22 Montesclaros vs. Commission On Elections

2/11/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 384
VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 269

Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections
*
G.R. No. 152295. July 9, 2002.
ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL CARANZO,

JOSEPHINE ATANGAN, RONALD ATANGAN and CLARIZA
DECENA, and OTHER YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY
SITUATED, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Senate
President and SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL in his capacity as
Minority Leader of the Senate of the Philippines, CONGRESSMAN
JOSE DE VENECIA in his capacity as Speaker, CONGRESSMAN
AGUSTO L. SYJOCO in his capacity as Chairman of the
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and
CONGRESSMAN EMILIO C. MACIAS II in his capacity as
Chairman of the Committee on Local Government of the House of
Representatives, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PAMBANSANG
KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN, AND
ALL THEIR AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK); Courts; Judicial Review; Separation of

Powers; Petitioners’ prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a
proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an
actual justiciable controversy; There can be no justiciable controversy
involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill—the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.—In the
instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the
power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the
May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a
resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA
No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to
petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no
actual controversy requiring judicial intervention. Petitioners’ prayer to
prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the
membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable
controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is
not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001702ffea0c72a3c76e1003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/20
enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no

con-
_______________
* EN BANC.
270
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
stitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill
constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of
rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of
judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. The second paragraph of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states—“Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, there can be no justiciable
controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Absent a clear violation of specific
constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the
Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal
processes or procedures of Congress.—Under the separation of powers, the
Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from setting into
motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus, the
following acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not
subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress, the
approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the
Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and the eventual approval into law
of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear
violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of
private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over
the internal processes or procedures of Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court has also no power to dictate to
Congress the object or subject of bills that Congress should enact into law.
—The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject
of bills that Congress should enact into law. The judicial power to review
the constitutionality of laws does not include the power to prescribe to
Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to compel Congress
by mandamus to enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, to

vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. To do so would
destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the
Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of
government.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners do not have a vested right to the
permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local
Government Code of 1991.—Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored
271
VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 271
the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which
fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18
years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the
age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Every law passed by Congress is always subject to amendment or repeal by
Congress. The Court cannot restrain Congress from amending or repealing
laws, for the power to make laws includes the power to change the laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A party must also show
that he has a real interest in the suit, and by “real interest” is meant a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or
future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.—Petitioners
have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. A party
must show that he has been, or is about to be denied some personal right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled. A party must also show that he has
a real interest in the suit. By “real interest” is meant a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent,
subordinate, or inconsequential interest. In the instant case, petitioners seek
to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those who were at least 15
but not more than 21 years old. Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this
right is limited to those who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15
but less than 18 years old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to
this specific age group. Not falling within this classification, petitioners
have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified to
participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer
have a personal and substantial interest in the SK elections.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court will not strike down a law unless
its constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action and
adequately argued.—This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At
the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which reset the SK
elections and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet
enacted into law. After the passage of RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to
assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional. To grant

petitioners’ prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July 15,
2002 SK elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No.
9164. This, petitioners have not done. The Court will not strike down a law
unless its constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action and
adequately argued.
272
Same; Administrative Law; Public Officers; SK membership is not a

property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory
right conferred by law—Congress may amend at any time the law to change
or even withdraw the statutory right.—Congress exercises the power to
prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer
qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being
deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify
as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying
them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK
membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution because it
is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time
the law to change or even withdraw the statutory right.
Same; Same; Same; A public office is not a property right—no one has
a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy
of holding a public office; The constitutional principle of a public office as a
public trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office.—A public
office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a
“[P]ublic office is a public trust.” No one has a vested right to any public
office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office.
In Cornejo v. Gabriel, decided in 1920, the Court already ruled: “Again, for
this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be
necessary to consider an office a “property.” It is, however, well settled x x x
that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional
guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. x x x The
basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popular representative
government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one
where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an
office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of
the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents.”
(Emphasis supplied) Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office,
should realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to
public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a
local government legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners
a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative
councils. The constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust
precludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy
directing “equal access to opportunities for public service” cannot bestow
on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary
expectancy to ex-officio public offices.
Same; Same; Same; Congress has the power to define who are the
youth qualified to join the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress, and
those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as the
273
VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 273
youth cannot insist on being part of the youth.—While the State policy is to
encourage the youth’s involvement in public affairs, this policy refers to
those who belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has
the power to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK, which itself
is a creation of Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are past
the age group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth.
In government service, once an employee reaches mandatory retirement age,
he cannot invoke any property right to cling to his office. In the same
manner, since petitioners are now past the maximum age for membership in
the SK, they cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK
membership.
Same; Election Law; Presumption of Regularity; The Comelec’s acts
enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.—
The Comelec exercised its power and duty to “enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall” and to “recommend to Congress effective
measures to minimize election spending.” The Comelec’s acts enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. These acts
cannot constitute proof, as claimed by petitioners, that there “exists a
connivance and conspiracy (among) respondents in contravention of the
present law.” As the Court held in Pangkat Laguna v. Comelec, the
“Comelec, as the government agency tasked with the enforcement and
administration of elections laws, is entitled to the presumption of regularity
of official acts with respect to the elections.”
Courts; Actions; Certiorari; Words and Phrases; Grave abuse of
discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.—Grave abuse of discretion is
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law. Public respondents having acted strictly pursuant to
their constitutional powers and duties, we find no grave abuse of discretion

