Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

ISSN: 0096-3402 (Print) 1938-3282 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbul20

The Marshall Plan and American Foreign Policy

Edward S. Mason

To cite this article: Edward S. Mason (1948) The Marshall Plan and American Foreign Policy,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 4:1, 3-10, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.1948.11460146

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1948.11460146

Published online: 15 Sep 2015.

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THE MARSHALL PLAN .
..
AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Edward S. Mason

Dr. Mason, Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration

•
view. The Soviet Union has made
.

substantial progress in binding the

at Harvard, discusses the shift in our foreign policy from negotia- former German satellite countries
plus Poland and Czechoslovakia to
tion, which has proved fruitless, to the positive concept of economic
the communist axis. Although eco-
stability envisioned in the Marshal/ Plan for European Recovery. nomic recovery in this area has not
been notable and although the recov-
Dr. Mason presented this paper before the Academy of Political ery that has occurred has redounded
Science on November 12, and it will shortly appear in the Annals largely to Russian benefit, this has
not prevented the establishment of
of the Academy. strong Russian-dominated govern-
ments. In western Europe, communist
penetration to date has been less
successful. But, if economic recovery
The formulation and implementa- Others say that Russian actions to in the West which at least in the
tion of a program of economic assist- date can all be explained by her pre- area of industrial output has been
ance to Europe which will lead to occupation with security. The Soviet substantial, is now checked, political
economic and political stability there Union, according to this explanation, instability, so obvious in France and
(the so-called Marshall Plan) has be- is suffering from an acute case of Italy is bound to increase.
come the central task of American encirclement phychosis. As far as
foreign policy. The European Re- American policy is concerned, both
covery Program has thus replaced of these explanations add up to ap-
RUSSIANS MAY FIND
direct negotiations with the U.S.S.R. proximately the same thing. An acute
as our immediate method in moving preoccupation with defensive action
toward the stable and peaceful world can easily lead to action which is THEIR FORECAST FALSE
order which is our goal. An under- offensive in both senses of the word.
standing of the significance of this Both of these explanations are, Looking beyond the borders of
shift is prerequisite to useful partici- however, in my opinion wrong, or,
Europe one also must take into ac-
pation in the great continuing debate if not wrong, they are at least cus- count the fact that the depression in
on the achievement of world peace, tomarily stated in a manner that the United States still remains an
a debate in which physical scientists throws little light on appropriate imminent possibility in the Russian
are now taking an energetic part. American action. Our policy of nego- short-run forecast. And, over a longer
The character and magnitude of tiation has failed to date for al- period, Marxian ideology, of course,
American interests in European eco- together different reasons. foresees a disintegration of capitalism
nomic stabilization quite obviously everywhere. As long as events, in
cannot be discussed without reference Europe or the world, appear to bear
to our policy toward Russia. But the THE REAL REASON
out this vision of the immediate fu-
relevance of the current foreign aid ture we may expect to get nowhere
program to our Russian policy needs FOR FAILURE in negotiations with the Soviet Union
to be carefully stated and explicitly on matters that seriously concern the
understood. Whatever else the Russians lack- shape of the postwar world.
To date we have attempted through or for that matter anyone else trained Under these circumstances the only
negotiations with Russia to work out in the Marxian school-they do not effective line of action open to us
the basis of a stable postwar world. lack a sense of history. In fact they is to attempt, ourselves, to influence
We have negotiated in the United Na- have, ready-made, a "scientific" in- the course of events. To me this is
tions, in the Council of Foreign Min- terpretation of history which is not the primary significance of the new
isters, in the Allied Control Coun- only equipped to explain the past approach in American foreign policy.
cils in Berlin and Vienna, in the Far but to predict the future. This inter- If the Marshall program is success-
Eastern Commission, in Korea and pretation of history tells them that ful and the participating countries
elsewhere. To say that these negotia- time is working on their side. And are firmly established on the road to
tions have been notably unsuccessful if time is working on their side, why recovery, we may reasonably expect
belongs in the department of under- should they yield in negotiation today to see the increasing stability and
statement. that which the inevitable course of strength of democratic governments
It is highly important, nevertheless, events will bring them tomorrow? not only in Europe but elsewhere in
to diagnose correctly the reasons for What has happened in Europe, the world. If and when this happens,
this failure. Some say that our failure moreover, in the two and a half years we may also reasonably expect to
springs from the fact that Russia since the end of the war against Ger- see a change in the Soviet forecast
is obviously bent on world conquest. many, lends a certain credence to this with a subsequent improvement in

