Kant - Walsh

Royal Institute of Philosophy
Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics: I

Author(s): W. H. Walsh
Source: Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 55 (Jul., 1939), pp. 313-325
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
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KANT'S CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICSI-I
W. H. WALSH, M.A.
WHAT is the Critique of Pure Reason about ? The terminology of the

work is so perplexing, its argument so obscurely expressed, that
the ordinary reader may be forgiven if he puts it down at the end
very much in the dark as to what it all means. He will have seen
that in it Kant has attempted to establish certain conclusions: the
subjectivity of space and time, the existence and objective validity
of a number of a priori concepts or categories, the falsity of the
arguments used to defend the metaphysical system most widely
favoured in German learned circles in the eighteenth century; but
though he has grasped all this he may yet have failed to make
sense of the work as a whole. It is the old story of not seeing the
wood for trees; and in this case the fault is more excusable than in
most, for the individual trees each demand so much attention and
are so difficult to get round that it is all too easy to forget the very
existence of the wood. At the worst, one may think that there is
no wood at all; only a miscellaneous aggregate of individual trees
which have nothing to do with each other.
Yet this conclusion, if true, would be a strange one, contradicting
not only common expectation (for it is reasonable to expect that a
work on which its author spent so much trouble would have a
unitary theme), but also the implications of explicit statements of
Kant himself. The Critique of Pure Reason is presumably itself a
product of pure reason, and pure reason, as Kant is constantly
telling us,2 is a unity; or again, the Critique is a piece of (immanent)
metaphysics,3 and metaphysics, as Kant understands it, is nothing
if not systematic. It is true that Kant says that the Critique is not
itself the system of reformed metaphysics which his philosophy is
to make possible;4 but there is little doubt that the contents of the
first part of the latter (the metaphysic of nature as opposed to the
metaphysic of morals) would, if it had ever been written, have
x The present paper only deals with Kant's views as expressed in the
inaugural Dissertation and the first half of the Critique of Pure Reason. It is
hoped to follow it with discussions of the Dialectic and the relevant parts
of the other two Critiques. The writer is much indebted to Professor Paton
for help over points of detail. 2 E.g. B xxiii, B 766 = A 738.
3 Cf. letter to Herz, later than May II, I78I (Berlin edition, X, 252), wher
the Critique is said to contain the "metaphysic of metaphysics" (reference in
Vleeschauwer, La ddduction transcendentale, I, 6I). 4 B 869 - A 8I4.
313
PHILOSOPHY
consisted of little but the conclusions established in its so-called

"propaedeutic."'
It is the least we can do, then, to assume that the Critique is the
answer to a single question or set of questions. The problem nex
arises: what is this question to which Kant's work is the answer
Kant himself says in a passage in the second edition Introductio
(B I9): "The proper problem of pure reason is contained in the
question: how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" In th
first edition Preface (A xvii) he says: "The chief question is alwa
simply this: what and how much can understanding and reason
know apart from all experience?" These two statements are no
quite alternative formulations of the same problem. The second put
a general question, which the first particularizes; and the partic
larization is at the same time a beginning of a solution of the
difficulty. The general question concerns the extent of our a priori
knowledge: it asks what knowledge human beings can acqui
independently of sense-experience or introspection.z Many phil
sophers, and particularly in the eighteenth century, have believ
that there are certain propositions which we can know to be tru
independently of the evidence of the senses: the propositions
mathematics and many metaphysical propositions were alleged
be of this type. Clearly it is important for any philosopher wh
accepts this general position (as Kant does) to ask after the exte
and nature of our knowledge of these propositions. It is this proble
which Kant has before him throughout the Critique, and if we
through the work with some such formula in our minds as "Wh
can we know by simply thinking?" or better, "What can we kno
by other means than sense-experience?" we should be able to s
what it is about. But we shall find that Kant himself is more a
to use the other formula, "How are synthetic a priori judgmen
possible?"3 and this should be explained. In the famous passage
the Introduction to the Critique (B IO = A 6 ff.) Kant distinguishes
between two types of judgment, analytic and synthetic. Analyt
judgments are all a priori; they are what we can conclude from the
judgments we know already by analysing their subject-concepts
accordance with the principle of contradiction. No analytic judg
ment, therefore, gives us new or what might be called "positiv
knowledge. "Positive" knowledge is always expressed in synthet
judgments. Now it is clear that the sort of knowledge acquire
I Compare the handbook of metaphysics outlined in the latter to Jacob,
September i (?), 1787 (X, 47I). Of course there would also have been analys
setting out derivative concepts in such a system (cf. B 107 = A 82, B 249 =
A 204), but the general framework would have been set by the results of t
Critique of Pure Reason.
2 In the rest of this paper the term "sense-experience" must be taken t
include introspection. 3 E.g. in Prolegomena, ? 5.
314
KANT'S CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICS
independently of sense-experience whic

