Report on the investigation of

the collision between

Scot Explorer and Dorthe Dalsoe

Route ‘T’ in the Kattegat

Scandinavia

2 November 2004

Marine Accident Investigation Branch

Carlton House
Carlton Place
Southampton
United Kingdom
SO15 2DZ

Report No 10/2005
June 2005
 Extract from

The Merchant Shipping

(Accident Reporting and Investigation)

Regulations 2005 – Regulation 5:

“The sole objective of the investigation of an accident under the Merchant Shipping
(Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005 shall be the prevention of
future accidents through the ascertainment of its causes and circumstances. It shall
not be the purpose of an investigation to determine liability nor, except so far as is
necessary to achieve its objective, to apportion blame.”

NOTE

This report is not written with litigation in mind and, pursuant to Regulation 13(9) of
the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005, shall
be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose, or one of whose purpose
is to attribute or apportion liability or blame.
CONTENTS
Page
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

SYNOPSIS 1

SECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION 3

1.1 Particulars of ships and accident 3
1.2 Narrative 6
1.2.1 Scot Explorer 6
1.2.2 Dorthe Dalsoe 8
1.3 Action following the collision 9
1.4 Environmental conditions 9
1.5 The crews 9
1.5.1 Scot Explorer 9
1.5.2 Dorthe Dalsoe 11
1.6 Use of radar 11
1.7 Employment of able seamen on the bridge of Scot Explorer 12
1.8 Ship management 12
1.9 Determination of manning levels 13
1.9.1 The ship owners and managers 13
1.9.2 The principles of safe manning 14
1.9.3 The Safe Manning Document 14
1.10 STCW 95 – Rest periods and lookout 15

SECTION 2 - ANALYSIS 17
2.1 Aim 17
2.2 Fatigue 17
2.3 Interpretation of the situation 17
2.4 Watchkeeping practices on board Dorthe Dalsoe 19
2.5 Watchkeeping practices on board Scot Explorer 20
2.5.1 Assessment of risk of collision 20
2.5.2 Use of radar 20
2.5.3 Acceptance of CPA 21
2.5.4 Lookout 21
2.6 Employment of ratings as lookout 21
2.7 Safe manning 22

SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS 25
3.1 Findings 25

SECTION 4 - ACTION TAKEN 27

SECTION 5 - RECOMMENDATIONS 29
Figure 1 - Photographs of Scot Explorer

Figure 2 - Photograph of Dorthe Dalsoe

Figure 3 - Extract of chart BA 2107

Figure 4 - The shelter deck on board Dorthe Dalsoe

Figure 5 - AIS record displaying the track of Scot Explorer

Figure 6 - The damage to the bow of Dorthe Dalsoe

Figure 7 - Area defined in the Safe Manning Document

Figure 8 - Radar plot based on the vessels’ courses and speeds

Annex A - The recorded hours of rest – master of Scot Explorer

Annex B - The recorded hours of rest – AB(cook) of Scot Explorer

Annex C - IMO Resolution A890(21) and annexes

Annex D - Scot Explorer – Safe Manning Document

Annex E - Applicable collision regulations

Annex F - Intrada Ship Management Fleet Circular dated 10 November 2004

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AB - Able Seaman

BA - British Admiralty

COLREGS - International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,

1972, as amended

CPA - Closest Point of Approach

DOC - Document of Compliance

DP - Designated Person

GPS - Global Positioning System

IMO - International Maritime Organization

MCA - Maritime and Coastguard Agency

MGN - Marine Guidance Note

MSC - Maritime Safety Committee

MSN - Merchant Shipping Notice

OOW - Officer of the Watch

SMC - Safety Management Certificate

SOLAS - International Convention of Safety of Life at Sea

STCW - International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and

Watchkeeping incorporating the 1995 Amendments

UTC - Universal Co-ordinated Time

VHF - Very High Frequency

SYNOPSIS
The UK registered, 1882 grt, general cargo vessel Scot Explorer sailed from Corpach,
Scotland on 30 October 2004 for passage to Varberg, Sweden, carrying 2107 tonnes
of timber logs. At 1840(UTC+1) on 2 November 2004, she collided with the 14.7m
Danish fishing vessel Dorthe Dalsoe in international waters in the Kattegat. Dorthe
Dalsoe sustained considerable damage to her bow and required assistance from a
Danish patrol vessel and other vessels in the vicinity, being subsequently towed safely
into port. The damage to Scot Explorer was superficial and she was able to continue
her voyage.

The collision occurred when Scot Explorer was following ‘Route T’ on a course of 131°
at 9.8 knots, and Dorthe Dalsoe was on a course of 260° in autopilot at 7 knots. The
fishing vessel was returning to Denmark to land her catch of prawns, after being at
sea since 0300(UTC+1) the previous day. It was dark and visibility was good.

At the time of the accident, the crew of Dorthe Dalsoe, which comprised her skipper
and an inexperienced deckhand, were working on the vessel’s shelter deck, from
where they were unable to see any vessels forward of the beam. Before leaving the
wheelhouse, her skipper had seen a masthead light on the starboard bow but did not
take any further action to determine if a risk of collision existed. He also configured the
navigation lights to indicate that the vessel was not under command on the
assumption that other vessels would keep out of the way.

The master of Scot Explorer, who was on watch on the bridge, had detected Dorthe
Dalsoe both visually and by radar. He had assessed that she would pass between 3
and 4 cables down the port side. When the fishing vessel had closed to within 1 mile,
the master attended to some routine work at the chart table. When he next looked out
of the window, about 2 minutes later, he saw Dorthe Dalsoe very close off the port
bow. Although the master of Scot Explorer immediately changed from auto to manual
steering and applied starboard helm, collision could not be avoided.

The investigation highlighted several causal and contributory factors. These included:

Dorthe Dalsoe
• Her skipper might have been fatigued as a result of insufficient and poor quality
sleep during the period leading up to the accident.
• Her skipper’s knowledge of the COLREGS with regard to lookout, the use of radar,
and the use of ‘not under command’ lights was poor, and its application dangerous.
• The navigation lights displayed were confusing.
• Her starboard side navigation light was probably not discernible among her bright
white deck lights.
• A proper lookout was not maintained and a risk of collision could not be determined
by the skipper when working on the shelter deck.

