue to be
in operation." Verily, these meaningful statements in the body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the
expropriated properties would remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer "in operation."
This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the
expropriated lots were not being used for any airport expansion project, the rights vis-à-vis the expropriated Lots
Nos. 916 and 920 as between the State and their former owners, petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted; and
(b) the foregoing unmistakable declarations in the body of the Decision should merge with and become an intrinsic
part of the fallo thereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is not in accord
with the findings as contained in the body thereof.10

Indeed, the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 should be read in its entirety, wherein it is apparent that the
acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to the condition that the Lahug Airport would
continue its operation. The condition not having materialized because the airport had been abandoned, the former
owner should then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated property.11

On this note, we take this opportunity to revisit our ruling in Fery, which involved an expropriation suit commenced
upon parcels of land to be used as a site for a public market. Instead of putting up a public market, respondent
Cabanatuan constructed residential houses for lease on the area. Claiming that the municipality lost its right to the
property taken since it did not pursue its public purpose, petitioner Juan Fery, the former owner of the lots
expropriated, sought to recover his properties. However, as he had admitted that, in 1915, respondent Cabanatuan
acquired a fee simple title to the lands in question, judgment was rendered in favor of the municipality, following
American jurisprudence, particularly City of Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore & M.S. RY. Co.,12 McConihay v. Theodore
Wright,13 and Reichling v. Covington Lumber Co.,14 all uniformly holding that the transfer to a third party of the
expropriated real property, which necessarily resulted in the abandonment of the particular public purpose for which
the property was taken, is not a ground for the recovery of the same by its previous owner, the title of the
expropriating agency being one of fee simple.

Obviously, Fery was not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held constitutional right that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation.15 It is well settled that the taking of private property by the
Government’s power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public
purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of
implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.16

More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property
pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for
the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if
the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it
would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the
particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be
denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity.

In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the
Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be
devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not
initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek
the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the
exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.17

Even without the foregoing declaration, in the instant case, on the question of whether respondents were able to
establish the existence of an oral compromise agreement that entitled them to repurchase Lot No. 88 should the
operations of the Lahug Airport be abandoned, we rule in the affirmative.

It bears stressing that both the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu and the CA have passed upon this factual issue and have
declared, in no uncertain terms, that a compromise agreement was, in fact, entered into between the Government
and respondents, with the former undertaking to resell Lot No. 88 to the latter if the improvement and expansion of
the Lahug Airport would not be pursued. In affirming the factual finding of the RTC to this effect, the CA declared—

Lozada’s testimony is cogent. An octogenarian widower-retiree and a resident of Moon Park, California since 1974,
he testified that government representatives verbally promised him and his late wife while the expropriation
proceedings were on-going that the government shall return the property if the purpose for the expropriation no
longer exists. This promise was made at the premises of the airport. As far as he could remember, there were no
expropriation proceedings against his property in 1952 because the first notice of expropriation he received was in
1962. Based on the promise, he did not hire a lawyer. Lozada was firm that he was promised that the lot would be
reverted to him once the public use of the lot ceases. He made it clear that the verbal promise was made in Lahug
with other lot owners before the 1961 decision was handed down, though he could not name the government
representatives who made the promise. It was just a verbal promise; nevertheless, it is binding. The fact that he
could not supply the necessary details for the establishment of his assertions during cross-examination, but that
"When it will not be used as intended, it will be returned back, we just believed in the government," does not
dismantle the credibility and truthfulness of his allegation. This Court notes that he was 89 years old when he
testified in November 1997 for an incident which happened decades ago. Still, he is a competent witness capable of
perceiving and making his perception known. The minor lapses are immaterial. The decision of the competency of a
witness rests primarily with the trial judge and must not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear that it was
erroneous. The objection to his competency must be made before he has given any testimony or as soon as the
incompetency becomes apparent. Though Lozada is not part of the compromise agreement,18 he nevertheless
adduced sufficient evidence to support his claim.19

As correctly found by the CA, unlike in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals,20 cited by
petitioners, where respondent therein offered testimonies which were hearsay in nature, the testimony of Lozada
was based on personal knowledge as the assurance from the government was personally made to him. His
testimony on cross-examination destroyed neither his credibility as a witness nor the truthfulness of his words.

Verily, factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this Court
and may not be reviewed. A petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only questions
of law and not of fact.21 Not one of the exceptions to this rule is present in this case to warrant a reversal of such
findings.
As regards the position of petitioners that respondents’ testimonial evidence violates the Statute of Frauds, suffice it
to state that the Statute of Frauds operates only with respect to executory contracts, and does not apply to contracts
which have been completely or partially performed, the rationale thereof being as follows:

In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because unless they be in writing there is no palpable evidence
of the intention of the contracting parties. The statute has precisely been enacted to prevent fraud. However, if a
contract has been totally or partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith, for
it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already delivered by him from the transaction in litigation, and, at
the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him thereby.22

In this case, the Statute of Frauds, invoked by petitioners to bar the claim of respondents for the reacquisition of Lot
No. 88, cannot apply, the oral compromise settlement having been partially performed. By reason of such assurance
made in their favor, respondents relied on the same by not pursuing their appeal before the CA. Moreover, contrary
to the claim of petitioners, the fact of Lozada’s eventual conformity to the appraisal of Lot No. 88 and his seeking the
correction of a clerical error in the judgment as to the true area of Lot No. 88 do not conclusively establish that
respondents absolutely parted with their property. To our mind, these acts were simply meant to cooperate with the
government, particularly because of the oral promise made to them.

The right of respondents to repurchase Lot No. 88 may be enforced based on a constructive trust constituted on the
property held by the government in favor of the former. On this note, our ruling in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno is
instructive, viz.:

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority is correct in stating that one would not find an express statement in the
Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 to the effect that "the [condemned] lot would return to [the landowner] or that [the
landowner] had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned
or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug Airport." This omission notwithstanding, and while the
inclusion of this pronouncement in the judgment of condemnation would have been ideal, such precision is not
absolutely necessary nor is it fatal to the cause of petitioners herein. No doubt, the return or repurchase of the
condemned properties of petitioners could be readily justified as the manifest legal effect or consequence of the trial
court’s underlying presumption that "Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation" when it granted the complaint for
eminent domain and the airport discontinued its activities.

The predicament of petitioners involves a constructive trust, one that is akin to the implied trust referred to in Art.
1454 of the Civil Code, "If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the performance of an
obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is
offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him." In the case
at bar, petitioners conveyed Lots No. 916 and 920 to the government with the latter obliging itself to use the realties
for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its bargain, the government can be compelled by petitioners to
reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, petitioners would be denied the use of their properties upon a state
of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized.

Although the symmetry between the instant case and the situation contemplated by Art. 1454 is not perfect, the
provision is undoubtedly applicable. For, as explained by an expert on the law of trusts: "The only problem of great
importance in the field of constructive trust is to decide whether in the numerous and varying fact situations
presented to the courts there is a wrongful holding of property and hence a threatened unjust enrichment of the
defendant." Constructive trusts are fictions of equity which are bound by no unyielding formula when they are used
by courts as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of legal title may not in good conscience retain the
beneficial interest.

In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustee’s sole duty is to transfer the
title and possession over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary. Of course, the "wronged party seeking the aid of a
court of equity in establishing a constructive trust must himself do equity." Accordingly, the court will exercise its
discretion in deciding what acts are required of the plaintiff-beneficiary as conditions precedent to obtaining such
decree and has the obligation to reimburse the trustee the consideration received from the latter just as the plaintiff-
beneficiary would if he proceeded on the theory of rescission. In the good judgment of the court, the trustee may
also be paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred in sustaining the property, his fixed costs for
improvements thereon, and the monetary value of his services in managing the property to the extent that plaintiff-
beneficiary will secure a benefit from his acts.
The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in this case, respondent MCIAA and
petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in Art. 1190 of the Civil Code, "When the conditions have for
their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall
return to each other what they have received x x x In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the
provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who
is bound to return x x x."23

On the matter of the repurchase price, while petitioners are obliged to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents, the latter
must return to the former what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of the property, plus legal
interest to be computed from default, which in this case runs from the time petitioners comply with their obligation to
respondents.

Respondents must likewise pay petitioners the necessary expenses they may have incurred in maintaining Lot No.
88, as well as the monetary value of their services in managing it to the extent that respondents were benefited
thereby.

Following Article 118724 of the Civil Code, petitioners may keep whatever income or fruits they may have obtained
from Lot No. 88, and respondents need not account for the interests that the amounts they received as just
compensation may have earned in the meantime.

In accordance with Article 119025 of the Civil Code vis-à-vis Article 1189, which provides that "(i)f a thing is improved
by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x," respondents, as creditors,
do not have to pay, as part of the process of restitution, the appreciation in value of Lot No. 88, which is a natural
consequence of nature and time.26

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 28, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
October 22, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Cebu City, and its February 7, 2007 Resolution
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:

1. Respondents are ORDERED to return to petitioners the just compensation they received for the
expropriation of Lot No. 88, plus legal interest, in the case of default, to be computed from the time
petitioners comply with their obligation to reconvey Lot No. 88 to them;

2. Respondents are ORDERED to pay petitioners the necessary expenses the latter incurred in maintaining
Lot No. 88, plus the monetary value of their services to the extent that respondents were benefited thereby;

3. Petitioners are ENTITLED to keep whatever fruits and income they may have obtained from Lot No. 88;
and

4. Respondents are also ENTITLED to keep whatever interests the amounts they received as just
compensation may have earned in the meantime, as well as the appreciation in value of Lot No. 88, which is
a natural consequence of nature and time;

In light of the foregoing modifications, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Cebu City,
only for the purpose of receiving evidence on the amounts that respondents will have to pay petitioners in
accordance with this Court’s decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 9

G.R. No. L-25043             April 26, 1968

ANTONIO ROXAS, EDUARDO ROXAS and ROXAS Y CIA., in their own respective behalf and as judicial co-
guardians of JOSE ROXAS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

Leido, Andrada, Perez and Associates for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Don Pedro Roxas and Dona Carmen Ayala, Spanish subjects, transmitted to their grandchildren by hereditary
succession the following properties:

(1) Agricultural lands with a total area of 19,000 hectares, situated in the municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas
province;

(2) A residential house and lot located at Wright St., Malate, Manila; and

(3) Shares of stocks in different corporations.

To manage the above-mentioned properties, said children, namely, Antonio Roxas, Eduardo Roxas and Jose
Roxas, formed a partnership called Roxas y Compania.

AGRICULTURAL LANDS

At the conclusion of the Second World War, the tenants who have all been tilling the lands in Nasugbu for
generations expressed their desire to purchase from Roxas y Cia. the parcels which they actually occupied. For its
part, the Government, in consonance with the constitutional mandate to acquire big landed estates and apportion
them among landless tenants-farmers, persuaded the Roxas brothers to part with their landholdings. Conferences
were held with the farmers in the early part of 1948 and finally the Roxas brothers agreed to sell 13,500 hectares to
the Government for distribution to actual occupants for a price of P2,079,048.47 plus P300,000.00 for survey and
subdivision expenses.

It turned out however that the Government did not have funds to cover the purchase price, and so a special
arrangement was made for the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation to advance to Roxas y Cia. the amount of
P1,500,000.00 as loan. Collateral for such loan were the lands proposed to be sold to the farmers. Under the
arrangement, Roxas y Cia. allowed the farmers to buy the lands for the same price but by installment, and
contracted with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation to pay its loan from the proceeds of the yearly amortizations
paid by the farmers.

In 1953 and 1955 Roxas y Cia. derived from said installment payments a net gain of P42,480.83 and P29,500.71.
Fifty percent of said net gain was reported for income tax purposes as gain on the sale of capital asset held for more
than one year pursuant to Section 34 of the Tax Code.

RESIDENTIAL HOUSE

During their bachelor days the Roxas brothers lived in the residential house at Wright St., Malate, Manila, which they
inherited from their grandparents. After Antonio and Eduardo got married, they resided somewhere else leaving only
Jose in the old house. In fairness to his brothers, Jose paid to Roxas y Cia. rentals for the house in the sum of
P8,000.00 a year.

ASSESSMENTS
On June 17, 1958, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue demanded from Roxas y Cia the payment of real estate
dealer's tax for 1952 in the amount of P150.00 plus P10.00 compromise penalty for late payment, and P150.00 tax
for dealers of securities for 1952 plus P10.00 compromise penalty for late payment. The assessment for real estate
dealer's tax was based on the fact that Roxas y Cia. received house rentals from Jose Roxas in the amount of
P8,000.00. Pursuant to Sec. 194 of the Tax Code, an owner of a real estate who derives a yearly rental income
therefrom in the amount of P3,000.00 or more is considered a real estate dealer and is liable to pay the
corresponding fixed tax.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue justified his demand for the fixed tax on dealers of securities against Roxas
y Cia., on the fact that said partnership made profits from the purchase and sale of securities.

In the same assessment, the Commissioner assessed deficiency income taxes against the Roxas Brothers for the
years 1953 and 1955, as follows:

1953 1955

Antonio Roxas P7,010.00 P5,813.00

Eduardo Roxas 7,281.00 5,828.00

Jose Roxas 6,323.00 5,588.00

The deficiency income taxes resulted from the inclusion as income of Roxas y Cia. of the unreported 50% of the net
profits for 1953 and 1955 derived from the sale of the Nasugbu farm lands to the tenants, and the disallowance of
deductions from gross income of various business expenses and contributions claimed by Roxas y Cia. and the
Roxas brothers. For the reason that Roxas y Cia. subdivided its Nasugbu farm lands and sold them to the farmers
on installment, the Commissioner considered the partnership as engaged in the business of real estate, hence,
100% of the profits derived therefrom was taxed.

The following deductions were disallowed:

ROXAS Y CIA.:

1953

Tickets for Banquet in honor of P

          S. Osmeña 40.00

Gifts of San Miguel beer 28.00

Contributions to —

Philippine Air Force Chapel 100.00

Manila Police Trust Fund 150.00

Philippines Herald's fund for Manila's

neediest families 100.00

1955

Contributions to Contribution to
          Our Lady of Fatima Chapel, FEU 50.00

ANTONIO ROXAS:

1953

Contributions to —
 Pasay City Firemen Christmas Fund 25.00

Pasay City Police Dept. X'mas fund 50.00

1955

Contributions to —

Baguio City Police Christmas fund 25.00

Pasay City Firemen Christmas fund 25.00

Pasay City Police Christmas fund 50.00

EDUARDO ROXAS:

1953

Contributions to —

Hijas de Jesus' Retiro de Manresa 450.00

Philippines Herald's fund for Manila's

neediest families 100.00

1955

Contributions to Philippines
          Herald's fund for Manila's
          neediest families 120.00

JOSE ROXAS:

1955

Contributions to Philippines
          Herald's fund for Manila's
          neediest families 120.00

The Roxas brothers protested the assessment but inasmuch as said protest was denied, they instituted an appeal in
the Court of Tax Appeals on January 9, 1961. The Tax Court heard the appeal and rendered judgment on July 31,
1965 sustaining the assessment except the demand for the payment of the fixed tax on dealer of securities and the
disallowance of the deductions for contributions to the Philippine Air Force Chapel and Hijas de Jesus' Retiro de
Manresa. The Tax Court's judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect to petitioners Antonio Roxas,
Eduardo Roxas, and Jose Roxas who are hereby ordered to pay the respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue the amounts of P12,808.00, P12,887.00 and P11,857.00, respectively, as deficiency income taxes
for the years 1953 and 1955, plus 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest as provided for in Sec. 51(a) of the
Revenue Code; and modified with respect to the partnership Roxas y Cia. in the sense that it should pay
only P150.00, as real estate dealer's tax. With costs against petitioners.

Not satisfied, Roxas y Cia. and the Roxas brothers appealed to this Court. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
did not appeal.

The issues:

(1) Is the gain derived from the sale of the Nasugbu farm lands an ordinary gain, hence 100% taxable?

(2) Are the deductions for business expenses and contributions deductible?
 (3) Is Roxas y Cia. liable for the payment of the fixed tax on real estate dealers?

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue contends that Roxas y Cia. could be considered a real estate dealer
because it engaged in the business of selling real estate. The business activity alluded to was the act of subdividing
the Nasugbu farm lands and selling them to the farmers-occupants on installment. To bolster his stand on the point,
he cites one of the purposes of Roxas y Cia. as contained in its articles of partnership, quoted below:

4. (a) La explotacion de fincas urbanes pertenecientes a la misma o que pueden pertenecer a ella en el
futuro, alquilandoles por los plazos y demas condiciones, estime convenientes y vendiendo aquellas que a
juicio de sus gerentes no deben conservarse;

The above-quoted purpose notwithstanding, the proposition of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue cannot be
favorably accepted by Us in this isolated transaction with its peculiar circumstances in spite of the fact that there
were hundreds of vendees. Although they paid for their respective holdings in installment for a period of ten years, it
would nevertheless not make the vendor Roxas y Cia. a real estate dealer during the ten-year amortization period.

It should be borne in mind that the sale of the Nasugbu farm lands to the very farmers who tilled them for
generations was not only in consonance with, but more in obedience to the request and pursuant to the policy of our
Government to allocate lands to the landless. It was the bounden duty of the Government to pay the agreed
compensation after it had persuaded Roxas y Cia. to sell its haciendas, and to subsequently subdivide them among
the farmers at very reasonable terms and prices. However, the Government could not comply with its duty for lack of
funds. Obligingly, Roxas y Cia. shouldered the Government's burden, went out of its way and sold lands directly to
the farmers in the same way and under the same terms as would have been the case had the Government done it
itself. For this magnanimous act, the municipal council of Nasugbu passed a resolution expressing the people's
gratitude.

The power of taxation is sometimes called also the power to destroy. Therefore it should be exercised with caution
to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the
tax collector kill the "hen that lays the golden egg". And, in order to maintain the general public's trust and
confidence in the Government this power must be used justly and not treacherously. It does not conform with Our
sense of justice in the instant case for the Government to persuade the taxpayer to lend it a helping hand and later
on to penalize him for duly answering the urgent call.

In fine, Roxas y Cia. cannot be considered a real estate dealer for the sale in question. Hence, pursuant to Section
34 of the Tax Code the lands sold to the farmers are capital assets, and the gain derived from the sale thereof is
capital gain, taxable only to the extent of 50%.

DISALLOWED DEDUCTIONS

Roxas y Cia. deducted from its gross income the amount of P40.00 for tickets to a banquet given in honor of Sergio
Osmena and P28.00 for San Miguel beer given as gifts to various persons. The deduction were claimed as
representation expenses. Representation expenses are deductible from gross income as expenditures incurred in
carrying on a trade or business under Section 30(a) of the Tax Code provided the taxpayer proves that they are
reasonable in amount, ordinary and necessary, and incurred in connection with his business. In the case at bar, the
evidence does not show such link between the expenses and the business of Roxas y Cia. The findings of the Court
of Tax Appeals must therefore be sustained.

The petitioners also claim deductions for contributions to the Pasay City Police, Pasay City Firemen, and Baguio
City Police Christmas funds, Manila Police Trust Fund, Philippines Herald's fund for Manila's neediest families and
Our Lady of Fatima chapel at Far Eastern University.

The contributions to the Christmas funds of the Pasay City Police, Pasay City Firemen and Baguio City Police are
not deductible for the reason that the Christmas funds were not spent for public purposes but as Christmas gifts to
the families of the members of said entities. Under Section 39(h), a contribution to a government entity is deductible
when used exclusively for public purposes. For this reason, the disallowance must be sustained. On the other hand,
the contribution to the Manila Police trust fund is an allowable deduction for said trust fund belongs to the Manila
Police, a government entity, intended to be used exclusively for its public functions.
The contributions to the Philippines Herald's fund for Manila's neediest families were disallowed on the ground that
the Philippines Herald is not a corporation or an association contemplated in Section 30 (h) of the Tax Code. It
should be noted however that the contributions were not made to the Philippines Herald but to a group of civic
spirited citizens organized by the Philippines Herald solely for charitable purposes. There is no question that the
members of this group of citizens do not receive profits, for all the funds they raised were for Manila's neediest
families. Such a group of citizens may be classified as an association organized exclusively for charitable purposes
mentioned in Section 30(h) of the Tax Code.

Rightly, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the contribution to Our Lady of Fatima chapel at the Far
Eastern University on the ground that the said university gives dividends to its stockholders. Located within the
premises of the university, the chapel in question has not been shown to belong to the Catholic Church or any
religious organization. On the other hand, the lower court found that it belongs to the Far Eastern University,
contributions to which are not deductible under Section 30(h) of the Tax Code for the reason that the net income of
said university injures to the benefit of its stockholders. The disallowance should be sustained.

Lastly, Roxas y Cia. questions the imposition of the real estate dealer's fixed tax upon it, because although it earned
a rental income of P8,000.00 per annum in 1952, said rental income came from Jose Roxas, one of the partners.
Section 194 of the Tax Code, in considering as real estate dealers owners of real estate receiving rentals of at least
P3,000.00 a year, does not provide any qualification as to the persons paying the rentals. The law, which states:  1äwphï1.ñët

. . . "Real estate dealer" includes any person engaged in the business of buying, selling, exchanging, leasing
or renting property on his own account as principal and holding himself out as a full or part-time dealer in
real estate or as an owner of rental property or properties rented or offered to rent for an aggregate amount
of three thousand pesos or more a year: . . . (Emphasis supplied) .

is too clear and explicit to admit construction. The findings of the Court of Tax Appeals or, this point is sustained. 1äwphï1.ñët

To Summarize, no deficiency income tax is due for 1953 from Antonio Roxas, Eduardo Roxas and Jose Roxas. For
1955 they are liable to pay deficiency income tax in the sum of P109.00, P91.00 and P49.00, respectively,
computed as follows: *

ANTONIO ROXAS

Net income per return P315,476.59

Add: 1/3 share, profits in Roxas y Cia. P 153,249.15

Less amount declared 146,135.46

Amount understated P 7,113.69

Contributions disallowed 115.00

P 7,228.69

Less 1/3 share of contributions amounting

to P21,126.06 disallowed from partnership
but allowed to partners 7,042.02 186.67

Net income per review P315,663.26

Less: Exemptions 4,200.00

Net taxable income P311,463.26

Tax due 154,169.00

Tax paid 154,060.00

Deficiency P 109.00
==========

EDUARDO ROXAS

P
Net income per return
304,166.92

Add: 1/3 share, profits in Roxas y Cia P 153,249.15

Less profits declared 146,052.58

Amount understated P 7,196.57

Less 1/3 share in contributions amounting

to P21,126.06 disallowed from partnership
but allowed to partners 7,042.02 155.55

Net income per review P304,322.47

Less: Exemptions 4,800.00

Net taxable income P299,592.47

Tax Due P147,250.00

Tax paid 147,159.00

Deficiency P91.00
===========

JOSE ROXAS

Net income per return P222,681.76

Add: 1/3 share, profits in Roxas y Cia. P153,429.15

Less amount reported 146,135.46

Amount understated 7,113.69

Less 1/3 share of contributions disallowed 7,042.02 71.67

from partnership but allowed as
 deductions to partners

Net income per review P222,753.43

Less: Exemption 1,800.00

Net income subject to tax P220,953.43

Tax due P102,763.00

Tax paid 102,714.00

Deficiency P 49.00
===========

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified. Roxas y Cia. is hereby ordered to pay the sum of P150.00
as real estate dealer's fixed tax for 1952, and Antonio Roxas, Eduardo Roxas and Jose Roxas are ordered to pay
the respective sums of P109.00, P91.00 and P49.00 as their individual deficiency income tax all corresponding for
the year 1955. No costs. So ordered.
CASE 10

G.R. No. 125704 August 28, 1998

PHILEX MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, COURT OF APPEALS, and THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner Philex Mining Corp. assails the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 8, 1996 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 36975   affirming the Court of Tax Appeals decision in CTA Case No. 4872 dated March 16, 1995   ordering
1 2

it to pay the amount of P110,677,668.52 as excise tax liability for the period from the 2nd quarter of 1991 to the 2nd
quarter of 1992 plus 20% annual interest from August 6, 1994 until fully paid pursuant to Sections 248 and 249 of
the Tax Code of 1977.