expressed in synthetic judgments; so th
whether we know anything independent
simply the question whether we know an
propositions, since a priori means acquire
experience. Kant believes that the answer
that we know propositions of this sort in m
physics, the fundamental presuppositions
as are the propositions making up the bo
sense-experience; and that metaphysician
tions of this nature also. He therefore propo
his general question, "What can we know
experience?" by asking another question,
of our knowing synthetic a priori propo
him clear (and it is surely not an unreas
investigation of the synthetic a priori kn
have will throw light on the nature and ex
knowledge in general.
From all this it should be clear that the
is the same as that of so many other ph
investigation of the sources of knowledg
Only Kant is particularly interested in th
or intelligence is a source of propositions
"positive"; and his main aim is to estima
gestion. That is why his work is a "cr
critical estimation of the powers of pure r
by itself. The object is to say what pure re
do. The existence of certain propositions w
character, and objective validity are all reg
shows that reason (in a wide, non-technical
the existence of metaphysics shows that so
other, apparently more significant, powers
Critique, Kant will be in a position to pron
indeed it is to make this pronouncement
undertaken: the object of the work is to
of metaphysics, a science the very concept
in the Prolegomena (? I), implies that its so
Metaphysical knowledge, if such a thing is
example of non-empirical knowledge: is
knowledge ?
This question of the possibility of metaphysics is one which had
a particularly strong interest for Kant. It interested him both as a
technical philosopher and as an ordinary man. In technical philo-
sophy his chief aim, from the 'sixties onwards, seems to have been
to determine whether metaphysics in the traditional sense is pos-
3I5
PHILOSOPHY
sible, and, if not, what sort of metaphy

Again and again he discussed points conne
treating of it particularly in the Traiime an
tion. His pronouncements in the Critique an
that he thought that metaphysics occupied a
among the sciences. It was a science whic
be in demand,"I a science which responde
human beings. To eliminate metaphysics a
possible; the most that could be done wou
illegitimate types of metaphysics, making ro
doctrine. Is not the aim of the celebrated
in philosophy declared to be the setting of m
path of science?2 For a philosopher holding
of the possibility of metaphysics could not
But quite apart from this professional in
ordinary man an interest in the fate of m
vinced that there were certain truths or
important to maintain: the existence of G
the soul, the freedom of the will. Now these
thought to be the proper province of metap
in its capacity as speculative, brought for
against them. In neither case did it do mu
in question. Quite apart from the positive op
philosophies, the support lent them by ra
Leibnizian type was of dubious benefit. Fo
never able to confute their opponents compl
as they did that our acceptance of the pr
depended on the maintenance of their positi
doubt on our confidence in the truth of t
the traditional metaphysics claimed, these m
competence of the theoretical intellect, t
maintain without fear of contradiction the e
remaining dogmas. It remained, then, for an
truth of the dogmas to argue that their a
or fall with the success of the intellect in d
maintain this point is the aim of Kant's
For Kant's philosophy, in its exaltation
1 Prolegomena, Introduction; cf. B 24.
2 In all this Kant seems to be speaking rather l
interested in are the questions which metaphysi
the existence of God, the soul, and so forth. But
which the critical philosophy is to make possi
subjects; to speak roughly, it is the sum of our sy
so far as that is not mathematical. Its only menti
is to show that they involve questions which from
make-up we are unable to answer.
316
intellectual nature of man, is a philosoph

