Covid-19 CPG - Version 4 PDF

Provisional Clinical Practice Guidelines
on COVID-19 suspected and confirmed

patients
In collaboration with Ceylon College of Physicians Coordinated

by Epidemiology Unit
March 2020
Ministry of Health – Sri Lanka

Provisional Clinical Practice Guidelines on COVID-19 suspected
and confirmed patients
In collaboration with
Ceylon College of Physicians
Coordinated by
Epidemiology Unit
31st March 2020 (version 4)

GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT AND EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
Dr. Ananda Wijewickrama Consultant Physician, National Institute of Infectious Diseases, IDH/
President Ceylon College of Physicians
Dr. Damayanthi Idampitiya Consultant Physician, National Institute of Infectious Diseases, IDH
Dr. Eranga Narangoda Consultant Physician, National Institute of Infectious Diseases, IDH
Dr. Amitha Fernando Consultant Respiratory Physician, NHSL, Colombo
Dr. Chandimani Udugodage Consultant Respiratory Physician, Faculty of Medical Sciences,

University of Sri Jayewardenepura.
Dr. Jayantha Weeraman Consultant Paediatrician, Epidemiology Unit, Colombo
Dr. Neranjan Dissanayake Consultant Respiratory Physician, Teaching Hospital, Ratnapura
Dr. Manoj Edirisooriya Consultant in Intensive Medicine, NHSL, Colombo
Dr. Upul Dissanayake Consultant Physician, NHSL, Colombo
Dr. Priyankara Jayawardana Consultant Physician, De Soysa Maternity Hospital, Colombo
Dr. Rohitha Mutugala Consultant Virologist, Teaching Hospital Kandy
Dr. Channa Perera Consultant Judicial Medical Officer, Colombo
Dr. Indika De Lanerole Consultant Emergency Physician, NHSL, Colombo
Dr. Hasitha Tissera Consultant Epidemiologist, Epidemiology Unit
Editorial Assistance
Dr. Azhar Ghouse Senior Registrar in Community Medicine, Family Health Bureau
Dr. Sammani Ratnayake Research Assistant, Epidemiology Unit

CONTENTS
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
Clinical case definitions of COVID-19 .......................................................................... 2
Disposition of cases ..................................................................................................... 3
Assess severity, resuscitate if necessary and patient disposition ............................... 4
2 Preparing doctors for assessment of patients.................................................................... 6
3 Diagnosing COVID-19.......................................................................................................... 8
Laboratory diagnosis of COVID-19 .............................................................................. 8
Infection prevention and control (IPC) measures ....................................................... 9
4 Clinical management ........................................................................................................ 11
COVID 19 confirmed cases or COVID 19 suspected patients .................................... 11
Discharge criteria ...................................................................................................... 12
5 Management of Critically ill patients with COVID-19....................................................... 13
Criteria for ICU admission to the dedicated ICU ....................................................... 13
Referral and decision for ICU admission ................................................................... 13
Discharging patients from ICU .................................................................................. 14
Increasing ICU surge capacity.................................................................................... 14
Receiving critically ill patients (suspected/ confirmed having COVID 19) to ICU...... 15
Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS) associated with COVID 19 ................ 17
Sepsis and septic shock ............................................................................................. 19
Renal replacement therapy (RRT) ............................................................................. 21
Staff wellbeing ........................................................................................................... 22
6 Managing high-risk patients ............................................................................................. 23
COVID-19 in pregnancy ............................................................................................. 23
Care for older patients with COVID-19 ..................................................................... 23
7 Autopsy practice and disposal of dead body.................................................................... 25
8 Outbreak response plan for hospitals .............................................................................. 29
1 INTRODUCTION
The Corona virus disease 2019 (COVID-19) epidemic can affect us in one way or another, and
the recent severe outbreaks in several countries and the unpredictability of this epidemic will
essentially require advance preparedness for optimum care in the health sector. With this in
view, it became necessary to develop a clinical practice guideline (CPG) on clinical management
of COVID -19 patients. However, this CPG will be reviewed and revised based on further
evidence as the disease situation progresses.
Experience from Wuhan the capital city of Hubei province in central China, the epicenter of this
epidemic where the majority of patients and deaths reported was the basis of this guideline.
Preliminary evidence from COVID-19 cases suggest that transmission during the early phase of
illness also seems to contribute to overall transmission dynamics; therefore, isolation of more
severely ill patients at the time of presentation to healthcare facilities alone will not be
adequate. As the epidemic unfolds, it has become apparent that mild cases are common in
COVID-19 epidemic. Patients with mild disease manifestations will be missed unless a more
sensitive surveillance system is put in place, and these patients might spread the disease
silently, similar to influenza. However, more critical and life-threatening disease has been
observed among old age groups especially with co-morbidities. Therefore, early case detection,
prompt isolation of ill people, appropriate and timely management of patients, comprehensive
contract tracing and immediate quarantine of all possible contacts will minimize widespread
community transmission and will help to mitigate any major outbreak situation and associated
mortality.
This provisional CPG will be useful in early detection and management of suspected and
confirmed cases of COVID- 19, and to develop the capacity of the health sector to be prepared
for any eventuality with suspected and confirmed COVID-19 outbreaks.
Provisional Guidelines for Clinical Management of COVID-19, Min. of Health, Sri Lanka (March 2020) Page 1
Clinical case definitions of COVID-19
The present recommendation is to isolate and test all clinically suspected cases of COVID-19
infected patients.
The present recommendation is to isolate and test all clinically suspected cases of COVID-19
infected patients.
All confirmed cases should be transferred to National Institute of Infectious Diseases (IDH)
until further notice. Base Hospital Welikanda recently developed as an additional dedicated
COVID-19 treatment facility could also be contacted if and when necessary.
Clinically Suspected Case:
A. A person with ACUTE RESPIRATORY ILLNESS (with Cough, SOB, Sore throat) with a history
of FEVER (at any point of time during this illness), returning to Sri Lanka from ANY COUNTRY
within the last 14 days.
OR
B. A person with acute respiratory illness (with Cough, SOB, Sore throat) AND having been in
close-contact* with a confirmed or suspected COVID-19 case during the last 14 days prior to
onset of symptoms;
* Close-contact: A person staying in an enclosed environment for >15 minutes (e.g. same
household/workplace/social gatherings/travelling in same vehicle). OR who had direct
physical contact.
OR
C. A patient with acute pneumonia (not explainable by any other aetiology) regardless of
travel or contact history as decided by the treating Consultant.
OR
D. A person with ACUTE RESPIRATORY ILLNESS (with Cough, SOB, Sore throat) with a history
of FEVER (at any point of time during this illness), with a history of travel to or residence in a
location designated as an area of high transmission of COVID-19 disease during the 14 days
prior to symptom onset.
OR
E. A patient with fever and in respiratory distress# as evident by RR>30 per minute, SpO2
<90% at room air, regardless of travel or contact history as decided by the treating
Consultant
#
All patients with respiratory distress should receive the usual standards of care in keeping
with known aetiology in a designated triage area in the ETU or designated respiratory unit.
Management of these patients should NOT be delayed under any circumstance pending
the test result.
Confirmed case:
A person with laboratory confirmation of COVID-19 infection, irrespective of clinical signs
and symptoms
1.2 Disposition of cases
1.2.1 Disposition of suspected cases

