Psychosocial Approaches To Deeply Distur PDF

Free ebooks ==> www.Ebook777.
com
www.Ebook777.com
Free ebooks ==> www.Ebook777.com
Peter R. Breggin
E. Mark Stern
Editors
Psychosocial Approaches
to Deeply Disturbed Persons
Pre-publication nto a desert of “chemical

REVIEWS, I imbalance,” comes an oasis
of Psychosocial Approaches to
COMMENTARIES,
Deeply Disturbed Persons, a book
EVALUATIONS. . . with ten chapters by professionals
who approach deeply disturbed
persons from a non-medical view
point. The variety of those
approaches illuminates how many
different ways such persons can be
understood and helped. Clearly
the treaters have given much
thought and effort to their
endeavors. The degree of success
is amazing for those unfamiliar
with non-medical approaches. Psy
chosocial Approaches to Deeply Dis
turbed Persons does much to
expose the dedicated work of those
who try to understand disturbed
people, rather than condemn them
by labeling them as hopeless.
Revella Levin, PhD

Director; Centerfor the Study of
Psychiatry and Psychology-East
www.Ebook777.com
More pre-publication
REVIEWS; COMMENTARIES, EVALUATIONS. . .
P sychosocial Approaches takes

another step beyond the F resh insights, forgotten
insights, new ideas, good
devastating critique of neuroleptic ideas abound in this unusual vol
drugs, electroshock and psychosur ume which might spearhead a
gery that Peter Breggin made in long awaited transformation in
Toxic Psychiatry. In this book, the psychiatry.
editors have brought together a The authors hold different ideas
series of essays that help us real on the origins and nature of what
ized that the experience we label are called today “severe mental dis
schizophrenia is organized and not orders,” and the chapters reflect
chaotic, if we will only conquer these differences. But most are
our own fears and attempt to united by a conviction-shaped by
understand its meaning. Therapists, their clinical experience-that psy
families and patients alike will find chosocial treatment is not only
hope and inspiration from descrip possible and practical, but remains
tions of treatment programs and generally superior to the domi
practicing therapists who success nant alternative, hospitalization
fully treat deeply disturbed per and neuroleptic drugs.
sons. These articles argue persua Two strong threads run through
sively that love, understanding, several chapters and come across
and old fashioned clinical skills vividly in case histories: that the
can create atmospheres in which early experience of “schizophren
true healing can take place-even ics” or “manic depressives” are
for “psychotic” persons deemed often filled with humiliation and
incurable by medical practitioners. abuse and that their communica
tions and metaphors remain “in
Bill Brack, PhD comprehensible” mostly because
Professor of Psychology, Marymount we chose not to comprehend
University them. It remains for therapists and
other concerned persons to take
up the challenge.
David Cohen, PhD

Associate Professor; School of Social
Service and Director; Health and
Prevention Social Research Group,
University of Montreal
More pre-publication
REVIEWS\ COMMENTARIES, EVALUATIONS. . .
sychosocial Approaches to
Pinnovatively
Deeply Disturbed Persons
departs from the sta
are vulnerable to this psychosis
when under excessive stress, is
insightful and sobering. Other
tus quo of psychotherapeutic chapters provide a plethora of use
practice. It is a refreshing and ful information on mental health.
courageous challenge to the med With this work, Dr. Breggin again
ical model embedded in a human has prompted the mental health
istic spirit. The book consists of a community to rethink its current
series of provocative chapters practices and assume a more
written by a thoughtful and expe humanistic approach to helping
rienced group of mental health people with severe problems-in-
professionals. Several of these living.
chapters redefine the commonly
accepted notions of how mental Clemmont E. Vontress, PhD
illness develops. The chapter by Professor of Counseling & Counseling
Dr. Bertram Karon on Schizophre Program Director, The George Wash
nia, in which he argues that we all ington University
This page intentionally left blank
www.Ebook777.com
ALL HAWORTH BOOKS AND JOURNALS
ARE PRINTED ON CERTIFIED
ACID-FREE PAPER
to Deeply Disturbed
Persons
Peter R. Breggin
E. Mark Stem
Editors
First published 1996 by The Haworth Press, Inc.
Published 2013 by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 USA
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
Psychosocial Approaches to Deeply Disturbed Persons has also been published as The Psychother
apy Patient, Volume 9, Numbers 3/4 1996.
© 1996 by Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, microfilm
and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publisher.
The development, preparation, and publication of this work has been undertaken with great care.
However, the publisher, employees, editors, and agents of The Haworth Press and all imprints of
The Haworth Press, Inc., including The Haworth Medical Press and Pharmaceutical Products Press,
are not responsible for any errors contained herein or for consequences that may ensue from use of
materials or information contained in this work. Opinions expressed by the author(s) are not neces
sarily those of The Haworth Press, Inc.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Psychosocial approaches to deeply disturbed persons / Peter R. Breggin, E. Mark Stem, editors,
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-1-315-82522-9 (eISBN)
ISBN 978-1-56024-841-5
1. Schizophrenia. 2. Schizophrenia-Treatment. 3.Schizophrenics-Rehabilitation. I. Breggin,

Peter Roger, 1936- II. Stem, E. Mark, 1929-.
RC514.P71886 1996 96-12677
616.89'82-dc20 CIP
I n d e x in g & a b str a c t in g
Contributions to this publication are selectively in
dexed or abstracted in print, electronic, online, or
CD-ROM version(s) of the reference tools and in
formation services listed below. This list is current as
of the copyright date of this publication. See the end
of this section for additional notes.
Articles in this journal are selectively indexed or abstracted in the

following services as of the cover date of this issue:
• Abstracts ofResearch in Pastoral Care & Counseling, Loyola
College, 7135 Minstrel Way, Suite 101, Columbia, MD 21045
• CNPIEC Reference Guide: Chinese National Directory o f
Foreign Periodicals, RO. Box 88, Beijing, People’s Republic
of China
• Family Studies Database (online and CD/ROM), Peters
Technology Transfer, 306 East Baltimore Pike, 2nd Floor,
Media, PA 19063
• INNOVATIONS AND RESEARCH, NAMI/Boston University,
730 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, MA 02215
• INTERNET ACCESS (& additional networks) Bulletin Board
for Libraries ( “BUBL”), coverage o f information resources
on INTERNET, JANET, and other networks.
. JANET X.29: UK.AC.BATH.BUBL or 00006012101300
. TELNET: BUBL.BATH.AC.UK or 138.38.32.45 login
‘bubP
. Gopher: BUBL.BATH.AC.UK (138.32.32.45). Port 7070
• World Wide Web: http: / / www.bubl.bath.ac.uk./BUBL/
home.html
• NISSWAIS: telnetniss.ac.uk (for the NISS gateway)
The Andersonian Library, Curran Building, 101 St. James
Road, Glasgow G4 ONS, Scotland
• Mental Health Abstracts (online through DIALOG),
IFI/Plenum Data Company, 3202 Kirkwood Highway,
Wilmington, DE 19808
(continued)
www.Ebook777.com
• Social Work Abstracts, National Association of Social
Workers, 750 First Street NW, 8th Floor, Washington, DC
20002
• Special Educational Needs Abstracts, Carfax Information

Systems, P.O. Box 25, Abingdon, Oxfordshire 0X14 3UE,
United Kingdom
• Studies on Women Abstracts, Carfax Publishing Company,

P.O. Box 25, Abingdon, Oxfordshire OX14 3UE United
Kingdom
SPECIAL BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTES

related to special journal issues (separates)
and indexing/abstracting
Q indexing/abstracting services in this list will also cover material in

any “ separate” that is co-published simultaneously with Ha
worth’s special thematic journal issue or DocuSerial. Indexing/ab
stracting usually covers material at the article/chapter level.
Q monographic co-editions are intended for either non-subscribers or
libraries which intend to purchase a second copy for their circulat
ing collections.
□ monographic co-editions are reported to all jobbers/wholesalers/ap-
proval plans. The source journal is listed as the “series” to assist the
prevention of duplicate purchasing in the same manner utilized for
books-in-series.
□ to facilitate user/access services all indexing/abstracting services
are encouraged to utilize the co-indexing entry note indicated at the
bottom of the first page of each article/chapter/contribution.
□ this is intended to assist a library user of any reference tool (wheth
er print, electronic, online, or CD-ROM) to locate the monographic
version if the library has purchased this version but not a subscrip
tion to the source journal.
□ individual articles/chapters in any Haworth publication are also avail
able through the Haworth Document Delivery Services (HDDS).
CONTENTS
Introduction: Spearheading a Transformation 1

Peter R. Breggin
Persons as Agents and Beings 1
Persons as Objects or Biochemical Devices 3
Contrasting Therapeutic Approaches 3
Philosophy and Science 4
A Conflict Resolution Model 6
Schizophrenic Experience: A Humanistic Perspective 9

E. Mark Stern
Alternative Realities 9
Schizophrenia as a Mode of Being 10
Disengagement and Convention 10
Harvey: Seeing It All 13
Dangers for the Therapist 19
Advantages in Treating Schizophrenics 20
Psychotherapy and the Fear of Understanding

Schizophrenia 23
Bertram P. Karon
Leighton C. Whitaker
The Patient’s Terror and Therapist Reaction 26
The Therapeutic Alliance 28
Clinical Experience of Psychological Causality 29
Understanding the Catatonic Stupor 31
Hallucinations 33
Delusions 34
A Patient’s Summary 39
Soteria: A Therapeutic Community for Psychotic Persons 43
Loren R. Mosher
Introduction and Overview 43
Background 44
Clinical Settings 48
Results 51
System Change 53
Conclusion 56
Perceptions of Psychologists and Psychiatrists 59

Victor D. Sanua
Psychotherapy with “Schizophrenia”: Analysis

of Metaphor to Reveal Trauma and Conflict 77
Richard Shulman
Focus of This Paper 79
Questioning “Schizophrenia” as a Disease 81
Some Psychosocial Perspectives on “Psychosis” 87
Illustrative Therapy Sessions 90
Conclusion 100
Surviving the “Mental Health” System

with Co-Counseling 107
Janet Foner
“Mental Illness” 110
Continuing a Story 111
Experiencing the Hospital 113
Re-Evaluation Counseling (RC) 115
People Who Have Used the Process 117
Yielding to a Higher Power 125

Louis Birner
“The Manic Attack” 135
Theoretical and Treatment Considerations 137
No Place Like Home 141
Robert F. Morgan
Prologue 141
Gordius 142
Intake 144
Goals 144
Mother and the Governor 145
Art Therapy 145
Transference 146
Holiday 147
Love and Schizophrenia 148
Discharge 149
No Place Like Home 151
Working with the Families of Schizophrenic Patients 185

Julian L e ff
Ruth Berkowitz
Studies of the Effectiveness of Family Intervention 189
Family Sessions and Relatives Groups 192
The Education Programme 192
The Family Sessions 194
The Therapists Support Group 195
Why Two Therapists? 196
Introducing the Intervention to the Family 197
Avoiding Socialisation of Sessions 197
Improving Communication 198
Teaching Problem-Solving 199
Reducing Criticism 202
Reducing Overinvolvement 203
Expanding Social Networks 205
Reducing Social Contact 205
Lowering Expectations 206
The Relatives Group 207
Conclusions 208
WHO Studies on Schizophrenia: An Overview
of the Results and Their Implications
for the Understanding of the Disorder 213
Giovanni de Girolamo
Introduction 214
The International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia (IPSS) 214
The Study on Impairments and Disabilities
in Schizophrenic Patients 217
The Study on the “Determinants of the Outcome
of Severe Mental Disorders” 218
Conclusions 223
ABOUT THE EDITORS
Peter R. Breggin, MD, is a psychiatrist in private practice in

Bethesda, Maryland, and the founder of the Center for the Study of
Psychiatry and Psychology. He is also Faculty Associate, Department
of Counseling and Human Services, The Johns Hopkins University.
Dr. Breggin is the author of many books and articles, most recently
Toxic Psychiatry (1991), Beyond Conflict (1992), and with Ginger
Ross Breggin, Talking Back to Prozac (1994) and The War Against
Children (1994), all published by St. Martin’s Press. He has two
forthcoming books, The Heart o f Being Helpful and Brain-Disabling
Treatments in Psychiatry, both scheduled for 1997 from Springer
Publishing Company.
E. Mark Stern, EdD, is Professor Emeritus in the Graduate Faculty
of Arts and Sciences, Iona College, New Rochelle, New York. A
Diplomate in Clinical Psychology of the American Board of Profes
sional Psychology and a Fellow of the American Psychological
Association, the American Psychological Society, and the Academy
of Clinical Psychology, Dr. Stem has been President of the Divisions
of Humanistic Psychology and Psychology of Religion, APA. He is in
private practice of psychotherapy with offices at 215 East Eleventh
Street, New York, NY 10003.
Any similarity between persons and events described herein and actual
persons and events is purely coincidental, and is not intended to describe
any specific person or case history. The descriptions and depictions herein
are composites of many experiences and personalities encountered by the
writers over many years of clinical practice.
Introduction:
Spearheading a Transformation
Peter R. Breggin
In recent years, pharmacology and psychiatric hospitalization have

become the standard for most professionals when “ treating schizophre
nia.” Meanwhile, a body o f research and practical experience has been
evolving that supports innovative psychosocial interventions as less haz
ardous and more effective. As psychiatry goes through still another histor
ical cycle in the conflict between psychosocial and biological approaches,
we may be on the verge o f a renewed emphasis on human service interven
tions. This book hopes to spearhead such a transformation by reviewing
current research, theory and practice based on the psychosocial model.
PERSONS AS AGENTS AND BEINGS
How we view human beings in general is fundamental to the contro

versy over how to conceptualize and approach deeply disturbed, seem-
Author Note: The title of the book, Psychosocial Approaches to Deeply Dis
turbed Persons, reflects its orientation. Because the term treatment tends to
encourage a biopsychiatric or medical model, I have chosen the term approach as an
alternative. How to approach or “come near to” the labeled patient is often
critical. Similarly, the term schizophrenic narrows the scope of professional roles
and viewpoints. Therefore the book title addresses deeply disturbed people-those
who are profoundly troubled and anguished, and who often receive severe psy
chiatric labels, such as schizophrenia. Because of the wide variety of viewpoints
represented by the contributors and because of the need to communicate in a
commonly accepted language, the terms treatment and schizophrenia will nonethe
less recur throughout the chapters.
[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “Introduction: Spearheading a Transformation.” Breggin, Peter R.
Co-published simultaneously in The Psychotherapy Patient (The Haworth Press, Inc.) Vol. 9, No. 3/4,
1996, pp. 1-7; and: Psychosocial Approaches to Deeply Disturbed Persons (eds: Peter R. Breggin, and
E. Mark Stem) The Haworth Press, Inc., 1996, pp. 1-7. Single or multiple copies of this article are
available from The Haworth Document Delivery Service [1-800-342-9678,9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. (EST)].
© 1996 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved. /

2 PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACHES TO DEEPLY DISTURBED PERSONS
ingly irrational people. I believe that all individuals should be viewed as

agents and beings (Breggin, 1991,1992, 1997).
People as agents are active forces in their own lives. In philosophical
terms, they have autonomy and are capable of self-determination. Free
will may have its limitations, including those imposed by genetics and
biology, but the effective exercise of free will is critical to recovery and to
successful living. Because human beings must exercise free will in order
to survive and to prosper, they need a maximum of personal freedom.
Thus the principle of liberty becomes crucial to human progress on both
the personal and political level (Breggin, 1992). Approaches to deeply
disturbed human beings should as much as possible respect their auton
omy, independence, and freedom. They should seek to increase rather than
to limit their liberty.
People as beings not only have agency or the ability to take actions,
more specifically they are capable of generating values, including love.
They can offer love and they can accept it. Love is an active, positive
attitude toward others, a treasuring of others that is reverent, caring, and
empathic. The capacity to share love is central to recovery and to contin
ued personal growth (Breggin, 1997).
The principles of liberty and love-and relationships based on them-em-
power individuals, enabling them to overcome trauma stress, and to live
their fullest potential. On the one hand, empowerment is healing. It
soothes pain and anguish. On the other, it is strengthening—it supports the
individual’s pursuit of his or her own chosen values and ideals.
Persons are influenced and constrained by their bodies, and they require
their bodies in order to function; but they exist as well on a level that is
variously called psychological, psychosocial, existential, or psychospi
ritual. They generate thoughts and feelings, they create values and mean
ings, they choose courses of actions, and they relate to other beings-in-
fluencing them and in turn being influenced by them. That is, they are both
agents and beings.
Anguished, self-defeating responses to life, from anxiety and despair to
madness, are learned through hurtful interactions with ourselves, other
people, and life. Often these responses can be understood as “psychospiritual
overwhelm” (Breggin, 1991). In a somewhat simplified manner, I have
described the origin of this helplessness in the basic stress paradigm of hurt,
fear and helplessness (Breggin, 1992, pp. 103-104; 1997). The individual
becomes helpless in the face of seeming personal devastation from internal
and external threats. Healing requires overcoming helplessness through self-
understanding, rational thought processes, loving attitudes, positive values
and ideals, effective choices and actions, and loving relationships.
Introduction 3
PERSONS AS OBJECTS OR BIOCHEMICAL DEVICES
The “ scientific” or scientistic approach takes a starkly contrasting atti

tude toward those who suffer mental disturbances and anguish, especially
those who end up with psychotic labels (e.g., schizophrenia, major depres
sion and manic-depressive disorder).1 In the extreme, the person is seen as
a reactive object or biological mechanism. He or she becomes an “ it”
devoid of the capacity to generate thoughts or feelings, to create values or
meanings, to choose courses of action, or to influence and be influenced
by others. Or if the person is granted these human capacities, the capacities
are seen as irrelevant to the processes involved in “mental illness” and
“treatment” (Breggin and Breggin, 1994a & b).
In previous decades, the scientistic approach in psychiatry included
both a biological and an environmental wing. The individual’s behavior
was seen as determined by either biological variables or environmental
ones; but either way, the principles of cause and effect applied. In more
recent times, environmental determinism has lost its verge and been largely
replaced by genetic and biochemical determinism. Environment has come
to play almost no role in the thinking of many modem psychiatrists,
especially in regard to the “causation” of severe “mental illnesses,” such as
major depression, manic-depressive disorder, and schizophrenia (reviewed
in Breggin, 1991).
More “balanced” or “eclectic” psychiatric perspectives tend to include
both genetic predispositions and environmental influences. These are usu
ally found in textbooks of psychiatry. In actual practice, however, most
current theories and textbooks tend to emphasize genetic and biochemical
factors and to encourage physical treatments. Even while giving passing
mention to psychosocial theories and practices, these theories and text
books display skepticism toward them. They devote no attention to psy
chospiritual issues, such as love.
CONTRASTING THERAPEUTIC APPROACHES
If we approach the human as a being, then our task is to understand and

to empower. Understanding involves intuition, empathy and love. Empow
erment involves self-understanding, moral encouragement through a car
ing relationship, and guidance toward more effective, autonomous and
loving principles of living. It may also involve direct assistance in negotiat
ing life’s stresses, for example, by helping the individual become more
effective in utilizing community resources or by including his or her
family in the therapy.
www.Ebook777.com
If we approach the human “scientifically” or “objectively,” then the

tendency is to diagnose and to control, to impose our own abstract and
potentially oppressive category upon the person, and to manipulate the
outcome. Physical interventions, such as drugs and enforced confinement
in a mental hospital, become the preferred tools (Breggin and Breggin,
1994a &b).
Often the patient feels misunderstood, rather than understood; ¿«em
powered rather than empowered. These approaches seem to empower the
doctor far more than the patient.
The biopsychiatric approach can easily reinforce the patient’s worst feel
ings and attitudes. The patient already feels helpless-at the mercy of forces
beyond his or her control. The patient often feels like an object or thing that
can do nothing more than react helplessly to internal and external threats. In
the extreme, the individual suffers from delusions and hallucinations about
being influenced and manipulated by imaginary others and outside
unknown forces. Often the patient feels “mentally defective.”
Unfortunately, the biopsychiatrist’s approach will encourage the patient’s
self-destructive attitudes by further encouraging the patient to think and act
like a helpless victim of overwhelming forces, namely, genetic and
biochemical abnormalities. The doctor then “takes over” and prescribes
physical agents that are supposed to counteract the genetic and biochemical
influences. This further reinforces the patient’s self-destructive helplessness.
The patient can easily become a passive battlefield between two war
ring parties-the forces of his or her own alleged biological abnormalities,
and the forces of biopsychiatry in the form of drugs and electroshock.
Whatever the seeming outcome, the patient’s worst view of life is recon-
firmed-that he or she is a passive victim of forces beyond personal under
standing and control.
In an especially tragic irony, the biopsychiatrist frequently renders the
patient more helpless by means of brain-disabling treatments and involun
tary hospitalization (Breggin, 1991; Breggin & Breggin, 1994a & b). The
patient—whose problems are driven by overwhelming feelings of helpless-
ness-is further overwhelmed by coercive therapy and brain dysfunction.
PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE
There are, of course, not only philosophical considerations but scien

tific ones. To a great extent both the public and mental health profession
has accepted the claim that so-called schizophrenia is a genetic and biochem
ical disease, and that drugs, electroshock, and mental hospitals are effec
tive, humane approaches to severe human suffering. The public, the media
Introduction 5
and much of the profession mistakenly believe that the biopsychiatrists

have a comer on the scientific market.
I have critiqued this “science” in Toxic Psychiatry: Why Therapy,
Empathy, and Love Must Replace the Drugs, Electroshock and Biochemi
cal Theories o f the ‘New Psychiatry ’(1991), as well as in a variety of other
professional publications (Breggin, 1979, 1983; Breggin and Breggin,
1994a & b). Karon and Whitaker will continue that analysis in their chap
ter in this book. I will not try to duplicate or to summarize the arguments
and evidence already offered in rebuttal, except to say that biopsychiatric
claims are largely without foundation. There is no convincing evidence to
support genetic and biochemical theories or the physical interventions so
highly touted by contemporary biopsychiatry. Most available scientific
evidence instead undermines biopsychiatric theory and practice.
Scientific research does have a place in the helping professions, for exam
ple, in testing theories and more practically in the evaluation of “out
comes.” But any attempt to evaluate the results of a therapeutic approach
will reflect the researchers’ underlying values, often expressed in the
variables which are selected for evaluation. For example, studies that
demonstrate the effectiveness of drugs for depression typically focus on
symptom relief, such as weight gain or reduced insomnia. These studies
merely reconfirm the well-known fact that many drugs, including tricyclic
antidepressants, can physically stimulate appetite and cause sedation. On
the other hand, research that demonstrates the efficacy of psychotherapy
tends to focus on subjective changes in the patient’s feelings and on actual
changes in lifestyle or the conduct of life (Fisher and Greenberg, 1989).
Psychotherapy is more effective than medication when these criteria are
used.
Psychosocial research should place much more emphasis on the patient’s
personal or subjective response to “treatment.” In biopsychiatry, patients
who are medicated or shocked are typically labeled “improved” when
they conform to hospital demands or receive discharge from the hospital.
But the patients themselves often feel badly drugged, befuddled, or
coerced. Often they actively resist the supposedly beneficial treatment by
secretly spitting out their pills or by pleading for an end to shock treat
ment. Increased discharge rates often reflect the desire to escape from
escalating treatment with drugs or shock (Breggin, 1979, 1983, 1991).
Unfortunately, it is difficult to find research that takes into account the
patient or client’s personal, subjective response, or that examines benefi
cial changes in lifestyle. We end up trying to infer benefits from other
variables, such as length or frequency of hospitalization, that bear little
relationship to overall improvement in mood, attitudes or lifestyle.
A CONFLICT RESOLUTION MODEL
People who come to the attention of mental health professionals are in

conflict. Their conflicts may be internal, and characterized by guilt,
shame, anxiety, numbing and anger. Or they may be external or “behav
ioral,” involving others in their lives and society. The more severely “ ill”
they seem, the more they are embroiled in severe conflict-within them
selves and with others, often including active strife with mental health
professionals who try to treat.
Conflict resolution based on respect for the principles of liberty and
love provides an effective contemporary model for the mental health pro
fession. It addresses the basic needs of each individual involved in the
conflict and seeks to increase their satisfaction (Breggin, 1992, 1997). It
calls for creating a safe space for the individual in which coercive power is
replaced by reason, love, and mutual attempts to satisfy the basic needs of
those involved in the conflict.
Unfortunately, much of the mental health profession relies on the medi
cal model which seeks to identify one member of the conflict as the “ cause
of it all” and further seeks to locate the “cause” within the labeled indi
vidual’s genetic and biochemical vulnerability. In the process it frequently
revictimizes one of the victims of the conflict, while it ignores the larger
psychological, familial, social and political context of the conflict. Often it
utilizes coercive power in the form of brain-disabling treatments and
involuntary hospitalization.
Deeply disturbed people should be viewed as persons struggling to
survive and to grow-as persons in conflict with themselves and with other
people. Healing comes through a combination of self-development and
beneficial relationships with others. It is maximized when people are
treated as agents and beings, according to the ideals of liberty and love.
NOTE
1. Scientism is the misapplication of the principles of the physical sciences to
understanding human mental life and conduct. It emphasizes simple-minded cause
and effect reactivity at the expense of volition and subjectively-chosen values.
REFERENCES
Breggin, P. R. (1979). Electroshock: Its brain-disabling effects. New York:
Springer Publishing Company.
Breggin, P. R. (1983). Psychiatric drugs: Hazards to the brain. New York:
Springer.
Introduction 7
Breggin, P. R. (1991). Toxic psychiatry: Why therapy, empathy and love must
replace the drugs, electroshock and biochemical theories o f the 'new psychia
t r y New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Breggin, P. R. (1992). Beyond conflict: From self-help and psychotherapy to
peacemaking. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Breggin, P. R. & Breggin, G. (1994a). Talking back to Prozac: What doctors aren’t
telling you about today's most controversial drug. New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
Breggin, P. R., & Breggin, G. (1994b). The war against children: The govern
ment s intrusion into schools, families and communities in search o f a medical
“cure”for violence. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Breggin, P. R. (1997, in press) The heart o f being helpful New York: Springer
Publishing Company.
Fisher, S., & Greenberg, R. (1989). The limits o f biological treatments for psycho
logical distress: Comparisons with psychotherapy and placebo. Hillsdale,
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Schizophrenic Experience:
A Humanistic Perspective
E. Mark Stem
SUMMARY. Schizophrenic consciousness is an alternative view of life,

common to the human predicament as a means of psychic endur
ance. Psychosis diffuses identity. In so doing, the crazymaking per
son tends to be locked into symbiosis, cementing this closure
through automatically yielding to the demands of others via the pas
sageway of depersonalizing depression and anxiety. [Article copies
available from The Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-342-9678.]
ALTERNATIVE REALITIES
In the 1902 Gifford Lectures, delivered at the University of Edinburgh,

William James (1958) expressed concern that alternative “ forms of
(human) consciousness (tend to be) disregarded.” Paying serious attention
to experiential variations of conscious awareness is, in Jamesian terms, an
essential inquiry, without which psychology stands in danger of promoting
“ .. . a premature closing of our accounts with reality” (p. 298). Schizo
phrenic consciousness acts as an alternative to a world filled with intra-
cultural contradictions.
Each era confers meaning on the problems of being in the world. In our
time, as in others, confusing cultural sentiments abound. Some of the
fallout from these social bewilderments involves alternative sensibilities.
Among these alternative modes of being, schizophrenia reflects the condi
tion of a person whose relations to the current demands of sanity have
[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “Schizophrenic Experience: A Humanistic Perspective.” Stem,

E. Mark. Co-published simultaneously in The Psychotherapy Patient (The Haworth Press, Inc.) Vol. 9,
No. 3/4, 1996, pp. 9-21; and: Psychosocial Approaches to Deeply Disturbed Persons (eds: Peter R.
Breggin, and E. Mark Stem) The Haworth Press, Inc., 1996, pp. 9-21. Single or multiple copies of this
article are available from The Haworth Document Delivery Service [1-800-342-9678,9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.
(EST)].
© 1996 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved. 9

become broken (May, 1983). Nevertheless, the schizophrenic expresses this

break by devoting his or her existence to the reversibilities of commonly
accepted realities. In its haste to define and isolate models of disease
driven behavior, society has demonstrated an increasing reliance on neu
ropsychiatrie models (Torrey, 1995). Schizophrenics are widely regarded
as diseased. Labeling schizophrenia as a sickness in wait of a cure well
suits the dehumanizing signs of the times. The current emphasis on neu
ropsychiatrie models further increases this society’s dependence on differ
ential diagnostic codes resulting in the inevitable growing use of biochem
ical, electroconvulsive and surgical “ correctives.”
SCHIZOPHRENIA AS A MODE OF BEING
Schizophrenia is a multi-axis combination of genetic, biochemical, psy-

cho-social and developmental forces. Nonetheless, since social and tech
nological conditions tend to determine the role deviant behaviors in any
one time span, the schizophrenic phenomenon plays out its own contem
porary existential theme. Even as an alienated mode of being, schizophre
nia persists in redefining the current relationships of objects, space and
time. Schizophrenic imagery speaks to relationships in its unique surreal
language. As a dissident alternative to experience of “acceptable” rela
tionships, schizophrenic associations are rarely static. Appreciated as a
necessary agitator to other means of psychic endurance and survival,
schizophrenic experience makes few distinctions between subjects and
objects. Instead, schizophrenia connects with primordial linkages to primi
tive formats of language and perception. And while specific schizophrenic
behaviors are more prominent in certain individuals, the broader popula
tion of non-psychotics may at times embody similar deviations and
detachments. Dreams and hypnagogic states in the nonpsychotic, compare
well to the visions of the schizophrenic.
DISENGAGEMENT AND CONVENTION
Labeled clinically as a serious thought disorder, schizophrenia is, in fact,

a tousled scramble of estranged inventiveness and poetic cosmic specula
tions. Within schizophrenic consciousness, bizarre images reassess famil
iar conclusions. Contradiction, digression and mania knot themselves to
the task of the schizophrenic’s being in society, and this by his or her
ultimately despairing of intrusive normative social demands. Schizo
E. Mark Stern 11
phrenic disengagement from objective reality devolves personhood into a

further disengagement from society even as the psychosis forges new links
to alternative constructs. To be sure, schizophrenic challenges to norma
tive reality are often accompanied by frenzies and violent ecstasies. But
even in their extreme, these explosive expressions never relent in serving
as a persistent and tenacious surreal view of life, ultimately affecting all
boundary negotiations (Stem, 1986). Yet, even as schizophrenic images
necessarily duel with conventional imagery, conventional neuropsychiat
ric approaches are characteristically charged with the task of conventional
izing schizophrenic behavior.
Affective States
The affective life of schizophrenics is interwoven with strands of depres

sion. Such depressive imagery is not mere joylessness. Nevertheless, the
value of all phenomena are determined by the views taken of them. Neu
ropsychiatry and behaviorally-oriented psychology have waged their
respective battle cries against the sometimes necessary messages of
depression. Paul Schilder (1952), a pioneer in the psychotherapy of
schizophrenics, considers the process of being schizophrenic as a more
primitive mode of existence. Schilder observed that the schizophrenic is
not contented with such primitivism, and that the continuing search for
newer adaptations and even “progressive tendencies” is his or her way to
move into closer contact with the world. Schilder was cautious, if not
pessimistic, regarding the ordinary therapeutic successes with schizo
phrenic individuals. It behooves contemporary institutional mental illness
personnel to extinguish all affective irregularities. As a result it is not
uncommon for a post-medicated depressive to insist that he or she lives on
a flat horizon, malnourished of former feelings.
Boundaries between schizophrenia and mood disorders are often quite
arbitrary. Delusions combine affective deprivation with compensating furies.
Disturbances in expression are often incomplete attempts at coping with a
combined sense of hopelessness and grandiosity. Impasses in being able to
feel effective often appear beyond repair. Despite this seeming hopeless
ness, schizophrenic imagery can be challenging in its own right. In the
face of deep pain and “distortion” a psychotherapy patient, intent more on
the struggle than on the solution wrote:
I know I’m better because I feel worse.. . . The more lost I become
the clearer it gets___There is no winning or losing, but I keep what
I have. (Deinelt, 1979, p. 231)
Being able to weigh in such struggles distinguishes what is schizophrenic

depression, and may be apparent in any generic notion of schizophrenia.
Psychotic Despair
Schizophrenic consciousness can compromise itself into airtight leth

al®'. Viable tomorrows have little room to exist Depression, linked to psy
chotic experience, appears incapable of reckoning with time. Many
schizophrenics despair over ever having been bom. “ It is not,” wrote Paul
Tillich (1957), “the experience of time as such which produces (such)
despair; rather it is defeat in the resistance against time (p. 69).”
For the schizophrenic, time is the ultimate illusion. There is no distinc
tion between life and death. Identity is diffused. In its stead, symbiotic
unions abound:
Renata came into therapy at her twin brother’s request. They had just
turned 35. He described her as “ silly” and depressive. Their mother
had recently died of complications following a cerebral aneurysm.
The aneurysm had caused a profound paralysis of left side. Renata
had nursed her mother throughout the paralysis. Like her mother, she
too was, according to her brother, “ given to strange moods.” On the
day of her mother’s death, Renata developed a Bell’s palsy which
had resulted in a temporary paralysis of the left side of her face. She
was reminded by her brother, who accompanied her to the first
session, of how profoundly sad she’d been. He spoke of the “ strong
connection” which had always existed between mother and daugh
ter. Renata, on the other hand, claimed that she felt no need to grieve
since “ I see her face so clearly every time I look into a mirror.”
Renata felt alive in her mother’s deadness. She refused to use the
electrical device which had been prescribed to stimulate the left side
of her face. Any restoration of movement felt forbidding. Renata’s
paralysis anesthetized her being. Stimulation meant “coming apart”—
the feared “parting” from her mother.
Anxiety
Anxiety in the schizophrenic signifies further psychic and physical

extinction. In contrast to schizoid depression, anxiety is linked to the terror
of being and belonging. Otto Rank (1929) incorporates anxiety lay to the
hub of the birth process. It might equally be speculated that the presence of
anxiety is rooted in the echoes of the Big Bang of creation: the format of
all cosmic uncertainty (Gauquelin, 1967).
E. Mark Stern 13
Anxiousness within schizophrenia fails to confine the terrors of being

lost within the immensity of existence within any suitable control. Con
sider Pascal’s (1961) words:
Whoever shall thus consider himself will be frightened at himself,

and observing himself suspended in the mass of matter allotted to
him by nature, between these two abysses of infinity and nothing
ness, will tremble at the sight of these wonders, (p. 47)
Fretfulness and apprehensiveness team together to delimit boundaries

of personal reality. For the schizophrenic, anxiety is agoraphobic. This
imprisonment fails to provide safety, leaving only a pervasive surrealism
which, while appearing to be exotic, actually escalates into further disable
ment (Searles, 1961).
HARVEY: SEEING IT ALL
Harvey lived in a recurring dream. Day-to-day realities were sapped at

their foundations. Images would toss and turn between worry, horselaughs
and tears. Compulsions were indistinguishable from terrors. Harvey was
in total collapse. Fleeting ruminations randomly scanned seemingly unre
lated contexts. Time and body parts had become mere tracings of move
ment. Harvey’s torments were unremitting. He fretted about his head being
ripped into shreds. The idea of suicide was all that remained. Despite the
horrific undertow, here was a man fighting the tides for whatever small
degree of personal integrity he could muster.
When I first met him, Harvey was in imminent danger of losing a highly
stressful job. His behavior at work had become inappropriately obsessive
and ritualistic. Although a leave of absence was suggested, murmuring
preoccupations superseded his consideration of a corporate compensation
or disability plan. Rather than look into how he could survive, Harvey
toyed with the idea of challenging his boss to a wrestling match. He said
some vague things about “smearing his weapon.” There was no notice
able excitement as he meandered through memories of boyhood and teen
age fist fights. In fits, he would clutch at his crotch murmuring about lost
power. Clutching represented the enormity of how he had come to experi
ence his life/death struggles. In a near jumble of metaphors, he turned to
me directly and emphatically stated that he must protect his strength from
the power of the “weak.”
Harvey’s day dream fragments were filled with images of “ falling
through insisting cracks.” There were no discernible ends to these drops.

In the past, it was nightmares which had awakened him. Lately, free falls
and collisions melded into his waking hours. To reach bottom, he told me,
would be death. Soon after being forced to take a leave of absence from
work, he began to fear sleep. He would sit erect for days and nights
tapping his hands as if to the beat of marching music.
When most lucid, Harvey referred to himself as “the slimy shark,”
who, if it were not for the rapids, might have the power to devour other
people.
“Why?” I asked.
“ To force them to their feet.”
“ But with such power of your side, how could they then have any feet
to stand on?”
We were in a sort of exchange in which we’d each appeared to empha
size a particular view of submergence. The contrast figured into a multi
faceted picture of Harvey’s confusion.
Images of vying tides and rapids embodied his anxiety. I thought that he
might be propelling himself to fight for his own cause. But when this same
anxiousness was without imagery, fear and passivity took over. He had
become his own “the broken image. . . . An image so contorted and
malformed that even tossed from a bridge would produce no further frag
ments.”
In time I became what little projected extension he could cope with. He
saw me as some way to composure.
The day he left his job, Harvey became homebound. Just as soon as a
bed became available, he entered a psychiatric hospital as a voluntary
patient. During his stay in the hospital, our contacts continued over the
telephone. He seemed content that his fate was finally in others’ hands.
Even so, he became restless. An attending psychiatrist had prescribed
Haldol, an anti-psychotic medication which he continued to take in varied
dosages even after his discharge from the hospital.
His wife Meg was in therapy, but reportedly, her sessions with the
woman she referred to as her “ counselor” were sporadic and intermittent.
With Harvey’s permission, I saw her on several occasions as an aid to his
resumption of independent living. Meg was more concerned about her
own survival. Harvey’s three month hospital stay only added to their
fundamental marital problems. “Yes,” she said, “things had calmed
down. But it feels to me like he’s either had a lobotomy or that he’s even
more frightened out of his wits___If he can diminish so completely, what
am I to do?” She reported that he most often collapsed in a chair and
mumbled to himself. Some of the time it seemed as if he was in shock or
E. Mark Stern 15
seizure. “ I find it difficult to distract him,” she said, “and I’m frightened
that he might strike out at me___When he stands he paces in circles. The
repetitiveness nearly drives me crazy. After a while, I try to convince him
to sit.” I asked her what she thought he might be trying to express by
walking in circles. She indicated that he might be tying imaginative knots
with his body.
“Do you feel caught in the knots, (i.e., nots)?”
“Maybe,” she admitted, “but frankly, he seems scattered and indifferent.
The kind of indifference where he’s always underfoot, always demanding.”
She paused. Later she said that she was willing to grant that he’d been
under great strain. But there was something about him that had always
blinded him to anyone else’s needs.
“From what you say,” I suggested, “could it be possible that Harvey
circles around in some attempt to gather in his world, even if he makes it
impossible for anyone to actually relate to him in the process? . . . Perhaps
it’s not at all unlike his images of the tides, undertows, whirlpools and
circling sharks. Autistic children frequently spin around with their hands
clutching their genitals or genitalia as if in some sort of an attempt to
protect their existences. Harvey had once mentioned that he moved in
circles so that he could remain in one piece. Harvey was present during
this conversation. It was his way of keeping anyone else in one place.”
I once asked him: “ Does what you’re pacing mean that you have the
capacity for seeing people in circles?”
“ My wife.”
“And why your wife?”
“Without her I’m all out of control.”
“A shark out of control could devour people. Then again there are the
bigger sharks who are piloted by the smaller ones.”
“ Since all of this is happening to me happening with me, I suppose I’m
both big and small.”
“How’s that feel?” I asked.
“I’ll have to play by more of the rules,” he said.
“ But you were more involved in the rules than you were in the work.
Isn’t that why you were forced to go on temporary disability?” I paused.
He said nothing. “Was it more important that you knew where everyone
was, even more than know where you were at? It takes enormous creativ
ity to look at so many things at once. But hell, you’ve had to pay for it.”
Eventually, Harvey returned to his company. In the meantime, he’d been
reassigned. The cast of characters had all but changed. Very little was as he
remembered it. His memory had become somewhat blurred. His obses
siveness, now in partial remission, remained a steadying force. Spinning in
circles had its proven rewards: “ I like being able to keep my eyes on
everyone at once.”
The return to work remained a tenuous victory.
Therapy proceeded. Harvey gradually recognized his own purposes in trans
lating how he saw things into relatable, if not primitive, frames of refer
ence. In time, he took personal responsibility for his construction of social
reality. He termed it his “ sensitivity.”
The current concern was how to share what needed to be shared in
order to survive in what Harvey deemed to be a questionable environment.
I took his concern as a direct question. “You’ve been able to hold on and
let go in a way all on your own. You’ve regularly staved off storms. And
while those storms have sometimes had you under, you begin to under
stand that underlying it all is your personal way of refining your own
power and competence. You are unique, which often makes you feel alone
and not comparable to anyone else you know.”
A World Apart
Maurice Friedman’s (1992) cogent description of the isolation/participant

quality of the schizophrenic bears citing. “The schizophrenic,” according to
Friedman,
. . . even in his desire to have a world of his own apart from the
common world, helps to build the common world of speech-with-
meaning. His voice cannot be excluded without impoverishing us
all. (p. 227)
Psychotic imagery can indeed be regarded as both challenging and

crafty. Schizophrenics frequently develop a workable knowledge of their
“strangeness.” Ultimately, Harvey appreciated the value of his own
strange meaning. His imagery, no matter how perilous, served that mean
ing. From a humanistic perspective, personal authorship and legitimacy
are qualities which are to be encouraged. For Harvey, as for others, the
task was to reverence himself in his assertiveness and non-assertiveness. If
he created the impression that he had little or no identity, then it, too, was
necessary to protect what was, for Harvey, most unique about himself.
For Harvey, there was a continuing lessening of the haphazard demon
stration of shifting affects. A possible effect of the small amount of the
anti-psychotic medication Haldol had been different for Harvey. For many,
drugs like Haldol become unfortunate snares, creating an embittered
dependency. For him, the effect of Haldol, though he was using it in much
reduced doses, had the continuing paradoxical effect of enriching his
E. Mark Stern 17
range of responses to the challenge of sometimes incapacitating circum

stances.
None of what ultimately happened to Harvey could simply be regarded as
a “cure,” even though many terrors had since been abated and the storms of
yesterday seemed more in control. Harvey appeared to be less schizophrenic
in his basic orientation to reality. All could change at any moment. Schizoid
cognition continued to be his mainstay. But for now, he and I were better able
to engage in a more dimensional dialogue. Our exchanges took on new
challenges; what Laing (1965) properly alluded to as what simply had never
happened before in the former transference. At times, Harvey forced himself
to be more keenly aware of my constantly reorganized presence. At times, I
spoke for him, always careful not to “defeat” his imagery in the process. At
other times, he addressed me as someone he was beginning to know better
than he had ever known any human being before. I sensed a starting point. A
unique relationship had been built.
Despite the deepening of our relationship, suicidal ideation continued. I
responded to his suicide threats by emphasizing a universal tendency to
prepare for death in any way we can. Self-disclosures were appropriate to
our dialogue. I told Harvey that I daily perused the obituary section of the
newspaper. “ Do you ever see your own name among the dead?” he asked.
“Sometimes,” I answered.
“There are times,” he said, “that I feel less of a danger dead than
alive.”
I nodded: “Like no more surprises for you?”
“Yeah, just get it over with.”
“Your life, you mean?”
“Not entirely,” he replied, “ In fact, I don’t think I really relish dying.
Maybe I will someday, but not for now.”
“Could it be,” I suggested, “that the equivalent of dying is more like
being a nobody without any responsibility?. . . Like a baby?”
“Not at all. Babies have much too much to look forward to.”
“And,” I was quick to reply, “they probably deal with an awful lot of
anxiety, even when they’re taken care of just right. You know, like a fear of
falling.”
“I hate the vision of falling. For me,” he said, “it’s more like falling to
pieces.”
“Can you tell me how that happens?”
“Like living in my TV. Sometimes it feels so real, even though I know
it isn’t. The characters talk specially to me, and then they don’t. But I still
believe that they do. And they give me survival pointers. They don’t
always; so I guess, on the whole, I’m pretty frightened of turning the tube
on. But I do despite myself.”
“ Is it that they take away your will?” I asked.
“Well, as I said, they talk right to me. And sometimes I feel I must obey.
But obey has come to mean many things to me. I’ve learned that I can
obey one side or the other of their messages.”
“ So what I hear you say is that if you’re not real careful they can make
you fall. Seems to me that it’s up to you to weigh their impact.”
“That’s what I mean. And it’s not limited to the television. Telephones
pressure me. That’s one of the reasons I felt tempted to not return to my
office. Someone could call, and I can hear the messages in ways they’re
not intended to be heard.”
He suddenly appeared to be dispirited. I waited. “ Could it be that they,
the people who call and leave messages, any idea that are you really saying
something important to yourself at that time? Seems like they are the
soundings you most fear. Tell you what, if I were you, I would file any
messages for future use. Or else they could be old dispatches, like from
your parents, teachers or kids from way back when. Maybe talking about a
problem kid? Who knows?” I continued to wait.
Necessary Paranoia
Paranoia is a necessary ingredient in life, and especially important for

the schizophrenic. For my part, I find it clinically essential to grant credi
bility to every paranoid experience. “ So just maybe,” I continued, “the
phone and the TV are also trying to tell you something about the power
you are loath to want to take responsibility for?”
(Sometime later) “You said earlier that you do not easily identify your
self with infancy. But I see you’re wanting all the background babble and
the TV talk to reduce you to a place where you are cared for by being both
more or less than anyone else.”
Harvey learned from all of the elements of his breakdown. From his
experience with the anti-psychotic drug Haldol, he learned not necessarily
not to be schizophrenic, but that within his repertoire, he was capable of
circumventing crippling anxiety. Likewise, his psychotherapy helped him
to appreciate the creative possibilities within the experience of anxiety. He
came to know that obsessions, which had frequently removed him from
the core of responsibilities, could just as well become the means of master
ing them. He could, with some effort, make use of his paranoia in orienting
himself to his new assignment. The temptation was to yield to the gran
diosity of nothingness in performing the tasks of his new high demanding
position (Stem, E. M., 1984).
www.Ebook777.com
E. Mark Stern 19
Non-Existence
Underlying my work with Harvey was my continuing awareness of his

drive not to be. As a schizophrenic, his identity was hovering between
being and not having “been there” and “not yet there.” The obsessive
walking in circles and the unwillingness not to recline in bed had become
his means of engaging his dizziness by not falling into a greater pit of
unawareness. Although he was not prepared to die, he was more than
willing to allow for social and emotional estrangement, to dislocate from
himself. He was, in his mind, an absent presence. I had little desire to fix his
predicament. That would have certainly misplaced both of our energies.
In no way did I or do I romanticize the pain of Harvey’s memories.
Harvey’s existence hovered at the melding zones of unrestrained fury,
despair and confusing boundaries. Because of this medley, his imagery
bordered close to the grotesque. Psychotherapy heals through a recasting
of images and memories no matter how despairing they may appear to the
unattuned ear. Harvey’s images were filled with depression, anxiety, rest
lessness and paranoid delusions, yet they were at one with his search for
significance and meaning. The recital of anger, anguish and terror, many
dating back to his earliest years, stimulated our dialog. Though rarely “ in
touch” with anything beyond his estrangement, he began to hear himself
through my recapitulations, I became appreciative of his fear that he had
failed simply because he was different. His only hope, probably not at all
different from the aspirations of other schizoid and schizophrenic patients,
was to win me over to his way even as his attention was otherwise
directed. This small task provided Harvey with a necessary modicum of
validity.
DANGERS FOR THE THERAPIST
Leslie Farber (1976) notes that prolonged exposure to the schizo

phrenic can be precarious. And while he in no way suggests that schizo
phrenia is contagious, he does conclude that the therapist “ tends to
become something other than the person somewhat he is, or was, or was
meant to be” (p. 105). Farber sees the potential for deteriorating relations
in the personal life of the therapist. And there is some doubt that therapists
who have worked closely with schizophrenics ever truly re/cover the
ground they once tread. Undoubtedly this argument, and not the contro
versy about whether psychotherapy or pharmacology is in the best interest
of the psychotic patient, treads the cautions of close therapeutic ties with
the schizophrenic.
ADVANTAGES IN TREATING SCHIZOPHRENICS
Therapists who, with experience, respectfully treat psychotic patients,

appear more likely to develop the capacity for creating unique intuitive
postures. Some are simply more inclined to the language of deep emo
tional estrangement. It is those few who successfully provide the neces
sary give-and-take so fundamental in working with the psychotic. But
estrangement need not be a final condition. There is, as Eigen (1986) has
suggested, a psychotic core underlying the vast range of emotional states
and mental disorders. This core may, in my opinion, be a vital signifier for
all, those who are schizophrenic and those who are the fellow travelers of
schizophrenics. There is, in this core, an insistent need to recognize an
inherent tendency to reorder the priorities of being. And since the schizo
phrenic may be in touch with non-ordinary dimensions of existence, the
talking cure for psychosis is a back-and-forth one in which therapist and
patient are reshaped, if not transformed, by and through their dialogue.
REFERENCES
Aurelius, M. (1964) Meditations, (translated by M. Stainforth) Harmondsworth,

Middlesex, England: Penguin Books.
Deinelt, M. (1979) quoted in S. Kopp, The hanged man. Palo Alto, CA: Science
and Behavior Books (p. 231).
Eigen, M. (1986) The psychotic core. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.
Farber, L. (1976) Lying, despair, jealousy, envy, sex, suicide, drugs, and the good
life. NY: Basic Books.
Friedman, M. (1992) Religion and psychology: A dialogical approach. NY: Para
gon House Publishers.
Gauquelin, M. (1967) The cosmic clocks. NY: Avon Books.
James, W. (1958) The varieties o f religious experience. New York: The New
American Library.
Knight, R. (1993) Converging models of cognitive deficit in schizophrenia. In
Dienster, R. (Series Ed.) Nebraska symposium on motivation, Vol 31, Lincoln,
NE: University of Nebraska Press (pp. 93-156).
Laing, R. D. (1965) Mystification, confusion and conflict. In I. Boszormenyi-Nagi &
J. Framo (Eds.) Intensive family therapy. NY: Harper & Row.
Magaro, P. (1983) Psychosis and schizophrenia. In Dienster, R. (Series Ed.)
Nebraska symposium on motivation, Vol. 31, Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press (pp. 157, pp. 230).
May, R. (1983) The discovery o f being: Writings in existential psychology. New
York: Norton.
Pascal, B. (1961) Cited in Ungersma, A. The search for meaning: A new approach
in psychotherapy. Philadelphia: Westminister Press.
E. Mark Stern 21
Rank, 0. (1929) The trauma o f birth. NY: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
Schilder, P. (1952) Psychotherapy. London: Routledge & Kegan.
Searles H. (1961) Schizophrenia and the inevitability of death. Psychiatric Quar
terly, 35, pp. 631-655.
Stem, E. M. (1984) Schizophrenic hilarity. Voices: The Art and Science o f Psy
chotherapy, 20, 2, pp. 2-8.
Stem, E. M. (1986) Foundations for a soul psychology. In Gibson, K., Lathrop, D.
& Stem, E. M. (Eds.) Carl Jung and Soul Psychology. NY: Harrington Park
Press (pp. 2-7).
Tillich, P. (1957) Systematic theology, Vol. 2. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press.
Torrey, E. F. (1995) Surviving schizophrenia: A manual fo r consumers and pro
viders (3rd edition). NY: Harper Perennial.
Walsh, R., Elgin, D., Vaughn, F. and Wilber, K. (1980) Paradigms in collision.
In Walsh, R. & Vaughn, F. (Eds.) Beyond ego. Los Angeles: J. P. Tarcher
(pp. 36-58).
Psychotherapy and the Fear

of Understanding Schizophrenia
Bertram P. Karon
Leighton C. Whitaker
SUMMARY. Understanding schizophrenic persons means facing facts

about ourselves, our families, and our society that we do not want to
know, or to know again (in the case of repressed feelings and experi
ences). The central role of terror in producing symptoms, and the
genesis and psychological handling of symptoms, including delu
sions and hallucinations, are briefly described. [Article copies available
from The Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-342-9678.]
Moral treatment, an early psychologically based treatment for schizo

phrenics, was tried out, found to be successful, then abandoned (Bocko-
ven, 1972) in favor of harmful somatic treatments (Alexander & Seles-
nick, 1966; Whitaker, in press). What then was “moral treatment” and
why was it replaced by inferior and injurious treatments?
Moral treatment principles were very simple. First of all, no cruelty was
permitted. Physical force was permitted only to keep a patient from hurt
ing himself or someone else but not for punishment, not for “negative
reinforcement,” not for anything else. Harassment, ridicule, and humilia-
Bertram P. Karon, PhD, is Professor of Clinical Psychology, Michigan State

