5th Recitation Rule 132

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 186461, July 05, 2010 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SEVERIANO
OGAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the January 30, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02199 entitled People of the Philippines v. Severiano T. Ogan, which
affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35 in
Bontoc, Mountain Province in Criminal Case Nos. 1256 and 1257, both for rape.
Accused-appellant Severiano T. Ogan (Ogan) was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for
each rape.
Following People v. Cabalquinto,[1] the Court withholds the real names of the offended

parties and their immediate family members as well as such other personal circumstances
or information tending to establish their identities.
The Facts
Two Informations charged Ogan with rape as follows:
Criminal Case No. 1256
That on or about November 22, 1998, in the afternoon thereof, at Kayan East, Tadian,
Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design tell and direct one [AAA] who is seven (7) years of age to
enter his house and once inside the kitchen the above-named accused by means of force
and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of one [AAA] without the consent of [AAA] and against her will, the damage
and prejudice of the victim.
That the accused is a member of the Philippine National Police.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

That on or about November 21, 1998, in the afternoon thereof, at Kayan East, Tadian,
Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design tell and with force and intimidation, pull and drag into his
house his niece [BBB] and once inside the kitchen did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [BBB], a minor who is nine (9)
years of age, without the consent of and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of
the victim.
That the accused is a member of the Philippine National Police.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Both cases were jointly heard and during his arraignment, Ogan pleaded not guilty to
both charges.
Version of the Prosecution
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: AAA, a playmate of BBB;
AAA's mother, CCC; BBB, the niece of Ogan; her mother DDD; Dr. Rhodora Ambas;
and SPO1 Rosita Calisog.
The prosecution showed that around noon on November 21, 1998, BBB, then nine years
old, went looking for her brother Lyndon at the house of her uncle, Ogan, located in
Barangay Kayan East, Tadian, Mountain Province. She was invited inside by Ogan and
taken to the kitchen. There, Ogan took off his pants and removed that of BBB. He
brought out his penis, masturbated it, then inserted it into BBB's vagina, causing her
pain. BBB then felt in her vagina a sticky mucus-like substance which came out of the
accused's sex organ. Afterward, Ogan gave BBB PhP 10 and threatened her not to tell
anyone of the incident. BBB then went home.[4]
The next day, BBB and AAA, then 7 years old, went to Ogan's house to play with his
daughter Agnes. Agnes was not around. However, Ogan, who was alone in the house at
the time, ordered the girls to take a bath and wash their vaginas. The two complied, after
which Ogan ordered them to go to the kitchen. Ogan followed them, brought out his
penis and rubbed it with oil, then knelt in front of AAA and BBB and viewed their sexual
organs purportedly to determine which was bigger. As BBB went into the living room to
watch television, Ogan laid AAA on a bench, spread her legs apart, then licked and
fingered her genitals. He thereafter succeeded in inserting his penis in her vagina. After
the sexual act, Ogan washed his penis, hands and mouth, then gave the girls PhP 10, and
they left.[5]
Sometime in the late November 1998, CCC, the mother of AAA, overheard her daughters
AAA and EEE talking about something Ogan did to AAA. When asked by CCC about
the incident, AAA revealed details of the rape incident. Alarmed, CCC conferred with
DDD, BBB's mother. Together, the two mothers then brought their daughters to the
police station on December 6, 1998, where SPO1 Rosita Calisog made a report and took
their sworn statements.[6]
Following their complaint against Ogan, the parties went to Dr. Rhodora Ambas to have a
physical examination conducted.[7] Her examination of BBB showed positive hymenal
lacerations at 7 o'clock and 11 o'clock positions. AAA, on the other hand, showed
positive hymenal lacerations at 3 o'clock position.[8]
Before his arrest, Ogan and his wife Catalina approached the mothers of AAA and BBB
on several occasions. The couple sought for an amicable settlement of the cases. [9]
Also presented during trial was testimony as to the age of AAA. Her mother, CCC,
testified that she was born on January 29, 1991 and was seven (7) years old at the time of
the rape on November 22, 1998. The prosecution also presented AAA's certificate of live
birth during CCC's direct examination.[10] As to the age of BBB, her mother, DDD,
testified that BBB was born on November 1, 1989 and was nine (9) years old at the time
of the rape on November 21, 1998. Her certificate of live birth confirming her birth date
was likewise presented.[11]
Version of the Defense
The evidence for the defense consisted merely of the testimonies of Ogan, his wife
Catalina and their daughter Agnes.
Ogan is a police officer assigned with the PNP in Tadian, Mountain Province. He is
married to Catalina, a public school teacher stationed in Barangay Pandayan, Tadian, and
Agnes is their daughter. The family owns a house in Kayan East, Tadian, where the
couple and their children go home to on weekends. On weekdays, Ogan stays in Tadian
Poblacion, while his wife and children stay in Pandayan, Tadian.
The defense stated that on November 20, 1998, a Friday, Ogan and his family attended
the funeral of one Supervisor Astudillo in Kayan East, Tadian. The next day, November
21, 1998, Ogan reported for duty at 8 in the morning at the PNP station in Tadian,
Mountain Province but returned to Kayan East two hours later. He and his wife and all
their children stayed at home the rest of the day. In the afternoon, AAA and BBB arrived
at their house and played with Agnes. At 12:30 p.m. on November 22, 1998, Ogan
accompanied his family to Tadian Poblacion. There, his wife and children proceeded to
Pandayan while Ogan remained behind and went to his quarters.[12] In gist, Ogan
presented the defense of alibi.
On cross-examination, Ogan admitted that he signed a "promissory note" before the
barangay lupon of Kayan, upon the insistence of his wife. The note contained a promise
for him to "change his [character] and not to repeat the same offense."[13]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On December 2, 2003, in a joint judgment, the RTC pronounced Ogan guilty of the
crimes of rape in Criminal Case No. 1256 and acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case
No. 1257. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision[14] reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered sentencing Severiano Ogan, thus:
1. To suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor as

minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as
maximum in Crim. Case 1257;
2. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Crim. Case 1256;
3. To pay the offended party [AAA] in Crim. Case 1257 P25,000.00 as

indemnity and P20,000.00 as damages; and
4. To pay the victim [BBB] in Crim. Case 1256 P75,000.00 as indemnity and
P25,000.00 as damages.
With the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court found the testimonies of AAA and BBB credible. However, it did not
appreciate the circumstance of relation as to BBB as it was not proved that BBB is a
niece of accused-appellant. As to the defense of alibi, it ruled that the testimonies of
Ogan and his wife and daughter were self-serving. The fact that Ogan tried to settle the
cases against him were also considered by the court in convicting him.
On October 17, 2005, this Court ordered the transfer of Ogan's appeal to the Court of
Appeals in conformity with People v. Mateo.[15]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, accused-appellant pointed out that based on the testimonies of the victims, he
merely rubbed his penis on the sexual organs of the young girls. No act of penetration or
any acts that would fall under the definition of rape occurred. Thus, the defense
maintained that only acts of lasciviousness were committed against AAA in Criminal
Case No. 1256 when he rubbed his penis until he ejaculated. AAA also allegedly made a
lot of inconsistencies that should have been considered by the lower court.
The People, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued in its Brief
that with respect to Criminal Case No. 1257 where Ogan was convicted only of acts of
lasciviousness, the mere touching by the male's organ on the labia or pudendum of a
woman's private part is sufficient to consummate rape. A modification of the trial court's
judgment was thus recommended. The OSG was of the view that accused-appellant
should be convicted of rape on two counts; hence, he should suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for both counts. It was also recommended that the accused-
appellant pay civil indemnity of PhP 75,000 and moral damages of PhP 50,000.
On the basis of the clear and categorical testimonies of AAA and BBB, the CA
appreciated two counts of rape. It found that the prosecution successfully established all
the elements in the crime of rape. The defense of alibi was not given credence by the
appellate court as it was self-serving and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing proof.
Thus, the CA affirmed in toto the Decision in Criminal Case No. 1256 but modified the
Decision in Criminal Case No. 1257, as it found accused-appellant likewise guilty of
raping BBB.
The fallo of the CA Decision[16] reads:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 1256 is affirmed
without modification. Insofar as Criminal Case No. 1257 is concerned, appellant is found
guilty of rape instead of acts of lasciviousness. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The civil indemnity for [BBB] to be paid by the appellant is
increased to P75,000.00 and the damages awarded by the trial court is increased to
P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
On February 8, 2008, Ogan filed his Notice of Appeal of the appellate court's decision.
On April 15, 2009, the Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so
desired. The parties similarly manifested to adopt the arguments contained in their
respective briefs earlier filed with the Court.
The Issues
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged
II
Whether accused-appellant should be convicted only for acts of lasciviousness