All patients fitting to the above suspected case definitions (A, B, C, or D) should be admitted
and transferred by ambulance to the closest designated hospital (refer updates on the list of
designated hospitals) for confirmatory testing and management. This should be done only
after stabilizing the patient and in prior consultation with the respective designated hospital,
adhering to necessary infection prevention and control (IPC) precautions.
In case of E, patient should be managed in the same hospital. A sample for the PCR test
obtained and sent (not the patient) to the designated laboratories. Once the result is
available, if positive, the patient (once stable) can be transferred to a designated COVID-19
treatment center.
1.2.2 Disposition of a confirmed case `
All confirmed patients should be transferred to National Institute of Infectious Diseases (IDH)
with necessary precautions.
THESE INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO BE APPLIED IN ALL HOSPITALS

INCLUDING THOSE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Assess severity, resuscitate if necessary and patient disposition by first contact doctor
A suspected COVID-19 patient can present in one of several ways to a health care facility or a
general practice. A person presenting for screening purposes with or without mild symptoms,
a person with early respiratory symptoms and a person with pneumonia with acute respiratory
distress, where all three groups having had a travel or contact history. Ideally, treatment
centers should have clear sign posting so that a suspected COVID-19 patient will go straight to
a predetermined room (isolation room) for further evaluation and treatment. Suspected
patients should be provided with a medical mask. There should be a designated medical officer
who will assess the patient by taking history of symptoms, travel and contact and screen
whether such patients fit into the clinical case definition. Those who fit into the suspected case
definition and who may need hospital admission will be referred to the nearest designated
health care institution for confirmatory testing and management (list of hospitals and
designated laboratories annexed). Screening doctors should take necessary precautions by
wearing standard personal protective equipment (PPE) i.e. standard medical mask, disposable
gloves and apron. This system is especially applicable in a situation when there is established
community level disease transmission or significant number of patients are screened routinely.
Of those who are screened and found to have no symptoms including family contacts should
be advised on self-isolation by staying indoors for 14 days (incubation period) in a well-
ventilated room separate from the rest of the household. Such individuals should be advised
to use separate toilet, or clean shared toilet regularly and use separate towels and not to
entertain visitors. They should seek advice regularly on further management from the
designated sentinel hospital and area public health staff if they develop clinical symptoms.
Initial data from COVID-19 transmission areas suggest that the patients display approximately
three proportions of severity – 80% having mild symptoms, 15% severe disease, 5% critically
unwell. Those with severe disease or critically unwell patients should be given emergency
treatment at the initial treatment center and transported to the designated sentinel hospital.
Patients fitting the suspected case definition should be tested for COVID-19 at the designated
laboratory assigned for each sentinel hospital. A critically ill patient seen at a hospital ETU who
might be resuscitated but subsequently fitting to COVID-19 suspected definition based on the
history should be isolated in a separate area in ETU until transfer facilities are made available.
Hospital ambulance or ‘Suwasariya’ service should provide transfer facilities to the designated
sentinel hospital and the vehicle used for transporting such patients should be disinfected at
the receiving end.
Designated hospital
Temporary isolation
Clinical Management/Notify
Figure 1: Primary care assessment of suspected Covid-19 patient
2 PREPARING DOCTORS FOR ASSESSMENT OF PATIENTS
Current corona virus (COVID-2019) infection may present with mild, moderate, or severe
illness. Severe illness includes severe pneumonia, ARDS, sepsis and septic shock. Early
recognition of suspected patients allow for timely initiation of infection prevention and control
(IPC) measures.
Key action points:
 A designated area in the hospital should be identified away from the main OPD to screen
patients.
 This should be at the entrance to the facility, away from patient waiting areas.
 Clear sign posts should direct the patient to this area.
 A medical mask should be provided to the patient immediately at the designated area.
 The medical officer at the screening area should obtain a brief history (including contact
and travel history) and conduct a brief examination (pulse, respiratory rate, oxygen
saturation).
 Any patient who fits in to the definition of COVID-19 suspect should be admitted to a pre-
designated isolation area (room or ward).
 The patient should be clinically assessed and categorized according to the table below. This
tool is intended to be used at the screening centre to decide on the level of care.
Level of severity (one or more )

Parameter
Mild Moderate Severe (Critical)
1. Resp. Rate (RR/min) 12 – 20 20 – 30 > 30
2. Heart Rate (HR/min) < 100 100 – 120 > 120
3. O2 Saturation – on room air > 94 90 – 94 < 90
(% by Pulse Oxymeter)
Level of care Isolation Isolation area Designated
area with isolation area with
resuscitation critical care
facilities facilities
 The patient should be stabilized and necessary investigations done according to severity
and clinical indications.
 Once stabilized, the patient should be transferred by ambulance to the closest designated
hospital (see Annexure for the list of designated hospitals) for confirmatory testing and
management.
 The transfer should be done after informing the respective hospital, adhering necessary IPC
precautions.
Natural History of COVID-19 (with limited evidence available globally)
 At diagnosis: approx. 80% are mild; 15% severe; 5% critical

 Progression: approx. 10-15% of mild/moderate cases become severe
approx. 15-20% of severe become critical
 Average times:
- From exposure to symptom onset is 5-6 days;
- From symptom onset to recovery for mild cases is 2 weeks and 3 – 6 weeks
for severe cases;
- From symptoms onset to death is 2- 8 weeks
 True asymptomatic infection is unknown (probably very low)
 Children tend to have milder disease than adults
Figure 2: Brief natural history of COVID-19
3 DIAGNOSING COVID-19
Laboratory diagnosis of COVID-19
Indications
Testing for COVID-19 is indicated only for the patients who are belongs to case definition issued
by the Ministry of Health. Please refer the latest guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health.
Testing for COVID-19 for screening purpose is not recommended.
Test method
Detection of COVID-19 (SARS-2) virus RNA by real time RT-PCR.
Detection of viral antigen and detection of IgM/ IgG antibodies against COVID-19 virus by raid
immuno-chromatographic test (ICT) is not recommended at present.
Sample collection
Type of the samples is depending on the clinical presentation of the patients.
Patient with mild upper respiratory tract infection, nasopharyngeal or oropharyngeal swabs in
Viral Transport Medium (VTM) is preferred or use a sterile, leak-proof, screw-cap container
with VTM for sputum.
In patients with more severe respiratory disease, endotracheal aspirate or bronchoalveolar

lavage collected in VTM.
Tissue from biopsies or autopsy including those from the lungs in VTM
Ensure that Health Care workers (HCWs) who collect specimens should follow the standard and
precautions and should use the recommended PPE.
Perform procedures in an adequately ventilated room and should follow the steps of donning
and doffing of PPE.
Perform hand hygiene before and after contact with the patient and his or her surroundings
and after PPE removal.
Specimen should be labelled properly.
Transport of samples to the laboratory
Sample should be transported to testing laboratory as soon as possible with ice (4°C). If any
delay, can be stored at refrigerator (4°C) up to 48 hours. Do not freeze.
Ensure that personnel who transport specimens are trained in safe handling practices and spill
decontamination procedures.
Sample should be transported in triple package to ensure the requirements in the national or
international regulations for the transport of dangerous goods (infectious substances).
State the full name, age, travel history, clinical symptoms and the type of specimen of the
suspected case clearly on the accompanying request form.
Notify the laboratory as soon as possible that the specimen is being transported.
PPE is not necessary for people who transport specimens in the triple package.
Description of Triple package

