ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 1

Aleutian Islands
By George L. MacGarrigle

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 2

Introduction
World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in the history of mankind.
However, the half century that now separates us from that conflict has exacted its toll on
our collective knowledge. While World War II continues to absorb the interest of military
scholars and historians, as well as its veterans, a generation of Americans has grown to
maturity largely unaware of the political, social, and military implications of a war that,
more than any other, united us as a people with a common purpose.

Highly relevant today, World War II has much to teach us, not only about the profession
of arms, but also about military preparedness, global strategy, and combined operations
in the coalition war against fascism. During the next several years, the U.S. Army will
participate in the nation's 50th anniversary commemoration of World War II. The
commemoration will include the publication of various materials to help educate
Americans about that war. The works produced will provide great opportunities t learn
about and renew pride in an Army that fought so magnificently in what has been called
"the mighty endeavor."

World War II was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over several diverse theaters of
operation for approximately six years. The following essay is one of a series of campaign
studies highlighting those struggles that, with their accompanying suggestions for further
readings, are designed to introduce you to one of the Army's significant military feats
from that war.

This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military History by Geroge L.
MacGarrigle. I hope this absorbing account of that period will enhance your appreciation
of American achievements during World War II.

M.P.W. Stone
Secretary of the Army

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office,

Superintendent of Documents,
Mail Stop: SSOP,
Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-035882-5

page 3

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 3

Aleutian Islands

3 June 1942--24 August 1943

After securing strategically located bases during its war with China, Japan set out to crate
its long-coveted greater east Asia co-prosperity empire. Opening with a crushing attack
upon Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 that temporarily neutralized the U.S. Pacific
Fleet, the Imperial High Command quickly followed by dispatching large forces to seize
the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies and preparing plans for new
bases from which to strike Australia and India. By June 1942 Japanese authority on the
Asian mainland had extended beyond Malaya into Thailand and Burma. In the western
Pacific, it encompassed most of the larger islands north of Australia and east of Midway.

In the wake of such astounding military success, Japan decided to push onward rather
than consolidate its gains. Its next objectives, New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, were
clearly to be used as steppingstones to Australia. Between those objectives and the
Australian continent was the Coral Sea, where in early May the American Navy had
checked a powerful Japanese fleet in a battle that frustrated the enemy's hope for an early
invasion of Australia.

Remaining on the defensive throughout the Pacific, the United States hurriedly fortified
island bases along a great arc extending from Pearl Harbor to Sydney to keep open the
shipping routes to Australia. With only limited numbers of troops available, it
nevertheless joined Australia in planning an offensive in New Guinea and the Solomons
to halt Japanese advances. To command this offensive in what became known as the
Southwest Pacific Area, President Franklin D. Roosevelt selected General Douglas
MacArthur, leaving the remainder of the Pacific theater under the direction of the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.

Nimitz's command was divided into three combat areas (north, central, and south). The
North Pacific Area extended west from the continental United States, Canada, and the
Territory of Alaska across the Pacific to the Asian mainland. Included within Nimitz's
North Pacific Area were Japan's northern islands, the Kuriles, and, just 650 miles to the
east, Alaska's Aleutian chain.

Protruding in an long, sweeping curve for more than a thousand miles westward from the
tip of the Alaskan Peninsula, the Aleutians

page 4

provided a natural avenue of approach between the two countries. Forbidding weather
and desolate terrain, however, made this approach militarily undesirable. While spared
the arctic climate of the Alaskan mainland to the north, the Aleutians are constantly
swept by cold winds and often engulfed in dense fog. The weather becomes progressively
worse in the western part of the chain, but all the islands are marked by craggy mountains
and scant vegetation. Despite such inhospitable conditions, neither the United States nor

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 4

Japan could afford to assume that the other would reject the Aleutians as an impractical
invasion route.

Japanese concern for the defense of the northern Pacific increased when sixteen U.S. B-
26 bombers, led by Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle, took off from the carrier Hornet and
bombed Tokyo on 18 April 1942. Unsure of where the American raid originated, but
suspicious that it could have been from a secret base in the western Aleutians, the
Imperial High Command began to take an active interest in capturing the island chain.

Strategic Setting

The Aleutians first appeared as a Japanese objective in a plan prepared under the
direction of one of Japan's most able commanders, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. With
help from the Japanese Army, Yamamoto intended to "invade and occupy strategic points
in the Western Aleutians" as well as Midway Island on the western tip of the Hawaiian
chain. He envisioned these two sites as anchors for a defensive perimeter in the north and
central Pacific. His plan also included the final destruction of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. By
using the Aleutians and then Midway as bait, he intended to lure the already weakened
American fleet from Pearl Harbor and annihilate it before new construction could replace
the losses it had sustained on 7 December.

