G.R. No.

130716

Constitution

Statutes

Executive Issuances

Judicial Issuances

Other Issuances

Jurisprudence

International Legal Resources

AUSL Exclusive

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO (in his
capacity as chairman of the PCGG), respondents, GLORIA A. JOPSON, CELNAN A. JOPSON, SCARLET A.
JOPSON, and TERESA A. JOPSON, petitioners-in-intervention.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the people's constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern. Does this right include access to the terms of government
negotiations prior to their consummation or conclusion? May the government, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the proposed terms of a compromise
agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth? More specifically, are the
"General Agreement" and "Supplemental Agreement," both dated December 28, 1993 and executed
between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, valid and binding?
The Case

These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and "[e]njoin
respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any
greement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the
properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad — including the so-
called Marcos gold hoard"; and (2) to "[c]ompel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and
agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations
and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."1

The Facts

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the
prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public
treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what impelled him to
bring this action were several news reports 2 bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in
September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos
assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a
compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share
these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information 3 and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest,4 demands that respondents make
public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-
gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an
issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that
would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general
have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.

Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs.
They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked
the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be
compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not
become effective and binding.
Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to the
Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No. 141, entitled Republic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos,
and that the Republic opposed such move on the principal grounds that (1) said Agreements have not
been ratified by or even submitted to the President for approval, pursuant to Item No. 8 of the General
Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with their undertakings therein, particularly
the collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. The Republic also cited an April 11, 1995
Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the Sandiganbayan dismissed a similar petition filed by the
Marcoses' attorney-in-fact.

Furthermore, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in his May 4, 1998 Memorandum 5 to then PCGG Chairman
Magtanggol Gunigundo, categorically stated:

This is to reiterate my previous position embodied in the Palace Press Release of 6 April 1995 that I have
not authorized you to approve the Compromise Agreements of December 28, 1993 or any agreement at
all with the Marcoses, and would have disapproved them had they been submitted to me.

The Full Powers of Attorney of March 1994 and July 4, 1994, did not authorize you to approve said
Agreements, which I reserve for myself as President of the Republic of the Philippines.

The assailed principal Agreement 6 reads:

GENERAL AGREEMENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This Agreement entered into this 28th day of December, 1993, by and between —

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), a
governmental agency vested with authority defined under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, with
offices at the philcomcen Building, Pasig, Metro Manila, represented by its Chairman referred to as
FIRST PARTY,

— and —
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.,
all of legal age, and with address at c/o No. 154 Lopez Rizal St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, Imee Marcos Manotoc, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Jr., and Irene Marcos Araneta,
hereinafter collectively referred to as the PRIVATE PARTY.

W I T N E S S E T H:

WHEREAS, the PRIVATE PARTY has been impelled by their sense of nationalism and love of country and
of the entire Filipino people, and their desire to set up a foundation and finance impact projects like
installation of power plants in selected rural areas and initiation of other community projects for the
empowerment of the people;

WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal of December 21,
1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain
conditionalities are met, but even after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final
judgment of conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY;

WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY is desirous of avoiding a long-drawn out litigation which, as proven by the
past 7 years, is consuming money, time and effort, and is counter-productive and ties up assets which
the FIRST PARTY could otherwise utilize for its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other
urgent needs;

WHEREAS, His Excellency, President Fidel V. Ramos, has adopted a policy of unity and reconciliation in
order to bind the nation's wounds and start the process of rebuilding this nation as it goes on to the
twenty-first century;

WHEREAS, this Agreement settles all claims and counterclaims which the parties may have against one
another, whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants set forth herein, the parties agree
as follows:

1. The parties will collate all assets presumed to be owned by, or held by other parties for the benefit of,
the PRIVATE PARTY for purposes of determining the totality of the assets covered by the settlement. The
subject assets shall be classified by the nature thereof, namely: (a) real estate; (b) jewelry; (c) paintings
and other works of art; (d) securities; (e) funds on deposit; (f) precious metals, if any, and (g)
miscellaneous assets or assets which could not appropriately fall under any of the preceding
classification. The list shall be based on the full disclosure of the PRIVATE PARTY to insure its accuracy.

2. Based on the inventory, the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded to the FIRST PARTY,
and which shall be assigned to/retained by the PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE PARTY shall
be net of and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines. However, considering
the unavailability of all pertinent and relevant documents and information as to balances and
ownership, the actual specification of assets to be retained by the PRIVATE PARTY shall be covered by
supplemental agreements which shall form part of this Agreement.

3. Foreign assets which the PRIVATE PARTY shall fully disclose but which are held by trustees, nominees,
agents or foundations are hereby waived over by the PRIVATE PARTY in favor of the FIRST PARTY. For
this purpose, the parties shall cooperate in taking the appropriate action, judicial and/or extrajudicial, to
recover the same for the FIRST PARTY.