in their assailed acts.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari,

Prohibition and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Abraham Mantilla, Celestino Hilvano, Michael Roa and Jim
Baliad for petitioners.
274

The Solicitor General for respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with

prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.
The petition seeks to prevent the postponement of the Sangguniang
Kabataan (“SK” for brevity) elections originally scheduled last May
6, 2002. The petition also seeks to prevent the reduction of the age
requirement for membership in the SK.
Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this petition as a
taxpayer’s and class suit, on their own behalf and on behalf of other
youths similarly situated. Petitioners claim that they are in danger of
being disqualified to vote and be voted for in the SK elections
should the SK elections on May 6, 2002 be postponed to a later date.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),
membership in the SK is limited to youths at least 15 but not more
than 21 years old.
Petitioners allege that public respondents “connived,
confederated and conspired” to postpone the May 6, 2002 SK
elections and to lower the membership age in the SK to at least 15
but less than 18 years of age. Petitioners assail the alleged
conspiracy because youths at least 18 but not more than 21 years old
will be “summarily and unduly dismembered, unfairly
discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly disassociated
1
and obnoxiously disqualified from the SK organization.”
Thus, petitioners pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction—
“a) To prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law,

decree, Comelec resolution/directive and other respondents’
issuances, orders and actions and the like in postponing the
May 6, 2002 SK elections.
b) To command the respondents to continue the May 6, 2002
SK elections set by the present law and in accordance with
Comelec Resolutions No. 4713 and 4714 and to expedite
the funding of the SK elections.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 4-5.
275
VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 275

c) In the alternative, if the SK elections will be postponed for

whatever reason, there must be a definite date for said
elections, for example, July 15, 2002, and the present SK
membership, except those incumbent SK officers who were
elected on May 6, 1996, shall be allowed to run for any SK
elective position even if they are more than 21 years old.
d) To direct the incumbent SK officers who are presently
representing the SK in every sanggunian and2 the NYC to
vacate their post after the barangay elections.”
The Facts
The SK is a youth organization originally established by Presidential

Decree No. 684 as the Kabataang Barangay (“KB” for brevity). The
KB was composed of all barangay residents who were less than 18
years old, without specifying the minimum age. The KB was
organized to provide its members with the opportunity to express3
their views and opinions on issues of transcendental importance.
The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB to SK and
limited SK membership 4
to those youths “at least 15 but not more
than 21 years of age.” The SK remains as a youth organization in
every barangay tasked to initiate programs “to enhance the social,
political, economic, cultural, intellectual,
5
moral spiritual, and
physical development of the youth.” The SK in every barangay is
_______________
2 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
3 Second Whereas Clause of PD No. 684; See also Mercado vs. Board of Election
Supervisors of Ibaan, Batangas, 243 SCRA 422 (1995).
4 This was the same membership qualification in Section 116 of the Local
Government Code of 1983. Earlier, PD No. 1102, issued on February 28, 1977, had
increased the age requirement to “twenty-one years of age or less.”
5 Section 426 of the Local Government Code enumerates the powers and functions
of the Sangguniang Kabataan as follows: “Section 426. Powers and Functions of the
Sangguniang Kabataan. The Sangguniang Kabataan shall: (a) Promulgate resolutions
necessary to carry out the objectives of the youth in the barangay in accordance with
the applicable provisions of this Code; (b) Initiate programs designed to enhance the
social, political, economic, cultural, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical
development of the members; (c) Hold fund-raising activities, the proceeds of which
shall be tax-exempt and shall accrue to the general fund
276

