THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124347. July 21, 1997.]

CMS STOCK BROKERAGE, INC. , petitioner-appellant, vs . COURT OF

APPEALS, HONORABLE RAMON R. BUENAVENTURA in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
154, Pasig City, ATTY. GRACE BELVIS and ALBERTO VALINO, Ex-
O cio Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff respectively of the RTC, Pasig
City, and CAROLINA INDUSTRIES, INC. , respondents-appellees.

Gutierrez Cortez & Partners for petitioner-appellant.

Aventino B. Claveria & David Allaga for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court led by herein
petitioner CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., questioning the decision of herein public respondent
Court of Appeals for upholding the decision of the Regional Trial Court in dismissing
petitioner's case. Petitioner asserted that the pendency of another action involving the
ownership of the property subject matter of this case suspended the 12-month period of
redemption provided by the Rules of Court.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDGMENTS; SALE OF PROPERTY ON

EXECUTION; WHO MAY REDEEM; RIGHT GIVEN TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR AND NOT TO
ANY THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANT; CASE AT BAR. — The right of redemption upon an
execution sale, such as the one involving the subject parcels of land held on December 1,
1983, is provided for under Section 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. It must be noted that
the subject pieces of property were sold on execution by virtue of and pursuant to a writ of
execution issued against petitioner and in favor of the private respondent in Civil Case No.
12850 entitled Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. et al. The judgment
debtor, therefore, is none other than CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. itself, and as such, is the
party entitled to redeem. Plainly, under the aforequoted Paragraph (a) of Section 29, Rule
39, the real property sold on execution may be redeemed by the judgment debtor or his
successors in interest, in the whole or any part of the property. The exercise of this right of
redemption by the judgment debtor is not conditioned upon ownership of the property
sold on execution but by virtue of a writ of execution directed against such judgment
debtor. In instances when a piece of property is claimed by a third person, as in the case at
hand, Section 17 of the same Rule 39 provides what is to be done. When, however,
property is levied upon and sold, despite a claim by a third person who must vindicate then
his claim in a proper action, Section 29 determines who shall have a right of redemption.
Clearly, the right of redemption is given to the judgment debtor and not to any third-party
claimant. Petitioner CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. as the judgment debtor had the right to
redeem the property under Section 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and not Rosario
Sandejas, who was only a third-party claimant. It at all, Rosario Sandejas, as a third-party
claimant, may only recover the property, if wrongfully sold on execution, by a proper action
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 annulling the execution sale and reconveying the property to her. In no instance would she,
as third-party claimant, be allowed to exercise any right of redemption unless she is
likewise a successor in interest of the judgment debtor or a redemptioner under Section
29 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner's
supposition that unquestioned ownership of the subject property is a requisite for its
exercise of the right of redemption in this case has no legal basis. Petitioner could have
effected its right of redemption had it wanted to within the 12-month redemption period
provided under the Rules. This is the law and ignorance thereof is no excuse for petitioner's
failure to exercise such right.
2. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; MORTGAGE; FORECLOSURE; PERIOD OF
REDEMPTION; NOT INTERRUPTED BY AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE FILED BY A THIRD-
PARTY CLAIMANT; CASE AT BAR. — The second issue is whether or not petitioner's period
to redeem is tolled by an action to quiet title led by a third-party claimant questioning the
ownership of the property sold on execution. We rule in the negative. As already pointed
out, the issue of ownership insofar as petitioner's right of redemption as judgment debtor
is concerned, has no bearing whatsoever, so as have the effect of tolling or interrupting the
running of the 12-month redemption period. If at all, as pointed out by respondent Court of
Appeals, the condition imposed after the execution sale relating to the pending action for
quieting of title, may only bene t the third-party claimant, Rosario Sandejas, that is, should
her claim prosper, only then may the execution sale be declared null and void. But with
respect to petitioner's right of redemption as judgment debtor this condition is of no
moment.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATE OF SALE; ANNOTATION THEREON OF
EXISTENCE OF CLAIM BY THIRD-PARTY; WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT IF THIRD-PARTY
CLAIM DID NOT PROSPER. — Petitioner also relies upon the amendatory condition made in
the certi cate of sale by the deputy sheriff which respondent Court of Appeals ruled to be
for the bene t of Sandejas alone and not for petitioner. Petitioner invokes Section 28, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court. Although it may be true that the Certi cate of Sale expressly
mentioned the existence of the claim of Rosario Sandejas, the third-party claimant, such
annotation would only have legal effect upon the execution sale if and only if such third-
party claim prospered. To all intents and purposes this third-party claim was a resolutory
condition, upon the happening of which, the judgment creditor's right over the property
subject to execution may be voided. It may be signi cant to note that this resolutory
condition imposed upon the sale was in fact never ful lled. This Court in G.R. No. 101351
ruled in favor of private respondent and against third-party claimant Rosario Sandejas
insofar as said third-party claim is concerned. The legal effect contemplated by the
condition imposed upon the execution sale never materialized because the condition was
never ful lled. In legal contemplation, an unful lled condition becomes functus officio. The
more it cannot possibly extend the redemption period of herein petitioner, a party not privy
to such condition, whose rights and interests are totally separate and distinct from that of
the third-party claimant.

