G.R. No. 246679 - Governor Edgardo A. Tallado V. Commission On Elections, Norberto B. Villamin, and Senandro M. Jalgaldo
G.R. No. 246679 - Governor Edgardo A. Tallado V. Commission On Elections, Norberto B. Villamin, and Senandro M. Jalgaldo
G.R. No. 246679 - Governor Edgardo A. Tallado V. Commission On Elections, Norberto B. Villamin, and Senandro M. Jalgaldo
COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, NORBERTO B. VILLAMIN, and SENANDRO M.
JALGALDO.
Promulgated:
September 10, 2019
x---------------------------------------------
DISSENTING OPINION
JARDELEZA, J.:
The Constitution provides that the term of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. 1 Subsequently, We held in a number of cases that the
following requisites must concur for an elective official to be disqualified to run for
an elective local office: ( 1) the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) he has fully served
three consecutive terms. 2
1
CONSTITUTION, Article X, Sec. 8.
2
Abundv, S;-. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. ""lo. 201716, January 8, 2013, 688 SCRA 149, 167; Bolos, Jr. v.
Commission on Eieclions, G.R No. 184082, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 786, 793; and Latasa v. Commission on
Electfu,'is, G.R. Nv. 154829, Dc-cember 10, 2003, 4!7 SCRA 601,609.
3
See Ser,. 7. Rtile 1H of Administrative Order No. 7, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended.
4
Roilo,p.215.
5
Id. at 132-23 7.
6
Id.
7
Rollo, p. 58.
8
Id. at 238-245.
9
Id. at 246.
'" Id. at 502.C
Dissenting Opinion 2 G.R. No. 246679
Ultimately, the issue brought for the Court's consideration is whether the
implementation of the Ombudsman's Decisions dismissing Tallado from the service
caused an involuntary interruption in his term that prevented the application of the
three-term limit rule. The ponencia ruled in the affirmative. However, I disagree.
While the Court has not heretofore made a ruling on similar facts, this does not place
the case in a gray area. Law and jurisprudence dictate that the case be dismissed.
The Court has adopted the yardstick of strict interpretation in favor of term
limitation. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that the term of
office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. The framers of
the Constitution deemed it best to define the term of office of elective officials to
avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. 11 We have
held that the wording and circumstances surrounding the provision's formulation
impresses upon the Court "the clear intent to make term limitation a high priority
constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be
defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth." 12
Thus, in a number of cases, We interpreted the term limit rule in favor of limitation
rather than its exception. 13 Consistency, prudence, and a due regard to the
Constitutional value espoused by the above provision demand that We view this case
through the same measure. This necessitates a ruling that Tallado was merely
interrupted in the exercise of his functions but did not lose title to his office
involuntarily. His third term was not interrupted, so that he should have been held
ineligible to run in the 2019 national and local elections.
Tallado submits that when the Ombudsman's Decisions dismissing him from
the service were impl.~merited, he was divested of his title to the office of the
Governor. He had to vacate his office twice and was relegated to the status of a
private citizen. He was unable to discharge the functions of his office and collect the
saiaries and benefits that came with the post. He asserts that his eventual
reinstatement did not change the fact that he had lost his title to office so that the
continuity of his service was involuntarily interrupted. 14
The ponencia agrees, ruling that "[w]ithout doubt, the execution of the OMB's
dismissals xx x resulted in the petitioner's loss of title to the office of Governor." 15
Even as it acknowledges the non-finality of the Ombudsman's Decisions dismissing
Tallado from office, it held, that "he was dismissed for all intents and purposes of
the law xx x even ifhe had appealed. In that status, he ceased to hold the title to the
11
latasa v. Commission on E/e,:tic·ns, G.R. No. 154829, DecP.mber 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601, 614.
12
Aldovino, Jr. v. Coinmission en Elections, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 234, 253.
13
In A/Jovino, Jr. v. Commissiun on Elections, sz:pra at 255-256, We held that Ong v. Alegre (G.R. No. 163295,
January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 4?3) and Rivera v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007, 523 SCRA 41) "are
important ruli11gs for purposes of the three-term limitation because of what they directly imply. Although the election
requisite was not actually pre:-;ent, t!1e Court stil~ gave full effect to the three-term limitation because of the
constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to service for three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled
how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term
limitation rule in favor of limitatior: rather thaP its exception."
14
Rollo, p. 27.
" Ponenda, p. I 3. (
Dissenting Opinion 3 G.R. No. 246679
office in the fullest sense," 1~ The ponencia goes further to state that when Tallado
was dismissed, "the vacancy [created] was not temporary because the petitioner was
fully divested of his title to the office of Governor in both instances of dismissal."
Instead, "permanent vacancy in the office of Governor ensued." 17 In effect, the
ponencia compels Us to consider Tallado's dismissals as having existed in a vacuum
and discount the law, jurisprudence, and the realities of the situation.
