SHADES OF WILSON?

by Brandon Clim
# 4832827

Essay submitted to
Professor David Grondin
Vie politique aux États-Unis (POL 3548 A)

School of Political Studies

Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Ottawa
4 December 2010
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Every so often in politics, throughout the course of history, an individual comes along

and dramatically changes the way people see the world. Their ideas are seen to be so innovative

that they live on and continue to influence those who inevitably come after him. One of these

individuals happens to be Thomas Woodrow Wilson. In 1913, he became the 28th President of

the United States of America. After having been re-elected in 1917 by only the narrowest of

margins and on the promise that he would not bring the United States into the ongoing war

taking place in Europe, Wilson began to recognize that the Americans could no longer remain

neutral1. In a speech before Congress in 1918 famously known as the Fourteen Points speech2,

President Wilson introduced a new, elaborate foreign policy framework that set the course of the

United States’ foreign policy post-World War I. Inevitably, this framework would also influence

the way in which all nations conducted themselves in the international realm. G. John Ikenberry

summarizes, in the introduction to The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the

Twenty-first Century, six main components of Wilson’s framework:

First, the foundation of a peaceful order must be built on a community of democratic

states. […] Second, free trade and socioeconomic exchange have a modernizing and
civilizing effect on stats, undercutting tyranny and oligopoly and strengthening the
fabric of international community. […] Third, international law and international bodies
of cooperation and dispute settlement also have a modernizing and civilizing effect on
states, promoting peace and strengthening the fabric of international community. […]
Fourth, a stable and peaceful order must be built around this “community of power”
[…] which […] meant collective security, a system of peace sustained by commitments
to arms control and disarmament, self-determination, and freedom of the seas. […]
Fifth, these conditions – democracy, trade, law, collective security – were possible
because the world was moving in a progressive and modernizing direction. […] Finally,
the United States was at the vanguard of this movement, and it had special
responsibilities to lead, direct, and inspire the world due to its founding ideas,
geopolitical position, and enlightened leadership […] (Ikenberry, 2009: 11-12-13).

1
See “Bibliography”, White House, President Thomas Woodrow Wilson.
2
See “Bibliography”, Woodrow Wilson (1918).
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Little did he know that, nearly a century later, that very framework would continue to guide

American foreign policymakers’ decisions. Fast-forward some 83 years later: An ever confident

American populace watched on as George W. Bush3 was inaugurated as their 43rd president in

January of 2001. A self-proclaimed realist4, Bush would quickly be confronted with the most

destructive attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbour. The terrorist attacks that took place on the

morning of September 11th 2001 swiftly thrust foreign policy to the top of the Bush

administration’s priority list. The following will seek to answer a very specific question: Was

George W. Bush’s foreign policy guided by the Wilsonian foreign policy framework outlined in

his Fourteen Points speech? In this essay, I will argue that, unlike claims made by some scholars

and historians5 characterizing his foreign policy as Wilsonian, George W. Bush’s foreign policy

differentiates from Woodrow Wilson’s foreign policy framework on many fronts. Hence, I will

demonstrate that what became known as the Bush Doctrine6 deviates in three key areas from the

traditional Wilsonian framework. Firstly, The National Security Strategy of the United States of

America7 (hereafter “NSS”) advocates the “promotion” or rather the coercive imposition of

democracy by way of force in order to alleviate potential threats to U.S. national security

(followed by a very minor secondary goal of achieving world peace) hence ignoring a nation’s

right to self-determination. Secondly, the NSS states that the administration will not hesitate, if

necessary, to strike preemptively in order to prevent potential or perceived threats to its national

3
In this essay, unless otherwise stated, when I mention “President Bush” or “Bush”, I am referring to the
George W. Bush, the United States’ 43rd president.
4
Nicholas Lemann (2002) quotes Bush’s first major foreign-policy speech given in November 1999: “a
President must be a clear-eyed realist.”
5
Tony Smith (Ikenberry, 2009), David M. Kennedy (2005: 36) who claims that “Wilson would recognize
George W. Bush as his natural successor” and Melvyn P. Leffler (2005: 395) who argues “that there is more
continuity than change in the [foreign policy] of the Bush administration.”
6
An in depth analysis of the Bush Doctrine (which is embodied in the U.S. National Security Strategy of
2002) can be found in Robert Jarvis (2003), Jonathan Monten (2005), Ilan Berman (2003) and Walter Lafeber
(2002).
7
White House (2002). The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf
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security. Finally, in regards to the war in Iraq, the unilateral way by which the Bush

administration proceeded, having overstepped the legitimizing authority of the United Nations

Security Council (hereafter “UNSC”), diverges significantly from the Wilsonian liberal

internationalist tradition.