1
 Scot Explorer
• The estimation of the CPA of Dorthe Dalsoe by radar was inaccurate because of the
rudimentary methods used. Had more of the radar facilities available been used, a
more accurate assessment of the CPA, and therefore risk of collision, would have
been possible.
• The acceptance of a CPA of 4 cables was inappropriate given the sea room
available and the lack of other shipping in the vicinity.
• The master of Scot Explorer was distracted as the vessels closed.
• The master was alone on the bridge. Had an additional lookout been on the bridge,
he would have been well placed to alert the master to the approach of the fishing
vessel.
• The AB nominated as lookout on the bridge of Scot Explorer was unavailable
because priority was given to his duties in the galley.
• Although manned in accordance with her safe manning document, it was difficult for
the vessel to comply with the STCW 95 requirements for a dedicated bridge
lookout.

Following the collision, the ship managers of Scot Explorer increased the manning of
the vessel above the minimum required by her safe manning document, and issued
guidance on the use of bridge lookouts, and the determination of safe passing
distances. The Danish Maritime Authority stated its intention to promulgate the lessons
learned from this and other accidents involving Danish fishing vessels, to the Danish
fishing industry, on completion of a safety study currently in progress.

In response to recommendations previously made by the MAIB, the Maritime and

Coastguard Agency has commissioned an independent survey of safe manning levels
across Europe. Depending on the outcome of this study, a report will be forwarded to
the IMO highlighting the inconsistencies identified. The Maritime and Coastguard
Agency also intends to issue guidance on the use of lookouts in an MGN.

In view of the actions already taken, a recommendation has been made to the MCA to
maintain the priority given to those actions currently in progress regarding safe
manning and the use of bridge lookouts. A recommendation has also been made to the
International Chamber of Shipping to promulgate to its members the need to ensure
that ships are able to meet the requirements for a dedicated lookout during darkness,
and that bridge equipment must be used to its full potential if passing distances are to
be accurately determined.

2
SECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION
1.1 PARTICULARS OF SHIPS AND ACCIDENT

Scot Explorer (Figure 1)

Vessel details
Registered owner : Scot Explorer Shipping Ltd

Manager : Intrada Ships Management Ltd

Port of registry : Rochester

Flag : UK

Type : General cargo

Built : 1996, Societatea Comerciala Navol S.A.

Classification society : Germanischer Lloyd

Construction : Steel

Length overall : 81.68m

Gross tonnage : 1882

Engine power : 749kW

Dorthe Dalsoe (Figure 2)

Vessel details
Registered owner : Privately owned

Port of registry : Frederikshavn

Flag : Denmark

Type : Side trawler

Built : 1962

Construction : Wood

Length overall : 14.7m

Gross tonnage : 19.7

Engine power and/or type : 125kW

3
 Figure 1

Scot Explorer

4
 Figure 2

Dorthe Dalsoe

Accident details
Time and date : 1840(UTC+1) on 2 November 2004

Location of incident : 57°30.9N 011°17.0E

Persons on board : Scot Explorer – 5

Dorthe Dalsoe – 2

Injuries/fatalities : Nil

Damage : Scot Explorer – Superficial

Dorthe Dalsoe – The stem post was broken and
the fore deck crushed. Damage was most
extensive on the port side of the bow where the
hull was breached close to the waterline.

5
 1.2 NARRATIVE
(All times are UTC+1, and all courses are true)

1.2.1 Scot Explorer

Scot Explorer sailed from Corpach, Scotland on 30 October 2004, for passage
to Varburg, Sweden. She was carrying 2107 tonnes of timber logs, of which 226
tonnes was secured on deck. During the evening of 2 November, the ship was
transiting Route ‘T’ in the Kattegat on a course of 131° in autopilot; speed over
the ground was 9.8 knots (Figure 3). The chief officer was the OOW. At 1820,
he saw a vessel at a long distance on his port bow. The vessel, which was
closing, was brightly lit by her white deck lights. A red light was visible above
these lights.

The chief officer assessed that the vessel was a fishing vessel, but could not
determine her aspect or movement, either visually or by radar. As a precaution,
he switched on Scot Explorer’s deck lights to help ensure that she could be
clearly seen by the approaching vessel. Shortly after, when the fishing vessel
was between 3 and 4 miles, the chief officer saw a second red light on the
fishing vessel. He assumed this to be her port side navigation light. Based on
the sighting of this light, together with inspection of the fishing vessel’s relative
trail on the radar display, the chief officer assessed that the fishing vessel had
altered course to starboard, and would pass at a distance of 3 to 4 cables down
the port side.

When the fishing vessel was at a range of between 2.5 and 3 miles, the master
arrived on the bridge to take the bridge watch. The chief officer showed him the
1800 position on the paper chart, which was the last plotted position, and also
pointed out the fishing vessel, two points off the port bow. The chief officer then
went to the mess room for his evening meal.

The master assessed the fishing vessel to be on a reciprocal course and

passing between 3 and 4 cables down the port side. He did not think that the
vessel was actually engaged in fishing because of her speed, which he
estimated to be about 7 knots. There were no other vessels in close proximity.
When the fishing vessel was at one mile, the master could see a red light at the
top of her masthead, a white masthead light, what he took to be a red sidelight,
and deck lights. At this point the master went to the chart table, sited on the port
side of the bridge, to monitor the ship’s position using the graphical display on a
GPS receiver. He then updated the ship’s official logbook. After being at the
chart table for about 2 minutes, the master looked up and saw the fishing vessel
between 30m and 40m off the port bow. He immediately changed to hand
steering and applied starboard helm. Seconds later the vessels collided.

6
 Reproduced from Admiralty Chart 2107 by permission of
the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic office
Figure 3

7
 1.2.2 Dorthe Dalsoe
Dorthe Dalsoe sailed from Frederikshavn, Denmark at 0300 on 1 November for
passage to the fishing grounds in the southern part of the Vinga Rende, where
she arrived at 0700 the same morning. She then trawled for prawns, with each
tow lasting for about 7 hours. After hauling the fishing gear at 1800 on 2
November, the vessel commenced her return passage to Frederikshavn. Her
course was 260° in autopilot, and her speed was 7 knots. There were no radar
contacts on either of the two radar displays fitted, which were set to 1.5 and 3
mile range scales. However, the skipper saw a white masthead light about 45°
on the starboard bow and at an estimated range of between 4 and 5 miles. The
skipper switched off the vessel’s green trawling light, and switched on two red
lights sited one above the other on the aft masthead. He then joined the
deckhand on the shelter deck (Figure 4). The next he knew was when both
crew felt a heavy bump as Dorthe Dalsoe and Scot Explorer collided.

