G.R. No.

232395

PEDRO S. AGCAOILI, JR., ENCARNACION A. GAOR, JOSEPHINE P. CALAJATE, GENEDINE D. JAMBARO,

EDEN C. BATTULAYAN, EVANGELINE C. TABULOG, Petitioners

x-----------------------x

MARIA IMELDA JOSEFA "IMEE" R. MARCOS, Co-petitioner 

vs.
THE HONORABLE REPRESENTATIVE RODOLFO C. FARINAS, THE HONORABLE REPRESENTATIVE
JOHNNY T. PIMENTEL, Chairman of the Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability, and
LT. GEN. ROLAND DETABALI (RET.), in his capacity as Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives,
Respondents

THE COMMITTEE ON GOOD GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, Co-respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Styled as an Omnibus Petition,   petitioners Pedro S. Agcaoili, Jr. (Agcaoili, Jr.), Encarnacion A. Gaor (Gaor),
1

Josephine P. Calajate (Calajate ), Genedine D. Jambaro (Jambaro ), Eden C. Battulayan (Battulayan), Evangeline
C. Tabulog (Tabulog) - all employees  of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte and storied as "Ilocos 6" - seek
2

that the Court assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition  earlier filed by petitioners before the Court of
3

Appeals (CA),  and upon assumption, to direct the CA to forward the records of the case to the Court for proper
4

disposition and resolution.

Co-petitioner Maria Imelda Josefa "Imee" Marcos - the incumbent Governor of the Province of Ilocos Norte - joins
the present petition by seeking the issuance of a writ of prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for purposes
of declaring the legislative investigation into House Resolution No. 882  illegal and in excess of jurisdiction, and to
5

enjoin respondents Representatives Rodolfo C. Fariñas (Fariñas) and Johnny T. Pimentel and co-respondent
Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability (House Committee) from further proceeding with the
same. Co-petitioner prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, to restrain and enjoin respondents and co-respondent from conducting any further hearings or
proceedings relative to the investigation pending resolution of the instant petition.

In common, petitioners and co-petitioner seek the issuance of a writ of Amparo to protect them from alleged actual
and threatened violations of their rights to liberty and security of person.

The Antecedents

On March 14, 2017, House Resolution No. 882 was introduced by respondent Farinas, along with Representatives
Pablo P. Bondoc and Aurelio D. Gonzales, Jr., directing House Committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation,
pertaining to the use by the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte of its shares from the excise taxes on locally
manufactured virginia-type cigarettes for a purpose other than that provided for by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7171. The "whereas clause" of House Resolution No. 882 states that the following purchases by the Provincial
6

Government of Ilocos Norte of vehicles in three separate transactions from the years 2011 to 2012 in the aggregate
amount of ₱66,450,000.00 were in violation of R.A. No. 7171 as well as of R.A. No. 9184  and Presidential Decree
7

(P.D.) No. 1445: 8

a. Check dated December 1, 2011, "to cash advance the amount needed for the purchase of 40 units Mini cab for
distribution to the different barangays of Ilocos Norte as per supporting papers hereto attached to the amount of ...."
EIGHTEEN MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP18,000,000.00);

b. Check dated May 25, 2012, "to cash advance the amount needed for the purchase of 5 units Buses as per
supporting papers hereto attached to the amount of ... " FIFTEEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (PhP15,300,000.00), which were all second hand units; and

c. Check dated September 12, 2012, "to cash advance payment of 70 units Foton Mini Truck for distribution to
different municipalities of Ilocos Norte as per supporting papers hereto attached in the amount of ...." THIRTY TWO
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PhP32,550,000.00). 9

Invitation Letters   dated April 6, 2017 were individually sent to petitioners for them to attend as resource persons
10

the initial hearing on House Resolution No. 882 scheduled on May 2, 2017. In response, petitioners sent similarly-
worded Letters  dated April 21, 2017 asking to be excused from the inquiry pending official instructions from co-
11

petitioner Marcos as head of the agency.

Because of petitioners' absence at the May 2, 2017 hearing, a subpoena ad testificandum was issued by co-
respondent House Committee on May 3, 201 7 directing petitioners to appear and testify under oath at a hearing set
on May 16, 2017.   Likewise, an invitation was sent to co-petitioner Marcos to appear on said hearing. 
12 13

Since the subpoena was received by petitioners only one day prior to the scheduled hearing, petitioners requested
that their appearance be deferred to a later date to give them time to prepare. In their letters also, petitioners
requested clarification as to what information co-respondent House Committee seeks to elicit and its relevance to
R.A. No. 7171.   Copetitioner Marcos, on the other hand, submitted a Letter  dated May 15, 2017 seeking
14 15

clarification on the legislative objective of House Resolution No. 882 and its discriminatory application to the
Province of Ilocos Norte to the exclusion of other virginia-type tobacco producing provinces.