PROMOTING OR IMPOSING DEMOCRACY?

In September 2002, the Bush administration released its National Security Strategy

entitled The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (hereafter “NSS”). This

foreign policy document was seen by many as a staunch contrast of not only Wilson’s foreign

policy framework but of American foreign policy in general. For his party, in a Joint Address to

Congress, which led to the U.S. declaring war against Germany in 1917, Wilson stated: “The

world must be made safe for democracy”8. This statement does not indicate that the U.S. grand

strategy was to lead crusades throughout the world and impose its values and institutions on the

population of the world which would, in fact, contravene a sovereign nation’s right to self-

determination9. However, the Bush NSS states that the United States “will actively work to bring

the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world”

(White House, 2002: 4). Although having been an advocate for freer trade, peace and democracy,

it was not Wilson’s intention to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign nation by attempting to

overthrow a tyranny in order to impose a Western-styled democratic system of government10.

8
See “Bibliography”, U.S. National Archives & Record Administration.
9
It should however be noted that during his first term as president, Wilson’s foreign policy, in practice, was
quite different from that outlined in his Fourteen Points speech: “His most substantial intervention came in
neighbouring Mexico, where he sought to depose General Victoriano Huerta […]” (Quinn, 2010: 91); “Wilson […]
set in train highly interventionist policies in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua” (Quinn, 2010: 92).
10
It must be made clear that the statement I make about Wilson’s philosophy on interventionism does not
reflect his first term as president of the United States of America. Slaughter (Ikenberry, 2009: 93), citing John
Milton Cooper, points out that “Wilson’s early experience with intervention to help the democrats in the Mexican
Revolution turned him into a staunch anti-interventionist.”
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Anne-Marie Slaughter’s (Ikenberry, 2009: 92) contribution to The Crisis of American Foreign

Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century argues along these same lines: “[Tony] Smith

portrays Wilson as seeking to promote democracy and sees the neocon embrace of external

intervention to do so as a natural extension of Wilson’s legacy. Yet the historical record puts

Wilson in exactly the opposite light – supporting self-determination11 and insisting that nations

actually determine their destinies without external intervention.” President Bush’s foreign policy

did not take into consideration a nation’s right to self-determination; rather it was driven by the

principle of “imposing” democracy rather than attempting to “make the world safe for

democracy” as Wilson himself stated. When it comes to the process of democratization favoured

by the Bush Doctrine in both Afghanistan and Iraq, Andrew J. Enterline and J. Michael Greig

(2008: 323) refer to the concept of imposed democratic regimes (hereafter IDRs). According to

the authors, IDRs “are democratic governments installed by a foreign power [in this case, the

United States] in which the foreign power plays an important role in the establishment,

promotion, and maintenance of the institutions of government.” Finally, Joseph Nye, Jr. (2006:

139; emphasis added) explained that one of the major changes that President Bush made to the

American grand strategy was that he “ […] [advocated] coercive democratization as a solution to

Middle Eastern terrorism.” Therefore, in demonstrating how the Bush Doctrine seeks to impose

democracy on sovereign nations which ignores their right to self-determination, George W.

Bush’s foreign policy does not subscribe to Woodrow Wilson’s foreign policy framework.

WRECKLESNESS OR ANTICIPATION?

In Bush’s 2002 NSS, a concept was introduced to America’s foreign policy that
11
Slaughter (Ikenberry, 2009: 92) also goes on to state that “Self-determination meant the rights of minorities
within multiethnic conglomerates to determine their own fate and form of government. It also meant guarantees
against external intervention, a far cry from Smith’s caricature of Wilson as seeking intervention to impose any
particular form of government.”
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contrasted with the Wilsonian framework which advocated cooperative multilateralism, restraint

and compromise. Although preemption is one of the major pillars of the Bush Doctrine, it

received very little attention within the 35 page NSS policy document. However, the inclusion of

this concept was anything but coincidental. The origins of many of the components within

Bush’s doctrine could be traced all the way back to the time when George H. W. Bush was

president of the United States. As David Grondin (2005: 476) explains, a secret policy document

entitled Defense Planning Guidance was penned by Paul Wolfowitz and Lewis Libby who were

supervised under the watchful eye of the then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. However,

once William Clinton won the 1993 presidential election and the Republicans were ousted from

office, the Cheney-Wolfowitz Doctrine, as Grondin called it, would remain, at least for the

moment, an abstract theoretical framework. That is until 2001 when the United States elected

George W. Bush as its 43rd president. Coincidently, Bush Jr. had chosen none other than Richard