4. All disclosures of assets made by the PRIVATE PARTY shall not be used as evidence by the FIRST PARTY
in any criminal, civil, tax or administrative case, but shall be valid and binding against said PARTY for use
by the FIRST PARTY in withdrawing any account and/or recovering any asset. The PRIVATE PARTY
withdraws any objection to the withdrawal by and/or release to the FIRST PARTY by the Swiss banks
and/or Swiss authorities of the $356 million, its accrued interests, and/or any other account; over which
the PRIVATE PARTY waives any right, interest or participation in favor of the FIRST PARTY. However, any
withdrawal or release of any account aforementioned by the FIRST PARTY shall be made in the presence
of any authorized representative of the PRIVATE PARTY.

5. The trustees, custodians, safekeepers, depositaries, agents, nominees, administrators, lawyers, or any
other party acting in similar capacity in behalf of the PRIVATE PARTY are hereby informed through this
General Agreement to insure that it is fully implemented and this shall serve as absolute authority from
both parties for full disclosure to the FIRST PARTY of said assets and for the FIRST PARTY to withdraw
said account and/or assets and any other assets which the FIRST PARTY on its own or through the help
of the PRIVATE PARTY/their trustees, etc., may discover.

6. Any asset which may be discovered in the future as belonging to the PRIVATE PARTY or is being held
by another for the benefit of the PRIVATE PARTY and which is not included in the list per No. 1 for
whatever reason shall automatically belong to the FIRST PARTY, and the PRIVATE PARTY in accordance
with No. 4 above, waives any right thereto.
7. This Agreement shall be binding on and inure to the benefit of, the parties and their respective legal
representatives, successors and assigns and shall supersede any other prior agreement.

8. The PARTIES shall submit this and any other implementing Agreements to the President of the
Philippines for approval. In the same manner, the PRIVATE PARTY shall provide the FIRST PARTY
assistance by way of testimony or deposition on any information it may have that could shed light on
the cases being pursued by the FIRST PARTY against other parties. The FIRST PARTY shall desist from
instituting new suits already subject of this Agreement against the PRIVATE PARTY and cause the
dismissal of all other cases pending in the Sandiganbayan and in other courts.

9. In case of violation by the PRIVATE PARTY of any of the conditions herein contained, the PARTIES shall
be restored automatically to the status quo ante the signing of this Agreement.

For purposes of this Agreement, the PRIVATE PARTY shall be represented by Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr.,
as their only Attorney-in-Fact.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this instrument this 28th day of December, 1993, in
Makati, Metro Manila.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON

GOOD GOVERNMENT

By:

[Sgd.] MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO

Chairman

ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS,

IMELDA R. MARCOS, MA. IMELDA

MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R.

MARCOS, JR., & IRENE MARCOS-

ARANETA

By:

[Sgd.] IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS

[Sgd.] MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR.7

[Sgd.] IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA

Assisted by:

[Sgd.] ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR.

Counsel & Attorney-in-Fact

SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT

This Agreement entered into this 28th day of December, 1993, by and between —

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), a
governmental agency vested with authority defined under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, with
offices at the Philcomcen Building, Pasig, Metro Manila, represented by its Chairman Magtanggol C.
Gunigundo, hereinafter referred to as the FIRST PARTY,

— and —

Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.,
all of legal age, and with address at c/o No. 154 Lopez Rizal St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, Imee Marcos Manotoc, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Jr., and Irene Marcos Araneta,
hereinafter collectively referred to as the PRIVATE PARTY.

W I T N E S S E T H:

The parties in this case entered into a General Agreement dated Dec. 28, 1993;

The PRIVATE PARTY expressly reserve their right to pursue their interest and/or sue over local assets
located in the Philippines against parties other than the FIRST PARTY.

The parties hereby agree that all expenses related to the recovery and/or withdrawal of all assets
including lawyers' fees, agents' fees, nominees' service fees, bank charges, traveling expenses and all
other expenses related thereto shall be for the account of the PRIVATE PARTY.

In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY shall be entitled to
the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be eventually withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss
deposits.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this instrument this 28th day of December, 1993, in
Makati, Metro Manila.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON

GOOD GOVERNMENT
By:

[Sgd.] MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO

Chairman

ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS,

IMELDA R. MARCOS, MA. IMELDA

MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R.

MARCOS, JR., & IRENE MARCOS-

ARANETA

By:

[Sgd.] IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS

[Sgd.] MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR.9

[Sgd.] IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA

Assisted by:

[Sgd.] ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR.

Counsel & Attorney-in-Fact

Acting on a motion of petitioner, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 10 dated March 23,
enjoining respondents, their agents and/or representatives from "entering into, or perfecting and/or
executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and
concerning their ill-gotten wealth."

Issues

The Oral Argument, held on March 16, 1998, focused on the following issues:

(a) Procedural:

(1) Whether or not the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition; and

(2) Whether or not this Court is the proper court before which this action may be filed.

(b) Substantive:

(1) Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any
agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and

(2) Whether or not there exist any legal restraints against a compromise agreement between the
Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. 11

After their oral presentations, the parties filed their respective memoranda.