Petitioners failed to attend the hearing scheduled on May 16, 201 7. As such, the House Committee issued a Show
Cause Order  why they should not be cited in contempt for their refusal without legal excuse to obey summons.
16

Additionally, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos were notified of the next scheduled hearing on May 29, 2017. 17

In response to the Show Cause Order, petitioners reiterated that they received the notice only one day prior to the
scheduled hearing date in alleged violation of the three-day notice rule under Section 8  of the House Rules
18

Governing Inquiries.  Co-petitioner Marcos, on the other hand, reiterated the queries she raised in her earlier letter.
19

Nevertheless, at the scheduled committee hearing on May 29, 2017, all the petitioners appeared.  It is at this point
20

of the factual narrative where the parties' respective interpretations of what transpired during the May 29, 2017
begin to differ.

Legislative hearing on May 29, 2017

and the contempt citation

On one hand, petitioners allege that at the hearing of May 29, 2017, they were subjected to threats and
intimidation.  According to petitioners, they were asked "leading and misleading questions" and that regardless of
21

their answers, the same were similarly treated as evasive. 22

Specifically, Jambaro claims that because she could not recall the transactions Farinas alluded to and requested to
see the original copy of a document presented to her for identification, she was cited in contempt and ordered
detained.  Allegedly, the same inquisitorial line of questioning was used in the interrogation of Gaor. When Gaor
23

answered that she could no longer remember if she received a cash advance of ₱18,600,000.00 for the purchase of
40 units of minicab, Gaor was likewise cited in contempt and ordered detained.  24

The same threats, intimidation and coercion were likewise supposedly employed on Calajate when she was asked
by Farinas if she signed a cash advance voucher in the amount of ₱18,600,000.00 for the purchase of the 40 units
of minicabs. When Calajate refused to answer, she was also cited in contempt and ordered detained.  25

Similarly, when Battulayan could no longer recall having signed a cash advance voucher for the purchase of
minicabs, she was also cited in contempt and ordered detained.  26

Agcaoili, Jr. was likewise cited in contempt and ordered detained when he failed to answer Fariñas's query
regarding the records of the purchase of the vehicles.  Allegedly, the same threats and intimidation were employed
27

by Farinas in the questioning of Tabulog who was similarly asked if she remembered the purchase of 70 mini trucks.
When Tabulog replied that she could no longer remember such transaction, she was also cited in contempt and
ordered detained.  28

On the other hand, respondents aver that petitioners were evasive in answering questions and simply claimed not to
remember the specifics of the subject transactions. According to respondents, petitioners requested to be
confronted with the original documents to refresh their memories when they knew beforehand that the Commission
on Audit (COA) to which the original vouchers were submitted could no longer find the same. 29

Proceedings before the CA

The next day, or on May 30, 2017, petitioners filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondent House
Sergeant-at-Arms Lieutenant General Detabali (Detabali) before the CA. The CA scheduled the petition for hearing
on June 5, 2017 where the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its special appearance for Detabali,
arguing that the latter was not personally served with a copy of the petition.   On June 2, 2017, the CA in its
30

Resolution  issued a writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Detabali to produce the bodies of the petitioners before the
31

court on June 5, 2017.

On June 5, 2017, Detabali again failed to attend. Instead, the Deputy Secretary General of the House of
Representatives appeared to explain that Detabali accompanied several members of the House of Representatives
on a Northern Luzon trip, thus his inability to attend the scheduled hearing.  A motion to dissolve the writ of Habeas
32

Corpus was also filed on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the petition. 33
On June 6, 2017, petitioners filed a Motion for Provisional Release based on petitioners' constitutional right to bail.
Detabali, through the OSG, opposed the motion. 34

At the hearing set on June 8, 2017, Detabali again failed to attend. On June 9, 2017, the CA issued a
Resolution denying Detabali's motion to dissolve the writ of Habeas Corpus and granting petitioners' Motion for
35

Provisional Release upon posting of a bond. Accordingly, the CA issued an Order of Release Upon
Bond.   Attempts to serve said Resolution and Order of Release Upon Bond to Detabali were made but to no avail.
36 37

On June 20, 2017, the House of Representatives called a special session for the continuation of the legislative
inquiry.  Thereat, a subpoena ad testificandum was issued to compel co-petitioner Marcos to appear at the
38

scheduled July 25, 2017 hearing. 39

The tension between the House of

Representatives and the CA

During the June 20, 2017 hearing, House Committee unanimously voted to issue a Show Cause Order against the
three Justices of the CA's Special Fourth Division,  directing them to explain why they should not be cited in
40

contempt by the House of Representatives.   The House of Representatives was apparently dismayed over the
41