composed of a chairperson and seven members, all elected by the

Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Katipunan ng Kabataan in every
barangay is composed of all citizens actually residing in the
barangay for at least six months and who meet the membership age
requirement.
The first SK elections took place on December 4, 1992. RA No.
7808 reset the SK elections to the first Monday of May of 1996 and
every three years thereafter. RA No. 7808 mandated the Comelec to
supervise the conduct of the SK elections under rules the Comelec
shall promulgate. Accordingly,6
the Comelec
7
on December 4, 2001
issued Resolution Nos. 4713 and 4714 to govern the SK elections
on May 6, 2002.
On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette 8
V.C. Montesclaros
(“Montesclaros” for brevity) sent a letter to the Comelec,
demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6,
2002. Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter
_______________
of the sangguniang kabataan: Provided, however, That in the appropriation

thereof, the specific purpose for which such activity has been held shall be first
satisfied; (d) Create such bodies or committees as it may deem necessary to
effectively carry out its programs and activities; (e) Submit annual and end-of-term
reports to the sangguniang barangay on their projects and activities for the survival
and development of the youth in the barangay; (f) Consult and coordinate with all
youth organizations in the barangay for policy formulation and program
implementation; (g) Coordinate with the appropriate national agency for the
implementation of youth development projects and programs at the national level; (h)
Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the
sangguniang barangay may determine or delegate; and (i) Exercise such other powers
and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance.”
6 Rollo, pp. 47-55. Resolution No. 4713 is entitled “Rules and Regulation on the
Registration of Members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan in Connection with the May
6, 2002 Election of Members of the Sangguniang Kabataan.”
7 Ibid., pp. 56-61. Resolution No. 4714 is entitled “Calendar of Activities and
Periods of Certain Prohibited Acts in Connection with the May 6, 2002 Election of
Members of the Sangguniang Kabataan.”
8 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
277
VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 277

within 10 days upon receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will seek
judicial relief.
On February 20, 2002, Alfredo L. Benipayo (“Chairman
Benipayo” for brevity), then Comelec 9
Chairman, wrote identical
10
letters to the Speaker of the House and the Senate President about
the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections. In his
letters, the Comelec Chairman intimated that it was “operationally
very difficult” to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002.
Instead, the Comelec Chairman expressed support for the bill of
Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay
elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to November
2002.
Ten days lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of
Montesclaros. Subsequently, petitioners 11
received a copy of Comelec
En Banc Resolution No. 4763 dated February 5, 2002
recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to
November122002 but holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as
scheduled.
On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives
passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections. On March
11, 2002, the Bicameral Conference Committee (“Bicameral
Committee” 13
for brevity) of the Senate and the House came out with
a Report recommending approval 14
of the reconciled15 bill
consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050 and House Bill No. 4456. The
Bi-
_______________
9 Ibid., p. 64.
10 Ibid., p. 65.
11 Entitled “In Re: Position of the Commission on Elections on the Postponement
or Synchronization of the Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections within
the year 2002.”

12 Ibid., pp. 66-68.
13 Ibid., pp. 69-71.
14 “An Act amending Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local
Government Code of 1991,’ as amended, resetting the elections of the Sangguniang
Kabataan officials to the first Monday of November, 2002, and for other purposes.”
15 “An Act providing for a synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
elections on the second Monday of November 2002, repealing Republic Act No.
8524, and for other purposes.”
278

cameral Committee’s consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay

elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in the
SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age.
On March 11, 2002, petitioners filed the instant petition.
On March 11, 2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral
Committee’s consolidated bill and on March 13, 2002, the House of
Representatives approved the same. The President signed the
approved bill into law on March 19, 2002.
The Issues
16
Petitioners raise the following grounds in support of their petition:
“I.
RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND

UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN THEY INTENDED TO POSTPONE THE SK
ELECTIONS.
II.

