American Foreign Policy Interests, 37:80–86, 2015

Copyright # 2015 NCAFP

ISSN: 1080-3920 print=1533-2128 online
DOI: 10.1080/10803920.2015.1038925

NATO and the Ukraine Crisis

Michael Rühle
ABSTRACT Russia’s new assertiveness forces the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) to put greater emphasis on reassuring its easternmost
member states about the credibility of the Allies’ collective defense commit-
ment. This is to be accomplished through the ‘‘Readiness Action Plan,’’
which foresees a greater rotational military presence in Central and Eastern
Europe. However, the Allies will seek to ensure that this reemphasis on
collective defense in Europe will not come at the expense of expeditionary
missions at Europe’s periphery or beyond. Finding a compromise between
collective defense and crisis management, as well as between hedging
against Russia and seeking ways to constructively reengage, amount to a
complex double balancing act. Hence, the idea that NATO could somehow
be rejuvenated by the Ukraine crisis is underestimating the challenges that
the Allies now confront.

KEYWORDS collective defense; crisis management; defense spending; NATO;

Readiness Action Plan; Russia

The Ukraine crisis has led many observers to conclude that the European
security landscape is undergoing a sea change. Terms such as game
changer, wake up call (former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen), and
paradigm shift (General Breedlove, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
[NATO]’s Supreme Allied Commander) imply that Russia’s actions vis-à-vis
Ukraine are not just an isolated event but part of a profound transformation
of Russia’s attitude and policy vis-à-vis the West. After all, part of the Russian
choreography in annexing Crimea, where Moscow employed unmarked
armed forces inside Ukraine while concentrating regular Russian forces
at Ukraine’s border with surprising speed, was an information warfare
campaign that demonstrated a baffling degree of long-standing anti-Western
resentment.
Reflexively, some observers have interpreted these developments as
giving NATO a new lease on life. With Russia re-emerging as a common
threat, so the argument goes, Allies would draw closer together and the
cohesion of NATO would be strengthened.1 Moreover, with the mission
of the International Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan having come to
an end, and given the Allies’ little appetite to embark on other major
Michael Rühle is Head of the Energy
expeditionary operations, a shift of NATO’s military focus back to the
Security Section in NATO’s Emerging European theater almost appeared like the logical conclusion of a period
Security Challenges Division. He expresses of two decades of operations. The Central and Eastern European Allies, so
his personal views only.

80
the argument continues, would finally get the NATO; its willingness to put arms control agreements
enhanced NATO presence in their territories that at risk by testing new weapons systems; and, not least,
they had been craving since they joined the Alliance, the considerable increase in Russia’s military budget,
thus ending their self-perception as second-class coupled with offensive military exercises (including
members. And, all Allies would be under pressure the simulated use of nuclear weapons against NATO
to review their defense budgets by again taking a ser- Allies); and increasingly bellicose rhetoric.
ious look at the 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product In the context of the Ukraine crisis, Russia also
(GDP) benchmark that most of them had not met for stepped up its nuclear exercises, had its bombers fly-
decades. In sum, NATO would emerge reinvigorated ing closer to Allied borders, and boasted the develop-
from the crisis as an Alliance with a new sense of ment of new nuclear weapons. In the fall of 2014,
common purpose. Moscow announced that it would not participate in
However, such a view misses the mark. True, the the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. At the end of that
Ukraine crisis did provide a tangible theme for the same year, Moscow released a new military doctrine
September 2014 Wales Summit, replacing Afghanistan that named NATO and NATO’s enlargement as major
as the original—and inevitably bittersweet—major threats to Russia. While that document did not con-
issue at the summit. Moreover, NATO’s initial moves tain many surprises and was, indeed, status quo in
to quickly increase its military presence in Eastern some areas such as nuclear policy, it was noteworthy
Europe demonstrated that the Allies had understood not least for its references to the threat of foreign-
the importance of not being seen as dithering in the inspired regime change—a reference to the protests
face of Russian aggression against a neighboring on Kiev’s Maidan Square in early 2014 that had led
state. Yet the assumption that the Ukraine crisis to the demise of the Russia-friendly Janukovich
would rejuvenate NATO is far too simplistic. The government and had convinced Moscow to inter-
crisis may have indeed brought home to many vene. In this sense, the new military doctrine has
the continuing need for a collective defense frame- turned the siege mentality that had been visible for
work, but it also confronts NATO with a series of some time into Russia’s official foreign and security
political and military challenges that will put Alliance policy narrative.2
solidarity to the test. All of these moves happened against the backdrop
of Russian complaints about a West bent on margin-
alizing Russia’s political and military status, be it by
THE RUSSIA CHALLENGE enlarging NATO or by deliberately misinterpreting
With respect to Russia, two questions arise. First, is UN Security Council resolutions (e.g., on Libya),
Russia’s current behavior a passing phase or has it and Putin’s increasing domestic repression of certain
durably changed the relationship between Moscow societal groups, mixed with populist sentiments.
and NATO? Second, even assuming that the changes Russia’s ‘‘patriotic awakening’’—like so much in
in Russia’s policies are set to last, how much of a Russia, orchestrated from the top down—has
military threat are they to NATO? resulted in soaring approval ratings for President
Regarding Russia’s policy, most observers agree Putin. Given Russia’s economic and social decline,
that a shift toward greater assertiveness had been now hastened by falling oil prices, Putin’s appeal to
visible for quite some time: Moscow’s attempts to ‘‘Russian values’’ and Russia’s military strength
prevent Georgia from realizing its NATO ambitions; appears like a calculated gamble: by playing on
the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union, which deep-seated anti-Western resentment among parts
appeared like a thinly veiled attempt to regain of the Russian population, and by defining the West
Moscow’s erstwhile sphere of influence; the de facto and NATO as adversaries, he has chosen a path that
end of the U.S.–Russia ‘‘reset’’ after Putin’s return to he will not (and probably cannot) reverse quickly.
the presidency; the continuing support for Syrian Moreover, since a serious challenger to President
President Assad; Russia’s granting of asylum to the Putin and his vision of Russia does not seem in sight,
wayward National Security Agency (NSA) employee current trends in Russian policy may well continue.
Edward Snowden; Russia’s withdrawal from the Whether these developments amount to a concrete
missile defense talks with the United States and military threat to NATO, however, is less clear. For