CA's actions in the Habeas Corpus Petition, with House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez quoted as calling the involved
CA Justices "mga gago" and threatening to dissolve the CA.  Disturbed by this turn of events, the involved CA
42

Justices wrote a letter dated July 3, 2017 addressed to the Court En Banc deferring action on certain pending
motions  and administratively referring the same to the Court for advice and/or appropriate action.
43

Meanwhile, in the Habeas Corpus Petition, Detabali moved for the inhibition of CA Justices Stephen Cruz and Nina
Antonio-Valenzuela while CA Justice Edwin Sorongon voluntarily inhibited himself. 44

Subsequent Release of Petitioners

and Dismissal of the Habeas Corpus
Petition by the CA

On July 13, 2017 and while the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending before the CA, petitioners and co-
petitioner Marcos filed the instant Omnibus Petition.

During the congressional hearing on July 25, 2017 which petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos attended, and while
the present Omnibus Petition is pending final resolution by the Court, respondent House Committee lifted the
contempt order and ordered the release of petitioners. Consequently, petitioners were released on the same
date.  Respondent House Committee held the continuance of the legislative hearings on August 9, 2017 and August
45

23, 2017. 46

On August 31, 2017, the CA issued a Resolution in the Habeas Corpus Petition considering the case as closed and
terminated on the ground of mootness. 47

The Arguments

For the assumption of jurisdiction over

the Habeas Corpus Petition

Petitioners insist that the Habeas Corpus Petition then pending before the CA can be transferred to the Court on the
strength of the latter's power to promulgate rules concerning the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts and
its authority to exercise jurisdiction over all courts as provided under Sections 1  and 5(5),  Article VIII of the
48 49

Constitution.

Additionally, petitioners stress that the Court exercises administrative supervision over all courts as provided under
Section 6,   Article VIII of the Constitution, and pursuant to its authority as such, the Court has the power to transfer
50

cases from one court to another which power it implements through Rule 4, Section 3(c)  of AM No. 10-4-20-SC. 
51 52

Citing People of the Philippines v. Gutierrez, et al.,  petitioners likewise argue that the administrative power of the
53

Court to transfer cases from one court to another is based on its inherent power to protect the judiciary and prevent
a miscarriage of justice. 54

Respondents counter that the Omnibus Petition should be dismissed on the ground of mootness as petitioners were
released from detention.

In any case, respondents argue that petitioners cannot compel the Court to assume jurisdiction over the Habeas
Corpus Petition pending before the CA as assumption of jurisdiction is conferred by law. Respondents also argue
that the Omnibus Petition is dismissible on the grounds of misjoinder of action and for failure to implead
indispensable parties, i.e., the CA in the petition to assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition and the
Congress in the prohibition and Amparo petitions. Respondents also argue that petitioners committed forum
shopping when they filed the present Omnibus Petition at a time when a motion for reconsideration before the CA
was still pending resolution.

For the issuance of a Writ of

Prohibition

Co-petitioner Marcos assails the nature of the legislative inquiry as a fishing expedition in violation of petitioners'
right to due process and is allegedly discriminatory to the Province of Ilocos Norte.

Respondents counter that a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to enjoin legislative actions. House
Committee is not a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising judicial or ministerial function but a separate
and independent branch of government. Citing Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor,  and The 55

Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Hon. Majaducon,  respondents argue that prohibition does not lie against
56

legislative or quasi-legislative functions.

For the issuance of a Writ of

Amparo

Petitioners contend that their rights to liberty and personal security were violated as they have been detained, while
co-petitioner Marcos is continuously being threatened of arrest. 57

In opposition, respondents maintain that the writ of Amparo and writ of Habeas Corpus are two separate remedies
which are incompatible and therefore cannot co-exist in a single petition. Further, respondents argue that the
issuance of a writ of Amparo is limited only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances which are
not extant in the instant case.

The Issues

Encapsulated, the issues for resolution are:

1. Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition which seeks the release of petitioners from detention was rendered
moot by their subsequent release from detention?

2. Whether or not the Court can assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition then pending before the CA?

3. Whether or not the subject legislative inquiry on House Resolution No. 882 may be enjoined by a writ of
prohibition?

4. Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition sufficiently states a cause of action for the issuance of a writ
of Amparo? 58

Ruling of the Court

We dismiss the Omnibus Petition.