worth for all human beings. Because of
thinks that our moral nature is such that we can see that it necessi-
tates our belief in the dogmas in question (for practical purposes
they are unquestionably true), pretensions to knowledge in this
sphere must be rejected and room be left for a faith we can all
share. But in order that this position may be established, meta-
physics in its traditional form, as a science claiming to give us
knowledge of an intelligible world, must be shown to be bogus; and
not until that has been effected can we rest secure in the possession
of our dogmas. Hence the interest to the plain man of the result,
if not the details, of the Critique of Pure Reason. The Critique is
really a vindication of the plain man: as Kant says, the schools
have to recognize that "they can lay no claim to higher and fuller
insight in a matter of universal human concern than that which is
equally within the reach of the great mass of men (ever to be held
by us in the highest esteem)."'
That the determination of the possibility of metaphysics is the

principal object of the Critique of Pure Reason is made plain enough
in the prefaces to the first two editions, but it is not so obvious
how this is so when we move on to the main body of the text. In
the Analytic especially the argument is so difficult that one tends
to lose sight of its connection with the rest of the book, and this
tendency is increased by the interest of the doctrine of the Analytic
in itself. Thus Kant's attempt to establish the synthetic a priori
character of the general law of causality is treated by most philo-
sophers as a possible refutation of Hume; yet though this aspect of
his doctrine was plain enough to Kant himself, it is only an inci-
dental thing about it. From the point of view of the whole work
the main thing Kant has to say about the general law of causality
is something over which he is in agreement with Hume: that it is
only valid in the co-ordination of sense-data,2 and that therefore
the concept of cause could not be applied to the determination of
objects in general, as it was by the traditional metaphysics. Again,
in the Transcendental Deduction, the working out of the argument
from the unitary character of the self to the necessary applicability
of the categories distracts attention from the all-important con-
clusion which Kant is seeking to establish: that the categories,
I B xxxiii. Kant's position is obviously closely analogous to that of
theologians and Christian philosophers who have sought to discredit intel-
lectual proofs of the dogmas of religion so that they may fall back on the
(intellectually impregnable) evidence of revelation to maintain them. But
no one would claim that Kant's is a religious philosophy except in a very
wide sense. 2 Cf. Hume, Treatise, p. 212 (Selby-Bigge).
317
PHILOSOPHY
though objectively valid, i.e. related to an o

to a phenomenal object and are valid solely
experience. It would of course be wrong to
emphasize this conclusion;' but one is apt, i
on the details of the argument, to lose sigh
assign to it less importance than it deserves.
For these reasons it seems worth while to re-
the Aesthetic and Analytic from the point of
whole, keeping in mind Kant's preoccupatio
the possibility of metaphysics. A re-statem
be of interest not only historically (from the p
exegesis) but also (more important) philoso
theory is one which philosophers must at l
the question of the possibility of metaphysics
in philosophy, as recent discussions have sh
be made out for the view that Kant's posit
a priori propositions of "pure physics" is a
adopted by contemporary positivists; though
it without rejecting the positivist view of
physics, provided that, in addition to accep
in the Analytic, we are in general agreemen
in the Dialectic and over the nature of the
experience.2 But even if we differ from Kant
existence of a faculty of reason which can legi
as Hegel does, the results of the Analytic,
standing at least is not a metaphysical facu
be important.
Perhaps the best means of approach to the C

at once an elaboration of and contrast with th
"on the form and principles of the sensible
of I770.3 The Dissertation is particularly instr
Critique an examination of the possibility
sense of a science professing to give us infor
not knowable in sense-experience, since the
physics of this kind is explicitly argued for in
argument used to support this position is t
I E.g. B 178 = A I39.