JURISDICTION WHEN THEY INTENDED TO DISCRIMINATE,
DISENFRANCHISE, SINGLE OUT AND 17 DISMEMBER THE SK
MEMBERS WHO ARE 18 BUT NOT LESS (SIC) THAN 21 YEARS
OLD COMPOSED OF ABOUT 7 MILLION YOUTH.
III.

JURISDICTION WHEN THEY WILLFULLY FAILED TO FUND THE
SK ELECTION PURPORTEDLY TO POSTPONE THE SAME IN
ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THEIR ILLEGAL SCHEME AND
MACHINATION IN SPITE
_______________
16 Represented by Atty. Abraham A. Mantilla.

17 This should read “more.”
279
VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 279

OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE AVAILABLE FUNDS FOR THE

PURPOSE.
IV.
THE INCUMBENT SK OFFICERS WANTED TO PERPETUALLY

SIT ON THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES CONTRARY TO THE
ENVISION (SIC) OF THE CREATION OF THE SK ORGANIZATION,
18
HENCE, IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND CONSTITUTION.”
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, the Court takes judicial notice of the following
events that have transpired since petitioners filed this petition:
1. The May 6, 2002 SK elections and May 13, 2002 Barangay

elections were not held as scheduled.
19
2. Congress enacted RA No. 9164 which provides that voters
and candidates for the SK elections must be “at least 15
20
but
less than 18 years of age on the day of the election.” RA
No. 9164 also provides that there shall be a synchronized
SK and Barangay elections on July 15, 2002.
3. The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 4846, the rules
and regulations for the conduct of the July 15, 2002
synchronized SK and Barangay elections.
Petitioners, who all claim to be 20 years old, argue that the

postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections disenfranchises
them, preventing them from voting and being voted for in the SK
elections. Petitioners’ theory is that if the SK elections were

postponed to a date later than May 6, 2002, the postponement would
disqualify from SK membership youths who will turn 21 years old
between May 6, 2002 and the date of the new SK elections. Peti-
_______________
18 Rollo, pp. 25-26.

19 “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections, Amending Republic Act No. 7160, As Amended, Otherwise Known As
“The Local Government Code of 1991,’ And For Other Purposes.”
20 Sections 6 and 7 of RA No. 9164.
280

tioners claim that a reduction in the SK membership age to 15 but

less than 18 years of age from the then membership age of 15 but
not more than 21 years of age would disqualify about seven million
youths. The public respondents’ failure to hold the elections on May
6, 2002 would prejudice petitioners and other youths similarly
situated.
Thus, petitioners instituted this petition to: (1) compel public
respondents to hold the SK elections on May 6, 2002 and should it
be postponed, the SK elections should be held not later than July 15,
2002; (2) prevent public respondents from passing laws and issuing
resolutions and orders that would lower the membership age in the
SK; and (3) compel public respondents to allow petitioners and
those who have turned more than 21 years old on May 6, 2002 to
participate in any re-scheduled SK elections.
The Court’s power of judicial review may be exercised in
constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied
with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or
controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review
is pleaded at the earliest opportunity;
21
and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.
In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the
exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a
postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are
nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date
not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections
to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the
date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy
requiring judicial intervention.
Petitioners’ prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a

proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not
present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not
subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill
creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the
Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no
constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a
proposed
_______________
21 Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000).
281
VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 281

bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the

nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of
Congress.
22
The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in
vacuo. The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states—
“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.” (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the consti-

tutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.
Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain
Congress from passing any law, or from setting into motion the
legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following
acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not
subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of
Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the
reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and
the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each
chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific
constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private
parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial
23
review over
the internal processes or procedures of Congress.
The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or
subject of bills that Congress should enact into law. The judicial
power to review the constitutionality of laws does not include the
power to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no

power to compel Congress by mandamus to enact a law allowing
petitioners, regardless of their age, to vote and be voted for in the
July 15, 2002 SK elections. To do so would destroy the delicate
_______________
22 Allied Broadcasting Center, Inc. v. Republic, 190 SCRA 782 (1990).