On August 19, 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed before the Court a
Motion for Intervention, attaching thereto their Petition in Intervention. They aver that they are "among
the 10,000 claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos Family and/or the Marcos Estate is
recognized by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, Maximo Hilao,
et al., Class Plaintiffs No. 92-15526, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit US App. Lexis 14796, June
16, 1994 and the Decision of the Swiss Supreme Court of December 10, 1997." As such, they claim to
have personal and direct interest in the subject matter of the instant case, since a distribution or
disposition of the Marcos properties may adversely affect their legitimate claims. In a minute Resolution
issued on August 24, 1998, the Court granted their motion to intervene and required the respondents to
comment thereon. The September 25, 1998 Comment 12 of the solicitor general on said motion merely
reiterated his aforecited arguments against the main petition. 13

The Court's Ruling

The petition id imbued with merit.

First Procedural Issue:

Petitioner's Standing

Petitioner, on the one hand, explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the legal personality to file
the instant petition. He submits that since ill-gotten wealth "belongs to the Filipino people and [is], in
truth hand in fact, part of the public treasury," any compromise in relation to it would constitute a
diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose interest is for a full, if not
substantial, recovery of such assets.

Besides, petitioner emphasize, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue
"of transcendental importance the public." He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and
prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities,
if the issues raised are "of paramount public interest;" and if they "immeasurably affect the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people."

Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, 14 such as in this case. He invokes several decisions
15 of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case
involved public interest.

On the other hand, the solicitor general, on behalf of respondents, contends that petitioner has no
standing to institute the present action, because no expenditure of public funds is involved and said
petitioner has no actual interest in the alleged agreement. Respondents further insist that the instant
petition is premature, since there is no showing that petitioner has requested PCGG to disclose any such
negotiations and agreements; or that, if he has, the Commission has refused to do so.

Indeed, the arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling decisional rule as regards his legal
standing to institute the instant petition. Access to public documents and records is a public right, and
the real parties in interest are the people themselves. 16

In Tañada v. Tuvera, 17 the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public a right and the object
of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties
in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the
execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the
action. 18 In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters
of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, 19 in
connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court
declared that the right they sought to be enforced "is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land."

Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 20 while reiterating Tañada, further declared that "when a
mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which
possesses the right." 21

Further, in Albano v. Reyes, 22 we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been
involved under the questioned contract for the development, the management and the operation of the
Manila International Container Terminal, "public interest [was] definitely involved considering the
important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the country and the
magnitude of the financial consideration involved." We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure
provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the petitioner's
standing.

Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official
records, documents and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the
two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the
enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be
allowed.
In any event, the question on the standing of Petitioner Chavez is rendered moot by the intervention of
the Jopsons, who are among the legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth. The standing of the Jopsons
is not seriously contested by the solicitor general. Indeed, said petitioners-intervenors have a legal
interest in the subject matter of the instant case, since a distribution or disposition of the Marcoses' ill-
gotten properties may adversely affect the satisfaction of their claims.

Second Procedural Issue:

The Court's Jurisdiction

Petitioner asserts that because this petition is an original action for mandamus and one that is not
intended to delay any proceeding in the Sandiganbayan, its having been filed before this Court was
proper. He invokes Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition and mandamus.

The solicitor general, on the other hand, argues that the petition has been erroneously brought before
this Court, since there is neither a justiciable controversy nor a violation of petitioner's rights by the
PCGG. He alleges that the assailed agreements are already the very lis mota in Sandiganbayan Civil Case
No. 0141, which has yet to dispose of the issue; thus, this petition is premature. Furthermore,
respondents themselves have opposed the Marcos heirs' motion, filed in the graft court, for the
approval of the subject Agreements. Such opposition belies petitioner's claim that the government,
through respondents, has concluded a settlement with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill-gotten
assets.

In Tañada and Legaspi, we upheld therein petitioners' resort to a mandamus proceeding, seeking to
enforce a public right as well as to compel performance of a public duty mandated by no less than the
fundamental law. 23 Further, Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly confers upon the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto
and habeas corpus.

Respondents argue that petitioner should have properly sought relief before the Sandiganbayan,
particularly in Civil Case No. 0141, in which the enforcement of the compromise Agreements is pending
resolution. There may seem to be some merit in such argument, if petitioner is merely seeking to enjoin
the enforcement of the compromise and/or to compel the PCGG to disclose to the public the terms
contained in said Agreements. However, petitioner is here seeking the public disclose of "all
negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and documents related to or relating to such
negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."

In other words, this petition is not confined to the Agreements that have already been drawn, but
likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking towards any settlement on the alleged Marcos loot.
Ineluctably, the core issue boils down to the precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin
constitutional provisions on "public transactions." This broad and prospective relief sought by the
instant petition brings it out of the realm of Civil Case No. 0141.

First Substantive Issue:

Public Disclosure of Terms of

Any Agreement, Perfected or Not

In seeking the public disclosure of negotiations and agreements pertaining to a compromise settlement
with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth, petitioner invokes the following provisions
of the Constitution:

Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Respondents' opposite view is that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed and operative
official acts, not to those still being considered. As regards the assailed Agreements entered into by the
PCGG with the Marcoses, there is yet no right of action that has accrued, because said Agreements have
not been approved by the President, and the Marcos heirs have failed to fulfill their express undertaking
therein. Thus, the Agreements have not become effective. Respondents add that they are not aware of
any ongoing negotiation for another compromise with the Marcoses regarding their alleged ill-gotten
assets.
The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution have
as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within
which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following
are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2)
trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.