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (A.O. No. 7), as amended,
otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, states
that a Decision rendered by the Ombudsman dismissing an elective official from the
service in an administrative case is immediately executory but not yet final pending
a timely appeal with the .Court of Appeals (CA). If respondent wins such appeal, he
shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension. 18 In this connection,
We have held that in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is
barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the
meanwhile. However, he does not vacate and lose title to his office. Loss of office
is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability. 19
Here, Tallado timely filed respective petitions for review with the CA to
question the Ombudsman's Decisions dismissing him from the service. Hence, he
stepped down from his post on two occasions with the consciousness that he can
obtain a favorable outcome from his appeals and that his predicament may only be
temporary. And temporary it had been indeed, as the CA restrained the
implementation of the Ombudsman Decision in the Dela Cruz case and reduced to
six months suspension the penalty of dismissal imposed in the second Gonzales case.
These rulings enabled Tallado to be reinstated to his gubernatorial post.
16
Id. at 14. Italics in the original.
17
Id. at 16.
18
Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) as amended, Rule Ill, Section
7 pertinently provides:
Sec. 7. Finality and execution of decision. x x x
xxxx
An appeal shall not stop the decisior, from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal; he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be
paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
xxxx
I
19
Aldovino. Jr. v. Commm1ssion on Elections, supra note 12 at 262.
Dissenting Opinion 4 G.R. No. 246679
not receive by reason of his removal. This is a glaring indication that no permanent
effect of the dismissal pending appeal is contemplated so that none should attach.
The undeniable fact that [Tallado] was able to reassume his post
as Governor when the Court of Appeals, in OMB-L-A-15-0480,
issued the Temporary Restraining Order staying the dismissal order
and, in OMB-L-A-16-0360, modified the dismissal order to a
penalty of suspension for 6 months, only proves that the vacancies
created by the implementation of the dismissal orders were
temporary ar,.d did not result in the loss of title of [Tallado] to the
Office of the Governor. Therefore, there is no valid interruption that
would cause a break in the continuity of the service on the part of
[Tallado] as would entitle him to be qualified to run again for a
fourth (4 th ) term as Governor of Camarines Norte. 21 (Emphasis
omitted.)
Section 44 of the Local Government Code (LGC) states that "a permanent
vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or
is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office." On
the other hand, Section 46 of the LGC states that there is temporary vacancy when
the local elective official is temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for
physical or legal reasons such as, but not limited to, leave of absence, travel abroad,
and suspension from office.
It is clear from these definitions that the nature of the vacancy, whether
permanent or temporary, depends on the cause of the elective official's incapacity to
hold office. In other words, the nature of the vacancy is merely a consequence of
such incapacity. Being merely a consequence, it may not be construed independently
u%
20
See CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 13(8).
21
Rollo, pp. 53-54. .
Dissenting Opinion 5 G.R. No. 246679
The question should be answered in the negative, and this is for obvious
reasons. First, there was no final judgment dismissing Tallado from the service.
Anything less than a final judgment of dismissal cannot create a permanent void in
the Governor's office. Second, by actions rendered by the CA, Tallado was
reinstated as Governor. Not much legal calisthenics is required for one to recognize
that the vacancy caused by Tallado's dismissals were only temporary. Verily,
Tallado was not permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office,
and the vacancy created in his absence was not permanent.
The second dismissal that was reduced by the CA to suspension, on the other
hand, should all the more be treated as a temporary vacancy since Section 44 of the
LGC specified "suspension from office" as a cause for temporary vacancy.
22
Ponencia, p. 15.
23
The second paragraph of this section reads: "An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case
a
the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been
under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason
of the suspension or removal."
" Sup,a note 12.
Dissenting Opinion 6 G.R. No. 246679
'•
Third, We cannot ignore the legal presumptions and legal consequences that
arise from a declaration of a permanent vacancy in the Governor's office. As
mentioned, loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding
of guilt or liability. 26 For this matter, I am unable to agree with the majority position
that the finality or non-finality of the Ombudsman's Decisions would not have made
any difference since they would produce the same effect of removal of the incumbent
official from office. 27
a
Dissenting Opinion 7 G.R. No. 246679
would have become a legal anomaly. Again, since the Ombudsman's Decisions were
not yet final, their implementation produced a different effect.
Additionally, a final judgment removing Tallado from his post would have
called for a permanent replacement of the Governor under the rules of succession in
the LGC. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the Office of the Governor, the Vice-
Governor shall become the governor. The assumption of the successor is permanent.
Since the vacancy is permanent, the appointment of the successor authorized by law
to fill the vacancy has to be permanent. 29 Consequently, the Vice Governor should
serve as Governor until the end of the term that the Governor should have served. In
this case, however, when the Ombudsman's Decisions dismissing Tallado from
office were implemented, Vice Governor Pimentel assumed as Governor; but when
Tallado was reinstated Pimentel also returned to his old post. This situation betrays
the existence of a temporary, not permanent, vacancy in the Governor's office and
arose only because there was no final judgment on Tallado's dismissal.
In sum, the facts of the case sufficiently establish that the second requisite for
disqualification to run for an e.!ective local office--that Tallada fully served three
consecutive terms as Governor of Camarines Norte-was satisfied. What transpired
in this case was not an involuntary interruption of Tallado' s term, but merely an
29
Guekeko v. Santos, G.R. No. L-128, March 2, 1946.
30
Ponencia, p. 17.
" ;;~awna ,. PhWprEDS Tcchno-S,,,;ce/nc., (P £Tine.}, G. R. No. 169712, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 625,
6
Dissenting Opinion 8 G.R. No. 246679
Associate Justice