In addition to the two red lights on the aft masthead, the vessel displayed a
white light on her foremast, red and green sidelights, a white stern light, and
deck lights. The skipper frequently displayed this configuration of lights to
indicate that the vessel was ‘not under command’ when he left the wheelhouse
unattended to clean the catch on the shelter deck. It was the skipper’s
expectation that other vessels would keep out of the way. There were no
reported problems with the functioning of the vessel’s autopilot.
Figure 4

The shelter deck on board Dorthe Dalsoe

8
1.3 ACTION FOLLOWING THE COLLISION
Following the collision, the skipper of Dorthe Dalsoe went to the wheelhouse
and engaged the engine astern. He then contacted two other fishing vessels in
the vicinity, FN 269 and FN 270 via VHF radio, channel P1. He informed them
of the collision and asked for assistance. At 1841, the skipper also informed
Lyngby Radio via VHF radio, channel 16.

The master of Scot Explorer reduced speed, and sounded the general alarm.
The rescue boat was made ready to assist, and the chief officer went forward to
check for damage. At 1842, the master contacted Dorthe Dalsoe on VHF
channel 16, and requested they shift to channel 6. However, there was no
further communication between the two vessels because the skipper of Dorthe
Dalsoe did not speak English, and the master of Scot Explorer did not speak
Danish. At about 1849, Scot Explorer turned to head towards Dorthe Dalsoe
(Figure 5), and at 1851 Lyngby Radio transmitted a PAN message regarding
the collision.

After finding that Dorthe Dalsoe was taking in water forward, the skipper took
the precautionary measure of releasing the liferaft sited on top of the
wheelhouse in case it was needed at short notice. He then tried to make for
Osterby, but quickly stopped again when it was evident that the vessel’s forward
movement increased the water ingress through the damaged bow (Figure 6).
Once stopped, Dorthe Dalsoe was soon joined by FN 269 and FN270, Scot
Explorer, and the Danish naval patrol vessel Storen. Three pumps were
transferred to Dorthe Dalsoe from Storen and another vessel LRB 19, and at
2010 when two of the pumps were working correctly, Dorthe Dalsoe was taken
in tow by FN 270. The two vessels arrived in Strandby at 0045 the following
morning.

1.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

The visibility was good and the wind was south-east force 2 to force 4. Sunset
was at 1624, evening civil twilight was at 1705, and nautical twilight was at
1753. There was no moon.

1.5 THE CREWS

1.5.1 Scot Explorer
Scot Explorer had a crew of five comprising a British master, a Polish chief
officer, a British chief engineer and two Filipino ABs. One of the ABs was
nominated as cook.

The master first went to sea in 1978 with Crescent Shipping, where he spent 10
years as a second officer. He qualified as a chief officer in 1988, and gained his
command endorsement in 1997. In March 2002, the master moved to Intrada
Ship Management, where he served successive contracts as master on board
Scot Pioneer until August 2004. He joined Scot Explorer on 22 August 2004.

9
10
Figure 5

AIS display showing the track of Scot Explorer

 Figure 6
The master worked a pattern of 10
weeks on board, followed by 5 weeks of
leave. When at sea, he kept the 6 to 12
watches on the bridge, although the
exact timing varied due to the ship’s
schedule and meals. The master’s
record of hours of rest for October is at
Annex A. The master slept in his cabin
between 1500 and 1730 during the
afternoon of 2 November. He then ate
and watched TV in the mess room from
1800 to about 1835. He did not feel
tired.

The chief officer first went to sea in 1973

as an AB. He became an officer in 1991
and, although qualifying as a chief officer
in 1996, he continued to serve as a
second officer until joining Intrada Ship
Management in January 2002. While
working for Intrada, he had worked on
board Scot Ranger, Scot Pioneer, Scot
Trader, and had joined Scot Explorer on
25 August 2004. The chief officer had
previously worked with the master on
board Scot Pioneer. He kept the 12 to 6
Damage to the bow of Dorthe Dalsoe
watches on the bridge when at sea.
1.5.2 Dorthe Dalsoe
The crew of Dorthe Dalsoe comprised the skipper and one deckhand. Neither
had any nautical qualifications, or attended any nautical training courses. The
skipper was 37 years old and had been fishing for 20 years. He had owned
Dorthe Dalsoe for 7 years. This was the first time the deckhand had been to sea
on board a fishing vessel, and he described himself as a ‘tourist’ on board. The
skipper and the deckhand took turns to sleep while towing. The skipper slept a
total of about 8 hours during the trip, all of which was taken in the wheelhouse.

1.6 USE OF RADAR

Scot Explorer was fitted with two bridge radar displays, one of which was a river
radar and not used during sea voyages. The radar display in use was a Racal
Decca Bridgemaster, sited on the port side of the bridge next to the chart table.
When the master relieved the chief officer on the bridge, the display was initially
set to the 6-mile range scale but had been reduced to the 3-mile scale before
the collision. The display was course up in relative motion, and the master and
chief officer had determined the CPA of Dorthe Dalsoe using its synthetically
produced target trails based on 3 minutes of tracking. The range of the fishing

11
 vessel was estimated based on an assessment of the radar target’s position
relative to the fixed range rings on the radar display. The Bridgemaster display
was equipped with automatic acquisition and tracking, and guard zone facilities,
but these were not used. This was the first time the master had worked on board
a vessel equipped with a Bridgemaster display, but he was familiar with the use
of automatic plotting facilities.

1.7 EMPLOYMENT OF ABLE SEAMEN ON THE BRIDGE OF SCOT EXPLORER

It was stated that it was usual practice for an OOW to be accompanied on the
bridge by an AB during the hours of darkness. The AB nominated to accompany
the chief officer did not go to the bridge after dark on the evening of 2 November
because he was having supper. The AB nominated to accompany the master,
was also the cook, and was prevented from being on the bridge at the time of
the accident by his work in the galley. The AB cook normally worked in the
galley between 1000 and 1400, and between 1700 and 1900. His recorded
hours of rest for October are at (Annex B). The evening meal on board Scot
Explorer was routinely taken between 1800 and 1815. The crew acknowledged
that it was not always possible for an AB to be on the bridge during darkness,
particularly during meal times.

Following an earlier accident involving Scot Venture, Intrada Ship Management

issued a fleet directive in June 2004 titled Keeping a Safe Navigational Watch.
With regard to the employment of ABs on the bridge, this stated:
The Navigational Watch Rating is to be on the bridge not just during the
hours of darkness but as circumstances dictate, i.e. restricted visibility, heavy
commercial traffic, concentrations of fishing vessels or pleasure craft and
narrow or busy channels.

1.8 SHIP MANAGEMENT

Intrada Ship Management Limited was formed in 1977 and, at the time of the
accident, managed all seven ships owned by Scot Line. All of these vessels
were UK flag, and operated chiefly within the short-sea trade carrying timber
products between the UK and Scandinavia, spending an average of 2 days on
passage and 12 hours in port. The company also chartered two other vessels
engaged on similar operations.