I.
The Petition to Assume Jurisdiction over Habeas Corpus Petition

The release of persons in whose

behalf the application for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus was filed renders the
petition for the issuance thereof
moot and academic

The writ of Habeas Corpus or the "great writ of liberty"   was devised as a "speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
59

persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom."   The primary
60

purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal."  Under the Constitution, the privilege of the writ of Habeas
61

Corpus cannot be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.  62

As to what kind of restraint against which the writ is effective, case law  deems any restraint which will preclude
63

freedom of action as sufficient. Thus, as provided in the Rules of Court under Section 1, Rule 102 thereof, a writ
of Habeas Corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."

On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 102 spells the instances when the writ of Habeas Corpus is not allowed or when
the discharge thereof is authorized:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule
be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

Accordingly, a Writ of Habeas Corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court  because since then, the restraint has become legal.   In the
64 65

illustrative case of Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,   the Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus on the ground
66

of mootness considering the filing of an information before the court. The court pronounced that since the
incarceration was now by virtue of a judicial order, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies.

Like so, in Duque v. Capt. Vinarao,  the Court held that a petition for habeas corpus can be dismissed upon
67

voluntary withdrawal of the petitioner. Further, in Pestano v. Corvista,  it was pronounced that where the subject
68

person had already been released from the custody complained of, the petition for habeas corpus then still pending
was considered already moot and academic and should be dismissed. This pronouncement was carried on
in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34,  where the Court reiterated that the release of the persons in whose
69

behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot and academic.   Thus, with the subsequent release of all the petitioners from detention, their petition
70

for habeas corpus has been rendered moot. The rule is that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial
rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved and thus, will not determine a moot question
as the resolution thereof will be of no practical value.  71

Far compelling than the question of mootness is that the element of illegal deprivation of freedom of movement or
illegal restraint is jurisdictional in petitions for habeas corpus. Consequently, in the absence of confinement and
custody, the courts lack the power to act on the petition for habeas corpus and the issuance of a writ thereof must
be refused.

Any lingering doubt as to the justiciability of the petition to assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition
before the CA is ultimately precluded by the CA Resolution considering the petition closed and terminated. With the
termination of the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA, petitioners' plea that the same be transferred to this Court,
or that the Court assume jurisdiction thereof must necessarily be denied.

Nevertheless, the Court, in

exceptional cases, decides moot
questions

Although as above-enunciated, the general rule is that mootness of the issue warrants a dismissal, the same admits
of certain exceptions.

In Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo,   the Court summed up the four exceptions to the rule when Courts will
72

decide cases, otherwise moot, thus: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.   At the least, the presence of the second and fourth exceptions to the
73

general rule in the instant case persuades us to proceed.

The Court's administrative

supervision over lower courts does
not equate to the power to usurp
jurisdiction already acquired by
lower courts

Jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus and the adjunct authority to issue the writ are shared by this Court and
the lower courts.

The Constitution vests upon this Court original jurisdiction over petitions for .habeas corpus.   On the other hand,
74

Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Big. 129,  as amended, gives the CA original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas
75

corpuswhether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.  The CA's original jurisdiction over Habeas Corpus petitions
76

was re-stated in R.A. No. 7902.  Similarly, B.P. Blg. 129 gives the RTCs original jurisdiction in the issuance of a writ
77

of Habeas Corpus.  Family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the CA in petitions for habeas
78

corpus where the custody of minors is at issue,   with the Family courts having exclusive jurisdiction to issue the
79

ancillary writ of Habeas Corpus in a petition for custody of minors filed before it.  In the absence of all RTC judges in
80

a province or city, special jurisdiction is likewise conferred to any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge or
Municipal Circuit Trial Judge to hear and decide petitions for a writ of Habeas Corpus. 81
These conferment of jurisdiction finds procedural translation in Rule 102, Section 2 which provides that an
application for a writ of Habeas Corpus may be made before this Court, or any member thereof, or the Court of
Appeals or any member thereof, and if so granted, the same shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.   An 82

application for a writ of Habeas Corpus may also be made before the RTCs, or any of its judges, but if so granted, is
enforceable only within the RTC's judicial district.  The writ of Habeas Corpus granted by the Court or by the CA
83

may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before the RTC or any judge thereof for hearing
and decision on the merits.  84

It is clear from the foregoing that this Court, the CA and the RTC enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over petitions
for habeas corpus. As the Habeas Corpus Petition was filed by petitioners with the CA, the latter has acquired
jurisdiction over said petition to the exclusion of all others, including this Court. This must be so considering the
basic postulate that jurisdiction once acquired by a court is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues
until the case is terminated.   A departure from this established rule is to run the risk of having conflicting decisions
85

from courts of concurrent jurisdiction and would unwittingly promote judicial interference and instability.