“Dick” Cheney as his Vice-Presidential running mate which enabled the resurrection, after their

narrow victory in 2001, of the Cheney-Wolfowitz Doctrine. It was no surprise then, when the

NSS was released to the public, that if one looked closely, one could detect Cheney’s intellectual

fingerprints throughout the document. With that said, in explaining how the United States would

disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, the NSS document states: “While the United States

will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to

act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such

terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country […]” (White

House, 2002: 6; emphasis added). Later on, the document states: “The greater the threat, the

greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to

defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To
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forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act

preemptively” (White House, 2002: 15; emphasis added). In a December 2002 Brookings

Institute Policy Brief, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Susan E. Rice and James B. Steinberg (2002: 3)

explain that “[t]he concept [embodied in the NSS] is not limited to the traditional definition of

preemption—striking an enemy as it prepares an attack—but also includes prevention—striking

an enemy even in the absence of specific evidence of a coming attack.”

As one could expect after the release of any major foreign policy statement, the media,

political pundits and scholars all joined in on the conversation. “Historians who have placed

Bush in the mainstream of the American diplomatic tradition […] have exaggerated historical

continuity by ignoring his willingness to use unprecedented means of preemptive war to achieve

traditional Wilsonian goals” argues Lloyd E. Ambrosius (2006: 509). In the pages of The

Atlantic magazine, David M. Kennedy (2005: 36), a defender of Bush’s policies, avowed that

“[…] this doctrine of preemption marked a radical departure in American diplomacy.” In

keeping with that same idea, G. John Ikenberry had this to say about the strategy advanced by

the Bush administration:

[…] sweeping new ideas are circulating about U.S. grand strategy and the restructuring
of today’s unipolar world. They call for American unilateral and preemptive, even
preventive, use of force, facilitated if possible by coalitions of the willing – but
ultimately unconstrained by the rules and norms of the international community
(Ikenberry, 2002: 44).

Before moving forward, I think it is important to note that, as Robert S. Litwak (2002: 60-61)

points out: “There are strikingly few prior cases in which military force was either used or

seriously contemplated for purposes of pre-emption.” He goes on to recount how in the early

1960s, President Kennedy “seriously explored the feasibility of a preventive military strike on

China’s nascent nuclear capability […] the administration viewed China’s prospective
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acquisition of nuclear weapons as a major threat to US national security.” The case of the war in

Iraq has been added to that very short list of cases in which military force was in fact used for the

purpose of preemption. It is therefore clear that George W. Bush’s foreign policy, which

included the concept of preemption as its main component, was not guided by the Wilsonian

foreign policy framework.

LEGITIMATE UNILATERAL INTERVENTION?

While some have argued that George W. Bush foreign policy was a continuation of

Woodrow Wilson’s legacy12, many more have also come out completely contradicting such

claims. The coercive imposition of democratic values and institutions throughout the world and

formally advocating the preemptive use of military force were only two important components of

Bush’s foreign policy that did not adhere to Woodrow Wilson’s framework. However, the third

component is the one that has brought about the most controversy and criticism.

As Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz (2007: 25; emphasis added) explain:

With both the White House and the Congress in Republican hands, Bush gave
multilateral cooperation and international institution building short shrift. Soon after
entering office, Bush renounced the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court,
and the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. He declined offers of NATO involvement in the
war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and then went to war in Iraq without UN
authorization and with only a handful of allies. Through much of his first term, Bush
and his top advisers were openly dismissive of international institutions and
multilateralism.

In attempting to implement its foreign policy objectives outlined in the 2002 NSS, the Bush

administration made the significant shift towards unilateral behaviour. According to Ikenberry’s

understanding of the 2002 NSS policy document, “America is to be less bound to its partners and

to global rules and institutions while it steps forward to play a more unilateral and anticipatory

12
See Max Boot (2004), David M. Kennedy (2005), Lawrence F. Kaplan (2003).
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role in attacking terrorist threats and confronting rogue states seeking [weapons of mass

destruction]. The United States will use its unrivalled military power to manage the global order”

(Ikenberry, 2002: 49; emphasis added). Rather than embracing the traditional Wilsonian

multilateral cooperation, the Bush administration flirted with and eventually acted upon its

unilateral ambitions. According to John B. Judis (2006: 206): “Wilson warned that if the United

States shunned the League of Nations and tried to go it alone in the world, it would mean

sacrificing the goodwill that America had acquired during the [First World] war. The world

would revert to hostile trading blocs and eventually a new war would break out.” In hindsight, he

was right. Judis also wrote this about Wilson’s principles and beliefs:

Wilson believed that in order to achieve an enduring peace, the great powers would
have to replace the balance of power by a community of power and Machtpolitik
[German for “power politics”] by international law […] Wilson’s principles were
embodied in the structure of the League of Nations and the United Nations, with their
general assemblies, where each nation enjoyed a vote. There principles were also
inscribed in the charter of the United Nations, which reaffirmed “faith in the
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women and of nations large and small” and banned aggression by one
nation against another except in the case of self-defense (Judis, 2006: 208-209).