The company’s DOC was issued by the MCA in September 2002, and an Interim
SMC for Scot Explorer was issued by Germanischer Lloyd on behalf of the MCA
on 30 August 2004. The ship’s DP was one of the company’s technical
superintendents. He was also the DP for the other vessels owned by Scot Line
and managed by Intrada. The crewing manager, who was a qualified master,
conducted the company’s internal navigational audit of its vessels.

12
1.9 DETERMINATION OF MANNING LEVELS
1.9.1 The ship owners and managers
Formerly Bornrif, Scot Explorer was purchased and renamed by Scot Line on 31
August 2004. The ship changed from the Netherlands to the UK flag on the
same day. The vessel had been acquired to help meet the company’s
increasing share of freight market volume. The company reported that it had
experienced difficulty in obtaining a vessel of this type due to the limited number
of secondhand vessels available, and the delivery forecasts for new builds
typically being in the region of 3 years. Before purchasing Scot Explorer, Scot
Line had chartered her on consecutive voyage charters since April 2004.

When operating under the Netherlands flag, the minimum crew permitted by her
safe manning document was five, which was the maximum number the vessel
was able to accommodate in separate cabins. However, the master’s cabin was
equipped with two bedrooms.

Intrada Ship Management was uncertain whether the MCA would give approval
for Scot Explorer to be operated with a crew of five, which was fewer than its
other vessels. Before completing the purchase, the company submitted a
provisional application for a Safe Manning Document to the MCA on 8 June
2004, in order to seek its views on the matter. The application proposed a
minimum crew of five, in line with the accommodation available. Had the
application been rejected by the MCA, the company reported that it would have
investigated other options, including approaches to other Administrations. It did
not, however, state this as a possible course of action when forwarding its
original application to the MCA.

Despite observing that the vessel had operated efficiently with five crew when
on charter, and the company was aware that many of its competitors operated
vessels with fewer crew, Intrada had reservations about operating the vessel
with a crew of only five. Consequently, it decided to review the situation after the
ship had been running for three months. Prior to the purchase of Scot Explorer,
her designated master had been reluctant to accept command when initially
offered because of the differences in manning levels compared to Scot Pioneer.
When in command, he had discussed the limited accommodation available with
the DP and crewing manager after being invited to take an additional chief
engineer to sea for familiarisation. It had been agreed by the master and the
DP, that if operating with a crew of five was not successful, the number of crew
would be increased to six. The DP had researched the cost of modifying the
accommodation accordingly. Immediately following the collision, the master
stated that the operation of Scot Explorer was labour intensive, and that a third
AB would be of benefit, particularly when working cargo.

13
 1.9.2 The principles of safe manning
The principles of safe manning are laid out in IMO Resolution A.890 (21) (Annex
C) and SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 14. It is not mandatory for flag
administrations to adhere to these guidelines, but where they are followed,
responsibility for the application of these principles rests with the ships’ owners
and managers, with responsibility for approval falling to the relevant
administration. Guidance on the application of these principles is provided by the
MCA in MSN 1767(M), which also contains guidance on hours of rest and
watchkeeping. It also provides guidance on the numbers of certified deck and
engineer officers appropriate to the sizes of ships, tonnages and trading areas. It
does not provide specific guidance regarding the number of ratings to be
carried. With regard to consultation, the MSN states:
Owners and operators should consult with the master, seafarers’
representatives and the MCA (where appropriate) on their proposed manning
levels.

1.9.3 The Safe Manning Document

The Safe Manning Document for Scot Explorer (Annex D) was issued by the
MCA on 26 August 2004. It approved the vessel to be operated with a crew of
five within the area bounded by:
a line from a point on the Norwegian coast in latitude 62° North to a point 62°
North 02° West; thence to a point 58° North 10° West; thence to a point 54°
North 14° West; thence to a point 51° North 14° West; thence to a point 38°
40’ North 10° West; thence to Cape St Vincent including the Baltic Sea.

This area is shown at Figure 7. When operating outside this area, the ship was
required to carry an additional OOW (deck) and a second engineer.

The Safe Manning Document for Scot Venture, a 2594grt, UK flagged vessel
managed by Intrada and operating in the same trading area, required her to
carry a crew of seven when operating in the same area. This comprised a
master, a chief officer, a chief engineer, a motorman, two ABs and a cook. Scot
Pioneer, which was 1587grt, and had been the master’s previous command
within the company, had a minimum crew of six, including three ABs.

In 2004, the MCA installed a database of all UK registered vessels which

allowed comparison of vessels of similar size and operation. This facilitated
greater consistency when issuing Safe Manning Documents. However, the MCA
stated that it was difficult to modify Safe Manning Documents already approved.
It also stated that it did not consider it practical to require owners to modify
accommodation in order to implement the principles of safe manning. Some
owners had removed their vessels from the UK register following the MCA’s
rejection of their safe manning proposals.

14
 Figure 7

62°N 002°W

58°N
010°W A

54°N
014°W
51°N
014°W
A represents area defined in safe manning document
A

38°40’N
010°W

Area defined in the safe manning document

1.10 STCW 95 – REST PERIODS AND LOOKOUT

The provisions of STCW 95 include a mandatory code regarding manning and
operational matters. The code addresses watchkeeping at sea and sets out
certain principles to be observed in keeping a navigational watch, including the
keeping of a lookout. Relevant parts of the text read as follows:
Regulation VIII/1
“Each Administration shall, for the purpose of preventing fatigue;

1. establish and enforce rest periods for watchkeeping personnel; and

2. require that watch systems are so arranged that the efficiency of all
watchkeeping personnel is not impaired by fatigue and that duties are so
organised that the first watch at the commencement of a voyage and
subsequent relieving watches are sufficiently rested and otherwise fit for
duty.

15
 Section A-VIII/1
1. All persons who are assigned duty as officer in charge of a watch…shall be
provided a minimum of 10 hours rest in any 24 hour period.

2. The hours of rest may be divided into no more than two periods, one of
which shall be at least 6 hours in length.

The requirements for rest periods laid down in paragraph 1 and 2 need not be
maintained in the case of an emergency or drill or in any other overriding
operational conditions.

3. …the minimum period of 10 hours may be reduced to not less than 6

consecutive hours provided that any such reduction shall not extend beyond
two days and not less than 70 hours rest are provided each seven day
period.

