15 Crowdfunding: Principles, Trends and Issues: Stéphane Onnée and Sophie Renault
15 Crowdfunding: Principles, Trends and Issues: Stéphane Onnée and Sophie Renault
15 Crowdfunding: Principles, Trends and Issues: Stéphane Onnée and Sophie Renault
issues
Stéphane Onnée and Sophie Renault
INTRODUCTION
313
sourcing and clarify its contours (Lebraty, 2009; Schenk and Guittard,
2011; Pénin and Burger- Helmchen, 2012; Brabham, 2013; Renault,
2014). With a view to synthesizing this extensive body of literature,
Estellés-Arolas and González-Ladrón-de-Guevara (2012) proposed the
following definition:
● Crowd voting: the crowd’s views can also be requested; it can thus
support an individual or organization in the choices they make.
This is particularly useful for search algorithms and name-giving
procedures. In this context, the crowd is not necessarily aware of
participating in a value creation process. This is, for example, the
case of Google’s PageRank (Howe, 2008).
● Crowdfunding: the crowd’s money is requested. Crowdfunding can
be defined as the procedure allowing a project leader (a private
individual, a for-profit or not-for-profit organization, etc.) to use
the services of a funding platform (generic or specialized) to propose
a project to a community (open or targeted) of contributors, pos-
sibly in exchange for previously defined compensations (Onnée and
Renault, 2013).
Guillaume Gibault, the creator of the brand Le Slip Français views crowdfunding
as a communication media per se. Since its launch in 2011, the young brand has
successfully conducted four crowdfunding campaigns.
The first one in 2013, on the MyMajorCompany platform, helped increase brand
awareness while surfing on its humorous side. Indeed, the idea was to ask the
crowd to launch ‘sweet smelling briefs’ whose perfume was embedded in micro-
capsules that regularly released their scent over time . . . While the brand sought
€10 000, the crowd doubled the bet.
The second campaign was conducted in 2014. This time, its objective was
to provide funds to the Telethon to benefit the French Association against
Myopathies. The operation was called ‘Bouge ton pompon’. It was presented
on the KissKissBankBank platform and raised nearly €140 000. Support for the
operation by many celebrities on social networks (for example, German couturier
Karl Lagerfeld and Quebec singer Garou) undeniably strengthened the brand’s
appeal. Because of the success of this project, it has been renewed in November
2015 with a bonnet designed by the French couturier Jean-Paul Gaultier.
In February 2015, the brand offered a project on the US platform Kickstarter.
Well-conducted story-telling aimed to lay the groundwork for the French brand
breakthrough in the US. An exclusive capsule collection was offered to backers.
Pre-purchase was then presented as a sales channel just like any other, which,
Guillaume Gibault says, involves multiple benefits. In particular, it enables
both creators and backers to limit their risk- taking, since the production is
launched only after a minimum sum has been pledged. The use of crowdfund-
ing can also facilitate expanding into foreign markets by opting for a platform in
another country.
effect. Thus, the community that supports the project becomes a driving
force of the project. Ultimately, a successful crowdfunding campaign can
enable project developers to make themselves more credible to traditional
financiers (venture capitalists and banks).
There are also disadvantages and risks associated with crowdfunding.
For example, once an idea has been posted on a crowdfunding platform,
the whole world can see it. The idea may be copied and implemented
by other entrepreneurs. So, the project initiators must use legal methods
and instruments to protect their concepts and ideas (patents, trademark
and copyright). Another source of risk relates to the mismanagement of
the intellectual property of ideas submitted by the crowd: ‘Most crowd-
funding websites permit members of the public to comment on projects,
and in many cases, these comments include recommendations that are
later incorporated into the project’ (Wells, 2013). Wells then asks an
important question: ‘[. . .]Can the project creator use these ideas without
Crowdfunding has become one of the informal financing modes that facil-
itate the initiation of a project, along with funds from business angels or
‘love money’ from friends and family. As stated in an article by Tomczak
and Brem (2013, p. 339), ‘three roles have to be fulfilled in any crowdfund-
ing effort: (1) the intermediary, also known as the platform that serves as a
matchmaker between promoters and funders; (2) the fundraisers, contrac-
tors and others; (3) the investors themselves’. In this triptych, intermediary
platforms often play a central role, but direct crowdfunding – where the
fundraiser makes a direct appeal to a specific audience via his/her own
fundraising platform – is also an option.
Typically, the platform’s remuneration is a commission of around
8 percent of the amount raised, on average (Financement Participatif
France, 2014). This business model encourages platforms to strive for the
success of a large number of fundraising campaigns. Project leaders, in
turn, can choose from a variety of platforms able to accommodate their
projects; and they can compare and contrast competing features and ser-
vices. So, platforms try to innovate by defining a suitable differentiation
tions between two or mode distinct sides and each side is affiliated with the
platform’. In other words, entrepreneurs and contributors retain control
of their mutual interactions and they make substantial platform-specific
investments.
Conceptually, multisided market theory is related to the theory of
network externalities (Rochet and Tirole, 2006). The major argument is
that on a multisided platform, the value that accrues to agents on one
side of the platform depends not only on the quantity and variety of
such agents (direct network effect) but also on the quantity and variety
of agents on other sides of the platform (indirect network effect) (Rochet
and Tirole, 2006). Thus, crowdfunding contributors are likely to prefer
platforms offering a wider set of campaigns from which they can choose
the ones to support. In the particular case of the reward-based model, a
greater number of projects increase the probability that contributors will
obtain rewards that fit their preferences.