z Provided, that is, that we do not interpret moral and religious experience
as a source of metaphysical knowledge.
3 A letter of Kant's to Herz, May I, I78I (X, 249), announces the im-
pending publication of the Critique and says that it brings to completion
the series of meditations undertaken in common since the defence of the
Dissertation (reference in Vleeschauwer, op. cit., I, I54).
318
in possession of certain a priori concepts, an

later categories. When we remember that th
Analytic is to show that these concepts, thou
a priori and in our possession, nevertheless ar
(phenomenal) "object in general" and are with
in reference to sense-experience, we are not lik
the importance of the Dissertation.
In the Dissertation Kant combines the view
give us knowledge of appearances (since what w
senses is characterized by the form(s) of time (
and space are subjective ways of our perceivin
tion that metaphysics, in the traditional sense,
have in the Dissertation an assertion of what was later to be the
substance of the Aesthetic, but there is nothing directly correspond-
ing to the Analytic and Dialectic; or rather, though there are
passages from which these sections plainly developed, their content
is strikingly different from the parallel chapters in the Critique. Yet
Kant is already convinced of two points which were to be funda-
mental in the later work: (i) that metaphysics, if there is such a
thing, is a non-empirical science;z and (ii) that the only world with
which we can be directly acquainted (which we can "intuit") is that
we know through the senses.3 In the Critique itself these proposi-
tions are combined with one other-that all knowledge contains a
sense element (an element of "intuition")-to demonstrate the
impossibility of transcendent metaphysics; but in the Dissertation
this third proposition is not accepted and the conclusion not drawn.
The reason for this, already referred to, is that we are in possession
of certain purely a priori concepts;4 and by means of these we can
have, not indeed an "intuition" of things intellectual but a "sym-
bolic knowledge" of them.5 Hence we do have some means (though
not the best we could wish for) of getting beyond the evidence of
the senses, and metaphysics is, in principle at least, possible.
The position argued for here is one familiar enough in the history
of philosophy. Its affinity with views like those of Plato, for example,
is obvious; so much so that one commentator has seen in a study
of Plato in the years immediately preceding I770 the inspiration of
the Dissertation.6 It amounts to a denial of empiricism on the ground
that the first premise of empiricism is false. Not all our knowledge
Cf. especially ?? I3 ff.
2 ? 8: "No empirical principles are to be found in metaphysics."
3 ? o0 init. 4 ? 8.
s ? io. Presumably th
ligible world (a world
we can know it thr
insight into its gener
6 M. Wundt, Kant al
3I9
PHILOSOPHY
is drawn from sense-experience: besides

there is a "way of the intellect," and the
with other philosophers, is that the "way
true road to knowledge (or rather, the r
Metaphysics gives us knowledge of a non
instrument being the intellect; and meta
sciences." This is surely a respectable posi
false, and its details should be worth invest
Unfortunately, the details as put forward
tion are disappointingly vague, and it is h
of the more carefully worked-out position
evident. Kant begins (? 5) by remarking t
twofold use: logical and real. The logical use
cerned with the subordination and comp
principles according to the law of contradic
common to all sciences. What seems to b
formation of concepts; (ii) the grouping
ordinate concepts; (iii) the grouping of prin
rate in the sphere of phenomena, is that
experientia, i.e. (presumably) an orderly wor
something given is a prerequisite, and the in
data. But in its real use the intellect doe
itself originates concepts. There are in th
this view, certain pure concepts of "things
and these the intellect can discover by refle
tions on the occasion of experience (? 8). K
such concepts (ibid.): "possibility, existenc
cause, etc., with their opposites or correlativ
I Intellectus. This is the word equated by Baum

Verstand, whilst ratio is Vernunft (? 640). But n
in Kant's inaugural Dissertation is the critical dis
faculties to be found. "Intellect" in the Dissertat
covers both Verstand and Vernunft.
2 Vleeschauwer (op. cit., I, I57, 204-6), agreeing
sees in the usus logicus of the intellect in the Dis
mature transcendental deduction. If this means t
intellect so far as it operates logically is conceive
that of the understanding as a "transcendental"
the Critique, that does not seem to be true. The
is nearer the logical use of understanding in 178
good in all sciences (and therefore presumably in
doubtful whether Vleeschauwer is right in sayin
on which the intellect operates in its logical use ar
Kant does not say this, but merely that all the c
source need not be specified. The real use of the intellect seems to be the
source of the categories; but to all appearances Kant had not yet realized
the need of a transcendental deduction of pure concepts.
320
Now already in I770 Kant had come to