University, Psychology Research Building, East Lansing, MI 48824-1117.
Leighton C. Whitaker, PhD, is Adjunct Clinical Professor, Institute for Gradu
ate Clinical Psychology. Private Practice address: 220 Turner Road, Wallingford,
PA 19086-6037.
[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “ Psychotherapy and the Fear of Understanding Schizophrenia.”
Karon, Bertram P., and Leighton C. Whitaker. Co-published simultaneously in The Psychotherapy
Patient (The Haworth Press, Inc.) Vol. 9, No. 3/4, 1996, pp. 23-41; and: Psychosocial Approaches to
Deeply Disturbed Persons (eds: Peter R. Breggin, and E. Mark Stem) The Haworth Press, Inc., 1996,
pp. 23-41. Single or multiple copies of this article are available from The Haworth Document Delivery
Service [1-800-342-9678,9:00 a m - 5:00 p.m. (EST)].
www.Ebook777.com
tion were banned. Hippocrates’ principle that if you do not know how to
help the patient at least do nothing that will be harmful to the patient, was
taken seriously. Second, it was deemed important to keep an accurate case
history, which might reveal relevant information about this particular patient
and about people with similar disorders. Third, one was to do one’s best to
understand the patient as an individual human being. Work and social
relationships were encouraged as part of normal life.
In our time, psychoanalytic psychotherapy and other psychological
treatment modalities for schizophrenia are not fashionable; not because
they are not helpful, but because they make the professionals who become
therapists, as well as the public at large, so uncomfortable. It is usual to
attribute this discomfort to the assumption that schizophrenic people are
extremely different from the rest of us. The truth is just the opposite. What
makes both professionals and the general public uncomfortable with
schizophrenic people is not so much their difference from us, but their
similarity. We do not want to know what they have to teach us about the
human condition, including our own (Deikman, 1971).
In the 1930s, psychiatrists Harry Stack Sullivan and Frieda Fromm-
Reichmann consistently helped schizophrenics. The treatment was ardu
ous, but patients improved. They described their psychoanalytic treatment
in their papers and books (Sullivan, 1953; Fromm-Reichmann, 1950). The
well-known novel, I Never Promised You a Rose Garden (Greenberg,
1964) described that early treatment. The author, who had been a patient
of Fromm-Reichmann, used an assumed name, possibly because she was
embarrassed. It was only after later novels under her own name became
popular that she finally attached her name to this book, which not only
describes such treatment but demonstrates the kind of recovery that allows
the patient to write so well. Yet, many professionals act as if they have
never heard of psychotherapy with schizophrenics or that it has been
demonstrated long ago to be unhelpful and inferior to somatic treatment.
Of course, there are economic, sociological, political, ideological, and
apparently scientific motives for turning away from understanding schizo
phrenics. But we would be remiss in ignoring the fundamental emotional
bases underlying these motives. The economic, sociological, political,
ideological, and “ scientific” motives act in concert to maintain a stubborn
fear-laden obfuscation of the emotional truths, while serving to rationalize
ineffective or even harmful “practical” (in the short run) forms of neglect
and mistreatment.
Throughout our professional careers (over 36 and 28 years respec
tively) we have treated, among other people, schizophrenic patients by
psychotherapy. Whenever, in the course of this treatment, something about
Bertram P. Karon and Leighton C. Whitaker 25
a schizophrenic person has come to light, it has always illuminated the

human condition in general; and whatever psychology has learned about
the general human condition has illuminated schizophrenia as well and is
helpful in its treatment.
As is well-known, Freud’s most important discovery was the uncon
scious part of the mind which includes the repressed feelings, thoughts,
wishes, and memories which are too frightening, guilt-producing, or pain
ful to think about; keeping them repressed saves us pain in the short run.
To understand schizophrenic persons is to grasp painful facts about the
human condition that we would rather not know, or, more frightening, to
be reminded of painful facts we once knew, but repressed.
Even the sociological data about schizophrenia remind us of unpleasant
realities. Thus, the disproportionately greater incidence and prevalence of
schizophrenic disorders associated with low socioeconomic status, which
cannot be accounted for by downward drift, suggests, and psychothera
peutic experience makes vivid, the physical and psychological pain,
humiliation, and physical danger associated with being very poor in our
society-realities which those of us who are not very poor do not like to
perceive or remember. Similarly, schizophrenic disorders are more com
mon among those who are the victims of prejudice and discrimination
(e.g., Karon, 1975). Thus, the psychotherapist, to be effective, will often
be confronted with the ugliness of economic, racial, ethnic, and religious
discrimination which have contributed to these disorders. And the fact that
the long-term prognosis for schizophrenics is better in nonliterate cultures
(Sartorius, Jablensky, & Shapiro, 1978) reminds us of the relative lack of
kindness in our “civilization.”
Many schizophrenics have talked about incest, sexual abuse, and physi
cal abuse, but such talk nearly always has been dismissed as the ravings of
lunatics. Freud reported that the incest memories specifically of conver
sion hysterics, related in psychoanalysis, were revealed more often to be
fantasies rather than real events, although in many cases, according to
Freud, they were undoubtedly real (e.g., Freud, 1917/1977, p. 370).
Psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis (but not Freud) falsely gen
eralized that all such memories of patients were only fantasies, since it was
believed incest was a rare event. Those therapists and researchers who
worked with schizophrenics (e.g., Lidz, 1973) however, reported that the
incest “fantasies” related by those patients more often reflected real
events, as did their memories of child abuse. The ugly realities of child
abuse-^psychological, physical, and sexual (including incestHn our soci
ety are only now evident to most mental health professionals. It is now
known, for example, that one out of six, and perhaps one out of three,
women have been sexually abused (Gagnon, 1965; Finkelhor, 1979; Rus
sell, 1983).
Psychotherapeutic work with schizophrenics revealed that, lacking ade
quate nurturance, they often wish to be their own mother. This wish,
consciously or unconsciously, may underlie many symptoms (e.g., rock
ing, sucking, male patients wishing to be a woman, irrational needs to feed
[literally or symbolically] oneself or others). Later, Kestenberg (1975), on
the basis of her observation and treatment of children, reported that at the
age of two nearly every child goes through a stage where he or she wants
to be a mother. Girls want to be a mother to a little girl, and boys want to
be a mother to a little boy, so it is clear whose mother they want to be.
Schizophrenics simply continue this need into adulthood.
In order to help a postpartum schizophrenic (Rosberg & Karon, 1959) it
was necessary to learn (in her psychotherapy) about the fantasy that any
thing that filled the body was food. But Michel-Hutmacher (1955)
reported that normal children under seven regularly reported that belief.
Again, one can understand how schizophrenics, lacking nurturant satisfac
tion, would retain that belief as a kind of wish-fulfillment as well as a
cognitive or perceptual failure in differentiation. One implication, as
Sechehaye (1951) has so well demonstrated, is that fulfillment of the need
by a therapist skilled enough to devise a strategy that takes into account
both the patient’s need and fear can result in cognitive and perceptual
clarity.
One schizophrenic patient (Rosberg & Karon, 1958) revealed clearly,
and other schizophrenic patients confirmed, the existence of a terrifying
fantasy of having the inside of your body emptied out and drained, a terror
originating in early infancy, and augmented or diminished by later experi
ences. This fantasy takes various symptomatic forms, including in some
male patients that of a fear of being emptied or drained through the penis,
which is often experienced as more frightening than castration. Thus some
patients attempt to cut off their penises as the lesser evil. The therapist’s
knowledge of that fantasy allows one to recognize the subtle evidence of it
that occurs in some relatively normal men whose impotence is derived
from this fear and, consequently, to help these nonschizophrenic impotent
patients as well.
THE PATIENT’S TERROR AND THERAPIST REACTION
What happens when a therapist talks to a schizophrenic? Usually the

therapist at least feels uncomfortable, depressed, and/or angry, because the
patient doesn’t react the way the therapist wants him or her to react; the
patient often does not show the therapist respect. What the therapist knows
does not seem to work. But, in addition, the therapist feels scared and isn’t
sure why. Despite their personal therapy and professional training, mental
health professionals do not like to experience those feelings or affects any
more than anyone else does. It is not an accident that the most illuminating
discussions of negative countertransference have come from therapists who
have worked with schizophrenics (e.g., Searles, 1965). Sometimes the
therapist may, all too successfully, empathize with the schizophrenic
patient’s terror and tend to withdraw in terror just like the patient.
One of the reasons for these uncomfortable feelings on the part of the
therapist talking to schizophrenic people is that these are their feelings
communicated, as it were, to the therapist. One of the great mistakes made
in evaluating schizophrenia (probably because of our fear of empathy and
contagion, a mistake that even Eugen Bleuler made) is to assume that
because they look as if they have no feeling or affect that they have no
feelings. A common mistake in assessment is for the examiner to report
lack of affect instead of lack of affect expression. In fact, schizophrenic
persons have very intense feelings, i.e., affects, although they may mask or
even deny them. The primary or most basic affect is fear or, more pre
cisely, terror: that is, a seemingly all-pervasive, all-defeating fear that is by
its nature so difficult to describe as to be ineffable and thus an ultimately
lonely and alienating experience.
A man who appeared to be in a coma when picked out of a gutter by the
police was brought to a hospital where he continued not to move or speak
for three days. Meanwhile, exhaustive physical tests showed no physical
pathology. After an hour with a psychologist who treated him as a terrified
person, he became quite communicative. The turning point in coming out
of his “coma” was when the psychologist asked what he was afraid of, to
which he replied, “ Everything, everything is dangerous.” The psycholo
gist guaranteed him of several safe people and situations much as a parent
might do. He then talked easily and ate a meal.
Human beings are not easily able to tolerate chronic, massive terror. All
of the symptoms of schizophrenia may be understood as manifestations of
chronic terror or defenses against the terror. The chronic terror tends to
hide other feelings. Nonetheless, the schizophrenic frequently experi
ences, in addition to fear—whether chronically or intermittently-anger,
hopelessness, loneliness, and humiliation.
Fundamentally, we do not want to know about schizophrenia because
we do not want to feel terror at that intensity. All of us have the potential
for schizophrenic symptoms if there is enough stress; the only differences
seem to lie in the quantity and qualitative nature of the necessary stress.
In World War II the word “ schizophreniform” psychosis was used to

describe patients who looked just like schizophrenics in every way, but
“couldn’t” be schizophrenics because the patients got better. One battle
field situation that apparently provoked these “ schizophreniform” reac
tions in every soldier was very simple: an infantryman was under fire. He
dug a hole and, since the enemy was trying to kill him, as soon as the hole
was barely big enough, he got into it. The enemy kept shooting at him; he
had no place to go without being killed. He urinated on himself, and he
defecated on himself. When his rations were gone, he did not eat and did
not drink. If this stress lasted for three or more consecutive days, until the
shooting stopped, every soldier who survived looked like a classic schizo
phrenic (Grinker & Spiegel, 1965). But, if the soldier had been a reason
ably healthy person before this trauma, security and rest almost always led
to a spontaneous recovery. In those days they “knew” schizophrenics
never got better so, therefore, it could not really be schizophrenia; hence,
the diagnosis “ schizophreniform” reaction. Yet the key to understanding
schizophrenic reactions lay in those observations.
THE THERAPEUTIC ALLIANCE
Because of the intensity of the terror and the bleakness of the patient’s
expectations, therapists do not want to know what the patient experiences.
But without such understanding, without being able to tolerate such feel
ings, and without being able to be hopeful about the outcome, no therapeu
tic alliance is possible. Yet psychotherapy research in general reveals that
with any type of psychotherapy and any patient, the single best predictor
of outcome is whether there is a therapeutic alliance. That is, does the
patient feel that the therapist and the patient are on the same side, and that
the therapist wants to be and is capable of being helpful? Many neurotics
bring enough positive elements from their experience of their parents to
their initial therapeutic transference to make it strongly positive and the
therapeutic alliance is easily achieved. Schizophrenics, on the other hand,
usually have had so many bad experiences with other people that forming
a therapeutic alliance is rarely automatic. Sometimes it is achievable early
in therapy, and in other cases achieving a therapeutic alliance may be the
major focus of work for a long time. It is important to recognize, however,
that it is up to the therapist and not the patient to make the therapeutic
alliance possible.
Insofar as other important people in the patient’s life, including parents
and treatment professionals, may have been hurtful, uncaring, inadequate, or
pessimistic, ambiguity on the part of the therapist will lead to the patient
www.Ebook777.com
filling in the ambiguity by seeing the therapist as hurtful, uncaring, inade

quate, or pessimistic. The therapist should not be ambiguous, but clear that he
or she wants to help the patient, wants to understand, that the patient is
helpable, and that it will only take hard work. Since patients are afraid that
other people want to hurt them, they frequently will not communicate clearly
even what they understand. Patients will therefore not be surprised that you
do not understand everything; they will be impressed that you understand
anything, particularly if it is something no one else has understood.
It is not the therapist’s accurate understanding or empathy for the
patients which is curative, nor is that what the patients perceive when they
say we understand them; rather it is our attempt to accurately understand
them which is curative and which they perceive as understanding. It is a
benign trauma. No one has ever really tried hard to understand them, and
how unpleasant their subjective lives have been.
The patients frequently do not communicate even that you are helping
them, for fear that it will be used against them. Therefore, the therapist
sometimes must work with an act of faith that if you do reasonable things
long enough the patient will get better, and notice small changes, or get
feedback from the family or ward staff, or notice that when the patient
complains of new problems, they are often such that the patient can only
have these problems if other more serious problems had been overcome.
Sometimes all one has to do is ask, “What seems to be the trouble?
How can I help you?” If you take seriously what they ask, and help them,
even if it is not with what you think is the major problem, the basis for an
alliance develops.
For many patients it is useful to directly address the terror by saying, “ I
won’t let anyone kill you.” While patients may be skeptical of your ability
to do so, they are impressed that you know with what they are concerned,
and hope that you mean it. Since for most patients the life-threatening
danger is now intra-psychic, only a therapist can save them. For some,
however, there are real dangers in the outside world and it is critical that
one help them think about dangers realistically, and cope with the dangers
whether those are reality dangers over which the patient has no control but
with which he or she must cope, or reality dangers which the patient has
helped to create, or delusional dangers.
Some patients seem so formidable that even the decision “ I won’t run
screaming from the room” means that the therapy has already begun.
CLINICAL EXPERIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSALITY

Clinical experience leads one to be skeptical of genetic factors for schizo
phrenia. Of course, hospital records and superficial examinations often
make the disorder seem uncaused. But if one dares to listen carefully, the
disorder always makes psychological sense and seems inevitable in terms
of the life as experienced.
A favorite example was provided by psychiatry residents at a state
hospital who endured a seminar with Karon on psychotherapy with schizo
phrenics, which made them uncomfortable since they were told that shock
treatment and psychosurgery were destructive, and medication was of
limited benefit. They were encouraged to talk to their patients. That was
not what the rest of their supervisors told them. The residents, in reaction,
asked the instructor to interview a patient.
Most schizophrenics are not dangerous, but the residents chose some
one with a history of repeatedly assaulting strange men, who himself was
big, muscular, and moved very fast. The patient had been hospitalized for
ten years, but there was nothing in the case records which would account
for his disorder. The only apparent major stresses were that he was poor,
his father was an alcoholic, he developed a speech disorder (stutter) which
did not respond to speech therapy as an adolescent. He also reported a
venereal disease in the army (whose site was in his mouth), just before his
first assault on a stranger.
He was grossly incoherent and, when he became coherent, he stuttered
very badly. All the residents could have done to choose a more difficult
psychotherapy prospect would be to choose someone who didn’t speak
English at all! The lecturer insisted that the residents sit in the same room
during the interview, knowing they had never been that close to anybody
who moved that fast or was that dangerous.
In our value system, which most patients share, one deals first with
homicidal danger; secondly, suicidal danger; and thirdly, anything else.
This patient would creep up behind other patients and choke them. The
attendants would see feet waving in the air. The patient had not killed
anyone (he dropped the victim when the victim was unconscious), but the
attendants were worried that he might kill someone.
Therefore, the interviewer kept bringing up this symptom during the
first session. Finally, the patient and he worked out what seemed to be
going on. When he was a little boy, his mother, for minor offenses like not
eating, would put a cloth around his neck and choke him. This seemed to
be the correct psychological reconstruction, since after that first session he
stopped choking other patients. (It is a useful clinical rule of thumb that
when you get a dramatic improvement in a symptom, you are probably
doing the right thing.) Now this is not the kind of difficulty with which
even people with difficult mothers have had to cope.
A second fact came to light in a transference reaction. The patient
began a therapy hour by yelling, “Why did you do it to me, Dad?” It is not
difficult to recognize a transference reaction when a schizophrenic patient
calls the therapist “ daddy” or “mommy.”
“What did I do?”
“You know what you did!”
When asked how old he was, he said, “You know I was eight years
old.” Bit by bit he revealed that “you” had come home drunk and anally
raped him. This was not an ordinary alcoholic father.
The patient’s terrible stutter was also revealed to have an extraordinary
cause. In the middle of his stutter there were words in Latin. When asked if
he had been an altar boy, he said, “You swallow a snake, and then you
stutter. You mustn’t let anyone know.” He was extremely ashamed and
guilty. Apparently, he had performed fellatio on a priest.
He was reassured that it was all right, and it was interpreted orally,
“Anyone as hungry as you were would have done the same thing.” (It is a
common finding with schizophrenic patients that much of what seems
sexual really has to do with orality, that is, infantile feelings, survival, and
the early mother-child relationship. A penis, for example, may represent a
mother’s breast, and the breast represent love.)
At that point the stuttering stopped. When he started to stutter in later
sessions, it was only necessary to repeat the interpretation and the stutter
ing immediately ceased.
But look at this poor man’s life. He turned to mother, and mother was
terrible. If mother is terrible, one ordinarily turns to father, but his father
was terrible. He turned to God, and the priest was destructive. Would that
not drive anyone insane? Yet examination of ten years of ordinary hospital
records revealed no basis for his psychosis.
Of course, most parents of schizophrenics are not consciously destruc
tive people, but often admirable people who will go to great lengths to
attempt to get help for their children. Sometimes the destructive life expe
riences have nothing to do with the parents at all; in other instances hurtful
parenting is the result of bad professional advice, the repetition of bad
parenting that they endured from their own idealized parents, or the result
of unconscious defenses of which they are unaware and consequently
uncontrollable until brought into awareness.
UNDERSTANDING THE CATATONIC STUPOR
Let us consider what can be learned about the human condition from
the most bizarre symptoms of schizophrenia. Take the catatonic stupor, the
man or woman who sits in the comer and does not move. They are either
absolutely rigid or they may be waxily flexible. They may stay in one
position for hours or for days.
Fromm-Reichmann (1950) reported a long time ago that catatonic
patients see and hear everything that is going on around them even though
they do not react. They look like they are in a stupor, but they are not. They
feel as if they will die if they move. Fromm-Reichmann understood this
because the patients told her when they finally came out of the stupor.
Some years ago, Ratner (Ratner, Karon, VandenBos, & Denny, 1981)
investigated animals in a state that used to be called animal hypnosis.
If one turns an animal upside down and presses it, it becomes rigid or
waxily flexible. Rabbits, lions, tigers, alligators, 70 species of birds, fish,
octopuses, in fact, just about every species of animal, fish, bird and insect
tested show this response. The major exceptions are pet dogs and cats, and
laboratory rats in a laboratory where they had been handled gently every
day. While sometimes referred to as animal hypnosis, it is not hypnosis-
there is no verbal induction, and the animals do not obey commands. But
the animal will not move even if great pain is inflicted. After the passage
of time the animals come into rapid violent motion unpredictably, which is
like human catatonic excitement.
Classical conditioning experiments, pairing two stimuli while the ani
mal is rigid, leads to learning that can be demonstrated after they come out
of the state, so they are fully conscious of external stimuli. In fact, it is
identical with the catatonic stupor.
Ratner discovered its meaning. Most animals are prey for some preda
tor. Every species has a species-specific sequence of behaviors when it is
under attack by a predator-sham death, cries of distress to warn the others
in the group, etc. The last stage for every species seems to be this state of
rigidity. Most predators, if they are not hungry, will kill their prey and save
it for later. Some predators will not even attack something that does not
move, but most predators will. When the animal goes into this catatonic-
like state, most predators act as if they think it is dead. In an experiment
with ferrets and frogs, a ferret, for example, ate the eye out of one frog in
this state and the frog did not flinch. The ferret crunched up the foreleg of
another in its teeth, and it did not flinch either. In this experiment with
ferrets and frogs, 70 percent of the frogs survived. According to Ratner, if
even 30 percent survive to one mating, the effect on evolution is massive.
So the catatonic stupor is a life and species preservative strategy that is
built into just about all living animals, including human beings. The bio
logical evidence is consistent with the clinical evidence from somebody
like Fromm-Reichmann who actually listened to her patients. That needs
to be said because there are many “experts” on schizophrenia who have

never listened to any of their patients for more than half an hour.
But we do not want to know that you and I would go catatonic if we
were terrified enough. Nor do we want to know what it feels like to be that
terrified.
HALLUCINATIONS
As with the catatonic stupor, every other schizophrenic symptom is a

universal human potentiality. Take hallucinations, the most dramatic
symptom of all. Schizophrenic patients as well as professionals like to say
that nobody understands hallucinations. But hallucinations are entirely
understandable by Freud’s (1900/1950, 1916/1935, 1933) theories of
dreams, with a few additions. Today, the concept of the collective uncon
scious seems scientifically untenable; it was based on the then-accepted
biological theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, no longer
acceptable to biologists. There is no evidence of universal symbols; there
are only symbols which are frequently used with a given meaning, but
there are always people who will use any symbol with an entirely different
meaning.
Unlike most people, schizophrenics hallucinate while they are wide
awake. Everyone hallucinates when asleep. Dreams may take any sensory
modality, but the predominant experience is visual. Schizophrenics also
may hallucinate in any sensory modality, but the predominant modality is
auditory. Whatever other hallucinations they have, they almost always
hear voices. That is different from toxic psychoses where the hallucina
tions are primarily visual. (That is why LSD research was irrelevant. LSD
produces phenomena which are primarily visual, like any other toxic psy
chosis, but not at all like schizophrenia.)
Why predominantly auditory hallucinations? Because basically schizo
phrenia is an interpersonal disorder. If someone is blind, they are more
physically incapacitated than someone who is deaf. In terms of the proba
bility of emotional disorders, someone who is deaf is more likely to have
emotional problems caused by it, because it tends to cut them off from
people.
But is the capacity to hallucinate while wide awake restricted to schizo
phrenics? Not at all. It is well known that starving people start seeing food.
It is a human capacity if the motivation is strong enough; luckily, most of
us will never be desperate enough to have to hallucinate. A trivial example
illustrates the meaning of hallucinations. In the middle of a therapy ses
sion, a patient asked, “What’s that bell?”
www.Ebook777.com
“ I didn’t hear a bell.”

“ Well, I did.”
“ It may well be. There are a lot of firnny noises in this building. I work
here all the time and maybe, like a lighthouse keeper, I just don’t pay
attention to them anymore. What did the bell sound like?”
“ It sounded like a telephone bell, only very loud.”
“ That’s surprising. A telephone bell I would have heard. What comes
to mind when you think of a telephone bell?”
“ Trying to get through to somebody.”
“ I think I know what’s happening. I’ve been talking about what I
thought was important, but you know I’m off somewhere and you wish I
would get through to you and talk about what is really going on here.”
And then the patient smiled. She was too intimidated to tell the therapist
he did not understand and ask why he was talking about irrelevancies
when there were some things that were important. The most she could do
was wish that somehow he would get through to her; even that was too
frightening to deal with consciously, so she had to have it come through in
disguise, as a hallucination.
DELUSIONS
As mentioned above, attempts to understand delusions would have led

to considering incest, sexual abuse of children, and physical abuse of
children as serious problems in our society. What else do we not want to
know?
There are four bases for delusions. The most important source of delu
sions is Freud’s concept of transference: reliving feelings, fantasies, and
experiences from the past with no awareness that it is the past. Of course,
Freud thought schizophrenics did not form transference. He was mistaken
because he did not talk to schizophrenics. According to people who knew
him, Freud said schizophrenic patients scared him. He certainly had
enough work to do without schizophrenic patients. But even Freud’s infer
ences are unlikely to be accurate unless they are based on clinical observa
tions.
Freud originally thought of transference as a phenomenon occurring
only in psychoanalysis, as the chief resistance, which by understanding he
was able to transform into its most potent therapeutic tool. Ferenczi
(1909/1950) first pointed out, and Freud accepted, that transference, like
other resistances, was a defense used to cope in ordinary life. What was
unique about transference in therapy was not its occurrence, but that it was
studied.
However, the transference reactions of normals and neurotics are suffi

ciently subtle and realistic that one need not be upset by being reminded
how pervasively we re-create and re-experience our past. But schizophren
ics, if listened to, are not subtle in their transference.
Nor are the specific contents of their transference matters of which most
of us wish to be reminded. It is not pleasant to be reminded of the varieties
of misery which are inflicted on children in our society. Even more troub
ling than the awareness of obviously hurtful or neglectful treatment of
children is the insight that parents of admirable character and with the very
best of intentions, may harm their children, either because their hurtful
interactions are unconscious (Karon, 1960; Meyer & Karon, 1967) or
because the parents are misinformed about the consequences of their actions.
The most famous example of a history of such hurtfulness, albeit uninten
tional, is Schreber, a judge in Germany, a paranoid schizophrenic man who
was declared legally sane. After he left the hospital, he wrote a book
(Schreber 1903/1955) exposing the plot against him. Freud read the book
and had some important insights, but missed the transference.
Schreber claimed that God put metal bands around his head and his
chest and tightened them “ lovingly” until it hurt. Further, God wanted to
castrate him and make him a woman.
Schreber’s father (Niederland, 1959, 1960, 1972, 1984) was a world
famous pediatrician who wrote books on how to raise children. His advice
included advocating that “bad habits,” by which he meant masturbation,
should be punished immediately and they will disappear by the age of
four, never recur and leave no bad after effects. He knew because he had
done this with both of his sons. One committed suicide, and the other
became the most famous paranoid schizophrenic ever.
The father believed that exercise and posture were very important for
children. To improve their posture, he invented chairs, tables, and beds
with rods and metal rings that went around the head and around the chest
to make the child sit up straight and lie absolutely straight. He said he used
them “ lovingly.” We would probably consider them torture devices today.
He even advocated devices to discourage masturbation consisting of metal
rings with small spikes on the inside which would pierce the child’s penis
if he had an erection.
What God did in Schreber’s delusions was what Schreber’s real father
actually did to Schreber as a child. What psychiatrist would even consider
the possibility that a world famous pediatrician could have done such
terrible things? But remember, his father was not intending to torture
Schreber; his father thought all of this was good for the child.
To use a more contemporary example, a young woman alarmed the hospi-
tal staff by repeatedly cutting and burning herself. When asked about her
religion, she said, “ I was raised a Catholic.”
“ Oh, you were raised a Catholic, but you’re not now.”
“Actually, I’m a Satanist.”
“ Why don’t you tell me about it.”
“ I used to feel I had to save people. I had to save all the people in
Beirut.”
“ That’s a marvelous image. Beirut, that’s a marvelous image. You
know who the people in Beirut are, don’t you?”
She started to say yes and then she said, “Well, no.”
“What’s Beirut? Beirut is a city where people are killing each other,
and then they declare peace. But when you look, they are still killing each
other. Then they find out why they are killing each other, and then deal
with those problems and solve them; but they go on killing each other.
Then they have a truce, but still go on killing each other. What a marvelous
image-your family must have been like that.”
She became very interested at that point. “ Satan says that if I hurt
myself, he’ll keep me with him. That’s what he says.”
She was very scared. She described Satan’s voice and his appearance.
She described his face in considerable detail. When asked whether she
knew anybody who looked like that, she thought and said, “Yes; he
doesn’t look like it now, but he used to.”
“ Who?”
“ My father.”
Indeed, according to later information from the family, it turns out her
father used to beat her mother, and her mother eventually left the house.
One can understand a little girl’s belief that pain is the price of not being
abandoned.
That hallucination disappeared. All one had to do was to ask the patient
to describe her experience and ask what it could possibly mean.
The second source of delusions was described by Freud (1911/1950) on
the basis of insights derived from his reading of Schreber’s book. As is
widely cited, Freud derived many paranoid delusions from the fear of
homosexuality as different ways of contradicting the implicit guilt-pro
ducing feeling (for a man), “ I love him.” Thus, I do not love him, I love
me-megalomania; I do not love him, I love her-erotomania; I do not love
him (using projection), she loves him-delusional jealousy; I do not love
him (using projection), he loves me-the delusional threat of being endan
gered by homosexuals; I do not love him (using reaction formation), I hate
him-irrational hatred; or, most common, I do not love him (using reaction
formation), I hate him, but I cannot hate him for no reason, so (using
projection) he hates me, that is why I hate him, and if I hate him, obviously
I do not love him-delusional feelings of persecution.
However, secondary sources almost never mention one part of Freud’s
insight that is most meaningful and essential for therapeutic effectiveness.
In the language of libido theory, Freud said that the patient with schizo
phrenia feels withdrawn from emotional relatedness to everybody. Conse
quently, he wants to be able to relate to someone again. In addition to the
hunger for approval from the father is the fact that people of the same sex
are more like us than the opposite sex, and, in growing up, it is usual to
feel comfortable in relating closely to peers of the same sex before becom
ing comfortable with the opposite sex. When one feels withdrawn from
everybody, there is a strong urge to get close to people of the same sex.
Unfortunately, the patient fearfully interprets this self-curative tendency as
“homosexuality.”
But is this different from the normal adolescent, who is having trouble
with the opposite sex? Time spent with friends of the same sex leads to
becoming more comfortable with people and with the opposite sex. This is
the normal developmental sequence. With normals and neurotics, too, the
fear of homosexuality leads to withdrawing from friends of the same sex,
and that makes relating to the other sex even more difficult. Hence, the
generally useful advice for adolescents (or adults) having trouble with the
opposite sex is to spend more time with same sex friends, instead of
withdrawing from them. This usually makes relating to the opposite sex
easier.
Even the specific dynamics of paranoid feelings as defenses are mir
rored in the dynamics of some similar feelings in people who are not
schizophrenics.
It is usually helpful to let schizophrenic patients with symptoms based
on the fear of homosexuality know that their fear of being homosexual is
unfounded (if, as is usually the case, it is unfounded). They are simply
lonely, that their loneliness is normal, and that we all need friends of both
sexes. Unless they have had a meaningful and benign homosexual rela
tionship, schizophrenics are not helped by reassurances concerning the
increased acceptability of homosexuality, but they always feel understood
when their therapist talks of loneliness.
Of course, Freud’s views on paranoid delusions have been criticized,
fairly and unfairly. The fair criticism is that they account for only some
delusions, not all. The unfair criticism is that persecutors in the delusions
of women are usually men. But the first to point out this apparent contra
diction was Freud (1915/1957) noting that, when first psychotic, the perse
cutor is female and is changed to a male persecutor as a later development.
This illustrates the general human condition that feelings about men are
not necessarily based on experiences with men, nor are feelings about
women necessarily based on experiences with women.
The third basis for delusions is that some families actually teach strange
ideas. The study of schizophrenic patients (Lidz, 1973) reveals how
human beings depend on their families to teach them the categories of
thought and the meaning of those categories. Children (and adults) assume
that other people use concepts in the same way, unless confronted with
understandable contradictions. For example, if a person believes “ I love
you” includes in its meaning “ I hurt you, physically assault you, occa
sionally even try to kill you,” that person is unlikely ever to be able to
relate closely to another in a loving relationship.
It has been noted that families with disturbed children have a tendency
to discourage the use of people outside the family as sources of informa
tion and corrective identification. Patients from very disturbed families
who do not become schizophrenic are inevitably found to have remedied
the defects in their nuclear families with relationships outside that family.
This is a normal mechanism. Nobody ever had a perfect mother or father,
nor can parents provide every kind of nurturance needed. Most children,
as well as adults use people outside the family to correct any problems in
their family.
When parents interfere with this mechanism, any problem in the family
is enormously magnified in its destructive impact. The parents, of course,
do not do this to be hurtful; they are unaware that it has any harmful
consequences. Indeed, they may even believe that it is good for the child.
Parents who discourage extra-familial identifications are spared the nor
mal discomfort of having their values and beliefs challenged by their
children. But these challenges, whether or not communicated overtly,
partially shield the child from the impact of the inevitable parental mis
takes.
The last basis for delusions is the general human need for a more or less
systematic explanation of our world.
Most people share similar systematic understandings. One who
believes the world is flat is normal if the year is 1400, and is suspect if the
year is 1992. The belief is the same; it is the relationship to others’ beliefs
that makes it normal or suspect. In our pluralistic modem era, one is not
considered mentally ill if there is an obvious basis for a different under
standing. Thus, a fundamentalist usually does not consider mentally ill
those of us who take evolution seriously; he understands that such people
take biology, geology, and physics seriously but do not realize the “truth”
that God created fossils as fossils.
Schizophrenic people have had strange experiences. In part, their symp

toms are strange experiences by ordinary standards. In addition, their lives
often include unusual real events. Therefore, their systematic explanations
of their world seem strange. But they demonstrate a need to be as realistic
as their anxieties permit. Insofar as discrepancies between their under
standing and reality become apparent to them, and as dynamic balances
change, the patients continually revise their understanding.
The more intelligent patients are more apt to develop a systematic
understanding that is adequate enough to obviate the need for more deteri
orated symptoms and, hence, to be diagnosed as paranoid or paranoid
schizophrenic. The less intelligent are less likely to develop as fiinction-
ally adequate a “paranoid system.”
Because the paranoid system is not an abnormal process, but a normal
process used to cope with unusual problems, it is possible for a nonfrigh-
tened, nonhumiliating therapist to share the patient’s systematic under
standing, to respectfully call attention to inconsistencies, and to helpfully
supplement the patient’s understanding with the therapist’s knowledge of
the world, other people and, more importantly, of the workings of the
human mind.
A PATIENT'S SUMMARY
The best description of what it feels like to be schizophrenic came from

a catatonic man whom it took eight weeks of psychotherapy (without
medication) to get out of the hospital and back to work. One of his symp
toms was bowing. When asked why he bowed, he said, “ I don’t bow.”
“Yes, you do.”
“No, I don’t bow.”
“Wait a minute. You do this [the therapist bowed]. This is bowing; you
bow.”
“No, I don’t bow.”
“But you do this.”
“That’s not bowing.”
“What is it?”
“It’s balancing.”
“What are you balancing?”
“Emotions.”
“ What emotions?”
“Fear and loneliness.”
That is, when he was lonely, he wanted to get close to people (so he
leaned forward). When he got close to people, he got scared and had to
pull away (so he straightened up). But then he was lonely again.
Balancing between fear and loneliness is the best description of what it
feels like to be schizophrenic. But that is what the rest of us do not want to
understand.
REFERENCES
Alexander, F. G. & Selesnick, S. T. (1966). The history o f psychiatry. New York:

Harper & Row.
Bockoven, J. S. (1972). Moral treatment in community mental health. New York:
Springer.
Deikman, A. J. (1971). Phenothiazines and the therapist’s fear of identification.
Humanistic Psychology, II, 196-200.
Ferenczi, S. (1950). Introjection and transference. Sex in psychoanalysis. New
York: Brunner/Mazel, 35-93. (Original work published 1909)
Finkelhor, D. H. (1979). Sexually victimized children. New York: Free Press.
Freud, S. (1933). New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. New York: Norton.
Freud, S. (1935). A general introduction to psychoanalysis. New York: Liveright.
(Original work published 1916)
Freud, S. (1950). The interpretation o f dreams. New York: Macmillan. (Original
work published 1900)
Freud, S. ( 1950). Psychoanalytic notes upon an autobiographical account of a case
of paranoia (dementia paranoids). Collected papers, 3, 316-357. London:
Hogarth and the Institute for Psychoanalysis. (Original work published in
1911)
Freud, S. (1957). A case of paranoia counter to psychoanalytic theory. Complete
psychological works, 14, 262-300, London: Hogarth. (Original work published
1915)
Freud, S. (1977). Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. (J. Strachey, Trans.)
New York: Norton. (Original work published 1917)
Fromm-Reichmann, F. (1950). Principles o f intensive psychotherapy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Gagnon, J. H. (1965). Female child victims of sex offense. Sexual problems, 13,
176-192.
Greenberg, J. (1964). I never promised you a rose garden. New York: Holt,
Rinehart, & Winston.
Grinker, K. R. & Spiegel, J. P. (1965). Men under stress. New York: McGraw-
Hill.
Karon, B. P. (1960). A clinical note on the significance of an “ oral” trauma.
Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, 61, 480-481.
Karon, B. P. (1975). Black scars. New York: Springer.
Karon, B. P., & VandenBos, G. R. (1981). Psychotherapy o f schizophrenia: The
treatment o f choice. New York: Aronson.
Kestenberg, J. (1975). Children and parents: Psychoanalytic studies in develop

ment. New York: Jason Aronson.
Lidz, T. (1973). The origin and treatment o f schizophrenic disorders. New York:
Basic Books.
Meyer, R. G., & Karon, B. R (1967). The schizophrenogenic mother concept and
the TAT. Psychiatry, 30, 173-179.
Michel-Hutmacher, R. (1955). Das korperinnere in der Vorstellung der kinder.
Schweirische Zeitschrift fuer Psychologie und ihre Anwendungen, 14, 1-26.
Niederland, W. G. (1959). Schreber: Father and son. Psychoanalytic Quarterly,
11, 151-169.
Niederland, W. G. (1960). Schreber’s father.Journal o f the American Psychoana
lytic Association, 8, 492-499.
Niederland, W. G. (1972). The Schreber case sixty years later. International
Journal o f Psychiatry, 10, 79-84.
Niederland, W. G. (1984). The Schreber case: Psychoanalytic profile of a para
noid personality. Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic Press, xvi, 180 p.: il 1. 23 cm.
Ratner, S. G., Karon, B. P., VandenBos, G. R., & Denny, M. R. (1981). The
adaptive significance of the catatonic stupor in humans and animals from an
evolutionary perspective. Academic Psychology Bulletin, 3, 273-279.
Rosberg, J., & Karon, B. P. (1958). The oedipus complex in an apparently deterio
rated case of schizophrenia. Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, 57,
221-225.
Rosberg, J., & Karon, B. P. (1959). A direct analytic contribution to the under
standing of post-partum psychosis. Psychiatric Quarterly, 33, 296-304.
Russell, D. E. H. (1983). The incidence and prevalence of intrafamilial and
extrafamilial sexual abuse of female children. Child abuse and neglect, 7,
133-146.
Sartorius, N., Jablensky, A., & Shapiro, R. (1978). Cross-cultural differences in the
short-term prognosis of schizophrenic psychoses. Schizophrenia bulletin, 4,
102-113.
Schreber, D. P. (1955). Memoirs o f my recent illness. (I. Macalping and R. A.
Hunter, Trans.) London: Dawson. (Original work published 1903)
Searles, H. F. (1965). Collected papers on schizophrenia and related subjects.
New York: International Universities Press.
Sechehaye, M. A. (1951). Symbolic realization. New York: International Univer
sities Press.
Sullivan, H. S. (1953). Schizophrenia as a human process. New York: Norton.
Whitaker, L. (in press). Assessment o f schizophrenia disorders; sense and non
sense. New York: Plenum.
Soteria:
A Therapeutic Community
for Psychotic Persons
Loren R. Mosher
SUMMARY. A non-medical, non-hospital, non-professional, home

like, minimal medication program for newly diagnosed psychotic
persons is described. It is based on moral treatment principles and
the tradition of intensive inter-personal intervention with psychosis.
Research established that this program was as, or more effective than
hospital based, medication dependent, professionally delivered treat
ment for this subset of psychotic persons. [Article copies availablefrom
The Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-342-9678.]
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In the spring of 1971, a two-story, 12-room, 1912-vintage, wooden

house on a busy thoroughfare in San Jose, California, became a second
generation Kingsley Hall of London. True to its heritage, Soteria House
sat in the midst of a multiethnic working class neighborhood with a num
ber of advantages over its East London parent. First, substantial numbers
of college students and former state hospital patients lived in this desig
nated poverty area. Hence transience and deviance were not unknown.
Loren R. Mosher, MD, is Chief Medical Director (Psychiatry) in the Depart

ment of Health and Human Services, Adult Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Services, Montgomery County, 401 Hungerford Drive, Suite 500, Rockville, MD
20850. The author is also Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Uniformed Services
University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD 20814.
[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “ Soteria: A Therapeutic Community for Psychotic Persons.”
Mosher, Loren R. Co-published simultaneously in The Psychotherapy Patient (The Haworth Press, Inc.)
Vol. 9, No. 3/4, 1996, pp. 43-58; and: Psychosocial Approaches to Deeply Disturbed Persons (eds: Peter
R. Breggin, and E. Mark Stem) The Haworth Press, Inc., 1996, pp. 43-58. Single or multiple copies of
this article are available from The Haworth Document Delivery Service [1-800-342-9678, 9:00 a m - 5:00
p.m. (EST)].
www.Ebook777.com
Second, painting the exterior of the house and replanting its rundown yard
helped win acceptance in the community. Third, my London experience
convinced me that the house and its staff should attempt to conform to
neighborhood social norms. In contrast, the community surrounding King
sley Hall was instrumental in closing it.
Into this comfortable six bedroom home came-for three to six
months-a group of young, unmarried persons newly diagnosed and
labeled as having schizophrenia. Six could be accommodated at any one
time. The nonprofessional staff also lived there to provide a simple, home
like, safe, warm, supportive, unhurried, tolerant, and unintrusive social
environment. Soteria staff believed sincere human involvement and under
standing were critical to healing interactions with clients. The project’s
purpose was to find out whether this type of milieu was as effective in
promoting recovery from madness as that provided in a nearby general
hospital’s psychiatric ward, which was oriented toward using antipsy
chotic drugs. Ordinarily, the patients assigned to Soteria House receive no
antipsychotic drug for six weeks after entry. The staff believed it might
take that long before important relationships could form and before the
special qualities of the culture there could be meaningfully transmitted. If
no healing were evident in six weeks, patients were given a trial of tran
quilizers on a case-by-case basis (about 20% received such trials). In
contrast, all of the hospital-treated comparison cases received high doses
of neuroleptic drugs.
BACKGROUND
Although the author’s experiences at Kingsley Hall were important to

the development of the Soteria project, difficulties encountered with the
treatment of psychosis in hospital settings also provided a major impetus
for a home where schizophrenics live through their psychosis with a non
professional staff. To wit, even well staffed “progressive” hospitals invari
ably have institutional characters which create barriers to establishing
relationships which could maximally facilitate recovery from psychosis.
The “barrier” characteristics (present to varying degrees in different set
tings) are:
Theoretical Model
Although a variety of other models may be mixed in, or explicitly

avowed, most psychiatric wards function primarily within a medical
Loren R. Mosher 45
model. Doctors have final authority and decision making powers; medica
tions are accorded primary therapeutic value and used extensively; the
person is seen as having a disease, with attendant disability disfunction
and dysfunction which is to be “treated” and “ cured” ; labeling and its
consequences, objectification and stigmatization, are almost inevitable.
In contrast, at Soteria (from the Greek, salvation or deliverance) the
primary focus is on growth, development and learning. The staff are to be
with the patients, or residents as they are called, to facilitate these pro
cesses insofar as they can. They share decision-making powers and respon
sibility with residents. They are not there either to treat or cure the resi
dents. Neuroleptic medications are infrequently used. Although we have
no quarrel with the demonstrated heuristic value of the medical model, we
believe its application to psychiatric disorders can have unfortunate (and
unintended) consequences for individual patients. No alternative model is
proposed, however, as none seem to satisfactorily explain what we label
“schizophrenia” Our alternative stance is a phenomenologic approach to
schizophrenia, an attempt to understand and share the psychotic person’s
experience without judging, labeling, derogating or invalidating it.
Size
Most psychiatric hospital wards have at least 20 patients. Thus, the

staff/patient group is apt to be 40-60. For severely disorganized persons,
however, a social reference group of no more than 12-15 persons is espe
cially important. A group of this size, when combined with a homelike
atmosphere, maximizes the possibility of the disorganized person’s getting
to know and trust a new environment and to find a surrogate family in it; at
the same time, it minimizes the labeling and stigmatization process. This
number is about the maximum number able to live under one roof as an
extended family or commune. Most clinicians also believe 12 is about the
upper limit for group therapy. Finally, experimental psychology’s small task
groups have been shown to function most effectively with not more than 12
members. Thus, rather than a 20-bed ward, Soteria is a home that sleeps
8-10 comfortably, with six beds occupied by residents and two by staff.
Social Structure
This aspect interacts closely with size. To function effectively, every

organization, large or small, needs structure. In general, the larger the
organization the greater the structure. Unfortunately, more elaborated
structures have consequences which impinge negatively on persons under-
www.Ebook777.com
going psychotic disorganization: inflexibility, reliance on authority, insti

tutionalization of roles and decision-making power residing in the hierar
chy. These are outside the client’s control. Inevitably, those at the bottom
of the hierarchy feel powerless, irresponsible and dependent. Because of
this, Soteria is as unstructured as is commensurate with adequate function.
Structure which develops to meet functional needs is dissolved if the need
is not a continuing one. There is no institutionalized method of dealing
with a particular occurrence. For example, overt aggressive acts are dealt
with in a variety of ways including physical control, depending on a
myriad of contextual variables.
Medication
We live in an overmedicated, too frequently drug-dependent culture. Our

ambivalence about drugs is resolved by creating two categories of drugs:
good ones (e.g., alcohol) and bad ones (e.g., LSD). Psychiatry’s attitude is no
different from that of the wider social context; the magical answer is sought
from a pill. The antipsychotic drugs have provided psychiatry with real
substance for their magical cure fantasy with regard to schizophrenia. As is
the case with most such exaggerated expectations, the fantasy is better than
the reality. After 25 years, it is now clear that the antipsychotics do not cure
schizophrenia. It is also clear that they have serious, sometimes irreversible
toxicities (Crane, 1973), that recovery may be impaired by them in at least
some schizophrenics (Goldstein, 1970; Rappaport, et al., 1978) and that they
have little effect on long-term psychosocial adjustment (Niskanen and Achte,
1972). This is not to deny their extraordinary helpfulness in reducing and
controlling symptoms, shortening hospital stays and revitalizing interest in
schizophrenia. One aim of the Soteria project is to seek a viable, informed
alternative to the overuse of, and excessive reliance on, these drugs-often to
the exclusion of psychosocial measures. We use them infrequently and when
prescribed, they are kept primarily under the patient’s control. That is, the
resident is asked to monitor his response to the drug carefully, to give us
feedback so we can adjust dosage, and after a trial period of two weeks he is
given a major voice in determining whether or not die drug will be continued.
Soteria is a reaction to criticisms of existing facilities in each of the four
areas mentioned above. However, much of what is involved in the pro
gram is based on the positive contributions of a variety of other research
ers, clinicians and theorists. In fact, we recognize that no individual ele
ment of the Soteria program is new; it is their combination in one setting
we believe to be unique.
Some of Soteria’s roots are the era of moral treatment in America (Bock-
oven, 1963), the tradition of intensive interpersonal intervention in schizo-
Loren R. Mosher 47
phrenia (Sullivan, 1962; Fromm-Reichmann, 1948), therapists who have

described growth from psychosis (Menninger, 1959; Perry, 1962), the
group of psychiatric heretics (Laing, 1967; Szasz, 1961) and descriptions
of the development of psychiatric disorder in response to life crisis
(Brown and Birley, 1968).
Sample Selection
All subjects are obtained from a screening facility that is part of the
CMHC complex containing our control wards. Approximately 600 new
patients are seen there per month, of whom about 250 are hospitalized.
Anyone meeting the following basic criteria is a potential study candidate:
1. Clearly schizophrenic
2. Deemed in need of hospitalization
3. No more than one previous hospitalization for 4 weeks or less with a
diagnosis of schizophrenia
4. Age 18-30 (either sex)
5. Unmarried, separated, widowed or divorced.
The selection criteria are designed to provide a relatively homogeneous
sample of individuals diagnosed schizophrenic, but a group at risk for pro
longed hospitalization or chronic disability. Early onset and being unmar
ried have been shown to predict a need for chronic care (Strauss, et al.,
1977).
Because of research grant related changes (see Treatment Assignments
below) Soteria treated subjects are divided into two cohorts, 1971-76 and
1976-83. There are 37 experimental and 42 controls in the first and 20
experimental and 24 controls in the second cohort.
Treatment Assignments
Subjects meeting study selection criteria are identified without knowl
edge of the group to which they will ultimately be assigned. Study require
ments are explained and informed consent is obtained from the patient and
his family, or significant other, if available. In the 1971-76 study cohort,
because of limited experimental bed availability, subjects were assigned
on a consecutively admitted, space available basis. Subjects in the 1976-83
cohort were assigned on a strictly random basis.
Research Assessment
The measures below are a partial list of those completed at baseline
(admission to the study) and at followup (6,12 and 24 months postadmis
sion). All assessments are conducted by an independent research team that

has no direct treatment responsibilities in either setting.
Baseline
Diagnosis—As per diem DSM-II (American Psychiatric Association

1968). For a subject to be included in the study, three independent
diagnoses of schizophrenia must be in agreement.
Diagnosis symptoms—A checklist of seven symptoms. Four of seven
symptoms are required for inclusion in the study (Cole, Klerman,
and Goldberg, 1964).
Certainty of diagnosis—A 7-point scale (Mosher, Pollin, and Stabe-
nau, 1971).
Mode of onset-Assesses acute/insidious onset types (Vaillant, 1964).
Paranoid/nonparanoid status—A short scale for rating paranoid
schizophrenia (Venables and O’Connor, 1959).
Global severity-An overall measure of psychopathology.
Brief Social History Form—A detailed description of a patient’s and
family’s psychiatric and social history (Boothe, Schooler, and Gold
berg, 1972).
Followup
Patient Progress Report-For each 6-month interval, information on

the subject’s medication history, use of other treatment, living
arrangements (including any hospital réadmissions), work status,
social contacts, global severity and improvement is obtained.
CLINICAL SETTINGS
Experimental
Soteria is located on a busy street in a transitional neighborhood of a