Limitations to the Right:

(1) National Security Matters

At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a governmental
privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters. 24 But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may
not be invoked to withhold documents and other information, 25 provided that they are examined "in
strict confidence" and given "scrupulous protection."

Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest. 26

(2) Trade Secrets and

Banking Transactions

The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters
and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 27
and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 28)
are also exempted from compulsory disclosure. 29

(3) Criminal Matters

Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the
prosecution and the detention of criminals, 30 which courts may nor inquire into prior to such arrest,
detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free
public access to, for example, police information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of
fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.

(4) Other Confidential

Information

The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging
"confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made
available to the public." 32

Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door
Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court. 33

Scope: Matters of Public Concern and

Transactions Involving Public Interest

In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., 34 the Court emphasized that the information sought must be "matters of
public concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure
extends only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law." As to the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern,"
the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 35 elucidated:

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which
can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is
of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

Considered a public concern in the above-mentioned case was the "legitimate concern of citizens to
ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are
eligibles." So was the need to give the general public adequate notification of various laws that regulate
and affect the actions and conduct of citizens, as held in Tañada. Likewise did the "public nature of the
loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers (members of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa)" qualify the information sought in Valmonte as matters of public interest and
concern. In Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, 36 the Court also held that official acts of public officers done
in pursuit if their official functions are public in character; hence, the records pertaining to such official
acts and decisions are within the ambit of the constitutional right of access to public records.

Under Republic Act No. 6713, public officials and employees are mandated to "provide information on
their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, [and] ensure openness of
information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate . . .," except when "otherwise
provided by law or when required by the public interest." In particular, the law mandates free public
access, at reasonable hours, to the annual performance reports of offices and agencies of government
and government-owned or controlled corporations; and the statements of assets, liabilities and financial
disclosures of all public officials and employees. 37

In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions
must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental affairs. This
principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity to determine whether those to whom they
have entrusted the affairs of the government are honesty, faithfully and competently performing their
functions as public servants. 38 Undeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free flow of thought;
39 but thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that the public would gain a better perspective of
vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as participate in the affairs of the
government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. Certainly, it is by ensuring an unfettered
and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive
to the changes desired by the people. 40

The Nature of the Marcoses'

Alleged Ill-Gotten Wealth

We now come to the immediate matter under consideration.

Upon the departure from the country of the Marcos family and their cronies in February 1986, the new
government headed by President Corazon C. Aquino was specifically mandated to "[r]ecover ill-gotten
properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and [to] protect the interest of
the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or
accounts." 41 Thus, President Aquino's very first executive orders (which partook of the nature of
legislative enactments) dealt with the recovery of these alleged ill-gotten properties.

Executive Order No. 1, promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) days after the Marcoses fled the
country, created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the President in the recovery of vast
government resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives
and close associates both here and abroad.

Under Executive Order No. 2, issued twelve (12) days later, all persons and entities who had knowledge
or possession of ill-gotten assets and properties were warned and, under pain of penalties prescribed by
law, prohibited from concealing, transferring or dissipating them or from otherwise frustrating or
obstructing the recovery efforts of the government.

On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving additional powers to the PCGG which,
taking into account the overriding considerations of national interest and national survival, required it to
achieve expeditiously and effectively its vital task of recovering ill-gotten wealth.

With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the people, there is no
doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest. 42 We may also add that "ill-gotten wealth," by its very nature, assumes a
public character. Based on the aforementioned Executive Orders, "ill-gotten wealth" refers to assets and
properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of
government funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their public office; or their
use of powers, influences or relationships, "resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave
damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines." Clearly, the assets and
properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes,
therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public
treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by
competent courts. Another declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten
wealth is that it may be used for national economic recovery.

We believe the foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner has a right to
respondents' disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses' purported
ill-gotten wealth.

Access to Information
on Negotiating Terms

But does the constitutional provision likewise guarantee access to information regarding ongoing
negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement? This same clarification was sought and clearly
addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their deliberations, which we quote hereunder:
43

MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?

MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps
leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction?

MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.

Considering the intent of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its
officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any
proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten
wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications 44 during the stage
when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage.
There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as
discussed earlier — such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations,
intelligence and other classified information.

Second Substantive Issue:

Legal Restraints on a Marcos-PCGG Compromise

Petitioner lastly contends that any compromise agreement between the government and the Marcoses
will be a virtual condonation of all the alleged wrongs done by them, as well as an unwarranted
permission to commit graft and corruption.

Respondents, for their part, assert that there is no legal restraint on entering into a compromise with
the Marcos heirs, provided the agreement does not violate any law.

