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Stat Con - Chapter 4 Digests

The Supreme Court upheld the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former President Arroyo, finding that it restored his civil and political rights based on the clear wording of the pardon. In another case, the Court affirmed the conviction of a man for illegal possession of lumber based on his admission and the fact that warrantless searches are allowed under the Forestry Code when forest products are seized from an offender. In a third case, the Court heard challenges from various party-list groups regarding their disqualification from elections by the COMELEC, with the key issue being whether they represented marginalized sectors as required by law.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
92 views15 pages

Stat Con - Chapter 4 Digests

The Supreme Court upheld the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former President Arroyo, finding that it restored his civil and political rights based on the clear wording of the pardon. In another case, the Court affirmed the conviction of a man for illegal possession of lumber based on his admission and the fact that warrantless searches are allowed under the Forestry Code when forest products are seized from an offender. In a third case, the Court heard challenges from various party-list groups regarding their disqualification from elections by the COMELEC, with the key issue being whether they represented marginalized sectors as required by law.

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VERBA LEGIS  Yes, former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted

for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by


Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC
former President Arroyo. It is well-entrenched that where the
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA must be given its literal meaning and applied without
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015 attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum.
From the words of a statute there should be no departure. It is
FACTS: this Court’s firm view that the phrase in the presidential pardon
at issue which declares that former President Estrada "is
 September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former hereby restored to his civil and political rights" substantially
President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the complies with the requirement of express restoration.
Philippines, for the crime of plunder.
 October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended DURA LEX SED LEX
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Revaldo v. People
Estrada.
OLYMPIO REVALDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
 October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more
ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009
Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the
Mayor of the City of Manila.
FACTS:
 January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed
a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of
before the COMELEC. Risos Vidal anchored her petition on premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry
the theory that "Former President Estrada is Disqualified to Code.
Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by
the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of June 17, 1992, in the Municipality of Maasin, Province of Southern
Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification." Leyte, Philippines, the accused, with intent of gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of flat
lumber with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without
ISSUE: any legal document as required under existing forest laws and
regulations from proper government authorities.
 Whether or not former President Estrada is qualified to vote
and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon Maceda, the person in charge of the operations section of the PNP in
granted to him by former President Arroyo. Maasin, Southern Leyte, testified that on 18 June 1992, at around
11:00 in the morning, he went with Chief Alejandro Rojas, SPO3
Melquiades Talisic and SPO3 Nicasio Sunit to the house of petitioner
HELD:
to verify the report of Sunit that petitioner had in his possession
lumber without the necessary documents. They were not armed with a
search warrant on that day.They confiscated 20 pieces of lumber of Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC
different varieties lying around the vicinity of the house of petitioner.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
September 5, 1997, the RTC-Branch 25 rendered judgment convicting
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
petitioner of the offense charged and sentencing him.
August 23 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that motive or intention is FACTS:
immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the lumber without
the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability. The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and
organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13
ISSUE:
May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for
Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
police officers was legal. registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941)
and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280
HELD:
groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
Yes, even without a search warrant, the personnel of the PNP can participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
seize the forest products cut, gathered or taken by an offender
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC
pursuant to Section 80 of the Forestry Code.
Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s
Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National
documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court, Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the
petitioner categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and
confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal underrepresented" sector.
documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the
the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest
Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No.
products without the proper documentation consummates the crime.
9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing
Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law.
of the official.
On the penalty imposed by the lower courts, we deem it necessary to
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En
discuss the matter. Violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code is
Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether
punished as Qualified Theft with the penalties imposed under Articles
the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
participate in the elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).

RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA LEGIS


39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 underrepresented."
petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections.
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system
Ante Orders in all petitions. fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This
means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any
class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting
ISSUE: the party-list system.