Volume 37, Number 2, 2015 81

one, Ukraine does not belong to NATO, which makes relationship to Russia. Hence, while cooperation with
Russia’s harassment of that country most worrisome, Russia was suspended, the NATO–Russia Council
but does not necessarily translate into a direct threat remained open. As long as hope remains that Russia
to the Alliance. Russia’s actions against Ukraine could revert to a less-confrontational stance, NATO
evolved in the context of Ukraine’s association nego- wants to keep the doors open.
tiations with the European Union—a process that However, from the outset of the crisis, Allies
threatened to invalidate President Putin’s already expressed concern about Russia’s ability to achieve
shaky concept of a ‘‘Eurasian Economic Union.’’ In rapid-force concentrations along Ukraine’s borders,
this sense, Putin’s decision to annex Crimea appeared as demonstrated in the so-called snap exercises.3 This
like a decision made in desperation rather than out of ability, particularly when seen in the context of
a desire to enlarge Russian territory. Avoiding Russia’s quasi-religious commitment to defend
losses—and loss of face—appeared to have been ‘‘Russian peoples’’ elsewhere, could constitute a
more important than making gains. challenge—especially for those Allies with sizable
Second, the means employed by Russia, namely Russian minorities. Discussions on how to minimize
economic coercion, propaganda, regular and irregu- the risk of a limited Russian military advance into
lar forces, and rendering support to separatist groups, the territory of one or more Allies are nothing new.
were tailored to Ukraine’s specific situation. This During the cold war, NATO was worried that by a
form of ‘‘hybrid warfare’’ may be employed against rapid but limited military advance into NATO territory
other states as well (e.g., Moldova), but in the specific (e.g., West Berlin) the Soviet Union could achieve
European context it works only once the targeted a fait accompli that would undermine a serious NATO
state is internally divided or otherwise weak. It response.4 Accordingly, NATO needs to take mea-
appears unrealistic to assume that a hybrid warfare sures that would demonstrate to Russian planners
approach could amount to a direct threat to NATO, the futility of such an approach. At the same time,
whose member states are much more stable and these measures need to convince NATO’s geographi-
resilient than Ukraine. cally most exposed Allies that the Alliance’s collective
Third, and perhaps most important, Russia’s mili- defense commitment applies to them just as much as
tary activism cannot hide the fact that Russia’s forces to any other NATO member.
are still recovering from their post-Soviet crisis. While
Russia has stated ambitious goals in terms of force
modernization, and while many experts conclude
THE REASSURANCE CHALLENGE
that Russian forces are in much better shape today To meet this reassurance challenge, NATO’s Wales
than they were during the 2008 war with Georgia, Summit of early September 2014 agreed on the
doubts remain about their performance in a more Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to enhance the military
demanding environment and their in-depth strength. protection of NATO’s easternmost members. The RAP
Hence, whatever Russia may think of the cohesion of consists of ‘‘Assurance Measures,’’ such as increased
the Alliance, the prospect of facing 28 NATO member military presence and activity for assurance and deter-
countries that are bound by a mutual commitment to rence, and ‘‘Adaptation Measures,’’ meaning changes
collective defense, underwritten by the superior con- to the Alliance’s long-term military posture and capa-
ventional power of the United States, cannot inspire bilities. In essence, the plan foresees increasing the
confidence in Russian military planners. readiness level of NATO’s reaction forces as well as
NATO has carefully avoided labeling Russia a pre-deploying equipment and holding more and more
military threat. The Allies avoided confrontational complex exercises in Central and Eastern Europe. An
rhetoric, expressing instead their disappointment about-4,000 strong Very High Readiness Joint Task
about lost opportunities and emphasizing the self- Force (VJTF) consisting of land, air, maritime, and
defeating consequences of Russia’s actions. Moreover, special operations forces will act as a ‘‘spearhead’’ force
NATO’s response to Russia’s at times rather reckless capable of deploying within a matter of days.5
military activities close to NATO territory remained The RAP also foresees the establishment of a multi-
low-key. Indeed, from the outset of the Ukraine crisis, national NATO command and control presence and
Allies refrained from creating irreversible facts in their reception facilities on the territories of the eastern