Rule 102 in fact supports this interpretation. Observe that under Section 6, Rule 102, the return of the writ
of Habeas Corpus may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ.   In such case, the lower court to
86

which the writ is made returnable by the issuing court shall proceed to decide the petition for habeas
corpus. In Medina v. Gen. Yan  and Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc.,   the Court held that by virtue of such
87 88

designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas
corpus.]" Indeed, when a court acquires jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus, even if merely designated to
hear the return of the writ, such court has the power and the authority to carry the petition to its conclusion.

Petitioners are without unbridled freedom to choose which between this Court and the CA should decide the habeas
corpus petition. Mere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford the parties absolute freedom to choose the court to
which the petition shall be filed. After all, the hierarchy of courts "also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs."89

Further, there appears to be no basis either in fact or in law for the Court to assume or wrest jurisdiction over
the Habeas Corpus Petition filed with the CA.

Petitioners' fear that the CA will be unable to decide the Habeas Corpus petition because of the assault  it suffered
90

from the House of Representatives is unsubstantiated and therefore insufficient to justify their plea for the Court to
over-step into the jurisdiction acquired by the CA. There is no showing that the CA will be or has been rendered
impotent by the threats it received from the House of Representatives.  Neither was there any compelling reason
91

advanced by petitioners that the non assumption by this Court of the habeas corpus petition will result to an
iniquitous situation for any of the parties.

Neither can the Court assume jurisdiction over the then pending Habeas Corpus Petition by invoking Section 6,
Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 3(c), Rule 4 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which both refer to the Court's
exercise of administrative supervision over all courts.

Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

This Constitutional provision refers to the administrative supervision that the Department of Justice previously
exercised over the courts and their personnel. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission enlighten:

MR. GUINGONA: x x x.

The second question has reference to Section 9, about the administrative supervision over all courts to be retained
in the Supreme Court. I was wondering if the Committee had taken into consideration the proposed resolution for
the transfer of the administrative supervision from the Supreme Court to the Ministry of Justice. But as far as I know,
none of the proponents had been invited to explain or defend the proposed resolution.

Also, I wonder if the Committee also took into consideration the fact that the UP Law Constitution Project in its
Volume I, entitled: Annotated Provision had, in fact, made this an alternative proposal, the transfer of administrative
supervision from the Supreme Court to the Ministry of Justice.

Thank you.

MR. CONCEPCION: May I refer the question to Commissioner Regalado?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sarmiento): Commissioner Regalado is recognized.

MR. REGALADO: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

We did invite Minister Neptali Gonzales, who was the proponent for the transfer of supervision of the lower courts to
the Ministry of Justice. I even personally called up and sent a letter or a short note inviting him, but the good Minister
unfortunately was enmeshed in a lot of official commitments. We wanted to hear him because the Solicitor General
of his office, Sedfrey Ordofiez, appeared before us, and asked for the maintenance of the present arrangement
wherein the supervision over lower courts is with the Supreme Court. But aside from that, although there were no
resource persons, we did further studies on the feasibility of transferring the supervision over the lower courts to the
Ministry of Justice. All those things were taken into consideration motu proprio. 92

Administrative Supervision in Section 38, paragraph 2, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Administrative Code is defined as
follows:

(2) Administrative Supervision.-(a) Administrative supervision which shall govern the administrative relationship
between a department or its equivalent and regulatory agencies or other agencies as may be provided by law, shall
be limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such agencies
and to insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day
activities; or require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation
and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; to take such
action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification of violations,
abuses and other forms of maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but
may not increase or add to them[.]

Thus, administrative supervision merely involves overseeing the operations of agencies to ensure that they are
managed effectively, efficiently and economically, but without interference with day-to-day activities. 93

Thus, to effectively exercise its power of administrative supervision over all courts as prescribed by the Constitution,
Presidential Decree No. 828, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 842, created the Office of the Court
Administrator. Nowhere in the functions of the several offices in the Office of the Court Administrator is it provided
that the Court can assume jurisdiction over a case already pending with another court. 94

Rule 4, Section 3(c) of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, on the other hand provides:

Sec. 3. Administrative Functions of the Court. - The administrative functions of the Court en baneconsist of, but are
not limited to, the following:

xxxx

(c) the transfer of cases, from one court, administrative area or judicial region, to another, or the transfer of
venue of the trial of cases to avoid miscarriage of justice[.] (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, the administrative function of the Court to transfer cases is a matter of venue, rather than jurisdiction. As
correctly pointed out by respondents, the import of the Court's pronouncement in Gutierrez  is the recognition of the
95

incidental and inherent power of the Court to transfer the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a
neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of
justice, so demands.   Such incidental and inherent power cannot be interpreted to mean an authority on the part of
96

the Court to determine which court should hear specific cases without running afoul with the doctrine of separation
of powers between the Judiciary and the Legislative.