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
from participating in the elections. cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties
only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
HELD: organizations to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list
following prevailing decisions in disqualifying petitioners from system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to
participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court adopts deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are
petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-
under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle,
under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision. leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from
the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
that, during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly LITERAL IMPORT MUST YIELD TO INTENT
shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral
US vs. TORIBIO
parties for two obvious reasons.
G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUIS TORIBIO,
representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is defendant-appellant.
provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator
sought to attain by its enactment
Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the
town of Carmen in the province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of
found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a Toribio it will defeat the purpose of the law.
carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the
The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection
municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30
and if ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be
and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding,
justified, The Supreme Court think that the reasonable restriction
and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large
placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under
cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human
discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper
consumption.
exercise of that power.
The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting
The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an
is the slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house
epidemic that wiped 70-100% of the population of carabaos... The
without a permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he
Supreme Court also said that these animals are vested with public
contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and
interest for they are fundamental use for the production of crops.
that he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes
These reasons satisfy the requisites of a valid exercise of police
a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of
power
eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners,
and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of
state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property. the inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not
constitute the taking of carabaos for public purpose; it just serves as a
mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the
Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, protection of general welfare and public interest.
branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of police power.
LITERAL IMPORT MUST YIELD TO INTENT
Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes
Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE
Rationale: The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act
TANON STRAIT v. SEC. ANGELO REYES
prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for
human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015
provided for in section 30
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most FACTS:
tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote
the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction
should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other
June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the No, the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and
DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract- utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by
102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development
geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to
promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum
May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around
through the utilization of government and/or local or foreign private
the Tañon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering
resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the
approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine the area's
revenues to the Philippine Government.
underwater composition.
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87,
January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the
although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987
Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001,
Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed.
wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE)
commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the
of JAPEX's application for an ECC. Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with the
Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred.
March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the
This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections expounding
DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in
on this point, pronounced: It is a basic precept in statutory
Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to
construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the
drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted
determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read
until February 8, 2008.
according to its spirit and intent.
Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate
Note that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general
original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they
law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and
commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-
extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed below, the
46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.
exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case
may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the
Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the service contract is prohibited on the ground that
there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms,
conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil
CESSANTE RATIONE LEGIS, CESSAT ET IPSA LEX
exploration and extraction.
Comendador v. de Villa
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR v. GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, (G)
G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991
HELD:
Yes, the petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge. The right
to peremptory challenge was originally provided under Article 18 of
FACTS:
Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War).
The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
November 7,1972, when President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39
facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d'
(Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and
etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed
January 14, 1990, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been the peremptory challenge.
constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 to investigate the
January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045
petitioners.
proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law throughout the
January 30, 1990, the PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena Philippines. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of
individually addressed to the petitioners. The petitioners the military tribunals created there under, the reason for the existence
acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of
of the rebellion. At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners
the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante rationelegis, cessat
challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI
ipsa lex. Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right
Panel to grant them 10 days to file their objections in writing through a
to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the
Motion for Summary Dismissal.
apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the Proclamation No.2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18
petitioners 5 days to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows
affidavits of their witnesses. the right to peremptory challenge.

May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising
their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and
members of GCM No.14 by invoking Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.
GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been SUPPLYING LEGISLATIVE OMISSION
discontinued under P.D. No.39.
Farinas v. Barba
GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARINAS v. MAYOR ANGELO M.
ISSUE: BARBA,
Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to peremptory G.R. No. 116763, April 19, 1996
challenge.

FACTS:
HELD:
Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he resigned after going
without leave to the United States.
To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a recommendation for the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was
the appointment of Edward Palafox was made by the Sangguniang vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino
Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended
Barba. The resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand,
to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang
compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. Bayan but it was the mayor and not the provincial governor who
7160). appointed him.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision
of the Local Government Code, disapproved the resolution “for the
reason that the authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan
members are lodged in the Governor. Accordingly, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of
petitioner Al Nacino. On June 8, 1994, the Governor appointed CONSTRUCTION AS TO AVIOD ABSURDITY
petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On the other Paras v. Comelec
hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox
to the same position. PARAS v. COMELEC