82 American Foreign Policy Interests

Allies (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, had declared in 1996 and 1997 that it would put
Romania) at all times, with Allied personnel staffing neither nuclear weapons nor substantial combat
on a rotational basis and focusing on planning forces and infrastructure on the territory of its future
and exercising collective defense. The readiness members. This was also reflected in the 1997 NATO–
and capabilities of the Headquarters Multinational Russia Founding Act.
Corps Northeast in Szczecin (Poland) are to be Russia’s actions against Ukraine have invalidated
increased, thus expanding its role as a hub for many of the assumptions on which these NATO
regional cooperation. The RAP also entails the statements were based. However, establishing a truly
pre-positioning of military equipment and supplies permanent NATO military presence in the Central and
and the improvement of NATO’s ability to reinforce Eastern European member states would be of such
its eastern Allies through preparation of national enormous political and military significance that the
infrastructure, such as airfields and ports; the Allies are not likely to agree to doing so except in
updating of defense plans for Eastern Europe; and exceptional circumstances. Militarily, it would signal
more exercises focused both on crisis management NATO’s reorientation toward a cold war–type collec-
and collective defense. tive defense emphasis that would inevitably carry con-
The RAP is an important signal to both the NATO notations of a new cold war. Politically and militarily,
Allies and Russia. Its rapid implementation will thus it would signal that NATO had concluded that Russia
be crucial—all the more so as more agile forces may was once again its military adversary—a signal that
also be needed for other contingencies, for example, Allies are trying to avoid sending. Hence, as long as
along NATO’s southern borders. However, the Russia does not become more confrontational, NATO
challenges of implementing the RAP are significant. will put the emphasis on measures that are largely
Keeping forces on high readiness is something only temporary and scalable. The term chosen by the Uni-
the larger nations can do and only at considerable ted States for its reassurance measures aptly expresses
cost. The logistical challenges are also formidable. this fine line: persistent presence is similar to but not
The days when NATO was regularly exercising large- identical with permanent presence.
scale reinforcements—during the cold war, the Another challenge that NATO needs to address is
United States used to bring an entire corps across that of ‘‘hybrid threats.’’ To destabilize Ukraine, Russia
the Atlantic—are long gone. Short warning times combined military, paramilitary, cyber-, economic,
would also require NATO’s ‘‘frontline states’’ to invest energy, and strategic communications tools. While
in capacities that would enable them to hold out long this form of hybrid warfare may only succeed against
enough for reinforcements to arrive. And NATO’s states that are internally fragile and divided, it could
command structure, which has been considerably introduce sufficient ambiguity to make NATO’s
reduced in size, might also have to be adjusted to strategic assessment and decision making difficult,
handle the new collective defense emphasis. In short, while, at the same time, marginalizing elements of
to implement the RAP, NATO will have to relearn the full spectrum of NATO’s defensive capabilities.
certain skills that over the past 20 years had not been This is of particular concern to the Baltic nations, with
in demand. Above all, Allies will have to bear their large Russian minorities. NATO must, therefore,
additional costs—which will require them to make examine how best to prepare for such scenarios.
good on their Wales Summit pledge to increase Cooperation with other institutions will be a crucial
defense expenditures over time. element of any response, but NATO will also have
The Readiness Action Plan stops short of a perma- to review its intelligence sharing and political
nent NATO presence in Central and Eastern Europe. decision making and processes and seek to overcome
As of today, the region has no substantial NATO eventual disconnects.
military presence—a fact that has long been worrying Predictably, the mere semi-permanence of the
some Central and Eastern European member states.6 measures envisaged by the RAP have disappointed
The reasoning behind having only a ‘‘thin’’ military some observers in Central and Eastern Europe, who
NATO presence dates back to the specific situation had hoped for a more substantial military presence
of the mid-1990s. To prepare the ground for NATO in their region.7 It is, therefore, all the more crucial
enlargement and to not antagonize Russia, NATO that the agreed-on measures be implemented ‘‘in full