Primary receptacle Should be a waterproof, leak-proof receptacle containing the
specimen and receptacle should be wrapped with absorbent
material to absorb all fluid in case of breakage. Preferably
plastic container.
Secondary receptacle Should be a durable, waterproof, leak-proof receptacle to

enclose and protect the primary receptacle(s). Preferably
styrofoam container. Ice packs should be placed in between
primary and secondary receptacles.
Outer package Container which the secondary receptacle is placed. Preferably

cardboard box.
Infection prevention and control (IPC) measures

 Initiate IPC at the point of entry of the patient to health care facility.
 Suspected COVID-19 patients should be given a mask and directed to separate area.
 Keep at least 1 m distance between suspected patients.
 Instruct all patients to cover nose and mouth during coughing or sneezing with tissue or
flexed elbow and perform hand hygiene after contact with respiratory secretions.
 Standard precautions should always be applied in all areas of health care facilities. That is
hand hygiene, the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) when in indirect and direct
contact with patients’ blood, body fluids, secretions (including respiratory secretions) and
non-intact skin. Prevention of needle-stick or sharps injury; safe waste management;
cleaning and disinfection of equipment; and cleaning of the environment.
 Additional precautions (e.g. droplet, contact, or airborne) are required.
 IPC measures should be adhered to at all times.
Healthcare facility management
Managing patient placement

 If possible place COVID 19 suspected patients in single rooms
 Maintain at least 1-meter distance between all patients
 Avoid putting more than one patient in a single hospital bed
 Have alcohol based hand rub or soap and water hand-washing stations readily available
 Keep dedicated equipment for the patient e.g. stethoscope, BP apparatus
Managing the environment

 Limit movement of patients within the healthcare facility to reduce spread of infection
 If a patient needs to be moved e.g. for imaging, transfer out of hospital, plan ahead: all staff
and visitors who will come into direct contact with the patient should wear PPE
 Perform regular environment cleaning and disinfection (Annexure-5)
 Maintain good ventilation. If possible open doors and windows
Managing visitors
 Limit the number of visitors per patient
 All visitors should wear PPE
For healthcare workers

 At the point of entry /triage – medical mask
 Collecting respiratory specimens- goggles/face shield, preferably N-95 Mask, gown (long
sleeves), gloves
Provisional Guidelines for Clinical Management of COVID-19, Min. of Health, Sri Lanka (March 2020) Page
10
 Caring for a suspected patient – non-aerosol generating procedures - goggles/face shield,
gown, gloves, medical mask/N-95 mask
 Caring for a confirmed patient – non-aerosol generating procedures - goggles/face shield,
gown, gloves, N-95 mask
 Caring for a patient (confirmed or suspected) – with aerosol generating procedures -

goggles/face shield, gown, gloves, N95 respirator
 Transport of a patient (confirmed or suspected) – goggles/face shield, medical mask, gown,
gloves
 Do not touch your eyes, nose or mouth with gloves or bare hands until proper hand hygiene
has been performed.
 PPE s should be changed between use and for each patient. Dispose in a waste bin with lid
and wash hands thoroughly. Anything single use cannot be re used or sterilized.
 Hand hygiene –Use an alcohol based hand rub or wash hands with soap and water
➢ Before touching a patient
➢ Before engaging in clean/aseptic procedures
➢ After body fluid exposure risk
➢ After touching a patient
➢ After touching patient surroundings
Also see Annexure-5 on Guidance on the rational use of personal protective equipment (PPE)
in hospitals in the context of COVID-19 disease
4 CLINICAL MANAGEMENT
COVID 19 confirmed cases or COVID 19 suspected patients
1. Mild, no pneumonia –
➢ To be managed in an isolation area (COVID 19 confirmed cases can be managed
together)
➢ Monitoring of pulse, respiratory rate and saturation (Minimum of twice a day or as
clinically indicated)
➢ Observe for evidence of deterioration.
➢ High risk patients may require more frequent monitoring (eg: Age more than 50 yrs/
diabetes/ cardiovascular diseases/ other comorbidities)
➢ Therapies – anti pyretcs for fever, supportive therapy
2. Those with evidence of pneumonia

➢ To be managed in the designated ward/area for COVID 19 patients/suspects
3. Pneumonia with ARDS, Sepsis/Septic Shock and multi-organ failure.
Mild Disease – no need for supplemental oxygen
Moderate Disease – requires oxygen
Severe Disease – See section on critical care in Chapter 5
Obtain blood for basic haematology, biochemistry, ECG, X-Ray chest (use portable X Ray if
facilities are available)
Therapies -
➢ Oxygen (maintain saturation>94%, via supplemental oxygen.) Use disposable, single use
oxygen delivery devices (nasal prongs, simple nasal mask, venturi devices)
➢ HFNO (High Flow Nasal Oxygen) – In those with respiratory failure, but unable to
ventilate. Should be done with the health care personnel in PPE with N95 mask as this
is an aerosol generating procedure
➢ NIV (Non- Invasive Ventilation) - In those with respiratory failure, but unable to
ventilate. Should be done with the health care personel in PPE with N95 mask as this is
an aerosol generating procedure
➢ Identify patients co morbid conditions (IHD, DM, HT) and manage accordingly
➢ IV fluids – use conservatively. Aggressive fluid resuscitation will worsen oxygenation
Duel infection – Infections with another pathogen in addition to COVID 19. Eg Dengue,
Influenza. A positive COVID 19 does not rule out other infections.
There is no place for systemic corticosteroids, unless the patient has an asthma/ COPD
exacerbation.
Limited evidence suggests to avoid non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) such as

Ibuprofen in patients with COVID-19.
Discharge criteria
➢ When patient is clinically well
➢ Fever free for more than 72 hrs.
➢ Two (2) negative PCR more than 24 hrs apart (preference sputum sample)
➢ On discharge patients should follow strict home isolation for minimum of 3 weeks, as
preliminary evidence suggest viral shedding may be prolonged
This information will be updated regularly, based on additional evidence.
5 MANAGEMENT OF CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS WITH COVID-19
Patient is considered critically ill when he/ she show signs of multiple organ dysfunctions and
likely to die. Prioritizing and triaging patients who will be benefitted by ICU admission is of
paramount importance while taking measures to increase the surge capacity for ICU.
Criteria for ICU admission to the dedicated ICU
1. Confirmed patients with COVID 19