An attack on the Aleutians in early June 1942, Yamamoto believed, would draw the U.S.
fleet north to challenge his forces. With the departure of the U.S. warships from Pearl
Harbor, he would then move his main fleet to seize Midway. Because of Midway's
importance--the island was within bomber range of Pearl Harbor--he concluded that
Nimitz would redirect his fleet from the Aleutians to Midway to prevent the loss of the
island. Waiting off Midway to intercept that force would be the largest concentration of
naval power ever assembled by Japan. After overwhelming the American fleet,
Yamamoto would have undisputed control of the central and western Pacific.

Yamamoto commanded an armada of 176 warships and auxiliaries. A portion of that

force, the Northern Are Fleet, with 2 small aircraft

page 5

carriers, left the Kurile Islands to attack the Aleutians, while the remainder of his fleet,
which included 4 large aircraft carriers, 9 battleships, and 12 transports, converged on
Midway. The Aleutian attack was a sideshow, yet it would reduce Yamamoto's overall
available strength in carrier aircraft during the fight for Midway on 4-5 June, one of the
decisive battles of all time and the turning point of the Pacific war.

Operations

Before Japan entered World War II, its navy had gathered extensive information about
the Aleutians, but it had no up-to-date information regarding military developments on

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 5

the islands. It assumed that the United States had made a major effort to increase defenses
in the area and expected to find several U.S. warships operating in Aleutian waters,
including 1 or 2 small aircraft carriers as well as several cruisers and destroyers. Given
these assumptions, Yamamoto provided the Northern Area Fleet, commanded by Vice
Adm. Boshiro Hosogaya, with a force of 2 small aircraft carriers, 5 cruisers, 12
destroyers, 6 submarines, and 4 troop transports, along with supporting auxiliary ships.
With that force, Hosogaya was first to launch an air attack against Dutch Harbor, then
follow with an amphibious attack upon the island of Adak, 480 miles to the west. After
destroying the American base on Adak (in fact, there was none), his troops were to return
to their ships and become a reserve for two additional landings: the first on Kiska, 240
miles west of Adak, the other on the Aleutian's westernmost island, Attu, 180 miles from
Kiska.

Because U.S. intelligence had broken the Japanese naval code, Admiral Nimitz had
learned by 21 May of Yamamoto's plans, including the Aleutian diversion, the strength of
both Yamamoto's and Hosogaya's fleets, and that Hosogaya would open the fight on 1
June or shortly thereafter. Nimitz decided to confront both enemy fleets, retaining his
three aircraft carriers for the Midway battle while sending a third of his surface fleet
(Task Force 8) under Rear Adm. Robert A. Theobald to defend Alaska. Theobald was
ordered to hold Dutch Harbor, a small naval facility in the eastern Aleutians, at all costs
and to prevent the Japanese from gaining a foothold in Alaska.

Theobald's task force of 5 cruiser, 14 destroyers, and 6 submarines quietly left Pearl
Harbor on 25 May to take a position in the Alaska Sea 400 miles off Kodiak Island, there
to wait for the arrival of Hosogaya's fleet. In the meantime Theobald established his
headquarters on Kodiak and met with Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Simon B Buckner, Jr.,
the commander of the Army's Alaska Defense Command.

page 6

Command authority in the North Pacific Area was divided and cumbersome. Upon
reaching Alaska, Theobald became commander of all Allied naval and air forces,
authority over the ground forces, which remained under Buckner, with whom he was to
work in a spirit of "mutual cooperation." While Theobald reported directly to Admiral
Nimitz as his agent in the North Pacific Area, Buckner answered to the commander of the
San Francisco-based Western Defense Command, Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, who was
responsible for the defense of Alaska and western Canada. Any differences between
Nimitz and DeWitt in the North Pacific Area would be referred to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) in Washington for resolution.

As of 1 June 1942, American military strength in Alaska stood at 45,000 men, with abut
13,000 at Cold Bay (Fort Randall) on the tip of the Alaskan Peninsula and at two
Aleutian bases: the naval facility at Dutch Harbor on Unalaska Island, 200 miles west of
Bold Bay, and a recently built Army air base (Fort Glenn) 70 miles west of the naval
station on Umnak Island. Army strength, less air force personnel, at those three bases
totaled no more than 2,300, composed mainly of infantry, field and antiaircraft artillery

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 6

troops, and a large construction engineer contingent, which had been rushed to the
construction of bases.

On Theobald's arrival at Kodiak, he assumed control of the U.S. Army Air Corps'
Eleventh Air Force, commanded by Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) William C. Butler. This
force consisted of 10 heavy and 34 medium bombers and 95 fighters, divided between its
main base, Elmendorf Airfield, in Anchorage, and at airfields at Cold Bay and on Umnak.
Theobald charged Butler to locate the Japanese fleet reported heading toward Dutch
Harbor and attack it with his bombers, concentrating on sinking Hosogaya's 2 aircraft
carriers. Once the enemy planes were removed, Task Force 8 would engage the enemy
fleet and destroy it.

On the afternoon of 2 June a naval patrol plane spotted the approaching enemy fleet,
reporting its location as 800 miles southwest of Dutch Harbor. Theobald placed his entire
command on full alert. Shortly thereafter bad weather set in, and no further sightings of
the fleet were made that day.