DECISION

MELO , J : p

Petitioner, as judgment debtor, seeks to redeem two parcels of land sold on

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 execution nine years earlier upon the contention that the pendency of an action involving
the ownership thereof suspended the 12-month period of redemption 1 provided by the
present Rules.
On December 7, 1992, petitioner tendered the amount of P2,341,166.48 to Deputy
Sheriff Alberto Valino. When the deputy sheriff refused to execute a deed of redemption
petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region at Pasig
City and the case was ra ed to Branch 154 thereof presided over by herein respondent
Judge Ramon P. Buenaventura who thereafter ruled against petitioner on the ground that
the right of redemption had long expired.
Dissatis ed with this ruling which sustained the deputy sheriff's action, petitioner
led a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction with respondent Court of Appeals. On May 29, 1995, the appellate court
dismissed the petition (Martinez, Yanares-Santiago (P), and Reyes, R., JJ.).
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
The facts of the case were summarized by respondent Court of Appeals, adopting
pertinent facts as found and summarized by the same court in A.C. G.R. No. CV-03269
entitled "Rosario Sandejas vs. Carolina Industries, Inc., et al" (April 3, 1986), involving the
very same parcels of land, as follows:
The facts of this case are stated in the order of the lower court dated
March 21, 1984, which we quote with approval, as follows:

"As may be gleaned from the documents submitted by the herein

parties in support of their respective postures, the following facts appear
incontrovertible, viz:

"01. Plaintiff (Rosario Sandejas) is the registered owner of two

(2) parcels of land, which are covered by and more particularly described in
TCT Nos. 117995 and 189984 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.

"02. A FIRST mortgage was constituted on the subject

properties on 28 April 1969 in favor of the BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS for the sum of P150,000.00 and annotated on the corresponding
Transfer Certificate of Title as Entry No. 65222/T-117995 on 2 May 1969.

"03. A SECOND mortgage was constituted on the subject

properties on 09 July 1969 in favor of SISON, LUZ & JALBUENA (now CMS
STOCK BROKERAGE, INC.), the sum of P200,000.00, and annotated on the
corresponding Transfer Certi cate of Title as Entry No 75685/T-117995 on
30 July 1969.
"04. By virtue of the extra-judicial foreclosure of the SECOND
mortgage, the subject properties were sold at public auction on 10 May
1971 to SISON, LUZ & JALBUENA, INC. (now CMS STOCK BROKERAGE,
INC.) for the sum of P255,948.49, and the Certi cate of Sale issued by the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal was duly annotated on the corresponding
Transfer Certi cate of Title on 19 May 1971. (Vide Exhs. 1-B and 2-B, pp.
31 and 35 id., respectively).
"05. On 15 November 1972, plaintiff addressed a letter to her
brother 'Carling' (Atty. Carlos Moran Sison) requesting for a period of three
(3) years within which to redeem the subject properties. (Vide Annex A of
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 Plaintiff's Third-Party Claim, p. 39. id.).
"06. On 24 November 1972, Atty. Carlos Moran Sison informed
the plaintiff that she has ve (5) years to redeem the subject properties.
(Vide Annex B of Plaintiff's Third-Party Claim, p. 40, id.).

