LUMANOG V PP
LUMANOG V PP
LUMANOG V PP
DECISION
(En Banc)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard
employed assigned at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the
ambush-slay happened. As a purported eyewitness, he testified on what he saw during
the fateful day, including the faces of the accused.
All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of
ballistic and fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of police
officers and denial of constitutional rights during custodial investigation.
The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the accused-
appellants based on the credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who vividly recounted
before the trial court their respective positions and participation in the fatal shooting of
Abadilla, having been able to witness closely how they committed the crime.
1. Did the CA decision comply with the constitutional standard that “[n]o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based”?
2. Was the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the
custodial investigation valid?
3. Was the right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused violated?
4. Was the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo against the accused
credible?
5. Was the out-of-court identification of the accused-appellants made by the
eyewitness, security guard Alejo, in a police line-up was reliable?
6. Were the results of the ballistic and fingerprint tests conclusive of the
innocence of the accused-appellants?
7. Can the defense of alibi of the accused prevail over their positive
identification in this case?
III. THE RULING
1. YES, the CA decision complied with the constitutional standard that
“[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based”.
Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his
constitutional rights to remain silent, that any information he would give could be used
against him, and that he had the right to a competent and independent counsel,
preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of counsel he will be
provided with one (1). However, since these rights can only be waived in writing and
with the assistance of counsel, there could not have been such a valid waiver by Joel,
who was presented to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall only the
following day and stayed overnight at the police station before he was brought to said
counsel.
Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joel’s execution of
his statement before Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said confession must be
invalidated. To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional
requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is
obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under custodial investigation.
Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and assisted the latter while
responding to questions propounded by SPO2 Garcia, Jr., did not testify on whether he
had properly discharged his duties to said client. While SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified that
Atty. Sansano had asked Joel if he understood his answers to the questions of the
investigating officer and sometimes stopped Joel from answering certain questions,
SPO2 Garcia, Jr. did not say if Atty. Sansano, in the first place, verified from them the
date and time of Joel’s arrest and the circumstances thereof, or any previous
information elicited from him by the investigators at the station, and if said counsel
inspected Joel’s body for any sign or mark of physical torture.
3. No, the right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused was NOT
violated.
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that “all persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.” This protection extends to all citizens and covers the periods
before, during and after trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2), which
guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. However, just like the constitutional
guarantee of “speedy trial,” “speedy disposition of cases” is a flexible concept. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution
prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays, which render rights
nugatory.
In several cases where it was manifest that due process of law or other rights
guaranteed by the Constitution or statutes have been denied, this Court has not faltered
to accord the so-called “radical relief” to keep accused from enduring the rigors and
expense of a full-blown trial. In this case, however, appellants are not entitled to the
same relief in the absence of clear and convincing showing that the delay in the
resolution of their appeal was unreasonable or arbitrary.
4. YES, the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo against the
accused was credible.
In giving full credence to the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo, the
trial judge took into account his proximity to the spot where the shooting occurred, his
elevated position from his guardhouse, his opportunity to view frontally all the
perpetrators for a brief time -- enough for him to remember their faces (when the two [2]
lookouts he had earlier noticed walking back and forth in front of his guard post pointed
their guns at him one [1] after the other, and later when the four [4] armed men
standing around the victim’s car momentarily looked at him as he was approached at
the guardhouse by the second lookout), and his positive identification in the courtroom
of appellants as the six (6) persons whom he saw acting together in the fatal shooting of
Abadilla on June 13, 1996. The clear view that Alejo had at the time of the incident was
verified by Judge Jose Catral Mendoza (now an Associate Justice of this Court) during
the ocular inspection conducted in the presence of the prosecutors, defense counsel,
court personnel, and witnesses Alejo and Maj. Villena.
The trial judge also found that Alejo did not waver in his detailed account of how
the assailants shot Abadilla[,] who was inside his car, the relative positions of the
gunmen and lookouts, and his opportunity to look at them in the face. Alejo immediately
gave his statement before the police authorities just hours after the incident took place.
Appellants make much of a few inconsistencies in his statement and testimony, with
respect to the number of assailants and his reaction when he was ordered to get down
in his guard post. But such inconsistencies have already been explained by Alejo during
cross-examination by correcting his earlier statement in using number four (4) to refer to
those persons actually standing around the car and two (2) more persons as lookouts,
and that he got nervous only when the second lookout shouted at him to get down,
because the latter actually poked a gun at him. It is settled that affidavits, being ex-
parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, but do not really detract from
the credibility of witnesses. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and
testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused, as testimonial
evidence carries more weight than an affidavit.
6. NO, the results of the ballistic and fingerprint tests were NOT
conclusive of the innocence of the accused-appellants.
7. NO, the defense of alibi of the accused CANNOT prevail over their
positive identification in this case.
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the accused by the witnesses. To be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal
charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible
for the person charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its
commission, the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same
time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there
is the least possibility of accused’s presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold
water.