Early the next morning, despite dense fog and rough seas, Hosogaya launched some of
his aircraft to attack Dutch Harbor. Only half reached their objective. The rest either
became lost in the fog and darkness and crashed into the sea or returned to their carriers.
In all, seventeen planes found the naval base, the first arriving at 0545. As the Japanese
pilots looked for targets to engage, they came under intense antiaircraft fire and soon
found themselves confronted by U.S.

page 7

Buildings burning after the first enemy attack on Dutch Harbor, 3 June 1942. (DA
photograph)

fighter planes sent from Fort Glenn on Umnak Island. Startled by the American response,
they quickly released their bombs, made a cursory strafing run, and left to return to their
carriers. As a result of their haste they did little damage to the base. But Hosogaya's fleet
remained unlocated, and the U.S. planes based at Cold Harbor had received no word of
the attack because of a communication failure.

The next day the Japanese returned to Dutch Harbor. This time the enemy pilots were
better organized and better prepared. When the attack finally ended that afternoon, the
base's oil storage tanks were ablaze, part of the hospital was demolished, and a beached
barracks ship was damaged. Although American pilots had finally located the Japanese
carriers, attempts to destroy them proved fruitless. As bad weather again set in, all
contact with the enemy fleet was lost. In all, the Japanese raid claimed 43 U.S. lives, of
which 33 were soldiers. Another 64 Americans were wounded. Eleven U.S. planes were
downed, while the Japanese lost ten aircraft.

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 7

During the two-day fight, Task Force 8 had remained south of Kodiak Island, taking no
part in the action. Not until the 5th did Theobald send it to investigate a report of enemy
warships in the Bering Sea

page 8

Map 1: The Aleutians: 1942-1943

page 9

heading south toward Unalaska Island, which he interpreted to be a landing force intent
upon seizing Dutch Harbor. In the meantime, he instructed Butler to attack the enemy
ships with all available aircraft. Rapidly developing clouds in the area where the enemy
ships were reported prevented Butler's pilots from finding the enemy. Six recently
assigned B-17 Flying Fortress bombers equipped with radar reported scoring hits upon
enemy ships, but these later proved to be uninhabited islands in the Pribilofs chain--north
of Dutch Harbor.

While Task Force 8 entered the Bering Sea, Hosogaya's fleet moved south to join
Yamamoto, who had just suffered the loss of the four large carriers off Midway. Unable
to lure U.S. surface ships into range of his battleships, Yamamoto ordered his fleet to
return to Japan. Rather than have the Northern Area Fleet join him, Yamamoto now
instructed Hosogaya to return to the Aleutians, execute his original mission, and thereby
score a success to help compensate for the Midway disaster. Forgoing the planned attack
on Adak, Hosogaya moved directly to the western Aleutians, occupying Kiska on 6 June
and Attu a day layer. He encountered no opposition on either island, but the Japanese
public was in fact told that this was a great victory. It learned about the disaster at
Midway only after the war was over.

At Japanese Imperial Headquarters, the news of Yamamoto's great loss prompted the
dispatch of two aircraft carriers from Japan to reinforce Hosogaya. having correctly
anticipated Nimitz's next move--the dispatch, on 8 June, of his two carriers to destroy
Hosogaya's fleet--Imperial Headquarters saw an opportunity to immobilize the U.S.
Pacific Fleet by eliminating its only carriers. When Nimitz learned of the capture of
Kiska, he countermanded his order. Unwilling to risk the loss of his only carriers in the
Pacific to land-based lanes from Kiska, and presumably informed that Hosogaya would
soon have four carriers at his disposal in the North Pacific, he decided to retain his
carriers for spearheading a major advance in the Central Pacific.

For the Japanese, Kiska without Midway no longer had any value as a base for patrolling
the ocean between the Aleutian and Hawaiian chains, but Kiska and Attu did block the
Americans from possibly using the Aleutians as a route for launching an offensive on
Japan. Originally intending to abandon the islands before winter set in, the Japanese
instead decided to stay and build airfields on both islands. Although Generals Buckner
and DeWitt would in fact argue for a northern approach to Japan along the Aleutians, the

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 8

real motive for planning the recapture of the two remote islands was mainly
psychological--to remove the only Japanese foothold on American soil in the Western
Hemisphere.

page 10

Adak served as the forward staging base in the Aleutians for attacking Attu and Kiska.
Note the airstrip in the foreground. (DA photograph)

By mid-June the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the sooner a determined effort was
made to oust the Japanese from the Aleutians, the lesser the means required to do it
would be. They also theorized that the attack on the Aleutians and the occupation of its
westernmost islands might be part of a holding action designed to screen a northward
thrust by Japanese forces into Siberia's maritime provinces and the Kamchatka Peninsula.
As a result, they informed Theobald and Buckner of their concern about a possible
Japanese attack upon the Soviet Union that might also include the occupation of St.
Lawrence Island in the Bering Sea and of nearby Nome and its adjacent airfields on the
Alaskan mainland.