Volume 37, Number 2, 2015 83

and on time.’’8 The Warsaw Summit in 2016 will past—notably the partnerships with dozens of non-
be an important opportunity to take stock of the NATO countries—are largely irrelevant. And, finally,
implementation process. the fact that some of the forces dedicated to collective
defense (including certain investments foreseen by
the RAP) are not going to be used in operations will
THE EXPEDITIONARY CHALLENGE make their justification difficult to sustain domestically
The Ukraine crisis is a stark reminder that the post– in some Allied countries: as single purpose ‘‘deterrence’’
cold war European security order remains vulnerable forces, they will be perceived as a sunken investment.
and requires more attention than hitherto believed. Given these dilemmas, Allies will try to square the
However, the crisis has not invalidated the globaliza- circle by ensuring that changes in NATO’s force
tion of security challenges. The most striking example posture to bolster collective defense will not happen
was provided by the emergence of the ‘‘Islamic State’’ at the expense of their expeditionary capabilities.
(the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [ISIL]). The Hence, the solution will be in measures such as
military advances of these terrorist militias into parts beefing up of the NATO Response Force, perhaps
of Iraq and Syria happened around the same time with a specific ‘‘reassurance’’ component, rather than
as the Ukraine crisis, underscoring the need for the by entirely new, dedicated collective defense deploy-
Allies to maintain a broader strategic view. The Wales ments. By the same token, the U.S. ‘‘pivot’’ to Asia will
Summit reflected this sentiment, becoming a forum continue. Although the United States has played a
for setting up an anti-ISIL coalition under a U.S. lead. crucial reassurance role since the very beginning of
As part of this coalition, which also includes countries the Ukraine crisis, both through NATO and bilater-
in the region, many NATO Allies are conducting ally, a major reinforcement of the U.S. military pres-
airstrikes, supplying military equipment, and offering ence in Europe is unlikely. Rather than bringing
training and other assistance. While such engage- more U.S. forces back to Europe, the United States
ments risk provoking reprisals, as demonstrated by will opt for a rotational presence while, at the same
the terrorist attacks in France in January 2015, this time, putting pressure on the European Allies to take
has not changed the basic agreement among Allies on a greater share of the collective defense burden.9
that ISIL needs to be confronted militarily—the result In sum, as long as Russia does not directly confront
of allowing ISIL to establish permanent training NATO, the Allies will seek to balance their collective
camps in Iraq would certainly be worse. In addition, defense and crisis-management tasks, making sure
NATO’s other missions, ranging from counterpiracy that one does not come at the expense of the other.
operations (‘‘Ocean Shield’’) in the Gulf of Aden
to the training mission in Afghanistan (‘‘Resolute
Support’’), will continue, underlining the need to remain
OTHER CHALLENGES
engaged in operations beyond collective defense. To deter Russia while looking for ways to reengage
Hence, while much has been said about an alleged and to provide reassurance in Europe while also
post-Afghanistan ‘‘operational fatigue,’’ it appears maintaining an expeditionary focus amount to a
unlikely that the NATO Allies could afford to complex double-balancing act that may be hard to
relinquish their expeditionary focus. They must retain sustain. However, these are not the only challenges
certain expeditionary capabilities if they are to address confronting NATO as a result of the Ukraine crisis. That
contingencies at Europe’s periphery and beyond. crisis will also force the Allies to revisit several other
Not doing so would undo more than 20 years of trans- fundamental tenets of NATO’s approach to security.
atlantic efforts to shift NATO’s traditional geographic The most obvious challenge is NATO enlargement.
approach to security to a functional one. This would While the Allies had agreed not to burden the Wales
decouple Europe from the (global) U.S. security Summit with this potentially controversial issue, the
agenda—a strategic regression that is in neither side’s next summit in 2016 may well be the moment of
interest. Europe’s forces would also lose the experience truth: with Ukraine having revoked its nonaligned
gained in 20 years of NATO operations. Moreover, status in December 2014 as a result of Russia’s
a ‘‘return’’ to collective defense would tie Europe to intervention, a debate about whether to grant that
a mission for which the achievements of the recent country the Membership Action Plan (MAP) looks

