Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Second Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Second Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Second Division
DECISION
CARPIO , J : p
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals'
Decision 2 dated 28 September 2010 and its Resolution 3 dated 19 April 2011 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 91666. The Court of Appeals (CA) a rmed in toto the Decision 4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, in Civil Case No. R-1331.
The Facts
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) is a banking institution
organized and existing under Philippine laws. Respondent Barbara Sampaga Poblete
(Poblete) is the registered owner of a parcel of land, known as Lot No. 29, with an area of
455 square meters, located in Buenavista, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, under Original
Certi cate of Title (OCT) No. P-12026. In October 1997, Poblete obtained a P300,000.00
loan from Kabalikat ng Pamayanan ng Nagnanais Tumulong at Yumaman Multi-Purpose
Cooperative (Kapantay). Poblete mortgaged Lot No. 29 to Kapantay to guarantee payment
of the loan. Kapantay, in turn, used OCT No. P-12026 as collateral under its Loan Account
No. 97-CC-013 with Land Bank-Sablayan Branch.
In November 1998, Poblete decided to sell Lot No. 29 to pay her loan. She
instructed her son-in-law Domingo Balen (Balen) to look for a buyer. Balen referred
Angelito Joseph Maniego (Maniego) to Poblete. According to Poblete, Maniego agreed to
buy Lot No. 29 for P900,000.00, but Maniego suggested that a deed of absolute sale for
P300,000.00 be executed instead to reduce the taxes. Thus, Poblete executed the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 9 November 1998 (Deed dated 9 November 1998) with P300,000.00
as consideration. 5 In the Deed dated 9 November 1998, Poblete described herself as a
"widow." Poblete, then, asked Balen to deliver the Deed dated 9 November 1998 to
Maniego and to receive the payment in her behalf. Balen testi ed that he delivered the
Deed dated 9 November 1998 to Maniego. However, Balen stated that he did not receive
from Maniego the agreed purchase price. Maniego told Balen that he would pay the
amount upon his return from the United States. In an A davit dated 19 November 1998,
Poblete stated that she agreed to have the payment deposited in her Land Bank Savings
Account. 6 aEcTDI
On 7 January 2003, Land Bank led its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and
Cross-claim. Land Bank claimed that it is a mortgagee in good faith and it observed due
diligence prior to approving the loan by verifying Maniego's title with the O ce of the
Register of Deeds. Land Bank likewise interposed a cross-claim against Maniego for the
payment of the loan, with interest, penalties and other charges. Maniego, on the other hand,
separately led his Answer. Maniego denied the allegations of Poblete and claimed that it
was Poblete who forged the Deed dated 11 August 2000. He also alleged that he paid the
consideration of the sale to Poblete and even her loans from Kapantay and Land Bank.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On 28 December 2007, the RTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46,
rendered a Decision in favor of Poblete, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, as follows:
1. Declaring the Deed of Sale dated August 11, 2000 over O.C.T. No. P-
12026, as null and void;
SO ORDERED. 9
The RTC ruled that the sale between Poblete and Maniego was a nullity. The RTC
found that the agreed consideration was P900,000.00 and Maniego failed to pay the
consideration. Furthermore, the signatures of Poblete and her deceased husband were
proven to be forgeries. The RTC also ruled that Land Bank was not a mortgagee in good
faith because it failed to exercise the diligence required of banking institutions. The RTC
explained that had Land Bank exercised due diligence, it would have known before
approving the loan that the sale between Poblete and Maniego had not been
consummated. Nevertheless, the RTC granted Land Bank's cross-claim against Maniego.
In an Order dated 17 March 2008, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration
led by Land Bank for want of merit. Thereafter, Land Bank and Maniego separately
challenged the RTC's Decision before the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 28 September 2010, the CA promulgated its Decision a rming in toto the
Decision of the RTC. 1 0 Both Land Bank and Maniego led their Motions for
Reconsideration but the CA denied both motions on 19 April 2011. 1 1
In a Resolution dated 13 July 2011, 1 2 the Second Division of this Court denied the
Petition for Review on Certiorari led by Maniego. This Resolution became nal and
executory on 19 January 2012.