Our Ruling
We deny this appeal.
According to the defense, BBB categorically stated that Ogan only rubbed his penis on
AAA's vagina. He likewise did the same with BBB. There is, therefore, no act committed
that could be defined as rape. What were committed against AAA and BBB, the defense
claims, were only acts of lasciviousness.
To further his cause, Ogan points to the inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA, arguing
that it is unbelievable that AAA would feel pain from Ogan's insertion of his finger but
not from his penis. Moreover, the testimony of the examining doctor shows that the
hymenal lacerations found in both AAA and BBB were more than a month old but the
rapes were allegedly committed only two weeks before the medical examination.
The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the testimony of a rape victim, especially one
who accuses a close relative, should be given greater weight. It opined that the
inconsistencies raised by the defense are immaterial, because they do not relate to the
principal event.
The OSG also dubs as weak the defense of alibi presented by Ogan, especially since his
identity was sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses.
Rape Established
Republic Act No. 8353 (RA 8353) or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 expanded the
definition of rape to include other forms of sexual assault on a person.[17] Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was amended to include the second paragraph defining
how rape is committed:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
The records show that the prosecution has established the elements of rape in AAA's
testimony. The relevant portion of AAA's testimony is reproduced below:
Q Madam witness do you know Severiano Ogan?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q How do you know him?

A He is my uncle.[18]
xxxx
Q While he was kneeling down what did he do with your vagina?

A He spread apart the labia of our vagina [to] see who has a bigger vagina.
Q Did he put his finger in your vagina?

A Yes, Ma'am.
Q And what did he do, if that is your finger did he insert his finger in your vagina?
A (Witness showing her forefinger)
Q What was the feeling madam witness?

A I felt pain.[19]
xxxx
Q [When] you were lying on the floor what did he do with your legs?
A He spread apart my legs, and inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q What was your feeling at that time when he was inserting his penis into your vagina?
A [It] felt somewhat painful.[20]
Based on AAA's testimony, accused-appellant clearly raped her. AAA convincingly

described how she was raped, first, by sexual assault, and then, by penile penetration. It is
thus erroneous for the defense to insist that only acts of lasciviousness were committed
against AAA. As the appellate court observed, AAA gave explicit testimony of how
accused-appellant used his penis to penetrate her sexual organ.
Statutory Rape Committed
Paragraph (d) of Art. 266-A states that statutory rape is committed:
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (emphasis supplied)
As provided for in the Revised Penal Code, sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years
old is statutory rape. The two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age.
Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old is always rape.[21] The crime of statutory
rape carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua unless attended by the qualifying
circumstances defined under Article 266-B.[22]
Since the age of AAA (seven years old) was alleged and duly proved, Ogan must be
convicted of statutory rape.
We likewise affirm the ruling of the trial court that the prosecution failed to prove that
accused-appellant took advantage of his position as a police officer for purposes of
convicting him of qualified rape, since his victims were not under police custody.[23] Both
AAA and BBB were categorical in saying that they were at Ogan's house as visitors of
his daughter.
Medical Findings Consistent with Testimony
The Court finds, contrary to Ogan's assertion, that the medical findings do not discredit
the prosecution's main evidence. We must take exception to the misleading claim of Ogan
that the lacerations of the complainants were more than a month old though the rapes
were allegedly committed only two weeks before the medical examination. BBB was
raped on November 21, 1998, while AAA was raped the next day. After the medical
examination on December 7, 1998, Dr. Ambas, who examined the victims, said that the
lacerations were approximately more than a month old. Her findings on how old the
lacerations were are only estimates and should not serve to acquit Ogan. More so, the
records reveal the following:
Cross-examination of Dr. Rhodora Ambas:
Q These lacerations that you saw that time were fresh or [healed]?
A Healed lacerations.
Q These kinds of lacerations on the two minors that you examined, how long will it take
these lacerations to heal?
A About 3 weeks sir.[24]
The examining physician's findings on record clearly do not imply that the rapes were
committed before the dates Ogan was accused of raping AAA and BBB. Besides, there is
no gainsaying that medical evidence is merely corroborative, and is even dispensable, in
proving the crime of rape.[25] A freshly broken hymen is not required for a rape
conviction.[26]
Alibi Weak
Denial is inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-serving. Corollarily, alibi is

the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. [27] The trial
court noted that Ogan's alibi was self-serving and corroborated only by his wife and
child, who understandably cannot be expected to be disinterested witnesses. They
appeared to be closing ranks to hide a serious offense committed by a family member.
[28]
For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be sufficiently convincing as to preclude
any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus
criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.[29] Thus, he was not able to
show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at his own residence at the
time the rape incidents occurred. For one, the funeral of Astudillo happened on
November 20, 1998 or a day before the first rape incident happened, and the funeral was
in the same village as Ogan's residence. For another, the presence of his wife and
children at their house on November 21 and 22, 1998 was only attested to by his wife and
daughter. So it was not physically impossible for him to have been at his own home at the
time of the rape incident.
Far from supporting accused-appellant's claim of innocence, the records show that the
evidence for the defense raised more questions on his assertions. The most obvious
contradiction, which Ogan did not deny, is why a supposedly innocent man would sign a
"promissory note" in favor of the victims and vow not to repeat "the offense." It is
unbelievable that a grown man, a police officer at that, would attempt to settle a criminal
complaint if he were innocent.
There is no merit as well to accused-appellant's argument as to BBB. We thus affirm the

appellate court's conviction of Ogan of rape in Criminal Case No. 1257 instead of acts of
lasciviousness.
Inconsistencies in Testimony of BBB
Ogan asserts that it is beyond belief that BBB would feel pain from sexual assault
through the use of fingers but not when it came to penile penetration. Such a claim is both
immaterial and baseless. The elements of the crime of rape were firmly established by the
prosecution witnesses; pain is not one of those elements. For reference, the direct
testimony of BBB is quoted below:
Atty. Carantes
Q Your father said that you will go and find your brother Lyndon; where did you go and
find Lyndon?
A I went to look for him and found him at Gagawa.
Q Where is Gagawa?
A In Kayan, ma'am.
Q You stated earlier that you went to the house of Severiano Ogan; can you narrate to us
what happened in the house of Mr. Severiano Ogan?
A Because my father told me to go and look for Lyndon.
Q When your father told you to look for Lyndon, you proceeded to the house of
Severiano Ogan?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Did you see Severiano Ogan in his house?

A Yes, ma'am.
Q So what happened when you saw him in his house?

A I saw him in his house.
Q When you saw him in his house, did he say anything to you?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q What did he say to you?

A He told me: "Do not go away."
Q What did you say?