Section A-VIII/2.Part 3
1. The duties of the lookout and helmsperson are separate and the
helmsperson shall not be considered to be the lookout while steering, except
in small ships where an unobstructed all-round view is provided at the
steering position and there is no impairment of night vision or other
impediment to the keeping of a proper lookout. The officer in charge of the
navigational watch may be the sole lookout in daylight provided that on each
such occasion:
a. the situation has been carefully assessed and it has been established
without doubt that it is safe to do so;

b. full account has been taken of all relevant factors, including, but not
limited to:
- state of weather,
- visibility
- traffic density
- proximity of dangers to navigation
- the attention necessary when navigating in or near traffic separation
schemes; and

c. assistance is immediately available to be summoned to the bridge when

any change in the situation so requires

16
SECTION 2 - ANALYSIS
2.1 AIM
The purpose of the analysis is to determine the contributory causes and
circumstances of the accident as a basis for making recommendations to
prevent similar accidents occurring in the future.

2.2 FATIGUE
As the skipper of Dorthe Dalsoe had only 8 hours sleep, taken in the
wheelhouse when towing, during the 38 hours before the accident, it is probable
that he was feeling some effects of fatigue. The quantity of sleep was
insufficient, and its quality was poor. However, in view of the fact that it was his
normal practice to leave the wheelhouse unattended when cleaning the catch, it
is difficult to determine the extent to which the effects of fatigue might have
influenced the skipper’s decision-making in this respect.

Assuming that the recorded hours of rest (Annex A) for the master of Scot
Explorer are accurate, these exceed the minimum required by STCW 95 and
MGN 1767 (M). Additionally, as the master had also slept for 2.5 hours in the
afternoon, did not feel tired, and was active on the bridge after taking over the
watch, there is no evidence to indicate that his performance was affected by
fatigue.

2.3 INTERPRETATION OF THE SITUATION

Figure 8 is a plot based on the stated courses and speeds of Scot Explorer and
Dorthe Dalsoe. This shows that Dorthe Dalsoe closed Scot Explorer from a
bearing of 110° with a relative closing speed of 15.2 knots. This correlates with
the assessment that she was two points on the port bow when the master of
Scot Explorer took over the watch.

The course and speed of Scot Explorer have been verified by AIS data (Figure
5). Similar data is not available for Dorthe Dalsoe, and it is possible that the
fishing vessel altered course when the vessels were in close proximity due to a
malfunction of her autopilot. However, as the skipper of Dorthe Dalsoe was not
in a position to detect or notice such a malfunction, and the master of Scot
Explorer was not observing the vessel at the time, there is no eye witness
evidence to corroborate this possibility. Also, given that there had been no
previous problems experienced with the autopilot on board Dorthe Dalsoe, its
malfunction is considered to have been unlikely.

It is therefore most probable that both vessels had been on steady courses
throughout the build up to the collision.

17
 Figure 8

Radar plot based on the vessels’ course and speed

18
2.4 WATCHKEEPING PRACTICES ON BOARD DORTHE DALSOE
A vessel “not under command” is defined in the COLREGS (Rule 3f), and
results from an “exceptional circumstance” which prevents a vessel from being
able to manoeuvre to avoid other ships. This is normally interpreted as
unforeseen and unplanned events such as machinery breakdowns. The
cleaning of a fishing vessel’s catch is neither unforeseen, nor unplanned, nor
does it affect manoeuvrability. Dorthe Dalsoe was therefore not a vessel “not
under command” and, as she was also not “engaged in fishing” (Rule 3 d), she
was a “power driven vessel” (Rule 3b). As such, given the disposition and
movement of the two vessels, she was required to keep clear of Scot Explorer
in accordance with rules 15 and 16 of the collision regulations (Annex E).

The lights displayed by Dorthe Dalsoe to indicate that she was “not under
command” were also not in accordance with the requirements of the COLREGS
(Rule 27a). The display of a white masthead light forward was additional to the
requirements, and was a potential source of confusion to other vessels. It was
therefore not surprising that both the chief officer, and the master of Scot
Explorer, were not only unable to identify the lights exhibited as being for a
vessel “not under command”, but also misidentified one of the red lights on the
aft mast as a sidelight.

When the skipper left the wheelhouse and went to the shelter deck, from where
he had virtually no external visibility, he could not maintain a proper lookout, or
determine if a risk of collision existed. Although the COLREGS require these
obligations to be met by every vessel, regardless of status or condition, such
obligations were either not understood by the skipper, or were ignored by him.
This was emphasised by the fact that the skipper went to the shelter deck even
though he was aware that Dorthe Dalsoe was approaching Route “T” and the
masthead light of Scot Explorer was seen closing on the starboard bow. Had the
skipper increased the range set on his radar displays as required by COLREG
Rule 7, this would have provided him with the information required to determine
the CPA of Scot Explorer, and the risk of collision.

It is evident that the skipper’s knowledge and application of the COLREGS was
poor. His categorisation of Dorthe Dalsoe as being “not under command” was
erroneous, but was probably seen as a convenient measure, which the skipper
thought justified the abrogation of his duties towards other vessels while
preparing his catch for landing. The skipper’s decisions to move to the shelter
deck, and to display what he considered to be lights indicating that the vessel
was not under command, in the expectation that other vessels would keep out
of his way, were significant contributory factors to this collision.

19
 2.5 WATCHKEEPING PRACTICES ON BOARD SCOT EXPLORER
2.5.1 Assessment of risk of collision
As the closing speed was 15.2 knots and the collision occurred at 1840, the
distance between the two vessels must have been about 5 miles when Dorthe
Dalsoe was first sighted at 1820. From this point, the chief officer and then the
master determined her CPA and the risk of collision from her visual aspect,
based on their interpretation of the navigation lights seen, and from a visual
inspection of the synthetic trail behind her echo on the radar display. Their
resulting assessments were incorrect.

As discussed earlier, the lights displayed by Dorthe Dalsoe were potentially

confusing. It was therefore not surprising the deck officers of Scot Explorer
mistook one of the red lights at the aft masthead to be a port navigation light. As
a result, they assumed they were seeing a port bow aspect and that the fishing
vessel would pass down their port side. This was not the case. Given the
courses of the two vessels, Scot Explorer must have been around 60° on the
starboard bow of Dorthe Dalsoe. This is supported by her skipper’s sighting of a
white masthead light about 45° on the starboard bow before he left the
wheelhouse. The deck officers on board Scot Explorer might have realised the
error in their assumption had they seen the fishing vessel’s green starboard side
navigation light. It is not certain why they did not, but it is probable that the
green light was not readily discernible among the bright white deck lights.

The assessment that Dorthe Dalsoe was a fishing vessel, but was not engaged
in fishing, although correct, was potentially hazardous given the way the
information provided by the radar was used to estimate her speed. However,
many fishing vessels display lights and shapes to indicate that they are engaged
in fishing when on passage, and it is not surprising that many seafarers are
becoming increasingly sceptical of their validity. While the assessment made by
the master would have been made by many of his peers in similar situations, it
is dangerous to make such an assumption.