The facts show that on August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liabilities for the 2nd,
3rd and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd quarter of 1992 in the total amount of P123,821.982.52
computed as follows:

PERIOD COVERED BASIC TAX 25% SURCHARGE INTEREST TOTAL EXCISE

TAX DUE

2nd Qtr., 1991 12,911,124.60 3,227,781.15 3,378,116.16 19,517,021.91

3rd Qtr., 1991 14,994,749.21 3,748,687.30 2,978,409.09 21,721,845.60

4th Qtr., 1991 19,406,480.13 4,851,620.03 2,631,837.72 26,889,937.88

————— ————— —————— ——————

47,312,353.94 11,828,088.48 8,988,362.97 68,128,805.39

————— ————— —————— ——————

1st Qtr., 1992 23,341,849.94 5,835,462.49 1,710,669.82 30,887,982.25

2nd Qtr., 1992 19,671,691.76 4,917,922.94 215,580.18 24,805,194.88

————— ————— —————— ——————

43,013,541.70 10,753,385.43 1,926,250.00 55,693,177.13

————— ————— —————— ——————

90,325,895.64 22,581,473.91 10,914,612.97 123,821,982.52  3

========= ========= ========= =========

In a letter dated August 20, 1992,   Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities stating that it has
4

pending claims for VAT input credit/refund for the taxes it paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount of
P119,977,037.02 plus interest. Therefore these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied against the tax
liabilities, citing our ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc.  5

In reply, the BIR, in a letter dated September 7, 1992,   found no merit in Philex's position. Since these pending
6

claims have not yet been established or determined with certainty, it follows that no legal compensation can take
place. Hence, the BIR reiterated its demand that Philex settle the amount plus interest within 30 days from the
receipt of the letter.

In view of the BIR's denial of the offsetting of Philex's claim for VAT input credit/refund against its excise tax
obligation, Philex raised the issue to the Court of Tax Appeals on November 6, 1992.   In the course of the
7

proceedings, the BIR issued Tax Credit Certificate SN 001795 in the amount of P13,144,313.88 which, applied to
the total tax liabilities of Philex of P123,821,982.52; effectively lowered the latter's tax obligation to
P110,677,688.52.

Despite the reduction of its tax liabilities, the CTA still ordered Philex to pay the remaining balance of
P110,677,688.52 plus interest, elucidating its reason, to wit:

Thus, for legal compensation to take place, both obligations must be liquidated and demandable.
"Liquidated" debts are those where the exact amount has already been determined (PARAS, Civil
Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. IV, Ninth Edition, p. 259). In the instant case, the claims of
the Petitioner for VAT refund is still pending litigation, and still has to be determined by this Court
(C.T.A. Case No. 4707). A fortiori, the liquidated debt of the Petitioner to the government cannot,
therefore, be set-off against the unliquidated claim which Petitioner conceived to exist in its favor
(see Compañia General de Tabacos vs. French and Unson, No. 14027, November 8, 1918, 39 Phil.
34). 8

Moreover, the Court of Tax Appeals ruled that "taxes cannot be subject to set-off on compensation since claim for
taxes is not a debt or contract."   The dispositive portion of the CTA decision   provides:
9 10

In all the foregoing, this Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and Petitioner is
hereby ORDERED to PAY the Respondent the amount of P110,677,668.52 representing excise tax
liability for the period from the 2nd quarter of 1991 to the 2nd quarter of 1992 plus 20% annual
interest from August 6, 1994 until fully paid pursuant to Section 248 and 249 of the Tax Code, as
amended.

Aggrieved with the decision, Philex appealed the case before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-GR. CV No.
36975.   Nonetheless, on April 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals a Affirmed the Court of Tax Appeals observation. The
11

pertinent portion of which reads:  12

WHEREFORE, the appeal by way of petition for review is hereby DISMISSED and the decision
dated March 16, 1995 is AFFIRMED.

Philex filed a motion for reconsideration which was, nevertheless, denied in a Resolution dated July 11, 1996.  13

However, a few days after the denial of its motion for reconsideration, Philex was able to obtain its VAT input
credit/refund not only for the taxable year 1989 to 1991 but also for 1992 and 1994, computed as follows:  14

Period Covered Tax Credit Date

By Claims For Certificate of

VAT refund/credit Number Issue Amount

1994 (2nd Quarter) 007730 11 July 1996 P25,317,534.01

 1994 (4th Quarter) 007731 11 July 1996 P21,791,020.61

1989 007732 11 July 1996 P37,322,799.19

1990-1991 007751 16 July 1996 P84,662,787.46

1992 (1st-3rd Quarter) 007755 23 July 1996 P36,501,147.95

In view of the grant of its VAT input credit/refund, Philex now contends that the same should, ipso jure, off-set its
excise tax liabilities   since both had already become "due and demandable, as well as fully liquidated;"   hence,
15 16

legal compensation can properly take place.

We see no merit in this contention.

In several instances prior to the instant case, we have already made the pronouncement that taxes cannot be
subject to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors
of each other.   There is a material distinction between a tax and debt. Debts are due to the Government in its
17

corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity.   We find no cogent reason to
18

deviate from the aforementioned distinction.

Prescinding from this premise, in Francia v. Intermediate Appellate Court,   we categorically held that taxes cannot
19

be subject to set-off or compensation, thus:

We have consistently ruled that there can be no off-setting of taxes against the claims that the
taxpayer may have against the government. A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground that
the government owes him an amount equal to or greater than the tax being collected. The collection
of a tax cannot await the results of a lawsuit against the government.

The ruling in Francia has been applied to the subsequent case of Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on
Audit,   which reiterated that:
20

. . . a taxpayer may not offset taxes due from the claims that he may have against the government.
Taxes cannot be the subject of compensation because the government and taxpayer are not
mutually creditors and debtors of each other and a claim for taxes is not such a debt, demand,
contract or judgment as is allowed to be set-off.

Further, Philex's reliance on our holding in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Itogon-Suyoc Mines Inc., wherein
we ruled that a pending refund may be set off against an existing tax liability even though the refund has not yet
been approved by the Commissioner,   is no longer without any support in statutory law.
21

It is important to note, that the premise of our ruling in the aforementioned case was anchored on Section 51 (d) of
the National Revenue Code of 1939. However, when the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 was enacted, the
same provision upon which the Itogon-Suyoc pronouncement was based was omitted.   Accordingly, the doctrine
22

enunciated in Itogon-Suyoc cannot be invoked by Philex.

Despite the foregoing rulings clearly adverse to Philex's position, it asserts that the imposition of surcharge and
interest for the non-payment of the excise taxes within the time prescribed was unjustified. Philex posits the theory
that it had no obligation to pay the excise tax liabilities within the prescribed period since, after all, it still has pending
claims for VAT input credit/refund with BIR.  23

We fail to see the logic of Philex's claim for this is an outright disregard of the basic principle in tax law that taxes are
the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance.   Evidently, to
24

countenance Philex's whimsical reason would render ineffective our tax collection system. Too simplistic, it finds no
support in law or in jurisprudence.

To be sure, we cannot allow Philex to refuse the payment of its tax liabilities on the ground that it has a pending tax
claim for refund or credit against the government which has not yet been granted. It must be noted that a
distinguishing feature of a tax is that it is compulsory rather than a matter of bargain.   Hence, a tax does not
25

depend upon the consent of the taxpayer.   If any taxpayer can defer the payment of taxes by raising the defense
26

that it still has a pending claim for refund or credit, this would adversely affect the government revenue system. A
taxpayer cannot refuse to pay his taxes when they fall due simply because he has a claim against the government
or that the collection of the tax is contingent on the result of the lawsuit it filed against the government.   Moreover,
27

Philex's theory that would automatically apply its VAT input credit/refund against its tax liabilities can easily give rise
to confusion and abuse, depriving the government of authority over the manner by which taxpayers credit and offset
their tax liabilities.

Corollarily, the fact that Philex has pending claims for VAT input claim/refund with the government is immaterial for
the imposition of charges and penalties prescribed under Section 248 and 249 of the Tax Code of 1977. The
payment of the surcharge is mandatory and the BIR is not vested with any authority to waive the collection
thereof.   The same cannot be condoned for flimsy reasons,   similar to the one advanced by Philex in justifying its
28 29

non-payment of its tax liabilities.

Finally, Philex asserts that the BIR violated Section 106 (e)   of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which
30

requires the refund of input taxes within 60 days,   when it took five years for the latter to grant its tax claim for VAT
31

input credit/refund. 
32

In this regard, we agree with Philex. While there is no dispute that a claimant has the burden of proof to establish
the factual basis of his or her claim for tax credit or refund,   however, once the claimant has submitted all the
33

required documents it is the function of the BIR to assess these documents with purposeful dispatch. After all, since
taxpayers owe honestly to government it is but just that government render fair service to the taxpayers.  34

In the instant case, the VAT input taxes were paid between 1989 to 1991 but the refund of these erroneously paid
taxes was only granted in 1996. Obviously, had the BIR been more diligent and judicious with their duty, it could
have granted the refund earlier. We need not remind the BIR that simple justice requires the speedy refund of
wrongly-held taxes.   Fair dealing and nothing less, is expected by the taxpayer from the BIR in the latter's
35

discharge of its function. As aptly held in Roxas v. Court of Tax Appeals:  36

The power of taxation is sometimes called also the power to destroy. Therefore it should be
exercised with caution to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a taxpayer. It must be exercised
fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the "hen that lays the golden egg" And, in order
to maintain the general public's trust and confidence in the Government this power must be used
justly and not treacherously.

Despite our concern with the lethargic manner by which the BIR handled Philex's tax claim, it is a settled rule that in
the performance of governmental function, the State is not bound by the neglect of its agents and officers. Nowhere
is this more true than in the field of taxation.   Again, while we understand Philex's predicament, it must be stressed
37

that the same is not a valid reason for the non-payment of its tax liabilities.

To be sure, this is not to state that the taxpayer is devoid of remedy against public servants or employees,
especially BIR examiners who, in investigating tax claims are seen to drag their feet needlessly. First, if the BIR
takes time in acting upon the taxpayer's claim for refund, the latter can seek judicial remedy before the Court of Tax
Appeals in the manner prescribed by law.   Second, if the inaction can be characterized as willful neglect of duty,
38

then recourse under the Civil Code and the Tax Code can also be availed of.

Art. 27 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or
neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other
relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary action that may be taken.

More importantly, Section 269 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Act of 1997 states:

x x x           x x x          x x x
 (c) Wilfully neglecting to give receipts, as by law required for any sum collected in the performance
of duty or wilfully neglecting to perform, any other duties enjoyed by law.

Simply put, both provisions abhor official inaction, willful neglect and unreasonable delay in the performance of
official duties.   In no uncertain terms must we stress that every public employee or servant must strive to render
39

service to the people with utmost diligence and efficiency. Insolence and delay have no place in government
service. The BIR, being the government collecting arm, must and should do no less. It simply cannot be apathetic
and laggard in rendering service to the taxpayer if it wishes to remain true to its mission of hastening the country's
development. We take judicial notice of the taxpayer's generally negative perception towards the BIR; hence, it is up
to the latter to prove its detractors wrong.

In sum, while we can never condone the BIR's apparent callousness in performing its duties, still, the same cannot
justify Philex's non-payment of its tax liabilities. The adage "no one should take the law into his own hands" should
have guided Philex's action.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 8, 1996 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 11

[G.R. NO. 168081 : October 17, 2008]

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed
because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.

He is now before this Court via a Petition for Review on certiorari claiming that he was illegally
dismissed. To buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of
the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona
fide occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against because other overweight
employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.

After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the legality of

dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of
social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct.
Neither is it reflective of his moral character.

The Facts

Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines,

Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (5 8") with a large body frame. The proper
weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight
being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual1 of PAL.

The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an
extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight
concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the company's weight standards, prompting
another leave without pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.

After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioner's
weight problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to
February 1989.

On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with
company policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was
formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several
dates. He was also told that he may avail of the services of the company physician should he
wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989.2

On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained,
instead of losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the
limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was retained.

On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his
residence to check on the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds,
gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitment3 to
reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in
full, reads:

Dear Sir:

I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217 pounds to 200

pounds from today until 31 Dec. 1989.

From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until such time that
my ideal weight is achieved.

Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time schedule you will
set for my weight check.

Respectfully Yours,

F/S Armando Yrasuegui4

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain
grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he
was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks.

Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month to
comply with the weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight check on
different dates. He was reminded that his grounding would continue pending satisfactory
compliance with the weight standards.5

Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting his
passport for processing at the PAL Staff Service Division.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight
check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates.6 Again,
petitioner ignored the directive and did not report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990,
petitioner was required to explain his refusal to undergo weight checks.7

When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was
still way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.

From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for
leniency on the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205
pounds on November 5, 1992.

On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for
violation of company standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from
receipt of the charge within which to file his answer and submit controverting evidence.8

On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer.9 Notably, he did not deny being
overweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by
PAL since "no action has been taken by the company" regarding his case "since 1988." He also
claimed that PAL discriminated against him because "the company has not been fair in treating
the cabin crew members who are similarly situated."
On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was
undergoing a weight reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week so as to attain
his ideal weight.10

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his
ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period
covering a total of almost five (5) years," his services were considered terminated "effective
immediately."11

His motion for reconsideration having been denied,12 petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against PAL.

Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions

On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled13 that petitioner was illegally
dismissed. The dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the complainant's
dismissal illegal, and ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his former position or
substantially equivalent one, and to pay him:

A. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on June 15, 1993 until reinstated,
which for purposes of appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up to August 15, 1998
at P651,000.00;

b. Attorney's fees of five percent (5%) of the total award.

SO ORDERED.14

The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of
the job of petitioner.15 However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of
dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.16 Assuming that it did,
petitioner could be transferred to other positions where his weight would not be a negative
factor.17 Notably, other overweight employees, i.e., Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr. Barrios, were
promoted instead of being disciplined.18

Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).19

On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of
petitioner without loss of seniority rights and other benefits.20

On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied21 the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution22 of PAL.

On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the NLRC.23

On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment24 in the following tenor:

WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as
modified by our findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part of the dispositive portion of
said decision concerning complainant's entitlement to backwages shall be deemed to refer to
complainant's entitlement to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits
or their monetary equivalent instead of simply backwages, from date of dismissal until his actual
reinstatement or finality hereof. Respondent is enjoined to manifests (sic) its choice of the form
of the reinstatement of complainant, whether physical or through payroll within ten (10) days
from notice failing which, the same shall be deemed as complainant's reinstatement through
payroll and execution in case of non-payment shall accordingly be issued by the Arbiter. Both
appeals of respondent thus, are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.25

According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably regardless of the
amount of food intake, is a disease in itself."26 As a consequence, there can be no intentional
defiance or serious misconduct by petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.27

Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be reasonable. However,
it found as unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that petitioner was not remiss in the
performance of his duties as flight steward despite being overweight. According to the NLRC, the
Labor Arbiter should have limited himself to the issue of whether the failure of petitioner to
attain his ideal weight constituted willful defiance of the weight standards of PAL.28

PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.29 Thus, PAL elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals (CA) via a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.30

By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed31 the NLRC:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed NLRC decision is
declared NULL and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondent's complaint is hereby
DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.32

The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because it
"looked at wrong and irrelevant considerations"33 in evaluating the evidence of the parties.
Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing
qualification for an employee's position.34 The failure to adhere to the weight standards is
an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code in
relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to suggest.35 Said
the CA, "the element of willfulness that the NLRC decision cites is an irrelevant consideration in
arriving at a conclusion on whether the dismissal is legally proper."36 In other words, "the
relevant question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard and
whether or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify under this standard."37

Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are
reasonable.38 Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the
prescribed weight standards.39 It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by
petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.40

On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.41 Elaborating on its
earlier ruling, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational
qualification which, in case of violation, "justifies an employee's separation from the service."42

Issues

In this Rule 45 Petition for Review, the following issues are posed for resolution:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S
OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE
LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S

DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL
QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE";

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER

WAS NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED WHILE OTHER
OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED;

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING MOOT AND
ACADEMIC.43 (Underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

Our Ruling

I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) 44 of the Labor Code.

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they
constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an
employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as
prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article
282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:

x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; they were
the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his
or her position in the company. In other words, they were standards that
establish continuing qualifications for an employee's position. In this sense, the failure to
maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the
element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the
employer's qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds
(a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) - the "other causes analogous to
the foregoing."

By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and after an employee
is hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant
must initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must
continue to meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this
perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant
to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer
"qualifies" for his job irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or
intentional. x x x45
Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that obesity is a "physical
abnormality and/or illness."46 Relying on Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,47 he says his
dismissal is illegal:

Conscious of the fact that Nadura's case cannot be made to fall squarely within the specific
causes enumerated in subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of
subparagraph 1(f) and says that Nadura's illness - occasional attacks of asthma - is a cause
analogous to them.

Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient to convince anyone
that, as the trial court said, "illness cannot be included as an analogous cause by any stretch of
imagination."

It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the others expressly
enumerated in the law are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the employee. How Nadura's
illness could be considered as "analogous" to any of them is beyond our understanding, there
being no claim or pretense that the same was contracted through his own voluntary act.48

The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially different from
the case at bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The law applied in that
case was Republic Act (RA) No. 1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura,
thus, the rationale there cannot apply here. Third, in Nadura, the employee who was a miner,
was laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner was dismissed for his
failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the
issue in Nadura is whether or not the dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and
damages. Here, the issue centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to
meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was not accorded due process.
Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to comply
with the weight standards of PAL.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner's claims that obesity is a
disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is
possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline.
Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that
"[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is
yes. I can do it now."49

True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot of expenses."50 However,
petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company
physician, per the advice of PAL.51 He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly
failed to report when required to undergo weight checks, without offering a valid explanation.
Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather than an illness.

Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation
and Hospitals,52 decided by the United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook
worked from 1978 to 1980 and from 1981 to 1986 as an institutional attendant for the mentally
retarded at the Ladd Center that was being operated by respondent. She twice resigned
voluntarily with an unblemished record. Even respondent admitted that her performance met the
Center's legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook re-applied for a similar position. At that time,
"she stood 5 2" tall and weighed over 320 pounds." Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity
of plaintiff compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of emergency and it also put her
at greater risk of serious diseases.
Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on the basis of a
handicap. This was in direct violation of Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,53 which
incorporates the remedies contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent
claimed, however, that morbid obesity could never constitute a handicap within the purview of
the Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesity is a mutable condition, thus plaintiff could simply
lose weight and rid herself of concomitant disability.

The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under the
Rehabilitation Act and that respondent discriminated against Cook based on "perceived"
disability. The evidence included expert testimony that morbid obesity is a physiological
disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the neurological appetite -
suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing adverse effects within the
musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated that
"mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of the limitation flowing from a
given impairment," thus "mutability only precludes those conditions that an individual can easily
and quickly reverse by behavioral alteration."

Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the District Court for the
District of Rhode Island, Cook was sometime before 1978 "at least one hundred pounds more
than what is considered appropriate of her height." According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed
"over 320 pounds" in 1988. Clearly, that is not the case here. At his heaviest, petitioner was
only less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight
attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his
dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As
the CA correctly puts it, "[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable
to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element
runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful
action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary
although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d)."54

II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification
defense.

Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or
national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual
qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ).55 In the United States, there are a few federal and many state job
discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise
unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the
normal operation of a business or enterprise.56

Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no statute
providing for it.57 Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal.58

Both arguments must fail.

First, the Constitution,59 the Labor Code,60 and RA No. 727761 or the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons62 contain provisions similar to BFOQ.

Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British
Columbia Government and Service Employee's Union (BCGSEU), 63 the Supreme Court of Canada
adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in determining whether an employment policy is justified.
Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose
rationally connected to the performance of the job;64 (2) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary65 to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3)
the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish
the legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol,66 this Court
held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment
qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that
there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification
would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.67

In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to
BFOQ.68 BFOQ is valid "provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance."69

In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., 70 the Court did
not hesitate to pass upon the validity of a company policy which prohibits its employees from
marrying employees of a rival company. It was held that the company policy is reasonable
considering that its purpose is the protection of the interests of the company against possible
competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and procedures.

Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supporting
statute. Too, the Labor Arbiter,71 NLRC,72 and CA73 are one in holding that the weight standards
of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of
public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it
transports.74 It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.75

The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus, it is only
logical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting
obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a common carrier.

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its
passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly
the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be
viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.

In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin
crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all
times in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when
something goes wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common
carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People, especially the riding
public, expect no less than that airline companies transport their passengers to their respective
destinations safely and soundly. A lesser performance is unacceptable.

The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or attending to the
whims and caprices of the passengers. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to care
for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency
occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need
cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the agility to
attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling
flight schedules.
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to
consider in case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit
doors. Thus, the arguments of respondent that "[w]hether the airline's flight attendants are
overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission of transporting passengers to their
destination"; and that the weight standards "has nothing to do with airworthiness of
respondent's airlines," must fail.

The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell76 relied upon by petitioner cannot apply to his case.
What was involved there were two (2) airline pilots who were denied reassignment as flight
engineers upon reaching the age of 60, and a flight engineer who was forced to retire at age 60.
They sued the airline company, alleging that the age-60 retirement for flight engineers violated
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Age-based BFOQ and being overweight are
not the same. The case of overweight cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped
cabin space and narrow aisles and emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin
attendant would certainly have difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area.

In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their task. That an
obese cabin attendant occupies more space than a slim one is an unquestionable fact which
courts can judicially recognize without introduction of evidence.77 It would also be absurd to
require airline companies to reconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the aisles and exit doors
just to accommodate overweight cabin attendants like petitioner.

The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding
passengers from evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin
attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being
overweight necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are what
cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost seconds can translate into three lost
lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-bodied cabin attendant is blocking the
narrow aisles. These possibilities are not remote.

Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were made
known to him prior to his employment. He is presumed to know the weight limit that he must
maintain at all times.78 In fact, never did he question the authority of PAL when he was
repeatedly asked to trim down his weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith
demands that what is agreed upon shall be done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin
ang napagkasunduan.

Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based on height and
body frame for both male and female cabin attendants. A progressive discipline is imposed to
allow non-compliant cabin attendants sufficient opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus,
the clear-cut rules obviate any possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the
part of PAL.

III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by
PAL.

Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate
against him.79 We are constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that "[t]he
element of discrimination came into play in this case as a secondary position for the private
respondent in order to escape the consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is
a confession-and-avoidance position that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal, including the
reasonableness of the applicable standard and the private respondent's failure to comply."80 It is
a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.81
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner
has to prove his allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records which could
support the finding of discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by
simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him.
Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and the
differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other
employees.

Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants,
petitioner miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal
weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the particular
flights assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant
data that could have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the
words of the CA, "PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet."82

We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC, are accorded respect, even finality.83 The reason is simple: administrative agencies
are experts in matters within their specific and specialized jurisdiction.84 But the principle is not a
hard and fast rule. It only applies if the findings of facts are duly supported by substantial
evidence. If it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such
nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be
reversed. Factual findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set
aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.85

Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their
findings.

To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty86 of
the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be invoked.87 Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals.88 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,89 which is the source of our equal protection guarantee,
is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful.90 Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate
the equal protection guarantee.91

IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.

As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and wages have not
been mooted. He is entitled to reinstatement and his full backwages, "from the time he was
illegally dismissed" up to the time that the NLRC was reversed by the CA.92

At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee,
insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending
appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer,
merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement provided herein.

The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self-executory and does
not require a writ of execution,93 the option to exercise actual reinstatement or payroll
reinstatement belongs to the employer. It does not belong to the employee, to the labor
tribunals, or even to the courts.

Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL "did everything under the sun" to frustrate his
"immediate return to his previous position,"94 there is evidence that PAL opted to physically
reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position in accordance with the order of the Labor
Arbiter.95 In fact, petitioner duly received the return to work notice on February 23, 2001, as
shown by his signature.96

Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a case97 that "[t]he
unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles him to payment
of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance
of a writ of execution"98 and ""even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed
on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court."99 He failed to prove that
he complied with the return to work order of PAL. Neither does it appear on record that he
actually rendered services for PAL from the moment he was dismissed, in order to insist on the
payment of his full backwages.

In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight, petitioner in

effect wants to render the issues in the present case moot. He asks PAL to comply with the
impossible. Time and again, the Court ruled that the law does not exact compliance with the
impossible.100

V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.

Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.

Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may be deduced
from the language of Article 279 of the Labor Code that "[a]n employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the
time of his actual reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule.

Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act "social

justice,"101 or based on "equity."102 In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not
for serious misconduct; and (2) does not reflect on the moral character of the employee.103

Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month's pay for every year
of service.104 It should include regular allowances which he might have been receiving.105 We are
not blind to the fact that he was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which
would reflect on his moral character. We also recognize that his employment with PAL lasted for
more or less a decade.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in

that petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent to
one-half (1/2) month's pay for every year of service, which should include his regular
allowances.

SO ORDERED.

CASE 12
G.R. No. 118127             April 12, 2005

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in
his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON.
ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C.
OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON.
ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F.
CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON.
BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO, HON.
VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON. DANILO
V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON.
FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON. BERNARDO D.
RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE,
JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON.
LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors of the City of
Manila, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after.

Ernest Hermingway
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1

It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less immoral than if
performed by someone else, who would be well-intentioned in his dishonesty.