Supporting the possibility of an invasion of the Alaskan mainland were reports of a

Japanese fleet operating in the Bering Sea. On 20

page 11

June alone, three separate sightings placed an enemy fleet somewhere between the
Pribilof and St. Lawrence Islands, suggesting that either and enemy raid on or an outright
invasion of the Alaskan mainland was imminent, with Nome the likely objective. As a
result, a sense of urgency bordering on panic set in that triggered what was to become the
first mass airlift in American history. Within thirty-six hours, military as well as
commandeered civilian aircraft flew nearly 2,300 troops to Nome, along with artillery
and antiaircraft guns and several tons of other equipment and supplies. not until early
July--when U.S. intelligence reported with some certainty the departure of Hosogaya's
fleet from the Bering Sea--did the threat of invasion of the Alaskan mainland decline,
allowing for the redeployment of many of the troops hastily assembled at Nome.

page 12

In keeping with the Joint Chiefs' desire to move quickly to regain Kiska and Attu,
Theobald and Buckner agreed to establish a series of airfields west of Umnak from which
bombers could launch strikes against the closest of the enemy-held islands, Kiska. First to
be occupied was Adak, 400 miles from Umnak. Landing unopposed on 30 August, an
Army force of 4,500 secured the island. Engineers completed an airfield two weeks later,
a remarkable feat that they were to duplicate again and again throughout the campaign.

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 9

on 14 September U.S. B-24 heavy bombers took off from Adak to attack Kiska, 200
miles away. Repeated bombings of Kiska during the summer and into the fall convinced
the Japanese that the Americans intended to recapture the island. As a result, by
November they had increased their garrisons on Kiska and Attu to 4,000 and 1,000 men
respectively. During the winter months the Japanese would count on darkness and the
habitually poor weather to protect them from any serious attack.

Although continually restrained by the greater importance and more pressing needs of the
Solomons and New Guinea Campaigns, the buildup of U.S. Army forces in the Alaska
Command continued, reaching 94,000 soldiers by January 1943. By then an additional
thirteen bases had been built n Alaska, many of which were in the Aleutians. With an
unopposed Army landing on Amchitka Island on 11 January, Alaska Command forces
were now within fifty miles of Kiska.

Just surviving the weather on Amchitka was a challenge. During the first night ashore, a
"willowaw" (a violent squall) smashed many of the landing boats and swept a troop
transport aground. On the second day a blizzard racked the island with snow, sleet, and
biting wind. Lasting for nearly two weeks, the blizzard finally subsided enough to reveal
to a Japanese scout plane from Kiska the American beachhead on Amchitka. Harassed by
bombing and strafing attacks from Kiska, engineers continued work on an airfield on
Amchitka, completing it in mid-February. Japanese attacks on the island then sharply
declined.

As U.S. forces came close to Kiska and Attu, the enemy's outposts became increasingly
more difficult to resupply. In mid-March, Rear Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, who had
replaced Admiral Theobald in January, established a naval blockade around the islands
that resulted in the sinking or turning back of several enemy supply ships. When a large
Japanese force, personally led by Admiral Hosogaya, attempted to run the blockade with
3 big transports loaded with supplies escorted by 4 heavy cruisers and 4 destroyers on 26
March, the largest sea fight of the Aleutian Campaign took place, remembered best as the
last and longest daylight surface naval battle of fleet warfare. Known as the Battle of the
Komandorski Islands, the closest landmass

page 13

in the Bering Sea, the smaller U.S. force compelled Hosogaya to retire without
completing his mission and resulted in his removal from command. Henceforth, the
garrisons at Attu and Kiska would have to rely upon meager supplies brought in by
submarine.

Of the two islands, Kiska was the more important militarily. Containing the only
operational airfield and having the better harbor, Kiska was scheduled to be recaptured
first. For that purpose, Kinkaid asked for a reinforced infantry division (25,000 men).
When not enough shipping could be made available to support so large a force, he
recommended that Attu be substituted for Kiska as the objective, indicating that Attu was
defended by no more than 500 men, as opposed to 9,000 believed to be on Kiska. If the

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 10

estimate was correct, he indicated, he would require no more than a regiment to do the
job. Kinkaid also noted that U.S. forces based on Attu would be astride the Japanese line
of communications and thus in a position to cut off Kiska from supply and reinforcement,
which in time would cause Kiska to "wither on the vine."

After gaining JCS approval on 1 April for the Attu operation (code-named SANDCRAB)
and obtaining the needed shipping, work began to recapture the little, fog-shrouded island
at the western end of the Aleutian chain. Attu is 35 miles long and 15 miles wide, with
snow-capped peaks that reach upward to 3,000 feet. Steep slopes extend down from the
peaks to treeless valleys below, carpeted with muskeg, a "black muck" covered with a
dense growth of lichens and moss. Because the Japanese current has a moderating effect
on temperatures, much of the time in the outermost Aleutians the muskeg is barely firm
enough for a man to cross on foot. The same current accounts for the pea-soup fogs, the
constant pervading wetness, and the frequent storms that make the outer Aleutians so
forbidding.