AND
2. Acute and potentially reversible organ dysfunction poorly responding to initial
resuscitation
a. Severe respiratory failure or intubated ( SpO2 /FiO2 ratio < 200)
b. Refractory circulatory shock ( SBP < 90 mmHg, Lactate > 4)
c. More than single organ failure
AND
3. Patient has adequate physiological reserves to survive critical illness eg; good
baseline organ functions without significant chronic co-morbidities
AND
4. Goals of ICU admission are defined. e.g; for full escalation of organ supports,
limited escalation for 48 hours
Referral and decision for ICU admission
1. Any physician or experienced member of the treating team may refer patients to
designated ICU for admission of critically ill COVID 19 patients.
2. In addition, nursing staff, or members of the outreach/medical emergency
team where one exists, may need to alert the ICU medical staff directly in
circumstances of unusual urgency.
3. Consultant in-charge of the ICU or experienced member of the ICU team should
carefully assess the patients trajectory and agree with the referring team to
admit only those who will be potentially salvageable/ benefited by ICU care
4. The referring team shall maintain responsibility for the patient up to admission
to ICU, and shall remain responsible for ongoing management if admission is
refused or deferred.
Discharging patients from ICU
Patient step down /discharge from the ICU to a HDU or ward has to be carefully
and rapidly planed as the demand for bed will rise exponentially leading to
collapse of all the critical care services.
Every patient should be daily assessed in ABCDE order to promptly de-escalate
as they get better. De-escalation plan should be reviewed at least twice a day
in-order to liberate patients from life sustaining measures early.
Patients stepped down from ICU/HDU should be send back to a separate cubicle
in the cohort area for COVID 19 confirmed cases as some of them may still shed
the virus at the time of the discharge.
Those who are with multiple co-morbidities and poor physiological reserves or
unable to show expected progress during pre-determined ICU trial (eg; for 48
hours) should be either stepped down or not for further escalation in case of
further deterioration.
Deceased patients with COVID 19 : Refer to the chapter on disposal of deceased
Increasing ICU surge capacity

1. Create cohort ICUs for COVID-19 patients (areas separated from the rest of the ICU beds
to minimize risk of in-hospital transmission).
2. Organize a triage area where patients could receive mechanical ventilation if necessary
in every hospital to support critically ill patients with suspected COVID-19 infection,
pending the final result of diagnostic tests.
3. Establish local protocols for triage of patients with respiratory symptoms, to test them
rapidly, and, depending on the diagnosis, to allocate them to the appropriate cohort.
4. Ensure that adequate personal protective equipment (PPE) for health personnel is
available, with the organization of adequate supply and distribution along with
adequate training of all personnel at risk of contagion.
5. Report every positive or suspected critically ill COVID-19 patient to the regional
coordinating center.
6. Take immediate measures to convert non-functioning ICU beds available
7. Postpone or cancel non-urgent procedures and potentially convert some surgical
theatres as critical care areas.
8. Create new ICU beds and made available within few days to account for at least 10% of
the expected cases of COVID 19 infection.
9. Patients suspected of having severe / critical symptoms of COVID-19 should be
resuscitated on admission in an isolated area of the respective OPD/ETU/ED with
facilities for potential escalation to ventilator support (NIV/HFNC/ portable ventilator).
Those patients should be either subjected to prompt PCR testing if available onsite or
transferred to a sentinel hospital designated for COVID-19 PCR testing after informing
the respective hospital.
Receiving critically ill patients (suspected/ confirmed having COVID 19) to ICU
1. Isolation; Health care staff receiving patients should be wearing appropriate PPE.
Patients should be admitted to isolation room / cohort isolation with negative pressure
ventilation, if available.
2. Assessment; Patient should be assessed according to the ABCDE order, however
thorough and repeated clinical examination is not advised to minimize the exposure.
Immediate connection of patient to multipara monitor, urgent portable chest X-ray and
arterial blood gas analysis is useful to confirm the severity of physiological derangement
and working diagnosis.
3. Maintain oxygenation; Initiate oxygen therapy at 6L/min and titrate flow rates to reach
target SpO2 ≥ 90% in non-pregnant adults and SpO2 ≥ 92-95 % in pregnant patients. If
the patient remains distressed with high work of breathing, hypoxaemic or in refractory
shock, early invasive mechanical ventilation is advised over a trial of non-invasive
ventilation or high flow nasal oxygen therapy.
4. Hemodynamic resuscitation; Prompt intravenous access should be established and
those who are in circulatory shock (as evidenced by hypotension, oliguria, cold
peripheries) should be resuscitated with crystalloid boluses. Consider noradrenalin,
early as the first line vasopressor to achieve MAP ≥ 65 mmHg. Conservative fluid
management is advised in patients with or without acute respiratory distress syndrome
(ARDS).
5. Empiric antimicrobials Initial empiric therapy with neuraminidase inhibitors could be if
there is concern that the patient might have influenza pneumonia. Empirical antibiotics
should be considered early in patients with evidence of secondary bacterial infection.
6. Steroids; are not indicated in COVID-19 infections unless, there is another clear-cut
indication for steroid (e.g. coronavirus plus asthma exacerbation, refractory septic
shock with escalating vasopressor support).
7. Invasive lines; Consider insertion of arterial catheter and ultrasound guided central
venous catheter early on those who present with circulatory shock. Those who may
potentially need prone ventilation due to rapid deterioration or acute kidney injury
would need a tri-lumen vascular catheter instead of central venous catheter for
potential renal replacement therapy.
8. Escalation plan; understand the patient’s co-morbid condition(s) to tailor the
management of critical illness and appreciate the prognosis. Communicate proactively
with patients and families and provide support and prognostic information. Understand
the patient’s values and preferences regarding life-sustaining interventions.
9. Enteral nutrition; should be established early. However, one should be cautious when
a critically ill may potentially need endotracheal intubation or remains in severe shock.
The glycaemic target of 140-180 mg/dL is recommended for critically ill patients.
Critically ill patients with COVID 19 can be are broadly categorized as acute respiratory distress
syndrome (ARDS) or sepsis/ septic shock depending on the predominant physiological
derangement. However, these conditions may co-exist in most of the cases that are critically
ill.
5.5.1 Endotracheal Intubation