J. Christopher  Gerald
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I

The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental law of the land. It is
foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it need be, the Court will not
hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily" in the words of Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional
guarantees when faced with laws that, though not lacking in zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the
test of constitutionality.

The pivotal issue in this Petition under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure seeking the
1 

reversal of the Decision in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower
2 

court), is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.
3  4

The antecedents are as follows:

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of
operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was
5 

licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC
6 

filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo
7 

S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council).  MTDC prayed
that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared
invalid and unconstitutional. 8
Enacted by the City Council on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the
9 

said Ordinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING

CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. 10

The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person,
partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr.
Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West,
pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in
entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect
the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to:

1. Sauna Parlors

2. Massage Parlors

3. Karaoke Bars

4. Beerhouses

5. Night Clubs

6. Day Clubs

7. Super Clubs

8. Discotheques

9. Cabarets

10. Dance Halls

11. Motels

12. Inns

SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are
prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting
payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding section.

SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses
enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of this
ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the
area, such as but not limited to:

1. Curio or antique shop

2. Souvenir Shops
 3. Handicrafts display centers

4. Art galleries

5. Records and music shops

6. Restaurants

7. Coffee shops

8. Flower shops

9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for wholesome family
entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele.

10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows, stage
and theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.

11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the zoning
ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or yard,
motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery, or funeral
establishments.

SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be punished
by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at the
discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, that in case of juridical person, the President, the General Manager, or
person-in-charge of operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of subsequent
violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked
permanently.

SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.

Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.

Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)

In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of
prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not
establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor
did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the
inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community." 11

MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City
Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv) of the Local Government Code of
12 

1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance
of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void
as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 499 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area
13 

as a commercial zone with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police
power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal
interests sought to be protected; (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of
Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates MTDC's
constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City
Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to
extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no
reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of
this area.14
In their Answer dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the
15 

power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community"
as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code, which  reads,  thus:
16 

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

....

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote
the general welfare and for said purpose shall:

....

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement
facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public
dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement;
regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which
tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of
the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community.

Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in the above-quoted
17 

provision included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and amusement. 18

Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic
Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila) which
19  20 

reads, thus:

ARTICLE III

THE MUNICIPAL BOARD

.  .  .

Section 18. Legislative powers. – The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:

.  .  .

(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance
of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances
which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or both such fine and
imprisonment, for a single offense.

Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private respondent had the
burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality. 21

Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter
simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial
zone. The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in
22 

operation. The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as class
23 
legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the
City of Manila.24

On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary
restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance. And on 16 July 1993, again in an intrepid gesture, he
25 

granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC. 26

After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from
implementing the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads: 27

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of the City of
Manila null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that had been issued by this
Court against the defendant. No costs.

SO ORDERED. 28

Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal on 12 December 1994, manifesting that they are elevating
29 

the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law. 30

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the
lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding that the
questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments,
31 

except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional. 32

In the Petition and in its Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the lower
33 

court. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of
the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of
the Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. They allege that
34 

the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the
presumption of validity. 35

In its Memorandum dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is
36 

void for being repugnant to the general law. It reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of
police power; that it is violative of due process, confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful
business; that it is violative of the equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer
unregulated discretion in the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.

This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area being its
home for several decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the area's many turn of events. It relished its
glory days and endured its days of infamy. Much as the Court harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila
and yearns to restore its lost grandeur, it believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end.  The Court
is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and
therefore null and void.

The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a constitutional
provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the
Constitution. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts at rendering them worthless.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it  must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable. 37
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the
laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the
38 

test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the
supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the
precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a
delegation of legislative power from the national legislature.  The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. 39

This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national legislature is still the principal
of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.40

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council
acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with police power in
order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. This delegated police power is
41 

found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:

SECTION 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case,
the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the
province/city/ municipality provided under the Code. The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the
42 

exercise of such delegated power.

The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations
thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at
43 

bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.

The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:

SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion
of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. 44

SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. 45

SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of laws. 46

Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 47

A. The Ordinance infringes
the Due Process Clause
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. . . ."48

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process.  It furnishes though a standard to which governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.  This
standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice, and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power.
49  50

The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative
enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial
procedure; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. 51

The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships are
"persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. 52

This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called "procedural due
process" and "substantive due process."

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of
notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action. 53

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking
away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a
sufficient justification for the government's action. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is
54 

such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only
55 

rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose.  But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then
the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a
compelling government purpose. 56

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights
of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically,
arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the
57 

respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of
Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
58 

interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
59

Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free
it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
60 

private rights can work.  A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. 61

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights a violation of the due process clause.
62 
The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the
Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying
nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and motels.  Petitioners insist that even the
Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila had already
63 

taken judicial notice of the "alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable
in great part to existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit
and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." 64

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the
community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City
Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive.

It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable regulations looking to
the promotion of the moral and social values of the community. However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals
and the eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it
can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of
businesses or their conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per
se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social
ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and establishments of the like
which the City Council may lawfully prohibit, it is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna
65 

parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls,
motels and inns. This is not warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated
establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.

That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal prostitution is
of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the
most innocent of places that it may even take place in the substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of
the Ordinance.  If the flawed logic of the Ordinance were to be followed, in the remote instance that an immoral
sexual act transpires in a church cloister or a court chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila
ordering the closure of the church or court concerned.  Every house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles for
that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are
impure men. Indeed, even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians churches continually recall the presence
and universality of sin in man's history.66

The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be said to be injurious
to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the deplorable human activity that may
occur within its premises. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that
reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere
likelihood or a naked assumption. If that were so and if that were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not
only be purged of its supposed social ills, it would be extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity,
reprehensible or not, in its every nook and cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may
to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a
thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The City Council instead should regulate human
conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants,
premiums and blessings of democracy.

While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they unwittingly punish
even the proprietors and operators of "wholesome," "innocent" establishments. In the instant case, there is a clear
invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and
patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein
employed. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead
impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of
their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it
67 

may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the
desired end.

Means employed are

constitutionally infirm

The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs,
day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3
thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of
approval of the Ordinance within which "to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." Further, it
states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the
erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently."

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty
and property.

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right
to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." In accordance
68 

with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will;
to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of
liberty.
69

The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty."  It said:
70 

While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized…as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
"liberty" must be broad indeed.

In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. In explaining the
respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these choices, the U.S. Supreme Court
explained:

These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of universe, and of
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood where
they formed under compulsion of the State. 71

Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of
the Ordinance may seek autonomy for these purposes.

Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in
intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premisesbe it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not
contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution.   Adults have a right to choose to forge
72 

such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.
The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. Their right to liberty under the
73 
due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as
long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.

Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include
privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedomit is the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. 74

The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
75 

Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are
indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built.
He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is
private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he
surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe
that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be
justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. 76

There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court chooses to exercise
restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should. The previous pronouncements of the Court are not
to be interpreted as a license for adults to engage in criminal conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not
diminished. The Court only reaffirms and guarantees their right to make this choice. Should they be prosecuted for
their illegal conduct, they should suffer the consequences of the choice they have made. That, ultimately, is their
choice.

Modality employed is
unlawful taking

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial
use of its property. The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the
77 

Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer
outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the
use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized
as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of
78 

individuals.

The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation." The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution. This
is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The constitutional provision is about
ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about
loss spreading. If the government takes away a person's property to benefit society, then society should pay. The
principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. 79

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the government
confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves
no reasonable economically viable use of the property. 80

In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, it was held that a taking also could be found if government
81 

regulation of the use of property went "too far."  When regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all
cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the act. While property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.82
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking.
In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by
general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when
regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and
fairness require that the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government and thus
borne by the public as a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the
public action.
83

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. A 84 

regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of
view, equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the
land make the use prohibitable. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
85 

beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a
taking.
86

A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require compensation under the
takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial
use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's
economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed
expectations and the character of government action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings
clause which is to prevent the government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. 87

A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of the
owner. 88

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited" establishments three (3) months from its approval
within which to "wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert
said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." The directive to "wind up business operations"
amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. 
Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an "allowed" business, the structure which housed
the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will likewise
leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount of money invested to
build the edifices which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time. It is apparent that
the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use.

The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed
businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in
Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a "taking" of private property.

The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate
area.  In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional burden imposed on the
owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers. The proffered solution does not put an end to the
"problem," it merely relocates it. Not only is this impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The
conversion into allowed enterprises is just as ridiculous. How may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant
or a coffee shop, art gallery or music lounge without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private
property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.

The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the government. The
burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed permanently after a subsequent
violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits them as a whole.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a
valid exercise of police power, which limits a "wholesome" property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it
constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation.  Private property which is not noxious nor
intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no
support in the principles of justice as we know them.  The police powers of local government units which have
always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain.  It needs restating that the
property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose
while the property taken under the power of eminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore
"wholesome." If it be of public benefit that a "wholesome" property remain unused or relegated to a particular
89 

purpose, then certainly the public should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private
property for public use.90

Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. It in no way controls or
guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set
forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the
mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make
possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the
unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are
unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could
be secured. 91

Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify
the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an
opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.92

Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, as cited in People v. Nazario,      the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an
93  94 

ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." The ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at
all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' "

Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments "tend to disturb the
community," "annoy the inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community." The
cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law
enforcers in carrying out its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process
clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.  This is a
sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which
amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we
take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.

Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable regulation which is a far cry from the ill-
considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.

In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas, the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating "sexually oriented
95 

businesses," which are defined to include adult arcades, bookstores, video stores, cabarets, motels, and theaters as
well as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual encounter centers. Among other things, the ordinance
required that such businesses be licensed. A group of motel owners were among the three groups of businesses
that filed separate suits challenging the ordinance. The motel owners asserted that the city violated the due process
clause by failing to produce adequate support for its supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours
resulted in increased crime and other secondary effects. They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour limitation on
the rental of motel rooms placed an unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of association. Anent the first
contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a study
which the city considered, was adequate to support the city's determination that motels permitting room rentals for
fewer than ten (10 ) hours should be included within the licensing scheme. As regards the second point, the Court
held that limiting motel room rentals to ten (10) hours will have no discernible effect on personal bonds as those
bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than ten (10) hours are not those that have played a
critical role in the culture and traditions of the nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.
The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. It imposed reasonable
restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.

The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, it needs pointing
96 

out, is also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode in
which motels may conduct business in order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality.
Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not
prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit. 97

The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and
personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the guise
of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

B.  The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to
give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of
98 

persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances. The "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." It limits governmental
99  100 

discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is
concerned. 101

The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise:

… What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: "The ideal
situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its
coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene
and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law." There is recognition, however, in
the opinion that what in fact exists "cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach
that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be
given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare be
promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property.
Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can
show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason."
Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws
operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated
in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. 102

Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may
operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. The classification
103 

must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.

2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. 104

In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and
usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as
similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does
not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate
area but not outside of this area.  A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the
area.

The standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is also discriminatory as prostitutionone of the
hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an
equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any less grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the
assumption that there is an ongoing immoral activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when
men are in harness? This discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related
to important government objectives. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
105 

Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws.

C.    The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate,
and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and maintenance of motels,
hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv), which provides that:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

.  .  .

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote
the general welfare and for said purpose shall:

.  .  .

(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports .  .  .  .

While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement
facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the
Code, which reads as follows:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

.  .  .
 (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote
the general welfare and for said purpose shall:

.  .  .

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement
facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public
dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement;
regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which
tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of
the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community.

Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and
other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to
promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the
establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments. It is well to recall the rulings of the Court
in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila that:106 

The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means and includes
the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be construed as synonymous with
"suppress" or "prohibit." Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities
could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the employment or business shall be
exercised. 107

And in People v. Esguerra, wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of Tacloban which
108 

prohibited the selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the municipality is empowered only to
regulate the same and not prohibit. The Court therein declared that:

(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to regulate or to
license and regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly withheld.
109

These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion that they were modified by the Code vesting upon City
110 

Councils prohibitory powers.

Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4
(vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend "such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment,
particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of
amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the
second and third clauses, respectively of the same Section.  The several powers of the City Council as provided in
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which
indicates that the clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to
justify being put together in a single enumeration or paragraph. These powers, therefore, should not be confused,
111 

commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power of regulation, suppression and
prohibition. 112

The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to
regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors,
and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be
included as among "other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to
disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City
Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.

The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily
implied or incidental to the exercise thereof.  By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are
to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers
must be construed against the City Council. Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express
113 

mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius
est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is
particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or
punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict construction. 114

The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of
the Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without merit. On the first point, the
ruling of the Court in People v. Esguerra, is instructive. It held that:
115 

The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section 2238 of the
Revised Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other provisions of the same Code, and
therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating liquors, for the power to regulate the selling, giving away and
dispensing thereof is granted specifically by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that, under the
general power granted by section 2238,  a municipal council may enact the ordinance in question,
notwithstanding the provision of section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and nugatory,
because the power to prohibit, includes the power to regulate, the selling, giving away and dispensing of
intoxicating liquors.

On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must necessarily
prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or
later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter,
which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative
will. If there is an inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter,
116 

which cannot be removed by any fair and reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the
legislative will which must prevail and override the earlier. 117

Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions contrary to those
of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have been divided into two general
classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of
the two can remain in force and those which occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is
intended to be a substitute therefor. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest
expression of the legislative will should prevail. 118

In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with
any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." Thus, submitting to petitioners'
interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the
Charter stating such must be considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions
granting the City Council mere regulatory powers.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the
abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects
the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It
can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a
legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A
motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. 119

Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and establishments in
another section of the Code which is reproduced as follows:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
 (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in
this connection, shall:

.  .  .

(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose  appropriate penalties for habitual
drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy,  prostitution, establishment and maintenance of     
houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance,  fraudulent devices and ways to obtain
money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the
printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other
activities inimical  to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;

.  .  .

If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the establishments
enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of
the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these
establishments with houses of ill-repute and expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these
establishments may only be regulated in their establishment, operation and maintenance.

It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That these
establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code. Section 131
under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics,
sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the "contractors" defined in
paragraph (h) thereof.  The same Section also defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and
entertainment," "synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun;" and "amusement places" to include
"theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain
oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these
establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which
means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its
place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict
grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration appear in different
sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies. 120

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As
correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial
area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except
warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any
machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must
not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the
general law. As succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority:
121  122

The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions
are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature
(except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the
Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As
delegates of the Congress, the local government units cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will
of their principal. In the case before us, the enactment in question, which are merely local in origin cannot
prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. 123

Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule, it has already
been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such
presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the
ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy
or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. 124
Conclusion

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It
is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation;
it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be
forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and
void.

Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public
for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such character deserves the
full endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of
the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City
Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their
transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws
not even under the guise of police power.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring
the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED.  Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 13

G.R. No. 132248. January 19, 2000

HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of

Education, Culture and Sports, Petitioner, v. MARIA LUISA C.
MORAL, respondent. Ne-xold

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

SECRETARY ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports

(DECS) seeks to nullify through this petition for review the Decision of the Court of
Appeals1 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by then DECS Secretary Ricardo T.
Gloria for lack of merit, as well as its Resolution dated 13 January 1998 denying
reconsideration thereof.

On 26 July 1994 former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against
respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National
Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some
historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian Division (FAD) of the
National Library which were under her control and supervision as Division Chief and
keeping in her possession, without legal authority and justification, some forty-one (41)
items of historical documents which were missing from the FAD vaults of the National
Library.

The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the complaint. Atty.
Jose M. Diaz, Special Prosecutor from the Department of Justice, represented the DECS
Secretary in the administrative case while respondent was represented by her own
private counsel. On 25 September 1996 Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding
respondent "guilty of the administrative offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the commission of pilferage of
historical documents of the national library, to the prejudice of the national library in
particular, and the country in general." She was ordered dismissed from the government
service with prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and
other remunerations.

On 30 September 1996 respondent received a copy of the resolution. Thereafter, or on 1

October 1996, she received another resolution correcting the typographical errors found
on the first resolution. Respondent did not appeal the judgment.

On 2 October 1996 respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action would be
most appropriate to take under the circumstances."2 Her petition was, however, denied.

Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution dated
September 25, 1996, which Secretary Gloria similarly denied in his Order of 23 October
1996. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the motion was merely "noted" in view
of the warning in the 23 October 1996 Order that the denial of the request for the
production of the Investigation Committee Report was final.3 As earlier stated,
respondent did not appeal the Resolution dated 30 September 1996 dismissing her from
the service. Instead, she instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the
regular courts against Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing
the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report.4 cräläwvirtualibräry

Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of

action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court. In its assailed
Decision of 24 November 1997 the appellate court sustained the trial court and
dismissed Secretary Glorias petition for lack of merit holding that -

FIRST. Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not having filed any motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order with the respondent judge before filing the instant
petition to this Court. This constitutes a procedural infirmity x x x x SECOND. Even if the
aforesaid procedural defect were to be disregarded, the petition at hand, nevertheless,
must fail. The denial of the motion to dismiss is an option available to the respondent
judge. Such order is interlocutory and thus not appealable. The proper recourse of the
aggrieved party is to file an answer and interpose, as defenses, the objection(s) raised
by him in said motion to dismiss, then proceed with the trial and, in case of adverse
decision, to elevate the entire case on appeal in due course.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals on 13
January 1998, Secretary Gloria filed the instant petition for review.

Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was
thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria.

The issues before us are: whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the motion to dismiss, and in holding that the trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.

Petitioner contends that there is no need to file a motion for reconsideration as the trial
courts order denying the motion to dismiss is a patent nullity, and a motion for
reconsideration would practically be a useless ceremony as the trial court virtually
decided the case, and that there is no law requiring the DECS to furnish respondent with
a copy of the Report of the DECS Investigation Committee so that the petition
for mandamus has no leg to stand on hence should have been dismissed for lack of
cause of action.

Excepting thereto respondent argues that the denial of the motion to dismiss is
interlocutory in nature as it did not dispose of the case on the merits, and petitioner still
has a residual remedy, i.e., to file an answer, thus her substantive rights have not been
violated as she contends; that respondent is clearly entitled to the remedy
of mandamus to protect her rights; and, that petitioner has not shown any law, DECS
order or regulation prohibiting the release of the petitioned documents for reasons of
confidentiality or national security.

We grant the petition. Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure mandatorily requires that the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly
and distinctly state the reasons therefor -

After hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion or order the
amendment of the pleading.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground
relied upon is not indubitable.

In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor (underscoring supplied).

Clearly, the above rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily denying motions
to dismiss "for lack of merit." Such cavalier disposition often creates difficulty and
misunderstanding on the part of the aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and
likewise on the higher court called upon to resolve the issue, usually on certiorari.

The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the
requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept
of mandamus and the trial courts jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of
administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioners motion to dismiss was
being denied. We are reproducing hereunder for reference the assailed Order -

This treats of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Gloria on 14 March 1997 to
which petitioner filed their (sic) opposition on April 8, 1997.

Respondent premised his motion on the following grounds: (a) Mandamus does not lie to
compel respondent DECS Secretary to release the Report of the DECS Investigating
Committee because the Petition does not state a cause of action; (b) The DECS
Resolution dismissing petitioner is legal and valid, and therefore, the writ of preliminary
injunction cannot be granted to enjoin its execution; while petitioner alleged among
others that she has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty,

this being its main objective. "Purely ministerial" are acts to be performed in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority
without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of
the act done. While the discretion of a Constitutional Commission cannot be controlled
by mandamus x x x x the court can decide whether the duty is discretionary or
ministerial x x x xMan-ikan

Generally, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the
administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to
acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and finding of fact. Findings of fact
by an administrative board or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts
and will not be disturbed except where the board or official has gone beyond his
statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and
without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion or as when there is
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law x x x x

WHEREFORE, in regard to the foregoing, the motion to dismiss by herein respondent is

hereby denied for lack of merit and is hereby ordered to file its (sic) responsive
pleadings within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order. Copy furnished petitioner who
is likewise given ten (10) days to submit his (sic) comment or opposition.

Indeed, we cannot even discern the bearing or relevance of the discussion therein
on mandamus, vis-a-vis the ground relied upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss,
i.e., lack of cause of action, and the dispositive portion of the order. The order only
confused petitioner and left her unable to determine the errors which would be the
proper subject of her motion for reconsideration. Judges should take pains in crafting
their orders, stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their issuance,
which are necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself
has not stated any basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for
reconsideration before resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had, would be to
expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise and specific in his order, a
certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with the rules
was justified.

Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, through a motion for
reconsideration, has been given an opportunity to correct the imputed errors on its act
or order. However, this rule is not absolute and is subject to well-recognized exceptions.
Thus, when the act or order of the lower court is a patent nullity for failure to comply
with a mandatory provision of the Rules, as in this case, a motion for reconsideration
may be dispensed with and the aggrieved party may assail the act or order of the lower
court directly on certiorari.5
cräläwvirtualibräry

On the second issue, the nature of the remedy of mandamus has been the subject of
discussions in several cases. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does
not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a
writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded
and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It
never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be
absolutely expressed, it must nevertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an
official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give
to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers
powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.6 cräläwvirtualibräry

In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has
a clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the
ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof.
Consequently, she is not entitled to the writ prayed for.

Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS
resolution dismissing her from the service.7 By her failure to do so, nothing prevented
the DECS resolution from becoming final and executory. Obviously, it will serve no
useful purpose now to compel petitioner to furnish her with a copy of the investigation
report.

Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish
respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally
held in Ruiz v. Drilon[8] that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be
informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to
inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative
decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to
meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the
investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.

Respondents assertion that the investigation report would be used "to guide [her] on
what action would be appropriate to take under the circumstances,"9 hardly merits
consideration. It must be stressed that the disputed investigation report is an internal
communication between the DECS Secretary and the Investigation Committee, and it is
not generally intended for the perusal of respondent or any other person for that matter,
except the DECS Secretary. As correctly ruled by Secretary Gloria in his Order of 2
October 1996 -

Respondents (Moral) counsel is reminded that the Report of the DECS Investigating
Committee is not an integral part of the Decision itself x x x x [t]he report is an internal
communication between the Investigating Committee and the DECS Secretary, and,
therefore, confidential until the latter had already read and used the same in making his
own determination of the facts and applicable law of the case, to be expressed in the
Decision he may make.

The Report remains an internal and confidential matter to be used as part - - although
not controlling - - of the basis for the decision. Only when the party adversely affected
by the decision has filed and perfected an appeal to the Civil Service Commission may all
the records of the case, including the aforesaid Report be forwarded to the CSC. In the
latter appellate tribunal, the respondents counsel may be allowed to read and/or be
given a copy of the Report to enable the appellant to file an intelligent and exhaustive
appellants Brief Memorandum.

More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the
Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of
law upon which respondents removal from office was grounded. This resolution, and not
the investigation report, should be the basis of any further remedies respondent might
wish to pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced by denying her access
to the investigation report.
In fine, the trial courts Order of 23 April 1997 denying petitioners motion to dismiss is
not a mere error of judgment as the Court of Appeals held, but a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the Order is
a patent nullity for failure to comply with the provisions of the rules requiring that a
resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons
therefor; and, respondent is clearly not entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not
appeal the DECS resolution dismissing her from service, and there is no law or rule
which imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the
investigation report, hence her petition clearly lacked a cause of action. In such
instance, while the trial courts order is merely interlocutory and non-
appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same since it is rendered with
grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 24

November 1997 sustaining the trial courts denial of petitioners motion to dismiss, as
well as its Resolution dated 13 January 1998 denying reconsideration, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The petition for mandamus filed by respondent before the court a quo to
compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report is
DISMISSED for want of cause of action.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 14

G.R. No. 211362               February 24, 2015

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military Academy, represented by his father
RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC)
OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
(CRAB), Respondents.

x-----------------------x

FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA, and on her own
behalf, Petitioner-Intervenor.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The true test of a cadet's character as a leader rests on his personal commitment to uphold what is morally and
ethically righteous at the most critical and trying times, and at the most challenging circumstances. When a cadet
must face a dilemma between what is true and right as against his security, well-being, pleasures and comfort, or
dignity, what is at stake is his honor and those that [define] his values. A man of an honorable character does not
think twice and chooses the fore. This is the essence of and. the Spirit of the Honor Code - it is championing truth
and righteousness even if it may mean the surrender of one's basic rights and privileges. 1

The Procedural Antecedents

Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation ceremonies of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), petitioners
Renato P. Cudia, acting for himself and in behalf of his son, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia (Cadet JCL
Cudia), and Berteni Catalufta Causing filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with application for
extremely urgent temporary restraining order (TRO). 2

In a Resolution dated March 1 7, 2014, the Court denied the prayer for TRO and instead, required respondents to
file their comment on the petition.
3

On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself and in behalf of her son Cadet 1 CL Cudia, filed a motion for
leave to intervene, attaching thereto the petition-in-intervention.  Per Resolution dated March 31, 2014, the Court
4

granted the motion and resolved to await respondents' comment on the petition. 5

A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3, 2014, recommending the admission of the petition-in-
intervention and adopting it as an integral part of their petition.  On May 20, 2014, petitioner-intervenor filed a
6

manifestation with motion for leave to admit the Final Investigation Report of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) dated April 25, 2014.  The Report  was relative to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029 filed by the spouses
7 8

Renato and Filipina Cudia (Spouses Cudia), for themselves and in behalf of their son, against the PMA Honor
Committee (HC) members and Major Vladimir P. Gracilla (Maj. Gracilla)9 for violation of Cadet lCL Cudia's rights to
due process, education, and privacy of communication. Subsequently, on June 3, 2014, petitioners filed a motion for
leave to adopt the submission of the CHR Report.  The manifestation was granted and the motion was noted by the
10

Court in its Resolution dated July 7, 2014.