2.5.2 Use of radar

If the radar had been used to its full potential, it is highly probable that the
confusion caused by the configuration of the fishing vessel’s navigation lights
would have been resolved in time for successful avoidance action to have been
taken. Visual inspection of Dorthe Dalsoe’s radar target trail would only have
given an approximation of her CPA, and would have relied on the judgment of
the master and chief officer to visually extend the trail past the origin of the radar
display. Also, as a target trail is initially lost following a change in range scale,
the master’s reduction of the radar range would have inevitably further reduced
the accuracy of this method until the trail had sufficient time to re-build.

Errors in the assessment of the CPA might also have resulted from the use of a
smaller range scale than intended. The master considered that Dorthe Dalsoe
was at one mile when he went to the chart table. The vessels were closing at
15.2 knots, which would have given an interval of almost 4 minutes to the
20
 collision. However, if the master was only at the chart table for 2 minutes before
the collision occurred, it follows that Dorthe Dalsoe must have initially been at a
distance of only 5 cables. It is possible that the master was at the chart table for
a longer period than he recollects, but it is equally possible that he reduced to
the 1.5 mile range scale, rather than the 3 mile range scale. If this were the
case, the use of the fixed range rings to measure distance would have caused
the master to double not only the distance of Dorthe Dalsoe, but also her
estimated CPA.

Had more of the radar’s facilities, such as automatic plotting, electronic bearing
line, and variable range marker been used, a more accurate assessment of the
CPA of Dorthe Dalsoe, and therefore risk of collision, would have been possible.
The monitoring of the fishing vessel’s bearing by radar would have also given a
reliable indication in this respect.

2.5.3 Acceptance of CPA

An estimated passing distance of between 3 to 4 cables does not provide much
of a safety margin considering the accuracy of the methods available to
determine CPA, and the possibility of unpredictable movement due to
mechanical failure or human behaviour. Notwithstanding the master and chief
officer’s incorrect determination of the heading and CPA of Dorthe Dalsoe, given
that there were no other vessels in the vicinity, there was no reason why the
chief officer or master could not have taken early action to provide a greater
margin of safety. Had they done so, the risk of collision would have been
considerably reduced.

2.5.4 Lookout
When two vessels are in close proximity, it is usual for an OOW to monitor the
situation carefully, at least until the other vessel has passed her CPA. In this
case, the master’s preoccupation with routine administration distracted him from
this important task. He did not monitor Dorthe Dalsoe from the time when he
moved to the chart table until seconds before the collision. Consequently,
because he was alone on the bridge, and had not utilised the radar guard zone
facility, he was ignorant of the approaching danger. Had a proper lookout been
maintained, the likelihood of collision would probably have been detected in time
for successful avoiding action to be taken.

2.6 EMPLOYMENT OF RATINGS AS LOOKOUT

Contrary to the requirements of STCW 95 and the Intrada Ship Management
Fleet Circular issued in June 2004, which require an additional lookout to be on
the bridge during the hours of darkness, the chief officer and master kept their
watches alone during the evening of 2 November. With Scot Explorer operating
in northern Europe in winter with only two ABs available, the difficulty
experienced in providing an additional lookout during the extended hours of
darkness was understandable, particularly during meal times. However, there

21
 was no apparent reason why the conflicting duties of the AB could not have
been resolved by better management of the meal times on board. There was
certainly no reason why he could not have at least accompanied the chief officer
for the hour between evening civil twilight and the start of supper. The fact that
he did not, possibly reflects the low priority given to the importance of providing
an additional lookout in relation to other duties.

Many bridge watchkeepers interviewed by the MAIB in recent years have

considered that the employment of deck ratings on the bridge as an additional
lookout was a waste of time, even during darkness or in busy shipping areas. In
many cases where they are used, their presence is seen as a token gesture
aimed at meeting regulatory requirements at the expense of deck maintenance
and other tasks. Others simply prefer to keep watches alone. In this case, had
the AB been on the bridge and not in the galley, he would have been available
to assist the master in monitoring the Dorthe Dalsoe. A trained and properly
briefed lookout would also have been well placed to quickly alert him to the
approach of the fishing vessel.

Until OOWs understand and appreciate the contributions to ship safety a

properly trained and briefed additional lookout can make, the positive impact of
any regulatory requirements regarding their use will be considerably reduced.

2.7 SAFE MANNING

The principles of safe manning contained in IMO Resolution 890(21), although
comprehensive, are not prescriptive or mandatory, and converting them into a
set number of persons on a particular ship requires many subjective
assessments to be made by vessels’ owners and managers, and the approving
Administrations. When assessing the number of deck ratings required, among
the basic requirements and duties which need to be considered are: deck
maintenance; cargo loading and discharge; mooring arrangements; bridge
manning, particularly the requirement for additional lookout; emergency
response; and even catering arrangements. All of which need to be completed
within the number of hours an individual is allowed to work by the requirements
of STCW 95, and for UK ships, MSN 1767.

Examination of the recorded hours of rest of the AB employed in the galley

(Annex B), shows that he was able to rest about 12 hours each day. However,
this only appears to reflect his 0600 to 1200 and 1800 to 2400 watch pattern. It
does not take into account the hours he typically had to work in the galley in
addition to his routine watches, namely 1200-1400 and 1700-1800. During the
latter half of October, he would therefore have only been able to rest for a total
of 9 hours in each 24-hour period. Consequently, it is apparent that in order to
fulfil his duties as lookout during darkness, cook, and general deckhand
employed on maintenance and cargo handling, the AB in question was not able
to achieve the minimum hours of rest required. Had a third deck rating been
carried, this would have been less likely, and the provision of a lookout on the
bridge would have been much easier to arrange during meal times.

22
Intrada had managed ships similar to Scot Explorer for a number of years, and
was experienced in the demands placed on its vessels and their crews. Its
decision to purchase the vessel was made against a background of an
increasing share of the market volume, difficulties in acquiring suitable ships of
similar size and type, knowledge of its competitors operating ships with fewer
crew, and a positive impression of the ship when under charter. However, the
company’s approach to the MCA for provisional approval for a minimum crew of
five before purchase, and its decision to initially operate the ship for a trial
period after purchase, indicate that the company had doubts about operating the
ship with fewer crew than on its other vessels. Given the hours required to be
worked by the AB cook, and the difficulties experienced in providing an
additional lookout, these doubts were justified. It was unfortunate that these
concerns were not taken into account before the manning proposal was
submitted to the MCA.