Prohibited Compromises

In general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the following matters:
(1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal separation, (3) any ground for legal
separation, (4) future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future legitimate. 45 And like any
other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy or public order. 46 A compromise is binding and has the force of law between the
parties, 47 unless the consent of a party is vitiated — such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or
undue influence — or when there is forgery, or if the terms of the settlment are so palpably
unconscionable. In the latter instances, the agreement may be invalidated by the courts. 48

Effect of Compromise

on Civil Actions

One of the consequences of a compromise, and usually its primary object, is to avoid or to end a
litigation. 49 In fact, the law urges courts to persuade the parties in a civil case to agree to a fair
settlement. 50 As an incentive, a court may mitigate damages to be paid by a losing party who shows a
sincere desire to compromise. 51

In Republic & Campos Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 52 which affirmed the grant by the PCGG of civil and
criminal immunity to Jose Y. Campos and the family, the Court held that in the absence an express
prohibition, the rule on compromises in civil actions under the Civil Code is applicable to PCGG cases.
Such principle is pursuant to the objectives of EO No. 14 particularly the just and expeditious recovery of
ill-gotten wealth, so that it may be used to hasten economic recovery. The same principle was upheld in
Benedicto v. Board of Administrators of Television Stations RPN, BBC and IBC 53 and Republic v.
Benedicto, 54 which ruled in favor of the validity of the PCGG compromise agreement with Roberto S.
Benedicto.
Immunity from

Criminal Prosecution

However, any compromise relating to the civil liability arising from an offense does not automatically
terminate the criminal proceeding against or extinguish the criminal liability of the malefactor. 55 While
a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar general sanction as regards
criminal liability. The authority must be specifically conferred. In the present case, the power to grant
criminal immunity was confered on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended by EO No. 14-A, whci
provides:

Sec. 5. The President Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant immunity from criminal
prosecution to any person who provides information or testifies in any investigation conducted by such
Commission to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent, defendant or accused has
acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question in any case where such information or
testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the latter's guilt or his civil liability. The immunity thereby
granted shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats such testimony before the
Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the Commission.

The above provision specifies that the PCGG may exercise such authority under these conditions: (1) the
person to whom criminal immunity is granted provides information or testifies in an investigation
conducted by the Commission; (2) the information or testimony pertains to the unlawful manner in
which the respondent, defendant or accused acquired or accumulated ill-gotten property; and (3) such
information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove guilt or civil liability of such individual. From
the wording of the law, it can be easily deducted that the person referred to is a witness in the
proceeding, not the principal respondent, defendant or accused.

Thus, in the case of Jose Y. Campos, the grant of both civil and criminal immunity to him and his family
was "[i]n consideration of the full cooperation of Mr. Jose Y. Campos [with] this Commission, his
voluntary surrender of the properties and assets [—] disclosed and declared by him to belong to
deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos [—] to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines[;] his
full, complete and truthful disclosures[;] and his commitment to pay a sum of money as determined by
the Philippine Government." 56 Moreover, the grant of criminal immunity to the Camposes and the
Benedictos was limited to acts and omissions prior to February 25, 1996. At the time such immunity was
granted, no criminal cases have yet been filed against them before the competent court.

Validity of the PCGG-Marcos

Compromise Agreements

Going now to the subject General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos
heirs, a cursory perusal thereof reveals serious legal flaws. First, the Agreements do not conform to the
above requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. We believe that criminal immunity under Section 5 cannot
be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases
now pending before the Sandiganbayan. As stated earlier, the provision is applicable mainly to witnesses
who provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth
case.

While the General Agreement states that the Marcoses "shall provide the [government] assistance by
way of testimony or deposition on any information [they] may have that could shed light on the cases
being pursued by the [government] against other parties," 57 the clause does not fully comply with the
law. Its inclusion in the Agreement may have been only an afterthought, conceived in pro forma
compliance with Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended. There is no indication whatsoever that any of the
Marcos heirs has indeed provided vital information against any respondent or defendant as to the
manner in which the latter may have unlawfully acquired public property.

Second, under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of
taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Construction. The
power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local
legislative bodies. 58 Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution, specifically provides: "No law granting
any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Member of the
Congress." The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its
authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases.

Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses form paying taxes on their properties,
such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any
special grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will
also violate the constitutional rule that "taxation shall be uniform and equitable." 59

Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internal
revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when (1) there is reasonable doubt
as to the validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayer's financial position
demonstrates a clear inability to pay. 60 Definitely, neither requisite is present in the case of the
Marcoses, because under the Agreement they are effectively conceding the validity of the claims against
their properties, part of which they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax exemption
fall within the power of the commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability. This power can be exercised
only when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and
collection costs involved do not justify the collection of the tax due. 61 In this instance, the cancellation
of tax liability is done even before the determination of the amount due. In any event, criminal
violations of the Tax Code, for which legal actions have been filed in court or in which fraud is involved,
cannot be compromised. 62

Third, the government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs, pending
before the Sandiganbayan and other court. 63 This is a direct encroachment on judicial powers,
particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well-settled is the doctrine that once a case has been filed
before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full
discretion and control of the judge. In a criminal case, the manner in which the prosecution is handled,
including the matter of whom to present as witnesses, may lie within the sound discretion of the
government prosecution; 64 but the court decides, based on the evidence proffered, in what manner it
will dispose of the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution,
even by the justice secretary, to withdraw the information or to dismiss the complaint. 65 The
prosecution's motion to withdraw or to dismiss is not the least binding upon the court. On the contrary,
decisional rules require the trial court to make its own evaluation of the merit of the case, because
granting such motion is equivalent to effecting a disposition of the case itself. 66

Thus, the PCGG, as the government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot guarantee the
dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not
within its sole power and discretion.