1. This represents a high risk for transmission to healthcare workers.
2. Airborne precautions (N95 masks) are indicated along with face shield and full contact
precautions.
3. Minimize personnel in the intubating room during the procedure.
4. Endotracheal intubation, which exposes the medical professional for COVID 19, should only
be attempted by an airway competent doctor. It is advised to wear full PPE and take
precautions as follows.
a) Employ rapid sequence induction to minimize contact time with the patient.
b) Pre oxygenate with C-Circuit/ D-circuit and tight fitting face mask / two handed grip to
minimize leak. Avoid bagging to reduce aerosalisation .
c) Use of videolaryngoscopy may avoid placing the operator's face close to the patient.
d) Attach a viral filter to the bag-valve mask before the procedure, if possible. This should
reduce the spread of viral particles out of the endotracheal tube following intubation
(or during bag-mask ventilation if that is required)
e) Attach to the ventilator immediately post intubation and do not use positive pressure
until cuff inflated.
f) Use capnography or predetermined length to decide the placement of ET tube to avert
the need for clinical examination.
g) Ensure meticulous removal, placement and discard of equipment used and PPEs.
5. Non-invasive ventilation; If NIV is applied in case if invasive ventilation is not available;
non-vented NIV mask (oro-nasal interface) with dual limb circuit should be used with
minimal leak around the mask.
6. High flow oxygen device and single limb NIV with vented mask is discouraged to minimize
aerosolisation. However, low flows 15-30 L/min may be considered.
7. Lung protective mechanical ventilator strategy (refer to management of ARDS) and
ventilator care bundle (head end elevated, sub-glotic suction, daily sedation interval,
spontaneous breathing trials, gastric ulcer prophylaxis and VTE prophylaxis) should be
applied to minimize the complications of invasive ventilation.
Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS) associated with COVID 19

Acute respiratory distress syndrome denotes a predominant oxygenation failure characterized
by acute diffuse, inflammatory lung injury, leading to increased pulmonary vascular
permeability, increased lung weight, and loss of aerated lung tissue. Diagnosis of ARDS is made
based on the “2012 Berlin criteria”
ARDS diagnostic criteria
1. Onset within 1 week of signs of the illness

2. Bilateral opacities consistent with pulmonary edema must be present and may be detected
on CT or chest radiograph
3. P/F (PaO2/ FiO2) ratio <300mmHg with a minimum of 5 cm H20 PEEP or non-ventilated
4. Respiratory failure is not fully explained by cardiac failure or fluid overload.
ARDS associated with COVID 19 is categorized according to the degree of oxygenation failure,
which has implications on therapeutic approach as follows;
o Mild ARDS: 200 mmHg < PaO2/FiO2 ≤ 300 mmHg (with PEEP or CPAP ≥5 cmH2O, or non-
ventilated)
o Moderate ARDS: 100 mmHg < PaO2/FiO2 ≤200 mmHg with PEEP ≥5 cmH2O, or non-
ventilated)
o Severe ARDS: PaO2/FiO2 ≤ 100 mmHg with PEEP ≥5 cmH2O, or non-ventilated)
o When PaO2 is not available, SpO2/FiO2 ≤ 315 suggests ARDS (including in non-ventilated
patients)
Management of ARDS
 Invasive mechanical ventilation; moderate to severe ARDS (PF < 200) patients will
essentially need mechanical ventilatory support to maintain oxygenation and ventilation.
As NIV and high flow nasal oxygen therapy is controversial due to high risk of aerosolisation,
timely invasive mechanical ventilation may benefit both the patient and the health care
staff.
 Lung protective ventilator strategy remains the mainstay of delivering ventilator therapy.
Every patient who receives MV should be set goals as follows;
a. Tidal volumes < 6-8 ml/Kg
b. PEEP titrated to FiO2 (target moderate PEEP )
c. Plateau pressure < 30 cmH2O (Driving Pressure < 18 cmH2O )
d. SpO2 88-92% (permissive hypoxia)
e. Permissive hypercapnoea to maintain pH > 7.25
 Adequate sedation and muscle paralysis (< 48 hours) is advised for those who are on
escalating supports from mechanical ventilator.
 Humidification should be essentially applied and closed suction devices should be used to
prevent frequent ventilator disconnections (avoid de-recruitment of the lung as well as
aerosolisation).
 Bacterial and viral filters should be applied during mechanical ventilation.
 Nebulization should be used only when essential.
 Restrictive fluid strategy; patients should be assessed for fluid responsiveness employing
multiple parameters and intravenous fluids should be limited unless there is circulatory
shock.
 Prone ventilation (annexure); early prone ventilation for 20 hours or more should be
considered for those who are deteriorating with PF < 150 (severe ARDS). However, it is
crucial to exclude other causes of sudden hypoxaemia (e.g. pneumothorax, lung collapse)
before attempting prone ventilation.
 Percutaneous dilated tracheostomy; would be helpful to minimize the need for sedatives
and early weaning. However, too early tracheostomy or transfer of patient to theatre for
tracheostomy and bronchoscopy during percutaneous procedures may expose others
unnecessarily.
 ECMO centers, if available should be alerted early for those who are having refractory
hypoxaemia even after trial of prone ventilation.
 Early mobilization; those who are mechanically ventilated for more than 24 hours should
be carefully assessed and started on chest and limb physiotherapy in order to prevent ICU
acquired weakness.
 Weaning; progress should be assessed using regular ABGs and CXR to wean ventilator
supports and liberate patients from the mechanical ventilation. It may be appropriate to
wean patients and extubate early to NIV or high flow nasal oxygen in order to reduce the
complications of prolonged ventilation.
 Communication; do not use personal mobile phones during duty hours. Availability of a
dedicated smart phone and intercom facilities in cohort or triage ICU is important to
improve communication and to prevent frequent staff movements.
Sepsis and septic shock

Sepsis denotes the predominant failure in perfusion, associated with dysregulated host
immune response to COVID 19 infection leading to life threatening organ dysfunction.
In septic shock, persisting hypotension (MAP < 65 mmHg) or serum lactate level >2 mmol/L is
seen despite adequate volume resuscitation.
5.7.1 Management of circulatory shock
Circulatory shock is a life-threatening situation characterized by alteration in tissue oxygen