Owners and ship managers have a responsibility to propose safe manning

levels. At the same time, they are also under commercial pressure to keep
manning costs down. In recent years, manning costs have largely been kept in
check via automation, advances in technology, and the employment of lower
paid seafarers from developing economies. However, the pressure to drive the
cost of manning down further has caused many owners and managers to
reduce the manning levels on board ships to as low as possible, with ‘safe
manning’ increasingly becoming synonymous with ‘maximum manning’.

The failure of Administrations to check this downward movement has resulted in

‘safe manning’ levels becoming ‘unsafe’. This is evident, not only from the
inability of the regulatory requirements regarding the minimum hours of rest and
the provision of additional lookout to be met on board Scot Explorer, but also
from many similar deficiencies highlighted in other MAIB investigations. A further
important consequence is that many ships, including Scot Explorer, have been
built with limited accommodation. This was problematic for Intrada in its search
for a suitable vessel, and will inevitably have a bearing on the determination of
safe manning levels in many ships in future years.

Administrations are obliged to ensure that the proposals of ship owners and
managers are reasonable, otherwise the requirement for approval is
meaningless. However, Administrations have their own financial and political
pressures, which interfere with this process. In this case, although the ship
manager did not state that it would approach another Administration if its
proposed manning for Scot Explorer was not generally accepted, the MCA was
conscious that this was a likely course of action. Consequently, it had to decide
whether to allow the vessel to trade between the UK and Scandinavia with
fewer crew than similar vessels within the same company, or to lose the ship to
another Administration, as had happened on other occasions. By approving the
ship’s operation with a crew of five within defined geographical constraints,

23
 which was acceptable to the ship manager, the MCA was able to put the ship on
its register and had some control on her operation. Had the ship been flagged
with another Administration, as she had been previously, she would have still
been a regular visitor to the UK, but the influence of the MCA would have been
restricted to Port State Inspections. It is considered that the majority of
Administrations would have taken similar action to that of the MCA.

Given the commercial pressures on ship owners and managers, and their ability
to move between competing Administrations, the downward pressure on
manning levels is likely to continue to have a detrimental effect on safety unless
action is taken to address the subjective manner in which safe manning levels
are determined. Notwithstanding the limitations of ships’ accommodation, and
extant approvals for sister vessels and ships of similar size and operation, this
can only realistically be achieved via prescriptive measures regarding the
number of officers and ratings to be carried. Such prescription needs to be
applied by all Administrations, or to all ships operating within a geo-economic
area such as the European Union.

24
SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS
3.1 FINDINGS
1. Although the quantity of sleep achieved by the skipper of Dorthe Dalsoe was
insufficient, and its quality was poor, it is difficult to determine the extent to
which the effects of fatigue might have influenced his decision-making. [2.2]

2. There is no evidence to indicate that the performance of the master of Scot

Explorer was affected by fatigue. [2.2]

3. Given the courses and speeds of the two vessels, Dorthe Dalsoe closed Scot
Explorer from a bearing of 110° with a relative closing speed of 15.2 knots.
There is no evidence to indicate that Dorthe Dalsoe changed course when the
vessels were in close proximity due to malfunction of her autopilot. [2.3]

4. Dorthe Dalsoe was a ‘power driven vessel’ not ‘a vessel not under command’
and, given the disposition and movement of the two vessels, she was required
to keep clear of Scot Explorer in accordance with rules 15 and 16 of the
collision regulations. [2.4]

5. The lights displayed by Dorthe Dalsoe to indicate that she was “not under
command” were not in accordance with collision regulations, and the display of
a white masthead light forward was a potential source of confusion to other
vessels. [2.4]

6. When the skipper left the wheelhouse and went to the shelter deck from where
he had virtually no external visibility, he could not maintain a proper lookout, or
determine if a risk of collision existed. [2.4]

7. The decisions of the skipper of Dorthe Dalsoe to move to the shelter deck, and
to display what he considered to be lights indicating that the vessel was not
under command, in the expectation that other vessels would keep out of his
way, were significant contributory factors to this collision. [2.4]

8. The assessments of the master and chief officer of Scot Explorer with regard to
the CPA and risk of collision with Dorthe Dalsoe, which were based on their
interpretation of the navigation lights seen, and from a visual inspection of the
synthetic trail behind her echo on the radar display, were incorrect. [2.5.1]

9. It is probable that the fishing vessel’s green starboard light was not seen by the
crew of Scot Explorer because it was not readily discernible among the bright
white deck lights. [2.5.1]

10. Many fishing vessels display lights and shapes to indicate that they are
engaged in fishing when on passage, and it is not surprising that many
seafarers are becoming increasingly sceptical of their validity. [2.5.1]

25
 11. Had more of the radar’s facilities on board Scot Explorer, such as automatic
plotting, electronic bearing line, and variable range marker been used, a more
accurate assessment of the CPA of Dorthe Dalsoe, and therefore risk of
collision, would have been possible. [2.5.2]

12. The radar guard facility was not being utilised. [2.5.4]

13. Notwithstanding the incorrect determination of the heading and CPA of Dorthe
Dalsoe, given that there were no other vessels in the vicinity, there was no
reason why the chief officer or master of Scot Explorer could not have taken
early action to provide a greater margin of safety. [2.5.3]

14. Had the master of Scot Explorer maintained a proper lookout, the likelihood of
collision would probably have been detected in time for successful avoiding
action to be taken. [2.5.4]

15. There was no apparent reason why the conflicting duties of the ABs on board
Scot Explorer could not have been resolved by better management of the meal
times on board. The fact that this was not done, possibly reflects a low priority
given to the importance of an additional lookout. [2.6]

16. Had the AB been on the bridge of Scot Explorer and not in the galley, he would
have been available to assist the master in monitoring Dorthe Dalsoe, and would
have been well placed to quickly alert him to the approach of the fishing vessel.
[2.6]

17. Until OOWs understand and appreciate the contributions to ship safety an
additional lookout can make, the positive impact of any regulatory requirements
for their use, will be considerably reduced. [2.6]

18. In order to fulfil his duties as, bridge lookout during darkness, cook, and general
deckhand employed on maintenance and cargo handling, the AB in question on
board Scot Explorer was not able to achieve the minimum hours of rest required.
[2.7]

19. Given the hours required to be worked by the AB employed in the galley of Scot
Explorer, and the difficulties experienced in providing an additional lookout, the
doubts of the ship manager regarding the ship’s manning level were justified.
[2.7]

20. The failure of Administrations to check the downward movement of manning

levels has resulted in ‘safe manning’ levels becoming ‘unsafe’. [2.7]

21. The detrimental effects on safety, of the downward movement of manning levels,
can only be relieved via prescriptive requirements regarding the number of
officers and ratings to be carried. Such prescription needs to be applied by all
Administrations, or to all ships operating within a geo-economic area such as the
European Union. [2.7]

26
SECTION 4 - ACTION TAKEN
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch:

• In its Bridge Watchkeeping Study published in July 2004, the MAIB recommended
that the MCA take the conclusions of the study forward to the IMO with the aim of
reviewing:
2004/206 - The guidelines on safe manning to ensure that all merchant vessels
over 500grt have a minimum of a master plus two bridge watchkeeping officers,
unless specifically exempted for limited local operations as approved by the
Administration.