A I did not leave.
Q What else happened?

A He removed his pants and he removed my pants and then he raped me.
Q How did he rape you?

A Because he brought out his penis and he "dinama na sak-en," he placed his penis inside
my vagina.
Fiscal Dominguez:
Your Honor "dama" in Kayan means rape.
Atty.
Carantes
Q You stated he placed his penis inside your vagina, what happened after that?
A Sperm came out from him, ma'am.
Q Can you describe how the sperm [looked] like?

A It looks like mucous, ma'am.
Q How did you know that?

A Because it looks like mucous.
Q After that, Madam Witness, what else happened?

A And then afterwards he gave me P10.00
Q Did he say anything when he gave that P10.00?

A Yes, ma'am.
Q What did he say?

A He said: "Do not tell anybody of what happened now otherwise I will shoot your
father."
Q After he said these, what else happened?

A I went to Gagawa.[30]
xxxx
Fiscal Dominguez
May we ask additional questions.
COURT
Proceed.
Fiscal Dominguez
Q Madam Witness, what did you feel when this Severiano Ogan inserted his penis into
your vagina?
A I felt pain.[31]
In ruling against Ogan's argument, the appellate court correctly turned to jurisprudence
that holds that even the slightest penetration of the female organ constitutes carnal
knowledge.[32] Where penetration is not fully established, as accused-appellant insists, we
have held that consummated rape can still be based on the victim's testimony that she felt
pain in the attempt at penetration.[33] People v. Brioso[34] explains that the Court looks for
other details in the evidence presented to be convinced that there was a penetration of
the labia of the pudendum of the victim. In the instant case, BBB's testimony that she felt
pain while Ogan inserted his penis into her sexual organ is corroborated by the medical
findings of hymenal lacerations. We are thus convinced that Ogan did not merely commit
acts of lasciviousness but was able to consummate the rape of BBB. The totality of the
evidence points only to this conclusion.
We present an important observation on courts and counsel acting on cases involving

children. The problem encountered by the trial court in eliciting a clear and concise
testimony from the child witnesses could have been avoided by asking questions that
were appropriately-phrased for a child their age.
This case was decided by the trial court in 2002, when the Rule on Examination of a
Child Witness was already effective. The Rule provides:
SEC. 19. Mode of questioning.-- The court shall exercise control over the questioning of
children so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure that questions are
stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) protect children
from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time.
The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.
To borrow from the Rule, courts must exercise control to ensure that questions are stated
in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child. Even calling her simply by
her name rather than "Madame Witness" would have made BBB more responsive and
comfortable on the witness stand. Had the Rule been followed, BBB would have been
able to have an easier time communicating with the court and the lawyers during the trial.
There would have been no confusion as to the details of her ordeal.
Penalty Imposed
It bears noting that both the trial and appellate courts did not specify what kind of
damages was being awarded apart from civil indemnity.[35] In awarding damages, the trial
court should state the factual bases of the award of these damages. [36] Thus, in rape cases,
damages may refer to moral and exemplary, and these must be specified as these have
different bases.[37]
In Criminal Case No. 1256, accused-appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and
pay civil indemnity of PhP 75,000 and pay damages of PhP 25,000.
The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the finding that rape
took place. The imposable indemnity is PhP 75,000 if the death penalty is imposed, and
PhP 50,000 if the penalty is reclusion perpetua.[38] In Criminal Case No. 1256, the crime
committed is simple rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code when the
offended party is under 12 years old, and the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. We
thus modify the award of PhP 75,000 to PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity
Moral damages, on the other hand, are awarded to rape victims without need of proof
other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries
from the experience she underwent. This award is separate and distinct from the awarded
civil indemnity and is currently set at PhP 50,000.[39]
Exemplary damages are also in order. As we held in People v. Pascual,[40] this is not the
first time that a child has been snatched from the cradle of innocence by some beast to
sate its deviant sexual appetite. Ogan should thus also be made to pay exemplary
damages to somehow abate this distressing trend. Current jurisprudence pegs this award
at PhP 30,000.[41]
In Criminal Case No. 1257, the appellate court modified accused-appellant's penalty
to reclusion perpetua, and increased civil indemnity to PhP 75,000. PhP 25,000 in
damages was also awarded. The award of civil indemnity and damages must be modified
to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. Since we find that accused-appellant only
committed simple rape under Art. 266-A of the Code when the offended party is under 12
years old, he must pay the corresponding damages of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP
50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02199 finding accused-appellant guilty of rape is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case Nos. 1256 and 1257, accused-appellant is
ordered to pay each victim PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages,
and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212436, October 02, 2019 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG),
PETITIONER, V. SANDIGANBAYAN 2ND DIVISION, TRADERS ROYAL
BANK, ROYAL TRADERS HOLDING CO., INC. AND BANK OF
COMMERCE, AS SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST OF TRADERS ROYAL
BANK, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
J. REYES, JR., J.:
Through this Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