San Francisco Bay Area city. Bordering Soteria on one side is a nursing
home and on the other, a two-family home. The neighborhood has a
mixture of small businesses, medical facilities (a general hospital is one
block away), single-family homes and small apartments (usually homes
that have been remodeled for this purpose). It is a designated poverty area
inhabited by a mixture of college students, lower-class families and ex
Loren R. Mosher 49
state hospital patients. Some 15-20 percent of residents in the area are
Mexican-American and there is a sprinkling of blacks.
Due primarily to licensing laws, the house can accommodate only six
residents at one time, although as many as ten persons can sleep there
comfortably. There are six paid nonprofessional staff plus the house direc
tor and a 1/4 time project psychiatrist. One or two new residents are
admitted each month. In general, two of our specially trained nonprofes
sional staff, a man and a woman, are on duty at any one time. In addition,
there are usually one or more volunteers present, especially in the evening.
Most staff work 36 to 48-hour shifts to provide themselves the opportunity
to relate to “spaced-out” (their term) residents continuously over a rela
tively long period of time. Staff and residents share responsibility for
household maintenance, meal preparation and cleanup. Persons who are
not “together” are not expected to do an equal share of the work. Over the
long term, staff do more than their share and will step in to assume
responsibility if a resident cannot do a task to which he has agreed. The
house director acts as friend, counselor, supervisor and object for dis
placed angry feelings by staff. The part-time project psychiatrist super
vises the staff and is seen as a stable, reassuring presence in addition to his
formal medico-legal responsibilities
Although staff vary in how they see their roles, they generally view
what psychiatry labels a “schizophrenic reaction” as an altered state of
consciousness in an individual who is experiencing a crisis in living.
Simply put, the altered state involves personality fragmentation with the
loss of a sense of self.
Few clinicians would disagree with a description of the evolution of
psychosis as a process of fragmentation and disintegration. But, at Soteria
House, the disruptive psychotic experience is also believed to have unique
potential for reintegration and reconstitution if it is not prematurely aborted
or forced into a psychologically straitjacketing compromise. This is in
keeping with the ethos at Kingsley Hall. Such a view of schizophrenia
implies a number of therapeutic attitudes. All facets of the psychotic
experience are taken by staff members as “real.” They view the experien
tial and behavioral attitudes associated with the psychosis-the clinical
symptoms, including irrationality, terror and mystical experiences-as
extremes of basic human qualities. Because “ irrational” behavior and
mystical beliefs are regarded as valid, Soteria staff try to provide an atmo
sphere that will facilitate integration of the psychosis into the continuity of
the individual’s life. Thus, psychotic persons are not to be considered
“diseased,” nor related to in a depersonalized way; to do so would invali
date the experience.
When the fragmentation process is seen as valid with potential for

psychological growth, the individual experiencing the schizophrenic reac
tion is tolerated, lived with, related to and validated, but not “treated” or
used to fulfill staff needs. Limits are set if the person is clearly a danger to
himself, others or the program as a whole—not merely because others are
unable to tolerate his madness. Antipsychotic drugs are ordinarily not used
for more than six weeks. If the resident shows no change at that time and is
either paranoid or has an insidious onset, neuroleptic drugs are instituted at
appropriate dosage levels.
Why use trained nonprofessionals as primary staff (see also Mosher et
al., 1973, and Hirschfeld et al., 1977)? Relatively untrained, psychologi
cally unsophisticated persons can assume a phenomenological stance vis-
a-vis psychosis more easily than highly trained persons (e.g., M.D.s or
Ph.D.s) because they have learned no theory of schizophrenia, whether
psychodynamic, organic or a combination of both.
Lacking the preconceived ideas of professionals, our nonprofessional
staff can be themselves, follow their visceral responses and be a “person”
with the psychotic individual. Highly trained mental health professionals
tend to lose this freedom in favor of a more cognitive, theory-based,
learned response that may invalidate a patient’s experience of himself if
the professional’s theory-based behavior is not congruent with the
patient’s felt needs. Professionals may also use their theoretical knowledge
defensively when confronted in an unstructured setting, with anxiety-pro
voking behaviors of psychotic persons. This pattern of response is not so
readily available to our unsophisticated nonprofessional therapists, nor is
it reinforced by a professional degree with its accompanying status and
power.
CMHC Comparison Ward
The Community Mental Health Center’s inpatient service consists of

two locked wards of 30 beds each. About 250 patients are admitted
(including réadmissions) per month. It is a well-staffed (1.5/1 staff/patient
ratio) active treatment facility oriented towards crisis intervention,
employing high doses of neuroleptics, rapid evaluation and placement in
other parts of the county’s treatment network as its immediate goal. All of
the control patients reported here received antipsychotic drugs during their
inpatient stays. Only one was discharged off drugs.
The CMHC staff is generally well trained, experienced and enthusias
tic; they see themselves as doing a good job. Patients are assigned to one
of five treatment teams on each ward which meet daily to decide treatment
plans. The assigned therapist provides one-half hour of psychotherapy
Loren R. Mosher 51
daily and takes a major role in treatment planning. The therapist may be a
technician, community worker or any of the other treatment specialists.
There are 1-1/2 hours per day of occupational therapy and a daily commu
nity meeting led by any member of the treatment team. A crisis group
meets for 1-1/2 hours five times per week (all patients); a couples group,
two hours per week (married patients and spouses); a psychodrama group,
two hours per week (all patients who are able); a women’s group, two
hours per week; and a survival group 1-1/2 hours (for readmitted patients)
three times each week.
Because the Center inpatient service takes patients from all over the
county (it is the only facility with a 24-hour-a-day psychiatric emergency
service and locked wards), most patients are referred back to one of four
regional centers nearest their homes for outpatient care. This care may
include partial hospitalization (day or night care), individual, family or
group therapy and medication followup. The county also has an extensive
board and care system and eight halfway houses for adolescents and
adults.
Although the present report focuses only on Soteria House and its
hospital comparison ward, a second experimental facility, Emanon House,
was established in a nearby county in 1974. It is compared with its own
nearby general hospital psychiatric ward. The research design is the same
for both project facilities.
RESULTS
Six week outcome data for all Soteria House subjects and two-year
outcome data from the subjects admitted between 1971 and 76 have been
reported in detail elsewhere (Mosher and Menn, 1978; Matthews et al.,
1979; Mosher et al., 1989). Briefly summarized, the significant results are:
1. Admission characteristics: Subjects in the two programs are remark
ably similar on most demographic and admission psychiatric variables.
2. Six week outcome: In terms of psychopathology, subjects in both
groups improved significantly and comparably, despite Soteria subjects
having not received neuroleptic.
3. Milieu assessments: Because Soteria programs is a recovery-facility
social environment, systematic study and comparison of the two milieus
are particularly important. We have used Moos’ WAS and COPES scale
for this purpose (Moos, 1974). The between-program differences, we find,
have been remarkable in their magnitude and stability over ten years. As
may be seen in Figure 1, the Soteria environment is perceived as signifi
cantly different from the CMHC milieu on 9 of 10 subscales of the Moos
159
FIGURE 1. Comparison of Soteria Staff and CMHC Staff WAS Real Testing Based on Staff Norms for 160 Wards
■Soteria N=7
100
CMHC N = 25
80
60
40
STANDARD SCORES
20
0
Ir voi Su pp Spont Aut Pract Prob Anger Order Clarity Contro
Relationship” “Treatment” ‘"Administration"
-20
Loren R. Mosher S3
instrument. They are similar on only the order and organization variable.
This pattern has remained stable with minor fluctuations for the project’s
10-year life. Thus we conclude that the two environments are, in fact, very
different with Soteria milieu, conforming closely to our predictions
(Wendt etal., 1983).
4. Community psychosocial adjustment: At two years postadmission,
Soteria-treated subjects from the 1971-76 cohort were working at signifi
cantly higher occupational levels and were more often living indepen
dently or with peers. These data from the 1976-83 cohort are not yet
available.
5. In the first cohort, despite the large differences in lengths of stay
during the initial admissions (about one versus five months), the cost of
the first 6 months of care for both groups is about $4,000.
SYSTEM CHANGE
To summarize, the Soteria project suggests that newly diagnosed

schizophrenic patients can be treated as well-or better-at no greater cost in
a nonhospital community setting as a hospital. Our results are consistent
with those of others who studied nonhospital alternative treatments, e.g.,
Fairweather et al., 1969; Pasamanick, 1967; Stein and Test, 1976; Lang-
sley et al., 1968; Polak and Kirby, 1976. Straw (1982) found that in 19 of
20 studies the outcomes were as good or better in the alternative treated
groups when compared with those receiving hospital care. Has this scien
tific evidence resulted in a shift away from hospitals to use of alternative
methods of care in the United States? Basically, the answer is no.
The evidence has not persuaded private psychiatry in the USA that
non-hospital alternatives are useful. As indicated in the Laing memoir just
preceding, this is no longer true in American public mental health where
the notion of “Crisis Residences” has caught on (see Stroul, 1987).
Why, in the era of so-called “ scientific” psychiatry, have these types of
facilities and clinical care paradigms not been widely implemented?
The most facile answers are that the studies were insufficiently rigor
ous, did not provide convincing evidence or were one-time, unreplicable
products of the investigators’ enthusiasm and dedication. As one of these
enthusiastic investigators, I must ask how many comparative outcome
studies of variations in hospital treatment are there? Despite the more than
a million patients psychiatrically hospitalized each year in the U.S., there
are very few controlled outcome studies of systematically varied inpatient
care (Glick et al., 1974; Herz et al., 1971; Caffey et al., 1972). While the
evidence supporting alternatives may not be incontrovertible, there would
www.Ebook777.com
appear to be more hard data relative to their usefulness than there are for
in-hospital treatment.
If the evidence presented is acceptable, why is the next step—its applica
tion to clinical care settings-not? I would posit that the implementation of
alternatives is unacceptable because they represent a threat to in-hospital
psychiatry’s turf. What are the elements of the Soteria program (these are
true to a greater or lesser extent for most alternatives) perceived as threats
to hospital psychiatry?
In brief, the elements of the Soteria program most relevant to this
discussion are:
1. The facility is not a hospital and its program is not run by doctors or
nurses by delegation. However, it admits only clients who would
have otherwise been hospitalized.
2. Neuroleptics, the standard treatment for schizophrenia, are used as
infrequently as possible, preferably not at all.
3. Primary treatment responsibility, power and authority are vested in
the nonprofessional staff.
How has traditional hospital psychiatry defended itself against this

rather radical attempt to demedicalize psychosis? We will describe four
that we believe to be most used to maintain the status quo.
1. Foremost, and most effective, there are no third-party payers in the
U.S. willing to underwrite this form of care. Psychiatry has not actively
moved to prevent third-party payment for alternatives, but it has not
actively sought it.
The ultimate viability of alternatives in the therapeutic market place
resides with funding sources-which is why they are becoming available in
public systems but not in private ones. The degree of interest these fiscal
intermediaries will have in paying for innovations in care is strongly
influenced by the prevailing Zeitgeist. In the last decade or so there has
been a substantial shift in American psychiatry’s Zeitgeist away from a
socio-environmental one to a more medical biologic point of view. Thus,
there is little pressure from biomedically oriented mainstream psychiatry
to pay for a basically nonmedical treatment. What are other relevant man
ifestations of the biomedical Zeitgeist? It would appear that psychiatry is
doing what it believes it must to continue to qualify for third-party pay
ment, i.e., sticking with hospital-based wards.
2. The medicalization of community psychiatry. It is ironic that the now
nearly 30-year-old community psychiatry movement in the U.S. has
moved the mental health system back into closer juxtaposition with the
somatic health system. That is, the relative isolation of mental health
Loren R. Mosher 55
before the 1960s-as manifested in the state hospital systems-was broken

down with the advent of community psychiatry with its emphasis on
inpatient care on wards in general medical hospitals. The growth of such
wards was also given impetus by psychiatric coverage in various health
insurance programs and by government sponsored medicare and medic
aid. For the most part, payment for inpatient care in general hospitals has
been the only consistently available mental health benefit. These two
factors account in large part for growth of these wards and the increasing
numbers of patients treated in them. For example, between 1967 and 1971,
the numbers of schizophrenic patients treated on such wards nearly
doubled-from 90,000 to 170,000 (Taube, 1969, 1973).
This process of bringing “mental illness” back into the mainstream of
medicine was given further impetus by a flurry of developments in medi
cal technology. That is, a whole array of new, sophisticated techniques
became available for use in the search for the “schizococcus” and other
specific etiologies of mental illness. Application of these techniques to
“mental illness” has provided us with a deluge of new information but has
as yet failed to discover specific etiologic factors in psychosis. In a charac
teristically American fashion, a new generation of technology-oriented
biological psychiatrists has risen preferentially to positions of influence
and power in many medical school departments of psychiatry.
3. Neuroleptics. Another important factor in the progressive medical-
ization of madness has been the introduction and widespread use of neuro
leptic drugs-clearly efficacious treatments for psychosis. Because drugs
can only be prescribed by M.D.s, as long as drugs are viewed as “the
answer” to mental illness, doctors’ power and control of the treatment
system are inevitable and will increase.
Because pills are given to individuals, they maintain medicine’s tradi
tional focus on a person as “ sick.” This can prevent the doctor and the
system over which he presides from looking at the family and wider social
contextual factors that might have exerted important influences on the
development of psychosis and might also therefore be amenable to inter
vention. Thus, medications can narrow conceptual sights and unnecessar
ily limit treatment possibilities.
4. The waning influence of psychoanalysis. It is fair to say that the ’50s
and early ’60s were the heyday of psychoanalytic influence on more
traditional psychiatry. Psychoanalysts and analytic theories were widely
used for both descriptive and etiologic purposes. For a number of years,
residents in the best known training programs entered analytic training.
In the late ’60s and through the ’70s their influence has been much
diluted by waves of findings from the new technologists and technology.
The appeal of analytic constructs, so pervasive in the ’50s and ’60s, has
been replaced by more reliably identifiable and quantifiable neurotrans
mitters, endorphins, etc. Whether these high-tech findings have made a
substantial contribution to clinical practice remains moot.
This evolution is complex, but psychoanalysis is not as interested in
psychosis as it was during its halcyon days. The neuroleptics, develop
ment of rapid turnover wards in general hospitals and community psychia
try each contributed to what I perceive as a withdrawal of psychoanalysis’
cathexis of psychosis. It seems to have given up psychosis in favor of a
return to the original turf of analysis-the outpatient treatment of neurosis.
This brief discussion is obviously oversimplified, biased and subject to
many exceptions. However, it does give one person’s perception—with
little vested interest in the process-of a facet of recent history.
CONCLUSION
The Soteria project closed its data collection and treatment facility in
1983 but data analysis has continued. What have we learned so far from
the second generation Kingsley Hall?
1. It is possible to establish and maintain an interpersonally based
therapeutic milieu that is as effective as neuroleptic in reducing the acute
symptoms of psychosis in the short term (six weeks) in newly diagnosed
psychotics.
2. The therapeutic community personnel do not require extensive men
tal health training and experience to be effective in the experimental con
text. They do, however, need to be sure that this is the type of work they
want to do, be psychologically strong, tolerant and flexible, and positive
and enthusiastic. Finally, they need good on-the-job training and easily
accessible supervision and backup.
3. Longer term outcomes (two years) for the Soteria treated group are as
good or better than those of the hospital treated control subjects in terms of
independence, autonomy and peer based social networks. In addition,
more than 80% of the experimental group have little or no risk of tardive
dyskinesia as they received little or no antipsychotic drug treatment over
the followup period.
4. Although it is difficult to confirm or dismiss from the data it appears
that the positive longer term outcomes achieved by the Soteria treated
subjects are at least in part due to the spontaneous growth of a Soteria-
related, easily accessible, social network around the facility. It provides
interpersonal support, housing, jobs, friends and recreational activities as
needed to ex-Soteria clients and staff.
www.Ebook777.com
Loren R. Mosher 57
REFERENCES
Bockoven J: Moral Treatment in American Psychiatry. New York: Springer Pub
lishing Co. (1963).
Boothe H, Schooler N, Goldberg S: Brief social history for studies in schizophre
nia: an announcement of a new data collection instrument. Psychopharmacol
ogy Bulletin 8:23-44, 1972.
Brown GW, Birley JLT: Crisis and life changes and the onset of schizophrenia. J
Health and Social Behav 9:203-214, 1968.
Caffey EM, Galbrecht CR, Klett CJ: Brief hospitalization and aftercare in the
treatment of schizophrenia. Archives o f General Psychiatry 24:81-86, 1972.
Cole J, Klerman G, Goldberg S: Effectiveness of phenothiazine treatment in acute
schizophrenics. Archives o f General Psychiatry 10:246-261, 1964.
Crane G: Clinical psychopharmacology in its 20th year. Science 181:124-128, 1973.
Fairweather G, Sanders D, Cressler D, Maynard H: Community Life for the Men
tally III: An Alternative to Institutional Care. Chicago: Adline Publishing Co.
(1969).
Fromm-Reichmann F: Notes on the development of treatment of schizophrenia by
psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Psychiatry 11:263-273, 1948.
Glick I, Hargreaves WA, Goldfield MD: Short vs. long hospitalization: a con
trolled prospective study. Archives o f General Psychiatry 30:363-369, 1974.
Goldstein M: Premorbid adjustment, paranoid status, and patterns of response to
phenothiazine in acute schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin 3:24-37, 1970.
Herz MI, Endicott J, Spitzer R, Mesnikoff A: Day vs. inpatient hospitalization.
A merican Journal o f Psychiatry 127( 10): 107-118, 1971.
Hirschfeld R, Matthews S, Mosher LR, Menn AZ: Being with madness: personal
ity characteristics o f three treatment staffs. Hospital and Community Psychia
try 28(4):267-273, 1977.
Klerman G, DiMascio A, Weissman M, Prusoff B, Paykel ES: Treatment of
depression by drugs and psychotherapy. American Journal o f Psychiatry
131:186-191, 1974.
Laing R: The Politics o f Experience. New York: Ballantine Books (1967).
Langsley DG, Kaplan DM, Pittman FS, Machotka P, Flomenhaft K, DeYoung CD:
The Treatment o f Families in Crisis. New York: Grune and Stratton (1968).
Matthews SM, Roper MT, Mosher LR, Menn AZ: A non-neuroleptic treatment
for schizophrenia: analysis of the two-year postdischarge risk of relapse.
Schizophrenia Bulletin 5(2):322-333, 1979.
Menninger K: Psychiatrist s World: The Selected Papers o f Karl Menninger.
Edited by B. Hall. New York: Viking Press (1959).
Moos RH: Evaluating Treatment Environments: A Social Ecological Approach.
New York: John Wiley and Sons (1974).
Mosher L, Pollin W, Stabenau J: Identical twins discordant for schizophrenia:
neurologic findings. Archives o f General Psychiatry 24:422-430, 1971.
Mosher L, Reifman A, Menn A: Characteristics of nonprofessionals serving as
primary therapists for acute schizophrenics. Hospital and Community Psychia
try 24:391-395, 1973.
Mosher LR, Menn A: Community residential treatment for schizophrenia: two-

year followup data. Hospital & Community Psychiatry 29:715-723, 1978.
Mosher LR, Vallone R, Menn AZ: The soteria project: new outcome data (“il
progetto soteria: nuovi resultati emersi”). In A. Migone, G. Martini and V.
Volterra (Eds), New Trends In Schizophrenia. Caserta: Edito dalla Fondazione,
pp. 313-330, 1989.
Niskanen P, Achte K: The Course and Prognosis o f Schizophrenic Psychoses in
Helsinki: A Comparative Study o f First Admissions in 1950. Monograph No. 2
from the Psychiatric Clinic of the Helsinki University Central Hospital, 1972.
Pasamanick B, Scarpitti FD, Dinitz S: Schizophrenics In the Community. New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts (1967).
Perry J: Reconstitutive process in the psychopathology of the self. Annals o f the
New York Academy o f Sciences 96:853-876, 1962.
Polak PR, Kirby MW: A model to replace psychiatric hospitals. J Nerv Ment Dis
162:13-22, 1976.
Rappaport M, Hopkins HK, Hall K, Belleza T, Silverman J: Are there schizo
phrenics for whom drugs may be unnecessary or contraindicated? Interna
tional Pharmacopsychiatry 13:100-111, 1978.
Stein LI, Test MA: Training in community living: One year evaluation. Am J
Psychiatry 133:917-918, 1976.
Strauss JS, Kokes RF, Klorman R, Sacksteder JL: Premorbid adjustment in
schizophrenia: concepts, measures, and implications. Part I. The concept of
premorbid adjustment. Schizophrenia Bulletin 3(2) 182-185, 1977.
Straw RB: Meta-analysis o f deinstitutionalization. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Northwest
ern University (1982). Doctoral dissertation.
Stroul BA: Crisis Residential Services In a Community Support System. Report to
the NIMH Community Support Program. Rockville, MD (1987).
Sullivan H: Schizophrenia As a Human Process. New York: W. W. Norton and
Co. (1962).
Szasz T: The Myth o f Mental Illness: Foundations o f a Theory o f a Personal
Conduct. New York: Hoeber-Harper (1961).
Taube C: Length o f Stay o f Discharges from General Hospital Psychiatric Inpa
tient Units. United States 1970-1971. Statistical Note 70. Biometry Branch,
NIMH, 1973.
Taube C: General Hospital Inpatient Psychiatric Services 1967. Survey and
Reports Section, Biometry Branch, Office of Program Planning and Evalua
tion, NIMH, 1969.
Vaillant G: Prospective prediction of schizophrenic remission. Archives o f Gen
eral Psychiatry 11:509-515, 1964.
Venables P, O’Connor N: A short scale for rating paranoid schizophrenia. Journal
o f Mental Science 105:815-818, 1959.
Wendt J, Mosher LR, Matthews S, Menn A: A comparison of two treatment
environments for schizophrenia. In: Gunderson JG, Will OA, Jr., Mosher LR,
eds. Psychiatric Milieu and the Therapeutic Process. New York: Jason Aron
son, Inc., pp. 17-33, 1983.
Perceptions of Psychologists
and Psychiatrists
Victor D. Sanua
SUMMARY. The purpose of this paper is to review surveys that

have been conducted to evaluate the perceptions of the general pub
lic towards psychologists and psychiatrists. There are two major
studies, one in Canada and the other in Atlanta, Georgia commis
sioned by psychiatry. Only minor studies have been conducted by
psychologists. There seems to be a consistent finding that psycholo
gists rate very well among the general public, while psychiatrists
seem to have an image problem. There has been a decided decrease
of physicians going into psychiatry, while the field of psychology is
thriving and the number of psychological associations is increasing.
In the Canadian study, it was revealed that about 75% of respondents
are hesitant to see a psychiatrist because they “are too ready to pre
scribe drugs.” In the Atlanta survey, 83% of the respondents indi
cated that they would feel uncomfortable seeing a psychiatrist. In
one research, a group of individuals were least satisfied with their
contacts with psychiatrists who dealt primarily with the medication
of a sick relative.
These findings are of extreme importance in view of the efforts of
a large number of clinical psychologists who would like to have pre
scription privileges. It is felt that on the basis of these findings,
psychologists should have a better evaluation of their own profes
sion. We can do better than psychiatrists! [Article copies available from
Victor D. Sanua, PhD, is affiliated with the Department of Psychology, St.

John’s University, Jamaica, NY 11439.
[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “Perceptions of Psychologists and Psychiatrists.” Sanua, Victor D.
1996, pp. 59-75; and: Psychosocial Approaches to Deeply Disturbed Persons (eds: Peter R. Breggin,
and E. Mark Stem) The Haworth Press, Inc., 1996, pp. 59-75. Single or multiple copies of this article are
available from The Haworth Document Deliveiy Service [1-800-342-9678,9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. (EST)].

At this time of the rapid development of the profession of psychology

and the continual efforts on the part of psychiatry to limit the professional
legitimacy of psychology as a provider of mental health services and
reduce the standing of our field, particularly with their powerful lobby in
Washington, D.C., it behooves us to get an overview of the feelings and
the attitude of the general public towards these professions. It is also
useful to examine how other mental health professionals view psychology.
For the longest period of time and still to some extent today, there seems to
be confusion about the functions of these two professions. One outstand
ing difference known by the majority of the educated public is that psychi
atrists have an M.D. degree and can prescribe drugs while psychologists
have a Ph.D. degree but cannot prescribe drugs.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the image that the general
public has of psychology and psychiatry, how psychiatrists and psycholo
gists view each other. The data available which would provide information
on each aspect of the question tend to be rather scarce. It is somewhat
surprising that in spite of the research orientation of psychologists, they
have not pursued research to “know themselves” better through an analy
sis of the attitudes of the general public towards the profession. Rosario
Webb and Ramsay Speer (1986) have pointed out that research on this
issue is meager, dated, and of questionable methodology.
To get some idea about the differences in public’s attitude towards
psychiatry and psychology, we have to refer to two studies conducted by
two market research organizations commissioned and financed by the
psychiatric establishment. One study was conducted in Ontario, Canada,
and the other in the U.S.A. We have not been able to locate an adequate
study by psychologists regarding the general public’s attitude towards
psychiatry and psychology. This is somewhat surprising because there is a
feeling that psychologists are not receiving adequate respect from the
general public, or possibly that the same public has a more favorable
picture of psychiatrists, particularly in view of their medical degree. Is it
possible that psychologists suffer from some inferiority feelings? As the
paper develops, data will reveal that such feelings are misplaced. Natu
rally, one of the criteria for such low self-evaluation is that psychiatrists
make more money than psychologists. I recall a discussion I had with a
psychiatrist when I told him that APA stands for the American Psychologi
cal Association, while ApA (small p) stands for the American Psychiatric
Association because of the much larger number of trained psychologists
than psychiatrists in the U.S.A. His immediate answer was that this was
true, but the fact remains that they still make more money, a fact that
cannot be denied.
Victor D. Sanua 61
In 1988, the Ontario Psychiatric Association (O.P.A.) commissioned

the organization Cormark Communications Inc. to conduct research into
the attitudes of the Ontario public towards psychiatry in view of O.P.A.’s
plan to introduce a public relations campaign directed towards the Ontario
general public (“Canadian survey,” 1989). Fortunately the study included
a number of questions about psychology. The following is a summary of
the report.
In terms of perceived effectiveness, the majority (54% of 751) responses
on the mailed questionnaires indicated that the competence of psychiatrists
and psychologists was about equal in helping people overcome their prob
lems. The remaining respondents were about equally split: half felt that
psychiatrists were more effective, while the other half chose psychologists
as being more effective. Thus on the basis of this finding, it seems that the
M.D. degree does not give an aura of superiority to the profession of
psychiatry, at least in Ontario. Respondents were provided a number of
reasons for hesitating to see a psychiatrist. The issue which generated the
greatest concern was the possibility that a psychiatrist might be “too ready
to prescribe drugs” as part of the treatment. The total percentage of those
who were hesitant to go to a psychiatrist because of the possibility of
having drugs prescribed, was 77% (23% indicated great concern; 32%
some concern; and 22% expressed slight concern). This certainly comes as
a revelation, also supported by further research to be discussed in this
paper, at this time when there are strong influences within the APA which
consider prescription privileges as representing a normal evolutionary
development in the expansion of the profession of psychology or “a log
ical evolution of professional practice” (DeLeon, Folen, Jennings, Willis
& al (1991). Only 15% of the respondents agreed with the statement:
“ Psychiatrists are generally well balanced people who have their lives in
control,” 40% disagreed; and 45% were unwilling to state how they felt
one way or another. Insofar as respect is concerned, 4 out of 10 responded
that psychiatrists were less respected than other medical doctors, four
indicated that they were respected to the same extent; and only 1 out of 10
felt that psychiatrists commanded more respect than other medical doc
tors. On the basis of these findings, Edward Waring, former president of
the Canadian Psychiatric Association, indicated that “ obviously, there is a
lot of opportunity for public education” (p. 14).
Since 1987, The Keckley Group of Atlanta, Georgia (“ Psychiatry: Fact
and Perceptions,” 1991) has been conducting studies on psychiatry in 10
markets representing a cross-section of opinion and geography. I shall
only include here the data as it pertains to the comparison between psychi
atrists and psychologists. Approximately 56% of psychologists agree that
“psychiatrists treat psychology unfairly. They take advantage of the sys

tem, and they don’t treat us as equals.” Furthermore, 39% felt that “ psy
chiatrists don’t understand psychologists, as they don’t ask our opinion.”
Three quarters of benefit managers noted that they were “considering
changes in the way health benefits were provided for these types of prob
lems.” Naturally this reflects the increasing pressure placed on businesses
by spiraling mental-health-care costs. While 72% of consumers agreed
that “psychiatry is necessary-all of us need help sometimes,” 83% said
they would feel “uncomfortable seeing a psychiatrist.” Sixty-two percent
said they would “rather see a psychologist than a psychiatrist.” While
53% of the consumers were able to identify in relevant terms psychiatrists,
43% were able to do so for psychologists, a disparity which might not be
meaningful in spite of the fact that a significant difference for many is that
the psychiatrist is an M.D. Using a scale of 1 to 10 (with 10 being the
highest mark), consumers were asked to score a variety of health profes
sionals on their academic training and competence. While the rating for
psychiatrists was 5.1, for clinical psychologists it was 4.8. As in the pre
vious report, psychologists appear to fare rather well. It would seem from
the Keckley’s study that psychiatry in general is not viewed more favor
ably in comparison to psychology.
Recent data show that psychiatry as a profession has tended to decline
in view of the smaller number of new physicians going into the field of
psychiatry. A recent article in the Psychiatric News (Cody, 1993) indicates
that psychiatry has had a difficult time getting physicians to specialize in
psychiatry. In 1988,746 were recruited. In 1993, only 477 were going into
the profession, and this is happening at a time when available residencies
are increasing. Only three states filled their psychiatric residency posi
tions: New Hampshire, Vermont and Utah.
This decline of psychiatry was confirmed by a column of APA presi
dent Frank Farley when he wrote in the APA Monitor, July, 1993 that
“Psychiatry appears to be declining in membership. . . . Social work
thrives, but continues primarily to be a non-doctoral field. A great strength
of psychology lies in its inclusion of both science and practice in the same
discipline. Serious problems have arisen in other fields where practice was
divorced from science” (p. 3).
The fact that psychiatrists have little regard for psychologists is con
firmed by various statements made recently by the leadership of the Amer
ican Psychiatric Association. I shall provide only a few quotations reflect
ing their attitudes, particularly in connection with the training of
psychologists as mental health workers, at least in their public pronounce-
Victor D. Sanua 63
ment. Fink, a former President of the American Psychiatric Association,

wrote the following:
Psychologists and other non-psychiatrists “don’t have the training to

make the initial evaluation and diagnosis” and “are not trained to
understand the nuances of the mind. . . . Doctors should refer to
doctors.” (American Medical News, Feb. 12, 1988, quotations are
found in Wright and Spielberger, 1989)
Sabshin, Medical Director of ApA, in addressing psychiatrists in gen

eral, writes the following in the Newsletter of the Pennsylvania Psychiatric
Association (Dec. 1988-Jan. 1989):
. . . physicians in every state must meet continuing education

requirements, yet psychologists have continuing education require
ments in fewer than 15 states. If psychologists wish to practice
medicine, their medical degrees ought to be conferred by medical
schools, not state legislatures or regulatory agencies. Furthermore,
psychologists should not be able to hide behind the simplistic and
erroneous claim that they provide services analogous to health care
by psychiatrists, but at significant cost-saving to their clients. . . .
While recognizing that psychologists have a role to play in our
health care system, I urge legislative scrutiny of their attempts to be
that which they are not. In doing so, we physicians affirm our profes
sional commitment to quality health care. (Reported by Wright and
Spielberger, 1989)
According to Wright and Spielberger, the truth about continuing educa

tion is that for physicians’ re-licensure it is needed in 22 states compared to
19 for psychologists. For a more adequate review of the efforts of the
psychiatric establishment to prevent psychologists from providing mental
health services because of their supposed incompetence to deal with “medi
cal mental illness,” the reader is referred to a review by Sanua (1993).
As a counter argument to the above statements made by psychiatrists
that psychologists are not competent to diagnose mental disorders or for
mulate treatment plans and that patients may be harmed if treated by
psychotherapy without the supervision of a psychiatrist, Dorken (1990)
reviewed 13 years of professional liability of psychologists and showed
that there has never been a court award against any insured psychologist
for failure to refer to a physician when needed. This certainly weakens the
argument by the above two leading psychiatrists that psychologists are not
adequate to the task of providing mental health care. It is to be noted that
www.Ebook777.com
64 PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACHES TO DEEPL Y DISTURBED PERSONS
psychiatric malpractice insurance costs 3-24 times more than psychologi

cal malpractice. O f course, this is because the administration of drugs
entails risks to patients. The following quotation by Dorken explains the
problem of using organic approaches in the treatment of mental disorders:
The high-risk assaultive procedures pioneered by psychiatry of deep

insulin coma therapy, prefrontal lobotomy, and regressive shock are
now ventures of the past based largely on conjecture. . . . Thus the
clear major difference between psychiatric and psychological prac
tice is the capacity of psychiatrists to prescribe drugs, (p. 151)
He points out that many patients kept under continued medication for
too long have suffered permanent neurological impairment. For a detailed
description of those risks the reader is referred to a review of the literature
by Sanua (1990, 1993a).
The negative attitude towards psychology is not shared by a number of
psychiatrists. Dietch, director of medical-student education in psychiatry
at the University of California, wrote a letter to the Supreme Court in
support of psychology. He stated that there is no research to show that
patients treated by psychologists fare worse than those treated by psychia
trists, who, on the other hand, may harm patients by improperly prescrib
ing psychotropic drugs (Buie, 1988).
According to psychiatrists Webb and Edward (1982), psychiatrists are
not well trained either in psychology or medicine. They write:
Their [psychiatrists’] dynamic formulations and vague references to

systems theory are pale by comparison to [those of] well-trained
experimental psychologists who know how to handle data, are
knowledgeable about group process, and know how to be persua
sive. Most of what modem psychologists know is well worth psy
chiatry’s knowing, (p. 81)
He declares that psychologists armed with computers and paper and

pencil tests offer a far more tempting “certainty” than the conceptual
generalities offered by psychiatrists. Warner (1979) found that psychia
trists were almost twice as likely to diagnose psychosis than other mental
health professionals. One of the possible explanations is that psychiatrists
could be motivated to diagnose psychosis more often, since it enables
them to take a more active role in prescribing medication.
Regarding the training of the psychiatrist, I shall refer to two psychia
trists who, prior to their medical training had obtained a Ph.D. degree.
Ome (1980), M.D. with a Ph.D. in clinical psychology, raises the serious
Victor D. Sanua 65
question as to whether psychiatrists should be medically trained, as he

delineates some of the problems of medical training. He argues that with
such a background, the psychiatrist will focus on locating the diseases of
the body that cause the problem, rather than searching for an appropriate
appreciation of psychological causation. Thus, medical training could be
counterproductive. He feels that a psychiatrist’s skill demands experience
in interpersonal relationships and an appreciation of the nuances of psy
chological causality. Fink, as noted earlier, stated that psychologists are
not trained to know the “nuances of the mind” (see p. 5). The training of a
psychiatrist starts immediately after his medical training. The internship
had been eliminated, but it seems now to have become a requirement. The
most significant aspect of the training is the day-to-day care the psychia
trist gives to patients and the formal and informal supervision he/she
receives. Psychiatrists acquire skills on the job, and it is possible for them
to become psychiatrists without having had a single course in psychology,
sociology or anthropology. Thus they may lack the intellectual tools devel
oped by the social sciences which could help resolve the kind of issues that
should concern the profession.
Kingsbury (1987), who like Ome trained both as a psychologist and a
psychiatrist, indicates that the psychologist is often lectured on the impor
tance of the scientific approach and that knowledge is accumulated
through sound methodology that would lead to replicability. Theories that
enjoy some vogue can thus be easily discarded. The message the student
gets is that while the scientific method always predominates and endures,
theories do not. Students are also taught to read carefully the specifics of
the sample selected and the validity and reliability of the tests used and to
make sure that there are no extraneous factors that may affect the results.
In contrast, in medical school the student is taught that science is a body of
knowledge and procedures shared by those educated in the science. How
ever, there are so many facts that develop that it would be difficult to
master them; as a result, medical students depend on reviews with little
space devoted to the manner in which the data were collected. The
psychologist would be inclined to give a series of lectures to “introduce”
a topic, while the physician would devote his lecture to discussing a
“topic” in detail. While psychologists seem to be more inclined to rein
force their ideas by using references, psychiatrists are more apt to use
clinical examples mostly from their own experience, e.g., “ I’ve had good
success using sedating phenothiazines to help manic patients” (Kingsbury,
p. 155). Kingsbury states that the scientific base of psychiatry regarding
the treatment of troubled people has increased very little in the last 20
years.
www.Ebook777.com
The following three studies consisted in asking various mental health

professionals their views of their colleagues and on their own profession.
Neimeyer & Walling (1990) asked groups of clinical psychologists, coun
seling psychologists, psychiatrists and social workers to rate their own and
each of the other groups along three variables: attractiveness, expertise
and trustworthiness. Results indicated that counseling psychologists and
social workers were viewed as more attractive but less expert than clinical
psychologists and psychiatrists. Clinical psychologists, counseling psychol
ogists, and social workers were viewed as more trustworthy than psychia
trists. As expected, in no instance did any professional group rate another
as significantly more attractive, trustworthy, or expert than itself, thus
suggesting the operation of an in-group/out-group bias. Thus while psychol
ogists were considered less attractive than counseling psychologists and
social workers, they were considered to have more expertise, a quality
shared by psychiatrists, but on the other hand, clinical psychologists were
rated first in trustworthiness while psychiatrists were shown to be least
trustworthy.
Janik and Kubickova (1990) asked specialists of five medical disci
plines, a total of 360 specialists, to define the social prestige of their
specialty. The sequence is as follows: surgeons, specialists in internal
medicine, pediatricians, gynecologists and, in the last place, psychiatrists.
The authors attribute the negative evaluation of psychiatry to its associa
tion with control and repressive functions performed by this discipline.
Koeske, Koeske and Mallinger (1993) examined the perception of self
versus other among 101 professionals (social workers, psychologists and
psychiatrists) regarding their effectiveness in intervention for 6 hypotheti
cal clients representing a range of mental health problems. Psychiatrists
were perceived as significantly less warm than social workers, even by
psychiatrists themselves. For ratings of perceived expertise, an in-group
preference was exhibited by psychologists and psychiatrists.
I shall now refer to a number of studies which have been conducted on
a smaller scale than those mentioned earlier in this paper, in which a
number of individuals belonging to specific groups were asked about their
perception of psychologists, psychiatrists and other mental health workers.
Alperin and Benedict (1985) reported that while psychiatrists were viewed
by a group of college students, as “ smart,” they were also seen as “ cold
and reserved.” Social workers were found to be warm but not particularly
smart. Psychologists were not negatively stereotyped, and they were more
likely to be consulted about personal problems.
Rosario Webb and Ramsay Speer (1986) administered a questionnaire
to college students, (nonpsychology majors) and their parents. The authors
Victor D. Sanua 67
wanted to discover what image they had about psychologists, psychia

trists, physicians, counselors, teachers and scientists. The results do not
support the allegations of an unfavorable image of psychology. Rather
they showed a favorable attitude towards psychologists, who were seen as
very similar to psychiatrists and dissimilar to scientists. It was felt that the
subjects’ familiarity with psychologists was doubtful. However, Rosario
Webb and Ramsay Speer believe that their study may mitigate psycholo
gists’ concerns about the public’s perception of psychology. Rosario Webb
(1989) in a later paper felt that a cross-section of the American public as
represented by a Harris or Gallup poll would be of importance.
The next three studies refer to recent research on the public image of
psychology. Only the most recent ones will be presented here, since we
assume that more familiarity with the profession of psychology in recent
years would result in more valid generalizations. In 1986 Wood, Jones and
Benjamin provided a survey of the research on the public’s image of
psychology. Older surveys found that respondents could not differentiate
between psychology and psychiatry, while later surveys revealed that the
public is able to distinguish between the two professions. Former studies
tended to view psychologists as more likely to be behavioral scientists and
psychiatrists as more likely to be practitioners. Wood, Jones and Benjamin
(1986) pointed out that recent studies on public opinion about psycholo
gists relied on samples which were not representative of the current U.S.A.
population. Carrying out their own research with 201 persons from four
metropolitan areas: Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Houston, and Washington,
D.C., they found that 84.43% agreed strongly or agreed somewhat that
psychology is a science. They were asked to indicate which activities were
more likely to be performed by psychologists and psychiatrists. They
found that a large percentage of the sample believed psychologists rather
than psychiatrists surveyed attitudes, predicted behavior and evaluated
children in schools. Psychiatrists were found to be more likely (80.60% vs.
15.42%) to prescribe drugs. Respondents also demonstrated a moderate
level of accuracy in their knowledge of the degree required to be a
psychologist. About 40% indicated that they needed a Ph.D. degree. When
respondents were asked about psychology’s impact on their daily lives,
45.41% reported that it had an impact, and 81.32% were able to indicate the
specific effect they had experienced. Because the most frequently men
tioned type of impact on the respondents’ daily lives concerned therapy,
the most salient effect of psychology apparently includes mental health
services. In conclusion, Wood, Jones and Benjamin (1986) believed that a
fuller understanding of the public image of psychology can suggest ways
in which organized psychology might better educate the public about the
nature of its functions and significance for everyday life.
Schindler, Berren, Hannah, Beigel et al. (1987) administered a ques
tionnaire to 119 patients at two community mental health centers and to
114 nonpatients to examine the public image of psychologists, psychia
trists, physicians and members of the clergy. The purpose was to evaluate
the competence of various mental health workers on 10 specific types of
patients. Psychiatrists were found to be more competent to deal with an
alcoholic housewife, a sexually abused person and a paranoid man.
Psychologists were found to be more competent to deal with a young
couple, a teenage drug user, a disinterested couple and a lonely student;
that is they were more effective in dealing with problems of adjustment
and relationships. Neither was found to be more competent than the other
in dealing with the following problems: a suicidal man, a depressed
woman and an overactive child. As to the personal qualities exhibited by
these two professionals, psychologists were found to be “ warmer,” and
“more caring” than psychiatrists, while psychiatrists were found to have
“more education and experience in mental health than psychologists.”
Professionalism, listening skills, skills in mental health and stability did
not differentiate the two professionals. In general, while psychologists
were found to be warmer and more caring than psychiatrists, they were
still viewed as being less capable in dealing with the more serious disor
ders. However, with more psychologists working in mental institutions,
only time will tell if such a stereotype will remain true.
Tessler, Gamache and Fisher (1991) interviewed patients who were
discharged from state hospitals or 24-hour crisis care facilities in major
cities of Ohio. They were asked to name family members who had been
supportive during their mental illness. Four hundred nine family members
were interviewed. All of the respondents were asked whether during the
course of the patient’s illness they had ever met or conversed with the
patient’s psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, nurse, case manager, or
other mental health professional on any matter pertaining to the patient’s
care. For each contact relatives were asked how satisfied they were with
what was accomplished. Psychiatrists, who accounted for 27 percent of
the 1,198 recent and past contacts, were identified most often in conjunc
tion with contacts concerning medication (47% of all contacts were con
cerned with medication). Psychologists were most frequently contacted in
conjunction with family therapy and the patients’ behavioral problems. A
one-way analysis of variance indicated that there were significant differ
ences between the satisfaction on ratings for contact with various types of
professionals. Respondents were satisfied with their contacts with psychol-
Victor D. Sanua 69
ogists, followed by nurses, case managers, social workers and psychia

trists. Thus the most satisfaction and least alienation were associated with
psychologists and the least satisfaction and most alienation were
associated with psychiatrists. According to these authors, past studies have
shown that the strongest factor influencing family satisfaction was the
occurrence of emotionally supportive interaction. This may explain why
the highest percentage of respondents were very satisfied with family
therapy. Again the use of psychotropic drugs by psychiatrists did not seem
to make them popular with the families. It should be noted that this study
was carried on by the Department of Sociology of the University of Mas
sachusetts, Amherst and published in Hospital and Community Psychiatry,
a psychiatric journal.
The July 1993 issue of the American Psychologist has a timely article
(Murstein and Fontaine) on the public’s knowledge about psychologists
and other mental health professionals. This study incorporated three attrib
utes: (1) the use of a random sample rather than the sample of convenience
usually used in previous studies, (2) A larger number of mental health
workers besides psychiatrists, (3) an examination of the public’s experi
ence with a mental health professional. Unfortunately out of 700 question
naires which were mailed to New London County, Ct. residents, only
14.8% could be used. A large number of letters (92) were returned as
undeliverable. The following are some of the findings. Compared to the
other mental health professionals, specific knowledge about psychologists
was rather poor. This is certainly understandable, since there are almost 50
different divisions of the American Psychological Association with their
own specialties. Physicians and clergymen topped the list regarding their
functions. In spite of the doubts shown about the function of the psychol
ogist, as compared to the psychiatrist more respondents (24) indicated
that they would consult a psychologist for mental health reasons, while
the number for the psychiatrist would be 20. The type of mental health
professionals most frequently recommended to a friend would be the
marriage and family counselor, with psychologists, psychiatrists, physi
cians, members of the clergy, psychotherapists and social workers fol
lowing in that order. Here again we see that the psychologist is preferred
to the psychiatrist for personal problems as well as for referrals for
friends. Respondents were asked how comfortable they would feel con
tacting each of the nine types of mental health professionals. The top of
the list included the physician, the psychologist and the clergyperson,
and the bottom of the list included the psychiatrist, the psychiatric nurse
and the telephone counselor. Thus respondents did feel significantly more
comfortable seeing a psychologist than a psychiatrist. Those who have
www.Ebook777.com
seen mental health professionals in the past are more likely to recommend
a psychologist than are those who have not seen one. According to Murs-
tein and Fontaine (1993) the greater comfortableness of the respondents
with psychologists compared to other trained mental health professionals
suggests an increasing role for the former. These authors remarked that
psychiatrists are unlikely to fade away, since they are the only ones who
dispense drugs, but their role as “talking” psychotherapists is diminishing
while their role as pill prescribers is increasing. It would appear from our
review that this latter role does not make patients comfortable with psychi
atrists. As we have seen, psychiatrists finished far down the list in com
fortableness. One of the possible explanations given by Murstein and
Fontaine is that psychiatrists have been trained in the authority-doctor-pas
sive-patient model, whereas most psychologists work in a more egalitarian
way with their clients. The authors however further indicated that as
psychologists continue to make in-roads into what was once a totally
medical/psychiatric jurisdiction (e.g., hospital privileges, the commitment
of patients to hospitals, and drug prescriptions), the uncomfortableness
favoring psychologists over psychiatrists may be erased. In conclusion,
Murstein and Fontaine (1993) believe that there is a rising popularity of
psychologists at the expense of psychiatrists. In view of the small number
of respondents they suggest that the next round of research will render a
verdict on the accuracy of their speculation. This research was financed in
part by a grant from the Connecticut College psychology department.
In the original version of this paper, I expressed the hope that the Ameri
can Psychological Association, with its tremendous financial resources,
could confirm the verdict that psychology is a “talking” profession by
conducting a large scale study and at the same time confirm the fact that
the general consumer in general is less likely to accept psychotropic drugs
by psychiatrists for his mental problems. This becomes all the more
important in view of the efforts of a number of influential psychologists
who are trying through legislative action to get prescription privileges for
psychologists.
It seems that such a study was conducted by the American Psychologi
cal Association but it was not given the publicity that such a study
deserved. I was able to get a copy by serendipity. The title of the research
is, “ Survey of general population of the USA on prescription privileges
for psychologists.” This survey was carried out by Frederick/Schneiders,
a market research organization. The study consisted of telephone calls to
1,000 adults nationwide. The interviews were conducted between Novem
ber 20 and November 23,1992. Let me summarize the findings. The main
question was whether Americans support “allowing psychologists to pre
Victor D. Sanua 71
scribe medication for their patients after completing additional training”

(p. 2). College graduates (53%) support prescription privileges for
psychologists, 39% oppose it and 8% don’t know. The figures for high
school graduates are 62, 31 and 7 percent respectively. However, what is
more significant is the rest of the survey regarding medication and the
feelings about the causes of mental disorders. In the APA survey, again for
the college-educated respondent, 68% believe that the most important
action to take in overcoming a mental health problem is “helping the
person understand the personal and social situations that led to the prob
lem,” 10% would like “to foster responsibility,” and only 12% believe
that medication would be required. The least effective argument with
consumers, in support of prescription privileges for psychologists is the
fact that “nurses and other groups with less training in mental health than
psychologists are safely prescribing medication.” Fifty-three percent felt
that this is not a good argument, 25% felt that it was somewhat good, and
15% felt it was a very good argument. It should be noted that this is one of
the strongest arguments used by pro-drugs psychologists, that is, that other
non-medical professions are able to prescribe.
Another interesting finding is that one-in-six Americans (16%) think
that “most serious mental health problems are the result of a physical
problem such as chemical imbalance” (p. 5). In view of the large scale
efforts on the part of the psychiatric establishment, through their publica
tions and the popular news media who reports on them, to persuade the
public of the organicity of almost every type of mental disorder, I am
delighted to see that the general public cannot easily be duped into this
ideology.
The face sheet of the report indicates the following, “This report was
received by the APA Board of Directors in December, 1992, with no
further action. It does not represent an official policy position of the
APA.” I wonder about the significance of the last sentence.
CONCLUSIONS
While all of the studies reviewed are not comparable because of sam
pling differences, the type of questions asked, and the methodology used,
there seems to be a consistent finding that psychologists rate very well
with the general public and with other mental health professionals, while
psychiatrists seem to have an image problem. While the number of
psychologists is increasing, there seems to be a recruiting problem in
psychiatry with many residencies left unfilled. What was most revealing in
two large-scale studies by Cormark Communication, Inc. in Canada and
the Keckley group in Atlanta, both financed by psychiatry, is that the

respondents in both surveys prefer to see a psychologist over a psychia
trist. In the Canadian study one reason for the reluctance to see a psychia
trist was they “ are too ready to prescribe drugs.” In one study it was found
that contacts between relatives of patients with psychiatrists had been least
satisfactory, and a large percentage of these contacts had to do with the
medication of these patients. Is it possible that the general public is becom
ing more familiar with the limitations of what were considered once “mir
acle drugs” and more attuned to “talk therapies” ? This was confirmed by
the survey commissioned by the American Psychological Association
when 1000 adult individuals were interviewed nationwide. It was found
that the best treatment for psychological problems is to have an opportu
nity to talk about the personal and social situations that led to these prob
lems. Only 12% believed that drugs are the treatment of choice.
The studies reviewed in this paper should, for all intents and purposes,
enhance the self-evaluation of psychologists; therefore, they should not
consider their profession as inferior to psychiatry. The latter profession
seems to be suffering in its popularity among the general public and in
potential candidates for the profession. However, there are recent efforts
on the part of the profession of psychiatry (Sanua, 1989) to deemphasize
the medical model with drugs being the primary treatment modality. An
article written in Psychiatric News (7/3/92) carries the following title,
“Don’t replace psychotherapy with a pill, experts remind public-sector
psychiatrists” (p. 13). The article includes the following statement by
Harold I. Eist: “ I can’t tell you how many times I’ve heard from inner-city
patients ‘Doc, don’t give me a pill; I need someone to talk to.’ ” In the
same article John C. Nemiah, editor of the American Journal of Psychia
try, raises the question as to “how psychiatrists are going to maintain
sensitivity to the individual needs of the patients, when there is so much
pressure to achieve the fast-acting, fairly quantifiable results so often
provided by medication?” (p. 13).
Regarding the studies of the public image of psychologists, there seems
to be a hodge-podge of small studies supported by limited grants from
small departments of psychology. The psychiatric establishment has been
willing to use some of their resources to get a better picture of the public’s
perception of psychiatry, while psychologists except for the APA tele
phone survey, have not pursued the same efforts with regard to their own
profession. In view of the persistent conflicts and confrontation with psy
chiatry which has been trying to demean the contribution of psychology, it
is surprising that a profession well-known for its strength in research has
not seen fit to counteract these efforts through a better public relations and
Victor D. Sanua 73
public information effort. For the past few years, the writer has been collect
ing pronouncements made at psychiatric conferences and conventions
where pessimistic feelings have been expressed about psychiatry. Here are a
few of them:
1. How effective is psychiatry? (Dietz, 1981).