Kinkaid, the commander of Northern Pacific Force, pulled together an imposing armada
to support the invasion. In addition to an attack force of 3 battleships, a small aircraft
carrier, and 7 destroyers for escorting and providing fire support for the Army landing
force, he had 2 covering groups, composed of several cruisers, destroyers, and
submarines, for early detection of a possible challenge by the Japanese Northern Area
Fleet. Reinforcing the naval support, the Eleventh Air Force was to provide 54 bombers
and 128 fighters for the operation, holding back a third of the bomber force for use
against ships of the Japanese fleet.

Early in the planning phase, U.S. intelligence upgraded the estimated enemy strength on
Attu threefold from its original figure of 500 men, prompting a request for additional
forces. Because Buckner

page 14-15

Map 2: The Pacific and Adjacent Theaters

page 16

Troops hauling supplies forward to units fighting the Japanese in the Chichagof area,
May 1943. (DA photograph)

had but a single infantry regiment in Alaska, widely dispersed throughout the territory,
the War Department provided the needed troops from DeWitt's Western Defense
Command, selecting the 7th Infantry Division, then stationed near Fort Ord, California,
as the unit to recapture Attu. Trained as a motorized force and at one time scheduled for
duty in the deserts of North Africa, the 7th Division was reported to be in a high state of

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 11

readiness; because of its location near the coast, it could readily undergo the amphibious
training required for its new mission. After completing that training during April 1943,
the men of the division embarked from San Francisco on transports with their
commander, Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown.

Arriving at windswept, partially snow-covered Fort Randall (Cold Bay) on the 30th, the
troops spent the next four days on the crowded transports. The cold, damp Aleutian
weather as far different from the warm California beaches they had just left. Because of
shortages in cold weather equipment, moreover, most of the men would enter combat
wearing normal field gear. While senior commanders realized that the troops would
suffer from the weather, most believed that within three days the fight for Attu would be

page 17

The west arm of Holtz Bay viewed from the ridge over which the troops advanced onto
Attu. Note the crashed Japanese Zero. (DA photograph)

over, particularly since the assembled naval support for the landings included three
battleships along with several cruisers and destroyers.

Three weeks before, a concerted air and naval bombardment of both Attu and Kiska had
begun, but it had been largely limited to Kiska because of the continual fog covering
Attu. Poor weather caused Kinkaid to postpone the departure of the invasion force from
Cold Bay to 4 May, a day behind schedule, and as the convoy neared Attu storms and
poor visibility forced yet a further delay until the 11th. The bad weather also seriously
reduced the air and naval strikes against Attu. carlet), nine miles northwest of Chichagof
Harbor, the location of the main Japanese base and General Brown's ultimate objective.
Meeting no opposition, the scout company moved inland. At noon, the 7th Division's
reconnaissance troop (less one platoon) landed at Scarlet and moved to joint the scout
company. Upon linkup, the two units, which constituted

page 18

a provisional battalion, were to occupy the head of the valley where a pass gave access to
one of the valleys leading back from Holtz Bay. In the meantime, at the end of the
western arm of Holtz Bay, the 1st Battalion of the 17th Infantry came ashore at Beach
Red. If the 1st Battalion encountered opposition when advancing on its first objective, a
camel-back hill mass designated as "Hill X," the provisional battalion was to attack the
enemy from the rear.

The men of the 1st Battalion, came ashore Beach Red, the main attack at Massacre Bay
finally got under way as the 2d and 3d Battalion Combat Teams of the 17th Regiment
landed unopposed on Beaches Blue and Yellow, approximately 6 miles south of

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 12

Chichagof Harbor. Had the landing not been delayed because of dense fog and high seas,
a third combat team--the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, attached to the 17th
Regiment--would also have come ashore. As it was, that unit remained aboard ship until
the next day.

Slowed by the slippery muskeg, the 2d and 3d Battalions stumbled side by side up
Massacre Valley, dividing on either side of a hogback. Both battalions came under fire at
1900; part way up the ridges overlooking the valley, the enemy, occupying dug-in
positions obscured in a thin mist, pinned them down. Attempts by the 3d Battalion, on the
left (southwest), to reach Jarmin Pass, the regimental objective at the heady of the valley,
failed, resulting in heavy losses. (A platoon from the 7th Reconnaissance Troop made
subsidiary landings at Alexai Point and joined the main body at Massacre Bay without
opposition.)

The fog, which had hampered the landings, likewise concealed the attacks from the
enemy. Not until midafternoon did the Japanese commander, Col. Yasuyo Yamazaki,
order his men from their caves to the prepared outer defenses surrounding Chichagof
Harbor, a trace that extended from Hill X on the west arm of Holtz Bay, southward to
Jarmin Pass, and then eastward to Sarana Bay.