84 American Foreign Policy Interests

like a foregone conclusion. At the 2008 Bucharest working with partner countries: new interoperability
Summit, the question of whether to offer the MAP initiatives were unveiled and several partners were
to Ukraine and Georgia had led to a public contro- offered support in defense-capacity building. These
versy among Allies, resulting in a decision to withhold initiatives, together with a more flexible partnership
the MAP in exchange for an unspecific promise that policy that emphasizes functional cooperation
both countries would eventually become NATO irrespective of regional groupings, should go a long
members.10 The Ukraine crisis will make both sides way to sustain the interest of partner countries in
of the argument feel vindicated: those who argued working with NATO. Whether they can also increase
in favor of MAP will claim that not having earmarked NATO’s influence on the domestic reforms of certain
Ukraine in 2008 as a prospective NATO member sig- partner countries remains to be seen.
naled to Russia that it could act against Ukraine with Finally, the challenge of defense spending. At the
impunity. Those who opposed the MAP in 2008 will Wales Summit, Allies agreed to halt the decline in
argue that the entire crisis only proved once again that defense expenditure and aim to increase defense
granting NATO membership to countries such as expenditure in real terms as GDP grows. The aim is
Georgia or Ukraine would be counterproductive to move toward achieving 2 percent of GDP within
and that the enlargement process will only benefit a decade. Allies also vowed to aim, also within a
Allied security if it continues to take place in a non- decade, to increase their annual investments to 20
confrontational environment. As the Warsaw Summit percent or more of total defense expenditures. This
approaches, NATO Allies will have to engage in this ‘‘Wales defense spending pledge’’ may appear gener-
discussion with greater intellectual discipline lest they ous regarding the timelines it sets to achieve its goals.
risk a replay of the 2008 controversy. Still, its political significance is considerable, as it
Another challenge is NATO’s partnerships. One of gives credibility to the expensive measures envisaged
the major policy innovations post–cold war, this by the RAP. It also sends the signal that NATO Allies
policy of developing military cooperation and acknowledge a deterioration of their security environ-
political consultation with non-NATO countries has ment and are prepared to improve their means to
connected NATO with dozens of nations from North- respond. Given the current economic climate, mov-
ern Africa to the Asia-Pacific region. Some partners ing toward the 2 percent guideline will not be easy
have made substantial military contributions to for many Allies. However, four Allies are already at
NATO-led operations, others have supported NATO the 2 percent level and eight others have committed
in other ways. The involvement of partner countries to reach this level in the near future. Moreover, some
has also increased the legitimacy of NATO’s actions. countries have already demonstrated that fiscal disci-
However, the political makeup as well as the expec- pline and adequate defense spending are not oppo-
tations and capabilities of NATO’s partner countries sites. None of these efforts are likely to overcome
differ widely, with some striving to get as close to the perennial U.S. frustration about the other Allies
NATO’s decision-making process as possible and not pulling their weight. However, to the degree that
others being content with minimal engagement. As the Wales defense-spending pledge signals the rever-
long as stabilizing Afghanistan provided a major sal of a trend, it will go some way toward meeting the
common project for most of NATO’s partner coun- challenge of transatlantic burden sharing.
tries, these differences did not matter that much.
However, the end of ISAF means that NATO’s
partnership policy loses a major catalyst. NATO’s
CONCLUSION
eventual shift toward collective defense—which also The Ukraine crisis is a reminder of Europe’s contin-
implies a degree of regionalization—could become ued volatility, yet to argue that it could ‘‘rejuvenate’’
another challenge for NATO’s partnership policy, NATO goes too far. If anything, the crisis will further
since most partners will be neither interested in nor increase the challenges for NATO, in particular how
relevant for the accomplishment of this task.11 to engage Russia, how to provide credible reassur-
Mindful of many partners’ post-ISAF expectations, ance to NATO’s Eastern Allies, and how to balance
the NATO Allies used the Wales Summit to send a the reemphasis on collective defense in Europe with
strong message about their continued interest in the ongoing requirement for crisis management at