2. Conceptual ambiguities and morality in modem psychiatry (Stone,
1980).
3. Psychiatry rides madly in all directions (Grinker, 1964).
4. The social discrediting of psychiatry (Dietz, 1977).
5. The death of psychiatry (Torrey, 1974).
Compared to psychiatry, psychology is becoming more and more vibrant

and enlarging its scope of activities as illustrated by the establishment of
new organizations, like the American Psychology Society and the Ameri
can Association of Applied and Preventive Psychology.
Psychologists do not need to add to their treatment armamentarium
psychotropic drugs which are of doubtful benefit to enhance their status.
As revealed by the reviewed studies, psychology should limit itself to its
humanistic and interpersonal approach to deal with people’s problems.
Psychology has come a long way from its laboratory roots to a respectable
profession of helping people with their psychological skills. We can do
better than psychiatrists. Let us not sell our professional birthright for a
mess of pharmaceutical pottage.
REFERENCES
Alperin, R. M. & A. Benedict, (1985). College students: perceptions of psychia

trists, psychologists, and social workers-a comparison. Psychological Reports,
57, 547-548.
Buie, J. (1988). Brief attacks decision in California hospital issue. The A.P.A.
Monitor, 19, (12), 22.
Canadian survey uncovers public’s perceptions about psychiatry: stigma is hard to
kill. Psychiatric News, XXIV, (10), 1989.
Cody, P. (1993). Residents matching in psychiatry continued to decline. Psychiat
ric News, XXVII (7), 1-20.
DeLeon, P. H., Folen, R. A., Jennings, F. L. Willis, D. J. & Wright, R. H. (1991).
The case for prescription privileges: A logical evolution of professional prac
tice. Journal o f Clinical Psychology, 20(3), 254-267.
Dietz, P. E. (1977). Social discrediting of psychiatry. American Journal o f Psy
chiatry, 134, 1356-1360.
Dietz, J. ( 1981 ). How effective is psychiatry? Boston Globe, April 21, 1981, p. 48.
www.Ebook777.com
Don’t replace psychotherapy with a pill experts remind public-sector psychia

trists? Psychiatric News, XXVII, (3), July, 1992.
Dorken, H. (1990). Malpractice claim experience of psychologists: Policy issues,
cost comparisons with psychiatrists, and prescription privilege implications.
Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 21, (2), 50-52.
Farley, F. (1993). The second century inaugural convention. The A.P.A Monitor,
24, (7), 3.
Grinker, R. R. Sr. (1964). Psychiatry rides madly in all directions. Archives o f
General Psychiatry, 10,228-237.
Janik, A. & Kubickova, N. (1990). Stereotyp pri hodnoceni prestize lekarskych
oboru. Stereotyping in evaluating the prestige of medical specialties. Cesk-
Psychiatrie, 86, 73-79.
Kingsbury, S. J. (1987). Cognitive difference between clinical psychologists and
psychiatrists. American Psychologists, 42, 152-156.
Koeske, G. F., Koeske, R. D. & Malinger, J. (1993). Perception of professional
competence: cross disciplinary ratings of psychologist, social worker and psy
chiatrist. American Journal o f Orthopsychiatry, 63,45-54.
Murstein, B. I. & Fontaine, P. A. (1993). The public’s knowledge about psycholo
gists and other mental health professionals. American Psychologist, 48, (7),
839-845.
Neimeyer, G. J. & Walling, C. C. (1990). Perceived social influence in mental
health, the professionals’ perspective. Social Behavior & Personality, 18,
217-224.
Ome, M. T. (1980). Should psychiatrists be medically trained? Let’s consider the
alternatives in light o f what the psychiatrist does. In J. P. Brady & H. K. H.
Brodie (Eds.), Psychiatry at the crossroads. Philadelphia: The Saunders Press.
Psychiatry: Fact and perceptions. (1991, January) National Register, 16, (4), p. 19.
Rosario Webb, A. & Ramsay Speer, J. (1986). Prototype of a profession: psycholo
gy’s public image. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice 17, (1), 5-9.
Rosario Webb, A. (1989). What’s in a question? Three methods for investigating
psychology’s public image. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice,
20, (5), 301-304.
Sanua, V. (1989). Reflections on the status of psychiatry by psychiatrists. Midwin
ter Conference of Div. 29, 42, 43 of A.P.A. San Antonio Texas, Feb. 23rd,
1991.
Sanua, V. (1990). A history o f “miracle” cures in the treatment of mental disor
ders. I. The age of shock therapies, II. The age of psychotropic drugs. Pres
ented at the European Congress of Psychology, Budapest, Hungary, July 1990.
Sanua, V. (1993). A psychologist critically evaluates the profession of psychiatry in
the U.S.A. In L. Communian and U. P. Gielen (Eds.), Advancing psychology and
its application: International Perspectives. Milan: Franco Angeli Publishers.
Sanua, V. (1993a). Psychotropic drugs: Prescription for disasters, a review of the
literature on the side-effects of psychiatric drugs, in press Psychological
Reports.
Schindler, F., Berren, M. R., Hannah, M. T., Beigel, A. & Santiago, J. M. (1987).
Victor D. Sanua 75
How the public perceives psychiatrists, psychologists, nonpsychiatric physi

cians, and members of the clergy. Professional Psychology: Research and
Practice, 18, (4), 371-376.
Stone, A. A. (1980). Presidential address: Conceptual ambiguities and morality in
modem psychiatry. American Journal o f Psychiatry, 137, 887-891.
Survey of general population of the United States on prescription privileges for
psychologists. (November 1992). Prepared for the American Psychological
Association by Frederick/Schneiders, Washington, D.C.
Tessler, R. C., Gamache, G. M. & Fisher G. A. (1991). Pattern of contact of
patients’ families with mental health professionals and attitude towards profes
sionals. Hospital Community Psychiatry, 42,429-35.
Torrey, E. F. (1974). The death o f psychiatry. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
Warner, R. (1979). Racial and sexual bias in psychiatric diagnosis. The Journal o f
Nervous and Mental Diseases, 167,303-310.
Webb, W. L. & Edwards, M. B., (1982). Psychiatry and medicine: marriage or
divorce? In R. C. W. Hall (Ed.), Psychiatry in crisis. (73-84). New York: Sp.
Medical and Scientific Books.
Wood, W., Jones, M. & Benjamin, L. T. Jr., (1986). Surveying psychology’s
public image. American Psychologists, 41, (9), 947-953.
Wright, R. & Spielberger, C. D. (1989). Psychiatry declares war on psychology.
Letter to A.P.A. membership.
www.Ebook777.com
Psychotherapy with ‘ 4Schizophrenia ’’:
Analysis of Metaphor
to Reveal Trauma and Conflict
Richard Shulman
SUMMARY. Use of a medical or disease model of “schizophrenia”

or “psychosis” often blinds us to seeing the metaphorical or poetic
use of language in these conditions. Exploration of those metaphori
cal and camouflaged communications often uncovers poignant and
relevant conflicts and traumas. After reviewing critiques of biologi
cal attempts at explanation, therapy case examples are given to
exemplify a narrative approach to understanding functional “psy
chosis.” [Article copies available from The Haworth Document Delivery
Service: 1-800-342-9678.]
Actually, often the only thing “wrong” (as it were) with the so-
called schizophrenic is that he speaks in metaphors unacceptable to
his audience, in particular to his psychiatrist. . . . When persons
imprisoned in mental hospitals speak of “rape” and “murder,” they
use inappropriate figures of speech which signify that they suffer
from thought disorders; when psychiatrists call their prisons “hospi
tals,” their prisoners “patients,” and their “patients’ ” desire for lib-
Richard Shulman, PhD, was educated at Wesleyan University, the University
of Michigan and the University of Toledo. He practices in Hartford, Connecticut,
where he has done individual, family and group therapy for ten years with people
given a variety of “psychotic” and “schizophrenic” diagnoses. He has presented
papers on this subject at numerous conferences including the National Conven
tion of the American Psychological Association.
[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “Psychotherapy with ‘Schizophrenia’: Analysis of Metaphor to
Reveal Trauma and Conflict.” Shulman, Richard. Co-published simultaneously in The Psychotherapy
Patient (The Haworth Press, Inc.) Vol. 9, No. 3/4, 1996, pp. 75-106; and: Psychosocial Approaches to
Deeply Disturbed Persons (eds: Peter R. Breggin, and E. Mark Stem) The Haworth Press, Inc., 1996,
pp. 75-106. Single or multiple copies of this article are available from The Haworth Document Deliveiy
Service [1-800-342-9678,9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. (EST)].

erty “ disease,” the psychiatrists are not using figures of speech, but
are stating facts.
Thomas Szasz (1976, p. 14)
Meanings alter in the service of emotional needs; and when a per

son’s acceptability to himself and others is threatened, when no
way out of an irreconcilable dilemma can be found, and when all
paths into the future seem blocked, there is still a way. One can
simply alter his perceptions of his own needs and motivations and
those of others; one can abandon causal logic or change the mean
ings of events; one can regress . . . In short, one can become
schizophrenic.
Communication is of the essence, and the patient is weaned from his

autistic preoccupations and his idiosyncratic communications by the
therapist’s ability to hear and understand what the patient wishes to
say even while he seeks to conceal through the use of idiosyncratic
metaphor and cryptic associations.
Theodore Lidz (1973, p. 10 & p. 103)
/some would have us/ . . . turn relatively quickly to the latest

information from such scientific fields as behavior genetics, bio
chemistry, psychopharmacology, epidemiology, and so on to find
reassuring evidence that the schizophrenic patient is, after all, quali
tatively different from truly human beings; so that it is pointless to
risk one’s own sanity by persisting in this disturbingly conflict-rid
den effort to work psychoanalytically with him.
Harold Searles (1975b, p. 226)
. . . even the most “ crazy,” manifestations of schizophrenia come

to reveal meaningfulness and reality-relatedness not only as trans-
ference-reactions to the therapist, but, even beyond this, as delu
sional identifications with real aspects of the therapist’s own per
sonality . . .
Harold Searles (1965, p. 34)
One can repeat specifically with respect to the psychoanalytic ther

apy of schizophrenia, as well as other psychosocial treatments,
www.Ebook777.com
Richard Shulman 79
Freud’s comments about psychoanalysis, that, in Mark Twain’s

words, “ The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.”
Bertram Karon (1989, pp. 146-7)
Let’s imagine that we have just begun seeing a young man in therapy
after he has ended a program with another therapist. He comes late to an
initial session, mentioning that he was delayed trying to visit his old
therapist, but she wasn’t there. If he next mentioned that he’d heard a news
story about a woman who abandoned her baby in a dumpster, stating that
he thought she should be shot, we might begin to hypothesize that the
vignette about the baby held some relevance to his feelings about his
current situation. This hypothesis might be strengthened if his other com
ments seemed to coalesce around similar themes, such as telling you how
silent you’ve been, or criticizing inhospitable aspects of your office.
In this regard we might be informed by the writings of Harold Searles,
Robert Langs and others who view a patient’s verbalizations as frequently
being thematically relevant to the therapeutic context, or as being uncon
scious supervision. These and other writers alert us to attend to the meta
phorical and thematic relevance of the patient’s associations-with particu
lar reference to the current state of the therapeutic relationship-and
therefore to put less emphasis on the manifest content of what is said.
Given this perspective, we would not be put off from our therapeutic task
if the client used metaphors that we judged to be unrealistic on a manifest
or surface level. For example, they might state that they were a baby in a
dumpster, or tell us that they were an aborted fetus. Or perhaps they might
tell us that they were a crew member on the spaceship “Juan Doe.” Only
later we might learn that “Juan Doe” was the name of the infamous
“garbage barge” that was denied entry to numerous ports. If we made this
simple transition to listening thematically and metaphorically, and to lis
tening without undue emphasis as to whether what was said sounded
“unrealistic,” “psychotic” or initially incomprehensible, we would be
doing what we have been told we can’t or shouldn’t do-therapeutic explo
ration with people whom we typically call “ schizophrenic.” 1
FOCUS OF THIS PAPER
This paper aims to resurrect debate about several questions related to

the conditions commonly known as “schizophrenia” or “psychosis,” and
to point to clinical and research evidence which suggest that our current
predominant models for understanding these conditions may be blinding

us to other, more cogent, perspectives for understanding them. Specifi
cally, our reliance on the imagery of “mental” or physical illness and
disease has contributed to discounting a more linguistic, narrative or meta
phorical analysis of the communications that we label as “ psychotic
symptoms.”
My own conviction in this regard is directly linked to my experience as
a psychotherapist. With great regularity I have found it increasingly pos
sible, throughout the course of discussion (therapy) with a “psychotic”
person, to understand certain symbolization used in their talk, and to see
how such poetic or camouflaged language may relate quite compellingly
to previously unexplored personal dilemmas or conflicts, or to previously
undisclosed trauma. With regularity I have seen that once reasonable
attention and discussion is devoted to those metaphorical uses of language
(what might be called the “symptoms” : the “thought disorders,” “delu
sions” or “hallucinations”) and to their referents (the traumas and con
flicts), that the “symptoms” fade from prominence, and are replaced by a
more direct discussion of the problematic traumas and conflicts them
selves.
But though these therapy experiences form the basis for this paper, I
will first present some more general criticisms of the “ mental health”
professions’ prevailing and predominant approach to the problem of “psy
chosis,” in order to show just how tenuous and unsupported those more
biological attempts at explanation are. Some organizations urge us to
define some behaviors as “symptoms” of “mental illness” or of a prob
able but as yet unproven brain disease. We are exhorted to “ learn to see the
sickness” (as in one prominent advertising campaign). But I propose that
this is akin to being urged to learn to see the emperor’s new clothes. That
is, we are being urged to blind ourselves to the “nakedness” (the lack of
substantiation of the medical metaphors and hypotheses), just as we are
being urged to ignore how some people (the “psychotic patients”) are
trying to communicate (albeit ambivalently and in a camouflaged manner)
with us.
We must remember that people receive the diagnosis of “schizophrenic”
or “psychotic” on the basis of their words or behavior, not based on the
status of their brains. It is, of course, not impossible that future medical
research will show us some substantive substrate of explanatory biological
fabric for “psychosis.” However, we should not lose sight of the fact that
we are being exhorted to see what is not yet established (that these are at
root medical “diseases”). We are being tacitly asked to collude in ignoring
Richard Shulman 81
certain alternative and, I believe, cogent explanations (“naked facts”) which

we also could see in front of our eyes.
In the Hans Christian Andersen tale, the strategy used by the tailors to
gain compliance with their shared falsehood was to let it be known that
those who could not see the fine clothes they were producing for the
Emperor were either fools or unfit for their posts. Similarly, we can see
parallels in the subtle coercion of the “mental health” professions. We are
exhorted and pressured to see the “sickness,” the “mental illness,” and to
use language suggesting disease, disability, mental incompetence, insanity
and biological illness. We are inherently asked to blind ourselves to the
possibility that there is camouflaged communication in what the people we
call “psychotic” are saying to us; and to the possibility that there may be
meaning in their “madness.”
QUESTIONING “SCHIZOPHRENIA” AS A DISEASE
The conception of “schizophrenia” as disease is questionable from sev

eral perspectives, some simply by analogy or comparison. Elsewhere in
work with troubled people, we accept that people can say things which we
don’t comprehend at first, can make statements which seem manifestly at
odds with reality, can deny certain accepted assumptions about their iden
tity, their experience or their memory. They can do these things in a way
which seems bizarre or initially inexplicable to a “rational” or relatively
“objective” observer. Yet we need not resort to exclusively or predomi
nantly medical hypotheses to explain such discrepancies. For example, in
the condition typically termed “multiple personality disorder,” a person
may tell us that they are five years old and named Sue, or five minutes
later, that they are 30 years old and named Sylvia. They may state that
these two entities have distinctly different memories and experiences and
no knowledge of each other. Since these descriptions are at odds with what
we call consensual reality, they could be labeled “psychotic.”
The literature on this form of human functioning and experience (or
“psychopathology”) points with near unanimity to potentially formative
childhood experiences which help account for these “psychotic” descrip
tions. Such childhood experiences are commonly known and documented
by now. Typically they involve repeated and cruel infliction of torture,
sexual and physical abuse, or exposure to a traumatic event such as the
witnessing of the violent death of a loved one (Putnam et al., 1986). These
powerful personal experiences, many of which are secret or unrevealed at
the outset of therapy, help us to understand how “psychotic” charactero-
logical configurations could be comprehended as adaptations to over-
whelming stress. They are “psychotic” configurations in the sense that

people describe their identity and experience in ways which are manifestly
at odds with consensual reality. As Rosenberg (1984) has pointed out, we
call actions, behavior or people “psychotic” when we initially can’t com
prehend their logic or point of view, and when we conclude that they are
inherently incomprehensible.
There has been some evidence of physiological correlates of aspects of
multiple personality disorder (Braun, 1983), and I am not arguing that
researchers should not investigate any human problem from any perspec
tive (sociological, chemical, anatomical, religious, economic, etc.) which
could conceivably prove illuminating or helpful. But certainly the case of
“multiple personality disorder” alerts us to the potentially central impor
tance of linguistic, psychotherapeutic, narrative or experiential studies of
people whom at first we might label “psychotic” (since we have not yet
made sense of their words and behavior). Along these lines, Sarbin (1986)
points to the dangers of tacitly accepting a mechanistic or positivistic
approach to science, which may then preclude productive contextualist or
narrative explorations that can contribute to our understanding of psycho
logical phenomena.
Given what we know of “multiple personality disorder,” we might then
posit that people adapt to stress in different ways. Some people get head
aches, some get anxious, some become sad and forlorn, some take their
frustrations out on others, and some people talk or describe themselves in
ways that at first seem incomprehensible to others, or report having experi
ences that seem inexplicable or unrealistic (“psychotic”). Certainly reports
of “hallucinations” by hostages who have been isolated while their lives
were threatened seem to support these inferences (Siegel, 1984).
Those who promulgate the metaphor of “mental illness” usually ignore
or deemphasize “ diagnostic” categories which link clear experiential pré
cipitants with the “ illnesses.” We are less likely to hear “multiple person
ality disorder” or “post-traumatic stress disorder” described as diseases
or “ mental illnesses.” Instead, the term “mental illness” tends to be
applied to situations in which peoples’ behavior or statements about them
selves initially appear to be perplexing or unexplained in terms of their life
experience. Such medical language often implies that there is some
unspecified biological disorder, or perhaps some biological marker which
is yet to be discovered, which would account for the unusual, disturbing or
incomprehensible thoughts or behavior.
In fact, Thomas Szasz’s (1976) critique of the conceptualization of
“schizophrenia” as a “ disease” emphasizes this frequently and conve
niently forgotten link in reasoning about “mental illness” : the typical
Richard Shulman 83
medical model of disease elucidation involves confirmation of the histo-

pathology (tissue pathology) or malfunction that underlies some humanly
unwanted or deleterious symptom or complaint. He notes that in the case
of “schizophrenia,” no underlying tissue pathology has ever been demon
strated. Instead, the “discovery” of the disease rather was its “ invention,”
when attention was called to a cluster of behaviors which seemed to
frequently coexist.
Elsewhere, Szasz (1987) incorporates the evidence compiled by the
“experts on diseases of the body, . . . pathologists.” He cites pathology
textbooks to show that although “ever since the earliest days of psychiatry,
psychiatrists have claimed that mental diseases are brain diseases; that
pathologists have never been able to confirm these claims" (p. 71, empha
sis in original). He concludes that “psychiatrists ought to convince
pathologists that schizophrenia is a brain disease before they take it upon
themselves to tell the public that it is such a disease or try to silence those
who disagree with them on this crucial issue” (p. 73).
The central point here, which we frequently keep ourselves blind to, is
that no one has ever been diagnosed as “psychotic” or “ schizophrenic”
on the basis of anything other than a judgment of their words and behavior.
Neither a CAT scan, an autopsy nor a test of neurotransmitters has ever
been used to diagnose this “disease,” nor could they be, because there is
no such demonstrated or reliable biological substrate. Burrell (1992) has
pointed to the specification of the DSM-III-R, noting that “schizophre
nia” can only be diagnosed when . . . “ It cannot be established that an
organic factor initiated and maintained the disturbance” (p. 192). Alterna
tively, “when a person presents with symptoms characteristic of Schizo
phrenia, the diagnosis can be made only when the clinician concludes,
after an appropriate evaluation, that no organic factor (such as a psychoac
tive substance or a brain tumor) can be established to have initiated and
maintained the disturbance” (p. 22). (See also Szasz (1987) on this issue.)
What Szasz articulates as a logical critique of our blind acceptance of
the term “ schizophrenia” as a disease, Sarbin and Mancuso (1980) rein
force through their critical review of much of the prominent recent litera
ture which purports to support the viability of “schizophrenia” as a useful
and distinct psychological term, and the literature that is usually cited to
substantiate the view that “schizophrenia” is a medical diagnosis with a
biological substrate. Like Szasz, they emphasize that repeated attempts to
scientifically shore up the diagnostically distinct psychological concept of
“schizophrenia,” or to find definitive or replicable biological markers of
any tissue pathology, have consistently failed. Among other powerful
critiques, they point out the regularity with which researchers who claimed
www.Ebook777.com
to have identified a psychological or biological correlate of “schizophre

nia” were generalizing from published findings of small but statistically
significant differences between the arithmetic means for groups of “schizo
phrenic” and “normal” samples. There were often substantial overlaps in
the data for each group, and often great variability in the data within the
“schizophrenic” samples. The authors point to the fallacy of assuming
that such findings, which were not routinely replicated, supported the
notion that the groups could be definitively differentiated by use of the
variables being studied. Many of these studies violated fundamental tenets
of research by failing to control for disguised aspects of the experimental
context, such as the use of major tranquilizers, or they failed to control for
other potentially intervening variables, such as intelligence, level of
education, the effects of institutionalization or patienthood experiences. I
will not summarize their work here, but I urge that their critique (Schizo
phrenia: Medical diagnosis or moral verdict?) be read by those who
tacitly accept the disease model of “ schizophrenia” as being either log
ically appropriate or confirmed by research. Sarbin later summarizes and
extends these arguments (1990, 1992).
Similarly, Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim (1988) review prominent psy
chiatric research and conclude that there is strong reason to consider other
approaches to studying the amorphous and indiscrete phenomena we call
“schizophrenic.” Their review convinces them that, “Not only is it
impossible to decide whether schizophrenia is a disease or a form of social
deviance without first identifying such an entity, but no meaningful
research can be carried out comparing schizophrenics to others without
first establishing the reliability and validity of the schizophrenia diagno
sis” (p. 305). After reviewing the inconsistent neurological, biochemical
and psychological research, they emphasize the lack of usefulness of
“schizophrenia” as a scientific category. They remind us that the “history
of science is littered with examples in which progress has been impeded
by the continued use of invalid categories leading to the persistent asking
of the wrong questions” (p. 317). The authors point to economic, political
and primarily guild interests (mostly involving organized psychiatry and
psychology) which may perpetuate such invalid diagnoses. These same
interests may promote a relatively blind “article of faith” in the potential
for future, more refined research to eventually document the validity of
“schizophrenia” as a label or as a medical/biological diagnosis or entity.
Their review argues for “ abandoning the ‘schizophrenia’ concept” in
favor of research into more discretely identified “psychotic symptoms.”
Persons’ (1986) paper, “The advantages of studying psychological phenom
Richard Shulman 85
ena rather than psychiatric diagnoses” makes similar and complementary

arguments.
Boyle (1990) goes into great detail to review flaws in logic and research
design in many studies which profess to strengthen the concept of
“schizophrenia” as a valid psychological or diagnostic category, or espe
cially to portray it as a disease. In one chapter of her book Schizophrenia:
A scientific delusion?, she critically reviews the claims of evidence for a
“genetic” factor in schizophrenia based on adoption and twin studies,
revealing the paucity of research support for the predominant biological
claims. She, like many authors cited here, also questions “Why has /the
concept of/ ‘schizophrenia’ survived?” Similar critiques of the research
claiming to establish the biological basis of “schizophrenia” are available
(Breggin, 1991; Cohen, 1989; Cohen & Cohen, 1986; Karon, 1991;
Karon, 1992; Lidz, 1973; Lidz & Blatt, 1983; Rose, 1984; Sass, 1992).
Breggin’s (1983) critical review of a segment of the literature on major
tranquilizers undermines a corollary to the medical model of schizophre
nia. He points out the historical falsification of the effects of major tran
quilizers that led to their inaccurate labeling as “ anti-psychotic” drugs. By
reviewing key research and recounting the historical derivation of these
drugs, he shows how their primary effect is tranquilizing, sedating, or in
his estimation “brain-disabling.” He demonstrates that, far from being a
specific treatment for a supposedly identifiable neurochemical malfunc
tion or disease, these drugs are cognitively repressive and disorienting
agents that affect all people (“normal” or not) as well as animals. He
points out how other medical specialties recognize this; only within psy
chiatry are these drugs relabeled and promoted with claims that they are a
specific treatment for a specific illness. For example, in emergency medi
cine, major tranquilizers are recognized as a sedating agent for any uncon
trolled, disruptive or belligerent patient (Clinton et al., 1987).
Breggin’s (1991) Toxic Psychiatry also summarizes and critiques
aspects of the literature which purport to identify “ schizophrenia” as a
disease, or to portray major tranquilizers as specific remedies for that
disease. He supports the reasoning of Sarbin and Mancuso (1980) by
pointing to evidence that the abnormalities that sometimes have been
shown to statistically differentiate groups of “ schizophrenics” from nor
mals on brain scans, or with regard to neurotransmitters, are probably not
innate anatomical or chemical markers of “schizophrenia.” Instead, he
argues that at least some of those abnormalities are evidence of the
iatrogenically-induced damaging effects of major tranquilizers, particularly
associated with long term consumption.
Rappaport et al. (1978a), in examining research evidence of “schizo
phrenics for whom drugs may be unnecessary or contraindicated” (p. 100),

summarize findings of phenothiazine effects “such as decreased sensoiy
and psychological sensitivity, decreased problem-solving ability and a
decreased ability to learn” (p. 107). In another review of evidence question
ing whether these drugs are more than “palliative,” Rappaport (1978b)
reviews “instances in which the use of antischizophrenic medication has
little or no effect and where its use is probably unnecessary” (p. 223). He
states that “the numbers of individuals involved cannot be considered by
any stretch of the imagination to be insignificant” (p. 223). Though he later
concludes “that antischizophrenia drugs are extremely valuable in favor
ably modifying unwanted psychological symptoms in some patients”
(p. 229), his review also reconfirms “patient complaints about being ‘held
down’ or being in a chemical straitjacket” (p. 223). Cohen and Cohen
(1986) acknowledge that many “patients” take such drugs willingly
because “they feel that the calming effects are worth a degree of discomfort
or diminished alertness” (p. 23). However, they underscore Coleman’s
(1984) crucial distinction: “it makes a difference whether a patient takes
drugs because he or she finds them helpful or because the patient believes
that modem science has discovered a brain abnormality that can be treated
with drugs” (Cohen & Cohen, 1986, p. 23).
I have witnessed psychiatrists warning colleagues to not openly use
terms such as “ chemical restraints” or “ major tranquilizers” in describing
such drugs, for fear that certain psychiatric practices might be criticized.
So, we are marshalled to deny what we see. But who among us in our
professional work has not seen these drugs used for just that purpose-to
subdue or sedate unwanted, unruly or initially incomprehensible behav
ior? Why is it that in some areas of psychiatric practice we are pressured to
describe these drugs in a biased manner? Again we can see the relevance
of the “ Emperor’s New Clothes” metaphor. Those who disagree with the
conventional view of “anti-psychotic” medication are seen as “fools” or
“unfit for their posts.”
Breggin (1991) also provides a lengthy historical and investigative
description of the guild competition among mental health professions, and
particularly of the increasing corporate alliance between the profession of
psychiatry and the pharmaceutical industry. Those two groups in particular
can have a mutual interest in describing human problems of confusing,
disturbing or disruptive behavior as if they were primarily reducible to
organic malfunctions. However, as we have seen, such organic substrates
are neither consistently substantiated by research nor confirmed in the
particular “patient.” Yet, those theories do provide the rationale for the
use of medication (which Breggin continues to demonstrate, provides a
Richard Shulman 87
basically “ brain disabling” effect), and a rationale for the position of

psychiatry as the authoritative force in explaining and managing troubled
or troubling people within society.
Along similar lines, Scull (1975) supplies an informative historical
account of how, in the nineteenth century, “that segment of the medical
profession which we now call psychiatry. . . acquired a monopolistic power
to define and treat lunatics” (p. 218). He points out that there was at that
time “a lack of any real knowledge base which would have given the
medical profession a rationally defensible claim to possess expertise vis-à-
vis insanity” (p. 222). Hence certain implicit parallels may be drawn histor
ically and sociologically to the professional debates and guild interests of
our own time. Since the period Scull describes, it has been “the psychia
trists /who/ possess the ultimate power to assign one person to the status of
being mentally ill, and to refuse the designation to another” (p. 221).
Leifer (1990) and Breggin (1991) describe instances in which vocal
critics of those biological theories and disease models have been threat
ened and censured, both by curtailment of teaching opportunities and
terminations of employment in academia, and by attempts to strip profes
sionals of their licenses. Colleagues inform me that biologically-oriented
professionals experienced similar professional repression in the past, when
psychosocial and psychoanalytic theories were more ascendant. Clearly,
such squelching of debate and academic freedom is reprehensible in the
service of anyone’s views, and it is scandalous in terms of what informa
tion it provides and denies both to the public and to relevant clinicians.
SOME PSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON “PSYCHOSIS”
Some writers have tried to make sense of “psychotic symptoms” from

a more experiential perspective. Bettelheim (1956) worked with “psy
chotic” children and began to wonder about the sense of terror, the emo
tional and cognitive confusion, and the distortions of reality he perceived.
He realized that he had seen such reactions previously in concentration
camp inmates and survivors. He began to conceptualize these “ symp
toms” as “ reactions to extreme situations,” by which he meant traumatic
and overwhelming situations from which the person could not withdraw or
escape. Support for such observations comes from other clinical areas. For
a considerable time we have had documentation of traumatic combat
situations which provoked “psychotic symptoms” (e.g., Grinker & Spie
gel, 1945). Dohrenwend and Egri (1981) provide evidence that “ sympto
matology of schizophrenia observed in combat situations is indistinguish
able from the symptoms of schizophrenia observed in patients from
civilian populations” (p. 17). They describe the stresses attendant to “pro
longed exposure to heavy combat,” reminding us that these “ extreme
situations” involve a loss of control in experiencing the “death of com
rades, threat of one’s own death or disablement. . . and being stripped of
. . . social support” (p. 18).
Similarly, Siegel’s (1984) inquiry into hostage situations which led to
hallucinatory experiences, suggests that these experiences derive from
“conditions of isolation, visual deprivation, restraint on physical move
ments, physical abuse, and threat of death” (p. 269). In attempting to
understand which of the hostages had “hallucinations,” he finds that “the
critical combination appears to be the presence of both isolation and the
threat of death” (p. 270).
Earlier in this paper, I pointed out the regularity with which people
described as exemplifying multiple personality disorder later revealed
excruciating instances or ongoing experiences of childhood trauma or
abuse. In describing the evolution of his observations about life situations
which contribute to “schizophrenia,” Lidz (1973) states:
Then, I noted during my residency that all of the schizophrenic

patients under my care came from disturbed or very peculiar fami
lies. Indeed, sometimes after spending an hour or two with one or
both of the patient’s parents, I would wonder just how long my
sanity or anyone’s sanity would withstand living with these people,
to say nothing of being raised by them. (p. 8)
Interest in the family milieu in which schizophrenic patients grew up

was stimulated further because close relatives of several patients,
who had not been taught that we were dealing with a disease of
unknown etiology, ignorantly explained to me just how the situation
in the patient’s family had driven the patient crazy, (p. 9, emphasis
added)
Where Freud had conceptualized his patient’s reports of incest as oedipal

fantasies, Lidz’s observations with these families led him to very different
conclusions. Lidz’s evidence suggested that “ when not reflecting actual
experiences, such reports occur when the patient’s fantasy had been stimu
lated by a parent’s near incestuous behavior or attitudes” (p. 112, note).
Karon (1991) expresses somewhat similar observations. He cites the
research on “ expressed emotion” (see for example Leff & Vaughn, 1980)
and “ parental communication deviance” in families of “ schizophrenic
patients” (research which is often associated supportively with Lidz’s
views), and continues:
Richard Shulman 89
In no case have I ever treated a schizophrenic whose life, as experi

enced, would not have driven me crazy. Where the therapeutically
reconstructed material concerned externally observable events, it has
been possible to confirm them. It is not isolated traumata, but contin
uing pressures, mediated through the resulting conscious and uncon
scious fantasy structures, which make human beings vulnerable. When
ever the family environment was unfortunate and the individual did
not end up psychotic, there were always people outside the family
who provided corrective identifications and experiences. Whenever
the family environment was not unfortunate and the individual
ended up psychotic, there were always traumatic experiences outside
the family which were overwhelming. (Karon, 1991, p. 8)
He states his clinical experience that “ in every case there are parent-child
interactions, whose consequences are hurtful, but different overt behaviors
occur in different families” (p. 7). But he also emphasizes that in previous
theorizing and research, portrayals of “the schizophrenegenic mother were
over-simplified and gross.” Earlier (Karon & VandenBos, 1981) he had
devoted considerable effort to contradicting the accusatory or guilt-ridden
view that parents of “ schizophrenics” were simply “criminal” or “evil.”
Lidz agrees:
The patient’s illness is far more tragic to the parents than to the thera
pist, and their noxious influences upon the patient were not malevo
lent but rather the product of their own personal tragedies and their
egocentric orientations, (p. 122)
Rosenberg (1984) examined the use of the term “ insane” by experts

and laymen, showing that both groups label a person’s behavior or speech
“ insane” when they are unable to account for the protagonist’s behavior
from that person’s perspective. However, Karon and VandenBos (1981) sup
ply case examples of therapeutic exploration of “schizophrenics’ ” seemingly
insane or incomprehensible verbalizations. They demonstrate that it is not an
impossible task to begin to-decipher some of the symbolism involved. For
instance, they describe the case of a man who was frequently seemingly
unprovokedly violent, who was often incoherent or silent, and who stated
cryptically, “You swallow a snake, and then you stutter; you mustn’t let
anyone know about it” (p. 38). The authors show how verbal and sym
bolic investigation revealed that as a child this man had been regularly
choked by a family member, had been incestuously raped, and later was
orally/sexually involved with a priest. These experiences previously had
been secret and undiscussed, and contributed to the man’s subsequent
speech impediment, as well as to his other formerly inscrutable behaviors

and verbalizations.
The Karon and VandenBos book is recommended to any student of
psychotherapy with “psychotic” patients, both for the illustrative sym
bolic case examples they discuss, and for their larger psychotherapy out
come research that documents the efficacy of psychotherapy in such situa
tions. Additionally, they examine critical flaws in most of the previous
psychotherapy research which had seemed to demonstrate the inefficacy
of psychotherapy with “schizophrenics.” Previous research frequently ignored
the inexperience of the therapists and supervisors studied, often utilizing
residents or therapists who had little experience with such “patients.”
Previous studies also used therapists who were involuntarily recruited to
do psychotherapy with psychotic patients. Other flaws cited were the
absence of either blind evaluation, or of long term follow-up measurement
in the studies. Karon (1989) later updates and expands his critical review
of studies which have compared the effects of psychotherapy with those of
medication in working with “ schizophrenics.”
However, much as I urge critical reading of these cited works, it was not
reading them that convinced me of the efficacy and importance of psycho
therapeutic exploration of “psychotic” verbalizations or other “ symp
toms.” Instead, I was first convinced through experiences in psychother
apy that were similar to those of Karon and VandenBos.
ILLUSTRATIVE THERAPY SESSIONS
First, let’s consider some vignettes from a therapy session with a “non-
psychotic patient.” (The following case examples are disguised for rea
sons of confidentiality). The man described at the beginning of this article
had been in outpatient therapy with me for several months when he came
to a session late. He said that he had stopped by his old therapist’s office,
but he had just missed her. Next he described a recent news story in which
a woman had given birth to a child and had left the baby in a dumpster. He
felt that she should be shot. He then mentioned that in his carpentry work
he’d recently dealt with a customer who had moved into a house that was
under construction and was not complete yet. He told me what a “dumb
move” he thought that was. Then he pointed out that I wasn’t saying
much. I was reminded that more than once recently he had mentioned
clocks or watches that “worked when they want to.” I pointed out that he
had mentioned not seeing his old therapist; that imagery had come up
about a mother abandoning a child, and about someone going into a new
situation that wasn’t really prepared adequately, and that he’d referred to
Richard Shulman 91
my quietness. I said that it made me wonder if there might be parallels

between what he’d said and the situation of leaving his old therapy and
starting with me. After being quiet for a while he shrugged as if to dismiss
my comment, and then began to speak of a guy he’d paid to fix his car. He
said that the guy had done a pretty good job, but then he’d jammed in a
part, damaging the trunk. I thought it best to be quiet.
Many of us are exposed to this manner of listening in therapy. It is a
conceptualization of the associations or verbalizations in therapy as being
expressive (perhaps on an indirect or “unconscious” level) of the emo
tional reactions of the client, and perhaps with particular relevance to
situations in the therapy. In this approach to psychodynamic understand
ing, most prominently discussed by both Searles and Langs, particular
attention is given to seeing client communications as “ derivative com
mentaries” (Langs, 1976) which express the client’s emotional reactions
to actual actions and attitudes of the therapist. From this perspective, the
patient’s associations are seen as unconscious supervision by which “the
patient is therapist to his analyst” (Searles, 1975a). In the session just
described, I believed that this man’s associations may have held some
relevance to his reaction to me and my seeming lack of involvement in the
therapy. His subsequent vignette may also have expressed his reaction to,
and partial criticism of, my comment. That is why I decided to be quiet. In
later weeks, I noticed that this man spoke regularly of his tendency to jam
on his brakes when driving on the highway, whenever he sensed he was
being followed too closely.
In this approach to listening in psychotherapy, it is not of primary
importance whether something a patient says is factually or realistically
true or accurate. The job of the therapist is not conceptualized as being a
judge of the (“manifest level”) literal truth or accuracy of statements.
Instead, statements are examined to try to appreciate levels of feeling and
communication that may be more subtle, or harder to describe, more
complicated, conflicted or ambivalent, perhaps less categorical, perhaps
more dreamlike, more awesome, emotionally poignant, or unspeakable.
In the clinical situation just mentioned, the imagery of a car following
too closely, or of something being jammed into someone’s trunk, turned
out to be a very apt symbolic or poetic expression of a central concern of
this man. These images foreshadowed a gradual direct discussion of very
real and formative traumatic sexual experiences he had had which contrib
uted heavily to his difficulties with men in particular.
But once emphasis is given to listening to therapeutic communications
from a metaphorical, symbolic perspective, any preoccupation with judg
ing the literal accuracy of a person’s statements becomes irrelevant. If a
patient in a session chose to tell us that they were a baby in a dumpster,

rather than simply relating a news item with a similar theme, should we
abandon the search for the potential underlying meanings of such an
assertion (since we judge the communication to be literally not true, and
hence “ psychotic” )? Why would we understand the statement to be so
radically different from what this man said to me?
By way of further comparison, in trying to understand a dream, we may
scan the descriptions for potential personal or idiographic meanings, or
their relevance to current situations. But most therapists wouldn’t consider
criticizing the seeming illogicalities of the dream imagery as a way of
invalidating potential relevancies of the dream. Why would we therefore
stop the search for metaphorical relevance in client communications gen
erally, just because the communications may seem implausible, unrealis
tic, or “psychotic” on a manifest level?
Here is a brief example. A woman applied to return to therapy in the
clinic where she had seen a male therapist years before. He had left the
clinic and she had continued to work with him in a new setting. Part of the
therapy had focused on her past history of sexual abuse. The therapist had
encouraged her to confront her family about this secret. When she failed to
follow some of the suggestions he felt were most important for her, he
ended the therapy. She returned to the old clinic for an intake interview. To
be helpful, the old therapist spoke with the intake worker, reviewing the
course of the therapy and discussing the referral. In the intake interview,
the patient spoke about her father. She said he ran a prostitution ring, and
she also believed that he called ahead to any stores or other places where
she went. She said that wherever she went, people had already been con
tacted by him.
In a subsequent staff meeting, the woman was given a psychotic diag
nosis. The staff reasoned that there was no evidence in reality that her
father ran a prostitution ring, and that her other concern, that anyone she
met had already been contacted by him, seemed “paranoid.” There were
suggestions that she would only be appropriate for “treatment” by
“medication” and not by “ therapy.”
Instead, the patient’s cogent metaphorical communication describing
pimping and procurement might have alerted staff to ways in which the
actions of the previous therapist and of the intake worker may have been
recreating traumatic patterns reminiscent of her sexual abuse. We might
remember that the previous therapist had tried to run her life, at least to
some extent, and he had eventually terminated her therapy when she
wouldn’t do what he said. Her reference to her father’s intrusive commu
nication similarly might have poignantly expressed her sense of violation
Richard Shulman 93
or contamination at the communication between the old therapist and the

intake worker.
Here is a condensed clinical example of how “psychotic” communica
tions may be explored for their metaphorical relevance. I saw a young man
in therapy who had recently been hospitalized on several occasions, in part
for his disruptiveness and “hyper-religiosity.” He had begun to stay up
late at night, while living in his mother and step-sister’s home, and he
would preach to them from the Bible because he felt that he needed to get
them to change. He thought perhaps he was Jesus Christ. At times he
would be silent for long periods of time. He also said he sometimes had
visions of people’s faces being mangled or crushed. Only much later did
he add that they were often the faces of his family.
Over the course of some family therapy sessions the man spoke of the
devil being in his house, though some people might not know it, or might
not want to talk about it. Certain sexual references were made as he
described the devil coming into people’s rooms at night. When such imag
ery had recurred, I questioned whether any devilish or sexual secrets had
actually gone on in the home. Eventually, when this symbolism and my
question had come up more than once, the step-sister asked if I meant
something like the time she had put rubber bands and clamps on his geni
tals. She eventually revealed that she had secretly physically and sexually
abused him for an ongoing period of time when they were left alone as
children. She also related these acts to the beatings her mother secretly had
given her. These revelations came out quite haltingly, over a long period of
time, and were accompanied by expressions of her fear that she was respon
sible for driving her stepbrother crazy. She hinted repeatedly at her guilty
feelings and looked to the patient for some confirmation or disagreement.
He would avoid eye contact and become silent at such times. When pressed,
he denied that she had hurt him, telling me privately that such abuse
couldn’t have happened because he didn’t have a stepsister.
At one point the young man was required to have an appointment with
a psychiatrist. He insisted to me that he did not want to be returned to
prescriptions of major tranquilizers. I emphasized that he should feel free
to tell the psychiatrist how he felt. When he had that meeting, it was noted
in the chart that the man had said little and was seen as “catatonic,” and
that the psychiatrist next met with the man’s mother and privately gave her
medication for him.
At the next meeting with the family, the client began to speak of how he
had cut up vitamin pills and had given them to a young relative to drink,
unbeknownst to her, mixed with her juice. As he continued to talk, imag
ery of poison came up, and of coercion. His mother insisted that he was
“talking crazy,” and that no such events with juice and vitamins had
happened. I suggested that perhaps his comments were relevant, pointing
out the potential parallel with what had evidently happened with the psy
chiatrist, the mother and the medication. He then produced numerous
stories of lurid, illegal and sometimes sexual activities that occurred
around his home, that he knew of and that others either didn’t know of or
didn’t want to speak of. Eventually the discussion led back again to the
sexual abuse that had never been fully discussed. The mother discounted
and disparaged her son’s remarks, pointing out the manifest illogicalities
in some of the stories he told. She hinted that she didn’t want to continue
such discussions, while simultaneously complaining that her son’s feelings
were “too bottled up” and that he didn’t communicate enough. The step
sister, in the mother’s absence, later revealed other previously secret inces
tuous contacts which had occurred in the family years ago, between other
adults and herself and other children.
Here is another clinical example. I worked with a young woman who
felt confused and vague about what her problems were, and why she had
made several suicide attempts. She had been hospitalized numerous times
and was viewed as “psychotic” each time. For months at a time she told
me that it seemed inexplicable that she kept repeatedly and inescapably
thinking of a guy in a leather jacket. She insisted that those thoughts were
her only problem. However, she often had been hospitalized when she was
very upset and felt certain that others were trying to kill her. She had told
me that she had started years of intermittent hospitalizations following her
father’s abrupt death when she was a teenager. When her mother joined
her for family therapy sessions, certain missing pieces were described.
The mother began to point out that, while she insisted that she had
never minded her husband’s actions, for years he had chosen to spend the
vast majority of his free time with his daughter. He would bathe her and
tuck her into bed at night, often falling asleep there in her bed. The mother
then pointed out that his bathing of the girl had continued into her teenage
years, and that the girl (client) should not have permitted this. It became
increasingly clear that part of the legacy of the father’s untimely death was
the mother’s manifestly denied but repeatedly insinuated blaming of her
daughter for his abrupt illness years ago. The mother spontaneously men
tioned several times that she had never been bothered by the father’s
allotment of his time and attention. The daughter seemed to me to be
unusually timid and deferential in her mother’s presence. However
eventually, and after great struggle, she pointed out that despite her moth
er’s repeated spontaneous assertions that there had never been any com
Richard Shulman 95
petition or bad feelings between the two females, that she-smiling tenta
tively at first as she said this-thought that perhaps there were.
In subsequent individual sessions, this young woman told me that she’d
realized why she was always thinking about men in leather jackets. If she
were with such a tough man, maybe he’d beat her mother up. Parallels
regarding her thoughts about myself and her father began to be explored.
Eventually she told me, “ I stay sick rather than let out my anger at my
mother.”
Interestingly, it should be noted that the occasion for these revealing
family sessions was her mother’s insistence that I fill out forms declaring
her daughter to be mentally disabled, so that money could be made avail
able to the daughter from a fund related to the deceased father. The daugh
ter felt more ambivalent about this decision, particularly since being
declared disabled would suggest a disqualification of her mental faculties
and perspective. There also seemed to be a sense in which another legacy
of the father’s death would be the concretization of her identity as a
“mental patient.” But she alternated in saying that she deserved the
money. Eventually the mother influenced her daughter to find a different
therapist.
Another example will give a picture of “psychotic” communication in
finer detail, with another “ schizophrenic” client who’d been hospitalized
numerous times. This middle aged man told me in his intake session that
his previous therapist was a very pushy and provocative man, and
described his own similar conflicts with his father. He pointedly declared
any discussion of certain other familial issues as being off limits. He next
met privately with a psychiatrist to arrange medication. I was later
informed that that physician had recommended an injectable major tran
quilizer which the client rejected. The psychiatrist acceded reluctantly to
the man’s request for an oral (pill) form.
However, I didn’t know of these things before the first therapy group
the man attended, where he immediately remarked on the quietness and
the laissez-faire manner in which I conducted the group. This was unlike
the “pushy” therapist, he said, who would “make you talk, dragging
things out of you, if necessary.” He kept interrupting the otherwise rela
tively quiet group saying, “You’re going to pull this out of me anyway, I
just know you’ll tear it out of me, so I might as well tell you.” He then
proceeded to tell me about strange occurrences within his brain. He asked
if I knew what androgens were. I asked if he meant the hormone. He
corrected me, explaining how androgens where when your brain was
taken and made into a machine (note the possible play on the word
‘androids’). This, he told me, was his basic problem: that his brain was
being turned into a machine. He elaborated by referring to the movie The

Stepford Wives. (That movie was based on the novel of the same name
(Levin, 1972) in which a married woman, new to a suburban New England
town, gradually discovers that each local housewife is being secretly
replaced by a robotic version of herself which will be more servile to her
husband. Also, on the day that the protagonist herself eventually succumbs
to the forced replacement, she first tries to appeal to a psychiatrist, who
instead gives her tranquilizers and suggests that she needs therapy.)
The psychiatrist with whom he had recently met joined the group dur
ing this lengthy and excited discourse by this man who was dominating the
group with his loud and rambling embellishments of the above noted
themes. Gradually, the psychiatrist suggested to the client, gently but
indirectly, that perhaps he should have an increase in his medication.
When it became clear that the physician was suggesting the medication
increase, the man turned to me and asked what I thought. I told him that I
saw the issue differently. I pointed out that he’d been talking about power
ful doctors, about his expectation of having things tom out of him, and
having his brain turned from something human into something machine
like, as well as The Stepford Wives imagery. If those were his concerns,
perhaps he was saying that tranquilizers, or an increased dosage, weren’t
what he wanted.
Some weeks later, the same psychiatrist told me that a close relative of
this man had written to him requesting that we: (1) insure that the client be
declared disabled and get state financial support, and (2) not let him stop
taking medications as he’d done in the past when he’d “gone off his
rocker,” and (3) give the man injectable major tranquilizers in spite of his
objection. The psychiatrist told me that he had already written back,
acknowledging the letter and generally agreeing with the relative, while
pointing out that the client had declined injections. He gave me copies of
both letters for filing.
When this man came in for the next group, I told him what I knew of
the situation, told him that I hadn’t read the letters, but that he was wel
come to see them. He read them, smiled, and immediately began to protest
that this was a misunderstanding-that he agreed completely with his rela
tive and the psychiatrist, and that he had always agreed to the injectable
medication. He preferred it, in fact. He later talked about how his only
financial support came from some family members, and that he would just
have to wait until they died to get an inheritance. Then he spoke at length
about how his mind was being replaced by a machine, and how everything
he saw, thought or heard was being broadcast to New Haven. I didn’t see
the connection until the end of the group when I found a state disability
Richard Shulman 97
evaluation form in my mail box, sent to me by the man’s relative, with a

return address in New Haven. After the group, the man remained to
receive an injection of major tranquilizers by syringe.
In the next session he attended, this man described a vignette in which
he had been sitting, minding his own business and smoking a cigarette,
when a person came up to him and threatened him with a knife. He said
that the guy who threatened him must be crazy, and the only way to handle
such a crazy person was to get out of there. I thought perhaps it was not an
accident that he had mentioned his assailant’s ethnic background (which
was the same as that of the psychiatrist), and that he had spoken of being
threatened with a sharp object.
Here is another, more longitudinal description of a therapy. This young
woman had been hospitalized previously many times, often with different
“psychotic” diagnoses. She spent her first individual session speaking of
the fact that people’s eyes changed. She asked me if I knew of time
shifting, how people could come from the past into the future and vice
versa. Primarily she spoke of her telepathic contact with a popular celeb
rity who had been her childhood lover and therapist. This celebrity often
said demeaning things to her, but he had also been the best lover. He
maintained contact with her now by putting voices into her head. She also
told me that her mother was a famous novelist. That was not literally true,
but I later learned that the author she named was known for her sexually
explicit writings with incestuous overtones, and for some biographical
controversy regarding the reality of her own incestuous experiences.
Over some months in therapy she seemed to hint indirectly at her fears
about our relationship. As I would wonder out loud about the potential
meaning of stories she told me, she would then often speak more directly
of her fears that I didn’t like her, was bored or angry, or didn’t think she
merited individual therapy sessions. Many times I felt the issue of my
trustworthiness was being raised, particularly whether I would take
responsibility for my contribution to some difficulty between us. For
instance, once I returned to the clinic office to be told by a secretary that a
relative of this woman had called long distance several times in my
absence, and was again on the phone now asking to speak with me. I chose
to take the call, explaining to the relative that I could say nothing about
someone in therapy. I agreed to hear the relative out, with the understand
ing that I would repeat all that was said to the client later. The relative then
criticized my attempts to help the client, telling me that I didn’t realize
how sick she was and how much more directive involvement she needed.
When I opened the next individual session by relaying this occurrence to
the woman, and acknowledging the potential breach in confidentiality in my
handling of the situation, she assured me that this was fine and that I could
continue to handle such situations in the same way in the future. She then told
a vignette about her boyfriend, whom she thought was unfaithful to her. She
thought he might have given out the keys to their apartment to someone else.
She also said that she thought that their phone was tapped. I pointed out the
potential parallel between her vignette and how I had started the session; that
my handling of the phone call could be described as a breach or unfaithful
ness in a relationship, or the violation of a trust involving a previously secure
structure or private conversation. She said nothing at first, but then nodded
her head vigorously. We discussed how to handle such situations in the
future, with her choosing that I should not accept calls from anyone.
Not long after that, by chance I encountered this woman as we both
were swimming in a public pool. I was particularly uncomfortable with
this because of her ongoing references to her celebrity therapist/lover. In
the following weeks I pointed out her indirect references to relationships
in which boundaries were blurred, and in which people were potentially
devious, sometimes with sexual overtones. I referred specifically to the
swimming pool encounter, and I decided to reiterate the limited and spe
cific nature of our work relationship together.
As our work continued, this woman increasingly hinted at sexual con
cerns. One afternoon, uncharacteristically, she telephoned me. She sounded
very shaken and frightened as she told me that she was “ beginning to
remember things.” She went on to detail how she had been molested as a
child by that celebrity, or someone who looked like him. (I had previously
noticed that there were two men about whom she would sometimes vacil
late in recounting memories, saying it was “either him or someone who
looked like him”-the celebrity and her father.) She said that a cuddly
stuffed animal toy had been used to violate her sexually. She calmed
eventually as we talked, but I was still surprised later in the afternoon
when she called me, quite emotionally composed, and told me that those
things she had described hadn’t happened. She said she had made them up.
At times this woman acceded to family members’ requests for family
sessions. Guidelines were established making clear that we would only
meet at her discretion, and that only she could choose to reveal any mate
rial from the individual sessions. With her mother present she began to use
imagery of sexual secrets, referring to events that had occurred previously.
Eventually, since it appeared that the mother was hinting at her discomfort
with the daughter’s allusions to sexuality, the daughter seemed to more
directly request to discuss sexual incidents that may have occurred when
she was a child. The mother looked genuinely chagrined and uncomfort
able, but eventually spoke of how school counselors had pointed to pos
Richard Shulman 99
sible sexual imagery in pictures her daughter had drawn as a girl. The
mother then compellingly spoke at length about her own very rigid
upbringing, and the supreme discomfort she felt in discussing sexual mat
ters. She described her sense of being overwhelmed, unprepared and
unable to deal with them as a mother years ago. She very tentatively
agreed that perhaps there had been sexual occurrences or preoccupations
that had troubled her daughter since childhood. The daughter seemed very
attuned to her mother’s hints at how frightening and threatening she found
these topics to be. I was reminded of the times my client had told me that
she received government money as a pay-off for her silence, and that she
feared she would be killed if she discussed certain topics.
Some weeks later I was notified that this woman had been brought to
the emergency room by her family members, who were trying to convince
her to be admitted to an inpatient unit. It was the day of her usual session,
so I offered for her to keep that appointment if she chose to. She showed
up with her family. Family members started out by telling her that she
wasn’t rational right now, and that she should recognize that she was sick,
and that her “schizophrenia” was probably going into phase. She was
quiet at first. Eventually she interrupted, yelling about a plot, a conspiracy
with the CIA and the FBI involved, and that everyone seemed to be
brainwashed and hypnotized. She told me that she thought I was brain
washed too. She then started to hint at sexual intrigues or secrets. When I
got her permission to comment on the “plot” and “brainwashed” imagery
and the reference to sexual intrigues, I connected these images with the
discussion in the last family session. She began to calm a bit. I ended by
asking what had happened with that discussion since the last family ses
sion. She then yelled, “That’s just it! No one will talk to me about it!”
During this session, the family eventually confirmed that when the
patient was a girl, some adult sexual infidelities had led to a gory death in
the family’s presence. Actual death threats at that time, as well as the fear
that the courts might still now intervene if other illegalities and sexual
misconduct were revealed, made people quite hesitant to speak openly.
However, it was eventually revealed that the client was not the only sibling
who had confirmed that ongoing secret sexual abuse of children by adults
had taken place in the home. At the end of the session, one family member
who had been quite verbally abusive and threatening toward me on some
occasions, sincerely asked me if I thought that the family might be under
mining the therapy.
Here are a few other highly condensed descriptions of what I saw as the
central imagery that developed and was explicated in therapy with other
“ schizophrenic” patients:
A woman felt that for years she had lived within a conspiracy against
her in which people wanted her to be sick or die. She wondered if the
conspirators wanted her to drink bleach. She was unsure if she’d ever been
made to drink urine or to eat worms, and she had a vision of having a
group of men sticking a bird down her throat. More than once, as I would
sit with my hands together, supporting my head, and with my fingers
under my nose, she would exclaim, “Dr. Shulman, why are you jamming
your penis up my vagina?” Eventually she began to have memories of
having been raped by a group of men, in one instance, and revealed other
chaotic and frightening aspects of her sexual history both within and
without her family.
A woman who was usually silent in group therapy was provoked and
taunted by a male group member of another ethnic group. She began to
scream at him that she was a full blooded Sioux Indian (not factually true)
and told him that she would take a tomahawk to him and turn him into a
squaw, and then dance around inside his tepee and see how he liked it. At
a later group she revealed a childhood history of racially tinged rapes.
A teenage girl who dressed revealingly and applied unusually large
amounts of makeup spoke very little, but sometimes mentioned visions of
snakes crawling into her bedroom at night. Eventually she told of ongoing
incest which was corroborated by others.
A woman nervously asked to have her young daughter accompany her
to her first appointment with a male therapist. She then spoke of how she
had tried to keep Martians out of her room when they hovered by the
window, but that they intruded in spite of her closing the window and
blinds, and they abducted her. She hesitated, looking at her daughter, but
then explained how her captors “examined” her and hurt her in exploring
her genital region. She then had her daughter leave the room as we began
to explore the possible connections with actual sexual assaults, which she
then began to say she had sustained. She also elaborated on a recurring
image she had had of male figures who come towards her menacingly. She
described how she cries out, but no one hears what she says.
CONCLUSION
Other writers have documented the benefits of similar therapeutic

explorations. In The severed soul, analyst Herbert Strean (Strean & Free
man, 1990) gives an extended case study to demonstrate the amenability
of “psychotic” or “schizophrenic” primary process verbalizations to tradi
tional psychoanalytic exploration (see also Strean & Freeman, 1988).
Peter Breggin’s Toxic psychiatry (1991) gives other similar case examples.
Richard Shulman 101
In their book Psychotherapy of schizophrenia: The treatment of choice