On the other hand, Land Bank filed this petition. HcSaTI
The Issues
Land Bank seeks a reversal and raises the following issues for resolution:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL ELEVENTH DIVISION)
ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT
DECLARING TCT NO. T-20151 AS NULL AND VOID. THE COURT OF
APPEALS MISCONSTRUED AND MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE
AND THE LAW IN NOT FINDING TCT NO. T-20151 REGISTERED IN
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THE NAME OF ANGELITO JOSEPH MANIEGO AS VALID.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL ELEVENTH DIVISION)
MISCONSTRUED THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN NOT FINDING
LAND BANK A MORTGAGEE IN GOOD FAITH.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL ELEVENTH DIVISION)
MISCONSTRUED THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN NOT FINDING THE
RESPONDENT AND ANGELITO JOSEPH MANIEGO AS IN PARI
DELICTO.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL ELEVENTH DIVISION)
ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL OR LACHES
ON RESPONDENT IN THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HER LOSS
WAS HER NEGLIGENCE TO SAFEGUARD HER RIGHTS OVER THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY, THEREBY ENABLING ANGELITO JOSEPH
MANIEGO TO MORTGAGE THE SAME WITH LAND BANK. 1 3
The Ruling of the Court
We do not find merit in the petition. AEIDTc
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court speci cally provides that
only questions of law may be raised, subject to exceptional circumstances 1 4 which are
not present in this case. Hence, factual ndings of the trial court, especially if a rmed by
the CA, are binding on US. 1 5 In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that the
signatures of Poblete and her deceased husband in the Deed dated 11 August 2000 were
forged by Maniego. In addition, the evidence is preponderant that Maniego did not pay the
consideration for the sale. Since the issue on the genuineness of the Deed dated 11
August 2000 is essentially a question of fact, we are not duty-bound to analyze and weigh
the evidence again. 1 6
It is a well-entrenched rule, as aptly applied by the CA, that a forged or fraudulent
deed is a nullity and conveys no title. 1 7 Moreover, where the deed of sale states that the
purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is void ab
initiofor lack of consideration. 1 8 Since the Deed dated 11 August 2000 is void, the
corresponding TCT No. T-20151 issued pursuant to the same deed is likewise void. In Yu
Bun Guan v. Ong, 1 9 the Court ruled that there was no legal basis for the issuance of the
certi cate of title and the CA correctly cancelled the same when the deed of absolute sale
was completely simulated, void and without effect. In Ereña v. Querrer-Kauffman , 2 0 the
Court held that when the instrument presented for registration is forged, even if
accompanied by the owner's duplicate certi cate of title, the registered owner does not
thereby lose his title, and neither does the mortgagee acquire any right or title to the
property. In such a case, the mortgagee under the forged instrument is not a mortgagee
protected by law. 2 1
The issue on the nullity of Maniego's title had already been foreclosed when this
Court denied Maniego's petition for review in the Resolution dated 13 July 2011, which
became nal and executory on 19 January 2012. 2 2 It is settled that a decision that has
acquired nality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modi ed in
any respect, even if the modi cation is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or
law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the
land. 2 3 This is without prejudice, however, to the right of Maniego to recover from Poblete
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what he paid to Kapantay for the account of Poblete, otherwise there will be unjust
enrichment by Poblete.
Since TCT No. T-20151 has been declared void by nal judgment, the Real Estate
Mortgage constituted over it is also void. In a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential
that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the
mortgage is void. 2 4
Land Bank insists that it is a mortgagee in good faith since it veri ed Maniego's title,
did a credit investigation, and inspected Lot No. 29. The issue of being a mortgagee in
good faith is a factual matter, which cannot be raised in this petition. 2 5 However, to settle
the issue, we carefully examined the records to determine whether or not Land Bank is a
mortgagee in good faith. IAcDET
There is indeed a situation where, despite the fact that the mortgagor is not the
owner of the mortgaged property, his title being fraudulent, the mortgage contract and any
foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy. 2 6 This is the
doctrine of "the mortgagee in good faith" based on the rule that buyers or mortgagees
dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certi cate of Title are not required to go
beyond what appears on the face of the title. 2 7 However, it has been consistently held that
this rule does not apply to banks, which are required to observe a higher standard of
diligence. 2 8 A bank whose business is impressed with public interest is expected to
exercise more care and prudence in its dealings than a private individual, even in cases
involving registered lands. 2 9 A bank cannot assume that, simply because the title offered
as security is on its face free of any encumbrances or lien, it is relieved of the responsibility
of taking further steps to verify the title and inspect the properties to be mortgaged. 3 0
Applying the same principles, we do not nd Land Bank to be a mortgagee in good
faith.
Good faith, or the lack of it, is a question of intention. 3 1 In ascertaining intention,
courts are necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by
which alone the inward motive may, with safety, be determined. 3 2
Based on the evidence, Land Bank processed Maniego's loan application upon his
presentation of OCT No. P-12026, which was still under the name of Poblete. Land Bank
even ignored the fact that Kapantay previously used Poblete's title as collateral in its loan
account with Land Bank. 3 3 In Bank of Commerce v. San Pablo, Jr. , 3 4 we held that when
"the person applying for the loan is other than the registered owner of the real property
being mortgaged, [such fact] should have already raised a red ag and which should have
induced the Bank . . . to make inquiries into and confirm . . . [the] authority to mortgage . . . .
A person who deliberately ignores a signi cant fact that could create suspicion in an
otherwise reasonable person is not an innocent purchaser for value."