2004/207 – The requirements of STCW 95 to change the emphasis with respect to

the provision of a designated lookout to ensure that a lookout is provided on the
bridge at all times, unless a positive decision is taken that, in view of daylight and
good visibility, low traffic density and the vessel being well clear of navigational
dangers, a sole watchkeeper would be able to fulfil the task.

2004/208 – The requirements of STCW 95 so that a bridge lookout can be more

effectively utilised as an integral part of the bridge team.

• In its report of the investigation of the grounding of Jackie Moon on 1 September

2004, the MAIB recommended the MCA to:
Ensure that when conducting port state control inspections on ships with only two
bridge watchkeeping officers, the hours of work and rest are carefully scrutinised,
and where a surveyor considers that the regulatory rest requirements have not
been met because of inadequate manning, serious consideration be given to
detention of the vessel.

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency:

• In response to the MAIB recommendation 2004/206, the MCA has arranged an

independent survey into safe manning levels across Europe. The survey will
include levels of manning according to vessel size and types required by different
European administrations, and also a study of accident investigations where levels
of manning might have been an influence. The study is programmed for completion
by July 2005 and, depending on its outcome, a report will be sent to the IMO
through the STCW sub-committee. The MCA also stated its intention to request that
the issue of safe manning be placed on the work programme of the IMO MSC.
• In response to MAIB recommendations 2004/207 and 208, the MCA intends to
issue guidance on the use of lookouts in an MGN, and to take the
recommendations forward to the IMO STCW sub-committee.

27
 The Danish Maritime Authority:

• The Danish Maritime Authority has stated its intention to promulgate the lessons
learned from this, and similar accidents, to the Danish fishing industry, on
completion of a study currently in progress.

Intrada Ship Management Ltd:

• After purchasing another vessel, Scot Carrier, on 8 December 2004, the company
manned the vessel with a crew of six, although she had been approved by the MCA
to operate with a crew of five.

• The accommodation on board Scot Explorer was modified to provide an additional

cabin. A third AB has been employed on board since 17 December 2004.

• A Fleet Circular dated 10 November 2004 was issued to all its masters regarding
the use of bridge lookouts, and the need to give as much sea room as possible to
other vessels, particularly fishing vessels (Annex F).

28
SECTION 5 - RECOMMENDATIONS
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is recommended to:

2005/153 Maintain the priority given to the recommendations made in the MAIB
Bridge Watchkeeping Study, and the report of the investigation into the
grounding of Jackie Moon, with the aim of reducing the incidence of
inadequate manning of ships in the short-sea trade, and improving the
standard of lookout on all merchant vessels.

The International Chamber of Shipping is recommended to:

2005/154 Highlight to its national ship owner associations that this was yet another
accident which could have been prevented had a dedicated lookout been
on the bridge during the hours of darkness. Further, to re-emphasise
procedures as outlined in its publication Bridge Procedures Guide with
specific reference to:

• All available navigational equipment being used to its full potential.

• Larger CPAs to be allowed for.

• The need for bridge watchkeepers to determine passing distances as

accurately as possible.

Marine Accident Investigation Branch

June 2005

Safety recommendations shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liability

29
 ANNEX A

The recorded hours of rest - master of Scot Explorer

 ANNEX B

The recorded hours of rest - AB(cook) of Scot Explorer

 ANNEX C

IMO Resolution A890(21) and annexes

 ANNEX D

Scot Explorer - Safe Manning Document

 ANNEX E

Applicable collision regulations

Applicable Collision Regulations

The following are extracts of the rules of the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972) (COLREGS) as amended:

Rule 3 – Definitions:
(b) The term “power-driven vessel” means any vessel propelled by
machinery.

(d) The term “vessel engaged in fishing” means any vessel fishing with
nets, lines, trawls or other fishing apparatus which restrict manoeuvrability, but
does not include a vessel fishing with trolling lines or other fishing apparatus
which do not restrict manoeuvrability.

(f) The term “vessel not under command” means a vessel which through
some exceptional circumstance is unable to manoeuvre as required by these
Rules and is therefore unable to keep out of the way of another vessel.

Rule 5 – Look-out
Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing
as well as by all available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances
and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of
collision.

Rule 7 – Risk of collision

(b) Proper use shall be made of radar equipment fitted and operational,
including long-range scanning to obtain early warning of collision and radar
plotting or equivalent systematic observation of detected objects.

(c ) Assumptions shall not be made on the basis of scanty information,

especially scanty radar information.

Rule 15 – Crossing situation

When two power-driven vessels are crossing so as to involve risk of collision,
the vessel which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the
way and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead
of the other vessel.
Rule 16 – Action by give way vessel
Every vessel which is directed to keep out of the way of another vessel shall,
so far as possible, take early and substantial action to keep well clear.

Rule 18 – Responsibilities between vessels

Except where rules 9,10 and 13 otherwise require:
(a) A power-driven vessel underway shall keep out of the way of:
(i) a vessel not under command;
(ii) a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre;
(iii) a vessel engaged in fishing;
(iv) a sailing vessel.

Rule 26 – Fishing Vessels

(c ) A vessel engaged in fishing, other than trawling, shall exhibit:
(i) two all-round lights in a vertical line, the upper being red and the
lower white, or a shape consisting of two cones with apexes
together in a vertical line one above the other;
(ii) when there is outlying gear extending more than 150 metres
horizontally from the vessel, an all round white light or a cone
apex upwards in the direction of the gear;
(iii) when making way through the water, in addition to the lights
prescribed in this paragraph, sidelights and a stern light.

Rule 27 – Vessels not under command or restricted in their ability to

manoeuvre.
(a) A vessel not under command shall exhibit:
(i) two all-round red lights in a vertical line where they can best be
seen;
(ii) two balls or similar shapes in a vertical line where they can best
be seen;
(iii) when making way through the water, in addition to the lights
prescribed in this paragraph, sidelights and a stern light.
 ANNEX F

Intrada Ship Management Fleet Circular dated 10 November 2004