(1981), Karon and VandenBos illustrate through case materials how explo
ration of such verbalizations provides clues as to their unconscious expres
sion of reactions to trauma and conflict. Others provide similar examples
of explorations of metaphors in psychoanalysis or psychotherapy with
“schizophrenics” (e.g., Boyer & Giovacchini, 1980; Langs & Searles,
1980; Ferreira, 1960; Karon, 1992; Searles, 1965; Will, 1961). Modrow
(1992) recounts in autobiographical detail the compounded tensions in his
family and early life which led to his own unusual behaviors and fantasy,
earning him the diagnosis “schizophrenic.”
Spence (1987) criticizes the tendency toward “narrative smoothing” in
most condensed case presentations. I believe his arguments raise important
issues. Clearly, the clinical situations I presented here have emphasized
certain of the symbolic highlights or recurrent themes in each therapy. The
reader sees these events only through my eyes, in condensed form and with
hindsight. However, I emphasize that I am not urging clinicians to accept
my viewpoint on the subject of metaphorical communication in “psychotic
symptoms” solely on the basis of these descriptions. Instead, I urge clini
cians to listen to people with such “symptoms” and “diagnoses” in ther
apy, and to judge my perspective based on their own subsequent experience.
Certainly I am trying to be compelling here in recreating the stories of these
people’s lives. But that is because I have been compelled by these camou
flaged communications, which repeatedly seemed to be hinting at traumatic
and deeply upsetting experiences. Such seemingly formative and traumatic
experiences have come into sharper focus and have regularly been con
firmed in reality over the course of discussion in therapy. The strongest
argument I can provide that does not depend heavily on the inevitable
human appeal, charm and drama of a case description, is to encourage
clinicians to try such an exploratory approach in therapy themselves.
I urge clinicians to avoid being blinded or prejudiced by predominant
theoretical models which suggest that the temporary incomprehensibility
of someone’s actions or speech can be resolved by the affixing of labels
such as “delusions,” “hallucinations,” “thought disorders” or “psy
choses” ; as if those labels explained to us that these phenomena should be
deemed (or dismissed as) narratively or symbolically invalid, inexpressive
or ultimately incomprehensible. Those models then suggest to clinicians
that they should take such clinical phenomena as “ symptoms” of a “ dis
eased mind,” or evidence of an incompetent person. The “patient” is then
seen as someone who should be “helped” by a “ supportive,” “directive”
or semi-paternal or authoritarian relationship. In other words, such tempo
rarily incomprehensible words and actions are taken as a cue or justifica-
tion for ending therapeutic exploration between two consenting and com
petent autonomous adults, and for beginning a relationship which is
invalidating for the “patient,” and which is symbiotically dominant/sub
missive. Szasz (1976) describes the relationship that typically develops
when “ schizophrenia” is “ treated” as a “disease.”
I will conclude by mentioning some writers who offer corollary support
for the perspective I have presented. Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson
(1967) state that “psychiatric symptoms” of “schizophrenia,” viewed
from the standpoint of communication studies, suggest that these symp
toms may be viewed as a “reaction to an absurd or untenable communica-
tional context (a reaction that follows, and therefore perpetuates, the rules
of such a context) . . . ” (p. 47). My repeated observations (such as the
cases cited) suggest to me that their viewpoint is relevant and accurate, and
contributes to understanding each individual therapeutic puzzle presented
to us in clinical practice. Their view also suggests just how powerful it can
be to break that cycle of problematic communication.
Rosenberg’s (1984) analysis of “psychosis” emphasizes:
These symptoms of schizophrenia are enormously varied. Some

involve thought, some affect, some behavior. There is no obvious
logical connection among them. Although they are apt to be charac
terized by distress and disability, the chief feature that they have in
common, we believe, is that naive external observers are unable to
understand the response in terms of the actor’s frame of reference,
intentions, motives, or desires, in ways that fit the observer’s theo
ries about the wellsprings of human action. When this occurs, the
behavior is viewed as insane, (p. 293)
The author underlines that, for professionals and laymen, the determina
tion of “ sanity” or “psychosis” is based on the ability of the observer to
understand or “take” the role of the other (the patient), with one excep
tion. People are not judged to be insane “when the observer attributes the
failure to take the role of the other to his or her own limitations” (p. 289).
Only after considerable clinical experience with case examples such as
those cited did I read Ferenczi’s (1932/1949) “ Confusion of Tongues. . . ”
paper. Although such aspects of psychoanalysis were not commonly dis
cussed then, Ferenczi felt that his patients were often critical of him, in a
way that was expressed in somewhat veiled communication. When he
began to respond to those criticisms, with some acknowledgement of the
element of accuracy in their descriptions of his inevitable faults, flaws or
mistakes, he found that people were more likely to begin to reveal to him
formative traumatic events and patterns in their childhoods. He felt that it
Richard Shulman 103
was a unique and moving therapeutic event for such people to have a
powerful figure acknowledge responsibility for their hurtful contribution
to their difficulties. It was on the basis of numerous revelations of trauma
by patients in therapy that Ferenczi urged Freud to reconsider the change
of position he had taken, in which Freud abandoned his original thesis that
emotional difficulties tend to stem from actual trauma (sexual and other
wise), and not from unconscious fantasies. (We have already seen how
Lidz / 1973/ came to a similar viewpoint.)
It is worth repeating the factors that Ferenczi believed facilitated revela
tions of both trauma and complicated emotional binds in therapeutic work.
He came to focus on camouflaged and ambivalent communication that
often suggested a criticism of the therapist. He found that it was a powerful
therapeutic intervention to acknowledge the potential relevance of that
communication within the therapy, and with special regard to actual
actions and comments of the therapist that are, to at least some extent,
accurately perceived as injurious or hurtful. For the “psychotic” patient,
this also entails acknowledgement of the “meaning in their madness,” the
relevance of their primary process associations, particularly in the context
of the therapeutic situation.
In this regard I am reminded of two quotes. Szasz (1976) said: “Actu
ally, often the only thing ‘wrong’ (as it were) with the so-called schizo
phrenic is that he speaks in metaphors unacceptable to his audience, in
particular to his psychiatrist” (p. 23). Twenty years previous to that, Bate
son, Jackson, Haley and Weakland (1956) had noted, “the peculiarity of
the schizophrenic is not that he uses metaphors, but that he uses unlabeled
metaphors” (p. 253). Later they pointed out: “The convenient thing about
a metaphor is that it leaves it up to the therapist. . . to see an accusation in
the statement if he chooses, or to ignore it if he chooses” (p. 255).
I urge clinicians to consider doing traditional, consensual, exploratory
therapy, that includes reasonable attention and respect for therapeutic frame
and boundaries, with the people we call “schizophrenic.” Consider the possi
bility that a metaphorical (or unconscious) commentary is being provided,
just as you might listen for it in therapy with others. Let it be your guide. I
believe you will be convinced of the poetic relevance of what is being said.
It is possible to do a voluntary, exploratory, uncovering or psychody-
namically informed therapy with the people we call “psychotic” or
“schizophrenic” that is not so different from therapy with other people.
Although the metaphors that are explored at first may seem relatively
more unusual, bizarre or somewhat alien; to borrow a phrase from Harry
Stack Sullivan, the therapy and the life stories that emerge, nevertheless
will be “more human than otherwise.”
NOTE
1. Language can both communicate and conceal. Throughout this paper I use
quotation marks to demarcate certain commonly used psychiatric terms and con
cepts that connotatively perpetuate a perspective that I wish to call into question.
The quotations serve as a reminder to the reader to question certain problematic
assumptions that I believe develop from our uncritical use of those terms.
REFERENCES
American Psychiatric Association. (1987) Diagnostic and statistical manual o f
mental disorders. (3rd ed., rev.). Washington, D.C.: Author.
Andersen, H. C. (1981) “The Emperor’s new clothes,” in Michael Hague's favour
ite Hans Christian Andersen fairy tales. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Bateson, G., Jackson, D., Haley, J. & Weakland J. (1956) Toward a theory of
schizophrenia. Behavioral Science, (1) 251-264.
Bentall, R., Jackson, H. & Pilgrim, D. (1988) Abandoning the concept o f ‘schizo
phrenia’: Some implications of validity arguments for psychological research
into psychotic phenomena. British Journal o f Clinical Psychology, (27)
303-324.
Bettelheim, B. (1956) Schizophrenia as a reaction to extreme situations. American
Journal o f Orthopsychiatry, (26) 507-518.
Boyer, L. B. & Giovacchini, P. L. (1980) Psychoanalytic treatment o f schizo
phrenic, borderline, and characterological disorders. New York: Aronson.
Boyle, M. (1990) Schizophrenia: A scientific delusion? London: Routledge.
Breggin, P. (1983) Psychiatric drugs: Hazards to the brain. New York: Springer.
Breggin, P. (1991) Toxic psychiatry. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Burrell, M. (1992) ‘Schizophrenia’ as a strategic concept, not brain disease. Given
at American Psychological Association Convention, Washington, DC.
Clinton, J., Sterner, S., Stelmachers, Z. & Ruiz, E. (1987) Haloperidol for sedation
o f disruptive emergency patients. Annals o f Emergency Medicine, (16)
319-322.
Cohen, D. (1989) Biological basis of schizophrenia: The evidence reconsidered.
Social Work, (34) 255-257.
Cohen, D. & Cohen, H. (1986) Biological theories, drug treatments, and schizo
phrenia: A critical assessment. The Journal o f Mind and Behavior, (7) 11-36.
Coleman, L. (1984) The reign o f error. Boston: Beacon Press.
Dohrenwend, B. P. & Egri, G. (1981) Recent stressful life events and episodes of
schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, (7/1) 12-23.
Ferenczi, S. (1949) Confusion o f tongues between the adult and the child. Interna
tional Journal o f Psycho-Analysis, (30) 225-230.
Ferreira, A. (1960) The semantics and the context of the schizophrenic’s lan
guage. Archives o f General Psychiatry, (3) 128-138.
Flack, W. Jr., Miller, D. & Weiner, M., eds. (1991) What is schizophrenia? New
York: Springer-Verlag.
Richard Shulman 105
Grinker, R. R. & Spiegel, J. P. (1945) Men under stress. Philadelphia: Blakiston.

Karon, B. and VandenBos, G. (1981) Psychotherapy o f schizophrenia: The treat
ment o f choice. New York: Aronson.
Karon, B. (1989) “Psychotherapy versus medication for schizophrenia: Empirical
comparisons” in The limits o f biological treatments fo r psychological distress.
Fisher, S. & Greenberg, R., eds. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Karon, B. (1991) Interaction between genetic vulnerability and rearing environ
ment: Discussion of Dr. Pekka Tienari’s paper. Given at Xth International
Symposium for the Psychotherapy of Schizophrenia, Stockholm, Sweden.
Karon, B. (1992) The fear of understanding schizophrenia. Psychoanalytic
Psychology, (9) 191-211.
Langs, R. (1976) The bipersonal field. New York: Aronson.
Langs, R. & Searles, H. F. (1980) Intrapsychic and interpersonal dimensions of
treatment. New York: Aronson.
Leff, J. & Vaughn, C. (1980) The interaction of life events and relative’s
expressed emotion in schizophrenia and depressive neurosis. British Journal o f
Psychiatry, (136) 146-153.
Leifer, R. (1990) Introduction: The medical model as the ideology of the thera
peutic state. The Journal o f Mind and Behavior, (11) 247-258.
Levin, I. (1972) The Stepford wives. New York: Random House.
Lidz, T. (1973) The origin and treatment o f schizophrenic disorders. New York:
Basic Books.
Lidz, T. & Blatt, S. (1983) Critiques of Danish-American studies of biological and
adoptive relatives of adoptees who became schizophrenic. American Journal
o f Psychiatry, (140) 426-435.
Modrow, J. (1992) How to become a schizophrenic. Everett, Washington: Apol-
lyon Press.
Persons, J. B. (1986) The advantages of studying psychological phenomena rather
than psychiatric diagnoses. American Psychologist, (41/11) 1252-1260.
Putnam, F. W., Guroff, J. J., Silberman, E. K , Barban L. & Post, R. M. (1986) The
clinical phenomenology of multiple personality disorder. Journal o f Clinical
Psychiatry, (47) 285-293.
Rappaport, M., Hopkins, H. K , Hall, K , Belleza, T. & Silverman, J. (1978a) Are
there schizophrenics for whom drugs may be unnecessary or contraindicated?
International Pharmacopsychiatry, (13) 100-111.
Rappaport, M. (1978b) “ Are drugs more than palliative in the management of
schizophrenia?” in Brady, J. P. & Brodie, H. K , eds., Controversy in psychia
try, Philadelphia: Saunders & Co.
Rose, S.P. (1984) Disordered molecules and diseased minds. Journal o f Psychiat
ric Research, (18/4) 351-360.
Rosenberg, M. (1985) A symbolic interactionist view of psychosis. Journal of
Health and Social Behavior, (25) 289-302.
Sarbin, T. R. & Mancuso, J. C. (1980) Schizophrenia: Medical diagnosis or moral
verdict? New York: Pergamon Press.
Sarbin, T. R. (1986) “The narrative as a root metaphor for psychology” in Narra

tive Psychology, Sarbin, T. R., editor, New York: Praeger.
Sarbin, T. R. (1990) Toward the obsolescence of the schizophrenia hypothesis.
The Journal o f Mind and Behavior, (11) 259-284.
Sarbin, T. R. (1992) “The social construction of schizophrenia” in What is schizo
phrenia? Flack, W. F., Miller, D. R. & Weiner, M., eds., New York: Springer-
Verlag.
Sass, L. (1992) Madness and modernism. New York: Basic Books.
Searles, H. F. (1965) “The differentiation between concrete and metaphorical
thinking in the recovering schizophrenic patient,” in Collected papers on
schizophrenia and related subjects. New York: International Universities
Press.
Searles, H. F. (1975a) “The patient as therapist to his analyst,” in Tactics and
techniques in psychoanalytic therapy. Vol. II: Countertransference. Giovac-
chini, P., editor, New York: Jason Aronson.
Searles, H. F. (1975b) “Countertransference and theoretical model,” in Psycho
therapy o f schizophrenia, Gunderson, J. G. & Mosher, L. R., eds., New York:
Aronson.
Siegel, R. K. (1984) Hostage Hallucinations. The Journal o f Nervous and Mental
Disease, (172) 264-272.
Spence, D. (1987) The Freudian metaphor. New York: Norton.
Strean, H. S. & Freeman, L. (1988) Behind the couch. New York: Wiley.
Strean, H. S. & Freeman, L. (1990) The severed soul. New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
Szasz, T. (1965) The ethics o f psychoanalysis. New York: Delta Books.
Szasz, T. (1976) Schizophrenia: The sacred symbol o f psychiatry. New York:
Basic Books.
Szasz, T. (1987) Insanity: The idea and its consequences. New York: Wiley.
Watzlawick, P, Beaven, J. H. & Jackson, D. D. (1967) Pragmatics o f human
communication. New York: Norton.
Will, O. A. (1961) “ Process, psychotherapy and schizophrenia” in Psychotherapy
in the psychoses, Burton, A., editor, New York: Basic Books.
Surviving the “Mental Health” System
with Co-Counseling
Janet Foner
SUMMARY. The writer describes reclaiming her life after institu

tionalization with emphasis on the importance of Re-evaluation
Counseling (RC). She describes her earlier hospital experiences and
how she came to reevaluate them. Case studies with the positive
impact of RC also are examined, as is the author’s current emotional
situation. [Article copies available from The Haworth Document Delivery
Service: 1-800-342-9678.]
In 19671 was a senior painting major in college, terrified at the prospect

of being on my own with no likely job or husband to provide income. I
took risks to help the situation and felt both powerful and scared, crying
and shaking and telling my friends how to change their lives.
One night I never noticed that I didn’t go to bed, as I was writing to my
ex-boyfriend in metaphors. A friend who was worried about me came to
Janet Foner, MPSSc, is the International Liberation Reference Person for “Men
tal Health” System Survivors in the Re-evaluation Counseling Communities; Co-
Coordinator, Support Coalition International; and Director, Leadership Exchange
Listening. Mailing address: 920 Brandt Ave., New Cumberland, PA 17070.
Author note: I’ve used quotation marks around all “mental health” terms
which refer to the medical model, including “mental health” itself, because these
terms are inaccurate and untrue in my opinion. I have used them because they are
the terms with which most people are familiar that refer to the concepts I am
talking about.
[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “ Surviving the ‘Mental Health’ System with Co-Counseling.”
Foner, Janet. Co-published simultaneously in The Psychotherapy Patient (The Haworth Press, Inc.) Vol. 9,
No. 3/4, 1996, pp. 107-123; and Psychosocial Approaches to Deeply Disturbed Persons (eds: Peter R.
Breggin, and E. Mark Stem) The Haworth Press, Inc., 1996, pp. 107-123. Single or multiple copies of this
article are available from The Haworth Document Delivery Service [1-800-342-9678,9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.
(EST)].

see me. I told her she shouldn’t be engaged to her fiance because she was
marrying him to please her family and he wasn’t right for her. (She did
marry him and got a divorce about seven years later.) I wasn’t communi
cating very clearly. She got scared and called my mother, who took me to
the school psychologist, the family doctor, and finally the outpatient clinic
of the local psychiatric hospital. I was very angry at my mother for insist
ing I go in the hospital; we often had angry arguments. I knew a lot about
mental hospitals, having just studied abnormal psychology in school. I
was also getting in touch with my feelings about growing up as a Jewish
woman and having to live with sexism and anti-Semitism combined, not to
mention the economic oppression of artists. Not able to put all this into
words at the time, I knew something was very wrong with our society.
Since I identified with blacks, due to my hair being similar to theirs, I
screamed at the doctor on hospital admissions about how racism is wrong,
in metaphors. What I was trying to say was that since the two unusual
colors of my mother’s coat, orange and green, could harmonize, why
couldn’t blacks and whites?
Unfortunately, the doctor didn’t understand and called for a nurse and
two attendants to take me to a locked ward. With no discussion, no ques
tions asked, and no reading of my rights they dragged me upstairs. While I
tried to fight them off, they injected me with a huge amount of thorazine
and put me in seclusion for about nine hours. It was like an incomprehen
sible nightmare. I felt I would die or jump out the window, but the only
window was very tiny and barred, so I did neither. Later I thought I heard
voices in the radiator, voices talking about or to me on the radio, saw a
picture of a lion coming out of the newspaper, and thought I was going to
be electrocuted both by the floors in the hospital and by the hairdryer in
the hospital beauty shop. These experiences were diagnosed as “psy
chotic.” My exact diagnosis probably was “paranoid schizophrenia.” I
spent a lot of time with nurses, attendants, other patients, psychiatrists, the
dance therapist, talking, crying, and shaking a lot about my experiences.
Unknowingly, that helped me. Psychologists tested me many times to
determine why I recovered from “psychosis” so quickly, but didn’t find
the answer.
Ten months after my entry into the hospital I was released, feeling that
my life was over at age 22.1 was in much worse shape than when I entered
the hospital. I was afraid to go out of the house, certain that people knew I
was an ex-“mental patient” just by looking at me and were talking about
me, was sure no one would hire me though I’d finished school shortly after
my release, felt very depressed and hopeless, and had no idea what to do
with my life. Gradually, with the help of family and friends and my
Janet Foner 109
psychiatrist (who slowly took me off thorazine over a period of about eight
months), I got back on my shaky feet, got married and moved out of state
to start a new life. The year 1970 was the last time I ever sought or
received help of any kind from the “mental health” system.
By 1973 I was back in my home state, taught art at a local community
art center, painted, and cared for my 1 and 1/2 year old son. I looked fine to
others but felt very bad about myself inside, was painfully shy, got
depressed very frequently, had few friends, could not talk about my expe
riences as a “ mental patient,” and still didn’t know what I wanted to do
with my life. I also was scared about raising a child.
Through a friend, I got involved in Re-evaluation Counseling (also
called Co-Counseling), an international network of people from all walks
of life, age groups, races and cultures who exchange peer support in a
natural self-healing process. The purpose is to recover full use of one’s
intelligence in order to improve one’s life on all levels, and ultimately the
lives of one’s friends, family, and co-workers. A leadership development
community to foster social change, it encourages people to think about,
develop policy on, and take action against all oppressions and to teach
others to use the process to aid in building liberation movements. When I
read the theory of Co-Counseling I was immediately struck by its clear
explanation of a mystery to the “mental health” field: What was happen
ing to me when I was hospitalized? How had I recovered from the experi
ences that led to my hospitalization?
The theory suggests that all people are by nature zestful, loving, coop
erative, creative, and, unless they have damage to the forebrain, com
pletely intelligent. We also have the capacity to heal ourselves from emo
tional and physical damage through an internal process outwardly
indicated by tears, laughter, trembling, sweat, angry sounds and move
ments (not to be confused with destruction of property or violence towards
someone), animated, non-repetitive talking, and yawns. Infants intuitively
seek attention in order to heal themselves via the above methods of dis
charge from difficulties encountered before or during birth. Older babies
are gradually socialized to control and suppress their healing process.
It is hypothesized that people ordinarily take in information through the
senses and store it in usable form in their brains. When people get hurt,
they stop thinking momentarily (a “ state of shock”) and the information
from the hurt experience comes in through the senses and is mis-stored in
non-usable form. If the person gets a chance to release emotion in the
above ways until the self-healing process is completed, the information
from the hurt experience will be re-evaluated and stored in usable form.
However, most of us, except as young infants and sometimes not even
then, don’t get to do that. We are prevented from doing so by the adults
taking care of us, all of whom were socialized at an early age by those
taking care of them, in the same way. Some adults try to comfort babies,
hush them, distract them, believing that emotional discharge is the hurt
itself, rather than the healing of the hurt. Other adults, lacking time or
attention, may verbally abuse a baby (as in “ Shut up or I’ll give you
something to cry about!” ), or may ignore a baby’s cries. In one way or
another the baby or young child is forced to hold back the discharge/re
evaluation healing process, since babies depend on their adult caretakers
for survival.
As the child gets older, more and more hurts occur and are not healed or
are only partly healed. Each person develops rigid behavior patterns com
ing from the particular ways the person got hurt and couldn’t heal. People
do not use flexible intelligence to respond to the current situation. Instead,
they are influenced by past hurts, do not think clearly, behave in ways
harmful to themselves or others, do not act or feel like the creative, joyous
persons they are, by nature. We think and behave rigidly in many ways,
called “patterns,” which often obscure our true nature.
The socialized prohibition of the natural healing process has a great deal
to do with the functioning of the “mental health” system. Applying the
above theory to the commonly held beliefs about “mental health,” in the
above view everyone is hurt to one degree or another and virtually no one
has had a chance to recover completely. Thus, everyone has difficulties in
functioning well since there is no dividing line between the “mentally
healthy” and the “mentally ill.” It’s all relative, and relative to the situation.
There are “acceptable” distress patterns, such as smoking, social drinking,
amassing nuclear weapons, adults yelling at children. These will not get one
labeled “psychotic,” but staying in bed all day and not going to work or
believing something is real that doesn’t appear that way to others may get
one so labeled. These distresses are designated symptoms of “mental ill
ness” but are not any more indicative of something wrong than the first set
of distresses mentioned, the “acceptable” ones.
“MENTAL ILLNESS ”
There are generally three kinds of phenomena that get called “mental
illness” : One is the discharge process of healing. The Diagnostic and
Statistic Manual that psychiatrists use is filled with descriptions of “ symp
toms” of “ diseases” such as crying extensively, trembling, sweating,
“laughing inappropriately.” What is known as a “ nervous breakdown” is
not the nerves, but the rigid patterns breaking down that have controlled
Janet Foner 111
and held back discharge and healing for years. The patterns are breaking
down and allowing the person to heal, but our society is focused on
making money and not on healing. It doesn’t ordinarily allow for times
and places to heal. Adults are expected to go to work and produce; thus it
appears inappropriate for adults to stop everything in order to heal. The
same is true of children once they reach school age.
A second kind of phenomenon usually called “ mental illness” is actu
ally the person intuitively seeking attention to heal by displaying a “pat
tern,” a recording of a past hurt in the person’s behavior, in hopes that
someone will notice and help.
The third kind of phenomenon is often the reason for children and teens
being labeled “mentally ill” when they behave in a way that, usually
unawarely, attempts to enable another person to discharge and heal. This
type of behavior is often misunderstood and not seen as the often desperate
attempt that it is to correct an intolerable situation for that person by
getting the adult in charge or a close person to discharge, re-evaluate, and
change the situation.
With this framework, hallucinations can be seen as the attempt by one’s
body to draw one’s own attention to distresses (often-forgotten ones) that
very much need to be discharged in order to continue to survive. People
whose discharge processes have become extremely inhibited and who also
have enormous amounts of hurts accumulated apparently can reach a satu
ration point where the body takes over and tries to preserve itself. Delusions
can be seen as a literal replay of a piece of a past hurtful experience or a
confusion of a past hurt with a present situation. The person talks about it as
if it were going on now in an attempt to discharge and re-evaluate it. With
the use of the natural healing process, hallucinations and delusions will
disappear as the person discharges and re-evaluates.
CONTINUING A STORY
While I haven’t completely discharged and re-evaluated my own story,

I have re-evaluated and have figured out the following. I had grown up
believing I was ugly and could not attract men. This came mostly from
anti-Semitism, growing up in a society where the blond, blue-eyed, volup
tuous Marilyn Monroe-types are the ideal; the stereotype of a Jew, dark-
skinned, with dark, curly hair and a large nose, is an unacceptable way to
look. I look like that stereotype as well as not being voluptuous and was
seen as unattractive by my family and the Jews I went to high school with
(95% of the school). They had internalized the anti-Semitic viewpoints, as
I had. Also, Jewish women are considered to be asexual compared to

Christian women, and so I thought myself incapable of attracting men.
As a young woman, I was to marry and raise children, according to
what I’d been told. When I lost the only boyfriend I’d ever had, someone I
wanted to marry very much, in the fall of 1966,1 felt awful. However, after
a week of crying, I decided to change my life and go out and meet men.
Previously I had been a very shy recluse. In April of 1967,1 went out with
three different men, all tall, dark and handsome by society’s standards and
very interested in me, all in the same week.
I had not cried enough about losing my boyfriend and grief began to
resurface, once I saw that I couldn’t be that unattractive if these attractive
men were interested in me. I became very confused and terrified because
this was a complete turnaround to how I had previously viewed and lived
my life. At the same time, I felt hope for the first time in seeing my dreams
could be realized. Everything was happening too fast for me to take it in,
including my fast-approaching graduation. If I were living in a healing-
oriented society, it would have been recognized that I was going through
profound emotional changes connected with new understandings about
myself, life, relationships with men, and the oppressions in society. Not
yet understanding it all, I spoke in metaphors that more directly expressed
what was not yet clear to me in linear thinking. In the language of Re-eval-
uation Counseling (RC), events had provided a contradiction to my dis
tress patterns. I could see that they were not the reality, which allowed me
to begin discharging and getting rid of my patterns. Unfortunately this
natural process was interrupted by my stay in the hospital and the thora-
zine I was forced to take there.
In Co-Counseling sessions I began discharging the grief about losing
my boyfriend and did so for several years. I began to look at how sexism
and anti-Semitism had affected my life and then attempted to act like the
beautiful Jewish woman I am, and discharged the emotion arising from
doing same. Taking that direction led me to make positive changes in my
outward appearance, to seek new friends who were not depressed and who
could support me well, to become close to many people, to take leadership
within RC and form close counseling relationships with several men who
knew I was beautiful and could counsel me well on that issue. Gradually I
stopped being shy, lost most of my fear of men, became a well-known
leader in RC and later in the ex-“patients” movement outside of RC. I
began to write well, became much more self-confident, able to speak in
front of groups, and to see myself sometimes as beautiful.
One day I looked in the mirror and saw a most beautiful, joyous, alive,
sexual, self-confident, happy woman and knew that it was the real me, the
Janet Foner 113
person I’d lost touch with, during very early distressing experiences from
which I’d never had a chance to recover. This was the same woman I’d
been looking for when I was in the hospital and had to ask one of my
friends there who I was. She had said to look in the mirror, which was very
helpful, but it wasn’t until 1985 that I could see there what I really had
needed to see all along. Since that day in 1985,1have never again doubted
my beauty or lost sight of who I really am. Now I can always look in the
mirror and see a beautiful woman and can make friends with any woman,
no matter how her looks are viewed by society; I am no longer jealous of
other women or wish to be someone else. I have many close friends, both
males and females, and am self-confident most of the time. What I was
trying to heal in 1967 has been healed completely, although I still have
other things to heal.
EXPERIENCING THE HOSPITAL
The other main re-evaluation I have done about my “mental health”

story concerns my hospital experiences. When I got out of the hospital I
had been “brainwashed” into believing that I was a “deeply disturbed
person,” that my hospitalization had helped me tremendously in my
recovery through all-powerful psychiatrists’ help which had saved my life,
that I had nothing much to do with my recovery, but the psychotropic
drugs I took really helped me and I needed them since there was some
thing very wrong with me. I had believed this last most of my life, but my
hospital experience intensified and made “official” that belief. It is only in
recent years, after talking about and discharging extensively on my hospi
tal experiences, that I realized how damaging those experiences were. I
could then stop blaming myself for what happened to me and recognize
that the shame I felt about myself as an ex-“mental patient” was coming at
me from societal oppression. It had no foundation in what was true about
me, since there really was nothing wrong with me, i.e., I had no permanent
emotional defects. While I had never enjoyed my hospitalization, I
believed it had been good for me, or at least that it was the only way to
help me, given my condition.
In recent years I have realized how damaging being put in seclusion
twice was to me. Those two experiences left me feeling extremely terrified
and unsafe. My ability to stand up for myself, to seek to fulfill my goals, to
speak rather than being very quiet were all badly damaged. In recent
Co-Counseling sessions I am at last able to discharge terror and grief from
being locked in seclusion. For many years it was too hard and too terrify
ing to even talk about it at all, let alone feel and discharge how it had felt.
I now am able to talk about seclusion in public speaking engagements or

other advocacy situations and to be less quiet, less scared. I am also more
able to believe in my ability to take charge of situations and fulfill my
goals.
When I was first forced to take psychotropic drugs I knew they made
me feel awful, exhausted, lethargic. But by the time I left the hospital, I’d
been told so much that they were good for me that I believed it. At that
time, feeling numb seemed better than feeling terrified. Later, as I regained
more ability to discharge and to feel more alive, aware, and also to just feel
more, period, feeling numb seemed the worst of the possibilities. It
became clear to me that the drugs I was forced to take had kept me from
the discharging I needed to do at the time and had given me extra damage
that needed to be healed-two years of my life where I barely felt alive.
As I learned to Co-Counsel, I began to realize that the psychiatrists I’d
had, while somewhat helpful in that they listened well and did not try to
discourage me from discharging, had not really “ saved my life.” Their
analyses of me had only increased my shyness, shame, and belief in my
own permanent “defects.” The natural healing processes which I and
everyone else have, were what had “ saved my life.” I was and am in
charge of my own process. In recent years I have realized that I was never
in need of hospitalization (nor do I believe anyone else is, unless they need
surgery or other types of medical care for identifiable physical ailments)
and that what I really needed at the time were some RC sessions and a few
other kinds of support.
I have also realized that when I thought the other patients were plotting
against me and when I thought that, on leaving the hospital, people on the
bus were talking about me, I felt that way due to distress experiences of the
past. As a child I had been scapegoated in a number of groups. When I felt
as unsafe as I did in the hospital, I unawarely felt as I had as a child, since
being forced to live in a group situation with strangers reminded me
unconsciously of those past times.
When I thought I was going to be electrocuted, it was because I was
bom in 1945, right around the time U.S. citizens heard about the Holo
caust, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, and my father was still recovering
from almost dying and was now paralyzed permanently from the waist
down. While still in the womb, I am sure I felt my mother’s fear of all this
and also became frightened. I’m convinced that I was bom terrified into a
family in severe crisis. I must have assumed that I was always in danger of
being killed as I was bom while so many people were dying. I identified
the hospital with a concentration camp because the hospital staff could not
Janet Foner 115
be trusted; they said they were helping you and then force-drugged you
and locked you in seclusion, a euphemism for solitary confinement.
All of this combined to make me believe I was going to be killed, just as
the Jews were told they were going to the “ showers”—which tamed out to
be the gas chambers. Thus my fear of the beauty parlor was that the hair
dryer could really be an electroshock machine (which I’d never seen, but
knew were used on other patients on my ward). Also, I’d been terrified as
a child by movie and television stories about prisoners being electrocuted-
and there I was, locked up and definitely a prisoner. When I figured out, in
recent years, why I feared electrocution in 1967, it all made sense and I no
longer thought of my fears as strange, or proving I’d been really “crazy.”
In general, re-evaluation of all the above has allowed me to feel equal,
on a par with other leaders, not unfit to talk to them as I had felt before. I
am able to talk easily about my “mental health” experiences both publicly
and privately, or not talk about them without feeling like I’m hiding
something. Previously I couldn’t talk about this subject even to close
friends. I am now proud to be a psychiatric survivor. It feels good and
powerful to be a leader in “mental health” system change, no longer
ashamed of my experiences in the system.
RE-EVALUATION COUNSELING (RC)
What was helpful to me when I was in the hospital turns out to be

exactly the natural healing process we call RC. If this process is done
formally, two people agree to exchange an equal amount of time giving
each other attention, often an hour each. The two people, for the first hour,
are focused on the process of one person’s reemergence (uncovering the
person’s inherently good nature where it has been obscured by patterns
and living on the basis of that nature) and what will allow that person to
think, decide, and act outside of patterns and to discharge the patterns.
The roles are reversed for the second hour with focus on the second
person’s reemergence. Each is in charge of the session from his or her
point of view. If the person in the role of client finds that the person in the
role of counselor is not being helpful, not paying attention, or is thinking
about the counselor’s own distress, the client may stop the session and
counsel the counselor until able to return to that role. The client always
decides what to bring up in the session, given the current capabilities of the
counselor and the depth of discharge and distress that the client is cur
rently able to deal with. In this way, trust and safety are built up gradually
and deeper and deeper levels of discharge and distress are reached. The
client tries out the counselor’s suggestions before deciding, due to distress,
not to use them, although if the counselor’s suggestion is truly on the

mark, the client will begin to discharge without having time to debate
about it.
The counselor thinks about the client independently of him/her. The
client will often say one thing and really mean another; the counselor must
rely on intuition, keen observation, knowledge of the person, knowledge
of basic theory, and testing out what works to be able to be effective. The
counselor is constantly learning to counsel better, becoming more and
more aware of what is or isn’t promoting the client’s reemergence. The
two are engaged in a give-and-take interaction on both sides and truly
working cooperatively together, using each other’s thinking. The coun
selor never analyzes or gives advice to the client.
The goal of the process is always to seek re-emergence, including the
elimination of patterns through discharge. Understanding what happened
to cause the patterns is never a goal or an end-point; it may be a beginning
for some of the work and is usually a by-product of it. There are no rigid
techniques, although there are some general guidelines. A maxim is that
the best technique is the one you invent at that moment. For the process to
work at its best, it is always helpful to do fresh thinking as you go along.
Practical ideas for ways of working are exchanged among Co-Counselors,
but these must be adapted and changed as they are used in order to be
workable. Flexibility, and paying complete, aware, loving attention are the
main skills needed by the counselor. Since we as human beings are all
natural counselors and clients of this sort, these skills are not really learned
but reclaimed.
During the session the client usually will begin with a description of
positive recent events in order to pull attention away from distress enough
to be able to have the slack needed to bring up old hurts. The first task in
the session is to focus attention fully on the current moment and the benign
general nature of reality. A good deal of time may be spent this way,
sometimes the whole session. Then the client will bring up any minor
problems and perhaps spend 10-15 minutes talking, laughing, etc., about
these. Next the client will state the goal of the session-such as setting
goals for life changes desired, counseling on what has come up while
trying to reach previous goals, continuing to work on an area defined in
previous sessions. The counselor will remind the client of how he/she
acted before being conditioned and in all ways possible provide for the
client a view outside of the patterns currently being tackled, and any others
that come up in the process. As the client begins to discharge, the coun
selor will encourage that process and provide attention to allow the client
to better be able to think about his/her reemergence. The goal is never to
Janet Foner 117
adjust to any situation that is not working well but to regain the ability to
flexibly handle any problem and change situations so that they work well
for the client.
At the end of the agreed-upon time, the counselor will ask the client
questions to draw attention off of the distress brought up in session onto
pleasant and interesting things in the current environment. Then or in a
later, separate session counselor and client switch roles. Thus the healing
process never becomes one of a person assumed to be “well” “ fixing”
someone who is “sick.” Mutual respect, lack of hierarchy, and true empow
erment become possible. A real cooperation between a counselor and
client, a real pulling for each other on an equal basis, becomes possible.
I have used this process with many Co-Counselors who are psychiatric
survivors like me, all once diagnosed “psychotic” but now no longer
using the “mental health” system or psychiatric drugs, as well as with
many current and former “patients” who are not Co-Counselors but have
learned something about the process from me. All of these people have
been able to improve their lives by using the Co-Counseling process and
many have used the process to recover from the effects of hospitalization,
psychotropic drugs, electroshock (as far as possible given its possibility of
at least some permanent brain damage), and other mistreatment within the
system. They have also healed from experiences for which they were
hospitalized, such as hallucinations and delusions. Many have used the
process to recover from the effects of and fight the oppression of “mental
patients,” eliminating their own negative feelings about themselves com
ing from societal stigma, for example. The following stories about some of
these people (using pseudonyms) are used with their permission.
PEOPLE WHO HAVE USED THE PROCESS
Michael was hospitalized in 1976 after he stopped eating, moving, and

talking. He felt like dying, was starving himself to death and was having a
number of very vivid hallucinations. Soon after hospitalization he began
talking again and was released in the custody of his parents (he had been
living on his own prior to that) with the provision that he take large doses
of Haldol and see a psychiatrist as an “outpatient.” He was doing this
when his closest friend, a Co-Counselor, came to visit. Adam asked Michael
what was going on; Michael began to cry profusely as Adam listened.
Later Michael visited Adam for several weeks and learned to Co-Counsel
from Adam and some of his friends. He cried a great deal in many sessions
for a year or two. During that time he moved to his own apartment and
later to a house with friends, stopped taking the Haldol and stopped seeing
his psychiatrist. He used many sessions to counsel about the effects of the
Haldol on him, and to discharge the negative effects of institutionalization
and therapy. He also used many sessions to discharge about his hallucina
tions and remembered the occluded incident that was the basis for most of
them.
The hallucinations included seeing his sister dead (she was and is alive)
and seeing Jesus in many forms. Michael remembered that when he was
three his sister, who was one, had almost drowned. His mother had left
him home alone and asked him to pray for his sister to live while she took
her to the hospital. Michael was a very religious child and felt it was his
responsibility to save his sister, to whom he was very attached. He felt that
God had answered his prayer when she did recover, and that he had a
special and powerful relationship to God because of that. As a little boy,
terrified that his sister would die and grief-stricken about that, he was left
alone and never helped with these feelings. It wasn’t even acknowledged
that he might have feelings about his sister almost dying since as a boy, he
was not supposed to cry or show fear. Many years later, the woman he had
planned to marry married someone else. Shortly after that Michael’s lover
had an abortion of their baby, which he wanted her to have, but was not
able to tell her. Michael was not able to cry about either of these losses,
both of which were very hard to accept. Sometime after that he began
wanting to die and seeing the hallucinations about his sister and Jesus,
including one in which Jesus seemed to rip open Michael’s heart.
As he was seeing the hallucinations, Michael cried and shook a lot and
did more of the same in later sessions on the hallucinations. After he
remembered the occluded incident about his sister, he corroborated the
story with his mother, saw the connections between the early near-loss and
the later losses and began to change his life to be able to live outside the
patterns he had acquired from those hurts. To be able to deal with major
griefs without discharging them he had spent about two years on mari
juana and other street drugs; he eliminated that addiction from his life. He
had dropped out of college after losing his first love and didn’t know what
to do with his life. He lived close to a poverty existence on part-time jobs.
To do something about “mental health” oppression, he got involved in the
ex-“ patients” liberation movement, started a political action group of
psychiatric survivors and began writing about our liberation. Michael went
back to college and graduated and started his own successful business. He
is now a leader in “mental health” liberation as well as an admired expert
in his second, new business venture.
I met the man I’ll call Robert in 1984 at his first RC workshop. He was
extremely shy, had little self-confidence and rarely spoke in a group. He
Janet Foner 119
had been court-committed to a forensic institution for the criminally “insane”

because he had been charged with trespassing and had previously seen a
psychiatrist. He was judged incompetent to stand trial and was locked up
for eight months. This hospitalization was so painful that he would have
committed suicide but couldn’t figure out how to do it there. A therapist he
later worked with stopped seeing him because he had so much difficulty
releasing his anger. At the RC workshop, a man I’ll call Cal was counsel
ing Robert and asked him to pretend Cal was an attendant who was going
to take him away to the mental institution. Cal took Robert’s arm and
asked Robert to pull away from him saying “No! I won’t go!” loudly;
Robert was thus able to discharge a great deal of anger.
Robert continued to discharge anger, grief, and shame about his hospi
talization and began to make changes in his life. He had a high-paying,
professional job but was not happy in it and so decided to quit, live on
savings, and work in the ex-“patients” movement, with the plan of
eventually getting a paying job in the movement. He became president of
his state’s survivors’ organization, was appointed to a number of state and
county “mental health” boards, became influential there, and was asked to
speak at various conferences. Robert also became certified to teach RC
and his support group of RC psychiatric survivors grew from two to eight.
No longer very shy, he is increasingly self-confident and effective as a
leader, and is now becoming influential as a national leader in the survi
vors’ movement. Robert is very rarely held back by angry feelings or
feeling suicidal.
I’ve known Rachel for about eight years. When I first met her she was
very quiet, sometimes got severe headaches when trying to deal with her
feelings, could not think of herself positively or as a leader. She saw
herself as needing help and incapable of giving much to others. She had
received a series of about 30 electroshocks during several hospitalizations.
In counseling she discharged a lot of terror and grief about her hospital
experiences as well as many negative feelings about herself. Rachel
started to speak up more, began giving parties, became more outgoing and
fun loving and became certified as an RC teacher. This meant taking on
leadership and thinking of herself as a leader. She doesn’t get headaches as
often now and sees herself as capable and as having something to offer.
Alice had a son labeled “hyperactive” and “ learning disabled” and
was told he might have become “schizophrenic” if he had not been
brought in to see the therapist. She was told by her therapist to consider her
husband her fourth child (besides her actual three children) because he
would not take responsibility in the marriage or with the children. Her
family physician had given her a number of psychiatric drugs and said she
was in “breakdown syndrome” and implied she would be hospitalized if it

weren’t for the children. Feeling she could not cope with her life, she went
into therapy and then got a divorce. Introduced to RC by a friend, she then
decided the therapy she was receiving was not useful and left it. Alice also
stopped taking the drugs that had been prescribed. She used the RC pro
cess in continuing to raise her sons as a single parent and eventually got
them involved in it also. The labeled son completed high school and a year
of college in which he got A’s and B’s; he then decided to pursue a
non-college career. He just got married in what looks to be a very good
marriage for him.
When I met Alice she was very concerned about her son’s “ mental
health” experience and could not deal with her own devastating experi
ence. Through Co-Counseling she began to see how important it was to
deal with how she had been hurt by this experience, particularly in not
being able to trust her own thinking. Alice discharged a lot about the
prescribed drugs and her feelings while taking them and started to re-eval
uate her lifestyle. She was struggling to make ends meet in a low-paying
sales job, not trusting herself to do what she really wanted to do. She took
courses in a type of bodywork and began to combine her ability to do
emotional healing work with body healing work and is now seeing private
clients. Eventually she will open a full-time business with a partner. Much
happier in her new career, she’s re-leaming to take care of herself as well
as others. She also identified herself publicly as a survivor, and discharged
a lot of fear while doing so. Alice has been active in a survivors’ organiza
tion outside of RC and has taken leadership on the issue within RC.
There are many other stories like these, many I know and don’t know. I
am sure there are a number of psychiatric survivors in RC who don’t get in
touch with our survivors’ network for fear of losing their jobs if they
become known as survivors or for other similar reasons. A few more
identify themselves each year as we do this liberation work. Much is also
being discovered within RC theory and practice about how to focus atten
tion off distress permanently; how to act on one’s clear, forward-moving
decisions rather than out of distress; how to maintain a reemergent direc
tion in one’s life and not sink into distress over long periods of time; how
to make liberation movements work well; what to do when someone is in
an emotional crisis. This last area is of much interest to psychiatric survi
vors.
An RC friend of mine, Alan, was at a workshop with a friend of his,
Don, who stayed up all night several nights in a row and was feeling so
anxious and upset that he could not calm down. Returning home from the
workshop, some of Don’s friends wanted to hospitalize him. Alan, a psy
Janet Foner 121
chiatric survivor, knew that Don would not get what he needed in a mental
hospital and wanted him to avoid the stigma of being hospitalized. He
insisted that he not be hospitalized and not be given psychiatric drugs.
Alan stayed with Don for a day, remaining calmly sure that Don was fine
and would/could “come out of it,” and discussing pleasant and interesting
topics. Don was able to regain his ability to sleep, to stop feeling unbear
ably anxious, and to resume everyday activities without any psychiatric
interventions.
Another aspect of this work within the RC community is weekend
workshops I and several others have led for people affected by “mental
health” oppression. In some, for all RC people, we have dealt with libera
tion from conformity, often reinforced by mental health oppression. For
mental health system survivors, (people who were hospitalized, those who
had therapy, and relatives of both groups, mostly children of survivors),
we have met separately and together and have worked on bridging gaps
between each of the groups. Relatives have also held their own work
shops. For the last three years I have led separate workshops for ex-psy
chiatric inmates. At the first one we spent many hours telling parts of our
hospital experiences and putting it all on a chart. We then had a mock
awards ceremony for the “best” in each category, such as longest stay or
most times hospitalized. The warmth, fellowship and spirited laughter that
permeated those events was a true healing time for all of us. At the most
recent of these, many people took responsibility for seeing that the work
shop went well. This was a wonderfiil contrast to the way most people
envision us to be. When I began doing this liberation work, I had internal
ized so much “mental health” oppression that I thought I didn’t want to
meet other psychiatric survivors and that doing such work was painful and
would drag one down because of other people’s painful stories. In fact, I
found the opposite to be true and have never met so many wonderful
people or had so much fun as I have in doing this work. At our workshops
everyone gets included, those who know each other and those who don’t.
There is a great sense of ease and well-being. Saturday night is usually skit
night where each support group (we divide into small groups around vari
ous issues part of the time) develops a skit that satirizes the negative aspects
of the “mental health” system or challenges our thinking in related areas.
Most of these evenings are spent laughing from start to finish.
In the last few years I’ve begun to teach RC to ex- and current “mental
patients” and “mental health” workers outside of the RC communities.
While I have not as yet done much long-term work with these people,
most have been very enthusiastic on receiving just a taste of the theory and
practice. One group, after practicing methods of appreciating each other,
decided to do an appreciation day on their own, using the skills I’d briefly
taught them, and had each person in their drop-in center be appreciated by
the whole group. A woman who attended an introductory one-hour session
of RC that I gave at a conference went home and led an all-day session for
her state-wide “ mental health consumer” group using the skills she
learned.
At a leaders’ training session I worked with one of the leaders in an RC
counseling session. I basically told him how good he is and what a good
leader he is, but was not sure how useful the session was to him since he
did not discharge very much at the time. Months later he mentioned the
counseling I had given him at a meeting we were both attending. He said it
was very helpful for him and got him out of feeling depressed. He said he
thought more people should get a chance to do this. People who have
attended introductory workshops on RC at conferences ask me to do
Co-Counseling with them at later conferences, call me for the same reason
or ask me to lead longer workshops for their self-help groups. People are
eager to regain these skills once they glimpse the possibilities. It gives
people a lot of hope. One woman told me that her friend, who attended an
RC workshop I did at a conference, had tried everything to get help for
years and this was the only thing he’d found that was helpful.
In the past year I’ve taught a series of day-long, monthly workshops for
a group of psychiatric survivor leaders, about half currently “ outpatients”
in the “mental health” system. One of these people now plans to teach a
similar series for people she works with (she’s an ex-“patient” mental
health worker). Another said this course kept him from being rehospital
ized during a crisis. Another person who couldn’t speak in public has now
become an advocate. One man has used the process to stop his periodic
depressions. All have begun to regain their abilities to heal themselves.
To find out more about RC, contact Harvey Jackins, the International
Reference Person for the RC Communities, at 719 Second Ave. North,
Seattle WA 98109, USA; Telephone 206-284-0311. For further informa
tion on the psychiatric survivors’ movement in RC or on workshops for
your survivors’ group or “mental health” agency, contact the author, Janet
Foner, at Leadership Exchange Listening, 920 Brandt Ave., New Cumber
land, PA 17070, USA; Telephone 717-774-6465. (For information about
Support Coalition International, a national human rights coalition for alter
natives to psychiatric oppression, open to the public, contact the author at
same address.) For writings by psychiatric survivors in RC about our
experiences in the system and changing it, write Rational Island Publishers
at P.O. Box 2081, Main Office Station, Seattle, WA 98111, USA. Ask for
Recovery and Reemergence #3 (partly by “mental health” workers and
Janet Foner 123
partly by survivors; includes the first draft liberation policy statement for
“mental health” system survivors-$2 plus postage) and #4 (all by survi
vors, with second policy statement—$3 plus postage). The revised version
of the second policy statement can be ordered for $3 plus postage as a
pamphlet called “What’s Wrong with the Mental Health System and What
Can Be Done About It.”
Yielding to a Higher Power
Louis B im er
SUMMARY. People caught in the agony of addiction and the grip of

psychosis need to find new ways of coping with the demands of real
ity and staying alive. This chapter deals with the struggles of a
patient who is a manic depressive, was addicted to alcohol, other
drugs and food. Keeping him alive and separating him from his sub
missive attitudes, psychotic past and suicidal behavior was the treat
ment challenge. Such patients must learn to use the therapeutic situa
tion to claim their own power. They must give up the need to die
mentally and physically. To win the battle against the psychotic pro
cess and the addictive defense both therapist and patient need to find
the courage to look at past traumas. They then must be creative
enough to find new ways of living out life in the present. Even the
most disturbed of people can grow emotionally as a new understand
ing of self and reality emerges in the treatment process. The psy
chotic past finally becomes a thing past. [Article copies available from
Will is a piano player/singer/entertainer at a fancy East Side bar in New