After filing three motions for extension of time,  respondents filed their Consolidated Comment  on June 19, 2014.
11 12

In a motion, petitioner-intervenor filed a Reply, which was later adopted by petitioners.  Submitted as Annex "A" of
13

the Reply was a copy of the CHR Resolution dated May 22, 2014 regarding CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029.  We 14

noted and granted the same on August 11, 2014 and October 13, 2014.
Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation with motion to submit the case for early resolution,  which the Court
15

noted in a Resolution dated August 11, 2014 and October 3, 2014. 16

The Facts

Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, the country's premiere military academy
located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City. He belonged to the "A" Company and was the Deputy Baron of his
class. As claimed by petitioners and petitioner-intervenor (hereinafter collectively called "petitioners," unless
otherwise indicated), he was supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine
Navy Saber as the top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine Navy.

On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1 CL cadets had a lesson examination
(LE) on Operations Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr. Costales) at the PMAFI Room. Per
published schedule from the Headquarters Academic Group, the 4th period class in OR432 was from 1 :30-3:00
p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5th period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H).

Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5th period class issued a Delinquency Report (DR)
against Cadet 1 CL Cudia because he was "[/]ate for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class x x x. "  Cadets 1 CL
17

Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and Dela Cruz were also reported late for five minutes. 18

On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers. They were logged and transmitted to
the Company Tactical Officers ( CTO) for explanation of the concerned cadets. Two days later, Cadet lCL Cudia
received his DR.

In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet lCL Cudia reasoned out that: "I came directly from
OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir." 19

On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj. Hindang), the CTO of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, meted out
to him the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Immediately, Cadet lCL Cudia clarified with Maj. Hindang his
alleged violation. The latter told him that the basis of the punishment was the result of his conversation with Dr.
Costales, who responded that she never dismissed her class late, and the protocol to dismiss the class 10-15
minutes earlier than scheduled. When he expressed his intention to appeal and seek reconsideration of the
punishment, he was · advised to put the request in writing. Hence, that same day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia addressed his
Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Benjamin L. Leander, Senior Tactical Officer (STO),
asserting:

I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period
class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4t period class, I went to my next class without any
intention of being late Sir.
20

A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his comments on the request of Cadet 1 CL Cudia and to
indicate if there were other cadets belonging to the same section who were also late.

On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj. Leander pointing out that, based on his
investigation, the 4th period class was not dismissed late. As a result, Maj. Leander sustained the penalty imposed.
Petitioners alleged that Cadet 1 CL Cudia came to know of the denial of his request only on January 24, 2014 upon
inquiry with Maj. Leander.

Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia was informed that Maj. Hindang reported him to the
HC  for violation of the Honor Code. The Honor Report stated:
21

Lying that is giving statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal, stating that his 4th period class ended at l
500H that made him late in the succeeding class. 22

Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1 CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol (Cadet 1 CL Mogol), as to what Maj. Hindang
meant in his Report, Cadet lCL Cudia learned that it was based on Maj. Hindang's conversations with their
instructors and classmates as well as his statement in the request for reconsideration to Maj. Leander. He then
verbally applied for and was granted an extension of time to answer the charge against him because Dr. Costales,
who could shed light on the matter, was on emergency leave.

On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text messages to Cadet lCL Cudia, conveying:

Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me bkground na. She told me its a report dated november. When maj
hindang ask me, no time referens. (04:25:11 P.M.)

All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal during last day last december. Whc i told, i wud presume they wil
finish early bee its grp work. (04:29:21 P.M.)23

The next day, Cadets lCL Cudia and Arcangel approached Dr. Costales, who reaffirmed that she and Maj. Hindang
were not in the same time reference when the latter asked her.

Later, Cadet 1 CL Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the Honor Report. He averred:

Sir, We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell rang (1455), I stood up,
reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. After which, I and Cadet lcl Arcangel asked for
some query with regards (sic) to the deductions of our previous LE. Our instructor gladly answered our question.
She then told me that she will give the copy of our section grade, so I waited at the hallway outside the ACAD5
office, and then she came out of the room and gave me a copy of the grades. Cadet Arcangel, Cadet Narciso and I
immediately went to our 5ti period class which is ENG412.

With these statements, I would like to clarify the following:

1. How could this be lying?

2. What is wrong with the side of Maj. Hindang (why did he come up to that honor report)?

3. What are his assumptions?

I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that my case be reopened and carefully reviewed for I did not
violate the honor code/system, I can answer NO to both questions (Did I intend to deceive? Did I intend to take
undue advantage?) and for the following reasons:

1. The honor report of Maj. Hindang was already settled and finalized given the fact that no face-to-face
personal conversation with Ms. Costales was conducted to clarify what and when exactly was the issue at
hand.

2. Statements of the respondents support my explanation.

3. My explanation to my appeal to my DR (Request for reconsideration of meted punishment) further

supports my explanation in my delinquency report.

4. My understanding of the duration of the "CLASS" covers not just a lecture in a typical classroom
instruction but includes every transaction and communication a teacher does with her students, especially
that in our case some cadets asked for queries, and I am given instruction by which (sic) were directly
related to our CLASS. Her transaction and communication with our other classmates may have already
ended but ours extended for a little bit.

I agree and consider that because Cadet CUDIA is under my instruction to wait, and the other cadets still
have business with me, it is reasonable enough for him to say that "Our class was dismissed a bit late"
(dealing with matter of seconds or a minute particularly 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds)

And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I can say it ended on time (1500H).
 (signed)
M COSTALES

w/ attached certification

5. I was transparent and honest in explaining the 2-minute delay and did not attempt to conceal anything
that happened or I did.

6. Furthermore, CPT DULA WAN PA, the Tactical Officer of Hawk Company[,] and I had a conversation with
regards (sic) to the same matter for which he can give important points of my case.

7. Cadet lcl DIAZ "D" Co can also stand as a witness that I waited for Ms. Costales.  24

On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a preliminary investigation on the reported honor
violation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. The Foxtrot Company was designated as the investigating team and was composed
of Cadet 1 CL Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets 1 CL Mogol, lCL Raguindin, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua,
3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as members.  Soon after, the team submitted its Preliminary Investigation Report
25

recommending that the case be formalized.

The formal investigation against Cadet 1 CL Cu di a then ensued. The Presiding Officer was Cadet 1 CL Rhona K.
Salvacion, while the nine (9) voting members were Cadets lCL Jairus 0. Fantin, lCL Bryan Sonny S. Arlegui, 1 CL
Kim Adrian R. Martal, 1 CL J eanelyn P. Cabrido, 1 CL ShuAydan G. Ayada, 1 CL Dalton John G. Lagura, 2CL
Renato A. Carifio, Jr., 2CL Arwi C. Martinez, and 2CL Niko Angelo C. Tarayao.  Acting as recorders tasked to
26

document the entire proceedings were 4CL Jennifer A. Cuarteron and 3CL Leoncio Nico A. de Jesus 11.  Those 27

who observed the trial were Cadets 1 CL Balmeo, Dag-uman, Hasigan, Raguindin, Paulino, Arcangel, and Narciso;
Cadets 2CL Jocson and Saldua, Jr.; and Cadet 3CL Umaguing. 28

The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014 and lasted until early morning the next day. Cadet
lCL Cudia was informed of the charge against him, as to which he pleaded "Not Guilty." Among those who testified
were Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and Cadets 1 CL Arcangel and Narciso. On the second night of the hearing
held on January 21, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia again appeared and was called to the witness stand along with Cadets
Brit and Barrawed. Dr. Costales also testified under oath via phone on a loudspeaker. Deliberation among the HC
voting members followed. After that, the ballot sheets were distributed. The members cast their votes through secret
balloting and submitted their accomplished ballot sheets together with their written justification. The result was 8-1 in
favor of a guilty verdict. Cadet lCL Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet lCL Lagura) was the lone dissenter. Allegedly,
upon the order ofHC Chairman Cadet 1 CL Mogol, the Presiding Officer and voting members went inside a chamber
adjoining the court room for further deliberation. After several minutes, they went out and the Presiding Officer
announced the 9-0 guilty verdict. Cadet 1 CL Cudia, who already served nine (9) touring hours, was then informed
of the unanimous votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor Code. He was immediately placed in the PMA
Holding Center until the resolution of his appeal.

On January 24, 2014, Cadet ICL Cudia filed a written appeal addressed to the HC Chairman, the full text of which
stated:

WRITTEN APPEAL

14 NOVEMBER 2013

This is when I was reported for "Late for two (2) minutes in Eng412 class", my explanation on this delinquency
report when I received it, is that "Our class was dismissed a (little) bit late and I came directly from 4th period
class ... etc". Knowing the fact that in my delinquency report, it is stated that ENG412 classes started 1500H and I
am late for two minutes, it is logical enough for I (sic) to interpret it as "I came 1502H during that class". This is the
explanation that came into my mind that time. (I just cannot recall the exact words I used in explaining that
delinquency report, but what I want to say is that I have no intention to be late). In my statements, I convey my
message as "since I was not the only one left in that class, and the instructor is with us, I used the term "CLASS", I
used the word "DISMISSED" because I was under instruction (to wait for her to give the section grade) by the
instructor, Ms. Costales. The other cadets (lCL MIRANDA, lCL ARCANGEL) still have queries and business with her
that made me decide to use the word "CLASS", while the others who don't have queries and business with her (ex:
lCL NARCISO and 1 CL DIAZ) were also around.

Note:

The four named cadets were also reported late.

Reference: Para 171. 0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to Dismissal Time)(Sec XVII, CCAFPR s2008)

It is stated in this reference that "Cadets shall not linger in the place of instruction after the section has been
dismissed. EXCEPT when told or allowed to do so by the instructor or by any competent authority for official
purposes. "

The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me before the two bells rang (indicating the end of class hour, 1500H).
I waited for her for about 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds, that made me to decide to write "a little bit late" in
my explanation. Truly, the class ENDED 1500H but due to official purpose (instruction by Ms. Costales to wait) and
the conflict in academic schedule (to which I am not in control of the circumstances, 4th PD class 1330H-1500H and
5th PD class 1500H-1 600H), and since Ms. Costales, my other classmates, and I were there, I used the word
"CLASS".

19 December 2013

I was informed that my delinquency report was awarded, 11 Demerits and 13 Touring hours. Not because I don't
want to serve punishment, but because I know I did nothing wrong, I obeyed instruction, and believing that my
reason is justifiable and valid, that is why I approached our tactical officer, MAJ HINDANG PAF, to clarify and ask
why it was awarded that day.

In our conversation, he said that he had a phone call to my instructor and he even added that they have a protocol
to dismiss the class, 15 minutes or 10 minutes before 1500H. I explained:

Sir, I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th
period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4th period class, I went to my next class
without any intention of being late Sir.

These statements are supplementary to my explanation in my delinquency report, in here, I specified the conflict in
the schedule and again, I have no intention to be late. After explaining it further with these statements, my tactical
officer said that since I was reported in a written form, I should make an appeal in a written form. Thinking that he
already understood what I want to say, I immediately made an appeal that day stating the words that I used in
having conversation with him. 29

Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated January 24, 2014, wherein Dr. Costales attested:

1. That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL, [and] NARCISO was (sic) with Cadet CUDIA in making query about
their latest grades in OR432 and/or results of UEl outside the ACADS office. The following facts may explain
their queries on 14 November 2013:

a. That I held my class in the PMAFI room instead of room 104.

b. That OR432 releases grades every Wednesday and cadets are informed during Thursday, either
in class or posted grades in the bulletin board (grades released was [sic J based on the previous
LEs: latest LE before UE was Decision Trees).

c. That UE papers were already checked but not yet recorded due to (sic) other cadets have not
taken the UE. Cadets were allowed to verify scores but not to look at the papers.
 d. Last 23 January 2014, Captain Dulawan clarified if indeed Cadet NARCISO and ARCANGEL
verified grades. The two cadets said that they verified something with me after the OR432 class and
they were with Cadet CUD IA. That the statements of the three (3) cadets are all the same and
consistent, thus[,] I honor that as true.

2. As to the aspect of dismissing late, I could not really account for the specific time that I dismissed the
class. To this date, I [cannot] really recall an account that is more than two (2) months earlier. According to
my records, there was a lecture followed by an LE during (sic) on 14 November 2013. To determine the time
of my dismissal, maybe it can be verified with the other members of class I was handling on that said date. 30

Respondents contend that the HC denied the appeal the same day, January · 24, as it found no reason to conduct a
re-trial based on the arguments and evidence presented.  Petitioners, however, claim that the written appeal was
31

not acted upon until the filing of the petition-in-intervention.32

From January 25 to February 7, 2014, respondents allege that the Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted an
informal review to check the findings of the HC. During the course of the investigation, Prof. Berong was said to
have confirmed with the Officer-in-Charge of the HC that classes started as scheduled (i.e., 3:05 p.m. or 1505H),
and that Cadet lCL Barrawed, the acting class marcher of ENG412, verified before the Commandant, Assistant
Commandant, and STO that the class started not earlier than scheduled.

Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the HC forwarded the Formal Investigation Report to the Staff Judge
Advocate (SJA) for review. The next day, the SJA found the report to be legally in order.

On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez), the Commandant of Cadets, affirmed the HC
findings and recommended to Vice Admiral Edgar Abogado, then PMA Superintendent, the separation from the
PMA of Cadet lCL Cudia for violation of the First Tenet of the Honor Code (Lying, pursuant to Sec. VII.12.b of the
CCAFPR S-2008). On the same date, Special Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA Headquarters placing Cadet 1
CL Cudia on indefinite leave of absence without pay and allowances effective February 10, 2014 pending approval
of his separation by the AFPGHQ, barring him from future appointment and/or admission as cadet, and not
permitting him to qualify for any entrance requirements to the PMA.  33

Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation to dismiss Cadet 1 CL Cudia.

On February 13, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting for
reinstatement by the PMA of his status as a cadet. 34

Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee ), the sister of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, posted his plight in her Face book
account. The day after, the Spouses Cudia gave a letter to Major General Oscar Lopez (Maj. Gen. Lopez), the new
PMA Superintendent, asking to recognize the 8-1 voting of the HC.  Copies of which were furnished to the AFP
35

Chief of Staff and other concerned military officials. Subsequently, Maj. Gen. Lopez was directed to review Cadet
lCL Cudia's case. The latter, in turn, referred the matter to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB).

On February 19, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia made his personal appeal letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez. On even date, the AFP
Chief of Staff ordered a reinvestigation following the viral Facebook post of Annavee demanding the intervention of
the military leadership.

Petitioners claim that, on February 21, 2014, Special Order No. 1 was issued directing all PMA cadets to ostracize
Cadet 1 CL Cudia by not talking to him and by separating him from all activities/functions of the cadets. It is said that
any violation shall be a "Class 1" offense entailing 45 demerits, 90 hours touring, and 90 hours confinement. Cadet
1 CL Cudia was not given a copy of the order and learned about it only from the media.  According to an alleged
36

news report, PMA Spokesperson Major Agnes Lynette Flores (Maj. Flores) confirmed the HC order to ostracize
Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Among his offenses were: breach of confidentiality by putting documents in the social media,
violation of the PMA Honor Code, lack of initiative to resign, and smearing the name of the PMA. 37

On February 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia requested the CRAB for additional time, until March 4, 2014, to file an
appeal on the ground that his intended witnesses are in on-the-job training ( OJT).  As additional evidence to
38
support his appeal, he also requested for copies of the Minutes of the HC proceedings, relevant documents
pertaining to the case, and video footages and recordings of the HC hearings.

The next day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia and his family engaged the services of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in Baguio
City.

The CRAB conducted a review of the case based on the following: (a) letter of appeal of the Spouses Cudia dated
February 18, 2014; (b) directive from the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case; and ( c) guidance from Maj. Gen.
Lopez.

On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre M. Costales, Jr. (Brig. Gen. Costales, Jr.), the CRAB Chairman,
informed Cadet lCL Cudia that, pending approval of the latter's request for extension, the CRAB would continue to
review the case and submit its recommendations based on whatever evidence and testimonies received, and that it
could not favorably consider his request for copies of the HC minutes, relevant documents, and video footages and
recordings of the HC hearings since it was neither the appropriate nor the authorized body to take action
thereon.  Subsequently, upon verbal advice, Cadet 1 CL Cudia wrote a letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez reiterating his
39

request.40

Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-complaint before the CHR-Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR)
Office against the HC members and Maj. Gracilla for alleged violation of the human rights of Cadet lCL Cudia,
particularly his rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication.41

On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, through the PAO, moved for additional time, until March 19, 2014, to file his
appeal and submit evidence. PAO also wrote a letter to AFP Chief of Staff General Emmanuel T. Bautista (Gen.
Bautista) seeking for immediate directive to the PMA to expeditiously and favorably act on Cadet 1CL Cudia's
requests. 42

Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of Siklab Diwa Class, the following events transpired:

On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of PAO Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta.  On 43

the other hand, the CRAB submitted a report to the AFP-GHQ upholding the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. 44

On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from Maj. Gen. Lopez stating the denial of Cadet 1CL Cudia's requests
for extension of time to file an Appeal Memorandum in view of the ample time already given, and to be furnished
with a copy of relevant documents because of confidentiality and presumption of regularity of the HC
proceedings.  Cadet 1CL Cudia, through PAO, then filed an Appeal Memorandum  before the CRAB.
45 46

On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Pres. Aquino), who is
the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, attaching thereto the Appeal Memorandum.  On the same day, Special Orders
47

No. 48 was issued by the PMA constituting a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB
members and PMA senior officers to conduct a deliberate investigation pertaining to Cadet 1CL Cudia's Appeal
Memorandum.  The focus of the inquiry was not just to find out whether the appeal has merit or may be considered
48

but also to investigate possible involvement of other cadets and members of the command related to the incident
and to establish specific violation of policy or regulations that had been violated by other cadets and members of the
HC.49

On March 13, 2014, the Cudia family and the Chief Public Attorney had a dialogue with Maj. Gen. Lopez. On March
14, 2014, the CHR-CAR came out with its preliminary findings, which recommended the following:

a. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to respect and uphold the 8 Guilty - 1 Not guilty vote;

b. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to officially pronounce Cdt Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed
against him before the Honor Committee;

c. For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-fledge graduating cadet and allow
him to graduate on Sunday, 16 March 2014;
 d. For the PMA to fully cooperate with the CHR in the investigation of Cudia's Case. 50

On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family had a meeting with Pres. Aquino and Department of National
Defense (DND) Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin. The President recommended that they put in writing their appeal,
requests, and other concerns. According to respondents, the parties agreed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia would not join
the graduation but it was without prejudice to the result of the appeal, which was elevated to the AFP Chief of Staff.
The President then tasked Gen. Bautista to handle the reinvestigation of the case, with Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez
supervising the group conducting the review.

Four days after Siklab Diwa Class' graduation day, petitioner Renato S. Cudia received a letter dated March 11,
2014 from the Office of the AFP Adjutant General and signed by Brig. Gen. Ronald N. Albano for the AFP Chief of
Staff, affirming the CRAB' s denial of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s appeal. It held:

After review, The Judge Advocate General, APP finds that the action of the PMA CRAB in denying the appeal for
reinvestigation is legally in order. There was enough evidence to sustain the finding of guilt and the proprietary (sic)
of the punishment imposed. Also, your son was afforded sufficient time to file his appeal from the date he was
informed of the final verdict on January 21, 2014, when the decision of the Honor Committee was read to him in
person, until the time the PMA CRAB conducted its review on the case. Moreover, the continued stay of your son at
the Academy was voluntary. As such, he remained subject to the Academy's policy regarding visitation. Further,
there was no violation of his right to due process considering that the procedure undertaken by the Honor
Committee and PMA CRAB was consistent with existing policy. Thus, the previous finding and recommendation of
the Honor Committee finding your son, subject Cadet guilty of "Lying" and recommending his separation from the
Academy is sustained.

In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to deny your appeal for lack of merit.  Thereafter, the Fact-
51

Finding Board/Investigating Body issued its Final Investigation Report on March 23, 2014 denying Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's appeal.  Subsequently, on April 28, 2014, the special investigation board tasked to probe the case
52

submitted its final report to the President.  Pursuant to the administrative appeals process, the DND issued a
53

Memorandum dated May 23, 2014, directing the Office of AFP Chief of Staff to submit the complete records of the
case for purposes of DND review and recommendation for disposition by the President. 54

Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its Resolution with respect to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029,
concluding and recommending as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission on Human Rights-CAR Office finds PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of the PMA Honor Committee and ..
certain PMA officials, specifically for violations of the rights of CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due
process, education, privacy/privacy of communication, and good life.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR Office RESOLVED to indorse to competent authorities for their
immediate appropriate action on the following recommendations:

1. The Philippine Military Academy must set aside the "9-Guilty, 0-Not Guilty" verdict against Cadet Aldrin
Jeff P. Cudia, for being null and void; to uphold and respect the "8-Guilty, 1-Not Guilty" voting result and
make an official pronouncement of NOT GUILTY in favor of Cadet Cudia;

2. The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the President in whose hands rest the ends of justice and fate of
Cadet Cudia, to:

2.1 officially proclaim Cadet Cudia a graduate and alumnus of the Philippine Military Academy;

2.2 issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding Diploma for the degree of Bachelors of Science; and

2.3 Issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding official transcript 'of his academic records for his BS
degree, without conditions therein as to his status as a PMA cadet.
3. The Public Attorneys' Office to provide legal services to Cadet Cudia in pursuing administrative, criminal
and civil suits against the officers and members of the Honor Committee named hereunder, for violation of
the Honor Code and System and the Procedure in Formal Investigation, dishonesty, violation of the secrecy
of the ballot, tampering the true result of the voting, perjury, intentional omission in the Minutes of
substantive part of the formal trial proceedings which are prejudicial to the interest of justice and Cadet
Cudia's fundamental rights to dignity, non-discrimination and due process, which led to the infringement of
his right to education and even transgressing his right to a good life.

3.1 Cdt lCL MIKE ANTHONY MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.2 Cdt lCL RHONA K. SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.3 Cdt 2CL ARWI C. MARTINEZ

3.4 Cdt 2CL RENATO A. CARINO, JR.

3.5 Cdt 2CL NIKOANGELOC. TARAYAO

3.6 Cdt lCL JEANEL YN P. CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.7 Cdt lCL KIM ADRIAN R. MARTAL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.8 Cdt lCL JAIRUS 0. FANTIN, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.9 Cdt lCL BRYAN SONNY S. ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.10 Cdt lCL DALTON JOHN G. LAGURA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.11 Cdt 1 CL BIANCHIHEIMER L. EDRA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.12 Cdt 4CL JENNIFER A. CUARTERON (recorder)

3.13 Cdt 3CL LEONCIO NICO A. DE JESUS II (record)

4. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA competent authorities should investigate and file
appropriate charges against Maj. VLADIMIR P. GRACILLA, for violation of the right to privacy of Cadet
Cudia and/or failure, as intelligence officer, to ensure the protection of the right to privacy of Cudia who was
then billeted at the PMA Holding Center;

5. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and PMA competent authorities should investigate Maj. DENNIS
ROMMEL HINDANG for his failure and ineptness to exercise his responsibility as a competent Tactical
Officer and a good father of his cadets, in this case, to Cadet Cudia; for failure to respect exhaustion of
administrative remedies;

6. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philppines, the PMA
Superintendent, to immediately cause the comprehensive review of all rules of procedures, regulations,
policies, including the so-called practices in the implementation of the Honor Code; and, thereafter, adopt
new policies, rules of procedures and relevant regulations which are human-rights based and consistent with
the Constitution and other applicable laws;

7. The Congress of the Philippines to consider the enactment of a law defining and penalizing ostracism and
discrimination, which is apparently being practiced in the PMA, as a criminal offense in this jurisdiction;

8. His Excellency The President of the Philippines to certify as priority, the passage of an anti-ostracism
and/or anti-discrimination law; and
 9. Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA authorities to ensure respect and protection of the rights of
those who testified for the cause of justice and truth as well as human rights of Cadet Cudia.

RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by the competent authorities on the foregoing CHR
recommendations.

Let copy of this resolution be served by personal service or by substituted service to the complainants (the spouses
Renato and Filipina Cudia; and Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia), and all the respondents. Also, to the PMA Superintendent, the
AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, His Excellency The President of the Philippines, The Public
Attorneys' Office.

SO RESOLVED. 55

On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained the findings of the AFP Chief of Staff and the CRAB. The
letter, which was addressed to the Spouses Cudia and signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., stated
in whole:

This refers to your letters to the President dated 12 March 2014 and 26 March 2014 appealing for a reconsideration
of the decision of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Honor Committee on the case of your son, Cadet 1 CL
Aldrin Jeff Cudia.

After carefully studying the records of the case of Cadet Cudia, the decision of the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Honor Code System of the AFP Cadet Corps, this Office has found no
substantial basis to disturb the findings of the AFP and the PMA Cadet Review Appeals Board (CRAB). There is no
competent evidence to support the claim that the decision of the Honor Committee members was initially at 8
"Guilty" votes and 1 "Not Guilty" vote. The lone affidavit of an officer, based on his purported conversation with one
Honor Committee member, lacks personal knowledge on the deliberations of the said Committee and is hearsay at
best.

Similarly, the initial recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights cannot be adopted as basis that Cadet
Cudia's due process rights were violated. Apart from being explicitly preliminary in nature, such recommendations
are anchored on a finding that there was an 8-1 vote which, as discussed above, is not supported by competent
evidence.

In the evaluation of Cadet Cudia's case, this Office has been guided by the precept that military law is regarded to
be in a class of its own, "applicable only to military personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization
requiring a system of discipline separate from that of civilians" (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August
2005 citing Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d 184 [1975] and Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 US 83 [1953]). Thus, this Office
regarded the findings of the AFP Chief, particularly his conclusion that there was nothing irregular in the
proceedings that ensued, as carrying great weight.

Accordingly, please be informed that the President has sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the PMA
CRAB. 56

The Issues

To petitioners, the issues for resolution are:

I.

WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING CADET FIRST CLASS
ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA FROM THE ACADEMY IN UTTER DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
CONSIDERING THAT:

A. Despite repeated requests for relevant documents regarding his case, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia
was deprived of his right to have access to evidence which would have proven his defense, would have
 totally belied the charge against him, and more importantly, would have shown the irregularity in the Honor
Committee's hearing and rendition of decision

B. Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was vaguely informed of the decisions arrived at by the Honor
Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy

C. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy have
afforded Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia nothing but a sham trial

D. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy
violated their own rules and principles as embodied in the Honor Code

E. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy, in
deciding Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia's case, grossly and in bad faith, misapplied the Honor Code so
as to defy the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the unquestionable fact that the former should yield to the
latter.

II

WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT CADET FIRST CLASS
ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA LIED, THEREBY VIOLATING THE HONOR CODE

III

WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED BY THE

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS OF SUCH GREAT WEIGHT AND PERSUASIVE NATURE THAT THIS
HONORABLE COURT MAY HONOR, UPHOLD AND RESPECT 57

On the other hand, in support of their prayer to dismiss the petition, respondents presented the issues below:

PROCEDURAL GROUNDS

I.

THE MANDAMUS PETITION PRAYING THAT CADET CUDIA BE INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF GRADUATES OF
SIKLAB DIWA CLASS OF 2014 AND BE ALLOWED TO TAKE PART IN THE COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES
HAS ALREADY BEEN RENDERED MOOT.

II.

THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE ACTUALLY FACTUAL WHICH ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.

III.

MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL RESPONDENTS TO GRANT THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR. IV. IT IS
PREMATURE TO INVOKE JUDICIAL REDRESS PENDING THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT ON CADET
CUDIA'S APPEAL.

V.

WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT MUST EXERCISE CAREFUL RESTRAINT AND
REFRAIN FROM UNDULY OR PREMATURELY INTERFERING WITH LEGITIMATE MILITARY MATTERS.

SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
 VI.

CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED CERTAIN CIVIL LIBERTIES BY
VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE PMA.

VII.

THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH AUTHORIZES IT TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY
MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT AS IT DEEMS FIT AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PECULIAR NEEDS OF THE
ACADEMY.

VIII.

CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

The PMA has regulatory authority to administratively terminate cadets despite the absence of statutory authority.

Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative dismissal of a guilty cadet.

Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by providing untruthful statements in the explanation for his
tardiness.

The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt the findings of the Honor Committee.

The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case were properly accorded to Cadet Cudia.

The subtle evolution in the voting process of the Honor Committee, by incorporating executive session/chambering,
was adopted to further strengthen the voting procedure of the Honor Committee. Cadet Lagura voluntarily changed
his vote without any pressure from the other voting members of the Honor Committee.

Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the PMA.

The findings of the Commission on Human Rights are not binding on the Honorable Court, and are, at best,
recommendatory.

Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his future when he was dismissed from the PMA. 58

The Ruling of the Court

PROCEDURAL GROUNDS

Propriety of a petition for mandamus

Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of the petition praying that Cadet 1 CL Cudia be included in the list
of graduating cadets and for him to take part in the commencement exercises was already rendered moot and
academic when the graduation ceremonies of the PMA Siklab Diwa Class took place on March 16, 2014. Also, a
petition for mandamus is improper since it does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Invoking
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,  respondents assert that a mandamus
59

petition could not be availed of to compel an academic institution to allow a student to continue studying therein
because it is merely a privilege and not a right. In this case, there is a clear failure on petitioners' part to establish
that the PMA has the, ministerial duty to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list, much less award him with academic
honors and commission him to the Philippine Navy. Similar to the case of University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,  it is submitted that the PMA may rightfully exercise its discretionary power on who may be admitted to
60

study pursuant to its academic freedom.

In response, petitioners contend that while the plea to allow Cadet 1 CL Cudia to participate in the PMA 2014
commencement exercises could no longer be had, the Court may still grant the other reliefs prayed for. They add
that Garcia enunciated that a respondent can be ordered to act in a particular manner when there is a violation of a
constitutional right, and that the certiorari aspect of the petition must still be considered because it is within the
province of the Court to determine whether a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess thereof.

We agree that a petition for mandamus is improper.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer,
or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.

For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act
should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform
the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to
decide how or when to perform the duty. 61

In this case, petitioners pray for, among others: Also, after due notice and hearing, it is prayed of the Court to issue
a Writ of Mandamus to:

1. direct the PMA to include Cadet Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA,
including inclusion in the yearbook;

2. direct the PMA to allow Cadet Cudia to take part in the commencement exercises if he completed all the
requirements for his baccalaureate degree;

3. direct the PMA to award unto Cadet Cudia the academic honors he deserves, and the commission as a
new Philippine Navy ensign;

4. direct the Honor Committee to submit to the CRAB of the PMA all its records of the proceedings taken
against Cadet Cudia, including the video footage and audio recordings of the deliberations and voting, for
the purpose of allowing the CRAB to conduct intelligent review of the case of Cadet Cudia;

5. direct the PMA's CRAB to conduct a review de nova of all the records without requiring Cadet Cudia to
submit new evidence if it was physically impossible to do so;

6. direct the PMA's CRAB to take into account the certification signed by Dr. Costales, the new evidence
consisting of the affidavit of a military officer declaring under oath that the cadet who voted "not guilty"
revealed to this officer that this cadet was coerced into changing his vote, and other new evidence if there is
any;

7. direct the PMA's CRAB to give Cadet Cudia the right to a counsel who is allowed to participate actively in
the proceedings as well as in the cross-examinations during the exercise of the right to confront witnesses
against him; and

8. direct the Honor Committee in case of remand of the case by the CRAB to allow Cadet Cudia a
representation of a counsel. 62

Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the following reliefs:

A. xxx

B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding:

 a.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to respect and uphold the 8 Guilty -1 Not Guilty vote;

b.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to officially pronounce Cadet Cudia as Not Guilty of the
charge filed against him before the Honor Committee;

c.) The PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet,
including his diploma and awards. 63

Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014
and to allow him to take part in the commencement exercises, the same was rendered moot and academic when
the graduation ceremonies pushed through on March 16, 2014 without including Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the roll of
graduates.

With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-fledged
graduating cadet, including his diploma, awards, and commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign, the same
cannot be granted in a petition for mandamus on the basis of academic freedom, which We shall discuss in more
detail below. Suffice it to say at this point that these matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of
academic freedom; therefore, beyond the province of the Court to decide.  The powers to confer degrees at the
64

PMA, grant awards, and commission officers in the military service are discretionary acts on the part of the
President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief. Borrowing the words of Garcia:

There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In
terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a
right. She [in this case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia] cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a
mandamus proceeding. 65

Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or government
agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.  For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a
66

clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to
perform the act sought to be mandated. 67

The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought by petitioners, which pertain to the HC and
the CRAB proceedings. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus petition does
not lie to require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to control or review the exercise of discretion; it will not
issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. 68

The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case must proceed since, as argued by petitioners, the Court is
empowered to settle via petition for certiorari whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents
in dismissing Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA.

Factual nature of the issues

According to respondents, the petition raises issues that actually require the Court to make findings of fact because
it sets forth several factual disputes which include, among others: the tardiness of Cadet 1 CL Cudia in , his
ENG412 class and his explanation thereto, the circumstances that transpired in the investigation of his Honor Code
violation, the proceedings before the HC, and the allegation that Cadet 1 CL Lagura was forced to change his vote
during the executive session/"chambering."

In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant controversy presents legal issues. Rather than determining which
between the two conflicting versions of the parties is true, the case allegedly centers on the application,
appreciation, and interpretation of a person's rights to due process, to education, and to property; the interpretation
of the PMA Honor Code and Honor System; and the conclusion on whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia's explanation
constitutes lying. Even if the instant case involves questions of fact, petitioners still hold that the Court is empowered
to settle mixed questions of fact and law. Petitioners are correct.
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the
conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.  The petition does not exclusively present factual matters
69

for the Court to decide. As pointed out, the all-encompassing issue of more importance is the determination of
whether a PMA cadet has rights to due process, to education, and to property in the context of the Honor Code and
the Honor System, and, if in the affirmative, the extent or limit thereof. Notably, even respondents themselves raise
substantive grounds that We have to resolve. In support of their contention that the Court must exercise careful
restraint and should refrain from unduly or prematurely interfering in legitimate military matters, they argue that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia has necessarily and voluntarily relinquished certain civil liberties by virtue of his entry into the
PMA, and that the Academy enjoys academic freedom authorizing the imposition of disciplinary measures and
punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the PMA. These issues, aside from being
purely legal being purely legal questions, are of first impression; hence, the Court must not hesitate to make a
categorical ruling.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Respondents assert that the Court must decline jurisdiction over the petition pending President Aquino’s resolution
of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' appeal. They say that there is an obvious non-exhaustion of the full administrative process.
While Cadet 1 CL Cudia underwent the review procedures of his guilty verdict at the Academy level - the
determination by the SJA of whether the HC acted according to the established procedures of the Honor System,
the assessment by the Commandant of Cadets of the procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict, the
evaluation of the PMA Superintendent to warrant the administrative separation of the guilty cadet, and the appellate
review proceedings before the CRAB - he still appealed to the President, who has the utmost latitude in making
decisions affecting the military. It is contended that the President's power over the persons and actions of the
members of the armed forces is recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.) Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga  and in Section 31  of
70 71

Commonwealth Act (CA.) No. 1 (also known as "The National Defense Act''). As such, the President could still
overturn the decision of the PMA. In respondents' view, the filing of this petition while the case is pending resolution
of the President is an irresponsible defiance, if not a personal affront. For them, comity dictates that courts of justice
should shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.

From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however, consider that President Aquino effectively denied the appeal of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They claim that his family exerted insurmountable efforts to seek reconsideration of the HC
recommendation from the APP officials and the President, but was in vain. The circumstances prior to, during, and
after the PMA 2014 graduation rites, which was attended by President Aquino after he talked to Cadet lCL Cudia's
family the night before, foreclose the possibility that the challenged findings would still be overturned. In any case,
petitioners insist that the· rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute based on the Corsiga v.
Defensor  and Verceles v. BLR-DOLE  rulings.
72 73

We rule for petitioners.

In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative
remedy has been exhausted. The rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that
"courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative
remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities, who are competent to act upon the matter
complained of, have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed
in the administrative forum."  In the U.S. case of Ringgold v. United States,  which was cited by respondents, it was
74 75

specifically held that in a typical case involving a decision by military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his
remedies within the military before appealing to the court, the doctrine being designed both to preserve the balance
between military and civilian authorities and to conserve judicial resources.

Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party may directly resort to judicial remedies if
any of the following is present:

1. when there is a violation of due process;

2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;

 3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;

4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;

5. when there is irreparable injury;

6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the
implied and assumed approval of the latter;

7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;

8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;

9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;

10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and

11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 76

Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA. Thus, it
may be a ground to give due course to the petition despite the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Yet more
significant is the fact that during the pendency of this case, particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of the President
finally issued its ruling, which sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this
supervening event bars any objection to the petition based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Court's interference within military affairs

Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v. Marsh  and Schlesinger v. Councilman  to support their contention that
77 78

judicial intervention would pose substantial threat to military discipline and that there should be a deferential review
of military statutes and regulations since political branches have particular expertise and competence in assessing
military needs. Likewise, in Orloff v. Willoughby  and Parker v. Levy,  it was allegedly opined by the U.S. Supreme
79 80

Court that the military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the
civilian. According to respondents, the U.S. courts' respect to the military recognizes that constitutional rights may
apply differently in the military context than in civilian society as a whole. Such military deference is exercised either
by refusing to apply due process and equal protection doctrines in military cases or applying them but with leniency.

In respondents' view, although Philippine courts have the power of judicial review in cases attended with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, policy considerations call for the widest latitude of
deference to military affairs. Such respect is exercised by the court where the issues to be resolved entail a
substantial consideration of legitimate governmental interest. They suppose that allowing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case
to prosper will set an institutionally dangerous precedent, opening a Pandora's box of other challenges against the
specialized system of discipline of the PMA. They state that with the PMA's mandate to train cadets for permanent
commission in the AFP, its disciplinary rules and procedure necessarily must impose h different standard of conduct
compared with civilian institutions.

Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this Court is part of the State's check-and-balance machinery,
specifically mandated by Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to ensure that no branch of the government or any of
its officials acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of, discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. They assert that judicial non-interference in military affairs is not deemed as absolute even in the U.S.
They cite Schlesinger and Parker, which were invoked by respondents, as well as Burns v. Wilson  and Harmon v.
81

Brucker,  wherein the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the proceedings of military tribunals on account of issues
82

posed concerning due process and violations of constitutional rights. Also, in Magno v. De Villa  decided by this
83

Court, petitioners note that We, in fact, exercised the judicial power to determine whether the APP and the members
of the court martial acted with grave abuse o.f discretion in their military investigation.

Petitioners' contentions are tenable.

Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the political branches of the government, not the courts, with superintendence
and control over the military because the courts generally lack the competence and expertise necessary to evaluate
military decisions and they are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon
military authority might have.  Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, We rule that the facts as well as the legal issues
84

in the U.S. cases cited by respondents are not on all fours with the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Instead, what applies
is the 1975 U.S. case of Andrews v. Knowlton,  which similarly involved cadets who were separated from the United
85

States Military Academy due to Honor Code violations. Following Wasson v. Trowbridge  and Hagopian v.
86

Knowlton,  Andrews re-affirmed the power of the district courts to review procedures used at the service academies
87

in the separation or dismissal of cadets and midshipmen. While it recognized the "constitutional permissibility of the
military to set and enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics," it said that the courts "have
expanded at an accelerated pace the scope of judicial access for review of military determinations." Later, in Kolesa
v. Lehman,  it was opined that it has been well settled that federal courts have jurisdiction "where there is a
88

substantial claim that prescribed military procedures violates one's constitutional rights." By 1983, the U.S.
Congress eventually made major revisions to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by expressly providing,
among others; for a direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court of decisions by the military's highest appellate
authority.89

Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position of petitioners is still formidable. In this jurisdiction, Section 1 Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by mandating that the duty of the courts of justice
includes not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but
also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.  Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
90

exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 91

The proceedings of the Cadet Honor Committee can, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, be considered a
governmental activity. As ruled in Andrews:

The relationship between the Cadet Honor Committee and the separation process at the Academy has been
sufficiently formalized, and is sufficiently interdependent, so as to bring that committee's activities within the
definition of governmental activity for the purposes of our review. While the Academy has long had the informal
practice of referring all alleged violations to the Cadet Honor Committee, the relationship between that committee
and the separation process has to a degree been formalized. x x x

Regardless of whether the relationship be deemed formal or informal, the Honor Committee under its own
procedures provides that a single "not guilty" vote by a member ends the matter, while a "guilty" finding confronts a
cadet with the hard choice of either resigning or electing to go before a Board of Officers. An adverse finding there
results not only in formal separation from the Academy but also in a damaging record that will follow the cadet
through life. Accordingly, we conclude that the Cadet Honor Committee, acting not unlike a grand jury, is clearly part
of the process whereby a cadet can ultimately be adjudged to have violated the Cadet Honor Code and be
separated from the Academy. Therefore, the effect of the committee's procedures and determinations on the
separation process is sufficiently intertwined with the formal governmental activity which may follow as to bring it
properly under judicial review 92

No one is above the law, including the military. In fact, the present Constitution declares it as a matter of principle
that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.  Consistent with the republican system of checks and
93

balances, the Court has been entrusted, expressly or by necessary implication, with both the duty and the obligation
of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. 94

SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS

Cadet's relinquishment of certain civil liberties

Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable to a cadet is not the same as that of a civilian because the
former' s rights have already been recalibrated to best serve the military purpose and necessity. They claim that
both Gudani and Lt. Col. Kapunan, Jr. v. Gen. De Villa  recognized that, to a certain degree, individual rights of
95
persons in the military service may be curtailed by the rules of military discipline in order to ensure its effectiveness
in fulfilling the duties required to be discharged under the law. Respondents remind that, as a military student
aspiring to a commissioned post in the military service, Cadet 1 CL Cudia voluntarily gave up certain civil and
political rights which the rest of the civilian population enjoys. The deliberate surrender of certain freedoms on his
part is embodied in the cadets' Honor Code Handbook. It is noted that at the beginning of their academic life in the
PMA, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, along with the rest of Cadet Corps, took an oath and undertaking to stand by the Honor
Code and the Honor System.

To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental human rights, including the right to due process, is, for
petitioners, contrary to the provisions of Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,  Executive Order (E.O.) No.
96

178  (as amended by E.O. No. 1005 ), AFP Code of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor
97 98

System, military professionalism, and, in general, military culture. They maintain that the HC, the CRAB, and the
PMA, grossly and in bad faith misapplied the Honor Code and the Honor System in deciding Cadet lCL Cudia's case
considering that these should not be implemented at the expense of human rights, due process, and fair play.
Further, under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, they can never overpower or defy the 1987 Constitution
since the former should yield to the latter. Petitioners stress that the statement that "a cadet can be compelled to
surrender some civil rights and liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented" simply pertains to
what cadets have to sacrifice in order to prove that they are men or women of integrity and honor, such as the right
to entertain vices and the right to freely choose what they want to say or do. In the context of disciplinary
investigation, it does not contemplate a surrender of the right to due process but, at most, refers to the cadets' rights
to privacy and to remain silent.

We concur with the stand of petitioners.

Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for the proper
functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a student at a civilian
public school.  In fact, the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook of the PMA expresses that, "[as] a training
99

environment, the Cadet Corps is a society which has its own norms. Each member binds himself to what is good for
him, his subordinates, and his peers. To be part of the Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights and
liberties for the good of the group." 100

It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian, which were adopted by Andrews, that a cadet
facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected private interests (life,
liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a
must.  For that reason, the PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good name,
101

reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, the minimal requirements
of the due process clause must be satisfied.  Likewise, the cadet faces far more severe sanctions of being expelled
102

from a course of college instruction which he or she has pursued with a view to becoming a career officer and of
probably

being forever denied that career. 103

The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do not specifically pertain to dismissal proceedings
of a cadet in a military academy due to honor violation. In Gudani, the Court denied the petition that sought to annul
the directive from then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which' enjoined petitioners from testifying before the
Congress without her consent. We ruled that petitioners may be subjected to military discipline for their defiance of a
direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. On the other hand, in Kapunan, Jr., this Court upheld the restriction imposed
on petitioner since the conditions for his "house arrest" (particularly, that he may not issue any press statements or
give any press conference during the period of his detention) are justified by the requirements of military discipline.
In these two cases, the constitutional rights to information, transparency in matters of public concern, and to free
speech - not to due process clause - were restricted to better serve the greater military purpose. Academic freedom
of the PMA

Petitioners posit that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss or
recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA. They argue that Honor Code violation is not among those listed
as justifications for the attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System do not state that a
guilty cadet is automatically terminated or dismissed from service. To them, the Honor Code and Honor System are
"gentleman's agreement" that cannot take precedence over public interest - in the defense of the nation and in view
of the taxpayer's money spent for each cadet. Petitioners contend that, based on the Civil Code, all written or verbal
agreements are null and void if they violate the law, good morals, good customs, public policy, and public safety.

In opposition, respondents claim that the PMA may impose disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit
and consistent with the peculiar needs of the Academy. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has
regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets since it is deemed reasonably written into C.A. No. 1.
Moreover, although said law grants to the President the authority of terminating a cadet's appointment, such power
may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.

Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic institution, the PMA has the inherent right to promulgate
reasonable norms, rules and regulations that it may deem necessary for the maintenance of school discipline, which
is specifically mandated by Section 3 (2),  Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. As the premiere military educational
104

institution of the AFP in accordance with Section 30,  Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59,  Chapter 9,
105 106

Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292 ("Administrative Code of 1987"), the PMA is an institution that enjoys
academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2),  Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. In Miriam College
107

Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,  it was held that concomitant with such freedom is the right and duty to instill
108

and impose discipline upon its students. Also, consistent with lsabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal,
Inc.  and Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,  the PMA has the freedom on who to admit (and, conversely,
109 110

to expel) given the high degree of discipline and honor expected from its students who are to form part of the AFP.

For respondents, Cadet 1 CL Cudia cannot, therefore, belatedly assail the Honor Code as basis of the HC' s
decision to recommend his dismissal from the PMA. When he enlisted for enrolment and studied in the PMA for four
years, he knew or should have been fully aware of the standards of discipline imposed on all cadets and the
corresponding penalty for failing to abide by these standards.

In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in lsabelo, Jr. and Ateneo, academic freedom is not absolute and
cannot be exercised in blatant disregard of the right to due process and the 1987 Constitution. Although schools
have the prerogative to choose what to teach, how to teach, and who to teach, the same does not go so far as to
deprive a student of the right to graduate when there is clear evidence that he is entitled to the same since, in such
a case, the right to graduate becomes a vested right which takes precedence over the limited and restricted right of
the educational institution.

While both parties have valid points to consider, the arguments of respondents are more in line with the facts of this
case. We have ruled that the school-student relationship is contractual in nature. Once admitted, a student's
enrolment is not only semestral in duration but for the entire period he or she is expected to complete it.  An 111

institution of learning has an obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to
pursue.  Such contract is imbued with public interest because of the high priority given by the Constitution to
112

education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over a educational institutions. 113

The school-student relationship has also been held as reciprocal. "[It] has consequences appurtenant to and
inherent in all contracts of such kind -it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school
undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or a profession.
On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules
and regulations."114

Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher
learning,  has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.  In Garcia, this Court espoused the
115 116

concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,  which 117

enumerated "the four essential freedoms" of a university: To determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may
teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to study.  An educational
118

institution has the power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for its government, this
being incident to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of the
college.  It can decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or
119

interference except when there is an overriding public welfare which would call for some restraint.  Indeed,
120

"academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative
duty to exercise it responsibly. An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article
19 of the Civil Code, that every 'person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."' 121
The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom and that "the
establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may
be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival."  As
122

a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the
mill, so does the school's disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue operating.  In this regard, the
123

Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to
dismiss or expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules.  In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of
124

Appeals,  this Court elucidated:

125

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught."
A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations
necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment
conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty,
and property.

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in
any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the
student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach." Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty
to develop discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.

[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human
rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and
duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline,
encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational
efficiency.

In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carry out its responsibility to help its
students "grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community."

Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in "who may be admitted to
study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine
whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the
withholding of graduation privileges. 126

The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for any act done by the
student prior thereto. In University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals,  We upheld the university's
127

withdrawal of a doctorate degree already conferred on a student who was found to have committed intellectual
dishonesty in her dissertation. Thus:

Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher
learning." This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic
freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As
pointed out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom
granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the
choice of students." If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly
can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the
right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not
terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, .as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of
such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent's case began before
her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many
investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been allowed to
graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant of
academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, "is not
to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion."

Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines. It
has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council. It follows that if the conferment
of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due
process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating a student's rights. An institution of higher learning cannot
be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more
objectionable than bestowing a university's highest academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same
through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the university's concern. It should be empowered, as
an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.

While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an educational
institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it
that this freedom is not jeopardized.128

It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry,
but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total
man.  Essentially, education must ultimately be religious, i.e., one which inculcates duty and reverence.  Under the
129 130

rubric of "right to education," students have a concomitant duty to learn under the rules laid down by the
school.  Every citizen has a right to select a profession or, course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and
131

equitable admission and academic requirements.  The PMA is not different. As the primary training and educational
132

institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules
and regulations, which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular.

The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle. It is the minimum standard for cadet
behavior and serves as the guiding spirit behind each cadet's action. It is the cadet's responsibility to maintain the
highest standard of honor. Throughout a cadet's stay in the PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It binds as
well the members of the Cadet Corps from its alumni or the member of the so-called "Long Gray Line."

Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets' character development. It defines the desirable
values they must possess to remain part of the Corps; it develops the atmosphere of trust so essential in a military
organization; and it makes them professional military soldiers.  As it is for character building, it should not only be
133

kept within the society of cadets. It is best adopted by the Cadet Corps with the end view of applying it outside as an
officer of the AFP and as a product of the PMA. 134

The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary means of achieving the cadets' character
development and as ways by which the Academy has chosen to identify those who are deficient in conduct.  Upon 135

the Code rests the ethical standards of the Cadet Corps and it is also an institutional goal, ensuring that graduates
have strong character, unimpeachable integrity, and moral standards of the highest order.  To emphasize, the
136

Academy's disciplinary system as a whole is characterized as "correctional and educational in nature rather than
being legalistic and punitive." Its purpose is to teach the cadets "to be prepared to accept full responsibility for all
that they do or fail to do and to place loyalty to the service above self-interest or loyalty to friends or associates.
"  Procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case
137

Respondents stress that Guzman v. National University  is more appropriate in determining the minimum standards
138

for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. Similarly, with the guideposts set in Andrews,
they believe that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was accorded due process.

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the HC, the CRAB and the PMA fell short in observing the important
safeguards laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR  and Non v. Judge Dames II,  which set the minimum standards to
139 140

satisfy the demands of procedural due process in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. For them, Guzman did not
entirely do away with the due process requirements outlined in Ang Tibay as the Court merely stated that the
minimum requirements in the Guzman case are more apropos.

Respondents rightly argued.

Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong  already settled the issue as it held that although both Ang Tibay and
141

Guzman essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the latter case is more apropos since it specifically
deals with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions.
That Guzman is the authority on the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the Court
in the fairly recent case of Go v. Colegio De San Juan De Letran. 142

In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process, to wit:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall
have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; ( 4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5)
the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities
to hear and decide the case. 143

We have been consistent in reminding that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice;  that the
144

proceedings may be summary;  that cross-examination is not an essential part of the investigation or hearing;  and
145 146

that the required proof in a student disciplinary action, which is an administrative case, is neither proof beyond
reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 147

What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the individual, which generally
encompass the right of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.  As held in De La Salle
148

University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 149

Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that
must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her
cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process.

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process - it is enough that the
parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to
present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. "To be heard" does not only mean presentation
of testimonial evidence in court - one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. 150

The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted to investigate a cadet's
honor violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. It articulates that – The Spirit of the
Honor Code guides the Corps in identifying and assessing misconduct. While cadets are interested in legal
precedents in cases involving Honor violations, those who hold the Spirit of the Honor Code dare not look into these
precedents for loopholes to justify questionable acts and they are not to interpret the system to their own advantage.

The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the cadets to internalize Honor in a substantive way. Technical and
procedural misgivings of the legal systems may avert the true essence of imparting the Spirit of the Code for the
reason that it can be used to make unlawful attempt to get into the truth of matters especially when a cadet can be
compelled to surrender some civil rights and liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented. By virtue
of being a cadet, a member of the CCAFP becomes a subject of the Honor Code and System. Cadet's actions are
bound by the existing norms that are logically applied through the Code and System in order to realize the
Academy's mission to produce leaders of character - men of integrity and honor. 151

One of the fundamental principles of the Honor System also states:

2. The Honor System correlates with legal procedures of the state's Justice System but it does not demean its Spirit
by reducing the Code to a systematic list of externally observed rules. Where misinterpretations and loopholes arise
through legalism and its technicalities, the objective of building the character of the cadets becomes futile. While,
generally, Public Law penalizes only the faulty acts, the Honor System tries to examine both the action and the
intention.
152

Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is aversion towards undue judicialization of an administrative
hearing in the military academy. It has been said that the mission of the military is unique in the sense that its
primary business is to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise, and that over-proceduralizing military
determinations necessarily gives soldiers less time to accomplish this task.  Extensive cadet investigations and
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complex due process hearing could sacrifice simplicity, practicality, and timeliness. Investigations that last for
several days or weeks, sessions that become increasingly involved with legal and procedural' points, and legal
motions and evidentiary objections that are irrelevant and inconsequential tend to disrupt, delay, and confuse the
dismissal proceedings and make them unmanageable. Excessive delays cannot be tolerated since it is unfair to the
accused, to his or her fellow cadets, to the Academy, and, generally, to the Armed Forces. A good balance should,
therefore, be struck to achieve fairness, thoroughness, and efficiency.  Considering that the case of Cadet 1 CL
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Cudia is one of first impression in the sense that this Court has not previously dealt with the particular issue of a
dismissed cadet's right to due process, it is necessary for Us to refer to U.S. jurisprudence for some guidance.
Notably, our armed forces have been patterned after the U.S. Army and the U.S. military code produced a salutary
effect in the military justice system of the Philippines.  Hence, pertinent case laws interpreting the U.S. military code
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and practices have persuasive, if not the same, effect in this jurisdiction.

We begin by stating that U.S. courts have uniformly viewed that "due process" is a flexible concept, requiring
consideration in each case of a variety of circumstances and calling for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.  Hagopian opined:
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In approaching the question of what process is due before governmental action adversely affecting private interests
may properly be taken, it must be recognized that due process is not a rigid formula or simple rule of thumb to be
applied undeviatingly to any given set of facts. On the contrary, it is a flexible concept which depends upon the
balancing of various factors, including the nature of the private right or interest that is threatened, the extent to which
the proceeding is adversarial in character, the severity and consequences of any action that might be taken, the
burden that would be imposed by requiring use of all or part of the full panoply of trial-type procedures, and the
existence of other overriding interests, such as the necessity for prompt action in the conduct of crucial military
operations. The full context must therefore be considered in each case.  (Emphasis supplied)
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Wasson, which was cited by Hagopian, broadly outlined the minimum standards of due process required in the
dismissal of a cadet. Thus:

[W]hen the government affects the private interests of individuals, it may not proceed arbitrarily but must observe
due process of law. x x x Nevertheless, the flexibility which is inherent in the concept of due process of law
precludes the dogmatic application of specific rules developed in one context to entirely distinct forms of government
action. "For, though 'due process of law' generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations,
opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings, * * * yet, this is not
universally true." x x x Thus, to determine in any given case what procedures due process requires, the court must
carefully determine and balance the nature of the private interest affected and of the government interest involved,
taking account of history and the precise circumstances surrounding the case at hand.

While the government must always have a legitimate concern with the subject matter before it may validly affect
private interests, in particularly vital and sensitive areas of government concern such as national security and
military affairs, the private interest must yield to a greater degree to the governmental. x x x Few decisions properly
rest so exclusively within the discretion of the appropriate government officials than the selection, training, discipline
and dismissal of the future officers of the military and Merchant Marine. Instilling and maintaining discipline and
morale in these young men who will be required to bear weighty responsibility in the face of adversity -- at times
extreme -- is a matter of substantial national importance scarcely within the competence of the judiciary. And it
cannot be doubted that because of these factors historically the military has been permitted greater freedom to
fashion its disciplinary procedures than the civilian authorities.

We conclude, therefore, that due process only requires for the dismissal of a Cadet from the Merchant Marine
Academy that he be given a fair hearing at which he is apprised of the charges against him and permitted a
defense. x x x For the guidance of the parties x x x the rudiments of a fair hearing in broad outline are plain. The
Cadet must be apprised of the specific charges against him. He must be given an adequate opportunity to present
his defense both from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses and other evidence. We do not suggest,
however, that the Cadet must be given this opportunity both when demerits are awarded and when dismissal is
considered. The hearing may be procedurally informal and need not be adversarial.  (Emphasis supplied)
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In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that Wasson and Hagopian are equally controlling in cases where
cadets were separated from the military academy for violation of the Honor Code. Following the two previous cases,
it was ruled that in order to be proper and immune from constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be
dismissed or separated from the academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges against
him, and be given an adequate opportunity to present his or her defense both from the point of view of time and the
use of witnesses and other evidence.  Conspicuously, these vital conditions are not too far from what We have
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already set in Guzman and the subsequent rulings in Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business Administration  and 160

De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 161

In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and
existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the
opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the
case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written
explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written report together with its recommendation
to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor case was
submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal
investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the
chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough
discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the ' Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict
underwent the review process at the Academy level - from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA, to the Commandant of
Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the
directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct
a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all
had issued unfavorable rulings.

It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters
falling under their respective jurisdictions, the factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded
respect if not finality by the Court, unless such findings are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition
or collusion; where the procedure which led to the findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when
a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.  In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, We find
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no reason to deviate from the general rule. The grounds therefor are discussed below seriatim:

As to the right to be represented by a counsel –

For petitioners, respondents must be compelled to give Cadet 1 CL Cudia the right to be represented by a counsel
who could actively participate in the proceedings like in the cross-examination of the witnesses against him before
the CRAB or HC, if remanded. This is because while the CRAB allowed him to be represented by a PAO lawyer, the
counsel was only made an observer without any right to intervene and demand respect of Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
rights.  According to them, he was not sufficiently given the opportunity to seek a counsel and was not even asked
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if he would like to have one. He was only properly represented when it was already nearing graduation day after his
family sought the assistance of the PAO. Petitioners assert that Guzman is specific in stating that the erring student
has the right to answer the charges against him or her with the assistance of counsel, if desired.

On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued v. Exevea  and Nera v. The Auditor General  in asserting that the
164 165

right to a counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations or non-criminal proceedings. Also, based on
Cadet lCL Cudia's academic standing, he is said to be obviously not untutored to fully understand his rights and
express himself. Moreover, the confidentiality of the HC proceedings worked against his right to be represented by a
counsel. In any event, respondents claim that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not precluded from seeking a counsel's advice
in preparing his defense prior to the HC hearing.

Essentially, petitioners claim .. that Cadet lCL Cudia is guaranteed the right to have his counsel not just in assisting
him in the preparation for the investigative hearing before the HC and the CRAB but in participating fully in said
hearings. The Court disagrees.
Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not
indispensable. Further, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,  the Court held that "a party in an administrative
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inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel."
Hence, the administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel
is not an absolute requirement.

More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which We adopt. Thus:

The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all of the other aspects of the hearing.
Where the proceeding is non-criminal in nature, where the hearing is investigative and not adversarial and the
government does not proceed through counsel, where the individual concerned is mature and educated, where his
knowledge of the events x x x should enable him to develop the facts adequately through available sources, and
where the other aspects of the hearing taken as a whole are fair, due process does not require representation by
counsel.167

To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to recognize a right to representation by counsel, as a function of
due process, in military academy disciplinary proceedings.  This rule is principally motivated by the policy of
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"treading lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the military
establishment to govern its own affairs within the broad confines of constitutional due process" and the courts' views
that disciplinary proceedings are not judicial in nature and should be kept informal, and that literate and educated
cadets should be able to defend themselves.  In Hagopian, it was ruled that the importance of informality in the
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proceeding militates against a requirement that the cadet be accorded the right to representation by counsel before
the Academic Board and that unlike the welfare recipient who lacks the training and education needed to
understand his rights and express himself, the cadet should be capable of doing so.  In the subsequent case of
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Wimmer v. Lehman,  the issue was not access to counsel but the opportunity to have counsel, instead of oneself,
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examine and cross-examine witnesses, make objections, and argue the case during the hearing. Disposing of the
case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by the argument that an individual of a
midshipman's presumed intelligence, selected because he is expected to be able to care for himself and others,
often under difficult circumstances, and who has full awareness of what he is facing, with counsel's advice, was
deprived of due process by being required to present his defense in person at an investigatory hearing.

In the case before Us, while the records are bereft of evidence that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was given the option or was
able to seek legal advice prior to and/or during the HC hearing, it is indubitable that he was assisted by a counsel, a
PAO lawyer to be exact, when the CRAB reviewed and reinvestigated the case. The requirement of due process is
already satisfied since, at the very least, the counsel aided him in the drafting and filing of the Appeal Memorandum
and even acted as an observer who had no right to actively participate in the proceedings (such as conducting the
cross-examination). Moreover, not to be missed out are the facts that the offense committed by Cadet 1 CL Cudia is
not criminal in nature; that the hearings before the HC and the CRAB were investigative and not adversarial; and
that Cadet lCL Cudia's excellent-academic standing puts him in the best position to look after his own vested
interest in the Academy.

As to the confidentiality of records of the proceedings –

Petitioners allege that when Maj. Gen. Lopez denied in his March 11, 2014 letter Cadet lCL Cudia's request for
documents, footages, and recordings relevant to the HC hearings, the vital evidence negating the regularity of the
HC trial and supporting his defense have been surely overlooked by the CRAB in its case review. Indeed, for them,
the answers on whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia was deprived of due process and whether he lied could easily be
unearthed from the video and other records of the HC investigation. Respondents did not deny their existence but
they refused to present them for the parties and the Court to peruse. In particular, they note that the Minutes of the
HC dated January 21, 2014 and the HC Formal Investigation Report dated January 20, 2014 were considered by
the CRAB but were not furnished to petitioners and the Court; hence, there is no way to confirm the truth of the
alleged statements therein. In their view, failure to furnish these documents could only mean that it would be
adverse if produced pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. 172

For lack of legal basis on PMA' s claim of confidentiality of records, petitioners contend that it is the ministerial duty
of the HC to submit to the CRAB, for the conduct of intelligent review of the case, all its records of the proceedings,
including video footages of the deliberations and voting. They likewise argue that PMA' s refusal to release relevant
documents to Cadet 1 CL Cudia under the guise of confidentiality reveals another misapplication of the Honor Code,
which merely provides: "A cadet who becomes part of any investigation is subject to the existing regulations
pertaining to rules of confidentiality and, therefore, must abide to the creed of secrecy. Nothing shall be disclosed
without proper guidance from those with authority" (IV. The Honor System, Honor Committee, Cadet Observer).
This provision, they say, does not deprive Cadet 1 CL Cudia of his right to obtain copies and examine relevant
documents pertaining to his case.

Basically, petitioners want Us to assume that the documents, footages, and recordings relevant to the HC hearings
are favorable to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's cause, and, consequently, to rule that respondents' refusal to produce and have
them examined is tantamount to the denial of his right to procedural due process. They are mistaken.

In this case, petitioners have not particularly identified any documents, witness testimony, or oral or written
presentation of facts submitted at the hearing that would support Cadet 1 CL Cudia's defense. The Court may
require that an administrative record be supplemented, but only "where there is a 'strong showing or bad faith or
improper behavior' on the part of the agency,"  both of which are not present here. Petitioners have not specifically
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indicated the nature of the concealed evidence, if any, and the reason for withholding it. What they did was simply
supposing that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's guilty verdict would be overturned with the production and examination of such
documents, footages, and recordings. As will be further shown in the discussions below, the requested matters,
even if denied, would not relieve Cadet 1 CL Cudia's predicament. If at all, such denial was a harmless procedural
error since he was not seriously prejudiced thereby.

As to the ostracism in the PMA –

To petitioners, the CRAB considered only biased testimonies and evidence because Special Order No. 1 issued on
February 21, 2014, which directed the ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, left him without any opportunity, to secure
statements of his own witnesses. He could not have access to or approach the cadets who were present during the
trial and who saw the 8-1 voting result. It is argued that the Order directing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's ostracism is of
doubtful legal validity because the Honor Code unequivocally announced: "x x x But by wholeheartedly dismissing
the cruel method of ostracizing Honor Code violators, PMA will not have to resort to other humiliating means and
shall only have the option to make known among its alumni the names of those who have not sincerely felt remorse
for violating the Honor Code."

On their part, respondents assert that neither the petition nor the petition-in-intervention attached a full text copy of
the alleged Special Order No. 1. In any case, attributing its issuance to PMA is improper and misplaced because of
petitioners' admission that ostracism has been absolutely dismissed as an Academy-sanctioned activity consistent
with the trend in International Humanitarian Law that the PMA has included in its curriculum. Assuming that said
Order was issued, respondents contend that it purely originated from the cadets themselves, the sole purpose of
which was to give a strong voice to the Cadet Corps by declaring that they did not tolerate Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
honor violation and breach of confindentiality of the HC proceedings.

More importantly, respondents add that it is highly improbable and unlikely that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was ostracized by
his fellow cadets. They manifest that as early as January 22, 2014, he was already transferred to the Holding
Center. The practice of billeting an accused cadet at the Holding Center is provided for in the Honor Code
Handbook. Although within the PMA compound, the Holding Center is off-limits to cadets who do not have any
business to conduct therein. The cadets could not also ostracize him during mess times since Cadet 1 CL Cudia
opted to take his meals at the Holding Center. The circumstances obtaining when Special Order No. 1 was issued
clearly foreclose the possibility that he was ostracized in common areas accessible to other cadets. He remained in
the Holding Center until March 16, 2014 when he voluntarily left the PMA. Contrary to his claim, guests were also
free to visit him in the Holding Center.

However, petitioners swear that Cadet 1 CL Cudia suffered from ostracism in the PMA. The practice was somehow
recognized by respondents in their Consolidated Comment and by PMA Spokesperson Maj. Flores in a news report.
The CHR likewise confirmed the same in its Resolution dated May 22, 2014. For them, it does not matter where the
ostracism order originated from because the PMA appeared to sanction it even if it came from the cadets
themselves. There was a tacit approval of an illegal act. If not, those cadets responsible for ostracism would have
been charged by the PMA officials. Finally, it is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not choose to take his meals at
the Holding Center as he was not allowed to leave the place. Petitioners opine that placing the accused cadet in the
Holding Center is inconsistent with his or her presumed innocence and certainly gives the implication of ostracism.

We agree with respondents. Neither the petition nor the petition-inintervention attached a full text copy or even a
pertinent portion of the alleged Special Order No. 1, which authorized the ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Being
hearsay, its existence and contents are of doubtful veracity. Hence, a definite ruling on the matter can never be
granted in this case.

The Court cannot close its eyes though on what appears to be an admission of Cadet 1 CL Mogol during the CHR
hearing that, upon consultation with the entire class, the baron, and the Cadet Conduct Policy Board, they issued an
ostracism order against Cadet 1 CL Cudia.  While not something new in a military academy,  ostracism's
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continued existence in the modem times should no longer be countenanced. There are those who argue that the
"silence" is a punishment resulting in the loss of private interests, primarily that of reputation, and that such penalty
may render illusory the possibility of vindication by the reviewing body once found guilty by the HC.  Furthermore, in
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Our mind, ostracism practically denies the accused cadet's protected rights to present witnesses or evidence in his
or her behalf and to be presumed innocent until finally proven otherwise in a proper proceeding.

As to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's stay in the Holding Center, the Court upholds the same. The Honor Code and Honor
System Handbook provides that, in case a cadet has been found guilty by the HC of violating the Honor Code and
has opted not to resign, he or she may stay and wait for the disposition of the case. In such event, the cadet is not
on full-duty status and shall be billeted at the HTG Holding Center.  Similarly, in the U.S., the purpose of "Boarders
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Ward" is to quarter those cadets who are undergoing separation actions. Permitted to attend classes, the cadet is
sequestered , therein until final disposition of the case. In Andrews, it was opined that the segregation of cadets in
the Ward was a proper exercise of the discretionary authority of Academy officials. It relied on the traditional
doctrine that "with respect to decisions made by Army authorities, 'orderly government requires us to tread lightly on
the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the military establishment to govern its
own affairs within the broad confines of constitutional due process.'" Also, in Birdwell v. Schlesinger,  the
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"administrative segregation" was held to be a reasonable exercise of military discipline and could not be considered
an invasion of the rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association.

Late and vague decisions –

It is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was kept in the dark as to the charge against him and the decisions arrived at by
the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA. No written decision was furnished to him, and if any, the information was unjustly
belated and the justifications for the decisions were vague. He had to constantly seek clarification and queries just
to be apprised of what he was confronted with.

Petitioners relate that upon being informed of the "guilty" verdict, Cadet 1 CL Cudia immediately inquired as to the
grounds therefor, but Cadet 1 CL Mogol answered that it is confidential since he would still appeal the same. By
March 11, 2014, Maj. Gen. Lopez informed Cadet 1 CL Cudia that the CRAB already forwarded their
recommendation for his dismissal to the General Headquarters sometime in February-March 2014. Even then, he
received no decision/recommendation on his case, verbally or in writing. The PMA commencement exercises
pushed through with no written decision from the CRAB or the PMA on his appeal. The letter from the Office of the
Adjutant General of the AFP was suspiciously delayed when the Cudia family received the same only on March 20,
2014. Moreover, it fell short in laying down with specificity the factual and legal bases used by the CRAB and even
by the Office of the Adjutant General. There remains no proof that the CRAB and the PMA considered the evidence
presented by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it being uncertain as to what evidence was weighed by the CRAB, whether the
same is substantial, and whether the new evidence submitted by him was ever taken into account.

In refutation, respondents allege the existence of PMA's· practice of orally declaring the HC finding, not putting it in
a written document so as to protect the integrity of the erring cadet and guard the confidentiality of the HC
proceedings pursuant to the Honor System. Further, they aver that a copy of the report of the CRAB, dated March
10, 2014, was not furnished to Cadet 1 CL Cudia because it was his parents who filed the appeal, hence, were the
ones who were given a copy thereof.

Petitioners' contentions have no leg to stand on. While there is a constitutional mandate stating that "[no] decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based,"  such provision does not apply in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case. Neither Guzman nor Andrews require a specific
179
form and content of a decision issued in disciplinary proceedings. The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook
also has no written rule on the matter. Even if the provision applies, nowhere does it demand that a point-by-point
consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the parties are necessary.  What counts is that, albeit furnished
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to him late, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the reviewing body, assuring that it went through the processes of legal
reasoning. He was not left in the dark as to how it was reached and he knows exactly the reasons why he lost, and
is able to pinpoint the possible errors for review.

As to the blind adoption of the HC findings –

Petitioners assert that, conformably with Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only President Aquino as the
Commander-in-Chief has the power to appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives no
authority to the HC as the sole body to determine the guilt or innocence of a cadet. It also does not empower the
PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC as a basis for recommending the cadet's dismissal. In the case of Cadet
1 CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA blindly followed the HC's finding of guilt in terminating his military service.

Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to conduct a review de nova of all records without requiring Cadet 1 CL
Cudia to submit new evidence if it is physically impossible for him to do so. In their minds, respondents cannot claim
that the CRAB and the PMA thoroughly reviewed the HC recommendation and heard Cadet lCL Cudia's side. As
clearly stated in the letter from the Office of the AFP Adjutant General, "[in] its report dated March 10, 2014, PMA
CRAB sustained the findings and recommendations of the Honor Committee x x x It also resolved the appeal filed
by the subject Cadet." However, the Final Investigation Report of the CRAB was dated March 23, 2014. While such
report states that a report was submitted to the AFP General Headquarters on March 10, 2014 and that it was only
on March 12, 2014 that it was designated as a Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, it is unusual that the CRAB
would do the same things twice. This raised a valid and well-grounded suspicion that the CRAB never undertook an
in-depth investigation/review the first time it came out with its report, and the Final Investigation Report was drafted
merely as an afterthought when the lack of written decision was pointed out by petitioners so as to remedy the
apparent lack of due process during the CRAB investigation and review.

Despite the arguments, respondents assure that there was a proper assessment of the procedural and legal
correctness of the guilty verdict against Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They assert that the higher authorities of the PMA did not
merely rely on the findings of the HC, noting that there was also a separate investigation conducted by the HTG
from January 25 to February 7, 2014. Likewise, contrary to the contention of petitioners that the CRAB continued
with the review of the case despite the absence of necessary documents, the CRAB conducted its own review of the
case and even conducted another investigation by constituting the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body. For
respondents, petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof in showing bad faith on the part of the PMA. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary and considering further that petitioners' allegations are merely self-serving and
baseless, good faith on the part of the PMA' s higher authorities is presumed and should, therefore, prevail.