Fourth, the government also waives all claims and counterclaims, "whether past, present, or future,
matured or inchoate," against the Marcoses. 67 Again, this ill-encompassing stipulation is contrary to
law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived. 68 The stipulation in the
Agreement does not specify the exact scope of future claims against the Marcoses that the government
thereby relinquishes. Such vague and broad statement may well be interpreted to include all future
illegal acts of any of the Marcos heirs, practically giving them a license to perpetrate fraud against the
government without any liability at all. This is a palpable violation of the due process and equal
protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively ensconces the Marcoses beyond the reach of
the law. It also sets a dangerous precedent for public accountability. It is a virtual warrant for public
officials to amass public funds illegally, since there is an open option to compromise their liability in
exchange for only a portion of their ill-gotten wealth.

Fifth, the Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the parties shall
fulfill their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the Marcoses submit an inventory of
their total assets.
Sixth, the Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for determining which assets shall be
forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses. While the Supplemental
Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the $356 million Swiss deposits
(less government recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement pertains only to the said deposits. No
similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the other properties. Neither is there, anywhere in the
Agreements, a statement of the basis for the 25-75 percent sharing ratio. Public officers entering into an
arrangement appearing to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, in violation of
the Ati-Graft and Corruption Practice Act, 69 invite their indictment for corruption under the said law.

Finally, the absence of then President Ramos' approval of the principal Agreement, an express condition
therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, as detailed above, even
if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid.

From the foregoing disquisition, it is crystal clear to the Court that the General and Supplemental
Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are
violative of the Constitution and the laws aforementioned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28,
1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being
contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries
and officials who are or may be directly ot indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any
proposed compromise settlment, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten
wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

In concur in the results, pro hac vice, for it is paramount that matters of national interest deserve a
proper place in any forum. The procedural rules in the courts of law, like the locus standi of petitioner
Francisco I. Chavez, the propriety of the special legal action of mandamus used as a vehicle to reach this
Court on the issues involved and considered by the Court, as well as kindred legal technicalities and
nicety raised by respondents to thwart the petition are no trickle matters, to be sure, but I do not see
them to be cogent reasons to deny to the Court its taking cognizance of the case.

It is a cardinal principle in constitutional adjudication that anyone who invokes it has a personal and
substantial interest on the dispute. 1 Jurisprudentially there is either the lenient or the strict approach in
the appreciation of legal standing of legal standing. The liberal approach recognizes legal standing to
raise constitutional issues of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as taxpayers and citizens, directly affecting
them. 2 A developing trend appears to be towards a narrow and exacting approach, requiring that a
logical nexus must be shown between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated in
order to ensure that one is the proper and appropriate party to invoke judicial power. 3

With respect to the right to information, it being a public right where the real parties in interest are the
people themselves in general 4 and where the only recognized limitations is "public concern," it would
seem that the framers of the Constitution have favored the liberal approach. Rev. Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
S.J., a member of the Constitutional Commission, observe:

The real problem, however, lies in determining what matters are of public concern and what are not.
Unwitingly perhaps, by this provision the Constitution might have opened a Pandora's box. For certainly
every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern.
Jurisprudence in fact has said that "public concern," like "public interest," eludes exact definition and
embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to kno, either because these directly
affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary sitizen. 5

Corrolarily, there is need of preserving a certain degree of confidentiality in matters involving national
security and public relations, to cite a few, 6 and until a balance is struck, the Court may be constrained
on occasions to accept an electric notion that frees itself from the shackles of the trenchant requisites of
locus standi.

The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has a limited life in carying out its tasks and
time is running short. It is thus imperative that the Court must hold even now, and remind PCGG, that it
has indeed exceeded its bounds in entering into the General and Supplemental Agreements. The
agreements clearly suffer from Constitutional and statutory infirmities, 7 to wit: (1) The agreements
contravene the statute in granting criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs; 8 (2) PCGG's commitment to
exempt from all form of taxes the property to be retained the Marcos' heirs controverts the
Constitution; 9 and (3) the government's underatking to cause the dismissal of all cases filed against the
Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts encroaches upon judicial powers. I also
see, like my other colleagues, too much vagueness on such items as the period within which the parties
shall fulfill their respective prestations and the lack of appropriate standards for determining the assets
to be forfeited by the government and those to be retained by the Marcoses.

In this respect, while there is legal posibility when the terms of a contract are not totally invalidated and
only those opposed to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy are rendered
inefficacious, when however, the assailed provisions can be seen to be of essence, like here, the
agreement in its entirety can be adversely affected. True, the validity or invalidity of a contract is a
matter that generally may not be passed upon in a mandamus petitonn, for it is as if petitioner were
seeking declaratory relief or an advisory opinion from this Court over which it has no original
jurisdiction, 10 the immediacy and significance of the issues, neverthless, has impelled the Court to
rightly assume jurisdiction and to resolve the incidental, albeit major, issues that evidently and
continually vex the parties.

WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

In concur in the results, pro hac vice, for it is paramount that matters of national interest deserve a
proper place in any forum. The procedural rules in the courts of law, like the locus standi of petitioner
Francisco I. Chavez, the propriety of the special legal action of mandamus used as a vehicle to reach this
Court on the issues involved and considered by the Court, as well as kindred legal technicalities and
nicety raised by respondents to thwart the petition are no trickle matters, to be sure, but I do not see
them to be cogent reasons to deny to the Court its taking cognizance of the case.

It is a cardinal principle in constitutional adjudication that anyone who invokes it has a personal and
substantial interest on the dispute. 1 Jurisprudentially there is either the lenient or the strict approach in
the appreciation of legal standing of legal standing. The liberal approach recognizes legal standing to
raise constitutional issues of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as taxpayers and citizens, directly affecting
them. 2 A developing trend appears to be towards a narrow and exacting approach, requiring that a
logical nexus must be shown between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated in
order to ensure that one is the proper and appropriate party to invoke judicial power. 3
With respect to the right to information, it being a public right where the real parties in interest are the
people themselves in general 4 and where the only recognized limitations is "public concern," it would
seem that the framers of the Constitution have favored the liberal approach. Rev. Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
S.J., a member of the Constitutional Commission, observe:

The real problem, however, lies in determining what matters are of public concern and what are not.
Unwitingly perhaps, by this provision the Constitution might have opened a Pandora's box. For certainly
every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern.
Jurisprudence in fact has said that "public concern," like "public interest," eludes exact definition and
embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to kno, either because these directly
affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary sitizen. 5

Corrolarily, there is need of preserving a certain degree of confidentiality in matters involving national
security and public relations, to cite a few, 6 and until a balance is struck, the Court may be constrained
on occasions to accept an electric notion that frees itself from the shackles of the trenchant requisites of
locus standi.

The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has a limited life in carying out its tasks and
time is running short. It is thus imperative that the Court must hold even now, and remind PCGG, that it
has indeed exceeded its bounds in entering into the General and Supplemental Agreements. The
agreements clearly suffer from Constitutional and statutory infirmities, 7 to wit: (1) The agreements
contravene the statute in granting criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs; 8 (2) PCGG's commitment to
exempt from all form of taxes the property to be retained the Marcos' heirs controverts the
Constitution; 9 and (3) the government's underatking to cause the dismissal of all cases filed against the
Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts encroaches upon judicial powers. I also
see, like my other colleagues, too much vagueness on such items as the period within which the parties
shall fulfill their respective prestations and the lack of appropriate standards for determining the assets
to be forfeited by the government and those to be retained by the Marcoses.

In this respect, while there is legal posibility when the terms of a contract are not totally invalidated and
only those opposed to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy are rendered
inefficacious, when however, the assailed provisions can be seen to be of essence, like here, the
agreement in its entirety can be adversely affected. True, the validity or invalidity of a contract is a
matter that generally may not be passed upon in a mandamus petitonn, for it is as if petitioner were
seeking declaratory relief or an advisory opinion from this Court over which it has no original
jurisdiction, 10 the immediacy and significance of the issues, neverthless, has impelled the Court to
rightly assume jurisdiction and to resolve the incidental, albeit major, issues that evidently and
continually vex the parties.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.

Footnotes

1 Petition, p. 3; rollo, p. 4.

2 Annexed to the petition were the following news articles:

1. Estrella Torres, "$2-B FM Hoard Found," Today, September 25, 1997, p. 1.

2. "Gov't Working Out Secret Deal on Marcos Gold," The Manila Times, September 25, 1997, p. 1.

3. Estrella Torres, "FVR Man Has FM Money," Today, September 27, 1997, p. 1.

4. Donna Cueto and Cathy Cañares, "Swiss, RP Execs Plotted Gold Sale," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
September 28, 1997.

5. Jocelyn Montemayor, "Coded Swiss Accounts Traced to Palace Boys?" The Manila Times, September
29, 1997.

3 § 7, Art. III, 1987 Constitution.

4 § 28, Art. II, ibid.

5 The solicitor general's Manifestation, dated August 11, 1998.

6 Rollo, pp. 213-216.

7 It appears that Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. did not sign the General Agreement.

8 Rollo, pp. 217-218.

9 It appears that Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., did not sign the Supplemental Agreement either.

10 Rollo, pp. 159-160.

11 Resolution dated March 16, 1998, pp. 1-2; ibid., pp. 147-148.

12 Rollo, pp. 396-403.

13 This case was deemed submitted for resolution on September 28, 1998, when the Court received the
solicitor general's Comment on the Motion and Petition for Intervention.

14 Citing Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 536, May 29, 1987.

15 Such as Avelino v. Cueno, 83 Phil 17 (1949); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52, May 14, 1991; Kapatiran
ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371, June 30, 1988.

16 Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p.
334.