II.
The Petition for Prohibition

Under the Court's expanded

jurisdiction, the remedy of
prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction by any branch
or instrumentality of the Government

Respondents principally oppose co-petitioner Marcos' petition for prohibition on the ground that a writ of prohibition
does not lie to enjoin legislative or quasi-legislative actions. In support thereof, respondents cite the cases of Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association  and The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. 
97 98

Contrary to respondents' contention, nowhere in The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee did the Court finally settle that
prohibition does not lie against legislative functions.  The import of the Court's decision in said case is the
99

recognition of the Constitutional authority of the Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure and provided that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected. Thus, if these Constitutionally-prescribed requirements are met, courts have no
authority to prohibit Congressional committees from requiring the attendance of persons to whom it issues a
subpoena.
On the other hand, the Court's pronouncement in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association should be taken in its proper
context. The principal relief sought by petitioners therein was the invalidation of the implementing rules issued by
the National Government Center Administration Committee pursuant to its quasi-legislative power. Hence, the Court
therein stated that prohibition is not the proper remedy but an ordinary action for nullification, over which the Court
generally exercises not primary, but appellate jurisdiction. 100

In any case, the availability of the remedy of prohibition for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Legislative and Executive branches has been
categorically affirmed by the Court in Judge Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council,   thus: 101

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a
tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.  (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
102

The above pronouncement is but an application of the Court's judicial power which Section 1,   Article VIII of the
103

Constitution defines as the duty of the courts of justice ( 1) to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and (2) to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Such innovation under the 1987 Constitution later on became known as the Court's "traditional jurisdiction" and
"expanded jurisdiction," respectively.  104

While the requisites for the court's exercise of either concept of jurisdiction remain constant, note that the exercise
by the Court of its "expanded jurisdiction" is not limited to the determination of grave abuse of discretion to quasi-
judicial or judicial acts, but extends to any act involving the exercise of discretion on the part of the government.
Indeed, the power of the Court to enjoin a legislative act is beyond cavil as what the Court did in Garcillano v. The
House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, et al.   when it enjoined therein respondent
105

committees from conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation on the notorious "Hello Garci" tapes for failure to comply
with the requisite publication of the rules of procedure.

Co-petitioner Marcos failed to show

that the subject legislative inquiry
violates the Constitution or that the
conduct thereof was attended by
grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction

While there is no question that a writ of prohibition lies against legislative functions, the Court finds no justification
for the issuance thereof in the instant case.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is expressly provided by the
Constitution under Section 21, Article VI thereof, which provides:

Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in,
or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis ours)

Even before the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the Court in Arnault v. Nazareno  recognized that the power of
106

inquiry is an "essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function."   In Senate of the Philippines v. Exec.
107

Sec. Ermita,   the Court categorically pronounced that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
108

executive branch, as in the instant case.  109

Although expansive, the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not without
limitations. Foremost, the inquiry must be in furtherance of a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e., legislation, and as
such, "investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and punish those investigated" should
necessarily be struck down.   Further, the exercise of the power of inquiry is circumscribed by the above-quoted
110

Constitutional provision, such that the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected."  It is jurisprudentially settled that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
111

including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

In this case, co-petitioner Marcos primordially assails the nature of the legislative inquiry as a fishing expedition in
alleged violation of her right to due process and to be discriminatory to the Province of Ilocos Norte. However, a
perusal of the minutes of legislative hearings so far conducted reveals that the same revolved around the use of the
Province of Ilocos Norte's shares from the excise tax on locally manufactured virginia-type cigarettes through cash
advances which co-petitioner Marcos herself admits   to be the "usual practice" and was actually allowed by the
112

Commission on Audit (COA).   In fact, the cause of petitioners' detention was not the perceived or gathered illegal
113

use of such shares but the rather unusual inability of petitioners to recall the transactions despite the same having
involved considerable sums of money.