"07. In the meantime, the FIRST mortgage in favor of the Bank

of the Philippine Islands was extra-judicially foreclosed and the subject
properties were sold at public auction on 02 February 1973 to CMS STOCK
BROKERAGE, INC. for the sum of P71,995.00 (Vide Annex G of Motion to
Dismiss, p. 45 id., and Annexes A and 2 of Defendant's Manifestation and
Motion dated 09 January 1984 pp. 219 and 200, id., respectively).
"08. On 22 June 1974, Atty. Carlos Moran Sison issued a receipt
which reads: 'Received from Rosario S. Sandejas a diamond ring and a
pair of earrings in redemption of her land located at Muntinlupa, s/t
CARLOS MORAN SISON'.
"09. In the audited Statement of Financial Conditions as of 31
December 1978, 31 December 1979, 31 December 1980 and 30 June 1981
of CMS STOCK BROKERAGE, INC., the subject properties were listed as one
of the 'ASSETS' of said corporation, with an equity valuation of
P327,943.49 and P71,995.00 paid by CMS STOCK BROKERAGE, INC. in the
foreclosure sales of the SECOND and FIRST mortgages, respectively.

"10. The subject properties were levied on execution by the

defendant sheriff on 01 March 1982.

"11. On 02 June 1982, plaintiff filed a Third-Party Claim with the

defendant sheriff wherein it is alleged, among others:
'5. That on June 22, 1974 I redeemed above-
mentioned properties from CMS STOCK BROKERAGE by
paying said Brokerage a diamond ring and a pair of earrings
in redemption for above properties, . . .;
'6. That since then, I have neglected to request for
the cancellation of the annotation in my title of the Certificate
of Sale issued in favor of SISON, LUZ JALBUENA by reason
of the fact that I was very busy attending to other more
pressing obligations after which I suffered a stroke as a
consequence of which I no longer was able to attend to the
cancellation of said annotation.
"12. Plaintiff instituted this action for 'quieting ownership of real
property injunction and damages' on 22 April 1983.
"13. On 1 December 1983, the defendant Sheriff proceeded with
the scheduled public auction sale of the subject properties after the
Supreme Court, by its Resolution adopted on 26 November 1983 in G.R.
No. 64510, entitled 'Dr. Romeo Gustilo, et al., versus The Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al.' LIFTED the temporary restraining order issued on 21
November 1983 enjoining the Sheriff of Rizal from proceeding with the
public auction sale of the garnished and levied properties of the petitioners
therein, particularly the two parcels of land, as scheduled on 01 December
1983 at 10:00 A.M."
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 As culled from the records, at the public auction held on December 1, 1983,
respondent Deputy Sheriff sold the parcels of land in question to herein private
respondent (now, also private respondent in the instant petition) as the highest
bidder and issued the corresponding certificate of sale to the latter.
Several days later on December 12, 1983, respondent Deputy Sheriff
issued an Amended Certificate of Sale containing the following notations:
". . . subject to the result and effect of Civil Case No. 1508, entitled
'Rosario S. Sandejas vs. Carolina Industries, Inc., et al., Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 137 it being a third-party complaint.
"The period of redemption of the real property/properties described
above will expire one (1) year from and after the date of registration of this
Certificate of Sale."

and this was registered on December 16, 1983 in the O ce of the Register
of Deeds.

On December 18, 1984, the Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale was issued.
On April 16, 1986, title to the property was consolidated in the private
respondent's name and a writ of possession was issued in its favor.
On April 16, 1986, title to the parcels of land was registered in private
respondent's name.

In a decision dated October 16, 1991 in G.R. No. 101351, the Supreme
Court declared petitioner as the real owner of the subject parcel of land and not
Rosario S. Sandejas who initiated the proceedings for "quieting of ownership of
real property, injunction and damages which was docketed as Civil Case No.
1508.
On December 18, 1991, a final entry of the decision in G.R. No. 101351 was
entered in the Supreme Court's Book of Judgments.

On December 7, 1992, petitioner made an offer to redeem the parcels of

land in question.

Subsequently, on December 15, 1992, it led a notice to redeem and

tendered the redemption money amounting to P2,341,166.48 with the O ce of
the Clerk of Court. Petitioner also paid an additional sum of P11,905.83 as
Sheriff's Commission or deposit fee.