existence of certain a priori concepts or (t
representations did not necessarily mean
an intelligible world. For non-empirical
one of two possible parts. They may giv
a reality other than that we know in sens
be merely a priori forms for the co-ord
second alternative is that which Kant ad
over the a priori representations of time
of space and time in general (as opposed
ticular spatial and temporal situations)
rience; space and time are a priori repre
are endowed. But that does not mean t
source of knowledge other than sense-
time, though a priori, are only a priori fo
i.e. subjective ways of our perceiving. W
time and all the data of the outer sen
operation time and space are presuppose
supposed as subjective forms; apart from
come from the senses they are empty. Th
nor the science of mathematics, which
have any metaphysical value.I
There remain the purely intellectual con
Kant unhesitatingly plumps for the vi
might be called, following Vleeschauwer, a
that is to say, that they are a source of k
experience and in fact give us insight in
things in themselves. The pure intellec
(? 9) to play a dual part. First they serve t
of sensible concepts: they show that the
ledge of appearances and thus prevent o
measure of true reality. But they are o
critical function because of their other, d
the pure intellectual concepts "issue in som
ceivable only by the pure intellect and
all things so far as real. This pattern-pe
fection either in the theoretical or in
former case it is the supreme being, G
I The concept of number, the basis of arithmet

? 12, to be intellectual (though cf. ? 23), but to
in the concrete the auxiliary notions of time
addition and juxtaposition of a plurality)." On
arithmetic, see Kemp Smith's commentary to
does not mention algebra in the Dissertation. Fo
see Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, I,
X 321
PHILOSOPHY
perfection" (? 9). It is not altogether easy to

by this (to us) curious language, but it mus
intellect gives us some sort of knowledge o
would call an Absolute, and that this impli
lectual concepts constitute a source of kn
sense-experience. The dogmatic use of the pu
is, presumably, metaphysics, though that sci
"that part of philosophy which contains the
use of the pure intellect." There is a scienc
whose aim it is to bring out the distinctio
intellectual knowledge; and Kant says that th
a specimen of (rather, an essay in) that scien
If we ask what all this amounts to, the a
We know in sense-experience a world whic
to its matter, in the empirical sciences; (b) as
matics. But over and above this we are posses
of knowledge in certain intellectual concepts
mental equipment. These give us insight into
not of appearances but of reality (? 4); and
science is possible. This science is metaphysic
of which is the attaining of a conception of
Both the most interesting and the least sati

the inaugural Dissertation is the doctrine
intellect. Two things about the work imm
familiar with the Critique: the "ontological
intellectual concepts, and the lack of anythin
critical distinction between understandin
concepts cited in ? 8 are all concepts of th
later sense, and unless Kant's saying that t
concepts of "things or relations"2 points to i
hint of the future faculty of reason.3 Again,
of the intellect foreshadows it, there is no an
sary co-operation of sense and thought in
these doctrines we have simply a crude affirm
between the senses and the intellect and a
worked out in detail, of how the one gives us
ances, the other of things in themselves.
I We are also said to know moral concepts thr
(? 7). The likeness of the general theory to the Ca
ideas is striking. 2 " Vel rerum vel respectuum" (? 5).
3 On the other hand, since the "intellect" of the Dissertation is ess
metaphysical, it is precisely what reason pretends to be in the Cri
already said, "intellect" covers both reason and understanding.
322
In the Critique all this is changed, and it i

of one part of the change-that affecting th
standing-that we are chiefly concerned
of the Critique is that the existence of a
used to prove the conclusions they are
Dissertation, with the result that metaph
be impossible. Thus the Critique supplies, as
on and a refutation of the most striking co
tion. But because of the all-important di
standing and reason, the overthrow of m
is accomplished in two parts: in the Anal
of the understanding are treated of, and in
ideas of reason are dealt with. As it turns o
to be a metaphysical faculty are though
than those of understanding; but there i
the existence of the Dissertation shows,
understanding have metaphysical value.I Sin
is to trace the development of the discus
metaphysics in the first half of the Crit
ideas will here be omitted.
It will not be necessary to spend any great