23 Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756 (1998); See also Arroyo v. De Venecia,
227 SCRA 268 (1997); Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 249 SCRA 628 (1995).
282

system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for

the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of
government.
Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored the age
requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which
fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less
than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the
permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. Every law passed by Congress is always
subject to amendment or repeal by Congress. The Court cannot
restrain Congress from amending or repealing laws, 24
for the power to
make laws includes the power to change the laws.
The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged
voters to vote or be voted for in an election that is limited under RA
No. 9164 to youths at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is
needed to allow all those who have turned more than 21 years old on
or after May 6, 2002 to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections.
Youths from 18 to 21 years old as of May 6, 2002 are also no longer
SK members, and cannot participate in the July 15, 2002 SK
elections. Congress will have to decide whether to enact an
amendatory law. Petitioners’ remedy is legislation, not judicial
intervention.
Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in
maintaining this suit. A party must show that he has been, or is
about to be denied25
some personal right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled. A party must also show that he has a real interest
in the suit. By “real interest” is meant a present substantial interest,
as distinguished from a mere expectancy 26
or future, contingent,
subordinate, or inconsequential interest.
In the instant case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally
conferred by law on those who were at least 15 but not more than 21
years old. Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is
limited to those who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15
_______________
24 Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1998 ed., p. 152.

25 Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000).
26 Caruncho III v. Commission on Elections, 315 SCRA 693 (1999).
283
VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 283

but less than 18 years old. The new law restricts membership in the
SK to this specific age group. Not falling within this classification,
petitioners have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer
qualified to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly,
petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial interest in the
SK elections.
This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time
petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which reset the SK
elections and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was
not yet enacted into law. After the passage of RA No. 9164,
petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could
be unconstitutional. To grant petitioners’ prayer to be allowed to
vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections necessitates
assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. This, petitioners have
not done. The Court will not strike down a law unless its
constitutionality is27 properly raised in an appropriate action and
adequately argued.
The only semblance of a constitutional issue, albeit erroneous,
that petitioners raise is their claim that SK membership 28
is a
“property right within the meaning of the Constitution.” Since
certain public offices are “reserved” for SK officers, petitioners also
claim a constitutionally protected “opportunity” to occupy these
public offices. In petitioners’ own words, they and others similarly
situated stand to “lose their opportunity to work 29in the government
positions reserved for SK members or officers.” Under the Local
Government Code of 1991, the president of the federation of SK
organizations in a municipality, city or province is an ex-officio
member of the30
municipal council, city council or provincial board,
respectively. The chairperson of the SK in the 31
barangay is an
exofficio member of the Sangguniang Barangay. The president of
the national federation of SK organizations is an ex-officio member
_______________
27 See Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 486 (1999).

28 Petition dated March 11, 2002, p. 3; Rollo, p. 8.
29 Ibid.
30 Section 438, Local Government Code of 1991.
31 Section 390, Local Government Code of 1991.
284

of the National Youth

32
Commission, with rank of a Department
Assistant Secretary.
Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for
SK membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an
amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a
proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK
members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act
disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK
elections. SK membership is not a property right protected by the
Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law.
Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even
withdraw the statutory right.
A public office is not a property right. As the 33
Constitution
expressly states, a “[P]ublic office is a public trust.” No one has a
vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an 34
expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel,
decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:
“Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it
would be necessary to consider an office a “property.” It is, however, well
settled x x x that a public office is not property within the sense of the
constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or
agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popular
representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of
the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or
contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant
to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he
represents.” (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should

realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to
public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio
member of a local government legislative council, the law does not
confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a proprietary
expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. The constitutional
principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any
proprietary claim
_______________
32 Section 5, RA No. 8044.

33 Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
34 41 Phil. 188 (1920).
285
VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 285

to public office. Even the State 35policy directing “equal access to

opportunities for public service” cannot bestow on petitioners a
proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to
ex-officio public offices.
Moreover, while the State 36
policy is to encourage the youth’s
involvement in public affairs, this policy refers to those who belong
to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the power
to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK, which itself is a
creation of Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are
past the age group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of
the youth. In government service, once an employee reaches
mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke any property right to
cling to his office. In the same manner, since petitioners are now
past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they cannot
invoke any property right to cling to their SK membership.
The petition must also fail because no grave abuse of discretion
attended the postponement of the SK elections. RA No. 9164 is now
the law that prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for
the SK elections. This law also fixes the date of the SK elections.
Petitioners are not even assailing the constitutionality of RA No.
9164. RA No. 9164 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and
will apply to the July 15, 2002 SK elections.
Petitioners have not shown that the Comelec acted illegally or
with grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the
postponement of the SK elections. The very evidence relied upon by
petitioners contradict their allegation of illegality. The evidence
consist of the following: (1) Comelec en banc Resolution No. 4763
dated February 5, 2002 that recommended the postponement of the
SK elections to 2003; (2) the letter of then Comelec Chairman
Benipayo addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate; and (3) the Conference Committee
Report consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050 and House Bill No. 4456.
The Comelec exercised its power and duty to “enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an elec-
_______________
35 Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