In a letter dated December 16, 1992 respondents Sheriffs informed

petitioner that they can not execute and issue the certi cate of redemption as
requested in the absence of a court order directing the them to do so.
Respondents Sheriffs further informed the latter that they accepted the tendered
amounts for safekeeping.

On January 13, 1993, petitioner led a "Motion to require Sheriff to Execute

Certificate of Redemption".

On January 20, 1994, respondent Judge issued the challenged order

denying petitioner's motion requiring the Sheriff to execute a certi cate of
redemption.

A motion for reconsideration dated February 16, 1994 was denied by

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 respondent Judge in an order dated July 12, 1994.

(pp. 48-52, Rollo.)

The petition is anchored on the following assignment of errors:

(1) RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS GUILTY OF GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN NOT
UPHOLDING THE UNQUESTIONABLE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO REDEEM THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY CONSIDERING THAT THE PENDENCY OF THE ACTION
INVOLVING THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP NECESSARILY INTERRUPTS OR
SUSPENDS THE PERIOD OF REDEMPTION.
(2) RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN BASING ITS FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS ALREADY THE
OWNER OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES AT THE TIME THEY WERE LEVIED UPON
ON ITS OWN PREVIOUS DECISION IN ANOTHER CASE INVOLVING THE SAME
PARTIES (CA G.R. CV NO. 03209) DATED APRIL 3, 1986, WHICH DECISION WAS
SUBSEQUENTLY RECONSIDERED AND THEREFORE NO LONGER EXIST IN LEGAL
CONTEMPLATION.
(3) RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO. 1508 FILED BY
ROSARIO SANDEJAS DID NOT INTERRUPT OR TOLL THE REDEMPTION PERIOD
OF PETITIONER ON THE GRAVELY ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THERE IS
NEITHER A STATUTE OR DECISION WHICH SUPPORTS THE PREPOSITION THAT
THE PERIOD OF ONE (1) YEAR TO REDEEM THE PROPERTY IS SUSPENDED BY
INSTITUTION OF ACTION TO ANNUL FORECLOSURE SALE (CITING THE CASE OF
PEOPLE'S FINANCING CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 192 SCRA 34,
CITING SUMERARIZ VS. DBP, 21 SCRA 1374).

(4) THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE POSITION
OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE RESERVATION IN THE AMENDED CERTIFICATE
OF SALE TO THE EFFECT THAT IT IS SUBJECT TO THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE
FILED BY ROSARIO SANDEJAS AND ITS CORRESPONDING ANNOTATION ON
THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLES OF DISPUTED PROPERTIES WERE SOLELY FOR
THE BENEFIT OF ROSARIO SANDEJAS AND NOT PETITIONER CMS STOCK
BROKERAGE, INC. (CITING SECTIONS 28 & 36 OF RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF
COURT).

(5) THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSE (sic)

ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING SWEEPING STATEMENTS AND MISQUOTING OR
CHANGING THE CONTEXT OF THIS HONORABLE COURTS PRONOUNCEMENTS
IN QUIMSON VS. PNB, 36 SCRA 26 AND PIANO VS. CAYANONG, 7 SCRA 397, TO
JUSTIFY ITS RULING THAT PETITIONER'S RIGHT OF REDEMPTION HAS LONG
EXPIRED.
(6) THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED BY LACHES FROM EXERCISING ITS
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION.
(pp. 22-24, Rollo.)

Upon deliberate consideration of the arguments in support of petitioner's assigned