Volume 37, Number 2, 2015 85

Europe’s periphery and possibly beyond. Other 2. See the sarcastic comments by Liliana Shevtsova on
factors, such as a potentially controversial enlarge- December 27, 2014, http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?
id=549E64FF3E920, as well as by Aleksander Golts, ‘‘Russia’s
ment process or continued transatlantic debates New Military Doctrine All Bark, No Bite,’’ Moscow Times,
over ‘‘fair’’ burden sharing could further complicate January 12, 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/
the picture. opinion/article/russias-new-military-doctrine-all-bark-no-bite/
514247.html; also see Dmitri Trenin, ‘‘2014: Russia’s New
Even if Russia’s turn for the worse is more than a
Military Doctrine Tells It All,’’ Carnegie Moscow, December
passing phase, a ‘‘Cold War 2.0’’ is something the 29, 2014, http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=57607.
Allies will want to avoid to the extent that it is in their 3. See Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Philip M. Breedlove, ‘‘A NATO
power to do so. A shift toward a posture of ‘‘hedging’’ for a Dangerous World,’’ Wall Street Journal, August 17, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/anders-fogh-rasmussen-and-philip
will be inevitable. However, as long as Russia does -m-breedlove-a-nato-for-a-dangerous-world-1408317653.
not directly confront NATO, Allies are likely to refrain 4. See the debates about ‘‘Live Oak’’ in the early 1960s,
from steps that they would consider to be politically released by NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
provocative, too militarily ambitious, or too finan- 76788.htm.
5. See NATO Fact Sheet on the Readiness Action Plan, December
cially expensive. It may have required Stalin to create 2014, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf
NATO (to paraphrase former NATO Secretary General _2014_12/20141202_141202-facstsheet-rap-en.pdf.
Dirk Stikker), but the twenty-first-century NATO does 6. See Slawomir Sierakowski, ‘‘NATO’s Second-Class Members,’’
New York Times, August 22, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/
not require an assertive Russia to assure its survival.
2014/08/23/opinion/slawomir-sierakowski-natos-second-class-
members.html?_r=0.
Notes 7. See Jakub Palowski, ‘‘ ‘Spearhead’ Is Not Enough. How Can
NATO Stop Russia?,’’ Defence24, http://www.defence24.
1. See ‘‘The Future of NATO. First Principles. Russia’s Annex- com/analysis_spearhead-is-not-enough-how-can-nato-stop-
ation of Crimea Has Brought NATO Renewed Purpose,’’ russia.
The Economist, March 29, 2014, http://www.economist. 8. Doorstep statement by NATO Secretary General Jens
com/news/international/21599797-russias-annexation-crimea- Stoltenberg at the meeting with President Toomas Ilves of
has-brought-nato-renewed-purpose-first-principles; Raf Casert, Estonia, November 20, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
‘‘Ukraine Crisis Gives NATO Alliance New Purpose,’’ AP, natohq/opinions_114973.htm?selectedLocale=en.
March 18, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-crisis-gives- 9. See http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/01/08/us-scales-
nato-alliance-purpose-152109745.html; Anne Applebaum, back-troops-at-europe-bases-to-save-500-million/.
‘‘Obama’s Legacy Could Be a Revitalized NATO,’’ Washington 10. See the blunt assessment provided in Robert M. Gates, Duty.
Post, August 22, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
opinions/anne-applebaum-obamas-legacy-could-be-a-revitalized- 2014), 122.
nato/2014/08/22/0f43da78-2a22-11e4-8593-da634b334390_ 11. Notable exceptions are Finland and Sweden, which share
story.html. similar interests vis-à-vis Russia.

86 American Foreign Policy Interests

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