June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos G.R. No. 123169, 4 November 1996
Norte a petition for quo warranto and prohibition.
July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the
FACTS:
appointment of respondent Palafox by respondent Mayor Barba.
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,
Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in
ISSUE: 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the
registered voters of the barangay.
Who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what
procedure? Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the
petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on
HELD: November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed
the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The
The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of
the Governor upon the recommendation of the Sangguniang petitioner's opposition.
concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas where the
vacancy occurs. December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this
time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall
The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner City a petition for injunction, with the trial court issuing a temporary
indicated in the preceding paragraph, neither is entitled to the seat in restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court
lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the
petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of
contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of
without COMELEC approval. his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be
held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the
January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the
purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted
recall election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for
by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering
certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction.
inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and
Petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which
required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public
we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the
respondent, to comment on the petition.
following admonition: We admonish against a too-literal reading of the
Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat
of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the
Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth. The spirit, rather than the
from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this
immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No.
7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years
thereafter.
CONSTRUCTION IN FAVOR OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE
Salvacion v. Central Bank
ISSUE:
KAREN E. SALVACION v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Whether or not the recall election is valid. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y
NORTHCOTT
G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997
HELD:
No, the recall is not valid. It is a rule in statutory construction that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the FACTS:
context,i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together
Karen E. Salvacion, herein petitioner, then 12 years old, was coaxed
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
and lured by private respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott to go with
whole enactment. 4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an
him in his apartment, where she was detained for four days from
elective local official to recall election once during his term of office.
February 4 to 7, 1989; and was raped 10 times (once on February 4
Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely
and 3 times a day from February 5-7). Aside from the criminal case for
designates the period when such elective local official may be subject
serious illegal detention and 4 counts of rape filed by the Makati
of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office.
investigating fiscal, the petitioner along with her parents, file in
Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular
Regional Trial Court (RTC) a civil case for damages with preliminary any other order or process of any court. Legislative body, government
attachment against Bartelli, which the court then granted. agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a
foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
A notice of garnishment was served to China Banking Corporation,
aggrieved by a foreign guessed like accused Greg Bartelli. This would
where the dollar account of the private respondent was deposited, by
negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of
the Deputy Sheriff of Makati. But respondent bank invoking Republic
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that
Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it
the lawmaking body intended for right and justice to prevail. Simply
and later on invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, to
stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those
the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are
fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process
conscience.
or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body. In a letter in response to the inquiry of the
counsel of petitioners to Central Bank, it is stated that the provision in
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 is absolute in
application and that it does not admit of any exception, nor has the LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THE IMPOSSIBLE
same been repealed nor amended.
Santos, Jr. v. PNOC
March 29, 1990, after hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered
judgment in favor of petitioners, Petitioners tried to execute on PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR. v. PNOC
Bartelli’s dollar deposit. G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008

ISSUES: FACTS:
Whether the dollar bank deposit of Greg Bartelli in China Bank December 23, 2002, PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed
Corporation be exempted from attachment, garnishment or any other a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be collected was the
any administrative body petitioner’s unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by
respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.

HELD: Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed


because the latter cannot be located in his last known address despite
No, the provisions of Section 133 of CB Circular No. 960 are hereby earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondent’s motion, the
held to be inapplicable to this case because of its peculiar trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent
circumstances and the Court requires respondents to comply with the caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of
writ to execution and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent
respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would justify submitted the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of service of
the judgment. In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent respondent’s employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the
of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of summons by registered mail to petitioner’s last known address.
CB Circular No 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment or
Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the cannot be located. In the case at bar, there is obviously no way notice
publication of summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the can be sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him.
reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted said motion and The law does not require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur
proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its ad impossible. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility.
evidence. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in
accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicability. Be
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit
that as it may, a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was still
Attached Answer, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by
mailed to him at his last known address but it was unclaimed.
respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court.
Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not
require such execution with the clerk of court. It also denied the
motion to admit petitioner’s answer because the same was filed way
beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari contending that NUMBER AND GENDER OF WORDS
the court committed grave abuse of discretion since it has no
jurisdiction due to improper service of summons, failure to furnish him Santillon v. Miranda
with copies of its orders and processes and upholding technicality PEDRO SANTILLON v. PERFECTA MIRANDA,
over equity and justice.
G.R. No. 19281, June 30, 1965

ISSUE:
FACTS:
Whether or not there was a failure on the part of the trial court to
furnish Petitioner with copies of orders and processes issued in the November 21, 1953, Pedro Santillon died without testament in Tayug,
course of the proceedings Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one son, Claro Santillon, and his
wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several
parcels of land located in that province.
HELD: Four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of
No, Santos failed to file an answer in time, which is why he had to file administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow
an Omnibus Motion to Admit Attached Answer. The disputed order of Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario
September 11, 2003 was a finding that the Santos was in default for Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated
failure to file an answer or pleading within the period fixed. It is in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta
illogical to notify him of the order simply on account of the reality that Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta
he was no longer residing and/or found on his last known address and Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her
his whereabouts unknown thus the publication of summons. Santos undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to
could not reasonably demand that copies of orders and processes be said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate
furnished him. His residence or whereabouts is not known and he was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d)
that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not
Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous,
appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed because "children" will not include "child".
administrator of the estate.
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the
March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from
sixty days, a project of partition and distribution of all the properties of which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two
the deceased Pedro Santillon. contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with
legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or
April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to
widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to
resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their
provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's
respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil
desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both
Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties
situations.
is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided
as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the
other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled
under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining
half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while
Perfecta claimed 1/2.
NECESSARY IMPLICATION
June 28, 1961, the court issued an order, the dispositive portion of
which is hereby ruled and ordered that in the intestate succession of DENR v. United Planners
the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (DENR) v. UNITED PLANNERS CONSULTANTS, INC.
(1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after
deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015
properties.