3
the prospect of achieving agreement about a situation in which it will be tions are of one sort; if, on the other
through the process of negotiation. possible to reach agreement with Rus- hand,-and as I believe--the promo-
After all, this would not be the ia on the main lines of a peace- tion of recovery in Europe will lend
first time that Soviet truculence based ful postwar settlement-and I be- aid and assistance to our attempts
on a faulty forecast has given way lieve this is a fair statement of the to negotiate with Russia, they are
to sweet reasonableness once the objective--it has certain implications, of quite a different sort.
falseness of the forecast had been both domestic and foreign, concerning The hysterical overtones of some
demonstrated by the course of events. the way the program is conducted. of the writing on Russia in certain
After World War I the leaders of sections of the American press cer-
the Russian Revolution expected revo- tainly suggest the first interpreta-
lution elsewhere in the capitalist tion of the program. Both this and
AID MUST BE
world. Indeed, since it was widely the overzealous search for communist
held that the success of communism sympathizers in Washington and else-
A POLITICAL WEAPON where may be condoned, however, if
in Russia depended upon the success
of world revolution, the communists the European aid program is to be
in Germany, Hungary, and other If we hope and expect later to be regarded as a lining up of allies for
countries were urged by their Soviet able to reach agreement with the the inevitable struggle. They are
brethren to try out the formula. When Soviet Union, we will not attempt hardly to be condoned on any other
the formula conspicuously failed, Sov- to convert the Marshall plan into an interpretation.
iet foreign policy changed 180 de- If the foreign aid program is an
anti-Russian program. We will not
grees. It was decided that communism attempt to promote European recov-
ask the European countries to take
could be made to succeed in one coun- sides for the inevitable war between ery in order to establish the basis
trY after all. for an equitable peace settlement,
east and west. We will not undertake
neither hysteria nor the loss of our
If and when the short-run pros- measures which amount to the pro-
civil liberties is called for.
pects for communist development secution of economic warfare against
west of the Iron Curtain hang fire Russia. Rather will we attempt to
and falter, the chances of a satisfac- encourage so far as possible the ex-
tory European settlement will im- change of goods between western MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS
prove. There is then no incomJ'lati- and eastern Europe.
bility between the Marshall program In Germany, while taking the steps FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY
and the continued attempt to reach necessary to the economic recovery
agreement with the Russians through of the western zones, we will not Turning now to the character of the
negotiations. In fact quite the reverse close the door to the unification of United States program in western
is true. Our best chance of reaching Germany. We will not bestow ap- Europe it must be recognized that,
satisfactory agreement is through the proval on western European political if the course of events is to run con-
success of the foreign aid program. parties and governments in propor- trary to the Soviet prognosis, what is
It is for this reason that to char- tion to the intensity and volume of called for is not merely relief but the
acterize the Marshall program as their anti-Russian propaganda. laying of a solid foundation for eco-
anti-Russian or as an attempt to by- What we will do, if the foreign aid nomic recovery. Congress has pro-
pass the United Nations is particular- program is regarded as a necessary claimed the end of "operation rat-
ly absurd. The United Nations will step toward a reasonable settlement hole." If the Marshall program is to
never be able to function as intended among the great powers, is to focus accomplish its purpose, assistance
until the United States and the Sov- attention upon the economic problem from the United States henceforth
iet Union have settled by negotiation of recovery in western Europe. We must be justified primarily in terms
certain outstanding issues of which have the right and the duty to in- of its contribution to economic recov-
the most important are the inter- sist on such measures of cooperation ery. And American assistance, if it
national control of atomic weapons, from European countries as are clear- is to be effective, must be rendered
and the kind of peace settlement to ly necessary to the promotion of eco- within an adequate framework of self-
be imposed on Germany. We shall nomic recovery within the framework help by the European countries and
never be able to settle these issues of established institutions. We have of mutual assistance among these
in a manner at all satisfactory to the no right-nor will we be able--to im- countries.
United States so long as the Soviet pose conditions affecting the struc- This is recognized in the Paris
Union foresees a course of events ture or functioning of political and report of the sixteen countries which
which, for her, makes negotiations economic institutions in the partici- in its statement of principles and in
unnecessary. pating countries. its conception of the problem is an
To embark wholeheartedly on the excellent document. When one turns
foreign aid program does not mean from general principles to the de-
then that we should cease to nego- HYSTERIA AT HOME tailed statement of requirements the
tiate with the Soviet Union. Nor, I report, it is true, is something less
think, need we expect that the Soviet than adequate. No one who has any
MUST BE AVOIDED
Union will break off negotiations un- inkling of the difficulties of nego-
less and until it is sure that the course tiating among sixteen countries a
of events is moving so inexorably in The domestic implications of the schedule of estimated production, ex-
their favor that further negotiations foreign aid program are equally im- ports and import requirements, proj-
is unnecessary. portant. If the program is merely a ected four years into the future, could
If the primary objective of our campaign in a so-called "cold war" have expected otherwise.
economic policy in Europe is to bring against Russia, the domestic implica- (Continued on Page 10)