delivery and/or capacity to use oxygen, giving rise to tissue dysoxia. Exploration of the type &
cause of shock requires a consideration of broad differentials and thorough evaluation. Septic
shock, a form of distributive shock, is the commonest form of circulatory shock among patients
with COVID 19 infection admitted to critical care. However, some patients will have
components of more than one type (mixed shock).
1. Fluid responsiveness, as the key to guide resuscitation should be assessed in sepsis and
other types of shock. Multiple parameters e.g. MAP, UOP, lactate level, base deficit, should
be incorporated to improve the accuracy of assessment.
2. Resuscitation goals /end points should be defined e.g. fluid balance, CVP, IVC collapsibility
for the haemodynamic resuscitation
 In case of shock, hemodynamic resuscitation measures should be adopted immediately, and
the established management goals should be reached as quickly as possible (ideally first 3h).
 The first step in hemodynamic resuscitation is to quickly reach and maintain minimum
acceptable tissue perfusion pressure (PP), defined as MAP ≥ 65mmHg.
 Once PP has been secured, the tissue dysoxia should be corrected, defined as the restoration
of normal global hypoxia tissue marker values: ScvO2≥70% (or SvO2≥65%), and/or lactate
levels.
3. Fluid therapy in critically ill takes four phases; SOSD.
 Salvage phase (rapid boluses within minutes) focuses on achieving a BP and cardiac output
within minutes, compatible with immediate survival and performing lifesaving procedures to
treat the underlying cause of shock.
 Optimization phase (fluid challenges within hours) focuses on promoting cellular O2
availability and monitoring cardiac output, mixed venous oxygen saturation (SvO2), and
lactate levels.
 Stabilization phase (maintenance fluids) focuses on preventing organ dysfunction, even after
hemodynamic stability has been achieved. This phase typically last from hours to days.
 De-escalation phase (diuretics/HD) focuses on weaning the patient from vasoactive agents
and providing treatments to help achieve a negative fluid balance.
One need to carefully assess the phase of fluid therapy to determine whether patient needs
fluid loading, maintenance or fluid removal to improve vital organ perfusion. It is important to
remember that some patients may present during optimization or stabilization phase and other
might revert back to initial stages requiring escalation of haemodynamics supports during latter
part of the illness.
Renal replacement therapy (RRT)
Acute kidney injury is defined by the acute rise of serum creatinine or rapid onset oliguria
overwhelming the renal capacity to handle the solute and volume load. It is estimated that
approximately 20% of the critically ill patients with COVID 19 infection may progressed to acute
kidney injury.
1. Availability of RRT; It is essential that renal replacement therapy eg; CRRT or HD should be
available onsite in the institutions, where critically ill COVID 19 cases are admitted.
Otherwise, the high risk transfers for RRT at another hospital is not justifiable considering the
relatively poor outcome of patients with KI and the risk to others.
2. Indications for RRT; RRT specially the continuous renal replacement therapy is not only
resource but labor intensive. Therefore, CRRT has to be reserved for patients with favorable
outcomes. RRT has to be considered in patients with progressive multiorgan failure not
limited to those who develop AKI with
a) Refractory acidosis
b) Refractory hyperkalaemia
c) Refractory fluid overload
d) Uraemic complications
Vascular access; Right internal jugular line has to be used as the first line for vascular access
and always chest X ray should be examined for the vascath position before starting RRT.
3. SLEDD (sustained low efficiency daily dialysis) which is more affordable and less labor
intensive should be attempted over CRRT in those with AKI even dependent on vasoactive
medications.
4. CRRT dose (volume based) is 20-25 ml/Kg/h. CRRT is less likely to be successful when the ICU
staff is not well trained as therapy delivery should always be titrated and continued without
interruption for 48-72 hours.
5. Circuit life; whenever CRRT is started, principle challenge is to extend the circuit life. Circuit
life in CRRT is mainly affected by vascath position, blood flow rate, ultrafiltration and
anticoagulation.
6. De-escalation; CRRT can be switched as the patient improves (better solute control,
resumption of urine output and haemodynamic stability) initially to SLEDD and subsequently
to HD if needed.
Staff wellbeing
Medical staff will be under both physical and psychological pressure, while facing this
potentially large-scale infectious public health event. Therefore early measures to address
burn-out would ensure better service is being delivered during this difficult period and keeping
the staff safe.
1. Keep prepared and to mobilize additional staff (doctors, nurses and support staff) when the
crisis is escalating
2. Train staff on donning, doffing, prone ventilation and communication modes regularly.
3. Limit and minimize extended duty hours more than 24 hours. ( May not be able to give 1:1
care)
4. Make sure staff gets an adequate rest, meals, toilets and sleep for which dedicated areas
should be identified
5. Screen staff regularly for symptoms of COVID 19 or other illnesses
6. Arrange communication means to contact family and friends on regular basis.
7. Hospital security staff should be available to be sent to help deal with uncooperative
patients.
8. Leisure activities and training on how to relax may be arranged to help staff reduce stress.
9. Psychological counselors regularly visited the rest area to listen to difficulties or stories
encountered by staff at work, and provide support accordingly.
10. Avoid patients’ visitors at any time inside the ICU.
KEY POINTS to be considered in ICU care:

 stigma among staff
 IPC protocols
 specific procedures
 therapeutic approaches
See Annexure for the LIST OF DRUGS AND EQUIPMENT FOR MANAGEMENT OF CRITICALLY
ILL PATIENTS WITH COVID-19
6 MANAGING HIGH-RISK PATIENTS
COVID-19 in pregnancy
Pregnant women do not appear to be more susceptible to the consequences of corona virus
than the general population. There is no evidence that the virus can pass to the baby during
pregnancy.
As a precautionary approach pregnant women with suspected or confirmed COVID-19, when

they go into labour are being advised to attend an obstetric unit with specialist cover with
isolation facilities. At the moment there is no evidence that the virus can be carried in the breast
milk. Therefore, benefits of breastfeeding outweigh any potential risk of transmission of corona
virus through breast milk.
Pregnant women with suspected, probable, or confirmed COVID-19, including women who may
need to spend time in isolation, should have access to obstetric, foetal medicine and neonatal
care, as well as mental health and psychosocial support, with facilities to care for any maternal
and/or neonatal complications.
Mode of birth should be based on obstetric indications.
Please note that this information is subjected to further evidence based with more experience.
Care for older patients with COVID-19

Overall mortality reported as approx. 1-2% of infected persons while the case fatality among
hospitalized patients is reportedly around 15%.
Table: Who is at risk of dying from COVID-19

Age (yrs) No. of Deaths %
0 – 9 years 0 0
10-19 1 in 500 0.2
20-29 1 in 500 0.2
30-39 1 in 500 0.2
40-49 1 in 250 0.4
50-59 1 in 76 1.3
60-69 1 in 27 3.6
High-risk
70-79 1 in 12 8.0
80+ years 1 in 6 15
Older adults (above 50 years of age) with serious medical conditions e.g. heart disease,
diabetes, lung disease are at higher risk to become very sick from the COVID -19 infections.
Suspected/Probable (awaiting diagnosis) cases of COVID -19 (who are probably in self-
isolation), if faced with a medical/ surgical or obstetrics emergency should be first assessed for
COVID 19 infection and concurrently transferred/ referred to the relevant specialty clinic/
unit immediately for appropriate care. Necessary arrangements should be made in the clinic/
ward to attended to them immediately/ as a priority basis to limit their waiting time.
7 AUTOPSY PRACTICE AND DISPOSAL OF DEAD BODY
COVID-19 related deaths could be categorized arbitrarily into 4 groups:
Category I
Death following confirmed Corona Viral Infection (COVID-19)
• Method of disposal
- An inquest is not required.

- Minimum handling.
- Viewing of the body only by close relative/s is allowed in a pre-designated area in hospital.
- No embalming/No autopsy (medico-legal or pathological). The body cannot be taken
home.
- Place the body in a body bag and seal.
- Body should not be viewed after sealing.
- Funeral undertaker should place sealed body bag in a coffin for transportation (coffin
should be preferably sealed)
- The body should be cremated within 24 hours (preferably within 12 hours).
In case of death occurring in the ward /ICU /ETU:

 Only use designated body bags or a suitable alternative.
 The dead body should be handled by the attending staff and put in the body bag and
kept in a pre-designated place.
 If the death occurred in ICU, the body should be removed from the machines and
placed in a pre-designated area.
Supervision of disposal should be done by MOH/ PHI along with area police.
Category II
Death following suspected Corona Viral Infection (awaiting laboratory confirmation)
- An inquest may be required.