petitioner Republic of the Philippines represented by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeks to
nullify the Resolutions dated September 25, 2013[2] and March 25, 2014[3] of the
Sandiganbayan 2nd Division in Civil Case No. 0181 which granted respondent Bank of
Commerce's motion to strike out the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses for violating the
bank's right to cross-examination.
The Facts
In 1997, the Republic, represented by the PCGG, commenced a complaint[4] for sum of
money, reconveyance and enforcement of foreign judgment relative to the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos), his family,
relatives and close associates.
The complaint was filed against Traders Royal Bank (TRB) wherein it was alleged that
TRB issued several banking instruments showing receipt of funds from President Marcos.
These banking instruments were turned over to the PCGG and pursuant to the latter's
mandate to recover President Marcos' ill-gotten wealth, presented said instruments to
TRB for payment. TRB, however, refused payment allegedly without just and valid
cause.
The PCGG also alleged that the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) invested in TRB by
buying equity consisting of 278,488 shares of the common stock. RBC thereafter sold all
its 278,488 shares of stock to Banque de Paris et des Pays Bays (Suisse) SA (Banque de
Paris). In reality, however, the PCGG alleged that the purchaser was President Marcos
and his close friend then Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto. According to the PCGG,
these shares are ill-gotten wealth and should, thus, be reconveyed to the government.
After the issues were joined, the PCGG presented its witnesses. Among those presented
were witnesses Reynaldo Guiao (Guiao), Eleuterio Camarote (Camarote), and Julieta
Bertuben (Bertuben) at the hearing dates on March 10, 1999 and August 31, 1999.[5]
Meantime, in 2000, TRB's Articles of Incorporation was amended and its name was
changed to Royal Traders Holding Co., Inc., (RTHCI).[6] In 2001, the Bank of Commerce
allegedly purchased RTHCI. Consequently, the PCGG amended its complaint to implead
as additional defendants RTHCI and the Bank of Commerce.[7] The PCGG alleged that
the amendment in TRB's Articles of Incorporation was a precursor to the sale of RTHCI
to the Bank of Commerce for the purpose of mingling TRB's assets with the latter to
escape its obligations with the government upon which PCGG's complaint was based. [8]
In the course of the proceedings, the PCGG prayed that it be allowed to enter against
Bank of Commerce the previously presented testimonial and documentary evidence, but
the Sandiganbayan denied the same on the ground that it would violate the Bank of
Commerce's right to due process. Thus, as early as in its Resolution dated May 18, 2007,
the Sandiganbayan already ruled:
x x x. However, its prayer that the testimonial and documentary evidence so far presented
by it be considered/entered as evidence against the additional defendants Royal Traders
Holding Co., Inc. and Bank of Commerce, cannot be favorably acted upon, especially
insofar as defendant Bank of Commerce is concerned because it would violate its right to
cross-examination. x x x
xxxx
There is, thus, a need for the plaintiff to recall the witnesses it had already presented
in order to afford defendant Bank of Commerce the right to cross-examine the said
witnesses.[9] (Emphasis supplied)
This notwithstanding, the PCGG, at the hearing held on November 29, 2011, manifested
that it will adopt as evidence against Bank of Commerce the testimonies of Guiao,
Camarote, and Bertuben that were presented in evidence against TRB during the hearings
on March 10, 1999 and August 31, 1999.[10] The Sandiganbayan required the Bank of
Commerce to submit its manifestation as regards the need to conduct cross-examination.
Accordingly, the Bank of Commerce manifested that it finds it necessary to conduct
cross-examination on said witnesses and that it be allowed to do so on the hearings
scheduled on March 5 and 6, 2012.[11]
However, during the hearing on March 5, 2012, the PCGG manifested that said witnesses
were unavailable for cross-examination by the Bank of Commerce. The hearings were
then reset to May 14 and 15, 2012.[12] These hearings, however, did not proceed because
the case records were transferred from the Sandiganbayan's Third Division to its Second
Division. The hearings were then moved to August 29 and 30, 2012.[13]
At the hearing on August 29, 2012, the PCGG again manifested that the witnesses were
unavailable for cross-examination. Thus, the hearing was again moved to November 14
and 15, 2012.[14]
The cross-examination, however, did not push through as rescheduled because the PCGG
again manifested that the witnesses were unavailable as they can no longer be located.
Consequently, the Bank of Commerce moved to strike out the testimonies of Guiao,
Camarote and Bertuben on the ground that it was denied the opportunity to cross-
examine said witnesses.[15] The PCGG opposed the motion, arguing that the Bank of
Commerce is the successor-in-interest of TRB, and that since TRB had cross-examined
the witnesses, the Bank of Commerce should be bound by such cross-examination.[16] It
also argued that the burden of recalling the witnesses for cross-examination falls upon the
party wishing to exercise said right. In reply, the Bank of Commerce denied being the
successor-in-interest of TRB and that, in fact, it has defenses different from that of its co-
defendants.[17]
The Sandiganbayan 's Resolutions
In its first assailed Resolution dated September 25, 2013, the Sandiganbayan granted the
Bank of Commerce's motion and accordingly ordered that the testimonies of witnesses
Guiao, Camarote and Bertuben be stricken off the record with respect to the Bank of
Commerce. It held that the Bank of Commerce was never afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses. The Sandiganbayan also held that neither was the bank
negligent nor that it incurred delay in conducting the cross-examination.[18]
The PCGG's motion for reconsideration met similar denial from the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution dated March 25, 2014.
The Issue
The present Petition is before the Court on the sole ground that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the testimonies of witnesses Guiao,
Camarote and Bertuben be stricken off the record as to the Bank of Commerce.
The Ruling of the Court
The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
In an adversary judicial system such as ours, the right to cross-examine a witness is

essential to the principle of due process.[19] Indeed, no person may be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law.[20] The right of a party to confront and
cross-examine opposing witnesses is available in either criminal or civil judicial
litigation, or in administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers.[21]
Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court reads:
Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. — Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters
stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and
freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the
reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
The PCGG anchors its objection to the striking out of the testimonies of the witnesses on
its allegation that the Bank of Commerce and TRB are one corporate entity as a result of
entering into a fraudulent purchase agreement.[22] Being one corporate entity, the PCGG
posits that the cross-examination conducted by TRB should be considered as cross-
examination conducted by Bank of Commerce. In other words, the PCGG claims identity
of interests between TRB and the Bank of Commerce as an exception to the right to
cross-examination.
The Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[23] while principally

adjudicating on the right to cross-examination in relation to a former testimony or
deposition, is nevertheless instructive on when substantial identity or identity of interest
between parties satisfies the requirement for the opportunity to cross-examine:
The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness
made on direct examination. The opportunity for cross-examination has been regarded as
an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the
right of cross-examination is absolute, and is not a mere privilege of the party against
whom a witness may be called. This right is available, of course, at the taking of
depositions, as well as on the examination of witnesses at the trial. The principal
justification for the general exclusion of hearsay statements and for the admission, as an
exception to the hearsay rule, of reported testimony taken at a former hearing where the
present adversary was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine, is based on the premise
that the opportunity of cross-examination is an essential safeguard against falsehoods and
frauds.
In resolving the question of whether the requirement of opportunity to cross-examine has

been satisfied, we have to consider first the required identity of parties as the present
opponent to the admission of the Bane deposition to whom the opportunity to cross-
examine the deponent is imputed may not after all be the same "adverse party" who
actually had such opportunity.
To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial or action, the parties to the
first proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later proceeding. Physical identity,
however, is not required; substantial identity or identity of interests suffices, as where the
subsequent proceeding is between persons who represent the parties to the prior
proceeding by privity in law, in blood, or in estate. The term "privity" denotes mutual or
successive relationships to the same rights of property.
In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity of
interest or privity between the then opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the
respondents. While Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, at most, the
deposition should be admissible only against him as an ETPI stockholder who filed
the certiorari petition docketed as Civil Case No. 0130 (and, unavoidably, as successor-
in-interest of the late respondent Jose Africa). While Africa and the respondents are all
ETPI stockholders, this commonality does not establish at all any privity between them
for purposes of binding the latter to the acts or omissions of the former respecting the
cross-examination of the deponent. The sequestration of their shares does not result in the
integration of their rights and obligations as stockholders which remain distinct and
personal to them, vis-à-vis other stockholders.[24] (Internal citations omitted)
In the case at bar, identity of interests between TRB and the Bank of Commerce,
although alleged, has yet to be established. That the Bank of Commerce bought RTHCI
for purposes of mingling its assets to subvert the government's effort to recover ill-gotten
wealth and that the Bank of Commerce is the successor-in-interest of TRB are mere
conclusions of law,[25] or at best, allegations which the PCGG bears the burden to prove
by the required quantum of evidence.
In any case, the Bank of Commerce denied being the successor-in-interest of TRB and
raised the following as a defense:
15.1 Traders Royal Bank or its assets was not mingled with [Bank of Commerce]. As
explained, [Bank of Commerce] purchased identified recorded assets and assumed
identified recorded liabilities of [TRB], now known as [RTHCI].
xxxx
15.3 Moreover, the following, among others, show that there was no mingling of assets
between [Bank of Commerce] and [TRB] now known as [RTHCI]:
a. [Bank of Commerce] and TRB maintained their separate corporate personalities,

distinct and independent of each other. The separate existence of [Bank of Commerce] on
one hand and [TRB] now known as [RTHCI] negates any mingling of assets between the
two corporations.
b. [Bank of Commerce] did not absorb the employees of [TRB] now known as [RTHCI].
The employees [of TRB] were all retired by [TRB] and their retirement benefits were
paid by [TRB]. [TRB], (now known as [RTHCI]), not [Bank of Commerce] settled the
retirement benefits of its employees. x x x
c. Certain liabilities remain as obligations of [TRB] (now known as [RTHCI]) and were
excluded in the [Purchase Sale Agreement] x x x.[26]
Thus, to hold that TRB's actions, including the conduct of cross-examination, bind the
Bank of Commerce on account of privity is to precipitately judge a determinative issue
upon which the PCGG's cause of action against the Bank of Commerce is based.
There is likewise no reason to disturb the Sandiganbayan's findings that the Bank of
Commerce did not waive its right to cross-examination. Basic are the rules that the
essence of the right to cross-examination is mere opportunity[27] and not actual cross-
examination; and that the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or
impliedly.[28]
Here, the Bank of Commerce expressly manifested its intention to subject the witnesses
Guiao, Camarote and Bertuben to cross-examination and the repeated postponements of
the trial schedules were not due to its fault or negligence. By presenting said witnesses on
direct examination, the PCGG had the duty to make them available for cross-examination
in accordance with the dictates of due process. The Bank of Commerce should not stand
to suffer by the repeated failure of the PCGG to present its witnesses for cross-
examination.[29]
Consequently, the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses renders
their testimony incomplete and therefore inadmissible for being incompetent as to the
Bank of Commerce. As held in Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines:[30]
Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the
witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-
examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when
cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable
to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered
incompetent.
The right of a party to cross-examine the witnesses of his adversary is invaluable as it is

inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The
express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the
right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable
part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. Subject to appropriate
supervision by the judge in order to avoid unnecessary delays on account of its being
unduly protracted and to needed injunctions protective of the right of the witness against
self-incrimination and oppressive and unwarranted harassment and embarrassment, a
party is absolutely entitled to a full cross-examination as prescribed in Section 8 of Rule
132 thus: "Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-
examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important
facts bearing upon the issue." Until such cross-examination has been finished, the
testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore,
be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the
case. (Emphases supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated September 25,

2013 and March 25, 2014 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division in Civil Case No. 0181
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 132164, October 19, 2004 ]
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. ALLYSON BELAGAN,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his

reputation, it is necessary that the reputation shown should be that which existed
before the occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation arose, [1] or at the
time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement
of the suit.[2] This is because a person of derogatory character or reputation can still
change or reform himself.
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’
Decision[3] dated January 8, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 44180, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“WHEREFORE, Resolution No. 966213 dated September 23, 1996 and Resolution
No. 972423 dated April 11, 1997 of the respondent Civil Service Commission are hereby
set aside. The complaint against petitioner Allyson Belagan filed by Magdalena Gapuz is
hereby DISMISSED.
The dismissal of petitioner Belagan is lifted and he is hereby ordered to be immediately

reinstated to his position without loss of seniority, retirement, backwages and other
rights and benefits.
SO ORDERED.”
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate complaints filed respectively by
Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of the “Mother and Child Learning Center,” and
Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against
respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with
sexual indignities and harassment, while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and
various malfeasances.
Magdalena’s sworn complaint alleges that sometime in March 1994, she filed an
application with the DECS Office in Baguio City for a permit to operate a pre-school. One
of the requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school
premises by the DECS Division Office. Since the officer assigned to conduct the
inspection was not present, respondent volunteered his services. Sometime in June
1994, respondent and complainant visited the school. In the course of the inspection,
while both were descending the stairs of the second floor, respondent suddenly placed
his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheek. Dumbfounded, she muttered, “Sir,
is this part of the inspection? Pati ba naman kayo sa DECS wala ng values?” Respondent
merely sheepishly smiled. At that time, there were no other people in the area.
Fearful that her application might be jeopardized and that her husband might harm
respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet.
Several days later, Magdalena went to the DECS Division Office and asked
respondent, “Sir, kumusta yung application ko?” His reply was “Mag-date muna
tayo.” She declined, explaining that she is married. She then left and reported the
matter to DECS Assistant Superintendent Peter Ngabit.
Magdalena never returned to the DECS Division Office to follow up her application.
However, she was forced to reveal the incidents to her husband when he asked why the
permit has not yet been released. Thereupon, they went to the office of the respondent.
He merely denied having a personal relationship with Magdalena.
Thereafter, respondent forwarded to the DECS Regional Director his recommendation to

approve Magdalena’s application for a permit to operate a pre-school.
Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from a local newspaper that certain
female employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging a high-ranking DECS official
with sexual harassment. Upon inquiry, she learned that the official being complained of
was respondent. She then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities and
harassment to former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria.
On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed under suspension.
On the part of Ligaya Annawi, she alleged in her complaint that on four separate
occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins,
embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower
part of her back.
Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the payment of the teachers’
salaries; (2) failing to release the pay differentials of substitute teachers; (3) willfully
refusing to release the teachers’ uniforms, proportionate allowances and productivity
pay; and (4) failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the
DECS rules and regulations.
The DECS conducted a joint investigation of the complaints of Magdalena and Ligaya. In
his defense, respondent denied their charge of sexual harassment. However, he
presented evidence to disprove Ligaya’s imputation of dereliction of duty.
On January 9, 1995, the DECS Secretary rendered a Joint Decision[4] finding respondent

guilty of four (4) counts of sexual “indignities or harassments” committed against Ligaya;
and two (2) counts of “sexual advances or indignities” against Magdalena. He was
ordered dismissed from the service. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, foregoing disquisitions duly considered, decision is hereby
rendered in the two above-entitled cases, finding:
a) Respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the DECS Baguio City Schools
Division GUILTY of the four counts of sexual indignities or harassments committed against the
person and honor of complainant Miss Ligaya Annawi, a Baguio City public school teacher,
while in the performance of his official duties and taking advantage of his office. He is,
however, ABSOLVED of all the other charges of administrative malfeasance or dereliction of
duty.
b Respondent Baguio City Superintendent Allyson Belagan likewise GUILTY of the two
) counts of sexual advances or indignities committed against the person and honor of
complainant Mrs. Magdalena Gapuz, a private school teacher of Baguio City, while in the
performance of his official duties and taking advantage of his office.
Consequently, respondent Allyson Belagan is HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED from the

government service, with prejudice to reinstatement and all his retirement benefits and
other remunerations due him are HEREBY DECLARED FORFEITED in favor of the
government.
SO ORDERED.”[5]
Upon appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), on September 23, 1996,
promulgated Resolution No. 966213[6] affirming the Decision of the DECS Secretary in
the case filed by Magdalena but dismissing the complaint of Ligaya. The CSC ruled that
respondent’s transgression against Magdalena constitutes grave misconduct. Thus:
“The acts of Belagan are serious breach of good conduct since he was holding a
position which requires the incumbent thereof to maintain a high degree of moral
uprightness. As Division Superintendent, Belagan represents an institution tasked to
mold the character of children. Furthermore, one of his duties is to ensure that teachers
in his division conduct themselves properly and observe the proper discipline. Any
improper behavior on his part will seriously impair his moral ascendancy over the
teachers and students which can not be tolerated. Therefore, his misconduct towards
an applicant for a permit to operate a private pre-school cannot be treated lightly and
constitutes the offense of grave misconduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Allyson Belagan is hereby found guilty of grave

misconduct and imposed the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with all the
accessory penalties. The decision of the DECS Secretary is modified accordingly.” [7]
On October 29, 1996, respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that he has never been charged of any offense in his thirty-seven (37) years
of service. By contrast, Magdalena was charged with several offenses before the
Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, thus:

“1. Criminal Case No. 43416 for LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION (December 3, 1980)
2. Criminal Case No. 45629 for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (May 13, 1982)
3. Criminal Case No. 45630 for GRAVE THREATS (May 13, 1982)
4. Criminal Case No. 45914 for GRAVE THREATS (June 24, 1982)
5. Criminal Case No. 51532 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (January 25, 1985)
6. Criminal Case No. 51533 for LIGHT THREATS (January 25, 1985)
7. Criminal Case No. 51556 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (January 30, 1985)
8. Criminal Case No. 51818 for LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985)
9. Criminal Case No. 51819 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985)
10. Criminal Case No. 51820 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (March 18, 1985)
11. Criminal Case No. 51821 for UNJUST VEXATION (March 18, 1985)
12. Criminal Case No. 62173 for UNJUST VEXATION (May 29, 1991)
13. Criminal Case No. 62172 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (May 29, 1991)
14. Criminal Case No. 62754 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (December 2, 1986)
15. Criminal Case No. 55642 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (December 2, 1986)
16. Criminal Case No. 55423 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (October 24, 1986)
17. Criminal Case No. 55846 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (November 4, 1986)
18. Criminal Case No. 55800 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (January 7, 1987)
19. Criminal Case No. 57312 for UNJUST VEXATION (November 29, 1987)
20. Criminal Case No. 55643 for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (December 13, 1985)
21. Criminal Case No. 53404 for UNJUST VEXATION (December 13, 1985)
22. Criminal Case No. 55422 for UNJUST VEXATION (October 24, 1986)” [8]
In addition, the following complaints against Magdalena were filed with the
Barangay Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, both in Baguio
City:
“1. Ordana vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 11-19-02-A) for GRAVE THREATS, UNJUST
VEXATION, RUMOR MONGERING
2. Teresita De Los Santos vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 86-8-26-8) for GRAVE THREATS &
ORAL DEFAMATION
3. Mrs. Conchita Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 029) for ORAL DEFAMATION and
FALSE ACCUSATION
4. Mrs. Clara Baoas vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 030) for HARASSMENT and THREATS
5. GABRIELA SILANG TANOD FORCES vs. Gapuz (Case No. 031) for HABITUAL TROUBLE
MAKER
6. Pablo Ortiz vs. Gapuz (November 1, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION
7. C. Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (September 11, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
8. Mrs. Liza Ancheta vs. Gapuz (September 27, 1978) for RUMOR MONGERING
9. Mr. Pananin (Beneco Personnel) (October 8, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
10. Mrs. Minda Valdez vs. Gapuz (November 6, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
11. WOMEN’S CLUB vs. GAPUZ (February 9, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION
12. Vistro Salcedo case (May 8, 1979)
Where Mrs. Gapuz was spreading rumors against Barangay Captain and Police Chief
13. Demolition Scandal (May 10, 1979)
Where she called all the residents of their Barangay for an emergency meeting and
where she shouted invectives against the residents
14. Incident of June 13, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the Barangay Sanitary Inspector
15. Incident of August 25, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the servants of Mr. De Leon
16. Incident of August 26, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz terrorized the council meeting
17. Incident of September 2, 1978
Mrs. Clara Baoas was harassed by Mrs. Gapuz
Mrs. Gapuz quarreled with Mrs. C. Ballesteros during the council meeting
Mrs. Gapuz was hurling invectives along her alley in the early morning
Mrs. Gapuz tapped electric wire from Mrs. Tessie de los Santos with the latter’s consent
Mrs. Gapuz was shouting and hurling invectives scandalously around her residence
Mrs. Gapuz was shouting, complaining about alleged poisoned sardines near the
premises of her residence which killed her hen.
Mrs. Gapuz was shouting unpleasant words around the neighborhood. She did not like
the actuations of a bayanihan group near the waiting shed.” [9]
Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt
on her character, integrity, and credibility.
In its Resolution No. 972423[10] dated April 11, 1997, the CSC denied respondent’s
motion for reconsideration, holding that:
“The character of a woman who was the subject of a sexual assault is of minor
significance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the person accused of
having committed the offense. This is so because even a prostitute or a woman of ill
repute may become a victim of said offense.
As such, the fact that complainant Magdalena Gapuz is shown to have had cases before
the regular courts for various offenses and was condemned by her community for
wrongful behavior does not discount the possibility that she was in fact telling the truth
when she cried about the lecherous advances made to her by the respondent. x x x”
Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. As stated
earlier, it reversed the CSC Resolutions and dismissed Magdalena’s complaint.
The Appellate Court held that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being
questionable. Given her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, “she is not one
whom any male would attempt to steal a kiss.” In fact, her “record immediately raises
an alarm in any one who may cross her path.”[11] In absolving respondent from the
charges, the Appellate Court considered his “unblemished” service record for 37 years.
Unsatisfied, the CSC, through the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition raising the
following assignments of error:
“I. The Supreme Court may rule on factual issues raised on appeal where the Court of
Appeals misappreciated the facts. Furthermore, where the findings of the Court of Appeals
and the trial court are contrary to each other, the Supreme Court may review the record
and evidence. The Court of Appeals erred in not giving credence to the testimony of
complainant Magdalena Gapuz despite convincing and overwhelming signs of its
truthfulness.
II. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it failed to give due weight
to the findings of the DECS, which conducted the administrative investigation, specifically
with respect to the credibility of the witnesses presented.
III The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent should be penalized under Sec.
. 22 (o) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V and not Sec. 22 (e) of said rules.” [12]
In his comment, respondent maintains that Magdalena’s derogatory record
undermines the verity of her charge and that the Court of Appeals is correct in
dismissing it.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The pivotal issue before us is whether complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is

credible. This is a question of fact which, as a general rule, is not subject to this Court’s
review.
It is a rule of long standing that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, if supported by
substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable
by this Court.[13] This Court is, after all, not a trier of facts. One of the exceptions,
however, is when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court or a quasi-judicial body, like petitioner herein.[14]
Here, the Court of Appeals and the CSC are poles apart in their appreciation of
Magdalena’s derogatory record. While the former considered it of “vital and paramount
importance” in determining the truth of her charge, the latter dismissed it as of “minor
significance.” This contrariety propels us to the elusive area of character and reputation
evidence.
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a

controversy.[15] One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., Section
51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote here:
“SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. –
(a) In Criminal Cases:

xxxxxx
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it
tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the
offense charged.”
It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal
cases, not to administrative offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule of
evidence can be applied here, still, we cannot sustain respondent’s posture.
Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under this
provision. Only those which would establish the probability or improbability of the
offense charged. This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits
and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged. [16] Thus, on a charge of rape -
character for chastity, on a charge of assault - character for peaceableness or violence,
and on a charge of embezzlement - character for honesty. [17] In one rape case, where it
was established that the alleged victim was morally loose and apparently uncaring
about her chastity, we found the conviction of the accused doubtful. [18]
In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer
evidence that has a bearing on Magdalena’s chastity. What he presented are charges for
grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious
mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of evidence are inadmissible
under the above provision because they do not establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.
Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to establish is
Magdalena’s lack of credibility and not the probability or the improbability of the
charge. In this regard, a different provision applies.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It
refers to a person’s integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. [19] A witness may
be discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for truth, [20] honesty[21] or
integrity.[22] Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on Evidence reads:
“SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness. –A witness may be impeached
by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that
his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has
made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by
evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination
of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an
offense.”
Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own behalf,
opened herself to character or reputation attack pursuant to the principle that a party
who becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself in the same position as any
other witness, and may be impeached by an attack on his character or reputation. [23]
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the
character or reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject of
inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate question – is Magdalena’s derogatory record
sufficient to discredit her credibility?
A careful review of the record yields a negative answer.
First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts
committed in the 80’s, particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect to the complaints filed
with the Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts
complained of took place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the offense
was committed in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer reliable proofs
of Magdalena’s character or reputation. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in
according much weight to such evidence. Settled is the principle that evidence of one’s
character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in
question.[24] In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of
the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from
the commencement of the suit.[25] Hence, to say that Magdalena’s credibility is
diminished by proofs of tarnished reputation existing almost a decade ago is
unreasonable. It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of
moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable
to change or reform.
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the criminal
cases specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great majority of
jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that
he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the
purpose of impairing his credibility.[26] This view has usually been based upon one or
more of the following grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the
witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent persons are
often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to be
innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may not be
impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct. [27] Significantly,
the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a witness
may not be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is
rejected because of the confusion of issues and the waste of time that would be
involved, and because the witness may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such
wrongful acts.[28] As it happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut
each of the charges against her listed by respondent.
But more than anything else, what convinces us to sustain the Resolution of the CSC is
the fact that it is supported by substantial evidence. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her
testimony is replete with details, such as the number of times she and respondent
inspected the pre-school, the specific part of the stairs where respondent kissed her,
and the matter about her transient boarders during summer. Magdalena would not
have normally thought about these details if she were not telling the truth. We quote
her testimony during the cross-examination conducted by DECS Assistant Secretary
Romeo Capinpin and Undersecretary Antonio Nachura, thus:
“Q Was there any conversation between you and Dr. Belagan during the inspection on
the first floor and the second floor?
A There was, sir. It was a casual conversation that we had with regard to my family,
background, how the school came about, how I started with the project. That was all, sir.
Q Nothing about any form of sexual harassment, in words or in deeds?
A Sir, because he inspected the second floor twice, sir. We went up to the stairs twice,
sir.
Q Why?
A I really don’t know what was the reason behind, sir. But on the second inspection, sir,
I told him that as of that time I had some transients with me. I was making use of the
premises for transients because that was summer then, sir. And I already started paying the
place so I said, ‘Sir, I have some transients with me in the evening’ and he said, You know
Mrs. Gapuz, I am interested to stay in one of the rooms as one your boarders. But I
respectfully declined saying, ‘Sir, I think for delicadeza I cannot accept you. Not that I don’t
want you to be here but people might think that I am keeping you here and that would
prejudice my permit, sir.’
ASEC R. CAPINPIN:
Q When did the alleged kissing occur? Was it during the first time that you went up
with him or the second time?
A No, sir, on the second time, sir.
Q Second time?
A Yes, sir. We were going down, sir.
Q And you were going down?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you recall what portion of the stairs where you were during the alleged kissing?
A Sir, on the topmost of the stairs.
Q Before you went down?
A Yes, sir. At the topmost because there is a base floor going up to the stairs and it
has 16 steps.
Q So, it was not on the 16th step but still on the topmost?
A Yes sir.
Q Part of the floor of the building?
A Yes, sir. Topmost, sir?
ASEC R. CAPINPIN:
Q Will you kindly tell us your relative position at that time?
A Sir, on the second time that we went up and I mentioned about these transients
that I had then and he wanted to stay in the place in one of the rooms and then I declined
and I was still showing the rooms simultaneously. On the last, the biggest room that I had,
he said, ‘No. Never mind, I am not going to see that anymore.’ So he waited for me there
and upon reaching the place, as I was to step down on the first step going down, he placed
his arm and held me tightly and planted the kiss on my cheek, sir.
Q You said that he wanted to stay in one of the rooms?
A Yes, sir, as a boarder.
Q Is that room used for transients?
A During that time, sir, during the summertime, I made use of the time to get some
transients.
Q And he was telling you that he wanted to occupy one of the rooms?
A Yes, but I declined, sir for delicadeza.
Q At that time, there were no transients yet.
A When he came over for the inspection sir, nobody was there.” [29]
The above testimony does not stand in isolation. It is corroborated by Peter
Ngabit, DECS Assistant Division Superintendent. Ngabit testified that Magdalena
reported to him that respondent kissed her and asked her for a “date.”
" I would like to call your attention to Exhibit ‘A’ which is the affidavit of Mrs.
Q Magdalena B. Gapuz, particularly item no. 8, and may I read for your information – ‘That the
Monday after the incident, I went to the DECS Division Office expecting to get favorable
recommendation from the DECS Regional Office for the issuance of my permit. That I
proceeded to the Superintendent and asked him, ‘Sir, kumusta ‘yung application ko’ and he
said, ‘mag date muna tayo’ but I refused and explained that I am married, after which I
proceeded to the Office of Asst. Superintendent Peter Ngabit to relate the incident and then
left the Division Office.’ Do you remember if Mrs. Gapuz went to your Office on the particular
day?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time was that?
A I cannot remember, sir.
Q Was it morning, afternoon?
A I think it was in the morning, sir.
Q Morning.
A Yes, sir.
Q Early morning?
A About noon, sir.
Q What transpired between you and Mrs. Gapuz in your office?
When she came to my Office, she was relating about that and she was even insulting
me saying among others that I was a useless fixture in that Office because I cannot do
anything with the processing of her paper or application.
Q It says here that she would relate the incident to you. Did she relate any incident?
A Yes, she did sir.
Q What was that incident all about?
A She was saying that when Mr. Belagan went to visit her school, he stole a kiss from
her and that she was saying that when she asked Supt. Belagan for her papers, she was
asked for a date before the Indorsement. After that, she left.” [30]
With Magdalena’s positive testimony and that of Ngabit, how can we disregard
the findings of the DECS and the CSC? Surely, we cannot debunk it simply because of the
Court of Appeals’ outdated characterization of Magdalena as a woman of bad
reputation. There are a number of cases where the triers of fact believe the testimony
of a witness of bad character[31] and refuse to believe one of good character. [32] As a
matter of fact, even a witness who has been convicted a number of times is worthy of
belief, when he testified in a straightforward and convincing manner. [33]
At this juncture, it bears stressing that more than anybody else, it is the DECS
investigating officials who are in a better position to determine whether Magdalena is
telling the truth considering that they were able to hear and observe her deportment
and manner of testifying.[34]
In reversing the CSC’s Resolutions, the Court of Appeals ruled that “there is ample
evidence to show that Magdalena had a motive” in accusing respondent, i.e., to
pressure him to issue a permit. This is unconvincing. The record shows that respondent
had already issued the permit when Magdalena filed her letter-complaint. Indeed, she
had no more reason to charge respondent administratively, except of course to
vindicate her honor.
Petitioner prays that we sustain its ruling penalizing respondent for grave misconduct
and not merely for disgraceful or immoral conduct which is punishable by suspension
for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense. [35] Misconduct
means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior, especially by a government official.[36] To constitute an administrative offense,
misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer.[37] In grave misconduct as distinguished from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest. [38] Corruption as an element of
grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. [39] This is apparently present in
respondent’s case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but also a demand for a “date,”
an unlawful consideration for the issuance of a permit to operate a pre-school.
Respondent’s act clearly constitutes grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal. [40]
We are, however, not inclined to impose the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Respondent has served the government for a period of 37 years, during which, he made
a steady ascent from an Elementary Grade School Teacher to Schools Division
Superintendent. In devoting the best years of his life to the education department, he
received numerous awards.[41] This is the first time he is being administratively charged.
He is in the edge of retirement. In fact, he had filed his application for retirement when
Magdalena filed her complaint. Section 16, Rule XIV, of the Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 provides:
“SEC. 16. In the determination of penalties to be imposed, mitigating and
aggravating circumstances may be considered. x x x.”
The mitigating circumstances are enumerated in Section 53, Rule IV, of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, [42] which reads in part:
“SEC. 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. – In
the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and
alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be
considered.
The following circumstances shall be appreciated:
x x x x x x
j. length of service
xxx xxx
l. and other analogous cases.”