errors, the relevant issues may be synthesized thusly:
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 (1) Whether or not petitioner could have effected the redemption of the subject
property within the 12 month period provided under the Rules; and
(2) Whether or not the 12-month period of redemption was interrupted by Civil
Case No. 1508 entitled, "Rosario Sandejas vs. Carolina Industries, Inc., et al."
We resolve the first issue in the affirmative.
It is petitioner's contention that it could not have exercised the right of redemption
before the lapse of the 12-month redemption period on or before December 17, 1984
because its title at the time was clouded by the claim of a third party, Rosario Sandejas.
Petitioner contends that it was only on December 18, 1991 when the Supreme Court
sustained the position of Carolina Industries, Inc. as against the claim of Rosario Sandejas
that petitioner's period of redemption commenced.
It may be recalled that the action led by Rosario Sandejas is based on the claim
that her brother, Carlos Moran Sison, had given her in 1972 a period of ve years within
which to redeem the foreclosed parcels of land. On June 22, 1974, well within the ve year
period, she allegedly redeemed the properties by giving her brother a diamond ring and a
pair of earrings as payment for the redemption price. Therefore, when the parcels were
levied upon by Carolina Industries, Sandejas led a third-party claim with the Sheriff,
stating that she had already redeemed the property from CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. When
the sheriff rejected her third-party claim, she went to court on an action for quieting of title.
She eventually lost the case before this Court.
Petitioner now submits that on December 1, 1983 when the two parcels of land
were sold at public auction to Carolina Industries and on December 18, 1984 when the
nal deed of sale was issued in the latter's name, CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. had no clear
title because ownership and title to the subject parcels of land were being claimed and
asserted by Rosario Sandejas. Petitioner, it is contended, was then, not yet the true,
absolute, declared, and registered owner of the disputed properties. According to
petitioner, the undisputed true and registered owner was then Rosario Sandejas. Petitioner
complains that it would be damned if it then redeemed the property because of the
ensuing manifest falsehood about the ownership of the property, and equally damned if it
did not because of the expiration of 12-month redemption period should the same be
counted from December 17, 1984. Necessarily, so petitioner contends, its 12-month
period started only on December 18, 1991, after this Court ruled that petitioner is the
owner, dismissing the case for quieting of title filed by Rosario Sandejas. aisadc

The Court of Appeals rejected this contention principally because under the
established factual circumstances, petitioner considered itself to be the owner of the
subject property despite the alleged pending case for quieting of title.
Although the legal basis relied upon by respondent Court of Appeals is not entirely
precise because it premised the right of redemption of petitioner upon ownership, this
Court nds the result arrived at by respondent court to be correct. For the guidance of
bench and of the bar, we deem it necessary to point out that petitioner's reliance on the
supposed cloud or uncertainty in its ownership or title for not effecting redemption within
the 12-month redemption period is misplaced.
The right of redemption upon an execution sale, such as the one involving the
subject parcels of land held on December 1, 1983, is provided for under Section 29, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
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 Sec 29. Who may redeem real property sold. — Real property sold as
provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be
redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following persons:
(a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in the whole or
any part of the property;
(b) A creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or mortgage on
the property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the judgment under
which the property was sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner.
(Emphasis supplied.)

It must be noted that the subject pieces of property were sold on execution by virtue
of and pursuant to a writ of execution issued against petitioner and in favor of the private
respondent in Civil Case No. 12850 entitled, Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock
Brokerage, Inc., et al., where this Court, upon review, in G.R. No. 46908, had occasion to
rule:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED, and private
respondent CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. is ordered to pay Carolina Industries, Inc. in
the amount of P634,796.00, representing its liquidated margin deposit, with
interest at 12% per annum from the time of the ling of the complaint until fully
paid, and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. Private respondents are directed to
secure the release from the Bank of the Philippine Islands the amount of
P500,000.00, together with all its earnings, in favor of the petitioner. Cost against
private respondents.