since the arguments there used by Kant are
those put forward in corresponding se
Dissertation. Once more we have a theory
apriority and subjectivity of time and s
a priori representations: they are the presu
experience we have rather than something
but they are also forms of our sensibility,
sarily perceive the data of the senses. It fol
and time have no metaphysical value, but
with space and time cannot have metaph
metaphysics, if there is such a thing, m
must have some other source than sense-
that the point about the fatal nature of
and time is important in relation to Kan
concepts.
It must be confessed that the argument of the Aesthetic has only
a minor philosophical importance nowadays. The doctrine of the
subjectivity of space and time remains important, but the position
that space and time might be both a priori and of metaphysical
value can hardly be taken seriously. Thus so far as the Aesthetic
argues against a metaphysical conception of space and time, it is
x Cf. also e.g. B 87-8 = A 63 and Prolegomena, ? 33.
323
PHILOSOPHY
not likely to be confuted. On the other

Aesthetic Kant is concerned to put forward
matics (as he does for geometry at least
exposition of the concept of space"), his t
seems to be an antiquated view of the
Philosophical theories of the nature of math
Kant's does, from the view that the scien
nection with space and time cannot be valid
ably clear that mathematics is not "about"
Nevertheless, there is a point about Kant's
propositions which remains instructive.
concern itself with the "pure manifolds" of
to say, mathematics describe the essential n
when abstraction is made from all concre
situations. But because of this element of abstraction mathematical
propositions do not say anything about the world of fact, even the
sensible world of fact. They merely enunciate laws which anything
which falls within that world must obey. They may therefore be
described as propositions which prescribe to experience; apart from
this reference to experience they are empty of real significance. It
is true that the pure mathematician continues to be interested in
them; but then he is not specially concerned, as a pure mathe-
matician, with the question of whether mathematical propositions
give us knowledge.
This theory of the prescriptive, character of mathematical pro-
positions has a merit which raises it above the rest of the Aesthetic.
It not only gives what seems to be a true account of the nature of
mathematical propositions, but is also suggestive in connection with
the rest of our synthetic a priori knowledge.2 For it shows that a
1 It must not be thought that the use of this word here and later implies
agreement with Professor C. I. Lewis's view of the arbitrary character of
a priori propositions.
2 Of course it is widely held that mathematical propositions are not
synthetic but analytic. The reason for this is that all the propositions of a
given mathematical system can be deduced from a number of primary
propositions, together with the definitions of a number of primary concepts,
by aid of the law of contradiction alone. But this does not prove that the
primary propositions and definitions are not themselves synthetic, and if
they are, so is the body of the science. That they are seems to be a reasonable
view, since otherwise it is hard to see what internal significance the system
could have, or what would differentiate it from any other similar system.
It would be like a set of trucks without anything to set it in motion.
Cf. Kant, Prolegomena, ? 2: "A synthetic proposition can indeed be com-
prehended according to the law of contradiction, but only by presupposing
another synthetic proposition from which it follows." Kant himself, of
course, believes that mathematical propositions are not only thus synthetic
by derivation but also in their own right; but in this he seems to be mistaken.
324
body of propositions which are both a p

nevertheless be only a body of prescripti
while not drawn from, may be in relation
no doubt errs in thinking that there is a s
mathematics and space-time experience,
terminology which will be explained late
tions are specially rather than generally pr
in fact, does have some sort of metaphys
Leibniz's language, it is true for all possi
not mean that by itself mathematics is
metaphysics; you cannot say anything v
intelligible world by knowing that math
true of it. All this, as we shall see, throws
value of another set of prescriptive propos
(To be concluded)
325

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Royal Institute of Philosophy

Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics: I

WHAT is the Critique of Pure Reason about ? The terminology of the

consisted of little but the conclusions established in its so-called

independently of sense-experience whic

sible, and, if not, what sort of metaphy

intellectual nature of man, is a philosoph

That the determination of the possibility of metaphysics is the

though objectively valid, i.e. related to an o

Perhaps the best means of approach to the C

I E.g. B 178 = A I39.

in possession of certain a priori concepts, an

is drawn from sense-experience: besides

I Intellectus. This is the word equated by Baum

Now already in I770 Kant had come to

I The concept of number, the basis of arithmet

perfection" (? 9). It is not altogether easy to

Both the most interesting and the least sati

In the Critique all this is changed, and it i

It will not be necessary to spend any great

not likely to be confuted. On the other

body of propositions which are both a p

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