FACTS:
ISSUE:
July 26, 1993 - Petitioner, through the Land Management Bureau
Whether or not the word “children” in Art. 996 can also be interpreted (LMB), entered into an Agreement for Consultancy Services
as “child” in accordance with Art. 892? (Consultancy Agreement) with respondent United Planners
Consultants, Inc. in connection with the LMB’s Land Resource
Management Master Plan Project (LRMMP). Under the Consultancy
HELD: Agreement, petitioner committed to pay a total contract price of
P4,337,141.00, based on a predetermined percentage corresponding
Yes, it is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include to the particular stage of work accomplished.
the singular. So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If
the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving December 1994 - Respondent completed the work required, which
spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse petitioner formally accepted on December 27, 1994. However,
petitioner was able to pay only 47% of the total contract price in the In an Order dated July 9, 2012, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to
amount of P2,038,456.30. quash.
October 25, 1994 - The Commission on Audit (COA) released the July 12, 2012 - Petitioner received the RTC’s Order dated July 9,
Technical Services Office Report (TSO) finding the contract price of 2012 denying its motion to quash. Dissatisfied, it filed on September
the Agreement to be 84.14% excessive. This notwithstanding, 10, 2012 a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
petitioner, in a letter dated December 10, 1998, acknowledged its SP No. 126458, averring in the main that the RTC acted with grave
liability to respondent in the amount of P2,239,479.60 and assured abuse of discretion in confirming and ordering the execution of the
payment at the soonest possible time. Arbitral Award.
For failure to pay its obligation under the Consultancy Agreement March 26, 2014 - The CA dismissed the certiorari petition on two (2)
despite repeated demands, respondent instituted a Complaint against grounds, namely: (a) the petition essentially assailed the merits of the
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Due to the Arbitral Award which is prohibited under Rule 19 of the Special ADR
existence of Arbitration clause, the respondent moved for the issue to Rules and (b) the petition was filed out of time, having been filed way
be tried through arbitration. The Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Award beyond 15 days from notice of the RTC’s July 9, 2012 Order, in
dated May 7, 2010 (Arbitral Award) in favor of respondent violation of Rule 19.2852 in relation to Rule 19.853 of said Rules
which provide that a special civil action for certiorari must be filed
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Arbitral Tribunal claimed
before the CA within 15 days from notice of the judgment, order, or
that it had already lost jurisdiction over the case after it had submitted
resolution sought to be annulled or set aside (or until July 27, 2012).
to the RTC its Report together with a copy of the Arbitral Award
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition.
March 30, 2011, the RTC merely noted petitioner’s aforesaid motions,
finding that copies of the Arbitral Award appear to have been sent to
the parties by the Arbitral Tribunal, including the OSG, contrary to ISSUE:
petitioner’s claim. On the other hand, the RTC confirmed the Arbitral
Whether or not the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Special
Award pursuant to Rule 11.2 (A)36 of the Special ADR Rules and
ADR Rules, resulting in the dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action
ordered petitioner to pay respondent the costs of confirming the
for certiorari.
award, as prayed for, in the total amount of P50,000.00. From this
order, petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration.
June 15, 2011 - Respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of HELD:
execution, to which no comment/opposition was filed by petitioner
despite the RTC’s directive therefor. In an Order dated September 12, The petition is DENIED, Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise
2011, the RTC granted respondent’s motion. Petitioner moved to known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004,”
quash the writ of execution, positing that respondent was not entitled institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System
to its monetary claims. It also claimed that the issuance of said writ (ADR System) in the Philippines. The Act, however, was without
was premature since the RTC should have first resolved its May 19, prejudice to the adoption by the Supreme Court of any ADR system
2010 Motion for Reconsideration and June 1, 2010 Manifestation and as a means of achieving speedy and efficient means of resolving
Motion, and not merely noted them, thereby violating its right to due cases pending before all courts in the Philippines.
process. May 7, 2010, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered the Arbitral Award in favor
of respondent. Under Section 17.2, Rule 17 of the CIAC Rules, no
motion for reconsideration or new trial may be sought, but any of the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the
parties may file a motion for correction of the final award, which shall cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. Acting on such
interrupt the running of the period for appeal, Moreover, the parties complaint, then City Mayor conduct an investigation through the City
may appeal the final award to the CA through a petition for review Legal Officer on the matter. Respondent City Legal Officer submitted
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. a report to the City Mayor finding the herein petitioner guilty of
violating all the conditions of its business permit and recommending
the disqualification of petitioner from operating its business in Iligan
City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent city mayor acted beyond his authority
in imposing the special conditions in the permit