The judgment debtor, therefore, is none other than CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. itself,
and as such, is the party entitled to redeem.
Plainly, under the aforequoted paragraph (a) of Section 29, Rule 39, the real property
sold on execution may be redeemed by the judgment debtor or his successors in interest,
in the whole or any part of the property. The exercise of this right of redemption by the
judgment debtor is not conditioned upon ownership of the property sold on execution but
by virtue of a writ of execution directed against such judgment debtor. In instances when a
piece of property is claimed by a third person, as in the case at hand, Section 17 of the
same Rule 39 provides what is to be done. When, however, property is levied upon and sold
despite a claim by a third person who must vindicate then his claim in a proper action,
Section 29 determines who shall have a right of redemption. Clearly, the right of
redemption is given to the judgment debtor and not to any third party claimant.
Petitioner CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. as the judgment debtor had the right to
redeem to property under Section 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and not Rosario
Sandejas, who was only a third-party claimant. If at all, Rosario Sandejas, as a third-party
claimant may only recover the property, if wrongfully sold on execution, by a proper action
annulling the execution sale and reconveying the property to her. In no instance would she,
as third-party claimant, be allowed to exercise any right of redemption unless she is
likewise a successor in interest of the judgment debtor or a redemptioner under Section
29 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, why should the third party claimant and owner,
if he truly is such, be required to pay the redemption price (which in almost all instances, is
in the amount of the judgment debt) to the judgment creditor when the obligation
principally pertains to the judgment debtor? Why should the law prejudice the third party
claimant? This only shows that the judgment debt or obligation and not ownership is the
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 main consideration in granting the judgment debtor the right to redeem.
From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner's supposition that unquestioned
ownership of the subject property is a requisite for its exercise of the right of redemption
in this case has no legal basis. Petitioner could have effected its right of redemption had it
wanted to within the 12-month redemption period provided under the Rules. This is the law
and ignorance thereof is no excuse for petitioner's failure to exercise such right.
The second issue is whether or not petitioner's period to redeem is tolled by an
action to quiet title led by a third-party claimant questioning the ownership of the
property sold on execution.
We rule in the negative.
As already pointed out, the issue of ownership insofar as petitioner's right of
redemption as judgment debtor is concerned, has no bearing whatsoever, so as have the
effect of tolling or interrupting the running of the 12-month redemption period. If at all, as
pointed out by respondent Court of Appeals, the condition imposed after the execution
sale relating to the pending action for quieting of title, may only bene t the third-party
claimant, Rosario Sandejas, that is, should her claim prosper, only then may the execution
sale be declared null and void. But with respect to petitioner's right of redemption as
judgment debtor this condition is of no moment.
The case of Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs . Intermediate Appellate
Court (150 SCRA 591 [1987]) nds no application to the case at bench. First of all, in said
case, the party in whose favor the period of redemption was deemed tolled is the same
party who initiated the action in court. In the present case, a third-party claimant, and not
herein petitioner, was involved in the action for quieting of title. Secondly, the property
involved in the Consolidated Bank case had been put in custodia legis by virtue of a writ of
attachment duly annotated on the transfer certi cate of title. Clearly, there is no such writ
herein. Most importantly, in the Consolidated Bank case, the Court found therein petitioner
as the victim of fraud, justifying the Court's ruling in its favor. In the case at bar, no such
fraud was even alleged to have been committed against petitioner.
Petitioner also relies upon the amendatory condition made in the certi cate of sale
by the deputy sheriff which respondent Court of Appeals ruled to be for the bene t of
Sandejas alone and not for petitioner. Petitioner invokes Section 28, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
Sec. 28. Certi cate of Sale where property claimed by third person . —
When a property sold by virtue of a writ of execution has been claimed by a third
person the certi cate of sale to be issued by the sheriff pursuant to sections 25,
26 and 27 of this rule, shall make express mention of the existence of such third
party claim.

Although it may be true that the Certi cate of Sale expressly mentioned the
existence of the claim of Rosario Sandejas, the third party claimant, such annotation would
only have legal effect upon the execution sale if and only if such third-party claim
prospered. To all intents and purposes this third-party claim was a resolutory condition,
upon the happening of which, the judgment creditor's right over the property subject of
execution may be voided.
It may be signi cant to note that this resolutory condition imposed upon the sale
was in fact never ful lled. This Court in G.R. No. 101351 ruled in favor of private
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 respondent and against third-party claimant Rosario Sandejas insofar as said third-party
claim is concerned. The legal effect contemplated by the condition imposed upon the
execution sale never materialized because the condition was never ful lled. In legal
contemplation, an unful lled condition becomes functus o cio . The more it cannot
possibly extend the redemption period of herein petitioner, a party not privy to such
condition, whose rights and interests are totally separate and distinct from that of the
third-party claimant.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court nds it irrelevant to discuss the other
assigned errors. Moreover, the Court nds petitioner's invocation of our liberal rulings on
the exercise of the right of redemption to have neither factual nor legal basis. The Court
has no alternative but to apply Sections 29 and 30, of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to the
letter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, without special pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. The period of redemption under Section 28, Rule 39 of The 1997 Rules of Court, effective
July 1, 1997, shall be one year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale,
instead of twelve months.

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