York City. His analyst-to-be walked into said bar one night and ordered a
glass or two of orange juice as he listened to Will play and sing. Amazed to
see anyone at the bar order orange juice, Will asked me about this and
Louis Bimer, PhD, is a member of the National Psychological Association for

Psychoanalysis and the American Psychological Association. He is in the private
practice o f psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, and group therapy. He has done
research and published in the areas of the resistances to the creative process and
the psychological aspects o f procrastination, betrayal and addiction. Mailing
address: 50 East 72nd Street, New York, NY 10021.
[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “ Yielding to a Higher Power.” Bimer, Louis. Co-published
simultaneously in The Psychotherapy Patient (The Haworth Press, Inc.) Vol. 9, No. 3/4,1996, pp. 125-140;
and: Psychosocial Approaches to Deeply Disturbed Persons (eds: Peter R. Breggin, and E. Mark Stem)
The Haworth Press, Inc., 1996, pp. 125-140. Single or multiple copies of this article are available from The
Haworth Document Delivery Service [1-800-342-9678,9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. (EST)].

seemed struck dumb when I said I never drank. This was especially signif
icant because Will was a chronic drinker. Whenever I visited the bar Will
cut his act short so he could spend a few minutes talking with the “ local
shrink.”
Will’s appearance presented a contradiction. Handsomely and tastefully
dressed, a man lull of charm and wit who sang and played beautifully, he
was at the same time a hundred pounds overweight. As he worked through
the night, he would drink hard liquor mixed with soda and yet never
appear drunk. The management gave him his drinks for free, and Will
would order them two or three at a time. When they were consumed, he
would dramatically tell the bartender that there were “ dead soldiers” on
his piano and he needed replacements. As an entertainer, he never seemed
tired or in a bad mood. Rather, his affect was expansive and elated and this
hyperemotional tone gave his performances an extra bounce of spirit. He
came across as an “ up guy” who could belt out a song with gusto. He was
never dull. Another feature of his talents worth noting is that he had a vast
repertoire and knowledge of modem music. His speaking voice gave the
impression of an educated cultivated person who read extensively.
During one of his breaks Will informed me that he’d like to talk to me
outside. His tone was quite serious. Once outside, he related that he was
quite worried about his health. Sometimes he felt depressed. His doctor
said he was prediabetic; this was very dangerous because he was 100 pounds
overweight. When I agreed that he could be in serious trouble, Will
laughed and said, “ Do you know what I have in my safety-deposit box? A
hundred Seconals and a bottle of Remy Martin. If I have to go out, I go out
in style.”
His grandiosity, denial, and self-destructive attitude rendered me impo
tent and I responded, “Will, there has to be a better way.” My remark seemed
to have no effect.
A few weeks later Will asked me for my card. He said he was worried
about his weight and about his son. Inasmuch as I had some personal
relationship with him, I declined to see him as a patient and referred him to
another analyst. A few days later Will called to say that he had seen the
“ Shrink” but that there was no chemistry between them and that he would
really like an appointment. It was obvious to me that this was a man who
pounded out his mania on a piano and sedated his moods with alcohol.
Will was a manic depressive, manic with an alcoholic defense, eating and
drinking himself to death.
Will’s first session was a monument to his defense of denial. Arriving
on time, he discussed his problems in a theatrical way. He was aware of his
drinking and of being overweight and was not too happy about it. Yet he
Louis Bimer 127
showed no real concern or anxiety over his plight. In short, he was putting
on a rehearsed and polished performance. To go along with his exhibition
ism and narcissism would have been a disservice to him. He wanted
sympathy, but in no way did he seem eager to do anything positive about
his problems. He had started drinking in his teens and never stopped. He
had seen weight doctor after weight doctor and had never really lost an
ounce. He was an obese alcoholic with a prediabetic condition. Time was
running out for him.
During the first half of his session I said nothing other than to ask a
question or two. Finally I asked, “ Do you think you have any real prob
lems?”
Amazingly enough, he answered in a light, pleasant tone, “Not really. I
have always been able to cope.”
I realized that if he was to be helped, his massive denial and pleasant
composure would have to be punctured. I responded by saying, “Will, I
have heard a lot of bullshit in my time, but you, you stupid bastard, take
first prize. You are 100 pounds overweight. You are almost a diabetic.
Once you get diabetes and mix it with alcohol, you stand an excellent
chance of losing limbs. Tell me, how would you like to be a one-armed
piano player or walk around on stumps? That’s something that would
really make your son feel good? You are 6 months away from being dead.
If you want to see me, you are going to have to do two things: One, see a
doctor and get on a diet and have your blood checked; and two, join
Alcoholics Anonymous. If you are not ready to meet these conditions, let’s
end the session now.”
Will was struck dumb, amazed at my toughness and frankness. Immedi
ately, something happened. He saw that he was given a task: lose weight
and stop drinking. He also chose to start to idealize me and made a
submissive gesture, saying, “You are the doctor. I agree to do what you
say.”
The rules of treatment were outlined, and Will began therapy on a
once-a-week basis. Treatment can be defined as having two phases: The
first phase could be called “the dry run” ; the second phase can be consid
ered “the real thing.” It is of particular note that the first phase of treat
ment was punctuated by what Will called a “manic attack.” This occurred
one night after work when he fell off a chair and seemed to lose emotional
control over himself. He went to a mental hospital and had himself com
mitted for the weekend. No doubt he went into a panic state. After the
weekend he felt fine. At that time, Will attached no major significance to
his attack and, despite my probing, the true meaning of the “attack” was
not apparent. Not then.
The first year of treatment had an educational flavor to it. The goals of
maintaining his contact with A.A. and with his medical doctor were fre
quently reinforced. Because he had idealized me, it was very easy for Will
to “ follow orders.” As a result, two significant and gratifying events
occurred. He gave up alcohol completely and lost 100 pounds in the first 3
months of treatment. In doing this, he illustrated the execution of two
needs often found in the personality constellation of the manic depressive:
challenge and triumph. It is through challenge and triumph that the depres
sive can avoid a sense of despair (Fenichel, 1949).
As is the case with most people who are very disturbed, Will was highly
undersocialized, lacking self-loving and self-protective judgment. His
reality sense was tenuous, to say the least. The early focus of therapy
centered on life management. This was in keeping with meeting matura-
tional needs and reducing his toxic interactions with life. Transferentially,
he saw me as his glorified advisor and a narcissistic extension of himself.
He presented the following very damaging behavioral problems:
1. Scoring pills for his girlfriend.
2. Involvement in shady deals:
a. buying stolen property,
b. lending money.
3. Involvement with dangerous and exploiting women.
4. Stealing from women’s pocketbooks.
Will’s self-damaging behavior was seen as a need to create situations

that produced humiliation or the threat of humiliation. He wanted to risk
provoking authority, especially in those circumstances that could lead to
punishment. There is no doubt that authority represented the maternal
authority figure of the past. He would narcissistically overvalue his girl
friend and then submit to her wishes through a projected idealization. The
marvelous lady had to be pleased. He would risk arrest by buying pills for
her illegally. Stealing from other women and seeking out abusive women
appeared to serve only one need: to risk humiliation and punishment.
Will was shocked, amazed, and gratified when I told him, “You are a
humiliation addict and it appears that you need a daily fix.”
“God dammit,” he responded, “ you are right. Thank you.”
The issue of self-worth and giving up humiliation was an important
treatment focus. When he spoke about wanting to do self-damaging acts,
he was given minor humiliations by being called an idiot or a schmuck.
These toxoidal interventions served to provide an answer to his quest for
abuse and humiliation, yet at the same time worked to reduce his actual
self-destructive behavior. Will was encouraged to develop appropriate
Louis Bimer 129
relationships and a stable design for living. He was seen on a once-weekly

basis for a year. During that time no dreams or childhood memories were
forthcoming. Then he said that financial problems made it impossible for
him to continue. He praised me in glowing terms and was pleased with
what he had accomplished in a year. Indeed, he was right. He did give up
his alcoholism and he did lose 100 pounds. Quite a year’s work! When
Will left treatment, he had completed his dry run in therapy. He had yet to
face the massive conflicts that plagued his life; he had yet to confront his
childhood amnesia. One can conjecture that his leaving treatment was a
way of saying that he could not integrate any more success into his life.
Success and the manic-depressive state do not mix very well.
About a year later, Will called to say that he would like to resume
treatment. On his arrival, I noted that he had put on a bit of weight. He was
as expansive as ever, speaking in high and eloquently grandiose tones.
A.A. was still an important part of his life, but trouble was brewing within
him because he could not master the fourth step of his alcoholism treat
ment program.
“Just what is the fourth step?” I inquired.
“ It is ‘yielding to a higher power,’ ” he responded.
Will made a very interesting Freudian slip when he said that the fourth
step was “yielding to a higher power.” In reality, A.A.’s fourth step is “a
fearless and searching moral inventory of ourselves.” No doubt this con
fusion can be seen as his trying to deny his own guilt and severe superego
pain. The only “moral inventory” he was given in his childhood was one of
self-hate. His next statement clarified why he feared a fearless and search
ing moral inventory. “Also there is something else I have to tell you. I
never told you the truth about my childhood. There is a lot I remember but
have been too ashamed to tell you.”
A contract was formed with Will: He would use therapy to work on the
fourth step and to fill in the history of the childhood that he worked so hard
to conceal during the first year of his treatment. What follows here is a
condensation of many sessions. His resistance to bringing in the material
can be fully understood because his childhood reeked of humiliation,
horror, alcoholism, incest, psychosis, and filth.
Will’s telling the truth about his childhood can be seen as maturational.
Quite often, though, he did not want to speak about it. He was given
negative support by being told such things as, “ Of course you had the
worst childhood in the world,” or “No doubt you are a horrible person,
but tell me about your loving family.” These toxoidal interventions helped
Will to speak about his past.
Of particular interest is the story of his maternal grandparents. The
grandfather was the scion of a rich distinguished Protestant family. The

grandmother was a poor shanty-Irish Catholic. She became pregnant out
of wedlock and, much to their families’ consternation, they married. The
grandfather was a professional man who, a few years after his marriage,
fell from a great height and became a hopeless cripple confined to a
wheelchair.
Will’s mother’s history is quite sketchy. She grew up in a home with an
invalid father and an alcoholic mother. She showed talent in music and
dance at an early age and was considered a great beauty. She managed to
become one of the famous showgirls of her day. A rather rich and influen
tial man seduced her and made her pregnant. She elected to have the child
and recapitulated her mother’s role, with the exception of not marrying the
man who impregnated her. Both mother and child lived in the home of the
maternal grandmother. It was the time of the great economic depression of
the thirties. Will came from a family of money and did not suifer finan
cially during this chaotic period. Indeed, he was to become a “rich child.”
Grandmother now had a captive family at her disposal. Will’s mother,
Belle, became grandmother’s drinking companion. In a short time she lost
her beauty and became a chronic alcoholic. Although the house was large,
she wound up sleeping in her mother’s bed. Alcohol use was daily-either
at home or in bars. When drunk, they vomited and defecated in random
spots in the house and made little effort to clean things up.
There was a sober period to the family day: between waking up and
some later hour in the afternoon, when the drinking started. Drunk or
sober, grandmother ruled the house with a sadistic iron hand and also a
very neglectful one. Will and grandfather were almost uncared for. Grand
father could void in his pants and not be attended to for days. Mealtime
consisted of supper, which was not good in terms of the quality of the food
and horrible in terms of the quality of the social interaction. Will was there
to be insulted or ignored.
The family structure consisted of an evil alcoholic woman dominating a
broken-down crippled husband, a degenerating daughter, and a psycholog
ically scarred grandson. The pathos of this scene was enormous: a rich,
promising professional wrecked, drunk, and in a wheelchair; a beautiful
talented showgirl becoming fat and alcoholic; and a grandson forming an
identification with disaster.
Will’s earliest childhood memories consisted of his wandering down
the street of his small town alone. He recalled making ketchup sandwiches
for himself because no adult was there to make breakfast. He was neglected,
abused, or ridiculed in the family interactions. Sometimes, as is the way
with alcoholic people, he received avalanches of affection, only to later
Louis Bimer 131
face subsequent indifference. To confuse and to add an even stranger irony

to his existence, Will discovered a huge cache of money in the basement.
He would walk around his town as a rich kid buying favor and friendship,
trying to compensate for his emotional poverty.
It is significant that there were no benign or consistently loving figures
in his childhood. Education meant little to him. He functioned inconsis
tently in school and did poorly in athletics. His childhood existence was
one of loneliness and isolation. Showpeople occasionally came to the
family home; Will observed them and became a self-taught actor. As a
youngster he also learned to play the piano by ear. His late childhood and
early adolescent years were punctuated by his doing periods of time in a
series of torturesome boarding schools. Theatrical and musical interests
were the only light in his dark and unhappy childhood.
Two very traumatic events occurred during Will’s adolescence. His
grandfather died, and he had to call the police; mother and grandmother
were out drinking at some bar. Will felt enormous shame bringing the
police into the vomit-filled, shit-filled house. The second event was even
more traumatic. When he was 14, Will’s grandmother took him to bed
with her and seduced him. The grandmother also slept in the same bed
with his mother. It appears that this woman, on a conscious and psychotic
level, lived to incestuously destroy everyone about her. As a result of his
grandmother’s action, Will was never interested in developing an active
and fulfilling sexual life. Rather, his sexuality has been mixed with humili
ation and indifference. All of his life he has walled himself off from any
appropriately loving involvement with the opposite sex.
Grandmother died when Will was 18. Her estate was a monument to her
life of destructiveness. The family home was such a filthy wreck that it
was barely saleable. His mother had degenerated into a fat alcoholic. The
once-famous beautiful showgirl was to end her life working as a chamber
maid in a low-class hotel. Will was already an alcoholic. Although grand
mother was dead and buried, she lived on in her grandson’s psyche, urging
him on to alcoholism and self-destruction.
Will related that grandmother had great contempt for men and loved the
company of women. Indeed, she slept with and was sexually involved
with her daughter. She was a hateful anti-Semite and treated everyone else
like dirt. What is most is most interesting is that Will’s memory of her
abusing him is very limited. Psychic crimes were committed against him;
however, other than the incestuous experience, his memory is quite blank.
This repression is probably at the core of his manic-depressive posture.
What was repressed was probably the destruction of his sense of value and
self-esteem. He was also robbed of his right to be angry. The higher power
that Will always yielded to was his mother and grandmother. Astound-
ingly enough, he has no remembrance at all of his mother. One could
speculate that both mother and grandmother were merged into one trau
matic image. The image deprived him on an oedipal level of any true
feeling of worth and self-satisfaction. A sense of trust or comfort was lost
in the dawning of his life. No doubt he experienced depression and rage in
his earliest years.
After the death of his grandmother, Will tried a number of jobs. When
he was not working he was drinking. As fate would have it, he wandered
into a bar one night, saw a piano, and started to play and sing. Quite by
accident, he found a career for himself that met his alcoholic, musical, and
exhibitionistic needs. One can conjecture that his alcoholism was a way of
dealing with his mania. Drinking slowed him down; it stabilized his
moods; and it also destroyed him physically and mentally. Perhaps on
some deeper level, when he was playing and singing in a bar, he was
reunited with his childhood family-only this time he was accepted and
beloved. Like his family, he was also quite drunk.
Will’s psychosexual history can be marked by one word: abuse. He has
no memory of his first 5 years. Early feeding and toilet training must have
been emotional disasters. This devastation can be seen as reflected in his
food and alcohol addictions. It is noteworthy that Will always wears a
strong cologne. The smell of the shit and the vomit of his childhood haunts
him. He makes his contact with the world through exhibitionism and
manic affect, not through intimacy.
Will’s marriage was part of a fantasy and was very brief. He wanted to
marry a Protestant American type of woman and have a son to whom he
could give the best so that the boy could climb the ladder of success. By a
strange quirk of fate, he met a woman who went along with this need and
they produced a son. After a year or two, Will left his wife and son, Bob.
He has been devoted to them both all his life. True to Will’s fantasy, Bob
graduated from a prestigious college and became a professional, marrying
a woman who came from a good background. In deference to his grand
mother, Will created another matriarchy. Unlike his grandmother, how
ever, he genuinely cared for his son. Like his father, Bob drinks; however,
his drinking is situational and occurs as he nears periods of success.
After leaving his wife, Will met the girlfriend who was to be the passion
and disaster of his existence. Roberta was extremely beautiful. She was
also a pillhead and a prostitute. Her life was punctuated by periods of
imprisonment for drug use. Will “ mothered” her; he fed her, gave her
money, and supported her habit by scoring pills for her. Scoring pills is
Louis Birner 133
dangerous because it involves risking arrest and/or being mugged. If

arrested, Will could have lost his license and his vocation.
Roberta and Will had an interesting sexual pattern. Neither was inter
ested in sexual intercourse per se but any style of oral stimulation was a
delight to them. “Going down” on Roberta was the ultimate thrill for Will
and gave him endless sexual pleasure. Roberta was never around for long.
Her being arrested or finding other men interfered with their relationship,
and she both exploited and humiliated Will during their time together.
True to his childhood history, Will mixed sex and humiliation. Indeed,
during his fourth year of treatment, Roberta died of an overdose in his bed,
leaving a pile of vomit. In deference to her memory, Will bought a tomb
stone for the lady.
Interestingly enough, Will related that he never had any homosexual
contacts. With women, he tends to be sporadic and impulsive. His penis
means little to him, his partner means little to him. His main source of
gratification is his mouth. Like most people who are locked in psychotic
conflict, he is fixated at the oral level of development. Like the infant, he
can feel both elated and starved emotionally with great ease.
Shortly after Will started treatment for the second time, he found a new
weight doctor who, among other things, prescribed the drug Elavil. As a
result Will became quite manic. I suggested he consult a psychiatrist about
whether or not he should be on Elavil. After the consultation with the
psychiatrist, he was placed on lithium, which tended to stabilize him.
When Will returned to treatment, he stated that he really wanted to get
into his analysis. He wanted to know if there was anything he should do as
a patient. I suggested that any information about his childhood would be
helpful. Much of Will’s treatment has centered on his childhood remem
brances.
Will’s degree of repression is remarkable. His mother never existed in
his recollections. In 5 years he has not brought in one dream. Childhood
loneliness and abuse are the two most significant communications. Memo
ries cluster only about grandmother. He vaguely describes his mother as
his protector against his grandmother. He tended to cast her in the role of
his protector and friend. No doubt this was a reaction formation to the rage
he feels toward his mother. Repression and the absence of memories point
to an extreme depressive posture in his early childhood. The more of his
awareness and cognition he could wall off, the safer he felt in the grim and
traumatic days of his early development. His preoedipal emotions prob
ably center on the loss of love from and his rage toward the maternal
introject. Early acts of separation and individuation were not supported
www.Ebook777.com
inasmuch as the mother herself was a dependent alcoholic who was narcis-
sistically involved in her own destruction.
In the transference, I am somewhat idealized. One of the things that
makes treatment most meaningful to Will is that it is a situation where he
receives no abuse. In terms of his ego functioning, he seems to need caring
but cannot take too much friendliness or warmth. He is the exhibitor, actor,
performer. The analyst is the listener. In fact, one of the things I do is help
him get his act together. Will likes toughness. His manipulativeness and
need to delude himself are challenged in treatment. In one session he
acknowledged, “ I am glad I cannot bullshit you.”
Will’s elation, charm, and up mood can create in the therapist a positive
countertransference on a subjective level. Such positive countertransfer
ence reactions must be looked on with suspicion. Will’s idealization, warm
mood, and fund of stories only serve to cloud his depression and self-de
structiveness. To reward the charm and the elation in any way is a disser
vice to him and to the treatment. On an objective countertransference
level, Will’s praise, warmth, and idealization must be seen as a treatment
resistance. This resistance is to be challenged as it serves to distance him
from making emotional contact. In Will’s case this idealization seemed a
mask of hatred inasmuch as none of the principals of his childhood stimu
lated a true feeling of love and caring.
It is important to note that, like most psychotics, Will has a problem
staying in reality. At work he does fine. An elated manic can have a
soothing effect in a bar full of mostly depressed people. Many customers
have praised him for his ability to lift them out of their depression with his
music and the warmth of his personality. It’s after work that Will is in
trouble. Unless he has a routine, he falls apart. He can be an avid reader, a
many-mile walker, or an engaging talker. It is when he feels he has nothing
to do that his anxiety level rises, heightening his potential to overeat or
even to drink. His friends are few and often have their own addictive
problems. Will feels he needs challenges; these challenges help keep him
reality bound. Without appropriate and consistent stimulation he can
regress into a depressive, depersonalized state.
On some levels, Will transfers his babyhood into treatment. He wants
an approving mother; he needs limitations, support, and guidance. In
short, he sees his analyst as the mother and father he never had. He refers
to me as his “professional.” It seems most probable that his reverential
feelings are the displaced hope of finding a good and loving mother. Will’s
rage has only one outlet and direction-his fury at his grandmother. It also
seems likely that this rage is kept under close control; he cannot afford to
lose any love objects. This, of course, is the dilemma of the psychotic: the
Louis Birner 135
need to hold on to the toxic introjects and the fear of losing them or of
displeasing them. Without his work and routine Will falls apart. Vacations
are impossible; being out of therapy for a week is most difficult.
Time has a peculiar meaning for Will. He exists in the prolonged battle
of his early childhood. The vital emotional supplies of caring, affection,
and recognition are only to be found in his audience, his therapist, and a
few friends. He is constantly fighting his depression and trying to separate
from his hateful introjects.
“THE MANIC ATTACK”
The session before Will’s “manic attack” was unusual. He asked per
mission to bring his grandmother’s perfume and to smell it during the
session. Perhaps he thought that this would help him to remember. In a
theatrical way, he presented the bottle, opened it, smelled it, and put some
perfume on his tie. For all of his drama and for all of the pungency of the
perfume, nothing happened. No memories of childhood or grandmother
were forthcoming. Indeed, this session left Will feeling somewhat disap
pointed.
Within a week he fell into what he has called a “ manic attack.” On
Sunday he felt a sense of panic and tried to get himself committed, without
any success. He called me and his psychiatrist, and he ran to a mental
hospital and sat in the emergency room. After the attack, he was a changed
person. His voice was slow and heavy; his movements reflected psycho
motor retardation; he was confused, emotionally flat, and time disoriented.
He appeared drug addicted. He was by no means suffering from mania but
was experiencing a psychotic depressive reaction, one that reflected the
core of hopelessness of his psyche. Grandmother’s perfume brought not
only the smells of childhood back to him, but also the major emotional loss
of his life. Freud (1917/1957) felt that depression represented a libidinal
investment in an unloving object. The unloving object-mother/grand-
mother-also represents his incorporated object. Will’s stuporous depres
sion was a reunion with his introjected family. This depressive mood was
in sharp contrast to his joyous and happy mood-which attempted to deny
the existence of these introjects and to affirm his own ego. His catatonic-
like stupor represents his infancy when he sought after and tried to incor
porate a loveless and cruel mother/grandmother figure. A lifelong patho
logical feeding process, as it were, had been initiated. Feeding at the
unbeloved and poisonous breast is a core problem in all depression. When
one introjects the unbeloved mother, depression can be seen as an attempt
to kill off the self and the introjected object. According to Lewin (1961),
the mother can be introjected as both a superego object and an ego object.
Disassociative depression is a way of yielding to this mother’s dreadful
influence and to her hollow, empty breast. In depression, Will yields to her
higher negative power.
It took Will 6 weeks to gather enough control over himself to resume
functioning. His only activity during this depressive reaction was work,
which consisted of playing and singing for 4 hours daily. After work he
either slept or ate. He could not remember appointments. Indeed, even
when appointment times were written down for him he would not remem
ber to show up. If he was late only one minute, I phoned him. He would
then rush over and have a part of his session. This time disorientation was
probably a repetition of the way his childhood time was made a chaotic
and frustrating stream of events without any rhythm or meaning. His early
feeding was most likely an inconsistent and masochistic experience; he
was probably fed when mother was sober (which may not have been very
often). There was probably no rhythm or pattern to his childhood rearing;
consequently, he resisted the pattern of his appointments.
The problem of treating the depressive side of the manic personality is
one of not yielding to induced feelings. Gross hopelessness, disorientation,
poor reality testing, and a depersonalized form of contact were transferred
to me. Will tried to stimulate feelings of pity and frustration in me. It
seemed most probable that his depression was covering up a murderous
rage toward both mother and grandmother. The challenge of working
through a severe depression is one of giving the patient appropriate com
munication.
I became gruff and unfriendly during this depressive period. This is in
keeping with Edith Jacobson’s (1971) notion that the severely depressed
person cannot integrate warmth or caring. The poison of his depression
was fed back to him in a toxoidal way, to reduce his self-hatred. His flat
empty state was countered by some very powerful emotions on my part.
This is in keeping with Spotnitz’s (1985) notion that, when appropriate,
the therapist should provide emotions that are missing in the patient’s
personality. I told him that he was a “ goddam schmuck living to please
your grandmother by becoming her Zombie,” or I made other comments
such as, “ Don’t be an asshole. Stop worshipping that cunt.”
Gradually, Will started to remember his appointments. His voice pattern
changed; the very heavy tone and slur pattern left his speech. The issue of
routine and managing his life came back into therapeutic focus and he was
able to work through his depression.
As a means of counteracting his depersonalized depressive reaction, Will
occasionally makes plans about his future, plans that often reflect his manic
Louis Birner 137
grandiosity, preoedipal states, and psychosexual conflicts. An example of

this is his planning a new piano act with a dwarf: “The dwarf will play the
part of an aggressive macho male. I’ll be the female. We will have purple
lights. I’ll put false keys on the piano. They will fly off at the right
moment. The act will be a sensation.”
Role confusion and a need to change sexual roles resulting from his
lack of male identity is obvious. The keys flying off his piano may repre
sent his expectancy of castration. Although this “ act” gives all the power
to the dwarf who is the symbolic mother or grandmother, Will sees this
performance as a means of esteeming himself and advancing his career.
He does not realize what his symbolically giving up his maleness could
mean and means in terms of repeating his childhood and the reexperienc-
ing of his castration fears.
Another “great act” Will is considering is a “Frankie and Johnnie”
routine. Frankie is a prostitute, and Johnnie is her pimp. “ I’ll have her pull
a gun and kill me. It will go over great.”
Once again, Will is symbolically destroyed by the maternal figure. This
fantasy is a denial of the feeling of annihilation and destruction that was so
much a part of his early development and the psychic key to his depres
sion.
Hopefully, in time, Will will be able to regulate his life so that he can
integrate enough self-esteem to hold his mania and his depression in
balance. His need for triumph (his mania) and the sense of defeat (his
depression) serve to keep him out of reality and to rob him of a sense of
inner peace.
At this point, Will has worked through some of his depression and is
somewhat in control of himself. When yielding to the higher power-his
mother/grandmother-he is immobilized in depression and loss of reality. In
struggling to claim his own ego, he begins to make contact with the world.
THEORETICAL AND TREATMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Therapy has effected some inner psychic change in Will. Five years of
once-weekly treatment has regulated his life. Treatment has been most
successful in the area of making psychic substitutions. Food and alcohol
have been renounced for the triumph of diet and sobriety. It must be noted
that these “ triumphs” are a very common reaction to a morbid state of
depression. The manic depressive is ambivalent toward his own ego. In
depression, he is powerless. In mania, which is the other side of his
depression, he is triumphant and no longer feels that he has to be afraid.
The superego has merged with the ego. In giving up obesity and alcohol
ism, Will triumphs over mother/grandmother and gives up his morbid

identification with them and with his pathological incorporation of them.
Mother and grandmother are temporarily destroyed.
Freud (1913/1958) discussed the manic-depressive cycle in his Totem
and Taboo. He considers the manic-depressive cycle to be a period of
increased and decreased guilt feelings, a cycle between annihilation and
omnipotence, of punishment and a new deed. In the last analysis, this goes
back to the original life cycle of hunger and satiety in the infant. Will’s
mania can be seen as a reaction formation to his depression, not a genuine
“triumph.”
What is interesting clinically is that Will also denies and reacts against
his depression through exhibitionism. He delights in his weight loss and
sobriety and is ready to show and tell the world about it. His exhibitionism
is not, however, a measure of an increase in self-esteem. It is a defense
against his depression and a way of handling sexual impulses.
In treatment, such patients are basically inaccessible when either manic
or depressive. They are often ambivalent and narcissistic and offer great
resistance to the analytic process. Two factors are of the greatest help: (a)
some enforced stabilization (through medication, treatment, or a life situa
tion), and (b) the free interval (that period in time when neither the mania
nor the depression predominates).
Will has experienced both factors in treatment. He does work, and his
moods are medically regulated and balanced. There have been free inter
vals in his analysis. Indeed, he has functioned for 5 years. In his infantile
way, he genuinely likes and cares for me, his therapist. The therapeutic
goal of working for free periods has met with some measured success. The
desired result in the treatment of manic-depressive psychosis is to extend
and to make the free interval a major part of the patient’s existence. Cases
have been noted in the literature where this goal has been achieved. For
instance, Abraham (1953, pp. 418-476) succeeded in curing patients afflicted
with manic-depressive psychosis.
As many writers have pointed out, depression represents a fixation at
the oral level of psychosexual development. The manic depressive is an
extreme case of this. Lewin (1950) notes in his concept of the “ oral triad”
that the sense of elation represents a liberation from profound superego
pressures. Elation is a false emotion and serves to deny certain psychic
expectancies such as annihilation, castration, incest, and primal scenes. To
eat, to be eaten, and to sleep are the baby’s earliest psychic expectancies.
In the manic depressive, any of these expectancies are tinged with the
threat of annihilation.
What is interesting about his case is that it reflects the cyclothymic
Louis Bimer 139
personality and the pattern of neurotic depression in general. Neurotics do

go through swings of mood and use the mechanism of denial. They can
also be narcissistic and inaccessible to treatment. However, the problem of
treatment is most complicated because we are dealing with psychotic
states and preoedipal communications and affects. The critical issues of
separation and individuation from early toxic introjects are primary. Giv
ing up the unbeloved breast and incorporating self-loving objects and
experiences are necessary in the treatment of both the neurotic and the
psychotic.
The work of Spotnitz (1985) has been of particular help in conceptually
understanding Will’s psychotic communication. Before the therapist can
enable maturational changes, he or she must understand the preverbal
communications and puncture the narcissist’s defenses that make the
patient inaccessible to treatment. Both the mania and the depression must
be seen as pre-ego feelings. Also, when Will expressed both sides of his
psychosis, the therapist had to note that he did not exist for him as an
object (human being); rather, if he did exist for Will he was more of an
audience. The idealized “professional” was more a psychotic projection
than a flesh-and-blood human being.
Part of the process of maturing the patient was to use support to get him
to make such valuable contacts as A.A., along with establishing routines
of walking and visiting museums and attending musical events. Through
treatment Will was-like the toddler-being given permission to walk down
the street and to experience life. Discussions of A.A., museums, and con
certs had a contact function and were object oriented. His previous alco
holism had kept Will drugged and out of life. His depression was narco
tized by his drinking. The depression also represented the preverbal feelings
of annihilation that he must have experienced from his drunken mother’s
inconsistent care. The mania itself can be seen as a total narcissistic
involvement, making him inaccessible to contact and treatment.
Fenichel (1945) notes that there are three special difficulties in dealing
with the manic depressive:
1. The oral fixation (crucial preoedipal material).

2. The narcissistic nature of the illness and the looseness of the trans
ference.
3. The inaccessibility to analytic influence due to the absence of a rea
sonable ego.
Working with the narcissistic transference, then, is the best hope of

establishing contact. Using a clear period when the ego can be reasonable
and in contact with reality is most beneficial.
Emphasis must be placed on dealing with the patient’s narcissism in

such ways as to help him or her to make emotional contact and to grow up.
This is often a frustrating task and a negative countertransference is easily
developed and must be fought against as therapy progresses The patient is
understood best as a psychotic infant resisting the language of health.
Extreme patience and an inner hopefulness are essential in working with
such patients. One must seek ways of substituting a reality sense in place
of morbid psychotic states and affects.
At the core of the manic depressive is the expectancy of both psychic
and physical destruction. Denial serves to keep all morbid expectancies
intact. The therapist must work to bring the patient into a reality state free
from the torment of introjects. As Will said in one session, “ I am getting
my hand off the worship button. I feel better.”
REFERENCES
Abraham, K. (1953). Selected papers on psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books.

Fenichel, O. (1945). The psychoanalytic theory o f neurosis. New York: Norton.
Freud, S. (1955). Totem and taboo. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The stan
dard edition o f the complete psychological works o f Sigmund Freud (Vol. 13,
pp. 1-164). London: The Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1913)
Freud, S. (1957). Mourning and melancholia. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The
standard edition o f the complete psychological works o f Sigmund Freud (Vol. 14,
pp. 237-160). London: The Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1917)
Jacobson, E. (1971). Depression. New York: International Universities Press.
Lewin, B. D. (1950). Psychoanalysis o f elation. New York: Norton.
Spotnitz, H. (1976). Psychotherapy o f preoedipal conditions. New York: Jason
Aronson.
Spotnitz, H. (1985). Modern psychoanalysis o f the schizophrenic patient (2nd
ed.). New York: Human Sciences Press.
No Place Like Home
Robert F. Morgan
SUMMARY. This is a case history, with a 23 year span, of a hos

pitalized artist’s fear of psychosis, treatment, and eventual outcome.
Using what would eventually be thought of as paradoxic intention,
psychotherapy, and art therapy, the initial year of counseling and dis
charge are illustrated by examples of the artist’s work. The long-term
outcomes, expected and unexpected, give a longitudinal perspective
in a Hawaiian context. [Article copies available from The Haworth Docu
ment Delivery Service: 1-800-342-9678.]
PROLOGUE
I owe much; I have nothing; the rest I leave to the poor.
(Francois Rabelais, 1533)
It had been 23 years since his discharge from my care. The voice was
mature, relaxed with a stronger island accent than I remembered. “Yes,”
he said, “ I definitely still want you to tell my story. And of course with my
art. That’s still what I do. Be sure particularly use the name on my canvas:
Gordius.”
Robert F. Morgan, PhD, is in private practice at 855 La Playa #358, San

Francisco, CA 94121-3252.
[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “ No Place Like Home.” Morgan, Robert F. Co-published simul
taneously in The Psychotherapy Patient (The Haworth Press, Inc.) Vol. 9, No. 3/4, 1996, pp. 141-183;
and: Psychosocial Approaches to Deeply Disturbed Persons (eds: Peter R. Breggin, and E. Mark Stem)
The Haworth Press, Inc., 1996, pp. 141 -183. Single or multiple copies of this article are available from The
Haworth Document Delivery Service [1-800-342-9678,9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. (EST)].

GORDIUS
The Law of Raspberry Jam: the wider any culture is spread, the
thinner it gets.
(Alvin Toffler, 1985)
Hawaii’s Portuguese community violated Toffler’s law as long as it
could. Fifty years ago the jam was successfully thick.
The Portuguese followed the Chinese and Japanese as seduced waves
of ethnic workers for the plantations of island entrepreneurs. To keep
grounded in their origins, tradition was jealously protected and family
expectations were clear.
The Portuguese were World War II “Okies,” lured to the island with
promise of paradise and exploited in the fields and canning plants by their
sponsors. The work was brutal and unrelenting. Into this tropical trap
came a young Portuguese family: mother, father, three sons.
The father and his older brother had died of heart failure and exhaustion
before Gordius was old enough for public school.
Once he headed for New York to be an actor. Mother wrote him regu
larly on the impossible odds against this happening. She told him he was
free to live his life as he wished but she would probably not survive alone.
He was guilty, frightened and unsuccessful. Doling out equal portions of
blame for himself and for his mother, he returned home.
He went to the University of Texas-not the most benign environment in
that decade for a gay Roman Catholic raised in Hawaii. (Neither of course
was New York: his ambivalence at leaving home was regularly reflected in
the odds he set against himself.) Again mother wrote dire predictions and
guilt-inducing pleas. And again he returned.
Paying more attention to his clear preference for the company of men,
he applied to an order of Catholic brothers within the Portuguese commu
nity. They told him there was no room for homosexual priests in their
order. He swore he would respect celibacy but they were unrelenting. He
called them unchristian and was evicted.
The next year he chose better, enlisting in the army. The military, even
today, is clearly a great career choice for those preferring the company of
their own gender. Gordius thrived, working his way up the ranks to ser
geant in four years. He was the pride of his commanding officer who told
him at the end of his enlistment period that he would sponsor him for
officer training school. Gordius, in a fit of trust (and ambivalence), told his
mentor the truth about watching his younger brother and escorting his
mother; as much as he was able, he took his father’s place. Although this
did not literally include sex, the tensions were there.
Robert F. Morgan 143
Mother was a survivor. Undaunted by unending labor and the deaths in

her family, she kept on. A small dour woman, she compensated for her
tenacity by avoiding any emotional commitments, particularly to her sons.
The lack of affection, communication, consideration, and empathy were
hallmarks of her stem care. She did have strong feelings about one thing:
the need for her sons to stay with her always. The extended family was a
culturally congruent concept and, as absolute matriarch, she counted on it.
By encouraging guilt, inadequacy, and fear in her children she worked
toward continuing this dependency, for to let them go would mean being
alone in the world. Unfair. Gordius’ best accomplishments were acknowl
edged, his worst highlighted. Girlfriends were vehemently discouraged.
Mother was, excuse a term no longer in style, a schizophrenogenic parent.
Gordius had one ray of light in these dark days. He was picked up by an
uncle for a monthly visit. The uncle was the only affectionate male in his
life at that time. He attended to Gordius with enthusiasm. The love was
frequent and literal. Gordius was sworn to secrecy. He knew that if his sex
with uncle were discovered, his sole holiday would end. And, also, he
cared much for this uncle.
Long after his younger brother had grown and left home, Gordius
remained, not with satisfaction and not without attempts at his sexual
orientation. But he had been celibate, he added. The CO said he’d have to
think about that and dismissed Gordius. It was never clear whether she
came with or without her husband’s blessing, but that night the CO’s wife
visited Gordius to convert him to heterosexuality. Predictably, facing the
very conflict he’d thought he’d left at home, he threw her out with edito
rial comment. The next day Gordius was sectioned out of the army on a
medical discharge: homosexuality.
Back home with mother, he got a job on a delivery truck and tried to
live harmoniously at home. The house rules from his side included abso
lute privacy for his room. Most important to him, mother was never to sit
on his bed. Of course she did, and often. Gordius threw epithets, furniture,
and generally caught his mother’s attention.
She began taking him to the family physician for therapy. Her primary
concerns were disobedience, tantrums, and homosexuality. The family
physician was not a psychotherapist but undertook individual therapy any
way. He was the community medical expert. While Gordius was being
seen, unknown to him, mother was allowed to watch and listen from an
adjoining room. After her son’s sessions ended she then consulted with the
doctor to review the material. Gordius was 30.
Eventually Gordius saw through this procedure, refused to return to the
unethical setting, and called the physician to tell him why. It was an
www.Ebook777.com
important event for Gordius; he was able to confront this father-figure

emphatically and effectively. He stood up to him and told him off.
The next day his physician died from heart failure.
While mother made full use of the event to consolidate her domination
of Gordius, she had become ambivalent herself. She was becoming
increasingly fearful, as was he, that his violence with furniture might
eventually extend to her. Gordius was also, in his most recent feelings of
guilt and failure, developing enough anger suppression and guilt to be
suicidal. He wondered about his own sanity.
Given all of this, Gordius voluntarily committed himself, in rare coop
eration with his mother, to the free public care of the state mental hospital.
INTAKE
All life is an experiment.
(Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1880)
The day always began early so at the end of the shift there would still be
surf time. I was a post-doctoral clinical intern and this was my first intake
session. Gordius was presented via paper as needing treatment for “homo
sexuality and disobedience,” although the diagnostic description was
“borderline schizophrenia.”
Borderline in those days meant they didn’t know what he was.
The Volunteer Services Coordinator, years ahead of her time, objected to
homosexuality as a diagnostic category of mental illness. 1 supported her and
added that unquestioning obedience to his mother as a psychiatric goal,
particularly for a patient in his 30’s, was not realistic. We were, of course,
rewarded for this heresy by being assigned treatment responsibility for Gor
dius. Already responsible for 200 patients, I soon learned that any comment
at intake was automatic commitment to taking on yet another individual case.
The Volunteer Services Coordinator, more seasoned than I, soon handed
off her responsibility to the new volunteer art therapist. I began seeing
Gordius for individual therapy once a week in my office.
GOALS
Perfection is finally attained, not when there is no longer anything to
add, but when there is no longer anything to take away.
(Antoine de Saint-Exupery, 1940)

It was easy for Gordius to formulate his goals for success. Most impor
tant was to leave home, break away from mother. As to his sexuality, he
didn’t really want to abandon men; he just wanted to relate more positively
to women. He was also fearful of his violence and wanted some control.
For his suicidal feelings, he needed both better expression of his anger and
a more satisfying vocational setting than the bread truck. Finally, he was
afraid of becoming schizophrenic; he understood what his diagnostic label
predicted, and he wanted some control of that as well. We agreed on all
these goals.
MOTHER AND THE GOVERNOR
The greatest challenge for young people is to learn good manners in

the absence of any example.
(Fred Astaire, 1981)
Shortly after therapy began, Gordius’ mother called me to find out what
he was saying about her. I explained that, because of his adult age, his
confidentiality had to be protected. I referred her to a social worker for
information in a general sense about the program. She did not take this
easily, being particularly concerned about a comment from her son that the
primary treatment goal was his freedom.
In another era this might have led to family or system work. But this
was 1966 and mother chose a more direct route. She complained to the
Governor of the state of Hawaii.
Hawaii is a small state with a big heart: her complaint was heard and
considered. It took several months before she was finally told, “Dr. Mor
gan was correct in his approach.” She called me one more time. “ It’s not
fair,” she said. “Why should he get the good therapist? I ’m the one who
worked so hard.”
But mother didn’t come in for treatment with another practitioner. In
time she eventually talked her youngest son into returning home.
ART THERAPY
A portrait is a painting with something wrong with the mouth.
(John Sargent, 1920)

¡46 PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACHES TO DEEPLY DISTURBED PERSONS
The volunteer art therapist, Mrs. W., was much loved by her patients.
Not only were her classes fun but she taught them much about themselves.
What wasn’t true to begin with soon became so. For example, she
explained at the outset that psychosis was communicated in art by greens
and purples. While this had little empirical support in the literature, it soon
became both a self-fulfilling prophecy and an important form of commu
nication.
With Mrs. W., Gordius was confronted with a relentlessly positive female
role model. In the beginning, he challenged her often. He painted her
portraits in greens and purples. Unfazed, she had him copy cartoons of
female faces and pointed out his turning straight line mouths into scowls.
(Even male figures rarely were smiling; female ones never were).
He began to identify her favorites among his productions and say,
“These are for Dr. Morgan.” But it didn’t work. She continued (and
continues) to be his friend. One goal met.
At every one of our sessions he would choose some of his art to express
feelings in individual therapy. In addition to speed sketching, copying, and
other art therapy techniques, he continued to develop his own unique
artistic style. A selection of these are included in this chapter.
TRANSFERENCE
The easiest kind of relationship for me is with ten thousand people.

