Assignments On Agency Problem and Strategies For Mitigating It BY Adnan Hussain
Assignments On Agency Problem and Strategies For Mitigating It BY Adnan Hussain
Assignments On Agency Problem and Strategies For Mitigating It BY Adnan Hussain
MITIGATING IT
BY
Adnan Hussain
Program
(IBMS)
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA-PAKISTAN
Agency costs are a type of internal cost that a principal may incur as a result of the agency
problem. They include the costs of any inefficiencies that may arise from employing an agent to
take on a task, along with the costs associated with managing the principal-agent relationship and
resolving differing priorities. While it is not possible to eliminate the agency problem, principals
can take steps to minimize the risk of agency costs.
Regulations
Principal-agent relationships can be regulated, and often are, by contracts, or laws in the case of
fiduciary settings. The Fiduciary Rule is an example of an attempt to regulate the arising agency
problem in the relationship between financial advisors and their clients. The term fiduciary in the
investment advisory world means that financial and retirement advisors are to act in the best
interests of their clients. In other words, advisors are to put their clients' interests above their
own. The goal is to protect investors from advisors who are concealing any potential conflict of
interest. For example, an advisor might have several investment funds that are available to offer
a client, but instead only offers the ones that pay the advisor a commission for the sale. The
conflict of interest is an agency problem whereby the financial incentive offered by the
investment fund prevents the advisor from working on behalf of the client's best interest.
Incentives
The agency problem may also be minimized by incentivizing an agent to act in better accordance
with the principal's best interests. For example, a manager can be motivated to act in the
shareholders' best interests through incentives such as performance-based compensation, direct
influence by shareholders, the threat of firing or the threat of takeovers. Principals who are
shareholders can also tie CEO compensation directly to stock price performance. If a CEO was
worried that a potential takeover would result in being fired, the CEO might try to prevent the
takeover, which would be an agency problem. However, if the CEO was compensated based on
stock price performance, the CEO would be incentivized to complete the takeover. Stock prices
of the target companies typically rise as a result of an acquisition. Through proper incentives,
both the shareholders' and the CEO's interests would be aligned and benefit from the rise in stock
price.
Principals can also alter the structure of an agent's compensation. If, for example, an agent is
paid not on an hourly basis but by the completion of a project, there is less incentive to not act in
the principal’s best interest. In addition, performance feedback and independent evaluations hold
the agent accountable for their decisions.