HELD:
GRANT OF POWER INCLUDES INCIDENTAL POWER
Yes, the power to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the
Acebedo v. CA corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. And the
ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. v. THE HONORABLE COURT power to revoke or cancel, likewise includes the power to restrict
OF APPEALS, through the imposition of certain conditions. In the case of Austin-
Hardware, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[7] it was held that the power to
G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000 license carries with it the authority to provide reasonable terms and
conditions under which the licensed business shall be conducted. As
the Solicitor General puts it:
FACTS:
"If the City Mayor is empowered to grant or refuse to grant a license,
Petitioner Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business which is a broader power, it stands to reason that he can also
permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local exercise a lesser power that is reasonably incidental to his express
optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he power, i. e. to restrict a license through the imposition of certain
attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedo conditions, especially so that there is no positive prohibition to the
dependent upon prescriptions or limitations to be issued by local exercise of such prerogative by the City Mayor, nor is there any
optometrists. Petitioner basically is not allowed to practice optometry particular official or body vested with such authority"
within the city (but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however
However, Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or
acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit.
permit to do business and the issuance of a license to engage in the
Private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI), practice of a particular profession. The first is usually granted by the
Iligan Chapter, lodged a complaint against the petitioner before the local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or
Office of the City Mayor, alleging that Acebedo had violated the Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. A business
permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) was organized
business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, to provide domestic water services in Brgy. Twang, La Trinidad,
on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural person to Benguet. Respondent La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a
engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession. government owned and controlled corporation, a local water utility
created under PD No. 198, authorized to supply water for domestic,
In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City
industrial and commercial purpose within municipality of La Trinidad,
Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical
Benguet.
shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of
optometry as a corporate body or entity, although it does have in its October 9, 2000, TMPC filed with National Water Resources Board an
employ, persons who are duly licensed to practice optometry by the application for Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate and
Board of Examiners in Optometry. maintain a waterworks system in Brgy. Tawang LTWD claimed that
under Sec. 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive.
A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of
business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such August 15, 2002, the NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise cannot be
permit, regulate the practice of a profession, like that of optometry. exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional under Sec.
Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative 2, Art. XII.
agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in
October 1, 2004, upon appeal of LTWD to the RTC, the latter
this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of
cancelled TMPC’s CPC and held that Sec. 47 of PD No. 198 is valid;
Examiners in Optometry.
that the ultimate purpose of the Constitution is for the State, through
The regulatory power to issue licenses or permits extends only up to its authorized agencies or instrumentalities, to be able to keep and
the regulation of a business and not in the regulation of a profession. maintain ultimate control and supervision over the operation of public
Therefore, the acts of the mayor are ultra vires and cannot be given utilities. What is repugnant to the Constitution is a grant of franchise
effect. exclusive in character so as to preclude the State itself from granting
a franchise to any other person or entity than the present grantee
when public interest so requires.
November 6, 2004, RTC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
WHAT CANNOT BE DONE DIRECTLY CANNOT BE DONE TMPC.
INDIRECTLY
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District
ISSUE:
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. LA TRINIDAD
Whether RTC erred in holding that Sec. 47 of PD No. 198 is valid
WATER DISTRICT
G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner. Quando aliquid
FACTS:
prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum – Those that cannot
be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Under Sec. 2 and 11, Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution, The President, Congress, and Court
cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by
allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are
exclusive in character. Sec. 47 of PD no. 198 is in conflict with the
above-mentioned provision of the Constitution. And the rule is that in
case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the former
prevails, because the constitution is the basic law to which all other
laws must conform to.

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