When General Brown came ashore at Massacre Bay toward the end of D-day, the tactical
situation was far from clear, but what information was available would not have indicated
that a long drawn-out struggle was in prospect. By 2130, five hours after the main
landings commenced, he had a total of 3,500 men; 400 at Beach

page 19

Map 3: The Capture of Attu -- 11-30 May 1943

page 20

SCARLET, 1,100 at Beach RED, and 2,000 at Beaches BLUE and YELLOW. On the
northern front, the 1st Battalion was close to Hill X and within twenty-four hours the 32d
Regiment, with its 1st and 3d Battalions, as due to arrive from Adak. In the southern
sector, the 2d Battalion of the 17th reported that it was within 1,000 yards of Sarana Pass,
and the 3d Battalion indicated that it was about 600 yards short of Jarmin Pass. The next
day, the 2d Battalion, 32d Regiment, on ship in Massacre Bay, was to come ashore to
reinforce the 17th Regiment. If additional forces were needed, General Buckner had
agreed to release the 4th Infantry Regiment, an Alaska unit, on Adak Island. Everything
considered, it would not have been unreasonable to suppose that within a few days Attu
would be taken.

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 13

The next day, with naval and air support, Brown's men continued their two-pronged
attack toward Jarmin Pass. Frontal assaults from Massacre Bay by the 17th Infantry failed
to gain ground. As patrols probed to develop enemy positions, the 2d Battalion, 32d
Infantry, came ashore at Massacre Bay. In the meantime, in the northern sector, the 1st
Battalion, finding the enemy dug in on Hill X, made a double envelopment which
succeeded in gaining a foothold on the crest of the hill, but the Japanese held firm on the
reverse slope. That night the first casualty report of the operation revealed that forty-four
Americans had been killed since the start of the invasion.

Further efforts of the Massacre Bay force on the 13th to gain Jarmin Pass again failed,
even with the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, entering the fight to reinforce the 3d Battalion,
17th Regiment. As U.S. losses continued to mount, font-line positions remained about he
same as those gained on D-day. Vicious and costly fighting occurred to the north as the
enemy attempted to drive the 1st Battalion troops from Hill X, but the crest remained
firmly in American hands at nightfall. The 3d Battalion, 32d Regiment, by then had
landed on Beach RED and was moving forward to reinforce the hard-pressed 1st Battalion
on Hill X. Naval gunfire and air support of the ground troops continued insofar as
weather conditions allowed.

Weather as well as the enemy continued to frustrate the American advance. Although
surface ships continued to bombard reported enemy positions ashore on the 14th, close
air support was extremely limited due to incessant fog that engulfed the island. In an
attempt to hasten the capture of Jarmin Pass, Brown ordered a combined attack by his
North and South Landing Forces, by then each with three battalions. While the South
Landing Force attempted to inch forward up Massacre Valley to gain the pass, North
Landing Force was

page 21

to drive the enemy off the reverse slope of Hill X, continue on to seize Moore Ridge, and
then take Jarmin Pass from the rear.

Each attack quickly bogged down. In the northern sector the provisional battalion that
had landed on Beach SCARLET remained checked, unable to break out to reach the
immobile 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, and when 3d Battalion, 32d Regiment, failed to
reach its assault positions in time, Brown canceled the combined attack. That evening in a
report to higher headquarters, he summarized the four days of fighting, concluding that
"progress through passes will, unless we are extremely luck, be slow and costly, and will
require troops in excess to those now available to my command."

The next morning, the 15th, success remained elusive until 1100 when the fog lifted in
the northern sector, revealing that the enemy had withdrawn to Moore Ridge in the center
of Holtz Valley, leaving behind food and ammunition. The pullback by the Japanese
allowed the provisional battalion to break out and eventually link up with the two
battalions near Hill X. As the men of North Landing Force then entered the valley in
chase, the relatively clear sky allowed enemy troops on occupying Moore Ridge to place

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 14

accurate fire upon them. Already slowed by that fire, the pursuit ended when a friendly
air strike hit advancing American troops by mistake.

Back on Adak, the forward command post for Admiral Kinkaid and General DeWitt, the
reported situation at Attu appeared grim. Of special concern to Kinkaid was the exposed
position of the ships directly supporting Brown's forces ashore. A Japanese submarine
had already attacked (unsuccessfully) one of Kinkaid's three battleships, and reports
persisted that a Japanese fleet would soon arrive to challenge the lading. As a result,
Brown was told that the Navy would withdraw its support ships on the 16th, or in any
event no later than the 17th, leaving him with an unprotected beachhead and a major
reduction in supporting fire.

Communication problems between Brown and Kinkaid and DeWitt, located more than
400 miles away, coupled with Brown's continued requests of reinforcements--the latest,
on the 15th, for part of Buckner's 4th Infantry Regiment--and a long dispatch requesting
large quantities of engineer and road-building equipment, and the lack of any positive
indications of a speedy breakthrough on Attu persuaded Kinkaid that Brown had bogged
down. When he consulted with DeWitt and Buckner, both agreed with him that Brown
should be replaced. Upon their recommendation, Kinkaid appointed Maj. Gen. Eugene
M. Landrum to take command of Attu on the 16th.