- Minimum handling.
- External examination only.
- Nasal swab, throat swabs, tracheal aspirate and femoral blood sample (centrifuged) to be
collected to be sent for analysis.
- Viewing of the body only by close relative/s is allowed in a pre-designated area in
hospital.
- Place the body in a body bag and seal after external examination.
- No embalming. The body cannot be taken home.
- Funeral undertaker should place sealed body bag in a coffin for transportation (coffin
should be preferably sealed).
- The body should be cremated within 24 hours.
- Clinicians and JMO should try to trace the report as early as possible:
 If COVID-19 become positive: should be cremated as in category- I
 If COVID- 19 is excluded: to handle as category IV
 If the report is not available within 24 hours: cremation.

• Only use designated body bags or a suitable alternative.
• The dead body should be handled by the attending staff and put in the body bag and kept in
a pre-designated place.
• If the death occurred in ICU, the body should be removed from the machines and placed in a
pre-designated area.
Supervision of disposal of the body should be done by MOH/ PHI along with area police.
Category III
Death following possible Corona Viral Infection with suggestive history and clinical findings
- An inquest may be required.

- Minimum handling.
- External examination only.
- Nasal swab, throat swabs, tracheal aspirate and femoral blood sample (centrifuged) to be
- Viewing of the body only by close relative/s is allowed in a pre-designated area in hospital.
- Place the body in a body bag and seal after external examination.
- No embalming. The body cannot be taken home.
- Funeral undertaker should place sealed body bag in a coffin for transportation (coffin should
be preferably sealed).
- The body should be cremated within 24 hours.
- JMO should try to trace the report as early as possible:
 If COVID-19 become positive: should be handled as category I
 If COVID- 19 is excluded: to handle as category IV
 If the report is not available within 24 hours: cremation

• Only use designated body bags or a suitable alternative.
• The dead body should be handled by the attending staff and put in the body bag and kept in
a pre-designated place.
• If the death occurred in ICU, the body should be removed from the machines and placed in a
pre-designated area.
Supervision of disposal of the body should be done by MOH/ PHI along with area police.
Category IV
Death due to pneumonia unlikely to be due to corona viral infection

• Method of disposal.
- An inquest may be required. Better not to open all body cavities.
- Nasal swab, throat swabs, tracheal aspirate and femoral blood sample (centrifuge) to be
- If necessary, perform a true cut lung biopsy.
Routine disposal can be recommended (this has to be dealt on case by case basis by JMO).
DEATH OF FOREIGN NATIONALS following diagnosed Corona Viral Infection
- Disposal is same as category- I.
- The hospital authority should inform the Ministry of Health officials to contact the relevant
embassy for the cremation in Sri Lanka.
DEATH OF FOREIGN NATIONALS due to other unnatural causes (e.g. RTA) with possible
exposure to COVID-19
- Disposal same as category II/category III However, an inquest is required. (An external
examination or a limited autopsy may be performed).
- Hospital authority should inform the Ministry of Health officials to contact the relevant
embassy for the cremation in Sri Lanka.
In case of any suspected criminality of COVID-19 infected patient under category I, II or III – An
inquest is required. A partial or full autopsy may have to be performed with necessary IPC on a
case by case basis by Consultant JMO.
Sample dispatch to designated laboratory - Please refer to Chapter 3 and annexure 1.
Supervision of disposal should be done by MOH/ PHI along with area police.
The post mortem handling should be done by the senior-most JMO with the senior morgue
attendants in category I, II or III.
In category I, II and III

 The body should never be washed under any circumstance.
 The body has to be placed in a sealed body bag and a coffin.
 Exclusive cremation.
 The disposal of bodies must be monitored by police, MOH and PHI.
8 OUTBREAK RESPONSE PLAN FOR HOSPITALS
This is an Interim plan for Institutional management of COVID-19 infection.
Activate hospital Operation Cell which is an integral component of disaster management plan
already in place in the health care institutions.
Key functional areas of the operation cell:

1. Should Update the hospital administration and clinical staff on the guidelines provided,
share essential elements of local daily situation report.
2. Provide continuous risk communication and technical information to the health staff
(especially health education to health staff) on the infection control measures to minimize
the institutional spread of COVID 19.
3. Continuous assessment of the availability of PPE, face masks and hand sanitizers in the
institution.
4. Ensure the availability of guidelines on proper utilization of such items by the hospital staff.
5. Coordinate with the national and regional Medical Supplies Division through the regional
epidemiologist (RE) and collect the adequate amount of such items.
6. Maintain an inventory with dedicated storage facility and ensure continuous availability
supply of such items.
7. In case of impending scarcity, coordinate with district focal points to introduce approved
alternative equipment.
8. Continuous situation analysis and make necessary amendments to institutional
preparedness activities based on varying local and international epidemic scenarios.
9. Ensure availability of transport (ambulance) facility of COVID 19 suspected patient to the
identified health facility for isolation, confirmation and management. Educate the
ambulance driver and helper on appropriate measures during transportation.
10. Measures should be taken to establishing of hand washing facilities at the hospital entrance
and OPD. Continuous monitoring of adherence to such practices among staff and hospital
attendees.
11. Strengthen the information hub to communicate the information on the hospital attendees
with travel history to the relevant MOOH for 14 days quarantine procedure. Information
on daily update on the suspected/isolated/and or transferred patients to the regional
epidemiologist and area MOOH.
12. Any other emergency activity where collective decision making is necessary
Human resource:
Technical team and the supportive staff for the coordination cell should be appointed by the
head of the institution.
Technical team:
 Multi-disciplinary expert team composed of Consultant microbiologist/ Physician or any
representative from the clinical team; e.g. Respiratory Physician, Intensivist, Virologist
based on the availability (for overall technical guidance)
 MO public health (for overall coordination with internal and district authorities)
 Hospital matron of nurse in charge (for assistance in monitoring and supervision of hospital
infection control activities)
 Infection control unit – medical officer and nursing officer
Supportive staff:
 Accountant.
 Administrative officer.
 Divisional pharmacist.
 RMO who has an experience with logistic management.
 Two development officers (one for surveillance and other for information management).
 Transport officer.
 Office assistance (SKS)
Logistics:
Ensure the continuous availability of basic requirements such as physical location, internet
facilities, computers, printers and multi-media equipment which are already in place.
ANNEXURES
ANNEXURE 1 - List of designated hospitals and laboratories (DGHS letter)
ANNEXURE 2 - List of equipment and drugs for management of critically ill patients with COVID-19
A. Infection control 12. Central venous catheters ( 15-20 cm)