We agree with respondents.

The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the Cadet Corps, has a limited role of investigating and determining
whether or not the alleged offender has actually violated the Honor Code.  It is given the responsibility of
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administering the Honor Code and, in case of breach, its task is entirely investigative, examining in the first instance
a suspected violation. As a means of encouraging self-discipline, without ceding to it any authority to make final
adjudications, the Academy has assigned it the function of identifying suspected violators.  Contrary to petitioners'
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assertion, the HC does not have the authority to order the separation of a cadet from the Academy. The results of its
proceedings are purely recommendatory and have no binding effect. The HC determination is somewhat like an
indictment, an allegation, which, in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case, the PMA-CRAB investigated de novo.  In the U.S., it
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was even opined that due process safeguards do not actually apply at the Honor Committee level because it is only
a "charging body whose decisions had no effect other than to initiate de nova proceedings before a Board of
Officers."
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Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC is covered by the due process clause and that irregularities in its
proceedings were in fact committed, still, We cannot rule for petitioners. It is not required that procedural due
process be afforded at every stage of developing disciplinary action. What is required is that an adequate hearing
be held before the final act of dismissing a cadet from the military academy.  In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the
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OIC of HC, the SJA, the Commandant of Cadets, and the PMA Superintendent reviewed the HC findings. A
separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate
the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Finally, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body composed of the
CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. The
Board/Body actually held hearings on March 12, 13, 14 and 20, 2014. Instead of commendation, petitioners find it
"unusual" that the CRAB would do the same things twice and suspect that it never undertook an in-depth
investigation/review the first time it came out with its report. Such assertion is mere conjecture that deserves scant
consideration.

As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial –

According to petitioners, the proceedings before the HC were a sham. The people behind Cadet ICL Cudia's
charge, investigation, and conviction were actually the ones who had the intent to deceive and who took advantage
of the situation. Cadet 1 CL Raguindin, who was a senior HC member and was the second in rank to Cadet 1 CL
Cudia in the Navy cadet 1 CL, was part of the team which conducted the preliminary investigation. Also, Cadet I CL
Mogol, the HC Chairman, previously charged Cadet 1 CL Cudia with honor violation allegedly for cheating
(particularly, conniving with and tutoring his fellow cadets on a difficult topic by giving solutions to a retake exam) but
the charge was dismissed for lack of merit. Even if he was a non-voting member, he was in a position of influence
and authority. Thus, it would be a futile exercise for Cadet 1 CL Cudia to resort to the procedure for the removal of
HC members. 186

Further, no sufficient prior notice of the scheduled CRAB hearing was given to Cadet I CL Cudia, his family, or his
PAO counsel. During one of her visits to him in the Holding Center, petitioner-intervenor was advised to convince his
son to resign and immediately leave the PMA. Brig. Gen. Costales, who later became the CRAB Head, also
categorically uttered to Annavee: "Your brother, he lied!" The CRAB conferences were merely used to formalize his
dismissal and the PMA never really intended to hear his side. For petitioners, these are manifestations of PMA's
clear resolve to dismiss him no matter what.

For their part, respondents contend that the CllR's allegation that Maj. Hindang acted in obvious bad faith and that
he failed to discharge his duty to be a good father of cadets when he "paved the road to [Cadet 1 CL Cudia's] sham
trial by the Honor Committee" is an unfounded accusation. They note that when Maj. Hindang was given the DR of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, he revoked the penalty awarded because of his explanation. However, all revocations of
awarded penalties are subject to the review of the STO. Therefore, it was at the instance of Maj. Leander and the
established procedure followed at the PMA that Maj. Hindang was prompted to investigate the circumstances
surrounding Cadet 1 CL Cudia's tardiness. Respondents add that bad faith cannot likewise be imputed against Maj.
Hindang by referring to the actions taken by Maj. Jekyll Dulawan, the CTO of Cadets 1 CL Narciso and Arcangel
who also arrived late for their next class. Unlike the other cadets, Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not admit his being late and
effectively evaded responsibility by ascribing his tardiness to Dr. Costales.

As to the CHR' s finding that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was likewise "in bad faith and determined to destroy [Cadet 1 CL]
Cudia, for reasons of his own" because the former previously reported the latter for an honor violation in November
2013, respondents argue that the bias ascribed against him is groundless as there is failure to note that Cadet 1 CL
Mogol was a non-voting member of the HC. Further, he cannot be faulted for reporting a possible honor violation
since he is the HC Chairman and nothing less is expected of him. Respondents emphasize that the representatives
of the HC are elected from each company, while the HC Chairman is elected by secret ballot from the incoming first
class representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1 CL Cu'dia believed that there was bias against him, he should have resorted
to the procedure for the removal of HC members provided for in the Honor Code Handbook.

Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on the part of the PMA to prevent Cadet 1 CL Cudia
from graduating because the Academy does not stand to gain anything from his dismissal. On the contrary, in view
of his academic standing, the separation militates against PMA' s mission to produce outstanding, honorable, and
exceptional cadets.

The Court differs with petitioners.

Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be presumed. Absent some showing of actual bias, petitioners' allegations
do not hold water. The mere imputation of ill-motive without proof is speculative at best. Kolesa teaches us that to
sustain the challenge, specific evidence must be presented to overcome
a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on
the same individual poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the
guarantee of due process is to be implemented. 187

Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide whether demerits are to be awarded, he is not an adversary of the
cadet but an educator who shares an identity of interest with the cadet, whom he counsels from time to time as a
future leader.  When the occasion calls for it, cadets may be questioned as to the accuracy or completeness of a
188

submitted work. A particular point or issue may be clarified. In this case, the question asked of Cadet 1 CL Cudia
concerning his being late in class is proper, since there is evidence indicating that a breach of regulation may have
occurred and there is reasonable cause to believe that he was involved in the breach of regulations. 189

For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive, the Court shall rely on the non-toleration clause of the Honor Code,
i.e., "We do not tolerate those who violate the Code." Cadets are reminded that they are charged with a tremendous
duty far more superior to their personal feeling or friendship.  They must learn to help others by guiding them to
190

accept the truth and do what is right, rather than tolerating actions against truth and justice.  Likewise, cadets are
191

presumed to be characteristically honorable; they cannot overlook or arbitrarily ignore the dishonorable action of
their peers, seniors, or subordinates.  These are what Cadet 1 CL Mogol exactly did, although he was later proven
192

to have erred in his accusation. Note that even the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook recognizes that
interpretation of one's honor is generally subjective. 193

Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Cadets 1 CL' Raguindin and Mogol as well as Brig. Gen.
Costales have an axe to grind against Cadet 1 CL Cudia and were bent on causing, no matter what, the latter's
downfall, their nefarious conduct would still be insignificant. This is so since the HC (both the preliminary and formal
investigation), the CRAB, and the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body are collegial bodies. Hence, the claim that
the proceedings/hearings conducted were merely a farce because the three personalities participated therein is
tantamount to implying the existence of a conspiracy, distrusting the competence, independence, and integrity of the
other members who constituted the majority. Again, in the absence of specifics and substantial evidence, the Court
cannot easily give credence to this baseless insinuation.

As to the HC executive session/chambering –

Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular administrative hearing in the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia because two
voting rounds took place. After the result of the secret balloting, Cadet 1 CL Mogol ordered the voting members to
go to a room without the cadet recorders. Therein, the lone dissenter, Cadet lCL Lagura, was asked to explain his
"not guilty" vote. Pressured to change his vote, he was made to cast a new one finding Cadet 1 CL Cudia guilty. The
original ballot was discarded and replaced. There was no record of the change in vote from 8-1 to 9-0 that was
mentioned in the HC formal report.

The Affidavit of Commander Junjie B. Tabuada executed on March 6, 2014 was submitted by petitioners since he
purportedly recalled Cadet 1 CL Lagura telling him that he was pressured to change his "not guilty" vote after the
voting members were "chambered." In the sworn statement, Commander Tabuada said:

1. That after CDT lCL CUDIA [was] convicted for honor violation, I [cannot] remember exactly the date but
sometime in the morning of 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I was in my office filling up forms for the renewal
of my passport, CDT 1CL LAGURA entered and had business with my staff;

2. When he was about to leave I called him. "Lags, halika muna dito," and he approached me and I let him
sit down on the chair in front of my table. I told and asked him, "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah ... ano ha ang
nangyari? Mag-Tagalog or mag-Bisaya ka." He replied, "Talagang NOT GUILTY ang vote ko sa kanya sir",
and I asked him, "Oh, bakit naging guilty di ha pag may isang nag NOT GUILTY, abswelto na? He replied
"Chinamber ako sir, bale pinapa-justify kung bakit NOT GUILTY vote ko, at na-pressure din ako sir kaya
binago ko, sir." So, I told him, "Sayang sya, matalino at mabait pa naman" and he replied "oo nga sir". After
that conversation, I let him go.194

It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its discretion when it committed voting manipulation since, under the rules,
it is required to have a unanimous nine (9) votes finding an accused cadet guilty. There is nothing in the procedure
that permits the HC Chairman to order the "chambering" of a member who voted contrary to the majority and
subjects him or her to reconsider in order to reflect a unanimous vote. Neither is there an order from the Chief of
Staff or the President sanctioning the HC procedure or approving any change therein pursuant to Sections 30 and
31 of C.A. No. 1. The HC, the CRAB, and the PMA violated their own rules and principles as embodied in the Honor
Code. Being a clear deviation from the established procedures, the second deliberation should be considered null
and void.

Petitioners further contend that the requirement of unanimous vote involves a substantive right which cannot be
unceremoniously changed without a corresponding amendment/revision in the Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook. In their view, "chambering" totally defeats the purpose of voting by secret ballot as it glaringly destroys
the very essence and philosophy behind the provisions of the Honor System, which is to ensure that the voting
member is free to vote what is in his or her heart and mind and that no one can pressure or persuade another to
change his or her vote. They suggest that if one voting member acquits an accused cadet who is obviously guilty of
the offense, the solution is to remove him or her from the HC through the vote of non-confidence as provided for in
the Honor Code.  Anent the above arguments, respondents contend that a distinction must be made between the
195

concepts of the Honor Code and the Honor System. According to them, the former sets the standard for a cadet's,
minimum ethical and moral behavior and does not change, while the latter is a set of rules for the conduct of the
observance and implementation of the· Honor Code and may undergo necessary adjustments as may be warranted
by the incumbent members of the HC in order to be more responsive to the moral training and character
development of the cadets. The HC may provide guidelines when the Honor System can be used to supplement
regulations. This being so, the voting process is continuously subject to change.

Respondents note that, historically, a non-unanimous guilty verdict automatically acquits a cadet from the charge of
Honor violation. The voting members only write either "guilty" or "not guilty" in the voting sheets without stating their
name or their justification. However, this situation drew criticisms since there were instances where a reported cadet
already admitted his honor violation but was acquitted due to the lone vote of a sympathetic voting member.

In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the HC adopted an existing practice that should the voting result in 7-2 or 8-1 the
HC would automatically sanction a jury type of discussion called "executive session" or "chambering," which is
intended to elicit the explanation and insights of the voting member/s. This prevents the tyranny of the minority or
lone dissenter from prevailing over the manifest proof of guilt. The assailed voting practice has been adopted and
widely accepted by the PMA Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 since their first year in the Academy. The allegations of
conspiracy and sham trial are, therefore, negated by the fact that such practice was in place and applied to all cases
of honor violations, not solely to the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia.

It is emphasized by respondents that any decision to change vote rests solely on the personal conviction of the
dissenter/s, without any compulsion from the other voting members. There can also be no pressuring to change
one's vote to speak of since a vote may only be considered as final when the Presiding Officer has affixed his
signature.

To debunk Commander Tabuada's statements, respondents raise the argument that the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body summoned Cadet 1 CL Lagura for inquiry. Aside from his oral testimony made under oath,
he submitted to the Board/Body an affidavit explaining that:

11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of Naval Warfare to ask permission if it is
possible not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending our baseball game outside the Academy.

12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B
T ABU ADA PN, our Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached him and he said:
"Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to answer because of the
confidentiality of the Honor Committee proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko
naman na bawal magsabi." Then I answered: "Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer nagsabi
na pumunta muna kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-
isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from
Not Guilty to Guilty Sir." He replied: "Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa
naman at matalino." 196

Cadet 1 CL Lagura restated the above in the Counter-Affidavit executed on March 12, 2014, which he submitted
before the CHR wherein he attested to the following:
 3. I was chosen to be a voting member of the Honor Committee for Honor Code violation committed by
Cadet Cudia, for "lying". As a voting member, we are the one who assess or investigate the case whether
the reported Cadet is Guilty for his actions or not.

4. I was the only one who INITIALLY voted "NOT GUILTY" among the nine (9) voting members of the Honor
Committee in the case of Cdt Cudia for Lying.

5. I initially voted "NOT GUILTY" for the reason that after the proceedings and before the presiding Officer
told the members to vote, I was confused of the case of Cadet Cudia. I have gathered some facts from the
investigation to make my decision but for me it is not yet enough to give my verdict of guilty to Cdt Cudia so I
decided to vote "NOT GUILTY" with a reservation in my mind that we will still be discussing our verdicts if
we will arrive at 8-1 or 7-2. Thus, I can still change my vote if I may be enlightened with the other's
justifications.

6. After the votes were collected, the Presiding Officer told us that the vote is 8 for guilty and 1 for not guilty.
By way of practice and as I predicted, we were told to go inside the anteroom for executive meeting and to
discuss our respective justifications. I have been a member for two (2) years and the voting committee will
always go for executive meeting whenever it will meet 8-1 or 7-2 votes.

7. I listened to them and they listened to me, then I saw things that enlightened my confusions that time. I
gave a thumbs-up sign and asked for another sheet of voting paper. I then changed my vote from "NOT
GUILTY" to "GUILTY" and the voting members of the Honor Committee came up with the final vote of nine
(9) votes for guilty and zero (0) votes for not guilty.

9. Cdt Cudia was called inside the courtroom and told that the verdict was GUILTY of LYING. After that, all
persons inside the courtroom went back to barracks.

10. Right after I changed to sleeping uniform, I was approached by Cdt Jocson and Cdt Cudia, inquiring and
said: "Bakit ka naman nagpalit ng boto? ., I answered: "Nasa process yan, may mali talaga sa rason mo."
They also asked who were inside the Chamber and I mentioned only Cdt Arlegui and Cdt Mogol. That was
the last time that Cdt Cudia and Cdt Jocson talked to me.

11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of Naval Warfare to asked (sic)
permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending our baseball
game outside the Academy.

12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about to exit out of the Office, CDR
JUNJIE B TABUADA PN, our Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached
him and he said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to
answer because of the confidentiality of the Honor Committee proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang mag-
alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi. " Then I answered: "Ako yung isang not guilty
Sir. Kaya [yung} Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamher. Nung nasa chamber kami,
nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung
pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan aka. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir. " He replied:
"Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino. " 197

Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the very fact that Cadet 1 CL Lagura, as the lone dissenter, was made
to explain in the presence of other HC members, who were in disagreement with him, gives a semblance of
intimidation, force, or pressure. For them, the records of the HC proceedings, which were not presented assuming
they actually exist, could have been the best way to ensure that he was free to express his views, reject the opinion
of the majority, and stick to his decision. Also, it was pointed out that Cadet 1 CL Lagura failed to clearly explain in
his affidavit why he initially found Cadet 1 CL Cudia "not guilty" and what made him change his mind. His use of
general statements like he "was confused of the case " and "saw things that enlightened my confusions " could
hardly suffice to establish why he changed his vote. Finally, petitioners note the admission of ·Cadet 1 CL Lagura
during the CHR investigation that he was the only one who was given another ballot sheet while in the chamber and
that he accomplished it in the barracks which he only submitted the following day. However, as the CHR found, the
announcement of the 9-0 vote was done immediately after the HC came out from the chamber and before Cadet 1
CL Lagura submitted his accomplished ballot sheet.
We rule for respondents.

As to the manner of voting by the HC members, the Honor Code tersely provides:

After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the presiding member of the Board will call for the members to vote
whether the accused is GUILTY or NOT GUILTY. A unanimous vote (9 votes) of GUILTY decides that a cadet is
found guilty of violating the Honor Code.198

From the above-quoted provision, it readily appears that the HC practice of conducting "executive session" or
"chambering" is not at all prohibited. The HC is given leeway on the voting procedures in' actual cases taking into
account the exigency of the times. What is important is that, in the end, there must be a unanimous nine votes in
order to hold a cadet guilty of violating the Honor Code.

Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC violated its written procedure,  We still rule that there is nothing
199

inherently wrong with the practice of "chambering" considering that the presence of intimidation or force cannot
automatically be inferred therefrom. The essence of secret balloting and the freedom to vote based on what is in the
heart and mind of the voting member is not necessarily diluted by the fact that a second/final voting was conducted.
As explained by Cadet 1CL Mogol before the CRAB:

13. x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to explain his side and insights regarding the case at hand. The other
members, on the other hand, would be given the chance to explain their votes as well as their insights to the
dissenting voter. The decision to change the vote of the dissenting voter rests solely on his personal conviction.
Thus, if he [or she] opted not to change his/her vote despite the discussion, his [or her] vote is accorded respect by
the Honor Committee. 200

It is elementary that intimidation or force is never presumed. Mere allegation is definitely not evidence.  It must be
1âwphi1

substantiated and proved because a person is presumed to be innocent of a crime or wrong and that official duty
has been regularly performed. 201

The oral and written statements of Cadet 1 CL Lagura should settle the issue. Before the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body and the CHR, he consistently denied that he was pressured by the other voting members
of the HC. His representation must be accepted as it is regardless of whether he has satisfactorily elaborated his
decision to change his vote. Being the one who was "chambered," he is more credible to clarify the issue. In case of
doubt, We have to rely on the faith that Cadet 1 CL Lagura observed the Honor Code, which clearly states that
every cadet must be his or her own Final' Authority in honor; that he or she should not let other cadets dictate on
him or her their sense of honor.  Moreover, the Code implies that any person can have confidence that a cadet and
202

any graduate of the PMA will be fair and just in dealing with him; that his actions, words and ways are sincere and
true.
203

As to the other alleged "irregularities" committed such as not putting on record the initial/first voting and Cadet 1CL
Lagura's bringing of his ballot sheet to and accomplishing it in the barracks, the Court shall no longer dwell on the
same for being harmless procedural errors that do not materially affect the validity of the HC proceedings.

Cadet 1 CL Cudia 's alleged untruthful statements

Petitioners insist that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not lie. According to them, there is no clear time reference as to when
was the actual dismissal or what was the exact time of dismissal - whether it should be the dismissal inside the room
or the dismissal after the section grade was given by Dr. Costales -in the minds of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang,
and the HC investigators and voting members. They claim that during long examinations, the time of dismissal was
usually five minutes before the class was set to end and the protocol of dismissing the class 15 minutes earlier was
not observed. When Maj. Hindang stated in accusatory language that Cadet 1 CL Cudia perverted the truth by
stating that OR432 class ended at 1500H, he did not state what was the true time of dismissal. He did not mention
whether the truth he was relying on was 5 or 15 minutes before the scheduled end of class.

It is also averred that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's only business was to ask Dr. Costales a query such that his business was
already finished as soon as she gave an answer. However, a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales, which is,
Cadet 1 CL Cudia must stay and wait for the section grade. At that point in time, he was no longer in control of the
circumstances. Petitioners claim that Dr. Costales never categorically stated that Cadet lCL Cudia was lying. She
recognized the confusion. Her text messages to him clarified his alleged violation. Also, the CHR noted during its
investigation that she could not exactly recall what happened in her class on November 14, 2013.

Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that when respondents stated that ENG412 class started at 3:05 p.m., it
proves that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was obviously not late. If, as indicated in his Delinquency Report, he was late two (2)
minutes in his 1500-1600H class in ENG 412, he must have arrived 3:02 p.m. Respondents, however, claim that the
class started at 3:05 p.m. Thus, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not late.

Relative to his explanation to the delinquency report, petitioners were of the view that what appears to have caused
confusion in the minds of respondents is just a matter of semantics; that the entire incident was a product of
inaccuracy, not lying. It is malicious for them to insinuate that Cadet 1 CL Cudia purposely used incorrect language
to hide the truth. Citing Merriam Webster's Dictionary, petitioners argue that "dismiss" means to permit or cause to
leave, while "class" refers to a body of students meeting regularly to study the same subject. According to them,
these two words do not have definite and precise meanings but are generic terms. Other than the words "class" and
"dismiss" used by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, which may actually be used in their generic sense, there is nothing deceiving
about what he said. Thus, the answer he chose might be wrong or not correct, but it is not false or not true.

For petitioners, Cadet lCL Cudia's explanations are evidently truthful and with no intent to deceive or mislead. He
did not manipulate any fact and was truthful of his explanation. His .. statements were clear and unambiguous but
were given a narrow-minded interpretation. Even the Honor Code acknowledges that "[e]xperience demonstrates
that human communication is imperfect at best, and some actions are often misinterpreted."

Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's transcript of records reflects not only his outstanding academic
performance but proves his good conduct during his four-year stay in the Academy. He has above-average grades
in Conduct, with grades ranging from 96 to 100 in Conduct I to XI. His propensity to lie is, therefore, far from the
truth.

On the other hand, respondents were equally adamant to contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was obviously quibbling,
which, in the military parlance, is tantamount to lying. He fell short in telling a simple truth. He lied by making
untruthful statements in his written explanation. Respondents want Us to consider the following:

First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late. During the formal investigation, Dr. Costales testified that a class is
dismissed as long as the instructor is not there and the bell has rung. In cases of lesson examinations (LE), cadets
are dismissed from the time they have answered their respective LEs. Here, as Cadet Cudia stated in his Request
for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment, "We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the
first bell rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. xxx" Clearly, at
the time Cadet Cudia submitted his papers, he was already considered dismissed. Thus, he cannot claim that his
[OR432] class ended at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H) or "a bit late."

Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the circumstances leading to his tardiness. After submitting his paper, Cadet
Cudia is free to leave and attend his next class. However, he initiated a conversation with Dr. Costales regarding
their grades. He was not under instruction by Dr. Costales to stay beyond the period of her class.

Furthermore, during the investigation of the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, Dr. Costales clarified her
statements in her written explanation. She explained that the "instruction to wait" is a response to Cadet Cudia' s
request and that it was not her initiated instruction. Clearly, there was no directive from Dr. Costales for Cadet Cudia
and the other cadets to stay. On the contrary, it was them who wanted to meet with the instructor. Third, contrary to
Cadet Cudia's explanation, his subsequent class, ENG412, did not exactly start at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H). In
the informal review conducted by the HTG to check the findings of the HC, Professor Berong confirmed that her
English class started as scheduled (3:05 in the afternoon, or 1505H) and not earlier. Cadet 1 CL Barrawed, the
acting class marcher of ENG412 also testified that their class started as scheduled (3 :05 in the afternoon, or 1505)
and not earlier.
204

Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse that Cadet 1 CL Cudia had no intention to mislead or deceive but
merely used wrong and unfitting words in his explanations. For them, considering his academic standing, it is highly
improbable that he used incorrect language to justify his mistake. Respondents' arguments are tenable.
The issue of whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed lying is an issue of fact. Unfortunately for petitioners, the Court,
not being a trier of facts, cannot pass upon factual matters as it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the
evidence considered in the proceedings below. Moreover, We reiterate the long standing rule that factual findings of
administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by the Court. In this case, as shown in the
previous discussions, there is no evidence that the findings of the investigating and reviewing bodies below are not
supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; that the procedure which led to the findings is
irregular; that palpable errors were committed; or that a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is
manifest. With respect to the core issue of whether lying is present in this case, all investigating and reviewing
bodies are in consonance in holding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied.

For purposes of emphasis though, We shall supplement some points.

As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines (CCAFP) states: "We,
the Cadets, do not lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate among us those who do. "

The First Tenet of the Honor-Code is "We do not lie. " Cadets violate the Honor Code by lying if they make an oral
or written statement which is contrary to what is true or use doubtful information with the intent to deceive or
mislead.  It is expected that every cadet's word is accepted without challenge on its truthfulness; that it is true
205

without qualification; and that the cadets must answer directly, completely and truthfully even though the answer
may result in punitive action under the CCPB and CCAFPR. 206

To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1 CL Cudia justified that: "I came directly
from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir." Subsequently, in his Request for
Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Leander, he reasoned out as follows:

I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period
class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4t period class, I went to my next class without any
intention of being late Sir.
207

In this case, the Court agrees with respondents that Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed quibbling; hence, he lied in
violation of the Honor Code.

Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term "Quibbling" has been defined in one U.S. case as follows:

A person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his listener by cleverly wording what he says, omitting
relevant facts, or telling a partial truth. When he knowingly does so with the intent to deceive or mislead, he is
quibbling. Because it is an intentional deception, quibbling is a form of lying.208

The above definition can be applied in the instant case. Here, instead of directly and completely telling the cause of
his being late in the ENG412 class of Prof. Berong, Cadet 1 CL Cudia chose to omit relevant facts, thereby, telling a
half-truth.

The two elements that must be presented for a cadet to have committed an honor violation are:

1. The act and/or omission, and

2. The intent pertinent to it.

Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate the Honor Code, but intent to commit or omit the act itself. 209

The basic questions a cadet must always seek to answer unequivocally are:

1. Do I intend to deceive?

2. Do I intend to take undue advantage?

If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he or she is doing the honorable thing. 210

Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, and
therefore, can only be proved by unguarded expressions, conduct and circumstances generally.  In this case,
211

Cadet 1 CL Cudia's intent to deceive is manifested from the very act of capitalizing on the use of the words
"dismiss" and "class." The truth of the matter is that the ordinary usage of these two terms, in the context of an
educational institution, does not correspond to what Cadet 1 CL Cudia is trying to make it appear. In that sense, the
words are not generic and have definite and precise meaning.

By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1 CL Cudia, Miranda, Arcangel, and Narciso already constitute a
"class." The Court cannot agree that such term includes "every transaction and communication a teacher does with
her students." Clearly, it does not take too much intelligence to conclude that Cadet 1 CL Cudia should have been
accurate by pinpointing who were with him when he was late in the next class. His deceptive explanation is made
more obvious when compared with what Cadets 1 CL Archangel and Narciso wrote in their DR explanation, which
was: "We approached our instructor after our class." 212

Further, it is unimportant whether the time of dismissal on November 14, 2013 was five or fifteen minutes ahead of
the scheduled end of class. Worth noting is that even Dr. Costales, who stood as a witness for Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
consistently admitted before the HC, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, and the CHR that he was already
dismissed when he passed his LE paper.  During the hearing of the Board/Body, she also declared that she merely
213

responded to his request to see the results of the UE 1 and that she had reservations on the phrases "under my
instruction" and "dismissed a bit late" used in his letter of explanation to the HC. In addition, Dr. Costales manifested
her view before the CHR that the act of Cadet 1 CL Cudia of inquiring about his grade outside their classroom after
he submitted his LE paper is not part of the class time because the consultation, being cadet-initiated, is
voluntary.  Assuming, for the sake of argument, that a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales when Cadet 1 CL
214

Cudia was asked to stay and wait for the section grade, still, this does not acquit him. Given such situation, a
responsible cadet who is fully aware of the time constraint has the last say, that is, to politely decline the invitation
and immediately go to the next class. This was not done by Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Thus, it cannot be said that he
already lost control over the circumstances.

It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1 CL Cudia cunningly chose words which led to confusion in the minds of
respondents and eventually commenced the HC inquiry. His case is not just a matter of semantics and a product of
plain and simple inaccuracy. There is manipulation of facts and presentation of untruthful explanation constitutive of
Honor Code violation.

Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1 CL Cudia .. While his Transcript of Records (TOR) may reflect
not only his outstanding academic performance but his excellent grade in subjects on Conduct during his four-year
stay in the PMA,  it does not necessarily follow that he is innocent of the offense charged. It is enough to say that
215

"evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do
the same or similar thing at another time."  While the TOR may be received to prove his identity or habit as an
216

exceptional PMA student, it does not show his specific intent, plan, or scheme as cadet accused of committing a
specific Honor Code violation.

Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel punishment

Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of the guilty cadet from the cadet corps.
Under the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines Regulation (CCAFPR), a violation of the Cadet Honor Code
is considered Grave (Class 1) delinquency which merits a recommendation for a cadet's dismissal from the PMA
Superintendent. The same is likewise clear from the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. Cadet 1 CL Cudia
is, therefore, presumed to know that the Honor Code does not accommodate a gradation or degree of offenses.
There is no difference between a little lie and a huge falsehood. Respondents emphasize that the Honor Code has
always been considered as an absolute yardstick against which cadets have measured themselves ever since the
PMA began and that the Honor Code and System seek to assure that only those who are able to meet the high
standards of integrity and honor are produced by the PMA. As held in Andrews, it is constitutionally permissible for
the military "to set and enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics. " Thus, in violating the Honor
Code, Cadet 1 CL Cudia forfeits his privilege to graduate from the PMA.
On their part, petitioners concede that if it is proven that a cadet breached the Honor Code, the offense warrants his
or her dismissal since such a policy may be the only means to maintain and uphold the spirit of integrity in the
military.  They maintain though that in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case there is no need to distinguish between a "little lie"
217

and a "huge falsehood" since he did not lie at all. Absent any intent to deceive and to take undue advantage, the
penalty imposed on him is considered as unjust and cruel. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the
penalty of dismissal is not commensurate to the fact that he is a graduating cadet with honors and what he allegedly
committed does not amount to an academic deficiency or an intentional and flagrant violation of the PMA non-
academic rules and regulations. Citing Non, petitioners argue that the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the
offense. Further, lsabelo, Jr. is squarely applicable to the facts of the case. Cadet 1 CL Cudia was deprived of his
right to education, the only means by which he may have a secure life and future.

Considering Our finding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied and his acceptance that violation of the Honor
Code warrants the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the PMA, there is actually no more dispute to resolve. Indeed,
the sanction is clearly set forth and Cadet 1 CL Cudia, by contract, risked this when he entered the Academy.  We 218

adopt the ruling in Andrews  wherein it was held that, while the penalty is severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and
219

not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process. It quoted the disposition of the district court, thus:

The fact that a cadet will be separated from the Academy upon a finding that he has violated the Honor Code is
known to all cadets even prior to the beginning of their careers there. The finding of a Code violation by hypothesis
includes a finding of scienter on the part of the offender. While separation is admittedly a drastic and tragic
consequence of a cadet's transgression, it is not an unconstitutionally arbitrary one, but rather a reasonable albeit
severe method of preventing men who have suffered ethical lapses from becoming career officers. That a policy of
admonitions or lesser penalties for single violations might be more compassionate --or even more effective in
achieving the intended result --is quite immaterial to the question of whether the harsher penalty violates due
process. 220

Nature of the CHR Findings

Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind eye on the CHR's recommendations. The CHR, they note, is a
constitutional body mandated by the 1987 Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights, and to conduct investigative monitoring of economic, social, and cultural rights, particularly
of vulnerable sectors of society. Further, it was contended that the results of CHR's investigation and
recommendations are so persuasive that this Court, on several occasions like in the cases of Cruz v. Sec. of
Environment & Natural Resources  and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections,  gave its findings
221 222

serious consideration. It is not, therefore, too late for the Court to hear what an independent and unbiased fact-
finding body has to say on the case.

In opposition, respondents assert that Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights  ruled that the CHR is merely a
223

recommendatory body that is not empowered to arrive at a conclusive determination of any controversy.

We are in accord with respondents.

The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely recommendatory and, therefore, not binding
to this Court. The reason is that the CHR's constitutional mandate extends only to the investigation of all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights.  As held in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights  and
224 225

a number of subsequent cases,  the CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial
226

agency. It is not empowered to adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The power to
investigate is not the same as adjudication:

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even
a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
 xxxx

[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do.
To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate, "commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study.
The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or
inquire into: x x x to subject to an official probe x x x: to conduct an official inquiry;" The purpose of investigation, of
course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling,
deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; xx x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve,
rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court
case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge." And "adjudge"
means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a
case of controversy x x x."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.  To determine finally.
1âwphi1

Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. xx Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment. " 226

All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary damages in accordance with Articles 19, 2217, 2219 and
2229 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA did not effectively deprive him of a future.
Cliche though it may sound, being a PMA graduate is not the "be-all and end-all" of his existence. A cadet separated
from the PMA may still continue to pursue military or civilian career elsewhere without suffering the stigma attached
to his or her dismissal. For one, as suggested by respondents, DND-AFP Circular No. 13, dated July 15, 1991, on
the enlistment and reenlistment in the APP Regular Force, provides under Section 14 (b) thereof that priority shall
be given to, among others, the ex-PMA or PAFFFS cadets.  If the positions open does not appeal to his interest for
227

being way below the rank he could have achieved as a PMA graduate, Cadet 1 CL Cudia could still practice other
equally noble profession or calling that is best suited to his credentials, competence, and potential. Definitely,
nobody can deprive him of that choice.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the Philippine
Military Academy is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 15

G.R. No. 206728, November 12, 2014

APO CEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. MINGSON MINING INDUSTRIES

CORPORATION, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 13, 2012 and the
Resolution3 dated April 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100456 which
affirmed the Decision4 dated July 31, 2007 of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) in MAB Case No. 02-96 (POA Case No. CEB-
001).

The Facts

The instant case arose from a dispute involving the mining claims known as “Allied 1 and 2” and
“Lapulapu 31 and 32” (subject mining claims) between petitioner Apo Cement Corporation
(Apocemco) and respondent Mingson Mining Industries Corporation (Mingson).5 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For the supposed failure of the old locators to develop and put to productive use the mineral
properties found in the area, Apocemco submitted a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA) proposal on June 19, 1991 before the DENR,6 essentially seeking to take over their
current holder, Luvimin Cebu Mining Corporation (Luvimin).7 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On August 18, 19928 and March 2, 1993,9 the DENR - Central Visayas, Region 7 Office (DENR
Regional Office) declared the subject mining claims, among others, abandoned and open for
location to other interested parties,10 prompting Luvimin to file an appeal.11 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Similarly, Mingson assailed the aforementioned declarations on the ground that its own mining
claims,  i.e., “Yellow Eagle I to VII,” overlapped with the subject mining claims. Particularly,
Mingson averred that its “Yellow Eagle IV” claim was registered on February 7, 1983 and was
found to have overlapped with the “Allied 1 and 2” claims, while its “Yellow Eagle III” claim was
registered on April 12, 1982 and overlapped with the “Lapulapu 31 and 32” claims.12 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The DENR Proceedings

In an Order13 dated March 1, 1995, the DENR Regional Office decreed that portions of the
subject mining claims be awarded to Mingson, considering that said claims have encroached its
Yellow Eagle I to VII claims.

However, upon Apocemco’s motion for reconsideration,14 the DENR Regional Office’s Legal
Division issued a Resolution15 dated September 5, 1995, recommending that the subject mining
claims be awarded, instead, to Apocemco, subject, however, to the outcome of Luvimin’s appeal.
In an Order16 dated September 20, 1995, the DENR Regional Director affirmed the foregoing
resolution, but subject to the review and concurrence of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
Region 7 - Panel of Arbitrators (POA), considering that pursuant to Section 21817of DENR
Department Administrative Order No. (DAO) 95-23, Series of 1995,18 the POA has been
mandated to resolve, among others, disputes involving rights to mining areas.

In a Decision19 dated May 3, 1996, the POA upheld the September 5, 1995 Resolution and the
September 20, 1995 Order, reiterating the findings therein made, without, however, requiring
the parties to file any pleading or setting the matter for hearing.

Aggrieved, Mingson appealed20 the POA’s Decision before the DENR MAB, averring that the said
Decision was not supported by facts and the evidence on record, and that it was arbitrary and
issued with grave abuse of authority.21 Subsequently, in Mingson’s letter22 dated August 8, 1996,
it claimed denial of due process.

In a Decision23 dated July 31, 2007, the DENR MAB granted Mingson’s appeal and thereby
reversed and set aside the POA’s Decision. It found that the POA merely conducted a review of
the case and Mingson, in particular, was not given an opportunity to be heard, which is
repugnant to due process.24 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Dissatisfied, Apocemco elevated the matter to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision25  dated June 13, 2012, the CA dismissed Apocemco’s appeal and sustained the
cralawred

DENR MAB’s finding that Mingson was not afforded by the POA its right to due process, given
that none of the applicable procedures found in DENR DAO 95-23 were followed.26 As an added
ground for dismissal, the CA held that Apocemco failed to perfect its appeal in accordance with
the Rules of Court, considering that the DENR MAB was not served a copy of its petition.27 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Unconvinced, Apocemco filed a motion for reconsideration28 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution29 dated April 23, 2013, hence, the petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ordered the dismissal of
Apocemco’s appeal.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

Sections 22330 (on preliminary conference), 22431 (on hearing), and 22732 (on the proceedings
before the POA), as well as Sections 22133 (on due course) and 22234 (on answers) of DENR DAO
95-23, or the Implementing Rules of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,35 clearly require that the
parties involved in mining disputes be given the opportunity to be heard. These rules – which
were already in effect36 during the time the dispute between the parties arose – flesh out the
core requirement of due process; thus, a stark and unjustified contravention of the same would
oust the errant tribunal of its jurisdiction and, in effect, render its decision null and void. As
explained in PO2 Montoya v. Police Director Varilla:37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts
are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to due process raises a
serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.38 (Emphases supplied)

Here, it has been established that the POA proceeded to resolve the present mining dispute
without affording either party any fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard in violation of the
aforementioned provisions of DENR DAO 95-23. Thus, as correctly ruled by the DENR MAB and
later affirmed by the CA, Mingson’s due process rights were violated, thereby rendering the
POA’s Decision null and void.

In this relation, the Court finds it apt to clarify that the DENR MAB did not err in taking
cognizance of the due process issue. While such issue was not assigned as an error in Mingson’s
Appeal39 dated July 27, 1996, the same was squarely raised in Mingson’s August 8, 1996
letter40 to the DENR MAB. Given the lack of any formal procedure on appeals at that time,41 the
DENR MAB cannot be faulted for considering the letter and the issues raised therein as part of
Mingson’s appeal. It must be added that the DENR MAB is not a court of law but an
administrative body; hence, it is not bound by strict rules of procedure and evidence, and is
allowed to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of each case speedily and objectively
without resort to technical rules,42 as in this case.

Besides, an apparent lack of due process may be raised by a party at any time since due process
is a jurisdictional requisite that all tribunals, whether administrative or judicial, are duty bound
to observe. In Salva v. Valle,43 the Court pronounced that “[a] decision rendered without due
process is void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a
separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked.”
The Court sees no defensible reason as to why this principle should not be herein applied.

That being said, and considering too Apocemco’s failure to comply with Sections 5 and 7, 44 Rule
43 of the Rules of Court in the proceedings before the appellate court, the instant petition is
hereby denied and the rulings of the CA are affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 13, 2012 and the Resolution
dated April 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100456 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 16

G.R. No. 204172, December 09, 2015

HON. HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), ATTY.
JOEL L. JACOB, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, LEGAL SERVICE
(DPWH), ATTY. OLIVER T. RODULFO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS HEAD, INTERNAL
AFFAIRS OFFICE, (DPWH), AND HON. JAIME A. PACANAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR, (DPWH), REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VIII, Petitioners, v. ALVARO
Y. APURILLO, ERDA P. GABRIANA, JOCELYN S. JO, IRAIDA R. LASTIMADO, AND
FRANCISCO B. VINEGAS, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated May 31, 2012 and the
Resolution3 dated September 28, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 05432,
which affirmed the Resolution4 dated August 5, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City
(RTC), Branch 34 in Civil Case No. 2006-06-75, setting aside the Formal Charge with Preventive
Suspension5 dated December 22, 2005 (Formal Charge) issued by the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) through petitioner - then Acting Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane,
Jr. (Acting Sec. Ebdane) - against respondents Alvaro Y. Apurillo, Erda P. Gabriana, Jocelyn S.
Jo, Iraida R. Lastimado, and Francisco B. Vinegas, Jr. (respondents), who were then DPWH
Officials and Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) Members, on due process considerations.

The Facts

On October 17, 2005, Juanito R. Alama (Alama), DPWH Assistant Head of the BAC-Technical
Working Group (BAC-TWG), received an anonymous complaint6 from an alleged concerned
employee of the DPWH, Tacloban City, claiming that R.M. Padillo Builders (RMPB), a local
contractor, won the bidding for the construction of the Lirang Revetment Project (subject
project), despite its non-inclusion in the list of Registered Construction Firms (RCF) which were
qualified to bid.7

On October 26, 2005, Alama sent a 1st indorsement letter8 to petitioner Atty. Oliver T. Rodulfo
(Atty. Rodulfo), DPWH Head of Internal Affairs Office, stating that under Department Order No.
2, Series of 2001 (DPWH DO No. 2),9 only contractors duly registered in the RCF and holding a
valid Contractor's Registration Certificate issued by the BAC-TWG shall be allowed to participate
in any bidding, per the requirement in the Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid.10

On November 8, 2005, Atty. Rodulfo issued a Subpoena11 which directed Engr. Gervasio T.

Baldos (Engr. Baldos), OIC District Engineer of the DPWH Tacloban City Sub-District Engineering
Office (DPWH Sub-District Office), to answer/comment on the anonymous complaint and,
accordingly, submit the following documents in relation to the award of the subject project to the
allegedly unregistered contractor, namely: (1) Approved BAC Composition for Calendar Year
2005; (2) Invitation to Bid for the Construction of the subject project; (3) Eligibility Screening;
(4) Abstract of Bids; (5) Resolution of Award; (6) Contract; (7) Notice of Award; (8) Notice to
Proceed; (9) Disbursement Voucher for the Construction of the subject project, if any; and (10)
Statement of Work Accomplished as of November, 2005.12
Atty. Rodulfo proceeded to investigate on the matter and, thereafter, forwarded his Investigation
Report dated November 21, 200513 to Acting Sec. Ebdane, finding that RMPB was indeed not a
duly registered contractor at the time of the bidding. Atty. Rodulfo, thus, recommended that the
officials of the DPWH Sub-District Office be administratively charged with Gross Misconduct and
that they be placed on preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days.14

On December 22, 2005, Acting Sec. Ebdane issued the Formal Charge against respondents,
who were then DPWH Officials and BAC Members, for Grave Misconduct. In the said issuance,
respondents were: (a) directed to file their answer, together with supporting evidence;
(b) given the option to elect or waive the conduct of a formal investigation; and (c)
placed under preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days.15

In their Answer with Motion to Dismiss and to Lift Ordgr of Preventive

Suspension16 (first Answer) filed on January 13, 2006, respondents argued, among others,
that they were not in any position to answer the Formal Charge against them due to lack of
basis.l7 In this relation, they pointed out that aside from the fact that RMPB had firmly expressed
in its duly sworn letter of intent that it was a registered contractor with the DPWH, it was not
their duty to determine whether a contractor is a registered contractor with the DPWH Notarial
Registry of Civil Works Contractors.18 As such, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
Formal Charge and the lifting of the preventive suspension order against them. Further, they
expressly waived their rights to a formal hearing, and sought instead, that the case
against them be decided based on the records submitted.19

Five (5) months later,20 respondents were re-issued the same Formal Charge, to which they filed
their Answer with Manifestation21 (second Answer), reiterating their previous statements, and
further alleging that the DPWH Sub-District Office never required them to submit a counter-
affidavit/comment, as in fact, it was only Engr. Baldos who had been issued a Subpoena to
submit an answer/explanation regarding the alleged irregularities in the bidding for the subject
project.22 Moreover, respondents averred that the Formal Charge served upon them did not state
the nature and substance of the charge/s hurled against them. For these reasons,
respondents demanded that a formal investigation be conducted.23

Without waiting for the DPWH's action, respondents filed on June 27, 2006 a petition
for certiorari and prohibition24 (June 27, 2006 petition) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2006-06-75, alleging that there was a violation of their right to due process since: (a) they
were not made to comment on the anonymous complaint;25 and (b) no preliminary investigation
was conducted prior to the issuance of the Formal Charge.26

On June 28, 2006, the RTC-Branch 9 issued a temporary restraining order27 against the
implementation of the preventive suspension order (Formal Charge), which was later converted
by the RTC-Branch 34 to a writ of preliminary injunction28 on July 12, 2006.29

On December 18, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss,30 claiming non-exhaustion of

administrative remedies and failure to state a cause of action,31 but was denied in an
Order32 dated July 28, 2008;33 hence, they filed their comment34 dated September 25, 2008.

The RTC Ruling

In a Resolution35 dated August 5, 2010, the RTC-Branch 34 set aside the Formal Charge. It held
that respondents' rights to administrative due process were violated when they were deprived of
the opportunity to file their comment/memorandum prior to, or during the preliminary or fact-
finding investigation conducted by Atty. Rodulfo,36 which violation was deemed to involve a
purely legal question, hence, an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.37 However, the RTC clarified that its ruling was not intended to prevent or avert the
DPWH from pursuing any separate administrative action against respondents, pointing out that
they have not been absolved from any administrative liability.38

Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the CA, claiming, among others, that respondents' June 27,
2006 petition before the RTC was filed out of time, as they only had until March 11, 2006, i.e.,
sixty (60) days from the day they first received the Formal Charge on January 10, 2006, to do
so.39

The CA Ruling

In a Decision40 dated May 31, 2012, the CA affirmed the RTC Resolution, On the procedural
error, it held that petitioners were estopped from raising the untimely filing of the June 27, 2006
petition by reason of their silence or failure to object to the same before the RTC.41 On the
merits, it ruled that the issuance of the Formal Charge against respondents, without complying
with the mandated preliminary investigation, or at least giving respondents the opportunity to
comment or submit their counter-affidavits, violated their due process rights.42 In this regard,
the CA found that Section 11, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service43 (URACCS) requires that respondents be given the opportunity to comment and explain
their side during a preliminary investigation conducted prior to the issuance of a Formal Charge
and that such comment is different from the Answer that respondents may file
thereafter.44 Moreover, the CA pronounced that a violation of the right to due process is an
admitted exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies.45

Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration,46 which was denied in a Resolution47 dated

September 28, 2012; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The linchpin issue in this case is whether or not respondents' due process rights were violated.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a
real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, as in the case at bar, procedural
due process simply means the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean
only verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process.48

In Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,49 the Court ruled that any procedural
defect in the proceedings taken against the government employee therein was cured by his filing
of a motion for reconsideration and by his appealing the adverse result to the administrative
agency (in that case, the Civil Service Commission [CSC]).50 Also, in Gonzales v. CSC,51 it was
held that any defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, and that denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who
was afforded the opportunity to be heard.52 Similarly, in Autencio v. Mañara,53 the Court
observed that defects in procedural due process may be cured when the party has been afforded
the opportunity to appeal or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.54

In this case, the Court finds that while there were missteps in the proceedings conducted before
the DPWH, namely: (a) respondents were not made to file their initial comment on the
anonymous complaint; and (b) no preliminary investigation was conducted before the filing of
the Formal Charge against them, contrary to the sequential procedure under the URACCS,55 they
were, nonetheless, accorded a fair opportunity to be heard when the Formal Charge directed
them:

Wherefore, you are hereby directed to submit within ten (10) days from receipt hereof your
detailed answer to the above stated charge in writing and under oath, together with whatever
evidence you may desire to present in support of your defense.

In your answer, you should state whether you elect to have a formal investigation of the charge
against you or waive your right to such an investigation.

If you fail to submit your answer within the period aforestated, you will be deemed in default
and the case against you will be decided on the basis of the available records.

x x x x56
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Accordingly, respondent filed their first Answer on January 13, 2006, wherein they had
presented their position before the agency, and more significantly, expressly waived
their rights to a formal hearing, as they sought instead, that the case against them be
decided based on the records submitted:

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, facts and premises, respondents most respectfully pray to the Hon. Secretary that
the instant Formal Charge be DISMISSED, and pending such dismissal, respondents pray that
the Order for the Preventive Suspension be LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Herein respondents
hereby waive their rights to a formal hearing and that the said case be decided based
on records submitted.
MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.57 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Hence, whatever procedural lapses the DPWH had committed, the same had already been cured
by the foregoing filing.

It deserves mentioning that while the Court, in Garcia v. Molina,58 had, on due process
considerations, previously set aside formal charges for having been issued without the benefit of
a prior preliminary investigation under the URACCS, said ruling is inapplicable to this case, since
the government employees who were charged therein did not waive their right to such hearing,
unlike the present case where respondents themselves filed an express waiver to a formal
hearing as above-shown.

Thus, having established that there was no violation of respondents' rights to administrative due
process, the CA incorrectly exempted respondents from compliance with the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies.59 They are therefore required to go through the full course of the
administrative process where they are still left with remedies. As case law states, a party with an
administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to
obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial
intervention.60 If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can
be sought.61

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 31, 2012 and the Resolution
dated September 28, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 05432 are hereby SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the Department of Public Works and Highways
Tacloban City Sub-District Office for the continuation of the administrative proceedings against
respondents Alvaro Y. Apurillo, Erda P. Gabriana, Jocelyn S. Jo, Iraida R. Lastimado, and
Francisco B. Vinegas, Jr.

SO ORDERED.