17 136 SCRA 27, 36-37, April 24, 1985, per Escolin, J.

18 Quoting from Severino v. Governor General, 16 Phil 366, 378 (1910).

19 "Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized,
access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transaction, or
decisions shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law."
20 Supra, per Cortes, J.

21 Also in Gonzales v. Chavez, 205 SCRA 816, 847, February 4, 1992. Cf. Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA
792, July 30, 1993.

22 175 SCRA 264, 273, July 11, 1989, per Paras, J.

23 See also Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., 170 SCRA 256, February 13, 1989.

24 IV RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 621-922, 931 (1986) [hereafter, "RECORD"];

Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286, 295, 297, May 23, 1995.

25 Almonte, ibid.

26 V RECORD 25.

27 RA No. 8293, approved on June 6, 1997.

28 RA No. 1405, as amended.

29 V RECORD 25, See also Vol. I, p. 709.

30 66 Am Jur § 27, Records and Recording Laws.

31 RA No. 6713, enacted on February 20, 1989.

32 § 7(c), ibid.
33 Legaspi, supra.

34 Supra, p. 266.

35 Supra, p. 541. Also quoted in Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., supra.

36 203 SCRA 515, 522-23, November 13, 1991.

37 §§ 5(b) & 8, RA No. 6713.

38 66 Am Jur § 19, Records and Recording Laws, citing MacEwan v. Holm, 266 Or 27, 359 P2d 413, 85
ALR2d 1086.

39 See Legaspi, supra, p. 540.

40 16A Am Jur 2d 315-317, § 497.

41 § 1 (d), Art. II of Proclamation No. 3 (known as the Provisional or Freedom Constitution), promulgated
on March 25, 1986.

42 Republic v. Provident International Resources Corp., 269 SCRA 316, 325, March 7, 1997; Republic v.
Palanca, 182 SCRA 911, 918, February 28, 1990; Republic v. Lobregat et al., 376 SCRA 388, January 23,
1995.

43 V RECORD 25 (1986).

44 66 Am Jur 2d § 39.

45 Art. 2035, Civil Code; Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Benedict, et al., 226 SCRA 314, 327, September 10,
1993.
46 Art. 2028 in rel. to Art. 1306, Civil Code; Republic v. Benedict, ibid., citing First Philippine Holdings
Corp. v. Sandigabayan, 202 SCRA 212, September 30, 1991; Heirs of Gabriel Capili v. Court of Appeals,
234 SCRA 110, 115, July 14, 1994.

47 Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997.

48 Art. 2038 in rel. to Art. 1330, Civil Code; Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 189, 199-200, March
20, 1996; Unicane Workers Union, CLUP v. NLRC, 261 SCRA 573, September 9, 1996; Del Rosario v.
Madayag, 247 SCRA 767, 770, August 28, 1995.

49 Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra; Del Rosario v. Madayag, supra; Osmeña v. Commission on Audit,
238 SCRA 463, 471, November 29, 1994.

50 Art. 2029, Civil Code.

51 Art. 2031, ibid.

52 173 SCRA 72, 84 May 4, 1989.

53 207 SCRA 659, 667, March 31, 1992.

54 Supra, pp. 319 & 324.

55 Art. 2034, Civil Code.

56 Republic & Campos Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, p. 83.

57 General Agreement, par. 8.

58 Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, 261 SCRA 667, September 11, 1996.

59 § 28 (1), Art. VI, Constitution, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236,
August 29, 1996; Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 249 SCRA 628, October 30, 1995; Kapatiran ng mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371, 383, June 30, 1988, citing City of
Baguio v. De Leon, 134 Phil. 912, 919-920 (1968).

60 § 204 (1), National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by § 3, RA 7646.

61 § 204 (2), NLRC.

62 Par. 2, ibid.

63 General Agreement, par. 8.

64 People v. Nazareno, 260 SCRA 256, August 1, 1996; People v. Porras, 255 SCRA 514, March 29, 1996.

65 Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997, pp. 21-22.

66 Ibid., p. 23, citing Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, June 30, 1987; Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, 235
SCRA 39, August 4, 1994; Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 575, October 13, 1994; and Roberts Jr.
v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307, March 5, 1996.

67 Last "Whereas" clause of the General Agreement.

68 Art. 1171.

69 Specifically § 3 (g) of RA 3019.

VITUG, J., separate opinon;

1 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89; Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 238, 244.

2 Defensor Santiago, Miriam, Constitution Law, First Edition, 1994, p. 11.

3 Am Jur § 189, 591, S. v. D., 410 US 641, 35 L Ed 2d 536, 93 S Ct 1146.

4 Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 540; Tañada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, 36, 37.

5 The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 edition, pp. 336-337.

6 Ibid.

7 Noteworthy is the absence of the President's Impramatur on the agreement.

8 Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-A.

9 Sec. 28 (4), Article VI, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. No law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress.

10 Sec. 17. Republic Act No. 296, Judiciary Act of 1948; Sec. 5, Art VIII, 1987 Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines; Remontigue vs. Osmeña, Jr., 129 Phil. 60, 61; Rural Bank of Olongapo, Inc. vs.
Commissioner of Land Registration, et al., 102 Phil. 794-795.

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