Like so, co-petitioner Marcos' plea for the prevention of the legislative inquiry was anchored on her apprehension
that she, too, will be arrested and detained by House Committee. However, such remains to be an apprehension
which does not give cause for the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of prohibition. Consequently, co-petitioner
Marcos' prayer for the ancillary remedy of a preliminary injunction cannot be granted, because her right thereto has
not been proven to be clear and unmistakable. In any event, such injunction would be of no useful purpose given
that the instant Omnibus Petition has been decided on the merits.  114

III.
The Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo

The filing of the petition for the

issuance of a writ of Amparo before
this Court while the Habeas Corpus
Petition before the CA was still
pending is improper

Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and directly intervene
through the writ of Amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz, et al. v. Hon. Judge Del Rosario, et al.,   thus:
115

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the
reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of
Amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security -
the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger
or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper
case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence
of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.   (Italics in the original)
116

Thus, while there is no procedural and legal obstacle to the joining of a petition for habeas corpus and a petition
for Amparo,   the peculiarity of the then pendency of the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA renders the direct
117

resort to this Court for the issuance of a writ of Amparo inappropriate.

The privilege of the writ of Amparo

is confined to instances of extralegal
killings and enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof

Even if the Court sets aside this procedural/aux pas, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos failed to show, by prima
facie evidence, entitlement to the issuance of the writ. Much less have they exhibited, by substantial evidence,
meritorious grounds to the grant of the petition.

Section 1 of the Rule on the writ of Amparo provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al.,   the Court categorically pronounced
118

that the Amparo Rule, as it presently stands, is confined to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or to
threats thereof, and jurisprudentially defined these two instances, as follows:

[T]he Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
"Extralegal killings" are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.  (Citations omitted)
119
The above definition of "enforced disappearance" appears in the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances  and is as statutorily defined in Section 3(g)  of R. A. No. 9851.  Thus, in Navia, et al. v.
120 121 122

Pardico,   the elements constituting "enforced disappearance," are enumerated as follows:

123

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the Amparo petition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.124

In Lozada, Jr., et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.,   the Court reiterates that the privilege of the writ
125

of Amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a
similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee
or a private individual.
126

Here, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos readily admit that the instant Omnibus Petition does not cover extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. Thus, on this ground alone, their petition for the issuance of
a writ of Amparo is dismissible.

Despite this, petitioners insist that their rights to liberty and security were violated because of their unlawful
detention. On the other hand, co-petitioner Marcos seeks the protective writ of Amparo on the ground that her right
to liberty and security are being threatened by the conduct of the legislative inquiry on House Resolution No. 882.
But even these claims of actual and threatened violations of the right to liberty and security fail to impress.

To reiterate, the writ of Amparo is designed to protect and guarantee the (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3)
right to security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life. In Rev. Fr. Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, et al.,   the Court had occasion to expound on the rights falling within the protective mantle of the writ
127

of Amparo, thus:

The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the
following: ( 1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.

In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the Court explained the concept of right to life in this wise:

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive- upon which the
enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of
this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he
established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and
property ... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." In a broad sense, the
right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body,
his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is
invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life
according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."

The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., in this manner:

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right
to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." x x x

Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., thoroughly expounded on the import of the right to
security, thus:

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." x x x
Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual
international human right. It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from
fear." Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

xxxx

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life,
liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react
differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more
correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened
with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security
mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or

security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be
searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment,
physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself
escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront
to the bodily integrity or security of a person.

xxxx

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of
bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the
rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these
rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of
the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. x x x.   (Citations omitted and
128

emphasis and italics in the original)

Nevertheless, and by way of caution, the rule is that a writ of Amparo shall not issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. Consequently, every petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo should be supported by justifying
allegations of fact, which the Court in Tapuz  laid down as follows:
129

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the
name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any
report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts
determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or
violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.  (Citations
130

omitted and italics in the original)

Even more telling is the rule that the writ of Amparo cannot be issued in cases where the alleged threat has ceased
and is no longer imminent or continuing. 131
In this case, the alleged unlawful restraint on petitioners' liberty has effectively ceased upon their subsequent
release from detention. On the other hand, the apprehension of co-petitioner Marcos that she will be detained is, at
best, merely speculative. In other words, co-petitioner Marcos has failed to show any clear threat to her right to
liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.

In Mayor William N. Mamba, et al. v. Leomar Bueno,   the Court held that:
132

Neither did petitioners and co-petitioner successfully establish the existence of a threat to or violation of their right to
security. In an Amparo action, the parties must establish their respective claims by substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence is that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It
is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person
charged.  133

Here, it appears that petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos even attended and participated in the subsequent
hearings on House Resolution No. 882 without any untoward incident. Petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos thus
failed to establish that their attendance at and participation in the legislative inquiry as resource persons have
seriously violated their right to liberty and security, for which no other legal recourse or remedy is available.
Perforce, the petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo must be dismissed.