According to Tomczak and Brem (2013, p. 341),
Backers’ Motives
intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors (Deci and Ryan, 2000) may
play a role in an investor’s decision to fund a project. According to
Gerber and Hui (2013), supporter motivations include the desire to collect
rewards, help others, support causes and be part of a community. Some
backers also want to be part of an innovative project (Schwienbacher and
Larralde, 2010; Ordanini et al., 2011).
Internet users who are mobilizing to provide funding on crowdfund-
ing platforms are similar to what Kozinets et al. (2008, p. 343) describe as
Online Creative Consumer Communities (OCCC), that is, communities of
individuals sharing a common orientation towards projects, products or
services that are likely, given their expertise, to generate value. Members
of these online communities are potential contributors seeking to finance
projects that would meet their own needs. In a study of motivations to
participate in a crowdfunding transaction, Gerber et al. (2012) identify
four main types of motivation: getting rewards, helping others, belonging
to a community and supporting a cause. In other words, backers’ moti-
vations might sometimes be economic, and at other times emotional or
social. Other authors point out that motivation decreases when people are
too frequently sought out or when they are kept waiting too long before
receiving their rewards, a fact observed mainly by Mollick (2014). He
indicates that 75 percent of projects deliver the results later than expected
by supporters. Hemer (2011, p. 14) also identifies the intrinsic motivations
in crowdfunding: ‘Personal identification with the project’s subject and
its goals; contribution to a societally important mission; satisfaction from
being part of a particular community with similar priorities; satisfaction
from observing the realization and success of the project funded; enjoy-
ment in being engaged in and interacting with the project’s team; enjoying
contributing to an innovation or being among the pioneers of a new tech-
nology or business; the chance to expand one’s own personal network; or
the expectation of attracting funders in return for one’s own crowdfunding
project’.
Motives differ, depending on the funding model used (gift- based,
reward-based, presale-based, loan-based, or equity financing), the nature
of projects (civic, communitarian, creative, entrepreneurial and so on), the
types of sharing and information exchange-tools or the techniques used
to present projects. Thus, backers care also about their social reputation
and/or enjoy private benefits from participating in the success of the initia-
tive (Lambert and Schwienbacher, 2010, p. 12). As for lending or equity
crowdfunding, the expectation of a financial return on contributions will
probably be more important than emotional attachment or social motiva-
tions. Also pertinent is Kuppuswamy and Bayus’ (2014) reference to the
literature on rational herding and information cascades: they argue that
We believe in the power of the crowd, and that a community can help you build
a better business. Most businesses fail due to a lack of insight or experience.
With the JumpStartFund approach, we can assist you to not only build a better
business, but to also build a smarter company.
● Choosing the right platform: the project creator must choose between
generic or specialist platforms by assessing the visibility and dyna-
mism of the selected platform and its capacity to support a particu-
lar project, as well as the platform’s commission rate. According to
Belleflamme (2013), the entrepreneur has to find a platform that
allows an optimal matching of the proposed project and the needs
and expectations of potential contributors. Furthermore, the project
initiator must choose a platform that has the ability to attract users
with high performance potential to achieve the appropriate mix of
buyers and sellers and create competitive advantage (Doshi, 2014).
The presence of these ‘superstar’ contributors, as Doshi (2014) calls
them, can create a positive ‘halo effect’. In the same way, the pres-
ence of a small number of well-informed participants can facilitate
the raising of more money (Parker, 2014).
● Benchmarking other projects: based on the project’s positioning,
project leaders will want to be original in the presentation of their
project, so as to stand out more easily and get the potential backers’
support.
● Telling a compelling story: in crowdfunding, it is essential for project
leaders to be able to sell their project effectively, and to paint a
favorable portrait of themselves. This gives consistency and soul
to the project, while developing backers’ emotional attachment
to it. For this narrative to work, it is vital to make the presenta-
tion appealing. Potential backers value originality, all the more so
when it is illustrated with videos and photos. However, Lawton and
Maron (2013) indicate that ‘ironically, many people who consider
using crowdfunding initially don’t want to be in their pitch video.
But that’s almost always counterproductive’. People want to know
the project initiator with his/her qualities and imperfections. They
give this advice to prospective campaigners: ‘Let people see your
eyes, let them see your passion’ (p. 88).
● Offering a broad range of rewards: funders must pay special atten-
tion to the range and variety of the rewards they offer. Such rewards
can be articulated along three tiers. In the first tier, small amounts
can be contributed without necessarily getting the main reward.
The second tier offers the main reward. Finally, the third tier
offers h igh-value consideration items. Figure 15.2 illustrates this
perspective.
Note that the higher up the level of top-tier rewards, the more
exclusive the circle of investors will be. Therefore, a scarcity effect
may contribute positively to the high-stakes involvement of the most
generous and committed backers.
First level
• A thank you from us and on behalf of all cat lovers
• Digital download of one song from the album along
Thanks + perks related to
with our thanks
the creative project
Second level • Digital download of the full 40 minute (or more) album of all
new, enhanced music for cats
The result of the creative • One CD containing the full 40 minute (or more) album of all
project and perks new, enhanced music for cats
Third level
• 30 minute Skype interview with the composer/creator David
Teie
High-value consideration
• One of the tracks of the new album will be named after your
items, possibly in limited
cat
amounts
Figure 15.2 Three reward tiers for the project ‘Music for Cats’ on
Kickstarter
Total strangers
CONCLUSION
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