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"Aleutians Cemetery" by Edward Lanning. More than 3,000 Japanese and Americans
died in the fighting at Attu. (Army Art Collection)

An advance by North Landing Force broke the deadlock on Attu the same day Landrum
assumed command. By then a foothold on the northern end of Moore Ridge had been
won in the center of Holtz Valley, thereby gaining control of the entire ridge. The
Japanese, greatly outnumbered by the Americans and in danger of being taken from the
rear, withdrew that night (16-17 May) toward Chichagof Harbor for a final stand.

Well before dawn, troops controlled by the 32d Regiment in the northern sector moved
forward and by daylight discovered that the enemy had gone. Patrols reported that the
east arm of Holtz Bay was free of the enemy, allowing for much-needed resupply by sea.
In the meantime, the 17th Regiment in the southern sector (at Massacre Valley) also
found previously defended enemy positions abandoned, and it occupied Jarmin Pass.

The Japanese pullback to Chichagof Harbor followed by the linkup of U.S. forces on the
18th provided the turning point of the battle. While nearly another two weeks of hard,
costly fighting remained, the uncertainty and frustration of the first few days on Attu
never recurred. It was slow business taking the machine-gun and

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 15

page 23

Map 4: Kiska Island -- 15-16 August 1943

mortar nests left manned on the heights by the retreating Japanese, but eventually the
combined American force, reinforced with a battalion of the 4th Infantry, drew a net
around Chichagof Harbor. The end came on the night of 29 May when most of the
surviving Japanese, about 100 to 1,000 strong, charged madly through American lines,
screaming, killing, and being killed. The next day the enemy announced the loss of Attu,
as American units cleared out surviving enemy pockets. Although mopping-up operations
continued for several days, organized resistance ended with the wild charge of 29 May,
and Attu was once more in American hands.

The Americans reported finding 2,351 enemy dead on the island; an additional few
hundred were presumed to have been buried in the hills by the Japanese. Only 28
Japanese surrendered. Out of a U.S. force that totaled more than 15,000 men, 549 had
been killed, another 1,148 wounded, and about 2,100 men taken out of action by disease
and nonbattle injuries. Trench foot was the most common affliction. Most of the
nonbattle casualties were exposure cases, victims of the weather and inadequate clothing.

Taking heed of the Attu experience, Kinkaid south to ensure that the final assault in the
Aleutians, against Kiska, would be made with better-equipped and more seasoned
soldiers. For the coming invasion his assault troops would wear clothing and footwear
better suited for the cold weather; parkas were substituted for field jackets and arctic
shoes for leather boots. The landing force would consist of either combat veterans from
Attu or troops trained at Adak in the type of fighting that had developed on Attu.

U.S. intelligence now upgraded its earlier estimates of enemy strength on Kiska to about
10,000 men. In keeping with that increase, Kinkaid arranged for his ground commander,
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Corlett, U.S. Army, to receive 34,426 troops, including 5,500
Canadians, more than double the original strength planned for the operation earlier in the
year. Code-named COTTAGE, the operation was to begin on 15 August, onto an island 3
to 4 miles wide with a high, irregular ridge dividing its 232-mile length and with a
defunct volcano at

page 24

its northern end. The Japanese had occupied only the central, eastern portion of the
island, locating their main base and airfield at Kiska Harbor. They also had small
garrisons on Little Kiska Island and south of the main harbor at Gertrude Cove.

Unlike Attu, Kiska was subjected to a heavy preinvasion bombardment. Reinforced

during June and operating from new airfields (at Attu and nearby Shemya), the Eleventh

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 16

Air Force dropped a total of 424 tons of bombs on Kiska during July. During the same
month, a strong naval task force lobbed 330 tons of shells onto the island. The combined
air and surface bombardment continued into August, interrupted only by bad weather.

Starting in late July, most pilots reported no signs of enemy activity on the island,
although a few noted that they had still received light antiaircraft fire. These reports led
intelligence analysts to conclude that the Japanese on Kiska had been evacuated (as was
done from Guadalcanal six months before) or had taken to the hills. Convinced that the
later contention was more probably, Kinkaid ordered the attack to take place as
scheduled, noting that if the Japanese were not there the landings would be a "super dress
rehearsal, good for training purposes," and the only foreseeable loss would be a sense of
letdown by the highly keyed up troops.

Departing Adak, the staging area for the invasion, an amphibious force of nearly a
hundred ships moved toward Kiska, reaching the island early on 15 August. Unlike the
dense fog experienced at Attu on D-day, the seas were strangely calm and the weather
unusually clear. After threatening to land at Gertrude's Cove on Kiska's east side of the
island, Corlett's men went ashore on the west side of the island; by 1600 a total of 6,500
troops were ashore. The next day Canadian troops came ashore onto another beach
farther north. As with the fight for Attu, the landings were unopposed. As Allied troops
pushed inland, the weather returned to the more normal dense fog and chilling rain and
wind. Veterans of the Attu campaign, in particular, expected that the enemy was waiting
on the high ground above them to take them under fire.