The hardest is with one.
(Joan Baez, 1989)
Gordius has a learned expectancy for a good father and a hostile mother.
The art therapist had not fit well into the hostility mode and his original
mother was not part of the hospital community. While I held the role of the
father for a time, Gordius settled on a new target as “mother” : the male
psychiatrist in charge of our unit and my supervisor.
This is, of course, hindsight. At the time I had no insight into the
increasingly hostile exchanges I was having with Dr. R. He had been gone
my first months at the hospital during which time I had engineered a
moratorium for his only treatment approach: ECT. He managed to take this
in stride but it predisposed him to seek out alternate challenges to my
work. There was no love between us and if I thought of him at all as a
mother, it was only in the presence of two additional syllables. So, Gordius
chose well. Dr. R. was clearly, even though the gender was wrong, a
personality much like his own mother. Even the size and belief systems
were the same. By violating small rules just before our sessions, he regu
larly triggered solitary confinement punishments from Dr. R. which
voided our therapy. I objected, often seeing Gordius in his cell, and the
battle was on. In time and with good supervision from my psychologist
compadres, I finally saw what was taking place and made my peace. . . or
at least worked with Gordius until he saw his role in maintaining the war
and removed himself as cause of the battle.
This was a big breakthrough for Gordius. He began to realize his
existential power: no longer was he a child unable to shape his life.
Concentrating now on his relationship with me, he began to make
demands. Therapy twice a week: OK. Therapy daily: no. No? He warned
me he could become violent if not given enough care. I asked him to
visualize the violence. He did so: not against himself or others but a brick
through an empty building’s window. The answer was still no.
I called the ward and told him that he would be back but would break a
window on the way. They thought I was a great prognosticator when the
glass broke.
At our next meeting we went out and looked at the still-unrepaired
window. “ Still no extra sessions?” he asked. “Nope.” The patient-thera-
pist relationship had been clarified and limited. We both relaxed and got
on with the therapy.
HOLIDAY
Whether one chooses celibacy or marriage, it will be repented.
(Socrates, 422 BC)
Gordius was making good progress in the hospital. He was getting

along with others of both sexes, his art was flourishing and was much
admired, and he had developed some control of his acts of violence.
By using visualization techniques, he was able to confront thoughts
rather than hide from them and to express anger in his fantasies rather than
his actions.
He also felt able to address his relationship with his mother. He got my
permission, and hers, to spend a holiday weekend at home.
His brother away, it was a chance for Gordius to try to move his
relationship with mother to a more positive level. First, though, he thought
he’d stop by the order of Catholic brothers.
There he told them that he was successful in therapy and now wanted to
begin a new life with them.
While Gordius had changed, they had not. Again he was evicted for
calling them unchristian. They wanted no part of formerly gay priests even
if celibate.
Gordius went home and, for once, opened up his sadness to his mother.
He had neglected to realize that she, minus any therapy, hadn’t changed
any more than the brothers had. She sneered at him and told him he wasn’t
a man. As she said this she took the knife that had been carving their
turkey and slammed it down next to him on the table. He grabbed the knife
and growled. Mother fainted.
Holding the knife, he went through his exercises, in fantasy carving her up
like the turkey. Suddenly he relaxed, realizing he need never harm anyone.
With his thoughts free his actions were in control. He put down the knife.
Mother sat up with a sneer. He picked up the knife. Mother lay down
again. He finally went over to mother, scratched her arm, and called the
police. (This too was functional; she never invited him back that year.)
Sunday night. The police sergeant came to my house and asked me if
Gordius was sane or crazy when he attacked his mother. A neophyte, I
gave candor: I didn’t know. This wouldn’t do. The officer patiently
explained that if crazy, he could leave Gordius at the hospital but if sane he
had to book him. I also knew the medical director never wanted us to say
patients were crazy in such circumstances for liability reasons (she had
only the month before insisted on the sanity of a released patient that
subsequently did homicidal sniping). I decided to interview Gordius.
Is your mother OK now? Yes. At the time you held the knife in your
hand and she was beginning to sneer at you again, did you think of anything
you could do besides scratch her with the knife? No. OK: you were crazy.
The officer, relieved, left Gordius with the hospital. The medical director
and I had a difficult meeting on Monday. But the therapy continued.
It was a turning point for Gordius. He never hurt anyone again, was
master of his actions, developed more alternatives than the habitual self-de-
feating ones, and clearly left home for good. At least the home with mother.
LOVE AND SCHIZOPHRENIA

How complete is the delusion that beauty is goodness.
(Leo Tolstoy, 1901)
At ease with women, Gordius now developed a relationship with
another male patient. He had worked through and abandoned the common
fantasy that somehow his heterosexual married therapist would satisfy his
non-therapeutic emotional needs and was now in love with a poetic com
padre from his ward.
It went well until Gordius chose to paint his lover’s disorder. Gordius
painted his lover in green.
Since the lover also had Mrs. W. as an art therapist, he got the message
and the relationship ended.
Now Gordius was concerned about his own sanity. If he could be fooled
about a lover, couldn’t he also be fooled about himself?
Much of my successful therapy had been based on the analytic (Bert
Karon) and behavioral areas (Ray Denny, Stan Ratner) but the hospital
supervising psychologists (Howard Gudeman, Robert Hunt) were very
existential. Despite my resistances to learning, the power of these ideas
coupled with the writings of Rollo May (later a friend of the family) took
me to a new direction for this fear of Gordius. What I did in 1966 would
later be popularized as “paradoxical intention.” I labeled it: “seemed a
good idea at the time.”
I worked with Gordius on his existential progress in taking responsibil
ity for his life. I told him he had the capacity, if he chose, to be schizo
phrenic. He also, therefore, had the capacity not to be. To demonstrate this I
suggested he visualize what it would be like if he were schizophrenic. I was
assured that his conception left no room for violence to himself or others.
Rather it sounded much like the experience that early medical experiment
ers with LSD described. I then suggested he spend the next week being his
version of schizophrenic. He agreed.
Much of the art from this period is in this chapter. He drew on his
knowledge of schizophrenics in the hospital and on this artistic license. His
hallucinations were more visual than auditory and his art was reflective in
some cases of good schizophrenic art: trees with organs, the art therapy
building with the inside on the outside. Occasionally he would be inconsis
tent and reality would sneak in: one picture had his first good self depiction
at the time. This was actually quite congruent with reality, he was making a
sane choice to travel through the experience of craziness. He had painted
himself schizophrenic. He lost his fear of the borderline diagnosis and
showed no further schizophrenic symptoms in the remainder of his year
with me at the hospital.
DISCHARGE
Truth is stronger than fiction.
(Experience, Robert F. Morgan, 1990)

Gordius had developed some discharge plans. He had met his goals and
was now committed to developing an outside career as an artist while
living on welfare. Although what he planned was feasible, he was never
theless terrified.
The only places he had ever succeeded in for long, away from mother,
were the army and the hospital. The former was out of the question and the
latter was about to be left behind. The hospital had become his home.
This was reflected in his art. A straw man walking up steps leading to
nowhere was typical.
One day he left a drawing of a bird flying over a moat. I put it on the
wall as always to wait for my consultant.
My consultant was a patient from a different ward who had moved
through paranoid schizophrenia (he eventually got a Master’s Degree in
counseling at a state university) and visited me regularly to work on his
discharge. In addition to library research, he was a first-rate interpreter of
art from real experience. John Rosen had used ex-patients in therapy and I
thought I might benefit from the same counsel.
My consultant didn’t know Gordius but was always right about inter
pretations of his art on my office wall. Subsequent free association with
Gordius invariably came to the same conclusion. Early on, my consultant
had walked up to a sketch by Gordius of Christ on the cross faced by
praying Mother Mary and a little brother (not quite the way the New
Testament had it). I had merely interpreted it as more religious fixation and
family enmeshment. My consultant put it more directly: “He’s willing to
be crucified if that’s what it takes to get his mother and brother to bow
down to him.”
My consultant was also good at recognizing me in Gordius’ drawings;
that was also something I occasionally overlooked.
So on this day, only one month away from Gordius’ discharge, my
consultant walked over to the fleeing bird and said: “ How long ago did the
artist leave here?” “ An hour.” “ Well, Doc, we still have time to catch him
before he gets to the top of the Pali and dies of exposure.”
Absolutely correct. Afraid of heaving through the front door, Gordius
climbed the mountain of perpetual rain dwarfing the hospital. The rescue
team brought him back intact. We kept working on discharge.
In the end I continued to see him on a monthly outpatient basis until I
left the islands. He seemed happy and was generating some exceptionally
fine art work. He continued his contact with Mrs. W. but we lost touch.
Ten years went by.
NO PLACE LIKE HOME
The only man who is really free is the one who can turn down an
invitation to dinner without giving an excuse.
(Jules Rennard, 1899)
It was Christmas and I was visiting Hawaii’s state hospital for the first
time in a decade. We were seeing friends in the area and I thought I’d take
an hour to stop by the place where I used to work. With the Hawaiian
sense of personal history, the hospital still had my name in their literature
as founder of the adolescent treatment program. I was enjoying seeing old
friends and mixed memories. The hospital had shrunk from a census of
1000+ to a few hundred on wards for intensive or specialized care. The
treatment had moved out to the community and a community college had
taken over much of what used to be the hospital. My former supervisor
and chief psychologist now ran the hospital, something that made me more
optimistic than I expected to be about the institution’s future.
Then nurse left from my era said, “One of the patients you worked with
is here now. You remember Gordius, don’t you?”
How sad, I thought. Had he visited once too often and been given ECT
or other iatrogenic treatment (Morgan 1983)? Had he needed more therapy
before he left?
“No, no,” said the nurse, seeing my expression. “He’s alright, it’s just
that Gordius is a street artist with very little money. Every Christmas he
develops what we call ‘seasonal schizophrenia’. He generates enough
symptoms to join us for Christmas including our Christmas Dinner. He’ll
be well by New Year’s Day. Gordius is an annual event here.”
NOTE
Gordius’ artwork follows.
REFERENCES
Morgan, R.F. editor (1983). The Iatrogenic Handbook: A critical look at research
and practice in the helping professions. Toronto: IP1 Publications Ltd. (Out of
print: Available from author.)
Morgan, R.F. editor, (1985). Electric Shock. Toronto: 1PI Publications Ltd.
Self-Image
Self-Image
Psychotherapist
Art Therapist
Art Therapy Technique: Frowning Women

Art Therapy Technique: 2 Minute Family Portrait

Another Family Portrait, Therapist Added

Distancing: Stained Glass Faceless



Family Portrait: Stained Glass With Faces

Family Portrait: Including Preceding Patient
www.Ebook777.com
Family Portrait: (Original Monster In Green) "Life In Death”

Parental Hierarchy : Gloomy Outlook For Sick Turtles

Vocational Exit
Vocational Problem
Artist’s Insight: Portrait Of Poet And (Delusional) Lover

Paradoxical Intention: Schizophrenia Choice Art Morning Of Day 1

Paradoxical Intention: Schiz. Choice Art In PM: Art Therapy Building In/Out
More On Schiz Choice Day: Afternoon Art And Tree Has Changed (Self
Image +)
¡72 PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACHES TO DEEPLY DISTURBED PERSONS
Choosing Not To Be Schizophrenic But Still In Need

Robert F Morgan 173
Stained Glass Curtain Call: Impending Therapeutic Interruption

Health Anger At Therapist: Gone For A Week In A Good Cause

New Surreal Art Style Developing; Depression Saved For Therapy Hour
More Surreal Style

Flashback Curtain Call: Considering Discharge

One Flew Over: Run Away To Avoid Leaving

Therapist As Dragon: Discharge Approaching

Straw Man and Stairway Leading Nowhere: Anxiety On New Life

Ready To Leave: Art Style A And Accurate Self Image

Art Style B: Discharge Week And Ready To Go

1990 Art Sample: Remembering Psychotherapy
www.Ebook777.com
Working with the Families
of Schizophrenic Patients
Julian Leff
Ruth Berkowitz
SUMMARY. An investigation of working with families of schizophren

ics in group settings as a means of assisting aiding in patients’ expressed
emotions and social contacts and in helping reduce relapse rates.
[Article copies available from The Haworth Document Delivery Service:
1-800-342-9678.]
We have used the term “working with” in the title in preference to

“therapy,” because the latter implies that the family is the object of treat
ment and hence in need of it. This view characterised the therapy offered
to families of schizophrenic patients in the 1950s and ’60s, but was explic
itly rejected by the new approaches that developed in the ’70s and ’80s.
The earlier therapies were developed on the basis of the premise that the
family was responsible for making one of its members schizophrenic.
Consequently they were aimed at correcting the presumed distortion in the
family, whether this was a problem with the parents’ marriage (Lidz et al.,
1957) or with communication between the members (Bateson et al., 1956).
We believe there was little or no evidence that such abnormalities
occurred more frequently in the families of schizophrenic patients than in
Julian Leff, MD, is Professor in the MRC Social and Community Psychiatry
Unit, Institute of Psychiatry, De Crespigny Park, London SE5 BAF.
Dr. Ruth Berkowitz is a Psychoanalytic Psychotherapist and Systematic Fam
ily Therapist. Mailing address: 18 Kensington Park Road, London W 11 3BU.
[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “ Working with the Families o f Schizophrenic Patients.” Leff,
Julian, and Ruth Berkowitz. Co-published simultaneously in The Psychotherapy Patient (The Haworth
Press, Inc.) Vol. 9, No. 3/4, 1996, pp. 185-211; and: Psychosocial Approaches to Deeply Disturbed
Persons (eds: Peter R. Breggin, and E. Mark Stem) The Haworth Press, Inc., 1996, pp. 185-211. Single
or multiple copies of this article are available from The Haworth Document Delivery Service
[1-800-342-9678, 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. (EST)].

families in which a member suffered from some other psychiatric condi

tion (Hirsch & Leff, 1975). Nevertheless, these theories of family respon
sibility exerted a pervasive influence on psychiatric professionals and
often led to families either being treated as grossly pathological or being
shunned.
More recently, a new approach to family work began to emerge. The
research background to this innovation was a series of studies conducted
in the Medical Research Council Social Psychiatry Unit in London. These
studies were focused on the emotional attitudes of relatives towards
patients with schizophrenia. Measurement of the relatives’ attitudes was
achieved through use of a semi-structured interview, the Camberwell Fam
ily Interview (CFI), and a set of rating scales which became known collec
tively as Expressed Emotion (EE) (Brown and Rutter, 1966; Vaughn and
Leff, 1976a). The ratings are made from audiotapes of the CFI and depend
as much upon the rate, volume and tone of speech as on the content. The
key ratings are of critical comments, hostility, overinvolvement, and warmth.
In samples of relatives in western countries hostility always accompanies a
high level of critical comments; however, in a study in north India, Hindi
speaking relatives expressed hostility at low levels of criticism (Wig et al.,
1987). Each of the three negative components of EE is associated with
relapse of schizophrenia over a nine month follow-up period after the
patient’s discharge from hospital. A high rating on warmth in the absence
of high ratings on the negative components is associated with a lower
relapse rate. These findings, which have been repeatedly replicated, sug
gested that relatives were capable of influencing the course of schizophre
nia in a positive as well as a negative way. It is important to stress that in
practice low EE relatives are not simply characterised by an absence of
high EE attitudes. Far from being neutral or distanced from the patient,
they have an extensive repertoire of coping skills. They are able to mobi
lise the inert patient without bullying, to defuse tension, to back off from
conflict, and to create a supportive atmosphere without being overprotec-
tive. These are remarkable achievements when one considers that they
have often developed in the absence of any professional input. Our experi
ence of talking to low EE relatives raised the hope that if negative emo
tional attitudes could be modified, high EE relatives could be turned into
an important asset for the patient’s recovery.
Relatives are assigned to a high EE category if they score 6 or more
critical comments during the CFI, express any degree of hostility, or score
3,4, or 5 on the overinvolvement scale. Studies have now been conducted
in a variety of cultures, and indicate that there is a wide range in the
proportion of high EE relatives in the different settings (Table 1).
Julian Leffand Ruth Berkowitz 187
TABLE 1. Proportion of High EE households across cultures
Country City Group %

Italy Milan Italian 70
UK Salford British 69
Poland Cracow Polish 69
US Los Angeles Anglo-American 67
Denmark Aarhus Danish 54
UK London British 52
US Los Angeles Mexican 41
India Chandigarh Urban 30
Rural 8
There are two important implications of these findings. First, it is evi

dent that in some cultures, particularly north India, only a minority of
relatives show high EE attitudes, so that they cannot account for the first
onset of the illness. Secondly, culture exerts a major influence on relatives’
emotional attitudes to the schizophrenic patient. The nature of this influ
ence remains speculative at present, but it appears that cultures which
emphasize individual responsibility for success and failure, and which
promote achievement through competition, also generate intolerance in
relatives for the symptoms and disabilities of the schizophrenic patients.
There is other evidence against relatives’ EE playing a causal role in the
origin of schizophrenia, which derives from studies of non-schizophrenic
conditions. Criticism has been found as frequently in the spouses of
depressed neurotic patients as in the spouses of schizophrenic patients, and
furthermore is associated with relapse of depression (Vaughn and Leff,
1976b; Hooley et al., 1984). High levels of criticism have also been
recorded in the husbands of obese women (Fischmann-Havstad and Mars-
ton, 1984) and in the relatives of patients with Parkinson’s disease (Mac-
Carthy, personal communication), while overinvolvement and high criti
cism have been detected in the parents of anorexic patients (Szmuckler et
al., 1985). These findings demonstrate that high EE attitudes can develop
in relatives in response to a variety of psychiatric and physical disorders.
The key factor is probably the relapsing or chronic course of the disorder
rather than any specific constellation of symptoms.
Given these findings and the accumulating evidence from biological
studies of structural and functional abnormalities in the brains of patients
with schizophrenia, the assumptions underlying our intervention are that
schizophrenia is primarily a brain disease and that some families with a

schizophrenic member are functioning well on an emotional plane. These
assumptions account for many of the differences between recent family
interventions for schizophrenia and the earlier forms of family therapy
used with this condition. These differences are presented in tabular form
for ease of comparison (Table 2).
In running down the list, the first two differences have already been
discussed, and are reflected in the aim of therapy. In recent interventions
the aim is for the therapists to form an alliance with the family, enabling
them to work together on the problems thrown up by living with a person
with schizophrenia. The earlier interventions were often based on psycho
dynamic theories, and the therapists’ insights were relayed to the family
with the expectation of inducing change. In our experience of working
with families of schizophrenic patients we have not found that they were
TABLE 2. Comparison between earlier and recent family interventions for

schizophrenia
Earlier interventions Recent interventions

Disease concept A psychological A biological illness
of schizophrenia response to family which can occur in
dysfunction. well-functioning
families
Role of family Implicated in the Not a causal factor.
aetiology of the Can influence course
illness. for better or worse.
Aim of therapy To correct family To help family cope
dysfunction. The better with the
family is the client. patient. Family is
an ally in treating
the schizophrenic
patient.
Role of insight Fed back to family Helps therapists
to produce change. understand family.
Not fed back to
family.
Role of
therapists “Traditional.” Within sessions:
giving family
information, advice
and guidance.
Outside sessions:
linking family with
services.
Julian Leff and Ruth Berkowitz 189
able to use the insights we provided. That does not mean that we reject the
usefulness of family dynamics. On the contrary, we often utilise dynamic
theories to understand the behaviour of family members to one another.
Sometimes they illuminate the critical or overinvolved attitudes of rela
tives. We have also found the concept of countertransference helpful in
understanding the ways in which power struggles in the family become
echoed in the therapeutic team, and in tracing the origins of feelings of
anger and helplessness in the therapists (Berkowitz and Leff, 1984). How
ever we no longer make statements to the families based on psychody
namic insights.
The final difference in Table 2 concerns the therapists’ role. In more
traditional interventions therapists tended to reflect back clients’ questions
within sessions and not to undertake activities on their behalf outside
sessions. In recent interventions therapists provide family members with
factual information, answer their questions about the illness, medication,
hospital practices, and so on, and give guidance. Outside the sessions they
act as advocates on behalf of the families with the health and social
services. There are often difficulties in persuading service providers to
engage with the families of psychiatrically ill patients and with the patients
themselves. This is particularly true of schizophrenia on account of the
chronicity of the condition, and the diversity of services that is often
required. The therapists are in a better position to facilitate engagement
than family members by virtue of their professional status and their greater
familiarity with the personnel and procedures involved. Sometimes a
phone call to a colleague will achieve what the family has failed to accom
plish in months of trying. On the other hand, it is important not to take
over from the family the responsibility of continuing contact with
appropriate services. Some relatives behave in a manner that alienates
service providers, in particular being very critical of what is offered. It is
more effective for therapists to work with the family on this attitudinal
problem than to attempt to maintain links between disgruntled relatives
and disaffected professionals.
STUDIES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS

OF FAMILY INTERVENTION
The recent family interventions have been evaluated in a number of

controlled trials (Goldstein etal., 1978; Leff etal., 1982; 1985; 1989; 1990;
Falloon et al. 1982; 1985; Hogarty et al. 1986; 1987; Tarrier et al. 1988;
1989). In all the trials patients have been maintained on anti-psychotic
medication, often depot preparations, and have been randomly assigned to
a family intervention or to individual treatment of one sort or another.

However, our most recent trial was exceptional in comparing two forms of
family intervention. As shown in Table 3, in our first trial (Leff et al.,
1982; 1985) we adopted a similar design to the other studies, comparing a
package of family interventions with routine care, in which the relatives
received little or no attention. Our second trial (Leff et al., 1989; 1990)
was aimed at teasing out the effective components of the package and
involved a comparison of family sessions with a relatives group. It should
be noted that this is the only study that included a family intervention
aimed at the relatives alone.
The results of these studies have been remarkably consistent, showing a
significant advantage for family over individual treatment during the first
year of follow-up. In most cases this has been sustained during the second
follow-up year, although the difference in relapse rates has been reduced,
with the exception of Falloon’s study.
In our most recent study, the two-year outcome was almost identical for
patients in the family sessions and relatives group streams, even though
they were not involved in the latter intervention. This shows that modifica
tion of the attitudes and behaviour of the relatives alone is sufficient to
improve the outcome for the patient.
The two-year relapse rates indicate that these interventions are not
preventing relapse altogether. Rather they are delaying it, over and above
the postponement of relapse achieved by maintenance medication. In our
own two trials, for those patients who relapsed during the two-year fol-
TABLE 3. Design of two consecutive trials of family intervention
All patients on maintenance antipsychotic medication
Trial 1 Trial 2
(Leff et al., 1982; 1985) (Leff et al., 1989; 1990)
Control Experimental Experimental 1 Experimental 2
Routine Education Education Education

Care + + +
Family sessions Family sessions Relatives group
+ (patients (patients
included) excluded)
Relatives group
TABLE 4. Outcome of family intervention trials for schizophrenia
Relapse Rates (%)
6-12 months 2 years

Study Control Experimental Control Experimental
Goldstein 48 0
et al. (1978)
Falloon et al. 44 6 83 12
(1982)
Leff et al. 50 8 75 33
(1982)
Hogarty et al. 41 0 67 25
(1986)
Tarrier et al. 53 12 59 33
(1987)
Leff et al. 8* 33
(1989)
17+ 36
* Family sessions
+ Relatives group attenders
low-up, the average time from discharge to relapse was 9.2 months in the
control group and 14.2 months in the experimental groups, an average
delay of five months.
The convergent findings of the various studies might appear surprising
when the terms used by the therapists for their interventions are compared;
namely crisis oriented family therapy (Goldstein et al., 1978), behavioural
family management (Falloon et al., 1982), psychoeducation (Hogarty et
al., 1986), enactive and symbolic behavioural interventions (Tarrier et al.,
1988). However, content analysis of the interventions employed reveals a
considerable overlap between the various studies, with a common core of
educational, problem-solving, and structural approaches (Leff, 1985; Stra-
chan, 1986). Rather than attempting to present an overview of all the
interventions, we will describe our own in some detail. Readers interested
in accounts of the others should consult Falloon (1984) and Anderson et al.
(1986).
In describing our programme we are aware of the need to specify in
considerable detail the nature of our interventions, since some of our
readers are likely to be unfamiliar with the involvement of family mem
bers in therapeutic work. For other readers with experience of this approach
we crave indulgence for the basic level of our account.
FAMILY SESSIONS AND RELATIVES GROUPS
We have already noted that our intervention was given in two different
contexts, family sessions in the home and a relatives group. The fact that
patients were not included in the group dictated a different approach.
Nevertheless many of the principles and the techniques were the same
across the two settings. We will describe our intervention as applied in
family sessions, and then outline the ways in which the group meetings
differed. However, first it is necessary to explain the education pro
gramme, since it preceded both other modes of intervention.
THE EDUCATION PROGRAMME
The rationale for attempting to educate the relatives derives from the aim
of moderating critical attitudes. A content analysis of critical comments
revealed the surprising fact that only 30% were about the florid symptoms
of schizophrenia, such as delusions and hallucinations. By far the majority
of critical remarks were focused on the negative symptoms of schizophre
nia: apathy, inertia, failure to participate in household activities, and lack of
emotional response (Leff and Vaughn, 1985). Relatives generally viewed
these behaviours as an integral part of the patient’s personality rather than
the manifestations of a disease. They considered that the patient was able to
control them and consequently blamed him or her for laziness or selfish
ness. We thought that educating the relatives about schizophrenia, including
the nature of negative symptoms, might change their perception of the
patient’s behaviour and lead to a lessening of criticism.
We wrote an education programme in language that was as simple and
as free of technical terms as possible. It was divided into four sections, on
the causes of schizophrenia, the symptoms, the prognosis, and the treat
ment and management. In the first section on aetiology we stated that there
was no evidence that families caused the condition. We presented it as an
illness which had a strong hereditary basis. In describing the symptoms we
laid as much emphasis on the negative as on the positive symptoms,

explaining that they were not under the patient’s control, although they
could respond to the right management. Concerning prognosis, we stated
that some people with a first attack of schizophrenia recover completely
and remain well for many years. The European concept of schizophrenia is
broader than the DSM-IIIR category and enables one to make such a state
ment. We also cautioned that although most patients lose their delusions
and hallucinations after drug treatment in hospital, they are often left with
negative symptoms and require a long convalescent period to return to a
more normal way of life. We emphasized the importance of maintenance
drugs in the management of the condition, and the need for patients to
avoid undue emotional stress.
At first we gave the programme in four sessions, but soon found that
this was too strung out and condensed it into two. We held the education
sessions in the patients’ homes, usually while the patient was still in
hospital receiving treatment for an acute episode of schizophrenia. We
chose to visit the home because we thought that relatives would be more
receptive on their own territory. We later came to realize that there were a
number of other advantages in beginning the intervention in this way. We
were always welcomed by the relatives, almost certainly because we had
made the effort to reach out to them and because we were bringing them a
gift they valued—information. Relatives often find it difficult to obtain
from professionals the information they need to understand the illness and
to manage it. Our decision to give the education programme in the home
turned out to be a very good way of engaging relatives, an endeavour that
has proved problematic for other groups offering intervention.
Because the education programme was self-contained, we were able to
evaluate it separately from the other components of our intervention. We
assessed its impact on the relatives by giving them a Knowledge Interview
immediately before and after the programme. In the first intervention
study we found that there were relatively few significant changes in
knowledge and attitudes in response to education. Whereas before the
education, 50% of relatives knew that the diagnosis was schizophrenia,
after it all relatives knew the diagnosis. This is not a surprising finding, but
it needs to be stated that some relatives were still unwilling to accept that
the patient suffered from schizophrenia and continued to maintain their
own view of the problem. Probably the most important effect of the educa
tion was a significant increase in optimism (Berkowitz et al., 1984). This
indicates that learning factual information about the illness is less alarming
than being left in ignorance to harbour fears and fantasies.
In the second study, there were other significant changes recorded. In
www.Ebook777.com
particular, relatives were less likely to advocate negative coping strategies

such as “he should pull himself together.” There was also a decrease in
the number of relatives who believed the patient could make himself
worse. However, this important increase in tolerance occurred between the
education programme and the nine month follow-up and is almost cer
tainly attributable to the addition of the other interventions (Berkowitz et
al., in press). In both studies, then, the education by itself made very little
immediate impact. We were neither surprised nor dismayed by this, since
we viewed the formal education programme as only the first step in famil
iarising the relatives with the factual information we wished them to
acquire. We anticipated that education would continue throughout the
period of contact with the families, and this proved to be the case. The
same questions kept recurring, and it was only when the relatives were
ready to receive and accept the information that they ceased. This will be a
familiar experience to anyone practising psychotherapy.
As explained above, the education programme was given to the rela
tives while the patient was still in hospital, so the patient did not partici
pate. The programme was written in the form of a small booklet, which
has subsequently been published by the National Schizophrenia Fellow
ship. We always left the booklet with the relatives, to give them an oppor
tunity to review the information as often as they wished. We also told them
that it was up to them to decide whether to show it to the patient on his
return home. In this way we evaded the decision ourselves as to whether
the education should be given to the patient. We now feel more confident
about sharing the information with the patient and trying to enlist them in
understanding and managing the illness when possible. For instance, with
out explaining the nature of schizophrenia to the patient, it is difficult to
provide a rationale for continuing with maintenance drugs once the symp
toms have abated. The timing of education for the patient needs to be
carefully chosen, ideally when the acute episode has subsided.
THE FAMILY SESSIONS
General Principles
However problematic the relatives’ relationship with the patient may

be, they are almost invariably willing to continue to provide 24 hour care
for him or her. Consequently it is important for the therapists to acknowl
edge the dedication of family members and the burden of care that they
shoulder. Therapists should avoid direct criticism of what family members
do for the patient. It may be very difficult for the therapist to hold back
criticism when s/he sees examples of poor coping behaviour. However,

criticism usually has a negative influence either in making the relative feel
more guilty or in mobilising their anger. This may be directed towards the
therapist, leading to rejection of the help offered, or may be displaced onto
the patient, increasing the high EE atmosphere. Therefore therapists need
to be like low EE relatives themselves, avoiding criticism of the family,
and instead encouraging change in a warm, supportive manner.
The time scale of this work is very long. Schizophrenia, even when
episodic, is a life-long problem. Brief interventions are unlikely to be
helpful to the families. Family sessions last one hour and are held once a
fortnight for at least nine months, but sometimes continue for two to three
years at a lesser frequency. The therapists need to persevere and to be
content with very small changes over long periods of time. Furthermore,
while relatives and patients are appreciative of the therapists’ time and
interest, they are unlikely to acknowledge the positive changes that have
occurred imperceptibly. Therapists who attempt to convince the family
that they have changed are more likely to provoke attempts to prove them
wrong than to receive appreciation.
THE THERAPISTS SUPPORT GROUP
The need for therapists to avoid direct criticism of family members, to

be patient for months or years, and to put up with little positive feedback
impose a considerable emotional burden. For this reason it is necessary to
establish a therapists support group. This comprises other therapists work
ing with families of schizophrenic patients. In addition to its function in
sustaining therapists over long periods of time, it allows them to let off
emotional steam. All their negative feelings about family members can be
safely ventilated in this forum. There is an additional emotional issue that
the therapists group can deal with. We have observed that the intense
emotions in high EE families readily become transmitted to the therapists
without their being aware of the source. In particular, conflict within the
family is often echoed by rifts within the therapeutic team, while feelings
of impotence and hopelessness, which are commonly experienced by rela
tives, can be presented by therapists with respect to their work with the
families (Berkowitz and Leff, 1984). The therapists group can help indi
vidual therapists to cope with these issues by identifying the source of the
emotions within the family. This enables the therapists to plan ways of
helping the family members to cope with them, rather than the therapists
feeling defeated by a sense of hopelessness.
WHY TWO THERAPISTS?
We almost invariably expect two therapists to work together in the

family sessions and in running the relatives groups. There are a number of
reasons for this. Many families with a schizophrenic member are quite
chaotic emotionally. There are numerous pressing problems to be dealt
with, and emotions run high about each of them. It is like walking into the
sea when there are strong undercurrents. It is easy for a therapist to lose
control of the situation and to be swept this way and that by the conflicting
emotional pressures. It is often the task of the second therapist to identify
the danger, to stand steadily on the beach, out of reach of the undertow,
and to throw the struggling therapist a line to effect a rescue. In practical
terms this means taking over direction of the session for a while, and
commenting on what seems to be happening, thus giving the other thera
pist time to recover his/her emotional balance.
Another advantage of two therapists is that it is easier to balance
alliances with family members. Where there is a struggle for power and
control in a family, it is natural for each family member to attempt to win
one or both therapists over to their side. In order to work productively with
the family it is necessary for therapists to make alliances with family
members, including the patient. However these need to be balanced if the
family is to achieve resolution of its conflicts. A single therapist can only
ally with one family member at a time although he or she can shift
alliances within a session. However the advantage of two therapists is that
while one is making an alliance with a family member representing one
side of a power struggle, the second therapist can support the protagonist
on the other side, thus achieving a balance. It needs to be emphasized that
these alliances are of course not permanent. Since the formation of
alliances is often influenced by gender (the men against the women; a
female relative attempting to attract a male therapist), it is useful for the
therapist pair to be a man and a woman. However, there is not too much of
a disadvantage in both being of the same sex.
A strategy that is available to two therapists but not to one is modelling
conflict resolution. If the therapists disagree over an issue, they can bring
the disagreement into the open and discuss it between themselves in front
of the family in a calm and rational way to achieve a resolution. This may
be a compromise, or one therapist may yield to the other, acknowledging
that they are right. This provides a useful corrective to the family’s heated
response to conflict.
INTRODUCING THE INTERVENTION TO THE FAMILY
One of the questions that almost always arises in the first family session
is, “why are you here?” This is an important challenge to the therapists.
The family have not asked them to visit, so it is natural for members to
question the purpose of their coming. Behind it is a concern about being
considered “the patient,” or anyhow in need of treatment. This is not
surprising given the history of professional attitudes to relatives, which we
have reviewed above. We have already emphasized that we do not view the
relatives as “sick” or needing treatment, and the therapists’ response must
underline that stance. Our reply emphasizes the important role the family
plays in keeping the patient well and is in the form, “we have come to help
you help the patient.” This statement incorporates a number of important
assumptions which foreshadow the work to be done over the succeeding
months or years. It is clearly stated that there is a sick person in the family
who needs help. It is acknowledged that the family can take action which
will help him/her. Nevertheless, it is suggested that they need the help of the
therapists to augment their attempts to improve the patient’s condition. We
have found this kind of response to be entirely acceptable to relatives.
AVOIDING SOCIALISATION OF SESSIONS
For therapists to enter the family home is an unusual event, although

there is a long tradition in the UK of home visits by the family doctor, and
the development of community psychiatry has led to such visits by com
munity psychiatric nurses and other psychiatric professionals. There is an
inevitable ambiguity about the position and role of the therapists: should
they be treated like guests or like staff in a service setting? How should
they be addressed and how should they address family members? Should
they accept offers of food and drink? The issue of the form of address is an
important one since it involves matters of status and can reinforce or
undermine hierarchies. The question of who wields authority in the family
is often salient, particularly as the role of schizophrenic patient can confer
power on the individual in subtle ways. Using a surname can help to
reinforce intergenerational boundaries and bolster the authority of a par
ent. On the other hand, using a patient’s full first name in preference to a
diminutive form can stress adulthood and independence. It is sensible to
begin by asking family members how they wish to be addressed. Formal
ities at the beginning of work with the family may be dispensed with later
as they become increasingly engaged, and issues of power and authority
are satisfactorily resolved.
We usually accept cups of tea or coffee and cake or biscuits when

offered. It would indeed be churlish to refuse refreshments, when the
family have often prepared them beforehand. This does not only represent
politeness, but often is a way of showing gratitude for the visits. However,
we do not interpret the gift, but accept it gratefully. Occasionally the
relative’s offer to make tea represents a way of escaping from the work of
the session. If the therapists suspect this motive they should defer tea till
later. Alternatively it can become the focus of useful work with an inactive
patient. The relatives can be encouraged to persuade the patient to make
the tea for the visitors. It must be recognized that sometimes families
overstep the bounds and either lavish excessive hospitality on the thera
pists or attempt to engage them in social conversations, asking questions
about their personal lives. This must be actively resisted or the therapists’
ability to help the family will be undermined. It can be a difficult tightrope
to walk, and therapists may find themselves arguing after the session about
whether it was appropriate to accept the second slice of cake!
IMPROVING COMMUNICATION
Not all families with a schizophrenic member are poor at communicat

ing. But in many high EE families the pressure of problems and of anxiety
surrounding them leads to floods of speech which threaten to overwhelm
the therapists. Furthermore in many such families the patient has with
drawn from conversation and is virtually silent. This can often result in
family members talking as though the patient was absent, which in turn
further reinforces the patient’s withdrawal.
It is necessary for the therapists to establish some ground rules for
communication. They sound very simple, but may take months to be
observed and require frequent reminders to family members. First, only
one person may speak at a time. In order to state this rule in a way that
avoids the implication of criticism of family members, the therapists say
apologetically that they can really only attend to one person at a time and
as everybody has something important to say it is necessary to take turns.
The second rule is that everyone is given an equal chance to speak. This
ensures that the patient, and any other uncommunicative relatives, are not
squeezed out of the conversation. The patient may be quite unused to
having the floor, and when given a chance may remain silent. It is impor
tant for the therapists to prevent other family members from encroaching
on the silence, and to reassure the patient that all present will sit quietly
and listen in case there is something he/she wants to say. But if he/she
prefers to remain silent that is quite all right. The value of this exercise is
that it emphasizes the importance of listening attentively to others, even if

they are saying very little. Relatives have often lost the skill of listening to
others as they feel so dominated by their own concerns. It is frequently
necessary for therapists to draw attention to something important that a
family member has just said, asking others present if they heard it, and
sometimes requesting them to repeat what they think the speaker said.
The third rule is that if a statement is made about a person in the room,
they must be addressed directly. This ensures that patients are not talked
about as he or she, as though they were not there. This practice just
reinforces their sense of being a non-person, and furthermore some of
them may already be plagued by third person auditory hallucinations.
Another advantage of having to address someone as “you” is that it is
more difficult to make really angry statements. It is much harder to say
“you make a terrible mess everywhere” than “he makes a terrible mess
everywhere.” Thus insisting on direct communication tones down the
negative emotion in critical remarks. Unless the therapists keep this rule
firmly in mind, it is frighteningly easy for them also to slip into the habit of
referring to the patient as he or she.
The successful establishment of these rules does more than improve the
clarity of communication. It also begins to firm up the boundaries between
individuals in the family, to redress the unequal distribution of power, and
to reinstate the patient as a person, as deserving of respect as every other
family member. Hence, although the rules appear simple, they are aimed at
effecting substantial changes in the way family members relate to each
other. That explains why it can take months before they are observed.
TEACHING PROBLEMSOLVING
This involves a straight-forward behavioural approach, but is not that
easy to implement for reasons we will discuss as we describe the succes
sive steps. The first step is to explore the main concerns of the family. It is
at this point that therapists often begin to feel overloaded by the number of
problems that emerge, usually helter skelter. However, experience with
families containing a schizophrenic member is useful in making therapists
familiar with the common problems. These are often the manifestations of
negative symptoms such as lying in bed till late, failing to attend to per
sonal hygiene, and leaving their room in a mess. The problems tend to be
phrased as complaints by the relatives about the patient, particularly when
relatives score high on critical comments. The patient will generally need
positive encouragement to present his or her view of what the problems
are. Some patients, of course, deny the existence of any problems, which is
one way of dealing with a barrage from the relatives.
The next step is to seek agreement between all family members on

which problem is to be tackled first. This requires tactful negotiation by
the therapists. Furthermore they have to be careful not to be diverted from
their aim. Each problem raised by the family seems so pressing that they
find it hard to concentrate on any one for long. As a result it often happens
that just as the therapists believe they have achieved a consensus on a
problem, a family member reverts to a previously raised problem and the
whole family gets sidetracked into discussing it. It is necessary for the
therapists to steer the family back to the agreed problem, gently but firmly.
As the therapists may need to take this action regularly, it is best done with
humour to avoid the family feeling criticised.
Once a particular problem is in focus, each person’s response to it needs
to be explored. If the problem is related to the negative symptoms of
schizophrenia, as is often the case, high criticism relatives will tend to
blame the patient. The therapists need to reiterate the information in the
education programme that negative symptoms are part of the illness and
that the patient is not being deliberately awkward. It is also useful to
inform the family that these are common problems which occur in many
families. This helps to reassure the family that they are not struggling with
a uniquely awful situation, and suggests that ways of dealing with it may
already have been worked out. It is essential that the patient’s view of the
problem be sought. This has the advantage of confirming the patient’s
experience, and also provides an opportunity for the therapists to establish
the patient as an expert on schizophrenia. After all, nobody else in the
family has inside information on the problem. This approach raises the
status of the patient by turning his/her affliction into an asset, and begins to
open up the relatives to an empathic understanding of the patient.
We have found that low EE relatives empathise with the patients with
out overidentifying with their experiences. By contrast high EE relatives
reject patients’ positive symptoms as rubbish or nonsense, for instance
when patients report hearing voices they respond by saying they don’t
exist or are only imagination. Low EE relatives deal with this situation by
acknowledging that the voices are a real experience for the patient but
stating clearly that they do not hear them. High EE relatives are likely to
be less critical of the patient if they gain a better understanding of the
experiences the patient is going through. For this reason we encourage the
patients to talk about their hallucinations and delusions in the family
sessions. This also has the effect of demystifying the symptoms and reduc
ing the relatives’ fear of them. On occasion, after hearing the patient’s
account, a relative will reveal that he or she has experienced something
similar at times, indicating the occurrence of minor untreated psychotic
episodes. For example when a patient spoke about paranoid delusions, his
sister recounted a time when she kept thinking there was a stranger hiding
in the house. Revelations like this decrease the patient’s feeling of alien
ation from other family members.
The patient’s account of a problem can also contribute to the search for
a solution. To take an example, difficulty in getting up in the morning is a
common complaint, which often exasperates relatives. There are a number
of different causes for this problem which the patient can help to sort out:
excessive medication making the patient sleepy, a reversal of day-night
rhythms so that the patient is awake and active into the early hours and
asleep till the afternoon, a tactic to avoid social contact with relatives, or
lack of any incentive to get up since there is nothing to do. Direct and
precise questioning of the patient can help the therapists and the family to
choose between these alternatives, and may also clarify the patient’s
understanding of the problem.
It is important to establish in considerable detail what each family
member does when faced with the patient’s problematic behaviour. Rela
tives are often reluctant to go into detail but this is necessary in order for
the therapists to identify the ineffective coping behaviours which need to
be altered. In addition to specifying what they do in these situations,
family members need encouragement to verbalise what they feel about
their attempts to cope.
Once each family member’s perspective on the problem has been
explored, the therapists need to break the problem down into small, man
ageable steps. To continue with the above example, if the difficulty in
getting up in the morning is due to a reversal of day-night rhythms, the aim
would be to help the patient go to sleep half-an-hour earlier and get up
half-an-hour earlier. If the aim is set too high, the family is likely to fail
and to become even more discouraged; whereas a small success will engen
der optimism. The family is asked to suggest ways of tackling the problem,
in this case how to help the patient go to bed and get up earlier. The
therapists need to be skilful in discriminating between high EE and low EE
solutions and in steering the family towards the latter. A high EE solution
would be to pull the patient out of bed in the morning (relatives have
actually tried this) while a low EE solution might be to help the patient buy
an alarm clock and set it, or to bring in a cup of tea at the agreed time.
After the family have reached agreement on a particular solution with
the therapists’ help, it is necessary to work out a detailed plan including
what each family member will do, the precise timing, and the frequency of
attempts. If the plan is too vague it is unlikely that it will be carried out. It
is not essential that each family member is actively involved in the task,
but it is important to stress that the whole family has the responsibility to
see that it is attempted. This action reduces the burden on the patient, and
lessens the likelihood of sabotage by one or other family member. It is
often the case that at this stage someone will complain that “ we have tried
this before and it doesn’t work.” It is a mistake to rise to this challenge by
promising good results this time, since this is unlikely to reassure a family
used to failure. It is preferable to agree that it may not work, but to empha
size the value of persistence. Finally the therapists should let the family
know that at the next session they will enquire about the outcome of the
task. Whenever possible, each session should end with the setting of an
agreed task and a reminder that the therapists will ask for feedback at the
next visit.
If the family report that the task was successfully carried out, the thera
pists should be suitably encouraging, and must stress to the relatives the
importance to the patient of appreciation expressed even for small
advances. On the other hand, failure to complete or even to attempt the
task must not draw criticism from the therapists. Having a schizophrenic
member is already taken by the family as a sign of failure, and the thera
pists must avoid compounding this. Therefore they need to say that the
task set was too difficult or that the timing was wrong. However, they do
need to enquire into how far the family got with the task as this will help to
identify the modifications required. A task such as the patient having to
wash her underwear twice a week might have to be scaled down to once a
week, while a task involving the parents going to the cinema together
might have to be postponed until more work is done on their anxieties
about leaving the patient alone.
REDUCING CRITICISM
We have already described some of the relevant techniques in preceding

sections. The underlying negative attitude is ameliorated by helping the
relative to separate psychologically from the patient, and to find sources of
emotional satisfaction outside of the relationship with the patient. Lower
ing the relative’s expectations for the patient (see below) contributes to
this process, which often occupies a long period of time.
The situation facing the therapists depends to some extent on the
patients’ responses to critical relatives, which vary between social with
drawal and counter-criticism. Patients who respond to criticism with
silence or by walking away do not provoke conflict, although they may
exasperate the relative exceedingly. When patients are critical in turn, the
mutual recriminations escalate and often lead to verbal abuse or physical
violence. Another situation in families that commonly generates conflict is

when one parent is critical and the other is overinvolved. The critical
parent accuses their partner of being too soft, while the overinvolved
parent sees the other as too harsh. Arguments frequently develop over the
best way to handle the patient’s problems.
Both these forms of conflict soon become evident in family sessions. The
therapists have a fire-fighting role and have to extinguish conflict rapidly
before it develops into a conflagration. This needs to be done firmly with
authority, but without making family members feel criticised. When con
flict arises the therapists should take control. They need to interrupt saying
that both sides have good ideas about how to cope with the problem, but
they both see it rather differently and it is necessary to discuss the different
solutions and decide which one to try first. The aim is to promote a calm
discussion of the alternatives instead of an emotionally fuelled argument
which both are intent on winning. As noted above, the therapists may
deliberately initiate a calm discussion of their own differences to model
this approach to conflict resolution for the family.
When conflict arises between a relative and the patient, it also has to be
halted, but this time with a comment by the therapist that it is evident how
much the relative cares about the patient. Many readers will recognize this
technique as reframing, that is, describing the interaction between family
members in a way that emphasizes the positive aspects and plays down the
negative ones.
It is evident that to halt conflict successfully, the therapists have to take
a position of considerable authority and power over the family. This is
necessary in the initial stages as these conflictual families are out of
control emotionally, and are usually frightened by the outbursts of verbal
and physical violence that regularly occur. Once the therapists have
succeeded in controlling these, they can begin to hand back power and
authority to the family members. This is essential in order for the family to
learn to get on well together without the therapists.
In our studies, we have found that these techniques are generally effec
tive in reducing criticism by the nine month follow-up.
REDUCING OVERINVOLVEMENT
Overinvolvement is more difficult to alter than criticism and requires a

longer time-scale of intervention. We have observed small reductions in
overinvolvement over nine months, but significant changes take two years
or more to effect. This is probably because overinvolvement is of much
longer standing than criticism, often dating from the patient’s early child-
www.Ebook777.com
hood. It is ineffective to concentrate on the overinvolved parent alone,

since both partners contribute to the bond. Work with both is required to
achieve some degree of emotional separation.
It is not difficult for both partners to appreciate the importance of
increasing the patient’s independence. Indeed many parents are only too
aware of what has become known as the When I Am Gone syndrome; the
foreboding that no one will be available to take over their role in caring for
the patient after their death. But even so it is hard for both partners to begin
to let go of one another. The relative needs reassurance that nothing ter
rible will happen to the patient if s/he begins to relax their vigilance. At
first even leaving the patient alone at home for half-an-hour may provoke
extreme anxiety. It is necessary for the therapists to bring into the open the
fears the relative harbours about what awful events might occur in their
absence. It is often a great relief for the relative to be given permission by
the therapists to lay down the burden of care for a brief period. We formu
late this permission in terms of the relative having spent so much time and
energy in caring for the patient that they have earned some respite.
Work with the patient is focused on building up their confidence that
they can cope on their own, at least for a brief spell to start with. Once the
first step has been taken, the work becomes a little easier, since the relative
experiences a sense of relief at giving up some of the responsibility, and
the patient a sense of achievement in coping by her/himself. However, the
tug to return to a state of mutual inter-dependence, which is both uncom
fortable and comfortable, remains strong, and progress is often slow and
incremental. A healthy sibling in the family is a potential ally, to be made
use of for accompanying the patient in excursions out of the home. They
can also introduce the patient to a peer group with whom to socialise.
However, a sibling may feel too embarrassed to establish contact between
their friends and the patient. Furthermore mutual envy may develop; the
patient being envious of the sibling’s educational, occupational and social
achievements, while the sibling envies the special position the patient
occupies in the affections of the overinvolved parent. This may prove an
insurmountable barrier to co-operation.
A useful technique in preparing the ground for separation is to ask the
parent to recount how s/he left the parental home. This reminds the parent
that independence from parents is a natural thing to aim at, and also
rehearses the emotions that parent and patient will experience in the pro
cess. It is worth emphasizing here that the emotions aroused need to be
worked through before any meaningful separation can be achieved.
Attempts to part patient and relative forcibly, for example by moving the
patient into sheltered accommodation, without this preparatory work will
almost certainly end in failure. In only a minority of families we have

worked with has the patient eventually moved out. But in the majority of
overinvolved relationships patient and relative have managed to establish
independent life styles, albeit under the same roof.
EXPANDING SOCIAL NETWORKS
Families with a schizophrenic member start off with average sized

social networks, but with the passage of time the networks tend to shrink.
This is a consequence of the family’s embarrassment at taking the patient
to social gatherings of friends and relatives and of inviting visitors to their
home, as well as social withdrawal by the patient. It is not uncommon to
find a middle-aged schizophrenic patient being cared for by an elderly
mother, neither having any social life outside of the home. The burden of
care is much more difficult to sustain in the absence of social support, and
moreover the patient and relatives are forced into each other’s company.
The therapists’ aims are to encourage relatives to re-establish social con
tacts with friends and relatives, and to link up the patient with people of
their own age. Relatives are often quite reluctant to make the necessary
changes in social activity, partly because of the issue of separation from
the patient which we have discussed above. It is worth noting that the
therapists’ act of joining the family itself expands their social network and
acts as a stepping stone to further contacts. The same is true of the relatives
group, which we will give an account of later.
With respect to the patient, deficient social skills may prove a major
obstacle to establishing friendships outside the family. Patients often find
it less threatening to attend a club frequented by other psychiatrically ill
people than to mix with healthy individuals. Although falling short of the
ideal, this is preferable to social isolation. As with the relative, the first
step in making social contact is usually the most difficult for the patient.
The therapists need to arrange for a community worker to accompany the
patient on the first visit to a club or drop-in centre, or failing this for one of
the therapists to go with the patient. If successful, this approach has the
effect of reducing social contact between patient and relatives, which is
one of the major aims of our interventions.
REDUCING SOCIAL CONTACT
We have explained above that the earlier naturalistic studies identified

low social contact between patient and relative as a moderating influence
on the effect of high EE attitudes. Patients who are able to distance them
selves from relatives at moments of tension are less vulnerable to relapse.
Some patients appear to use social withdrawal as a protective strategy,
while some low EE relatives encourage it themselves, for instance one
mother would suggest to her son that he take the dog out for a walk when
the situation between them became tense. High EE relatives usually find it
difficult to disengage themselves or the patient from tense encounters, so
that therapists need to explain the value of “time out” for the patient and
cooling off for the relative. The distancing can begin in a very concrete
way in the family sessions. Therapists are required to note the seating
arrangements in each session. Overinvolved relatives often take a seat next
to the patient. At some stage, but not in the first encounter with the family,
a therapist may suggest that s/he changes places with the patient. This
therapist will then support the overinvolved relative in the “absence” of
the patient, while the other therapist will support the patient’s more sepa
rate position. It is surprising what a difference this strategy can make to the
structure of family interaction.
We have already dwelt on ways of increasing leisure activities for
patients and relatives. We also need to consider occupation. The patient is
often unemployed, and the relatives may have retired or even have given up
work to look after the patient. In the latter case, the therapists persistently
encourage the relative to resume work again. If the relative has retired, work
is done on finding an interest that the relative is likely to enjoy and persuad
ing him or her to attend classes during the day or evening. These are
available very cheaply in the UK as part of adult education. To cater to the
patient’s needs, a place is sought in some form of sheltered occupation. In
the UK placements are available in day hospitals, day centres and sheltered
workshops. There are often waiting lists for such facilities, and this is one
example of a situation in which the therapists can usefully act as intermedi
aries between the family and the service providers.
LOWERING EXPECTATIONS
It is quite usual to find that relatives expect the patient to be completely

cured on discharge from hospital, particularly if it is the first episode of
illness. We have explained above our emphasis on the negative symptoms
and their persistence for long periods of time. The therapists repeatedly
stress the value of very small advances by the patient, and discourage
relatives from putting pressure on the patient to return immediately to
full-time work or education. This is a particular problem with middle class
parents, who generally have high aspirations for their children and may not
wish to consider more realistic alternatives. When a family is caring for a

more disabled patient, it should be explained that, rather than expecting
positive changes, preventing deterioration is a considerable achievement.
It is common for relatives to experience a deep sense of loss of the
person they knew intimately before the illness developed. This can be
particularly painful when the patient affords occasional glimpses of their
familiar self, keeping hope alive that they will one day recover their
undamaged personality. Relatives need to be given the opportunity to
grieve over the lost and valued person and to come to terms with the
reality of an individual whose ability to respond emotionally may be quite
restricted. It is upsetting for the patient to share the relative’s grief, which
is best dealt with either in sessions with the relative alone or in the rela
tives group.
THE RELATIVES GROUP
The reader will have realized that there is no overarching theory that
informs our work with families, although we have clearly defined aims
derived from a substantial body of previous research. We are prepared to
use any technique that helps us achieve these aims, and have borrowed
from a number of different schools. This eclectic approach applies as much
to the relatives group as to family sessions, but there are some advantages
and some disadvantages of the former compared with the latter, which we
will now explore. The following description is brief for reasons of space.
The interested reader will find a fuller account in Berkowitz et al. (1981).
A major advantage of the group is that it can be constituted of both high
EE and low EE relatives. When ways of tackling a particular problem are
asked for, low EE relatives are likely to suggest helpful methods of coping
which the therapists can then endorse. Relatives find it easier to accept
suggestions from each other than from the therapists. They can always
disqualify what the therapists say on the grounds that they have had no
experience of living with a schizophrenic patient. Obviously they cannot
reject the suggestions of other relatives for that reason. Furthermore rela
tives can be much more blunt with each other than therapists would dare to
be. They appear capable of taking more forceful statements from other
relatives in the group than they could from the therapists.
Because patients are not present in the group, the therapists can allow
relatives more latitude in letting off steam than they would in family
sessions. Anger, grief and guilt can be dealt with more openly in the group
than in the home, where the patient needs to be protected against such
intense emotions expressed by the relatives. However, the therapists have
to exert some control in the group to prevent one relative dominating a

session with his/her emotional needs. As in the family sessions, therapists
try to give each relative present an equal share of the time. However when
a new relative joins the group, they are encouraged to tell their story. All
other members present are asked to give a brief version of their circum
stances. This helps the new member to control the detail of their contribu
tion, and to compare their situation with others. This recounting provides a
useful, non-threatening way of enabling a new member to join the group.
Not all relatives are comfortable hearing the experiences of other families.
Relatives of patients with a first episode of schizophrenia in particular may
be dismayed to hear of patients with long histories of frequent relapses and
hospitalisations. Sometimes such relatives refuse to return to the group.
On the other hand many relatives benefit from others’ histories. They may
feel relieved that they are not so badly off by comparison with others, they
may be heartened by the ability of families to survive years of travail, or
may even gain from seeing themselves mirrored in others without neces
sarily acknowledging it.
The group is open-ended so that relatives come and go as they see fit. It
is held once a fortnight for an hour and a half, and on average each relative
attends once a month. There are no interventions based on the group
process.
We have referred above to the need to expand relatives’ social net
works. The group automatically fulfils this function, and relatives often
form friendships with other group members and meet them socially out
side the formal sessions.
The main disadvantage of the group is that the therapists cannot directly
observe interactions between relatives and patients, which can be very
informative. Therefore it is often appropriate to combine the group with
family sessions held in parallel.
CONCLUSIONS
Our research has shown that if relatives attend a group, the reductions
in EE, social contact and the patients’ relapse rate are very similar to those
achieved by family sessions. However, if the group is offered on its own,
nearly half the families fail to engage. The group is obviously less expen
sive in terms of time and personnel than family sessions, since two thera
pists can work with six to eight families with one fortnightly meeting. In
our first trial we used a combination of the two modes of working with
families and found that almost all relatives attended the group. Therefore
this is what we now recommend, namely two or three preliminary family
sessions during which the relatives are invited to join the group. An occa
sional family session may still be required from time to time, but the
majority of families will respond well to this approach. However there will
always be some relatives who are unable or unwilling to attend a group.
The reasons may be valid, for instance inability to take time off work,
severe agoraphobia, or a physical illness, or may be a way of avoiding
exposure to other relatives. Either way, therapists need to retain the flexi
bility to hold sessions in the home, since in the families who will not
attend groups and who thus receive no professional help the patients have
the worst outcome of all.
REFERENCES
Anderson, C. M., Reiss, D. J. and Hogarty, G. E. (1986) Schizophrenia in the
Family: A Practitioner's Guide to Psychoeducation and Management. New
York: Guilford Press.
Bateson, G., Jackson, D. D., Haley, J. and Weakland, J. H. (1956) Toward a theory
of schizophrenia. Behaviour Science, 1, 251 -264.
Berkowitz, R., Kuipers, L., Eberlein-Vries, R. and Leff, J. (1981) Lowering
expressed emotion in relatives of schizophrenics. In (ed. M.J. Godstein) New
Developments in Interventions with Families o f Schizophrenics. London:
Jossey-Bass.
Berkowitz, R. and Leff, J. (1984) Clinical teams reflect family dysfunction. Jour
nal o f Family Therapy, 6, 211-233.
Berkowitz, R., Shavit, N. and Leff, J. (in press) Educating relatives of schizo
phrenic patients. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology.
Brown, G.W. and Rutter, M. (1966) The measurement of family activities and
relationships: a methodological study. Human Relations, 19, 241-263.
Falloon, I.R.H. (1984) Family Management o f Mental Illness: A Study o f Clinical,
Social and Family Benefits. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Falloon, I. R. H., Boyd, J. L., McGill, C.W., Razani, J., Moss, H. B. and Gilder-
man, A. M. (1982) Family management in the prevention of exacerbations of
schizophrenia. New England Journal o f Medicine, 306, 1437-1440.
Falloon, I. R. H., Williamson, M., Razani, J., Moss, H. B., Gilderman, A. M. and
Simpson, G. M. (1985) Family versus individual management in the preven
tion of morbidity of schizophrenia: I. Clinical outcome of a two-year con
trolled study. Archives o f General Psychiatry, 42, 887-896.
Fischmann-Havstad, L. and Marston, A. R. (1984) Weight loss maintenance as an
aspect of family emotion and process. British Journal o f Clinical Psychology,
23, 265-271.
Goldstein, M. J., Rodnick, E. H., Evans, J. R., May, P. R. A. and Steinberg, M. R.
(1978) Drug and family therapy in the aftercare treatment of acute schizophre
nia. Archives o f General Psychiatry, 35, 169-177.
Hogarty, G. E., Anderson, C. M., Reiss, D. J., Komblith, S. J., Greenwald, D. P.,
Javna, C. D. and Kadonia, M. J. (1986) Family psychoeducation, social skills

training, and maintenance chemotherapy in the aftercare treatment of schizo
phrenia: I. One-year effects of a controlled study on relapse and Expressed
Emotion. Archives o f General Psychiatry, 43, 633-642.
Hogarty, G. E., Anderson, C. M. and Reiss, D. J. (1987) Family psychoeducation,
social skills training and medication in schizophrenia: The long and the short
o f it. Psychopharmacology Bulletin, 23, 12-13.
Hooley, J. M., Orley, J. and Teasdale, J. D. (1986) Levels of Expressed Emotion
and relapse in depressed patients. British Journal o f Psychiatry, 148, 642-647.
Leff, J. P. (1985) Social factors and maintenance neuroleptics in schizophrenic
relapse: An integrative model, integrative Psychiatry, 3, 72-88.
Leff, J. P., Kuipers, L., Berkowitz, R., Eberlein-Fries, R. and Sturgeon, D. (1982)
A controlled trial o f social intervention in schizophrenic families. British Jour
nal o f Psychiatry, 141, 121 -134.
Leff, J. P., Kuipers, L., Berkowitz, R. and Sturgeon, D. (1985) A controlled trial of
social intervention in the families of schizophrenic patients: two-year fol
low-up. British Journal o f Psychiatry, 146, 594-600.
Leff, J. P., Berkowitz, R., Shavit, N., Strachan, A., Glass, I. and Vaughn, C. (1989)
A trial of family therapy vs a relatives’ group for schizophrenia. British Jour
nal o f Psychiatry, 154, 58-66.
Leff, J. P., Berkowitz, R., Shavit, N., Strachan, A., Glass, I. and Vaughn, C. (1990)
A trial of family therapy vs a relatives’ group for schizophrenia: A two-year
follow-up. British Journal o f Psychiatry, 157, 571-577.
Leff, J. P. and Vaughn, C. (1985) Expressed Emotion in Families: Its Significance
fo r Mental Illness. New York: Guilford.
Lidz, T., Comelison, A. R., Fleck, S. and Terry, D. (1957) The intrafamilial
environment of the schizophrenic patient. I. Psychiatry, 20, 329-342.
Strachan, A. M., Leff, J. P., Goldstein, M. J., Doane, J. and Burtt, C. (1986)
Emotional attitudes and direct communication in the families of schizophren
ics: A cross-national replication. British Journal o f Psychiatry, 149, 279-287.
Szmuckler, G. I., Berkowitz, R., Eisler, I., Leff, J. and Dare, C. (1987) Expressed
Emotion in individual and family settings: a comparative study. British Jour
nal o f Psychiatry, 151, 174-178.
Tarrier, N., Barrowclough, C., Vaughn, C., Bamrah, J. S., Porceddu, K., Watts, S.
and Freeman, H. (1988). The community management of schizophrenia: a
controlled trial of a behavioural intervention with families to reduce relapse.
British Journal o f Psychiatry, 153, 532-542.
Tarrier, N., Barrowclough, C., Vaughn, C., Bamrah, J.S., Porceddu, K., Watts, S.
and Freeman, H. (1989) Community management of schizophrenia: a two-year
follow-up of a behavioural intervention with families. British Journal o f Psy
chiatry, 154, 625-628.
Vaughn, C. E. and Leff, J. P. (1976a) The measurement of expressed emotion in
the families of psychiatric patients. British Journal o f Clinical and Social
Psychology, 15, 157-165.
Vaughn, C. E. and Leff, J. P. (1976b) The influence of family and social factors on
the course of psychiatric illness: a comparison of schizophrenic and depressed

neurotic patients. British Journal o f Psychiatry, 129, 125-137.
Wig, N. N., Menon, D. K., Bedi, H., Leff, J., Kuipers, L., Ghosh, A., Day, R.,
Korten, A., Emberg, G., Sartorius, N. and Jablensky, A. (1987) Expressed
emotion and schizophrenia in North India. II. Distribution of expressed emo
tion components among relatives of schizophrenic patients in Aarhus and
Chandigarh. British Journal o f Psychiatry, 151, 160-165.
WHO Studies on Schizophrenia:

An Overview of the Results
and Their Implications
for the Understanding of the Disorder
Giovanni de Girolamo
SUMMARY. In this paper we shall briefly describe the three main

studies carried out by World Health Organization on schizophrenia,
namely:
1. the International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia (IPSS);
2. the study on impairments and disabilities in schizophrenic
patients;
3. the study on determinants of outcome of severe mental disor
ders.
We shall then discuss the main results of these studies and their
implications for a general understanding of this disorder.
Giovanni de Girolamo is affiliated with the Division of Mental Health, World

Health Organization, 1211 Geneva 27 (CH).
This paper is based on the data and experience obtained during the WHO
Projects on ‘the International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia,’ on the ‘Study on
impairments and disabilities in schizophrenia patients,’ and on ‘The determinants
of the outcome of severe mental disorders,’ projects sponsored by the World Health
Organization, and funded by the World Health Organization, the National Institute
of Mental Health (USA) and the participating field research centres. A full list of all
investigators and staff involved in these projects is presented in the official pub
lished reports of the studies.
The opinions expressed in this paper are solely responsibility of the author and
do not reflect the views of the World Health Organization.
[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “ WHO Studies on Schizophrenia.” de Girolamo, Giovanni.
1996, pp. 213-231; and: Psychosocial Approaches to Deeply Disturbed Persons (eds: Peter R. Breggin,
and E. Mark Stem) The Haworth Press, Inc., 1996, pp. 213-231. Single or multiple copies of this article
are available from The Haworth Document Delivery Service [1-800-342-9678,9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. (EST)].
www.Ebook777.com
INTRODUCTION
Some twenty million people in the world suffer from schizophrenia.