Conformably with our ruling in a similar case of sexual harassment, [43] and
respondent’s length of service, unblemished record in the past and numerous awards,
[44]
the penalty of suspension from office without pay for one (1) year is in order.
While we will not condone the wrongdoing of public officers and employees, however,
neither will we negate any move to recognize and remunerate their lengthy service in
the government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 8, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44180 is REVERSED. The CSC Resolution Nos. 966213
and 972423 are AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that respondent ALLYSON
BELAGAN is SUSPENDED from office without pay for ONE (1) YEAR, with full credit of his
preventive suspension.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 209518, June 19, 2017 ]
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE, PETITIONER, V. ANA KARI
CARMENCITA NUSTAD, AS REPRESENTED BY ATTY. MARGUERITE
THERESE L. LUCILA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Petitioner Ma. Hazelina A. Tujan-Militante seeks to set aside and reverse the: (1)
Decision[1] dated February 27, 2013, which dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65; and (2) Resolution[2] dated October 2, 2013, which denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals[3] (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 124811.
The Facts
On June 2, 2011, Respondent Ana Kari Carmencita Nustad (Nustad), as represented by

Atty. Marguerite Therese Lucila (Atty. Lucila), filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 55, Lucena City (RTC) and prayed that Ma. Hazelina A. Tujan-Militante
(Tujan-Militante) be ordered to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Lucena City the
owner's duplicate copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-435798, T-436799, T-
387158 and T-387159, which were all issued in Nustad's name. She averred that Tujan-
Militante has been withholding the said titles.
In its Order dated July 26, 2011, the RTC set the petition for a hearing[4].
Instead of filing an Answer, Tujan-Militante filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and

Annul Proceedings[5] dated September 2, 2011. She averred that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person as she was not able to receive summons. Moreover, she
argued that the Order appeared to be a decision on the merits, as it already ruled with
certainty that she is in possession of the subject titles.
The Ruling of the RTC
In an Order dated November 23, 2011, the RTC[6] denied Tujan-Militante's Motion and
ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case. Further the RTC stated that it has not yet
decided on the merits of the case when it ordered Tujan-Militante to surrender TCT Nos.
T-435798, T-436799, T-387158 and T-387159 because it merely set the petition for a
hearing.
Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration[7] and alleged that the Power of

Attorney executed by Nustad in favor of Atty. Lucila is void and non-existent. Tujan-
Militante likewise averred that Atty. Lucila is representing a Norwegian, who is not
allowed to own lands in the Philippines. Aside from the dismissal of the case, petitioner
prayed that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Land Registration Authority be
impleaded. Moreover, Tujan-Militante prayed for moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
In an Order[8] dated February 27, 2012, the court a quo denied Tujan-Militante's Motion

for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, Tujan-Militante filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In a Decision[9] dated February 27, 2013, the CA recognized the jurisdictional defect over
the person of Tujan-Militante, but nevertheless ruled that the flaw was cured by Tujan-
Militante's filing of her Motion for Reconsideration. Such Motion sought for affirmative
reliefs, which is considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a

Resolution[10] dated October 2, 2013.
Hence, this appeal.

The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of
summons. However, it is equally significant that even without valid service of summons,
a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter
voluntarily appears before it.[11] Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 20. Voluntary Appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action

shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds of relief aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not
be deemed a voluntary appearance.
By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual [petitioner is] deemed to
have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court to secure the affirmative relief against his opponent and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.[12]
In this case, while Tujan-Militante's motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the
court a quo on the ground of improper service of summons, the subsequent filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration which sought for affirmative relief is tantamount to voluntary
appearance and submission to the authority of such court. Such affirmative relief is
inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for
such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the [court]'s
jurisdiction.[13]
As to the claim of Tujan-Militante that the requirements laid down in Sec. 24, Rule
132[14] of the Rules of Court apply with respect to the power of attorney notarized abroad,
he cited the ruling in Lopez v. Court of Appeals.[15] In said case, this Court held that the
power of attorney must comply with the requirements set forth under Sec. 25 (now Sec.
24), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court in order to be considered as valid.
Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that:
Section 24. Proof of official record.- The record of public documents referred to in

paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept
is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
Section 19 of Rule 132 states that:
Section 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,

documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a
foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein.
All other writings are private. (emphasis supplied)
In the Heirs of Spouses Arcilla v. Teodoro[16], this Court clarified that the ruling in
the Lopez case is inapplicable because the Rules of Evidence which were then effective
were the old Rules, prior to their amendment in 1989. When the Rules of Evidence were
amended in 1989, the introductory phrase "An official record or an entry therein" was
substituted by the phrase "The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19"[17], as found in the present Rules. Also, Section 25 of the former Rules
became Section 24 of the present Rules.
On this note, the case of Heirs of Spouses Arcilla explained further:
It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the foreign

service under Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in Section 19 (a),
to wit: written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country. The Court agrees with the CA that had the Court intended to include notarial
documents as one of the public documents contemplated by the provisions of Section
24, it should not have specified only the documents referred to under paragraph (a)
of Section 19.[18] (emphasis supplied)
As the Rules explicitly provide that the required certification of an officer in the foreign
service refers only to written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country, as found in Section 19(a), Rule 132, such enumeration does not include
documents acknowledged before a notary public abroad.
With all these, We rule on the validity of the subject notarial document. What is
important is that [Nustad] certified before a commissioned officer clothed with powers to
administer an oath that she is authorizing Atty. Lucila to institute the petition before the
court a quo on her behalf.[19]
A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the
same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant; otherwise, the document should be upheld.[20]
Lastly, Tujan-Militante's contention that the TCTs under the name of Nustad are invalid
because of her citizenship constitutes a collateral attack on the titles. The CA correctly
ruled that the issue as to whether an alien is or is not qualified to acquire the lands
covered by the subject titles can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose.[21]
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated

February 27, 2013 and Resolution dated October 2, 2013, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 124811 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

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FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 186461, July 05, 2010 ]

VELASCO JR., J.:

Following People v. Cabalquinto,[1] the Court withholds the real names of the offended

Two Informations charged Ogan with rape as follows:

Criminal Case No. 1256

That the accused is a member of the Philippine National Police.

Criminal Case No. 1257

That the accused is a member of the Philippine National Police.

Version of the Prosecution

Version of the Defense

The Ruling of the Trial Court

WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered sentencing Severiano Ogan, thus:

1. To suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor as

2. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Crim. Case 1256;

3. To pay the offended party [AAA] in Crim. Case 1257 P25,000.00 as

With the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The fallo of the CA Decision[16] reads:

Whether accused-appellant should be convicted only for acts of lasciviousness

We deny this appeal.

Criminal Case No. 1256

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

Q How do you know him?

Q While he was kneeling down what did he do with your vagina?

Q Did he put his finger in your vagina?

Q What was the feeling madam witness?

Based on AAA's testimony, accused-appellant clearly raped her. AAA convincingly

Statutory Rape Committed

Paragraph (d) of Art. 266-A states that statutory rape is committed:

Medical Findings Consistent with Testimony

Cross-examination of Dr. Rhodora Ambas:

Denial is inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-serving. Corollarily, alibi is

Criminal Case No. 1257

There is no merit as well to accused-appellant's argument as to BBB. We thus affirm the

Inconsistencies in Testimony of BBB

Q Did you see Severiano Ogan in his house?

Q So what happened when you saw him in his house?

Q What did he say to you?

Q What did you say?

Q What else happened?

Q How did he rape you?

Q Can you describe how the sperm [looked] like?

Q How did you know that?

Q After that, Madam Witness, what else happened?

Q Did he say anything when he gave that P10.00?

Q What did he say?

Q After he said these, what else happened?

We present an important observation on courts and counsel acting on cases involving

J. REYES, JR., J.:

Through this Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

The Sandiganbayan 's Resolutions

The Ruling of the Court

The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

In an adversary judicial system such as ours, the right to cross-examine a witness is

Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court reads:

The Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[23] while principally

In resolving the question of whether the requirement of opportunity to cross-examine has

a. [Bank of Commerce] and TRB maintained their separate corporate personalities,

The right of a party to cross-examine the witnesses of his adversary is invaluable as it is