The records do not even show that Land Bank investigated and inspected the
property to ascertain its actual occupants. Land Bank merely mentioned that it inspected
Lot No. 29 to appraise the value of the property. We take judicial notice of the standard
practice of banks, before approving a loan, to send representatives to the premises of the
land offered as collateral to investigate its real owners. 3 5 In Prudential Bank v. Kim Hyeun
Soon, 3 6 the Court held that the bank failed to exercise due diligence although its
representative conducted an ocular inspection, because the representative concentrated
only on the appraisal of the property and failed to inquire as to who were the then
occupants of the property. CEIHcT
Since Land Bank is not a mortgagee in good faith, it is not entitled to protection. The
injunction against the foreclosure proceeding in the present case should be made
permanent. Since Lot No. 29 has not been transferred to a third person who is an innocent
purchaser for value, ownership of the lot remains with Poblete. This is without prejudice to
the right of either party to proceed against Maniego.
On the allegation that Poblete is in pari delicto with Maniego, we nd the principle
inapplicable. The pari delicto rule provides that "when two parties are equally at fault, the
law leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them." 4 0 We adopt the
factual finding of the RTC and the CA that only Maniego is at fault.
Finally, on the issues of estoppel and laches, such were not raised before the trial
court. Hence, we cannot rule upon the same. It is settled that an issue which was neither
alleged in the complaint nor raised during the trial cannot be raised for the rst time on
appeal, as such a recourse would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process, since the opposing party would be deprived of the opportunity to introduce
evidence rebutting such new issue. 4 1
WHEREFORE , we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 28 September 2010 Decision
and the 19 April 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91666. The
injunction against the foreclosure proceeding, issued by the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, is made permanent. Costs against Land Bank. CaSAcH
SO ORDERED .
Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza * and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1421 dated 20 February 2013.
1.Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.Rollo, pp. 38-49. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison with Associate
Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Danton Q. Bueser, concurring.
3.Id. at 72-73.
4.Id. at 50-71. Penned by Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan.
5.Id. at 124.
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6.Id. at 125.
7.Id. at 127.
8.Id. at 129.
9.Id. at 70-71.
10.Id. at 48. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: "WHEREFORE, the 28 December 2007
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46 in Civil
Case No. R-1331 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against defendant Maniego. SO
ORDERED."
11.Id. at 72-73.
12.CA rollo, pp. 574-575. The Entry of Judgment provides:
This is to certify that on July 13, 2011 a resolution rendered in the above-entitled case was
filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 196807 (Angelito Joseph Maniego vs. Barbara Sampaga Poblete). — . . . . On the
basis thereof, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari assailing
the Decision dated 28 September 2010 and Resolution dated 19 April 2011 of the Court
of Appeals, Manila, in CA-G.R. CV No. 91666 for late ling, as the petition was led
beyond the fteen (15)-day reglementary period xed in Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to
Section 5 (a), Rule 56, in view of the denial of the motion for extension to le the petition
in the Resolution dated 29 June 2011.
Moreover, counsel for petitioner failed to comply with the En Banc Resolution dated 10
July 2007 in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC which requires the parties or their counsels to indicate
their contact details in all their pleadings led before the Court. Likewise, counsel's
payments for professional tax and IBP membership dues are dated 27 January 2010
and 23 July 2010, respectively. . . ."
and that the same has, on January 19, 2012 become nal and executory and is hereby
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
23.Catindig v. Vda. De Meneses, supra note 16, citing Peña v. Government Service Insurance
System, 533 Phil. 670 (2006).
24.CIVIL CODE, Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential to the contracts of pledge and
mortgage:
(3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of
their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose.
25.Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of Militar, 504 Phil. 634 (2005), citing Sps. Uy v. Court of
Appeals, 411 Phil. 788 (2001).
26.Cavite Development Bank v. Lim, 381 Phil. 355 (2000).
27.Id., citing Philippine National Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 257 Phil. 748 (1989).
28.Philippine National Bank v. Jumamoy, G.R. No. 169901, 3 August 2011, 655 SCRA 54;
Philippine National Bank v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 180945, 12 February 2010, 612 SCRA 493;
Bank of Commerce v. San Pablo, Jr. , G.R. No. 167848, 27 April 2007, 522 SCRA 713;
Erasusta, Jr. v. Court of Appeals , 527 Phil. 639 (2006); Private Development Corporation
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals , 512 Phil. 237 (2005); Premiere Development Bank
v. Court of Appeals , 493 Phil. 752 (2005); Robles v. Court of Appeals , 384 Phil. 635
(2000).
29.Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, 429 Phil. 225 (2002), citing Rural Bank of Compostela
v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 521 (1997).
30.United Coconut Planters Bank v. Gillera, G.R. No. 171550, 30 September 2009 (Unsigned
Resolution), citing Home Bankers Savings & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals , 496 Phil. 637
(2005).
31.Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. and Williamson, 37 Phil. 644 (1918).
32.Id.