1. PPE; N95 masks, surgical masks, 13. Tri-lumen vascath ( 15- 20 cm)
overalls, wisers, goggals 14. CRRT solutions (Duosol K-2)
2. Parasafe (high level disinfectants ) 15. CRRT kits (machine specific)
3. 70% alcohol and TCL (low level 16. Haemodialysers ( high flux)
disinfectants) 17. Dialyser solutions ( ? bicarb based)
4. Hand wash stations
5. Hand wash solutions
E. Drugs (IV)
6. Hand rubs
1. Fentanyl vials
2. Morphine vials
B. Monitoring devices 3. Propofol 1%
1. Multipara monitors 4. Midazolam
2. Pulse oxymeters 5. Rocuronium
3. Thermometers (infra-red) 6. Suxamethonium
4. Uribags 7. Atracurium
5. ABG analyser 8. Vacuronium
6. Glucometers 9. Glycopyrolate
7. Portable X-ray 10. Adrenalin vials
11. Noradrenalin vials
C. Organ support devices 12. Atropine vials
1. ICU ventilators ( 1 per bed) 13. Dobutamin vials
2. Portable ventilators ( 1 per 5 beds) 14. Vasopressin vials
3. HFNC machines with accessories 15. Ephedrine vials
4. Infusion pumps 16. Antibiotics
5. CRRT machines 17. Insulin (Actrapid)
6. Haemodialysis machine 18. Amiodaron IV
7. Syringe pumps 19. Amiodaron oral
8. Pneumatic compression devices 20. Thiamine vials
9. Feeding pumps (NG) 21. Ranitidine vials
22. Enoxaparin
23. Haparin vials
D. Consumables 24. Haloperidol
1. Endotracheal tubes ( sizes 7 -8.5) 25. KCL ( pottacium chloride )
2. HMEs 26. MgSO4
3. Breathing circuits- disposable 27. Crystalloides (saline, RL, dextrose, 50%)
4. Bacterial and viral filers for ventilator 28. Lignocain 2%
5. Closed suction devices for ventilator 29. Nebuliser solutions ( salbutamol)
6. Suction apparatus with Yanker handle
7. Nasogastric tubes ( 12-16 FG)
8. Urinary catheters (12-18 FG)
9. Uribags
10. Syringes ( 1-50 cc )
11. Cannulae ( 14-22 G)
ANNEXURE 3 - Quick risk assessment check list for first contact level
Age: <50 yrs 1.Has come from Co-morbidities

abroad (ANY COUNTRY)  COPD
50-70 within 14 days prior to  Hypertension
onset of symptoms  IHD
> 70  DM
2. Had contacts with a  Chronic renal failure
confirmed case of  Chronic Liver Diseases
COVID19  Pregnancy
 Other
Presenting complaints Clinical Assessment

Symptoms Duration Mild Moderate Severe
 Fever  Pulse rate <100 100-120 >120
 Cough
 Resp. rate 12-20 20-30 >30
 Breathlessness
 Other  O2 saturation >94 90-94 <90
Page - 1
Provisional Guidelines for Clinical Management of COVID-19
ANNEXURE 4 - Public instruction flow chart for hospitals receiving suspected COVID-19
patients
 A person with a recent foreign travel (ANY COUNTRY) history ≤14 days
 A person who has been in close contact with a confirmed or suspected COVID 19
infected patient (Close contact- a person staying in an enclosed environment e.g.:
same house hold/workplace/social gatherings/travelling in same vehicle)
Symptom
s
 Fever
 Cough
 Breathless at rest
Positive Symptoms Negative Symptoms
Wear a face mask Self-isolation for 14 days

immediately
Inform area MOH
Go to the nearest health
care facility (if possible,
avoid public transport)
Inform the designated

Medical Officer regarding
foreign travel/contact and If symptoms
symptoms occur
Page - 2
ANNEXURE 5 - Guidance on use of PPE
Page - 3
Page - 4
Page - 5
ANNEXURE 6 - Ministry circular on COVID 19 treatment- HCQ/CQ
Page - 6
Page - 7
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. World Health Organization, Clinical management of severe acute respiratory

infection (SARI) when COVID-19 disease is suspected (Interim Guidance – 13 March
2020)
2. Centres for Disease Control (CDC) CDC. Resources for health professionals:
parasites - strongyloides [website]. Washington (DC): Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention
https://www.cdc.gov/parasites/strongyloides/health_professionals/index.html
3. Harvard Medical School - Coronavirus Resource Center (Updated: March 16, 2020)
https://www.health.harvard.edu/diseases-and-conditions/coronavirus-resource-
center
Page - 8

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Provisional Clinical Practice Guidelines

on COVID-19 suspected and confirmed

In collaboration with Ceylon College of Physicians Coordinated

Ministry of Health – Sri Lanka

Ceylon College of Physicians

31st March 2020 (version 4)

Dr. Amitha Fernando Consultant Respiratory Physician, NHSL, Colombo

Dr. Chandimani Udugodage Consultant Respiratory Physician, Faculty of Medical Sciences,

Dr. Jayantha Weeraman Consultant Paediatrician, Epidemiology Unit, Colombo

Dr. Neranjan Dissanayake Consultant Respiratory Physician, Teaching Hospital, Ratnapura

Dr. Manoj Edirisooriya Consultant in Intensive Medicine, NHSL, Colombo

Dr. Upul Dissanayake Consultant Physician, NHSL, Colombo

Dr. Priyankara Jayawardana Consultant Physician, De Soysa Maternity Hospital, Colombo

Dr. Rohitha Mutugala Consultant Virologist, Teaching Hospital Kandy

Dr. Channa Perera Consultant Judicial Medical Officer, Colombo

Dr. Indika De Lanerole Consultant Emergency Physician, NHSL, Colombo

Dr. Hasitha Tissera Consultant Epidemiologist, Epidemiology Unit

Dr. Sammani Ratnayake Research Assistant, Epidemiology Unit

Clinically Suspected Case:

1.2 Disposition of cases

1.2.1 Disposition of suspected cases

1.2.2 Disposition of a confirmed case `

THESE INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO BE APPLIED IN ALL HOSPITALS

Figure 1: Primary care assessment of suspected Covid-19 patient

Key action points:

Level of severity (one or more )

Natural History of COVID-19 (with limited evidence available globally)

 At diagnosis: approx. 80% are mild; 15% severe; 5% critical

Figure 2: Brief natural history of COVID-19

Laboratory diagnosis of COVID-19

In patients with more severe respiratory disease, endotracheal aspirate or bronchoalveolar

Specimen should be labelled properly.

Description of Triple package

Secondary receptacle Should be a durable, waterproof, leak-proof receptacle to

Outer package Container which the secondary receptacle is placed. Preferably

Infection prevention and control (IPC) measures

Healthcare facility management

Managing patient placement

Managing the environment

For healthcare workers

 Caring for a patient (confirmed or suspected) – with aerosol generating procedures -

COVID 19 confirmed cases or COVID 19 suspected patients

2. Those with evidence of pneumonia

3. Pneumonia with ARDS, Sepsis/Septic Shock and multi-organ failure.

Mild Disease – no need for supplemental oxygen

Moderate Disease – requires oxygen

Severe Disease – See section on critical care in Chapter 5

Limited evidence suggests to avoid non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) such as

This information will be updated regularly, based on additional evidence.

Criteria for ICU admission to the dedicated ICU

1. Confirmed patients with COVID 19

Referral and decision for ICU admission

Increasing ICU surge capacity

5.5.1 Endotracheal Intubation

Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS) associated with COVID 19

ARDS diagnostic criteria

1. Onset within 1 week of signs of the illness

Sepsis and septic shock