The disease usually starts early and often has a chronic, disabling course.
The overall cost of the disorder, both direct and indirect, is huge. The
burden caused to the patient’s family is very heavy and both patients and
their relatives often experience disadvantages because of the stigma
associated with the disorder, sometimes over generations. Schizophrenia is
a major public health problem. These facts were among the reasons which
have made the World Health Organization pay special attention to the
problem of schizophrenia and launch or stimulate studies aimed at a better
understanding of schizophrenia and at finding ways to deal with it. The
programme of collaborative clinical and epidemiological research (»1 schizo
phrenia, which started in the late 1960s, also aimed to develop a reliable
methodology for carrying out comparative cross-cultural studies in differ
ent populations.
THE INTERNATIONAL PILOT STUDY

OF SCHIZOPHRENIA (IPSS)
As underlined by Jablensky (1987), “Both the epidemiological and

cross-cultural approaches to the study of schizophrenia have their birth-
dates around the turn of the century.” Emil Kraepelin was one of the first
psychiatrists to publish some cross-cultural observations on dementia
praecox and manic-depressive illness after a trip to Java (Jablensky, 1989).
Since then, other researchers have investigated the epidemiology and the
clinical picture of schizophrenia in different cultures (Warner, 1985). How
ever, it was only when WHO planned and started the IPSS that a compara
tive cross-cultural research on this disorder, carried out using a standardized
reliable methodology, was made possible.
As shown in Table 1, the IPSS involved 9 centres in Africa, Asia, Europe
and North America, with a total of 1,202 patients aged 15-44. The patients were
selected for presence of psychotic symptoms and for absence of gross otganic
brain pathology, chronicity, alcohol- or drug-dependence, sensory defects and
mental retardation. The majority of patients (811) had a clinical diagnosis of
schizophrenia; the remaining 391 were classified as having affective disorders,
reactive psychoses, neuroses, and personality disorders. Each patient has a
detailed standardized clinical examination at the point of inclusion into the study
and full reassessments two years later and five years later. The principal
research instruments used in the IPSS were the Present State Examination, a
psychiatric history schedule and a social description form.
TABLE 1. Summary of the WHO Studies on Schizophrenia
INTERNATIONAL PILOT WHO COLLABORATIVE STUDY DETERMINANTS OF
STUDY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY OUTCOME OF SEVERE
MENTAL DISORDERS
NUMBER OF CENTRES 9 7______________________ J2___________________
COUNTRIES China (Taipei), Colombia, Bulgaria, Federal Republic of Colombia, Czechoslovakia,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, India, Germany, Netherlands, Sudan, Denmark, India, Ireland, Japan,
Nigeria, UK, USA, USSR Switzerland, Turkey, Yugoslavia Nigeria, UK, USA, USSR
NUMBER OF PATIENTS 1,202____________________ 520 1,379___________________
MAIN AREAS ASSESSEC Mental state (PSE), past history, Mental state (PSE), past history, Mental state (PSE), past history,
social description, course and sociodemographic description, course and outcome, disability in
outcome disability in social roles, social roles, stressful life events,
behavioural impairments, pattern expressed emotion, perception of
of course_________________ illness, family functioning
DIAGNOSIS Clinical (ICD-8), computer Clinical (ICD-9), computer Clinical (ICD-9), computer
(CATEGO), statistical clusters (CATEGO) (CATEGO), DSM-III (in some
centres)
FOLLOW-UP 2 years, 5 years 1 year, 2 years, 5 years 1 year, 2 years
Source: Jablensky, 1987.
159
The main conclusions of the IPSS can be summarized in this way

(WHO, 1979; Jablensky, 1984,1987,1989; Sartorius, 1988):
1. Schizophrenia is a universal disorder, which can be found both in the
most industrialized areas of the world, and in developing countries and
areas with a predominantly rural structure. Although in the IPSS no single
symptom was invariably present in every patient and in every setting, the
clinical pictures associated with a diagnosis of schizophrenia were remark
ably similar at the level of symptom profiles. Patients diagnosed as schizo
phrenic tended to have high scores on lack of insight, suspiciousness,
delusional mood, delusions or ideas of reference and persecution, flatness
of affect, auditory hallucinations, and the delusion of being controlled by
an external agency. Different proportions (between 31% and 85%, with an
average of 56%) of the patients meeting the general criteria of a non-affec-
tive functional psychosis also exhibited one or more of the Schneider
‘first-rank’ symptoms, considered for many years as reliably distinguish
ing schizophrenia from other non-organic psychotic illnesses. These symp
toms appeared to define a subpopulation of schizophrenia patients charac
terized by a generally high frequency and intensity of “positive” psychotic
symptoms which manifested great similarity across the cultures.
2. Although schizophrenia is universal, there is great variability in terms
of course and outcome. At the 2-year follow-up, which included 82% of the
initial cohort, 37% of the patients were psychotic; 31% were symptomatic
but not psychotic; and 32% were asymptomatic. On the whole, more than
half of the patients were in the two groups with better prognoses.
3. Finally, the outcome at the 2-year follow-up and at the 5-year fol-
low-up was significantly better for the patients from developing countries
(Colombia, India, Nigeria) than for those from the other countries. This
result was largely unexpected, but was confirmed even when it was con
trolled for certain variables, such as sex, age, and marital status. Out of all
9 countries, the two extremes of outcome were represented by strikingly
different results in Nigeria and in Denmark. While in Nigeria about 57%
of patients were in the group with the best outcome, in Denmark this
number was only 6%. In a parallel manner, while in Nigeria only 5% of the
patients were in the group with the worst outcome, in Denmark this group
included 31% of the patients.
In the IPSS no single variable, and no combination of a few “key”
variables, could explain much of the variation of any of the course and
outcome measures in schizophrenia; in other words, no characteristics of the
patient, of the environment, or of the initial manifestations of the disorder
considered in isolation were an effective predictor of the subsequent course
and outcome of the illness. The main variables associated with a positive
Giovanni de Girolamo 217
outcome were an acute onset of the disorder, being married, a good work
adaptation and the presence of affective symptoms. On the other hand a
negative outcome was associated with a slow onset, being divorced or sepa
rated, being socially isolated, having received a prior psychiatric treatment, a
long duration of the illness episode and a history of behavioural disorders.
The results of the 2-year follow-up have been amply confirmed at the
5-year follow-up, which included a total of 807 patients representing 76%
of the initial cohort (Leff et al., 1990). Once again the patients from
developing countries exhibited a clearly better outcome than the patients
from developed countries. In terms of clinical outcome, measured by
symptomatic status at time of follow-up, time spent in a psychotic episode
and pattern of course, the Indian and Nigerian patients did much better
than all the others. In addition, these patients and those from Colombia
also showed an exceptionally good social outcome.
Figure 1 shows the different patterns of course at the 5-year follow-up
(Sartorius et al., 1987). A significantly larger number of patients from
developing countries had a course characterized by a single episode of
illness, followed by full remission, or by many illness episodes, each
followed by full remission. On the other hand, a significantly larger num
ber of patients from developed countries showed either a course character
ized by one or more episodes followed by incomplete remission, or a
continuous condition of illness. All the different patterns of course corre
lated poorly with the initial diagnostic classification of the cases.
THE STUDY ON IMPAIRMENTS AND DISABILITIES

IN SCHIZOPHRENIC PATIENTS
The second study aimed to explore the behavioural impairments and
social disabilities in schizophrenic patients of recent illness onset. It
included 520 patients in seven countries who were examined initially and
also at one-year and two-year follow-up investigations (Table 1). In addi
tion to the PSE and a history schedule, two new instruments, the WHO
Disability Assessment Schedule (DAS) and the Psychological Impair
ments Assessment Schedule (PIRS), were developed for and used in this
study. The PIRS was designed to describe and quantify negative symp
toms, such as social and communication skills, while the purpose of the
DAS was to elicit and rate data on social role performance and the envi
ronment factors influencing such performance.
The main results of this study can be summarized in this way (Jablen-
sky, 1984, 1986, 1987):
1. There was a specific pattern in the occurrence of disabilities, in the
sense that some social roles, with their behavioral correlates, were
FIGURE 1. Pattern of course in schizophrenia

5 year follow-up (IPSS)
50 -,
40 -
30 -
20 -
10
0 -
1 epis. 1 epis. many epis. many epis:continous illness

remission non remis. remission non remis.
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
impaired before others; specifically, the area of sexual relationships tended

to be impaired first, followed then by the work role. The area of self-care,
which was initially preserved, became dysfunctional only when the major
ity of the other social roles had been impaired. In Table 2 the percentages
of patients with dysfunctions in the main 7 social roles are shown: the
range goes from a high of 74% of patients showing a dysfunction in sexual
behaviour to a low of 35% of patients who exhibited a dysfunction in the
area of self-care. This pattern could also be interpreted in the sense that a
patient who exhibited a dysfunction in sexual behaviour, because this was
the first area to be impaired, may not yet show disabilities in other areas,
while a patient with a disability in the area of self-care was likely to
already have a disability in the other areas.
2. Negative symptoms, such as inactivity, loss of interest and initiative,
poverty of speech, etc., were the best predictors of outcome at the 5-year
follow-up. Many similarities have emerged in patients from various
centres in terms of frequency of diagnostically important syndromes, the
nature and severity of psychological and behavioural impairments, and the
pattern of development of social role dysfunctions.
THE STUDY ON THE “DETERMINANTS OF THE OUTCOME

OF SEVERE MENTAL DISORDERS"
The third study, bearing the title “ Determinants of the Outcome of
Severe Mental Disorders,” was undertaken in view of the great potential
TABLE 2. Number and Percentage of Patients with Social Role

Dysfunctions, in up to 7 Roles, by Type of Social Role
ROLE PATIENTS
n %
Sexual relationship 198 74

Work role 171 64
Social withdrawal 158 59
Underactivity 156 58
Participation in household 138 52
Interests and information 136 51
Sell-care 93 35
Total no. of patients 267 100
Source: Jablensky, 1986.
importance of the IPSS findings, and it focused more than the IPSS on the
frequency of occurrence, the “natural history” of schizophrenia and the
factors associated with differences in course and outcome. This study was
based on more representative patient samples in different cultures (Sartorius
et al., 1986). The case-finding strategy designed for the new study consisted
of: (a) a prospective survey of specified psychiatric, other medical and
social services in a given catchment area in each setting; and (b) identifica
tion of all individuals making a first lifetime contact with such services
who exhibited signs and symptoms of a possible schizophrenic illness.
By extending the case-finding network to include a variety of “helping
agencies” in the community (e.g., religious institutions, traditional heal
ers), this strategy was expected to result in a better coverage of the incident
cases of the disorder than the first inclusion method, although patients who
never contacted any agency would still be missed.
Several research techniques which had earlier thrown light on specific
facets of the course of schizophrenia were also used. These included the
ascertainment of stressful life events prior to the onset of psychotic epi
sodes, the measurement of expressed emotion in a key relative, the assess
ment of the perception of psychotic symptoms by the patient’s family, and
the evaluation of functional impairments and social disability. It was
hoped that the application of these techniques would help to obtain data
that could contribute to an explanation of the extraordinary finding of the
IPSS that patients in developing countries on the whole have a better
outcome than those living in developed countries.
The total population included in this second major study, which was
carried out in 12 centres, 6 of which also participated in the IPSS, con
sisted of 1,379 subjects (745 men and 634 women) most of whom were
urban residents (Table 1). With the exception of Ibadan, Cali and the rural
area of Chandigarh, where most patients came from very poor neighbour
hoods, the socio-economic status of the patients’ neighbourhoods and
households in the other centres was rated as “ average” in comparison
with local standards in the majority of cases.
The great majority (86%) of the 1,218 cases for which the beginning of
the psychotic illness could be dated, had been identified by the case-find
ing network and assessed within 12 months of the onset of the disorder; in
61% of the cases this had occurred within 3 months.
The main results of this study can be summarized in this way (Jablen-
sky, 1987, 1989; Sartorius, 1988; Sartorius et al., 1986, 1989):
1. Although there is a remarkable difference in incidence rates for
schizophrenia diagnosed according to a broad definition, there is a striking
similarity in incidence rates for schizophrenia diagnosed according to
restrictive criteria. Adopting restrictive diagnostic criteria, the incidence of
schizophrenia is more or less the same in all countries: 7-14 cases per year
per 100,000 inhabitants aged 15-54 (Figure 2).
FIGURE 2. Incidence rates per 100,000

aged 15-54 (both sexes)
50-
rural
40- urban
30-
20 -
10 -
0 -
DENMARK INDIA INDIA IRELAND USA USSR JAPAN U.K.
■ I broad definition IH3 restrictive definition

2. As already found in the IPSS, schizophrenic patients from develop

ing countries have a course and an outcome significantly better than
patients from developed countries. While 56% of the patients from devel
oping countries exhibited a mild course, this percentage decreased to 39%
for the patients from developed countries. Moreover, while only 24% of
the patients from developing countries had a severe course, this percentage
was 40% for the patients from developed countries. Regarding the type of
onset, 36% of the patients under study had had an acute onset of the
illness; the others had had a sub-acute or an insidious onset. However, as
already found in the IPSS, the patients from developing countries had a
greater frequency of acute onset (49%) compared to the patients from
developed countries (26%), while the latter had more insidious onsets
(43%) compared to the former (27%).
Figure 3 shows more specifically the differences between the patients
on selected outcome variables; so, while 38% of the patients from devel
oping countries were in full remission more than 3/4 of the follow-up time,
compared to 22% of the patients from developed countries, only 16% of
the patients from developing countries were on antipsychotic medication
from 76% up to 100% of the follow-up time, compared to 61% of the
patients from developed countries. While 55% of the patients from devel
oping countries had never been hospitalized, this was true for only 8% of
the patients from developed countries. Finally, while 15% of the patients
FIGURE 3. Differences between Patients on Selected Outcome Variables
70
60
50
40-
30
20 -
10-
0 -
In remission On neuroleptics Never in hospital Socially impaired
Developing countries B Developed countries
No. of patients studied: 1,014

from developing countries had impaired social functions throughout the

follow-up time, 42% of the patients from developed countries were in this
condition.
3. As shown in the IPSS, patients from developing countries showed a
higher frequency of “voices speaking to the subject” and of visual hallu
cinations, while patients from developed countries showed more affective
symptoms (mainly depressive) and a higher frequency of delusional mood
and “thought insertion.”
A high proportion of patients (from a low of 52% in Agra to a high of
92% in Prague) had made their first contact for the disorder under study
with a health facility (psychiatric facility or GP); on the other hand 22% of
patients in India and 31% of patients in Nigeria had made their first
contact with an “alternative” facility (traditional healers or religious faci
lities). In 90% of the cases the reasons for contact were related to the
occurrence or worsening of bizarre behaviour or of unintelligible speech,
and to the deterioration of dally functions. In 26% of the cases it was
possible to find a family member with a history of psychiatric disorders.
The most common sub-type of schizophrenia was paranoid schizophre
nia (29% of the cases); in the developing countries about 10% of the
patients were affected by catatonic schizophrenia.
As mentioned above, two sub-studies focused on the role of life-events
and expressed emotion in the onset and course of schizophrenia.
In nine centres, among 386 patients studied with an acute onset, about
65% reported significant life events, independent from the illness, in the
two or three weeks prior to the occurrence of the disorder (Day et al.,
1987). Therefore it is confirmed that socioenvironmental stressors may
precipitate schizophrenic attacks and that such events tend to cluster in the
two to three week period immediately preceding illness onset. Interest
ingly, although the Indian and Nigerian centres reported many very acute
onsets, they also reported very low rates of life events; therefore, on the
basis of these results, the acute benign psychoses seen in these countries
do not seem to be psychogenic (Bebbington, 1987).
Regarding schizophrenia and expressed emotion, patients from the
Indian centre (Chandigarh) were compared to those from the Danish
centre (Aarhus). While 54% of the Danish patients were rated as high on
EE, which is a percentage similar to that found in British studies, in the
Indian centre 30% of the urban families and only 8% of the rural families
were classified as high EE. In particular, Indian relatives expressed signifi
cantly fewer critical comments, fewer positive remarks and less overin
volvement (Wig et al., 1987a, 1987b). The low proportion of high-EE
relatives in the Indian sample was significantly associated with a low

relapse rate (Leff et al., 1987).
CONCLUSIONS
What general conclusions can be drawn from this brief review of WHO
studies on schizophrenia?
The first conclusion is that multicentric transcultural studies represent a
valuable methodology for studying comparative psychiatric disorders and
for understanding the influence which psychosocial and biological vari
ables have on their pattern of course and outcome. They are feasible, and
can also significantly improve research capabilities through the training of
large groups of researchers and clinicians in the use of various research
instruments. WHO is now planning a new long-term follow-up study, in
which all patients included in the three studies discussed above, plus
others included in a WHO study on dosage of neuroleptics in different
populations, will be pooled in order to study the long-term course and
outcome of the illness (O’Connor, 1990). This study will be the largest
international long-term study on the course and outcome of schizophrenia
ever undertaken and will include a total sample of more than 3,000
patients in 18 research centres. Data collection for this study would begin
in June 1991 and would be completed within 12 months.
The second conclusion is that schizophrenia is universal, and patients
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia in different populations and cultures
share many features at the level of symptomatology. The incidence rates of
the disorder are very similar across different countries and cultures. How
ever, available evidence shows that socio-environmental factors play a
very important role with regards to incidence, and also prevalence, of the
disorder. Although the traditional social causation/social selection issue is
still unresolved (Angermayer & Klusman, 1987; Dohrenwend et al.,
1991), there are strong evidences which show a significant relationship
between the socioeconomic status and the risk for schizophrenia. Data
from the Epidemiological Catchment Area (ECA) Program shows that the
estimated relative risk for schizophrenia in the lowest socioeconomic sta
tus groups was 7.85 (p < .001) compared to the highest socioeconomic
status group and provides, according to the authors, “ a quite dramatic
confirmation of the findings reported by Hollingshead and Redlich a gen
eration ago” (Holzer et al., 1986). Moreover Eaton (1985), in a review of
the epidemiology of schizophrenia, concluded that the studies carried out
show a consistent pattern in a using three basic categories of social class, it
is common to observe a three-to-one difference in rates between the lowest
224 PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROA CHES TO DEEPL Y DISTURBED PERSONS
and the highest class. Jablensky (1988), in a comprehensive review of the

relationship between schizophrenia and the environment, stated that “Not
withstanding the methodological flaws of the early studies . . . , they have
been consistent in finding a significant relationship between macrosocial
variables and the epidemiology of schizophrenia.” Also the finding of a
substantial difference in the age of onset between males and females
(Hafner et al., 1989) seems to confirm the importance of sociocultural factors
in the occurrence of the disorder. In this context, it should be noted that a
substantial decrease in the incidence of the disorder over the last few
decades seems to have occurred, as shown in some specific studies (Munk-
Jorgensen, 1986; Munk-Jorgensen & Jorgensen, 1986; Stromgren, 1986;
Torrey, 1989; Sartorius et al., 1989; Beiser & Jacono, 1990; Der et al.,
1990).
However, although universal, schizophrenia appears to have substantial
variations in terms of course and outcome substantially different depend
ing on the type of socio-cultural and socio-economic setting. Generally
speaking, in the WHO studies the course and the outcome was signifi
cantly better for patients from developing countries than for those from
developed countries, and this is confirmed by the results of many other
studies (Warner, 1985). In addition, Warner (1985) has demonstrated that
macrosocial variables, including the unemployment rate and the overall
socioeconomic conditions of the society in which the patients live, can
deeply affect the course and the outcome of schizophrenia, for instance in
terms of recovery rates.
In any case, independent from the setting and contrary to the beliefs
held in the psychiatric field for decades, there is a remarkable percentage
of patients who recover from the illness. Table 3 shows the results of the
major long-term follow-up studies of schizophrenia published between
1960 and 1991; in these studies, which were carried out over a follow-up
period of up to 37 years, the percentage of patients clinically recovered
ranged from a low of 6% to a high of 66%, with an average of 28% and a
median value of 26%. The percentage of patients who showed a social
recovery ranges from a low of 17% up to a high of 75%, with an average
of 52% and a median value of 54%. Authors who have provided indepth
reviews of the follow-up studies of schizophrenia have reached the same
conclusion, stressing the possibility of social and/or clinical recovery for
schizophrenic patients, even when institutionalized for decades (Harding,
1985; Warner, 1985; Ciompi, 1988, 1989; Wing, 1987; McGlashan, 1988;
Shepherd et al., 1989; Wyatt et al., 1988). For this reason some authors
have proposed a challenging view of the very concept of chronicity, stat
ing that a variety of environmental and psychosocial factors can affect
patient outcome and induce a misperception of chronicity (Ciompi, 1980;

Harding et al., 1987).
It has been suggested that the existence of extended families may help
to explain the better recovery rate for patients living in developing coun
tries. To test this hypothesis, data from the 5-year and 10-year follow-up
obtained within the IPSS at Cali, Colombia, have been compared with data
from two 5- to 8-year follow-up studies of former schizophrenic inpatients
of the Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry (MPIP) in Munich (Germany)
(von Zerssen et al., 1990). Although schizophrenics in Cali are hospital
ized and treated with drugs only during acute episodes of the psychosis
and no facilities exist for long-term treatment, the psychopathological
outcome was, on the whole, not worse than in Munich. Furthermore, the
duration of hospitalization during the follow-up period was much lower in
Cali compared to the German patients and a significantly lower number of
Colombians were separated from their families. However, contrary to the
hypothesis, family size did not predict course and outcome at both centers.
The main results of the study concern the differences in the hospitalization
rate and the degree of family integration during the course of the psychosis
in an industrial and a developing country. They challenge the view that a
highly developed professional care system is the best guarantee for
improving the long-term course of schizophrenia. Rather, the integration
of patients in a natural social environment, and the restriction of medical
interventions to an indispensable degree may provide an optimal care
strategy. This strategy is easier to realize in developing countries where the
family structure is, on the whole, more intact than in industrialized coun
tries with high divorce rates and a tendency to isolate the elderly and the
sick from their families.
The third conclusion to be drawn from this review is that the results of
the WHO studies are especially important when planning mental health
services: according to their results, the vast majority of patients in devel
oping countries and many patients in developed countries can be treated as
out-patients, and in such circumstances their illness has a milder course.
The fourth and final conclusion is that some variables seem particularly
important for predicting the general and long-term outcome of the illness.
For instance, negative symptoms are especially important in this regard
and should be given great importance when formulating treatment and
rehabilitation plans. However, as underlined by Jablensky (1984), psy
chiatric services tend to pay much greater attention to the positive, often
dramatic symptoms of psychosis, while they give less attention to the
negative symptoms and to the impairments and dysfunctions in daily
TABLE 3. Clinical and Social Outcome in the Main Studies on the Long-Term Follow-up of Schizophrenia Published Between
226
1960-1991
AUTHOR, COUNTRY SELECTION DURATION SIZE OF FIRST MALE CLINICALLY POOR SOCIAL
YEAR YEARS OF FOLLOW- SAMPLE ADMISSIONS (%) RECOVERED CLINICAL RECOVERY
UP (YEARS) (%) (%) OUTCOME (%)
(%)
Affleck et al., U.K. 1959-61 12 155 ? 51 ? 24 48
1976
Astrup et al., USA 1938-50 5-20 1102 100 53 20 63 59
1962
Biehl et al., Germany ? 5 70 100 59 26 35 ?
1986
Bland & Om, Canada 1963 14 90 100 ? 21 37 65
1979
Bleuler, 1978 Switzerland 1942-43 5-20 208 66 48 20 24 51
Brown et al., U.K. 1956 5 339 33 43 18 41 43
1966
Ciompi, 1980 Switzerland 1963 mean 37 295 100 32 27 18 33
Gross & Germany 1945-59 21 502 - - 26 35 56
Huber, 1986
Harding et al., USA 1955-60 20 82 0 50 - 40 60
1987
Huberetal., Germany 1945-59 8-28 758 67 42 22 35 75
1975
Kulhara & India 1966-67 5-6 174 100 ? 29 32 72
Wig, 1978
Leon, 1989 Colombia 1968 10 84 - - 43 25 50
Marinow, 1988 Bulgaria ? 20 280 - - - 27 51
McGlashan, USA 1950-75 15 163 0 52 6 41 -
1984
Mignolli et al., Italy 1979 7 46 71 44 37 24 20
1991
Munk- Denmark 1972 13 53 100 - 23 50 24
Jorgensen,
1989
Murphy & Mauritius 1956 12 113 100 ? 59 36 71
Raman, 1971
Ogawaetal., Japan 1958-62 21-27 140 79 48 31 23 47
1987
Salokangas, Finland 1965-67 7-8 175 100 47 26 24 69
1983
Shepherd et U.K. ? 5 107 37 53 16 43 60
al., 1989
Stephens, 1970 USA 1948-59 5-16 472 100 ? 23 28 ?
Stone, 1986 USA 1963-76 10-23 94 - - 8 - -
Tsuang & USA 1934-44 30-40 525 ? 52 19 48 ?

Winokur, 1975
Vaillant, 1978 USA 1959-62 10 56 - - - 39 61
Vergheseet India 1981-82 2 323 - - 66 4 -
al., 1989
Watts, 1985 U.K. 1946-74 28 35 - 43 28 35 17
Waxier, 1979 Sri Lanka 1970-71 5-6 89 100 55 40 36 54
AVERAGE - - 14 243 86 48 28 32 52
MEDIAN - -- 12 155 99 48 26 35 54
VALUE
κ>
living of these patients. More attention given to the latter will result in an
improvement in the therapeutic interventions.
In conclusion it is possible to agree with the statement expressed by
Jablensky (1988): “The strongest evidence at present is that of an environ
mental effect on course and outcome of schizophrenia. Far from being an
autochthonous, pre-programmed process, schizophrenia appears to be a
dynamic development in which the quantity and quality of social stimuli,
the emotional ambience of the family and the community, the demands of
the society, and the ethos of treatment interact with the intrinsic neurophy-
siological vulnerability to shape the prognosis.”
REFERENCES
Astrup, C., Fossum, A. & Holmboe, R. Prognosis in Functional Psychoses,
Springfield: Thomas, 1962.
Bebbington, P., ‘Life events and schizophrenia. The WHO collaborative study,’
Social Psychiatry, 22:179-180, 1987.
Beiser, M. & Iacono, W.G. An update on the epidemiology of schizophrenia.
Canadian Journal o f Psychiatry, 35:657-668, 1990.
Biehl, H., Maurer, K, Schubart, C., Krumm, B. & Jung, E., ‘Prediction of outcome
and utilization of medical services in a prospective study of first onset schizo
phrenics: results o f a five-year follow-up study,’ European Archives o f Psy
chiatry and Neurological Sciences, 236:139-47, 1986.
Bleuler, M. The Schizophrenic Disorders: Long-Term Patient and Family Studies.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978.
Ciompi, L. Catamnestic long-term study on the course of life and aging of schizo
phrenics. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 6:606, 1980.
Ciompi, L., ‘Learning from outcome studies,’ Schizophrenia Research, 7:373-84,
1988.
Ciompi, L., ‘Review of follow-up studies on long-term evolution and aging in
schizophrenia,’ in: Schizophrenia and Aging, New York: Guliford, 1989.
Day, R., Nielsen, A., Korten, A., Emberg, G., Dube, K. C., Gebhart, J., Jablensky,
A., Leon, C., Marsella, A., Olatawura, M., Sartorius, N., Stromgren, E., Taka-
hashi, R., Wig, N. & Wynne, L.C., ‘Stressful life events preceding the acute
onset of schizophrenia: a cross-national study from the World Health Orga
nization,’ Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 77:123-205, 1987.
Der, G., Gupta, S. & Murray, R. Is schizophrenia disappearing? Lancet,
335:513-516, 1990.
Gross, G. & Huber, G., ‘Classification and prognosis of schizophrenic disorders in
light of the Bonn Follow-up Studies,’ Psychopathology, 79:50-9, 1986.
Harding, C. M. & Strauss, J.S., ‘The course of schizophrenia: an evolving con
cept,’ in: Alpert, M. (ed.), Controversies in Schizophrenia, New York: Guil
ford, 1985, pp. 339-353.
Harding, C. M., Brooks, G. W., Ashikaga, T., Strauss, J. S. & Breier, A., ‘The
Vermont Longitudinal Study of persons with severe mental illness, 1: Method

ology, study sample and overall status 32 years later,’ American Journal of
Psychiatry, 744:718-26, 1987.
Jablensky, A., ‘Gli studi trans-culturali dell’ Organizzazione Mondiale della
Sanità’ sulla schizofrenia: implicazioni pratich,’ in: Faccincani, C., Fiorio, R.,
Mignolli, G. & Tansella, M. (eds.), Le psicosi schizofreniche dalla ricerca alla
pratica clinica, Bologna: Patron, 1984, pp. 36-65.
Jablensky, A., ‘Menomazioni e disabilità nei pazienti schizofrenici,’ Devianza ed
Emarginazione, //:45-70, 1986.
Jablensky, A., ‘Multicultural studies and the nature of schizophrenia: A review,’
Journal o f the Royal Society o f Medicine, 80:162-67, 1987.
Jablensky, A., ‘An overview of the World Health Organization multi-centre stud
ies of schizophrenia,’ 455-71. In: Williams, Paul & Rawnsley, K. (eds.), The
Scope o f Epidemiological Psychiatry: Essays in Honour o f Michael Shepherd,
London: Routledge, 1989, pp. 225-39.
Leff, J., Sartorius, N., Jablensky, A., Anker, M, Korten, A., Gulbinat, W. &
Emberg, G. The International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia. In: Hairier, H. &
Gattaz, W.F. (eds.), Search for the Causes o f Schizophrenia, Vol. II, Berlin:
Springer, 1990, pp 57-66.
Leff, J., Wig, N.N., Ghoschizophrenia, A., Bedi, H., Menon, D. K, Kuipers, L.,
Korten, A., Emberg, G., Day, R., Sartorius, N., & Jablensky, A., ‘Expressed
emotion and schizophrenia in North India, III: Influence of relatives’
expressed emotion on the course of schizophrenia in Chandigarh,’ British
Journal o f Psychiatry, 757:166-73, 1987.
León, C. A., ‘Clinical course and outcome of schizophrenia in Cali, Colombia: A
ten-year follow-up study,’ Journal o f Nervous and Mental Disease,
777:593-606, 1989.
Marinow, A., ‘Prognosis and outcome in schizophrenia,’ International Journal o f
Mental Health, 77:63-80, 1988.
McGlashan, T. H., ‘The Chestnut Lodge Follow-up Study, II: Long term outcome
of schizophrenia and the affective disorders,’ Archives o f General Psychiatry,
47:586-601, 1984.
McGlashan, T. H., ‘A selective review of recent North American long-term fol
low-up studies of schizophrenia,’ Schizophrenia Bulletin, 74:515-42, 1988.
Mignolli, G., Faccincani, C. & Platt, S., ‘Psychopathology and social performance
in a cohort of patients with schizophrenic psychoses. A 7-year follow-up
study,’ in: Tansella, M. (a cura di), ‘Community-based psychiatry: long-term
patterns of care in South-Verona,’ Psychological Medicine Monograph, 1991
(in press).
Munk-Jorgensen, P., ‘Why has the incidence of schizophrenia changed in Danish
institutions since 1970?’ Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 75:62-8, 1987.
Munk-Jorgensen, P. & Mortensen, P. B., ‘Schizophrenia: A 13-year follow-up,’
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 79:391-9, 1989.
O’Connor, J. Largest international study on schizophrenia launched. Psychiatric
News, 25:1, 16, 1990.
Ogawa, K., Miya, M., Watarai, A., Nakazawa, M., Yuasa, S. & Utena, H., ‘A
long-term follow-up study of schizophrenia in Japan-with special reference to the
course of social adjustment,’ British Journal o f Psychiatry, 757:758-65, 1987.
Sartorius, N., ‘Solving the conundrum of schizophrenia. WHO’s contribution,’ in:
Stefanis, C. N. & Rabavilas, A. D. (eds.), Schizophrenia. Recent Biosocial
Developments, New York: Human Sciences Press, 1988, pp. 23-38.
Sartorius, N., Jablensky, A., Emberg, G., Leff, J., Korten, A. & Gulbinat, W.,
‘Course of schizophrenia in different countries: some results of a WHO
International comparative 5-year follow-up study,’ in: Hafner, H., Gattaz, W.F.
& Janzarik, W. (eds.), Search for the Causes o f Schizophrenia, Berlino:
Springer, 1987, pp. 107-13.
Sartorius, N., Jablensky, A., Korten, A., Emberg, G., Anker, M., Cooper, J. &
Day, R., ‘Early manifestations and first-contact incidence of schizophrenia in
different cultures,’ Psychological Medicine, 16:909-928, 1986.
Sartorius, N., Jablensky, A., Korten, A. & Emberg, G., ‘Course and outcome of
schizophrenia: a preliminary communication,’ in: Cooper, B. & Helgason, T.
(eds.), Epidemiology and the Prevention o f Mental Disorders, London: Rout-
ledge, 1989, pp. 195-203.
Sartorius, N., Nielsen, J. A. & Stromgren, E. (eds.), ‘Changes in Frequency of
Mental Disorders over Time,’ Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica Supplementum,
348(19), 1989.
Shepherd, M., Watt, D., Falloon, I. & Smeeton, N., ‘The natural history o f schizo
phrenia: A five-year follow-up study of outcome and prediction in a represen
tative sample o f schizophrenics,’ Psychological Medicine, Monograph suppl.
15, 1989.
Stone, M. H., ‘Exploratory psychotherapy in schizophrenia-spectrum patients,’
Bulletin o f the Menninger Clinic, 50:287-306, 1986.
Stromgren, E., ‘Changes in the incidence of schizophrenia?’ British Journal of
Psychiatry, 750:1-7, 1987.
Torrey, E. F., ‘Schizophrenia: Fixed incidence or fixed thinking?’ Psychological
Medicine, 79:285-87, 1989.
Tsuang, M. T. & Winokur, G. The Iowa 500: fieldwork in a 35-year follow-up of
depression, mania and schizophrenia. Canadian Psychiatric Association Jour
nal, 20:359-365, 1975.
Vaillant, G. E. A 10-year follow-up o f remitting schizophrenics. Schizophrenia
Bulletin, 4:78-85, 1978.
Verghese, A., John, J. K, Rajkumar, S., Richard, J., Sethi, B. B. & Trivedi, J. K.,
‘Factors associated with the course and outcome of schizophrenia in India:
Results o f a two-year multicentre follow-up study,’ British Journal o f Psychia
try, 754:499-503, 1989.
Warner, R., Recovery from Schizophrenia. Psychiatry and Political Economy;
London, Routledge, 1985.
Watts, C. A. H., ‘A long-term follow-up of schizophrenic patients: 1946-1983,’
Journal o f Clinical Psychiatry, 46:210-6, 1985.
Wig, N. N., Menon, D. K., Bedi, H., Ghoschizophrenia, A., Kuipers, L., Leff, J.,
Korten, A., Day, R., Sartorius, N., Emberg, G. & Jablensky, A., ‘Expressed
emotion and schizophrenia in North India, I: Cross-cultural transfer of ratings
of relatives’ expressed emotion,’ British Journal o f Psychiatry, 757:156-60,
1987.
Wig, N. N., Menon, D. K, Bedi, H., Leff, J., Kuipers, L., Ghosh, A., Day, R.,
Korten, A., Emberg, G., Sartorius, N., & Jablensky, A., ‘Expressed emotion
and schizophrenia in North India, II: Distribution of expressed emotion com
ponents among relatives of schizophrenic patients in Aarhus and Chandigarh,’
British Journal o f Psychiatry, 757:160-65, 1987.
Wing, J. K, ‘Has the outcome of schizophrenia changed?’ British Medical Bulle
tin, 43:741-53, 1987.
Wyatt, R. J., Alexander, R. C., Egan, M. F. & Kirch, D. G., ‘Schizophrenia, just
the facts. What do we know, how well do we know it?’ Schizophrenia
Research, 7:3-18,1988.
Zerssen, v. D., Leon, C. A., Moller, H. J., Wittchen, H. U., Pfister, H., Sartorius,
N., ‘Care strategies for schizophrenic patients in a transcultural comparison,’
Comprehensive Psychiatry, 37:398-408, 1990.
ADDITIONAL REFERENCES
Angermayer, M. C. & Klusmann, D. (eds.), From Social Class to Social Stress,
Berlin: Springer, 1987.
Dohrenwend, B. P., Levav, I., Shrout, P. E., Schwartz, S. B., Naveh, G., Link,
B. G., Skodol, A. E., Steue, A., Socioeconomic status and psychiatric disor
ders: a test of the social causation-social selection issue, 1991 (in press).
Holzer, C. E., Shea, B. M., Swanson, J. W., Leaf, P. J., Myers, J. K., George, L.,
Weissman, M. & Bednarski, P., The increased risk for specific psychiatric
disorders among persons of low socioeconomic status, American Journal o f
Social Psychiatry, 6:259-271, 1986.
Eaton, W. W., Epidemiology o£ schizophrenia, Epidemiologic Reviews, 7:105-126,
1985.
Jablensky, A., Schizophrenia and the environment, in: Henderson, S. & Burrows, G.
(eds.), Handbook o f Social Psychiatry, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1988, pp. 8-116.
Haftier, H., Riecher, A., Maurer, K., Loffler, W., Munk-Jorgensen, P., & Strom-
gren, E., How does gender influence age at first hospitalization for schizophre
nia? Psychological Medicine, 19:903-918, 1989.
Ciompi, L., Is chronic schizophrenia an artifact? Arguments and counter-argu
ments, Fortshritte der Neurologie und Psychiatrie, 48:237-248, 1980.
Harding, C. M., Zubin, J. & Strauss, J. S., Chronicity in schizophrenia: fact,
partial fact or artifact? Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 38:477-486,1987.
Haworth
DOCUMENT DELIVERY
SERVICE
This valuable service provides a single-article order form for any article from a
Haworth journal.
• Time Saving: No running around from library to library to find a specific article.
• Cost Effective: All costs are kept down to a minimum.
• Fast Delivery: Choose from several options, including same-day FAX.
• No Copy right Hassles: You will be supplied by the original publisher.
• Easy Payment: Choose from several easy payment methods.
Open Accounts Welcomefo r . . .

• Library Interlibrary Loan Departments
• Library Network/Consortia Wishing to Provide Single-Article Services
• Indexing/Abstracting Services with Single Article Provision Services
• Document Provision Brokers and Freelance Information Service Providers
MAIL or FAX THIS ENTIRE ORDER FORM TO:
Haworth Document Delivery Service or FAX: 1-800-895-0582
The Haworth Press, Inc. or CALL: 1-800-342-9678
10 Alice Street 9am-5pm EST
Binghamton, NY 13904-1580
PLEASE SEND ME PHOTOCOPIES OF THE FOLLOWING SINGLE ARTICLES:

1) Journal Title:_______________________________________________
Vol/Issue/Year: Starting & Ending Pages:_
Article Title:
2) Journal Title: _
Vol/Issue/Year: Starting & Ending Pages:
Article Title:
3) Journal Title: _
Article Title:
4) Journal Title: _
Article Title:
(See other side for Costs and Payment Information)
www.Ebook777.com
COSTS: Please figure your cost to order quality copies of an article.

1. Set-up charge per article: $8.00
($8.00 X number of separate articles)
2. Photocopying charge for each article:
I-10 pages: $1.00
II-19 pages: $3.00
20-29 pages: $5.00
30+ pages: $2.00/10 pages
3. Flexicover (optional): $2.00/article
4. Postage & Handling: US: $1.00 for the first article/
$.50 each additional article
Federal Express: $25.00
Outside US: $2.00 for first article/
$.50 each additional article
5. Same-day FAX service: $.35 per page
GRAND TOTAL:_____
METHOD OF PAYMENT: (please check one)
Q Check enclosed Q Please ship and bill. PO #_____________________
(sorry we can ship and bill to bookstores only! All others must pre-pay)
Q Charge to my credit card: □ Visa; □ MasterCard; □ Discover;
□ American Express;
Account Number:____________________ Expiration date:___________
Signature: X___________________________
Name: _____________________ Institution:
Address:
City:___________________________ State:________ Zip:

Phone Number: FAX Number:
MAIL or FAY THIS ENTIRE ORDER FORM TO:

Haworth Document Delivery Service or FAX: 1-800-895-0582
The Haworth Press, Inc. or CALL: 1-800-342-9678
10 Alice Street 9am-5pm EST)
Binghamton, NY 13904-1580
www.Ebook777.com

Psychosocial Approaches To Deeply Distur PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Psychosocial Approaches To Deeply Distur PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Psychosocial Approaches To Deeply Distur PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Free ebooks ==> www.Ebook777.

Pre-publication nto a desert of “chemical

Revella Levin, PhD

P sychosocial Approaches takes

David Cohen, PhD

This page intentionally left blank

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

1. Schizophrenia. 2. Schizophrenia-Treatment. 3.Schizophrenics-Rehabilitation. I. Breggin,

RC514.P71886 1996 96-12677

Articles in this journal are selectively indexed or abstracted in the

• Special Educational Needs Abstracts, Carfax Information

• Studies on Women Abstracts, Carfax Publishing Company,

SPECIAL BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTES

Q indexing/abstracting services in this list will also cover material in

Introduction: Spearheading a Transformation 1

Schizophrenic Experience: A Humanistic Perspective 9

Psychotherapy and the Fear of Understanding

Perceptions of Psychologists and Psychiatrists 59

Psychotherapy with “Schizophrenia”: Analysis

Surviving the “Mental Health” System

Yielding to a Higher Power 125

Working with the Families of Schizophrenic Patients 185

Peter R. Breggin, MD, is a psychiatrist in private practice in

In recent years, pharmacology and psychiatric hospitalization have

PERSONS AS AGENTS AND BEINGS

How we view human beings in general is fundamental to the contro­

© 1996 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved. /

ingly irrational people. I believe that all individuals should be viewed as

PERSONS AS OBJECTS OR BIOCHEMICAL DEVICES

The “ scientific” or scientistic approach takes a starkly contrasting atti­

CONTRASTING THERAPEUTIC APPROACHES

If we approach the human as a being, then our task is to understand and

If we approach the human “scientifically” or “objectively,” then the

PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

There are, of course, not only philosophical considerations but scien­

and much of the profession mistakenly believe that the biopsychiatrists

A CONFLICT RESOLUTION MODEL

People who come to the attention of mental health professionals are in

SUMMARY. Schizophrenic consciousness is an alternative view of life,

In the 1902 Gifford Lectures, delivered at the University of Edinburgh,

[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “Schizophrenic Experience: A Humanistic Perspective.” Stem,

© 1996 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved. 9

become broken (May, 1983). Nevertheless, the schizophrenic expresses this

SCHIZOPHRENIA AS A MODE OF BEING

Schizophrenia is a multi-axis combination of genetic, biochemical, psy-

DISENGAGEMENT AND CONVENTION

Labeled clinically as a serious thought disorder, schizophrenia is, in fact,

phrenic disengagement from objective reality devolves personhood into a

The affective life of schizophrenics is interwoven with strands of depres­

Being able to weigh in such struggles distinguishes what is schizophrenic

Schizophrenic consciousness can compromise itself into airtight leth­

Anxiety in the schizophrenic signifies further psychic and physical

Anxiousness within schizophrenia fails to confine the terrors of being

Whoever shall thus consider himself will be frightened at himself,

Fretfulness and apprehensiveness team together to delimit boundaries

HARVEY: SEEING IT ALL

Harvey lived in a recurring dream. Day-to-day realities were sapped at

through insisting cracks.” There were no discernible ends to these drops.

How we view human beings in general is fundamental to the contro

The “ scientific” or scientistic approach takes a starkly contrasting atti

There are, of course, not only philosophical considerations but scien

The affective life of schizophrenics is interwoven with strands of depres

Schizophrenic consciousness can compromise itself into airtight leth

range of responses to the challenge of sometimes incapacitating circum

Leslie Farber (1976) notes that prolonged exposure to the schizo

Moral treatment, an early psychologically based treatment for schizo

filling in the ambiguity by seeing the therapist as hurtful, uncaring, inade

However, the transference reactions of normals and neurotics are suffi

Schizophrenic people have had strange experiences. In part, their symp

Kestenberg, J. (1975). Children and parents: Psychoanalytic studies in develop

SUMMARY. A non-medical, non-hospital, non-professional, home

Loren R. Mosher, MD, is Chief Medical Director (Psychiatry) in the Depart

going psychotic disorganization: inflexibility, reliance on authority, insti

“psychiatrists treat psychology unfairly. They take advantage of the sys

Sabshin, Medical Director of ApA, in addressing psychiatrists in gen

According to Wright and Spielberger, the truth about continuing educa