For President Bush, however, the United States could not wait for new threats to materialize

because by then, it would be too little, too late. In his mind, sitting around and doing nothing was

not an option. When his administration completely side-stepped the legitimizing, multilateral

body that is the United Nations and moved forward with its “coalition of the willing”13, the Bush

Doctrine, which had been derived from the Cheney-Wolfowitz Doctrine from a decade earlier,

was finally being implemented to the full extent of its intent. According to a report conducted by

the Congressional Research Service in 2009, “[t]he visible public launch of [Operation Iraqi

13
On 27 March 2003, the White House issued a press release entitled Coalition Members (see “Bibliography”) in
which 49 countries that have publicly committed to the Coalition. Partners in the Coalition include Australia,
Denmark, Japan and the United Kingdom just to name a few.
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Freedom] took place on March 20, 2003, shortly after the expiration of President Bush’s 48-hour

ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons” (Dale, 2009: 40). It is apparent, by the obvious lack

of respect for international institutions such as the United Nations and international treaties such

as the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, that President Bush was not at all interested in multilateral

cooperation. Without question, the linchpin of Woodrow Wilson’s foreign policy framework,

which he articulated in his Fourteen Point speech, is multilateralism. If Wilson would have been

alive to witness the contempt the Bush administration demonstrated towards not only the

international community, but also towards the United Nations and its Charter, he would have

most definitely condemned such behaviour. The twenty-eighth president would have also looked

on in shock as the Bush administration’s unilateral declaration of war on Iraq in 2003 without

prior approval from the UNSC. In the end, it has been clearly demonstrated that George W.

Bush’s foreign policy, which advocates the unilateral use of military force, is irreconcilable with

Woodrow Wilson’s foreign policy framework.

Woodrow Wilson ideas live on to this day by not only influencing American politics, but

also by having planted the seeds which have come to grow into what is now referred to as the

international community. When it comes to Wilson’s innovative foreign policy proposals,

Thomas J. Knock (Ikenberry, 2009: 26) writes: “[…] the new directions he charted in foreign

policy during World War I shaped the politics and diplomacy of the United States throughout the

twentieth century and beyond […] no chief executive has ever communicated more effectively to

the people of the world the ideals of democracy or set in motion a more original idea for the

prevention of war than the twenty-eighth president.” I have argued that George W. Bush’s

foreign policy differs from Woodrow Wilson’s foreign policy framework in three key areas.
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After having given a brief background on Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Point, in which he sets a

new direction for America’s foreign policy. Based on that innovative framework, I began by

making the case that as opposed to Wilson’s goal of “making the world safe for democracy”,

President Bush’s foreign policy, which was embodied in his 2002 National Security Strategy

policy document, champions the coerced “promotion” of democracy throughout the world. Then,

I advanced that the Bush administration’s explicit intention that it would not hesitate to (and

eventually did) use preemptive force was not at all consistent with Wilson’s foreign policy

framework. Finally, I explained how the proposed (and again, the eventual) use of unilateral

force, as opposed to Wilson’s multilateral approach, was by far the most important difference

between the two presidents’ foreign policy. In conclusion, I would like emphasize that, although

I recognize that during President Wilson first term, he did in fact aggressively promote the

spread of democracy14. However, it is exactly this initial experience with interventionism that

informed his Fourteen Point speech which John B. Judis (2004: 6) so eloquently summarizes:

Wilson’s plan included self-determination for former colonies, an open trading system
to discourage economic imperialism, international arms reduction, and a commitment to
collective security through international organizations— what is now sometimes
referred to as “multilateralism.” Wilson continued to believe that the United States had a
special role to play in the world. But he now believed that it could best play that role by
getting other nations to work with it to effect a global transformation.

In conclusion, although President George W. Bush was faced with many complex policy

decisions almost right from the beginning of his presidency, his administration strayed away

from the traditional elements of the Wilsonian foreign policy framework; Firstly, by choosing

coercive “promotion” of democracy rather than respecting a nation’s right to self-determination;

Secondly, by choosing preemption rather than restraint; and finally, by choosing unilateral use of

military force rather than a United Nations’ sanctioned, multilateral military mission.

14
Michael Cox (2004: 599) reminds his readers that Wilson used “military force on no less than ten occasions”.
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