36 Section 13, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
286

37
tion, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall” and to
“recommend 38
to Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending.” The Comelec’s acts enjoy39 the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties. These acts cannot constitute
proof, as claimed by petitioners, that there “exists a connivance and
conspiracy (among) respondents in contravention of the present 40
law.” As the Court held in Pangkat Laguna v. Comelec, the
“Comelec, as the government agency tasked with the enforcement
and administration of elections laws, is entitled to the presumption
of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections.”
The 1987 Constitution imposes upon the Comelec the duty of
enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of elections. Petitioners failed to prove that the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress
the postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections. The evidence
cited by petitioners even establish that the Comelec has
demonstrated an earnest effort to address the practical problems in
holding the SK elections on May 6, 2002. The presumption remains
that the decision of the Comelec to recommend to Congress the
postponement of the elections was made in good faith in the regular
course of its official duties.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive
41
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law. Public respondents having acted strictly pursuant
to their constitutional powers and duties, we find no grave abuse of
discretion in their assailed acts.
Petitioners contend that the postponement of the SK elections
would allow the incumbent SK officers to perpetuate themselves in
power, depriving other youths of the opportunity to serve in elective
SK positions. This argument deserves scant consideration. While
RA No. 9164 contains a hold-over provision, incumbent SK
_______________
37 Section 2, paragraph (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

38 Section 2, paragraph (7), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.
39 Salcedo vs. Comelec, 312 SCRA 447 (1999).
40 G.R. No. 148075, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 97.
41 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, see note 21.
287
VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 287

officials can remain in office only until their successors have been
elected or qualified. On July 15, 2002, when the SK elections are
held, the hold-over period expires and all incumbent SK officials
automatically cease to hold their SK offices and their ex-officio
public offices.
In sum, petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in
maintaining this suit. This petition presents no actual justiciable
controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is
alleged to be unconstitutional. Lastly, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez and Corona, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—The requirement that a candidate possess the age

qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on
the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. (Garvida vs.
Sales, Jr., 271 SCRA 767 [1997])
Elections for SK officers are not subject to the supervision of the
COMELEC in the same way that contests involving elections of SK
officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
(Alunan III vs. Mirasol, 276 SCRA 501 [1997])
The election of Sangguniang Kabataan are governed by the
Omnibus Election Code. (Marquez vs. Commission on Elections,
313 SCRA 103 [1999])
——o0o——
288
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2/11/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 384

VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 269

ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL CARANZO,

Sangguniang Kabataan (SK); Courts; Judicial Review; Separation of

enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no

270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections

by mandamus to enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, to

VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 271

Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections

assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional. To grant

272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Administrative Law; Public Officers; SK membership is not a

VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 273

Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections

their constitutional powers and duties, we find no grave abuse of discretion

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari,

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Solicitor General for respondent.

Before us is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with

“a) To prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law,

1 Rollo, pp. 4-5.

VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 275

c) In the alternative, if the SK elections will be postponed for

The SK is a youth organization originally established by Presidential

2 Ibid., pp. 14-15.

276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

composed of a chairperson and seven members, all elected by the

of the sangguniang kabataan: Provided, however, That in the appropriation

VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 277

the year 2002.”

278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cameral Committee’s consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay

RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND

RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND

RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND

16 Represented by Atty. Abraham A. Mantilla.

VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 279

OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE AVAILABLE FUNDS FOR THE

THE INCUMBENT SK OFFICERS WANTED TO PERPETUALLY

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

1. The May 6, 2002 SK elections and May 13, 2002 Barangay

Petitioners, who all claim to be 20 years old, argue that the

elections. Petitioners’ theory is that if the SK elections were

18 Rollo, pp. 25-26.

280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tioners claim that a reduction in the SK membership age to 15 but

Petitioners’ prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a

21 Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000).

VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 281

bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the

Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the consti-

power to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no

22 Allied Broadcasting Center, Inc. v. Republic, 190 SCRA 782 (1990).

282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for