4
no untoward dislocation of our exist- years two, three and four in mind;
The Marshall Plan
ing economy will result. unless, in other words, it is recog-
(Continued from Page 4) nized that all parts of the program
It is not generally realized that
under present laws (excluding the are interrelated and focused on a
McMahon Act) the government al- There is little doubt that a num- definite recovery objective, there is
ready has the right to use any ber of stated requirements will have nothing to prevent this becoming
materials covered by patents•. There- to be scaled down either because of another "operation rathole."
fore it is difficult to see what ad- lack of availabilities in the United Congress has served notice that it
ditional advantage accrues to the States or because of overambitious is through with emergency appropria-
government in the provisions of the planning of the rate of industrial
McMahon Act which refuse patents tions and stop-gap aid. Is Congress
development and mechanization in ready to recognize the implications
on manufacturing processes for the
Europe. But it is well to recognize of an integrated foreign aid program
production of fissionable materials.
that in other respects the Paris re- carried through consistently to its
The remote possibility that advance port probably understates European
in the field may be held up through final objectives? The answer to that
requirements. The estimates of needed question will be given not only in the
refusal of the patent owner to license
imports are frequently based on over- halls of Congress but in the debate
at reasonable royalty to a third party
could be overcome through a pro- optimistic expectations of rates of on foreign policy which should, and
vision for compulsory licensing of local production. This seems particu- probably will, over the next few
patents of broad application. Thus I larly true in the case of coal and is months, be carried to every village
recommend that the provisions of probably true for a number of other and hamlet in the United States.
Sec. 11 dealing with government industrial areas.
seizure of patents be eliminated. This When one type of error is set off
would restore incentive to private re- against the other, it seems doubtful
search without taking any essential WE MUST NOT
whether the Paris report represents
rights from the government. a serious overstatement of probable
EXPECT GRATITUDE
The foregoing suggestions do not European requirements. Recogniz-
exhaust the possibilities of improve- ing fully the difficulties of such
ment, but they are things that can a forecast it would still be my opin- One final remark on the new ap-
be done immediately without radical ion that the order of magnitude of proach to United States foreign policy
reorganization. At the same time I European requirements stated in the seems in order. Let us not expect too
believe they are sufficient to elimin- report is roughly what will be re- much from this program in the way
ate some of the most fundamental quired to set western Europe on its of popular approbation abroad. Even
defects of the Atomic Energy Act. feet again. if all the European requirements sta-
There is no cause for fear that While it is important to keep this ted in the Paris report were supplied
government control will no be ade- order of magnitude in mind, it has without question by the United States,
quate. In addition to its direct con- little to do with the immediate prob- I doubt whether we should be re-
trol by licensing provisions, the lem. Congressional appropriations will garded as a generous big brother. The
government will have powerful indi- figure of Lady Bountiful is not an
no doubt be made on the customary
rect control through its administra- endearing one in literature. And when
yearly basis and there will be oppor-
tion of the security and clearance the position of Lady Bountiful is
tunity to review the operations of
procedures, through its present mo-
the program at a number of stages. taken by a country which has half
nopoly of the production of fission-
What must be emphasized, however, the world's industrial output and en-
able materials, and through its orders
is that unless appropriations for year joys a standard of living unmatched
for atomic weapons.
one are made with the program for elsewhere, it is too much to expect
The above program, although it that she shall be voted the most pop-
seems at first glance to concern in- ular member of the class. The one
dustry only, will permit independent to the idea that the unsettled state most likely to succeed, perhaps, but
atomic energy research, and thus of international relationships will last
not the most popular.
effectively remedy the present over- for a number of years. We cannot
centralization and change the climate indefinitely hold in check our own European requirements, in fact, will
in the research laboratories. By put- atomic energy development in the not be supplied without question. And
ting atomic energy development on a hope of an international accord which we shall find it necessary, if European
sound economic basis it will be possible will very likely never be reached. recovery is to be effectively promoted,
for universities to finance part of Opening the field of atomic energy to lay down conditions which will be
nuclear research privately, thus end- to American industry is not an ag- felt to be extremely onerous. Recrim-
ing the threat to our traditional ,Pat- gressive step. On the contrary, it inations on both sides will, there-
tern of education which exclusive focusses attention on the peaceful fore, be inevitable. If our objectives
government support entails. applications of atomic power. At the are attained, however, and western
We may as well reconcile ourselves same time the history of the last Europe once more stands on its own
two wars shows that deep industrial feet with governments both dem-
1 The owner of the patent has the right to participation is essential to the ocratic and stable, that will be enough.
a reasonable royalty which may be determined
by the courts. national defense. We should not ask for more.

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