The only guns that were fired, however, were those of friend against friend by mistake;
partly on that account, casualties ashore during the first four days of the operation
numbered 21 dead and 121 sick and wounded. The Navy lost 70 dead or missing and 47
wounded when the destroyer Abner Read struck a mine on 18 August. By the time the
search of the island, including miles of tunnels, ended, American casualties totaled 313
men.

page 25

The Allies had attacked an uninhabited island. The entire enemy garrison of 5,183 men
had slipped away unseen. To make the embarrassment complete, the Kiska evacuation
had been carried out on 28 July, almost three weeks before the Allied landing. The
original plan of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters had been to withdraw the
garrison gradually by submarine, but this scheme had been abandoned in late June
because most of the submarines assigned to the operation had been lost or damaged. The
Japanese also feared that by gradually weakening the garrison over a prolonged period,
the operation might fail. It was then decided to evacuate the force at one time, in one
movement, using cruisers and destroyers as transports. The date, at first set for early July,
was postponed until 28 July. Between then and D-day, Kiska had been under attack and
close surveillance by American naval units and the Eleventh Air Force, but the erroneous
reports of flak and Japanese activity--which inexperienced observers brought back--had

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 17

gone unquestioned. Surprise was achieved, but it was not the Japanese who were
surprised.

On 24 August 1943, Corlett declared the island secure, marking the end of the Aleutian
Islands Campaign. By year's end, American and Canadian troop strength in Alaska would
drop from a high of about 144,000 to 113,000. By then the North Pacific Area had
returned to complete Army control. During 1944 the Canadians would leave and U.S.
Army strength in the Alaska Defense Command decrease to 63,000 men. Although
interest in the theater waned, it was in the Aleutians, that the United States won its first
theater-wide victory in World War II, ending Japan's only campaign in the Western
Hemisphere.

Analysis

In clearing the Japanese invaders from the Aleutians, the objective had been partly to
eliminate a potential military threat but mainly to eradicate a psychological blot. Japan's
foothold in the Western Hemisphere was gone. Starting in June 1942 the Japanese had
threatened America's northern flank. Fourteen months later the reverse was true, although
the idea of using the western Aleutians as steppingstones to Japan had no official
approval. General DeWitt and others from time to time urged an assault by this route
upon Japan's Kurile Islands, but commitments to other theaters, and the desire of the
Soviet Union not to have its neutrality with Japan compromised, thwarted sanction of the
proposal.

From the Japanese perspective, however, the threat remained. The bored American troops
stationed in the Aleutians during the

page 26

last two years of the war were not involved. But harassing attacks by the U.S. Eleventh
Air Force from bases in the Aleutians against the Kurile Islands during that period
resulted in Imperial Headquarters' maintaining a large defensive force in the area which,
toward the war's end, amounted to about one-sixth of Japan's total air strength.

The centerpiece of the campaign was the battle for Attu. In terms of numbers engaged,
Attu ranks as one of the most costly assaults in the Pacific. For every 100 enemy found
on the island, about 71 Americans were killed or wounded. The cost of taking Attu was
thus second only to Iwo Jima. Of some consolation, the invasion of Rendova in the
Solomon Islands during June proceeded well largely because of the struggle for Attu. In
an attempt to either reinforce or evacuate Attu, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters had
ordered the Fifth Fleet north from Truk in May to the western Aleutians, thereby greatly
reducing Japanese naval strength in the Solomons area. While the fleet never reached the
Aleutians, its absence from the Solomons allowed the American landings at Rendova to
be virtually unopposed.

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ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 18

Stung by the brutal fight for Attu, Admiral Kinkaid south to avert the same mistakes at
Kiska. While the full-blown attack three months later upon the deserted island was an
embarrassment, the detailed preparation for Kiska was worth the effort. Lessons learned
by the Army in preparing and equipping troops to survive the rigors of combat in
wretched weather and difficult mountain terrain would prove useful during the upcoming
Italian campaign. Many amphibious warfare techniques developed during the Attu
landings were refined for Kiska and were further improved and applied to advantage in
later amphibious operations in the Pacific.

In one sense the departure of the Japanese from Kiska without a fight was unfortunate. It
gave American commanders a false picture of what might be expected from the enemy
when the odds were hopelessly against him. Instead of fighting to the death, as at Attu, he
had faded into the fog without a struggle. But Attu, not Kiska, was to provide the pattern
of future battles against the Japanese.

page 27

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office -- USGPO: 1992 302-270
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP
Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-035882-5

page 28

Further Readings

For those who wish to study the Aleutian Islands Campaign in more detail, the following
official histories provide a carefully documented account of the operation: Stetson Conn,
Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts
(1946); Samuel Eliot Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls, June 1942-April 1944
(1964); and Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Pacific: Guadalcanal to
Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 (1950), The Army Air Forces in World War II. The
best known popular history of the campaign is Brian Garfield's The Thousand Mile War:
World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians (1969). Another book that provides a vivid
account of the ground fighting on Attu, one with personal anecdotes from all ranks, is
The Capture of Attu as Told by the Men Who Fought There (1944).

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