IV.
Congress' Power to Cite in Contempt
and to Compel Attendance of Court Justices

It has not escaped the attention of the Court that the events surrounding the filing of the present Omnibus Petition
bear the unsavory impression that a display of force between the CA and the Congress is impending. Truth be told,
the letter of the CA Justices to the Court En Banc betrays the struggle these CA Justices encountered in view of the
Congressional power to cite in contempt and consequently, to arrest and detain. These Congressional powers are
indeed awesome. Yet, such could not be used to deprive the Court of its Constitutional duty to supervise judges of
lower courts in the performance of their official duties. The fact remains that the CA Justices are non-impeachable
officers. As such, authority over them primarily belongs to this Court and to no other.

To echo the Court's ruling in Maceda v. Ombudsman Vasquez:   [T]he Supreme Court [has] administrative
134

supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges'
and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers. 135

It is this very principle of the doctrine of separation of powers as enshrined under the Constitution that urges the
Court to carefully tread on areas falling under the sole discretion of the legislative branch of the government. In point
is the power of legislative investigation which the Congress exercises as a Constitutional prerogative. 1awp++i1

Concomitantly, the principle of separation of powers also serves as one of the basic postulates for exempting the
Justices, officials and employees of the Judiciary and for excluding the Judiciary's privileged and confidential
documents and information from any compulsory processes which very well includes the Congress' power of inquiry
in aid of legislation.   Such exemption has been jurisprudentially referred to as judicial privilege as implied from the
136

exercise of judicial power expressly vested in one Supreme Court and lower courts created by law.  137

However, as in all privileges, the exercise thereof is not without limitations. The invocation of the Court's judicial
privilege is understood to be limited to matters that are part of the internal deliberations and actions of the Court in
the exercise of the Members' adjudicatory functions and duties. For the guidance of the bench, the Court herein
reiterates its Per Curiam Resolution  dated February 14, 2012 on the production of court records and attendance of
138

court officials and employees as witnesses in the then impeachment complaint against former Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona, insofar as it summarized the documents or communications considered as privileged as follows:

(1) Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by the Court on each case included
in the agenda of the Court's session on acts done material to pending cases, except where a party litigant requests
information on the result of the raffle of the case, pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court (IRSC);

(2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before
the Court;

(3) Court records which are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature, in particular, documents and other
communications which are part of or related to the deliberative process, i.e, notes, drafts, research papers, internal
discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and similar papers;

(4) Confidential information secured by justices, judges, court officials and employees in the course of their official
functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged even after their term of office.
(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged materials that cannot be disclosed, except only
for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been made available by the court to the general public.

xxxx

By way of qualification, judicial privilege is unavailing on matters external to the Judiciary's deliberative adjudicatory
functions and duties. Justice Antonio T. Carpio discussed in his Separate Opinion to the Per Curiam Resolution, by
way of example, the non-confidential matters as including those "information relating to the commission of crimes or
misconduct, or violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, or any violation of a law or regulation," and those outside
the Justices' adjudicatory functions such as "financial, budgetary, personnel and administrative matters relating to
the operations of the Judiciary."

As a guiding principle, the purpose of judicial privilege, as a child of judicial power, is principally for the effective
discharge of such judicial power. If the matter upon which Members of the Court, court officials and employees privy
to the Court's deliberations, are called to appear and testify do not relate to and will not impair the Court's
deliberative adjudicatory judicial power, then judicial privilege may not be successfully invoked.

The Court had occasion to illustrate the application of the rule on judicial privilege and its qualifications to
impeachment proceedings as follows:

[W]here the ground cited in an impeachment complaint is bribery, a Justice may be called as a witness in the
impeachment of another Justice, as bribery is a matter external to or is not connected with the adjudicatory functions
and duties of a magistrate. A Justice, however, may not be called to testify on the arguments the accused Justice
presented in the internal debates as these constitute details of the deliberative process.  139

Nevertheless, the traditional application of judicial privilege cannot be invoked to defeat a positive Constitutional
duty. Impeachment proceedings, being sui generis,   is a Constitutional process designed to ensure accountability
140

of impeachable officers, the seriousness and exceptional importance of which outweighs the claim of judicial
privilege.

To be certain, the Court, in giving utmost importance to impeachment proceedings even as against its own
Members, recognizes not the superiority of the power of the House of Representatives to initiate impeachment
cases and the power of the Senate to try and decide the same, but the superiority of the impeachment proceedings
as a Constitutional process intended to safeguard public office from culpable abuses. In the words of Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereneo in her Concurring and Dissenting Opinion to the Per Curiam Resolution, the matter of
impeachment is of such paramount societal importance that overrides the generalized claim of judicial privilege and
as such, the Court should extend respect to the Senate acting as an Impeachment Court and give it wide latitude in
favor of its function of exacting accountability as required by the Constitution.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the Omnibus
Petition.

WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice