Primicias vs Ocampo, G.R. No.

L-6120 On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion
holding in effect that with the promulgation of the Rules of
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ASSESSORS; TRIAL WITH
Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1,
AID OF ASSESSORS, A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. — The
1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in
right to a trial by assessors is substantive in the sense that it
all courts of the Philippines... previously existing were not only
must be created and defined by express enactment as opposed to
superseded but expressly repealed... that the Supreme Court,
a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or obtain redress
having been vested with the rule-making power, expressly
therefor. The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section
omitted the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding
154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the old
assessors in said Rules of Court
Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are
not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to
This is so because in said section 154 this matter is referred to as this court imputing abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge.
a right given by law to a party litigant. Section 1477 of the
Issues:
Administrative Code of 1917 is couched in such a manner that a
similar right is implied when invoked by a party litigant. It says I. The right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is
that the aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code an absolute substantive right, and the duty of the court to
of Civil Procedure. And this right has been declared absolute provide assessors is mandatory.
and substantial by the Supreme Court in several cases where the "II. The right to trial with the aid of assessors, being a
aid of assessors had been invoked (Berbari v. Concepcion Et. substantive right, cannot be impaired by this court in the
Al., 40 Phil., 320; Colegio de San Jose v. Sison, 56 Phil., 344). exercise of its rule-making power.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIVE MATTER, DISTINGUISHED "III. Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section
FROM PROCEDURAL. — A substantive law creates, defines 2477 of the Old Charter of Manila, creating the right to trial
or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the with the aid of assessors, are substantive law and were not
powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of repealed by Rules of Court.
public affairs, whereas rules of procedure are provisions "IV. Granting without admitting that the provisions on assessors
prescribing the method by which substantive rights may be of the Code of Civil Procedure and the old Charter of Manila
enforced in courts of justice. (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules were impliedly repealed, nevertheless, the same provisions were
of Court, 1952 ed., p. 4; Bustos v. Lucero, 46 Off. Gaz., Jan. later reenacted by reference in section 49 of the Revised Charter
supp., pp. 445, 448.) of Manila which is now... the source of the right to trial with the
aid of assessors and which refers to the Code of Civil Procedure
3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ASSESSORS; TRIAL; merely to indicate the procedure for appointing assessors.
RIGHT TO ASSESSORS STILL EXISTS IN MANILA AND
IN PROVINCES. — The promulgation of the Rules of Court "V. Section 49 of the Revised Charter of Manila is not invalid
did not have the effect of repealing the provisions on assessors class legislation and does not violate the constitutional provision
embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure. These provisions have that the rules of pleading, practice and procedure 'shall be
not been incorporated by the Supreme Court in the present Rules uniform for all courts of the same grade.' "
of Court because they are substantive in nature. This remedy Ruling:
may be invoked not only in Manila but in all other places where
it existed prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Court. The The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of
provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter
Procedure are still in force and the same may still be invoked in of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are not
the light of the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No. embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.
409. It says that the aid may be invoked in... the manner provided in
the Code of Civil Procedure.  And this right has been declared
absolute and substantial by this Court in several cases where the
Facts: aid of assessors had been invoked... the intervention of the
Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of assessors is not an empty formality which may be disregarded
Manila with two statutory offenses, namely, (1) with a violation without violating either the letter or the spirit of the law.  It is...
of Commonwealth Act No. 606... in that he knowingly chartered another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such, it
a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien... without the approval is a substantial right of which they cannot be deprived without
of the President of the Philippines and (2) with a violation of vitiating all the proceedings.
section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the Revised The contention of respondents we reckon is predicated on the
Administrative Code... in that he failed to submit to the assumption that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil
Collector of Customs the manifests... and certain authenticated Procedure had been impliedly repealed.  Such is not the case. 
documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the We have already pointed out that the basic provisions on the
necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the matter partake of... the nature of substantive law and as such
departure of said vessel for a foreign port. they were left intact by the Supreme Court.
On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, It is therefore our opinion that the... respondent Judge acted with
petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be appointed to abuse of discretion in denying petitioner his right to the aid of
assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in assessors in the trial of the two criminal cases now pending in
said cases... as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. the Court of First Instance of Manila.
409... which provides that "the aid of assessors in the trial of any
civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the Court of
First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner Bustos vs Lucero, G.R. No. 2068
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure."  FACTS:

This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal who appeared for The petitioner in the case appeared at the preliminary
the People of the Philippines. investigation before the Justice of Peace of Masantol,
Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges
against him and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder cannot
which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.
moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and
her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to
manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right
prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his
objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him
announced his intention to renounce his right to present both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the
evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the
court of first instance. guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the
full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine
The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a
CFI praying that the record of the case be remanded to the preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged by the
justice of peace of Masantol, on order that the petitioner might fact that this formality is frequently waived. It is inevitable that
cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive
with their testimony. The motion was denied and for that reason rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not
the present special civil action of mandamus was instituted. to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh
Petitioner squarely attacks the validity of the provision of and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates
section 11 or Rule 108, on the ground that it deprives him of the only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage.
right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for For the Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify
the prosecution, contrary to the provision of section 13, Article the rules of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's
VIII of the Constitution. approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a
ISSUE: power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system
of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to
Whether or not Section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is an their source.
infringement to the provision of section 13, Article VIII, of the
Constitution hence the decision of the majority is judicial Araullo vs Aquino, G.R. No. 209287
legislation that diminishes the right of the accused. Facts:
For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the
HELD: constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related
No. The Supreme Court ruled that section 11 of Rule 108, like issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
its predecessors is an adjective law and not a substantive law or implementing the DAP.
substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and
the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of
Substantive rights are a term which includes those rights which the 1987 Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that
one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of firmly ordains that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury
normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the Used constitutional powers under Sec. 25(5) as a guise to use
rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of money out of the treasury without an appropriation made by
the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to law... indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of allowing the Executive to allocate public money pooled from
enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. As applied programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in
to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts the guise of the President exercising his... constitutional
are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, authority under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to
as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or transfer funds out of savings to augment the appropriations of
regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be offices within the Executive Branch of the Government.
punished Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially
remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution. Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada... had been allotted an additional
P50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Justice Renato C. Corona.
Evidence — which is the "the mode and manner of proving the
competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration
establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" — is Program,[1] explaining that the funds released to the Senators
identified with and forms part of the method by which, in had been part of... the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to
private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion.
criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure He clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators
refers to pleading, evidence and practice. The entire rules of based on their letters of request for funding
evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We
He explained that the funds under the DAP were usually taken
cannot tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional
from (1) unreleased appropriations under
grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence
embodied in these Rules. We do not believe that the curtailment Personnel Services;[2] (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over
of the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross- appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4)
examine the witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been
of such importance as to offend against the constitutional realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.
inhibition. As we have said in the beginning, preliminary
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website[3] that the DAP
investigation is not an essential part of due process of law. It
releases had been sourced from savings generated by the
may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere
Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the excess of jurisdiction on the... part of any branch or
savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased instrumentality of the Government.
appropriations, like... unreleased Personnel Services[4]
b) Requisites for the exercise of the power... of judicial review
appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year,
were complied with
unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and
discontinued projects per zero-based budgeting findings;[5] and (1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before
(2) the withdrawal of... unobligated allotments also for slow- the Court; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for
moving programs and projects that had been earlier released to adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a...
the agencies of the National Government. proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the
The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP's
case
use of savings,[
Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has
Why DAP is legal according to DBM
established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy
(1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which as to confer locus standi on each of them.
granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his
office in the general appropriations... law; (2) Section 49
Zulueta vs Asia Brewery, GR. No. 138137
(Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38
(Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book
VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of
When two or more cases involve the same parties and affect
1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of
closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated
2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the
of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) parties and to settle expeditiously the issues involved.
priority in the use of savings. Consolidation, when appropriate, also contributes to the
declogging of court dockets.
Issues:
Procedural Issue:... whether there is a controversy ripe for The Case
judicial determination, and the standing of petitioners. Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
Substantive Issues: 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the August 4, 1998
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
B. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 45020; as well as the February 23, 1999 Resolution[2]
Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be paid out of denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by decretal portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
law." "WHEREFORE, the instant petition is given due course.
Issue pertinent to Sec. 25 The assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, Branch 142 dated 13 February 1997 and 19 May 1997
C. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE.
executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate
Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution insofar as: SO ORDERED."
(a) They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated The Facts
allotments withdrawn from government agencies as "savings" as
the term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc., is engaged in the
GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013; manufacture, the distribution and sale of beer; while
Petitioner Perla Zulueta is a dealer and an operator of an
(b) They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or outlet selling the former's beer products. A Dealership
programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive Agreement governed their contractual relations.
Department; and
(c) They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in On March 30, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional
the GAAs Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo, Branch 22, a Complaint against
respondent for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance
D. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection
and Damages. The Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
Clause, (2) the system of checks and balances, and (3) the
20341 (hereafter referred to as the "Iloilo case"), was
principle of public accountability enshrined in the 1987
grounded on the alleged violation of the Dealership
Constitution considering that it authorizes the release of funds
Agreement.
upon the request of... legislators.
E. Whether or not factual and legal justification exists to issue a On July 7, 1994, during the pendency of the Iloilo case,
temporary restraining order to restrain the implementation of the respondent filed with the Makati Regional Trial Court,
DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly Branch 66, a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 94-2110
implementing the DAP. (hereafter referred to as the "Makati case"). The Complaint
was for the collection of a sum of money in the amount of
F. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the
P463,107.75 representing the value of beer products, which
DAP was in accord with the GAAs.
respondent had delivered to petitioner.
Ruling:
Procedural Issue:... a) The petitions under Rule 65 are... proper In view of the pendency of the Iloilo case, petitioner moved
remedies to dismiss the Makati case on the ground that it had split the
cause of action and violated the rule against the multiplicity
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle of suits. The Motion was denied by the Makati RTC through
actual controversies involving rights which are legally Judge Eriberto U. Rosario.
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
Upon petitioner's Motion, however, Judge Rosario inhibited or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in
himself. The case was raffled again and thereafter assigned the following language:
to Branch 142 of the Makati RTC, presided by Judge Jose "It is true that under the Civil Code of the
Parentala Jr. Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided.' But
On January 3, 1997, petitioner moved for the consolidation there are settled exceptions to this general
of the Makati case with the Iloilo case. Granting the Motion, rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE
Judge Parentala ordered on February 13, 1997, the or REMEDIAL in nature or when it
consolidation of the two cases. Respondent filed a Motion for CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated May
19, 1997. xxxxxxxxx
"On the other hand, remedial or procedural
On August 18, 1997, respondent filed before the Court of laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari assailing Judge Parentala's or modes of procedure, which do not create
February 13, 1997 and May 19, 1997 Orders. new or take away vested rights, but only
(Zulueta vs. Asia Brewery G.R. No. 138137 March 08, 2001) operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not
This decision, and more, can be found at come within the legal meaning of a
https://www.digest.ph/decisions/zulueta-vs-asia-brewery retrospective law, nor within the general rule
The Issues against the retrospective operation of
In her Memorandum,[5] petitioner interposes the following issues statutes."[7] (emphasis supplied)
for the consideration of this Court:
"a. Were the Orders of February 13, 1997 and Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending
May 19, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, proceedings even without express provision to that effect.
[8]
Branch 142 in Makati City (ordering  Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at
consolidation of Makati Civil Case No. 94- the time of their enactment. [9] In fact, statutes regulating the
2110 with the Iloilo Civil Case No. 20341) procedure of the courts will be applied on actions undetermined
already final and executory when respondent at the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws are retrospective
filed its petition for certiorari with the Hon. in that sense and to that extent.[10]
Court of Appeals such that said Court could
no longer acquire jurisdiction over the case Clearly, the designation of a specific period of sixty days for the
and should have dismissed it outright (as it filing of an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is purely
originally did) x x x, instead of due giving remedial or procedural in nature. It does not alter or modify any
course to the petition?; and substantive right of respondent, particularly with respect to the
filing of petitions for certiorari. Although the period for filing
"b. Independent of the first issue, did the the same may have been effectively shortened, respondent had
Makati RTC, Branch 142, correctly order the not been unduly prejudiced thereby considering that he was not
consolidation of the Makati case (which was at all deprived of that right.
filed later) with the Iloilo Case (which was
filed earlier) for the reason that the obligation It is a well-established doctrine that rules of procedure may be
sought to be collected in the Makati case is modified at any time to become effective at once, so long as the
the same obligation that is also one of the change does not affect vested rights.[11] Moreover, it is equally
subject matters of the Iloilo case, x x x?"[6] axiomatic that there are no vested rights to rules of procedure. [12]

The Court's Ruling It also bears noting that the ninety-day limit established by
The Petition is meritorious. jurisprudence cannot be deemed a vested right. It is merely a
discretionary prerogative of the courts that may be exercised
First Issue depending on the peculiar circumstances of each case. Hence,
Propriety of Petition with the CA respondent was not entitled, as a matter of right, to the 90-day
Petitioner avers that the Makati RTC's February 13, 1997 and period for filing a petition for certiorari; neither can it
May 19, 1997 Orders consolidating the two cases could no imperiously demand that the same period be extended to it.
longer be assailed. Allegedly, respondent's Petition for
Certiorari was filed with the CA beyond the reglementary sixty- Upon the effectivity of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
day period prescribed in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure on July 1, 1997, respondent's lawyers still had 21
Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Hence, the CA days or until July 22, 1997 to file a petition for certiorari and to
should have dismissed it outright. comply with the sixty-day reglementary period. Had they been
more prudent and circumspect in regard to the implications of
The records show that respondent received on May 23, 1997, the these procedural changes, respondent's right of action would not
Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration. It had, according have been foreclosed. After all, the 1997 amendments to the
to petitioner, only sixty days or until July 22, 1997, within Rules of Court were well-publicized prior to their date of
which to file the Petition for Certiorari. It did so, however, only effectivity. At the very least counsel should have asked for as
on August 21, 1997. extension of time to file the petition.

On the other hand, respondent insists that its Petition was filed Certification of Non-forum
on time, because the reglementary period before the effectivity Shopping Defective
of the 1997 Rules was ninety days. It theorizes that the sixty-day Petitioner likewise assails the validity of the sworn certification
period under the 1997 Rules does not apply. against forum-shopping, arguing that the same was signed by
counsel and not by petitioner as required by Supreme Court
As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are Circular No. 28-91. For his part, respondent claims that even if
certain recognized exceptions, such as when they are remedial it was its counsel who signed the certification, there was still
substantial compliance with Circular No. 28-91 because, a respondent for unpaid beer products, while the latter pertained to
corporation acts through its authorized officers or agents, and its an alleged breach of the Dealership Agreement between the
counsel is an agent having personal knowledge of other pending parties. We disagree.
cases.
True, petitioner's obligation to pay for the beer products
The requirement that the petitioner should sign the certificate of delivered by respondent can exist regardless of an alleged
non-forum shopping applies even to corporations, considering breach in the Dealership Agreement. Undeniably, however, this
that the mandatory directives of the Circular and the Rules of obligation and the relationship between respondent and
Court make no distinction between natural and juridical persons. petitioner, as supplier and distributor respectively, arose from
In this case, the Certification should have been signed "by a the Dealership Agreement which is now the subject of inquiry in
duly authorized director or officer of the corporation,"[13] who the Iloilo case. In fact, petitioner herself claims that her
has knowledge of the matter being certified. [14] In Robern obligation to pay was negated by respondent's contractual
Development Corporation v. Quitain,[15]in which the breach. In other words, the non-payment -- the res of the Makati
Certification was signed by Atty. Nemesio S. Cañete who was case -- is an incident of the Iloilo case.
the acting regional legal counsel of the National Power
Corporation in Mindanao, the Court held that "he was not Inasmuch as the binding force of the Dealership Agreement was
merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel and put in question, it would be more practical and convenient to
officer, whose basic function was to prepare legal pleadings and submit to the Iloilo court all the incidents and their
to represent NPC-Mindanao in legal cases. As regional legal consequences. The issues in both civil cases pertain to the
counsel for the Mindanao area, he was the officer who was in respective obligations of the same parties under the Dealership
the best position to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of Agreement. Thus, every transaction as well as liability arising
the allegations in the Complaint for expropriation in Davao City. from it must be resolved in the judicial forum where it is put in
As internal legal counsel, he was also in the best position to issue. The consolidation of the two cases then becomes
know and to certify if an action for expropriation had already imperative to a complete, comprehensive and consistent
been filed and pending with the courts." determination of all these related issues.

Verily, the signatory in the Certification of the Petition before Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely
the CA should not have been respondent's retained counsel, who related subject matters must be ordered consolidated and jointly
would not know whether there were other similar cases of the tried in court, where the earlier case was filed. [18] The
corporation.[16] Otherwise, this requirement would easily be consolidation of cases is proper when they involve the
circumvented by the signature of every counsel representing resolution of common questions of law or facts.[19]
corporate parties.
Indeed, upon the consolidation of the cases, the interests of both
No Explanation for parties in the two civil cases will best be served and the issues
Non-Filing by Personal Service involved therein expeditiously settled. After all, there is no
Citing Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules, petitioner also question on the propriety of the venue in the Iloilo case.
faults respondent for the absence of a written explanation why
the Petition with the Court of Appeals was served on her WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the
counsel by registered mail. In reply, respondent points out that assailed Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of
such explanation was not necessary, because its counsel held the Makati RTC (Br. 142) dated February 13, 1997 and May 19,
office in Makati City while petitioner and her counsel were in 1997 are hereby REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED
Iloilo City.
Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. vs Homena-Valencia, G.R. No.
We agree with petitioner. Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 173942
Rules, personal service of petitions and other pleadings is the FACTS:
general rule, while a resort to other modes of service and filing
is the exception. Where recourse is made to the exception, In 1998, NAVAL et. al. filed a case against FIL-ESTATE. The
a written explanation why the service and the filing were not RTC rendered a decision in favor of NAVAL of which FIL-
done personally is indispensable, even when such explanation ESTATE moved for reconsideration filed on 10 May 2000,
by its nature is acceptable and manifest. Where no explanation thirteen (13) days after petitioners received their copy of the
is offered to justify the resort to other modes, the discretionary RTC’s decision. On 26 July 2000, the RTC issued an order
power of the court to expunge the pleading becomes mandatory. denying the motion. Petitioners alleged in their petition that they
[17]
Thus, the CA should have considered the Petition as not received the order denying the motion for reconsideration on 11
having been filed, in view of the failure of respondent to present August 2005. They filed a Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2005,
a written explanation of its failure to effect personal service. or beyond the reglementary period to perfect the appeal which is
15 days from receipt of the RTC’s Decision (this is because the
In sum, the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA by herein 15 day fresh period from the denial of the Motion for
respondent, questioning the orders of consolidation by the Recosideration or Neypes Doctrine was promulgated on
Makati RTC, should not have been given due course. Not only September 14, 2005). Consequently, the RTC denied the appeal
was the Petition filed beyond the sixty-day reglementary period; and such denial was sustained by the Supreme Court in its
it likewise failed to observe the requirements of non-forum Decision dated October 15, 2007.
shopping and personal service or filing. All or any of these acts
ought to have been sufficient cause for its outright denial. FIL-ESTATE filed a Motion for Reconsideration on November
19, 2007 questioning the October 15, 2007 Decision of the
Second Issue: Supreme Court. It argued that following the Court’s 2005
Propriety of Consolidation decision in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, their Notice of Appeal
Apart from procedural problems, respondent's cause is also was perfected on time, that is, within fifteen (15) days from their
afflicted with substantial defects. The CA ruled that there was receipt of the RTC’s order denying their motion for
no common issue in law or in fact between the Makati case and reconsideration. Neypes has established a new rule whereby an
the Iloilo case. The former involved petitioner's indebtedness to appellant is granted a fresh 15-day period, reckoned from receipt
of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, within Both parties received the decision of the appellate court on Oct.
which to perfect the appeal. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate
court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision
FIL-ESTATE argued that since they received the RTC’s order xxx and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on
denying their motion for reconsideration on 11 August 2005, its face, stated that the said decision has on Oct. 21, 1995
following Neypes, they were entitled to a new 15-day period, become final and executory.
i.e., until 26 August 2005 or one (1) day after they had posted
the full appellate docket fees, to perfect the appeal on August Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and
25, 2005. Writ of Possession alleging that the 120-day period of
redemption of the petitioner has expired.
ISSUE: Whether the “fresh period” rule announced in Neypes
could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the
had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day redemption period
promulgated. should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the
CA or from March 13, 1996. The redemption price was
RULING: deposited on April 17, 1996.

Yes. Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions ISSUE:

pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there
being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably
procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they obtained in the trial court by the petitioner?
do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already HELD:
existing.
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule
——————————————————– that governs finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:
THINGS DECIDED:
SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal
A) Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall
being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of
judgments. The date when the judgments or final resolution
B) Procedural rules are remedial in character as they do not becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The
create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that
existing. such judgment or final resolution has become final and
executory.
Tan, Jr. vs CA, G.R. No. 136368
FACTS: SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or
final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be
executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in question in filed in the proper court after its entry.
favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal.
Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended
contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder the rule on finality of judgment by providing in section 1, Rule
Tan was given one (1) year within which to redeem or 39 as follows:
repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem the property until
his death on January 4, 1988. Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution
shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or
On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
a suit against the Magdangals for reformation of instrument expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has
alleging that while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their been duly perfected.
agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to
conclude an equitable mortgage. If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on
RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads: motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified
true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders
1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the
intention of the parties, hereby declared and reformed an adverse party.
equitable mortgage;
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the
2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue
after the finality of this decision P59,200 plus interest at the rate the writ of execution.
of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint
was filed, until paid; SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it
3)xxx. would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly,
petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is
On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then
existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the 1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel,
reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed degrading or inhuman punishment?
the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was 2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if 3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to 4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive
application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Held:
Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.
when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period
of redemption when he made the redemption.  Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601 cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment considering that (1)
R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in
carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be
Facts: administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules
Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification,
common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death the court which will fix the date of execution, which
penalty for the said crime. uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or
time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection
and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions. inherently cruel.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per
execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when
DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of
METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE constitution.  It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 something more than the mere extinguishment of life."  Would
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659. the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading
lethal injection against him under the grounds that it constituted or inhuman"?  The Court believes not.  For reasons discussed,
cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are
process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative
international covenants,  an undue delegation of legislative officials.
power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as
Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation to which "court" will fix the time and date of execution, and the
of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. 
Director. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. 
a ground. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are
already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the
and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal the date of execution nor the time of notification.  As to the date
injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read
rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No.
more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out
electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant on "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months
Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the
properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence,
that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months
implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became
Health and the Bureau of Corrections. final and executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.
Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in
attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. case of possible complications in the intravenous injection that
They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s arguments. respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned,
court gave due course to the petition. renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its punishment.  This is unsubstantiated.
implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for: (a) First.  Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, lethal injection required the expertise only of phlebotomists and
degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are
international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the
legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory. United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly
resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict,
Issue: without any other evidence whatsoever.
Second.  Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the
R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of
execution proceedings should be trained prior to the Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and
performance of such task.  We must presume that the public approval.  Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of
officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a
will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment. manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative
Third.  Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority
incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and under R.A. No. 8177.  Such apparent abdication of departmental
does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.
degrading and inhuman punishment.  "In a limited sense,
anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and 4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules
since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being
be said that all punishments are cruel.  But of course the an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent
Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go Secretary.  Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the
unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
employed to extinguish life humanely. "SEC. 17.  SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but DEATH SENTENCE.  Execution by lethal injection shall not be
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the
a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a person over seventy (70) years of age.  In this latter case, the
maturing society." death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of
2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states: the Revised Penal Code."
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary.  Petitioner insists
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may
the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  This penalty can the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No.
only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a
competent court." woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
for the "most serious crimes". While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by or within  one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the
the General Assembly on December 15, 1989.  The Philippines implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following
neither signed nor ratified said document. delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended,
and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which
the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced.  This
and specify the public agencies which will apply it.  It indicates addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based
the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an
carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must
the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to not override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the law it seeks to apply and implement. 
the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be Neypes vs CA, G.R. No. 141524
administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the
convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel FACTS:
involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained
prior to the performance of such task." The Court cannot see
that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles
detail. The question raised is not the definition of what of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary
constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the injunction before the RTC against the private respondents.
penalty already imposed by the Courts.  In this sense, R.A. No. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’
8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
administrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on
keep it from overflowing. March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18,
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the
No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be overlooked.  To trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998.
the implementing rules which provides a manual for the Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of
execution procedure. It was supposed to be confidential. appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the
implementing rules a vacuum.  The Secretary of Justice has
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of
holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22,
petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with
September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall
under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies
that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It
argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes
the final order of the trial court denying their motion for that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final
27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998
the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39
day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15
complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of
“final order” appealable under the Rules. appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the
requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period
ISSUES: of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is
the 15-day reglmentary period to appeal, the February 12, 1998 given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process,
order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to
dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration. resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts
become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver
justice fairly.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of
HELD: appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC’s decision or file
it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”)
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
reconsideration should be deemed as the final order. In the case Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if
of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided
Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of
motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal
motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise period of 15 days, as already discussed.
dismissed ― for having been filed out of time. The court a quo
ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after NOTE:
the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that
was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court
and declared that it was the denial of the motion for The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” do not apply to Rule 64 (Review
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit)
there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent because Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution. It is likewise
case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.
considered the order denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the
issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases,
the SC sustained petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, Pinga vs Heirs of Santiago, G.R. Bo. 170354
1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final
order contemplated in the Rules. Petitioner Eduardo Pinga was named as one of two defendants
in a complaint for injunction filed by respondent Heirs of
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the German Santiago, represented by Fernando Santiago. The
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their Complaint alleged that petitioner and co-defendant Vicente
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 Saavedra had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, respondent, cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new of the coconut trees.
trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh
period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Petitioner and his co-defendant disputed respondents' ownership
Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal of the properties in question, asserting that petitioner's father,
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying Edmundo Pinga, from whom defendants derived their interest in
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether the properties, had been in possession thereof since the 1930s.
full or partial) or any final order or resolution. They alleged that as far back as 1968, respondents had already
been ordered ejected from the properties after a complaint for
forcible entry was filed by the heirs of Edmundo Pinga. the Respondents, filed with the RTC for Letters of
Administration for the Intestate Estate of Maximino which
Respondents, as plaintiffs, had failed to present their evidence initially granted ordering him to collect rentals from
and failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of Maximino’s properties. But Gregorio filed a motion to set aside
time. On that ground, the complaint was dismissed. At the same the Order claiming that said properties were already under his
time, the RTC allowed defendants "to present their evidence ex- and his wife’s administration as part of intestate estate of
parte." Donata. Hence, Silverio’s Letters of Administration was
subsequently set aside. In 1987, Respondents filed a complaint
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration and prayed that with RTC against Petitioners for Annulment/Recovery of
the entire action be dismissed and petitioner be disallowed from possession of real property. In 1992, Respondents amended their
presenting evidence ex-parte. Respondents claimed that the complaint alleging that Donata, as Administrarix of Maximino’s
order of the RTC allowing petitioner to present evidence ex- Estate, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust,
parte was not in accord with established jurisprudence. They and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in
cited cases, particularly City of Manila v. Ruymann and registering in her name the real properties belonging to the
Domingo v. Santos, which noted those instances in which a Intestate Estate of Maximino. RTC favored Respondents and
counterclaim could not remain pending for independent Ordered Petitioners to reconvey subject properties and render
adjudication. Accounting to the former. Petitioners appealed to CA but the
CA affirmed the RTC, hence, they petitioned to SC.

ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the complaint necessarily ISSUE 1: Whether Respondents have rightful claim to recover
carries the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim. their share from Maximino’s Estate based on the alleged
misrepresentation of Donata that eventually resulted to her being
registered the disputed estate properties?
HELD:
HELD: No. Because Respondent’s cause of action had already
The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of been prescribed.
practice and procedure necessarily carries the power to overturn
judicial precedents on points of remedial law through the Assuming that Donata had employed misrepresentations that
amendment of the Rules of Court. One of the notable changes constitute fraud on her part that resulted to her successful
introduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the explicit registration of the estate properties under her name, such act
proviso that if a complaint is dismissed due to fault of the would necessarily result to an imposition of an implied trust
plaintiff, such dismissal is "without prejudice to the right of the upon her provided under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code.
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action." The innovation was instituted in spite of There are two kinds of implied trusts. One is the resulting trust
previous jurisprudence holding that the fact of the dismissal of and the other one is the constructive trust. Both are created by
the complaint was sufficient to justify the dismissal as well of operation of law. But the latter  is not created by any words,
the compulsory counterclaim. either expressly or impliedly, evidencing a direct intention to
create a trust, but only by construction of equity in order to
In granting this petition, the Court recognizes that the former satisfy the demands of justice, as contradistinguished from the
jurisprudential rule can no longer stand in light of Section 3, former which is always presumed to have been contemplated by
Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. the parties and their intention thereto is traceable in their
transaction but not however expressed in any deed or instrument
We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of of conveyance and may be proven by parole evidence as
Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault opposed to that of expressed trust (a trust relation created by
of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the express of intention of the parties thereto).
counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of
the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to The rule that an action to compel a trustee to convey property
prosecute the counterclaim. registered in his name in trust for the benefit of the cestui que
trust does not prescribe, only applies to express trust. Basis: the
The doctrine that the complaint may not be dismissed if the possession of the trustee is not adverse.  It may also apply to
counterclaim cannot be independently adjudicated is not resulting trust so long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust.
available to, and was not intended for the benefit of, a plaintiff But with respect to constructive trust, the rule is different,
who prevents or delays the prosecution of his own complaint. prescriptibility applies.

Pilapil vs Heirs of Briones, G.R. No. 150175 While Respondent’s right to inheritance was transferred or
FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz- vested upon them at the time of Maximino’s death, their
Briones. Respondents are the heirs of the late Maximino enforcement of said right by appropriate legal action may be
Briones. Maximino was married to Donata but their union did barred by prescription of action.
not produce any children. In 1952, Maximino died, Donata
instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s estate Art. 1144 of the Civil Code provides that actions must be
with the CFI Cebu City. CFI issued a Letters of Administration brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action
in favor of Donata who submitted an inventory of Maximino’s accrues:
properties included the disputed land. In same year 1952, CFI
issued order awarding ownership to Donata. In 1960, such order
 Upon written contract;
was recorded in Register of Deeds and by virtue thereof, a new
 Upon an obligation created by law;
TCT was issued in her name. In 1977, Donata died. Her niece,
 Upon a judgment.
Erlinda, one of the Petitioners, instituted with the RTC a Petiton
for Administration of the Intestate Estate of Donata. RTC
appointed her and her husband Gregorio as Administrators of
Donatoa’s estate. In 1985, Silverio, Maximino’s nephew, one of
Since implied trust is an obligation created by law (Art. 1456 HELD: No. While it is true that since the CFI was not informed
CC), then, Respondents had ten (10) years within which to bring that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court was
an action for reconveyance of their shares in Maximino’s estate. not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of
the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the
ISSUE 2: When the ten (10) year period begins? settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a
proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of
HELD: Reconveyance of real property based on an implied the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of
trust prescribes in ten (10) years from registration and/or the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the
issuance of title to the property, not only because Torrens whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the
System is a constructive notice to title to the whole world, but hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The
also because by registering the disputed properties exclusively publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely
in her name, Donata in effect had already unequivocally for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of
repudiated any other claim to the same. the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings,
most especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors
Donata registered and secured TCT over disputed properties in in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was
her name on June 27, 1960, but Respondents filed their voluntarily or involuntarily made.
complaint Reconveyance and Annulment only on March 3,
1987, or almost 27 years after the registration of said properties Novateknika vs PNB, G.R. No. 194104
in the name of Donata. Hence, there actions had already been
prescribed. FACTS:

While the action for partition among co-owners does not Petitioner Novateknika Land Corporation (NLC), together
prescribe so long as co-ownership is expressly or impliedly with 9 other Corporations, entered into a Credit Agreement
recognized (Art. 494 CC), but Donata had never recognized with PNB for the availment of an omnibus line in the
respondents as co-owners or co-heirs either expressly or principal amount of ₱500,000,000.00.
impliedly, as she asserted to be the sole heir of Maximino
necessarily excludes Respondents. After 2 Renewal Agreements, their total outstanding
principal obligation went up to ₱593,449,464.79. Due to
ISSUE 3: What is the effect if Donata has indeed employed nonpayment depsite repeated demands, PNB filed petitions
fraud and misrepresentation in registering the disputed property for extrajudicial foreclosure over the properties covered by
by claiming that she was the sole and the only heir of Maximino the Mortgage, which included the 4 parcels of land of NLC.
when in truth and in fact, she was not?

HELD: Donata’s fraud and misrepresentation may render CFI’s

Order in 1960 as voidable, but not void on its face, because, it After the Extrajudicial Sale, the properties were awarded to
was rendered by the court in regular exercise of its jurisdiction, PNB as the sole bidder, and the bid amount was applied in
hence, it cannot be subject to collateral attack as respondents did partial satisfaction of the outstanding obligation of the
in this case. borrowers.

ISSUE 4: Is the action to Annul CFI’s Order based on fraud had NLC filed an action for injunction with a prayer for the
also been prescribed? issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction
arguing, inter alia, that PNB’s right to bring a mortgage
HELD: Yes. Action to annul an order or judgment based on action had already prescribed.
fraud must be brought within four (4) from discovery of fraud.
The RTC granted NLC’s application for the issuance of a
In this case, Respondents discovered Donata’s fraudulent acts TRO, preventing PNB from consummating the public sale of
only in 1985, hence, their right to file an action to annul CFI’s the subject properties.
Order issued in 1960 likewise prescribed as they filed their
amended complaint for Annulment based on fraud only in 1992,
or 7 years from date of discovery thereof.
The RTC denied NLC’s prayer for injunctive relief, ruling
ISSUE 5: What is the quantum of evidence required to prove that the mortgage action had not prescribed.
fraud in a case where the principal actors had already been
dead? Aggrieved, NLC elevated the case to the CA via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA dismissed the petition
HELD: Proof beyond reasonable doubt. Reason: Fraud in outright for failure of NLC to file a motion for
breach of trust is not lightly imputed to the living; for the legal reconsideration before the RTC.
presumption is the other way, as to the dead who are not here to
answer for themselves, it would be the height of injustice and ISSUE:
cruelty to disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the
grave, unless the evidence of fraud is proof beyond reasonable Whether or not a Motion for Reconsideration is a condition
doubt. sine qua non to certiorari.

ISSUE 6: Can Respondents validly assail the court’s decision

vesting title to the disputed property in favor of Donata to be not
binding upon them on the ground that they were not made a RULING:
party to the proceeding thereon?
A Motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to
certiorari.
 Jurisprudence is replete with decisions which reiterate that
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that: before filing a petition for certiorari in a higher court, the
attention of the lower court should be first called to its
supposed error and its correction should be sought. Failing
this, the petition for certiorari should be denied. The reason
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, for this is to afford the lower court the opportunity to
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it through a
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to The petitioner’s disregard of this rule deprived the trial
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any court the right and the opportunity to rectify an error
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an act
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified unfairly imputed.
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or In the case at bench, the proper recourse of NLC was to
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, have filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may denying its application for injunctive relief. Only after the
require. denial of such motion can it be deemed to have exhausted all
available remedies and be justified in elevating the case to
xxxx the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Unmistakably, before a petition for certiorari can prosper, De Guzman vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103276
the petitioner must be able to show, among others, that he
does not have any other “plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.” This remedy referred to in De Guzman was charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and
Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the Corrupt Practices Act with the following evidence:
questioned order. 1) lone prosecution witness Josephine Angeles' testimony that
no such training programs were held at the designated places
Well established is the rule that the filing of a motion for and
reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a special civil 2) petitioner's failure to present a single receipt to support due
action for certiorari, subject to certain exceptions, to wit: disbursement of the P200,000.00, resulting from his former
lawyers' insistence in filing a demurrer to evidence despite prior
leave for that purpose having been denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction; DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
*Sandiganbayan: De Guzman convicted of violation of Section
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding 3(e) of the "Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" for his
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, alleged failure to account for P200,000.00 received for certain
or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower official training programs of the Department of Agriculture
court; Entry of judgment was ordered, to be made in due course. 5 Six
(6) years and one (1) month as minimum, to nine (9) years and
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of one (1) day as maximum in jail await petitioner. 
the question and any further delay would prejudice the *SC: affirmed Sandiganbayan.
interests of the government or the petitioner or the subject *SC (MR): denied motion.
matter of the action is perishable;
Petitioner takes a novel recourse by filing the instant "Omnibus
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for Motion For Leave to Vacate First Motion For Reconsideration
reconsideration would be useless; In The Light Of The Present Developments And To Consider
Evidence Presented Herein And To Set Aside Conviction". This
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is was filed on petitioner's behalf by a new counsel, as shown by
extreme urgency for relief; the "Entry of Appearance and Motion For Leave To Submit
Attached Omnibus Motion" filed on June 27, 1994 after
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is petitioner's former lawyers withdrew their appearance.
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is petitioner, for the first time, seeks to be relieved from what he
improbable; considers as the serious and costly mistake of his former lawyers
in demurring to the prosecution evidence after court leave was
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for denied, the effect of which deprived him of presenting before
lack of due process; the Sandiganbayan the pieces of documentary evidence that
would have completely belied the accusation against him.
Annexed to the Omnibus Motion are photocopies of the list of
expenses and receipts 12 in support of the liquidation voucher
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the (Exhibit "E") showing due disbursement of the P200,000.00
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and received for training programs

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where actually conducted.
public interest is involved.22
ISSUE:
None of the exceptions, however, is present in this case. WON De Guzman's Motion should be granted

HELD:
YES, substantial rights must ultimately reign supreme over Thereafter, the appellate court issued a Notice to File the
technicalities, thus, the Court is swayed to reconsider. Appellant’s Brief on May 20, 2005, which was received by the
Clearly, when "transcendental matters" like life, liberty or State law office representing petitioner on May 30, 2005, stating as
security are involved, suspension of the rules is likely to be follows:
welcomed more generously.
Under the circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity Pursuant to Rule 44, Sec. 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
demand that petitioner be not penalized for the costly you are hereby required to file with this Court within forty-five
importunings of his previous lawyers based on the same (45) days from receipt of this notice, SEVEN (7) legibly
principles why this Court had, on many occasions where it typewritten, mimeographed or printed copies of the Appellant’s
granted new trial, excused parties from the negligence or Brief with legible copies of the assailed decision of the Trial
mistakes of counsel. Court and proof of service of two copies upon the appellee/s.7
The fact that the decision . . . has become final, does not
preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because even However, despite said notice, petitioner failed to file its
with the finality of judgment, when its execution becomes appellant’s brief timely. Hence, on August 19, 2005, the
impossible or unjust, as in the instant case, it may be modified appellate court issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal filed
or altered to harmonize the same with justice and the facts. by petitioner. The full text of said Resolution reads:
In resume, this is a situation where a rigid application of rules of
procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to
render justice where justice is due — to secure to every Considering the report of the Judicial Records Division dated 17
individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a August 2005 stating that no appellant’s brief has been filed as
crime of which he is charged. To borrow Justice Padilla's words per docket book entry, the Court RESOLVES to consider the
in "People v. CA, et. al.", 32 (where substantial justice was appeal as having been ABANDONED and consequently
upheld anew in allowing therein accused's appeal despite the DISMISS the same pursuant to Sec. 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997
withdrawal of his notice of appeal and his subsequent escape Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.8
from confinement).
Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, petitioner filed its
CASE IS REMANDED TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN FOR Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s
RECEPTION & APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE Brief,9 which was filed forty-two (42) days late from the date of
"if only to truly make the courts really genuine instruments in its expiration on July 15, 2005.
the administration of justice", the Court believes it imperative,
in order to assure against any possible miscarriage of justice On November 15, 2005, the appellate court denied petitioner’s
resulting from petitioner's failure to present his crucial evidence Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s
through no fault of his, that this case be remanded to the Brief. It ruled that one of the grounds by which the Court of
Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner's Appeals may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss
evidence. the appeal is the failure on the part of the appellant to serve and
file the required number of copies of his brief within the time
CMTC Int'l Marketing Corp. vs Bhagis Int'l Trading Corp., G.R. prescribed by the Rules of Court, viz.:
No. 170488
For this Court to admit the appellant’s brief after such wanton
disregard of the Rules would put a strain on the orderly
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under administration of justice.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolutions dated
August 19, 20051 and November 15, 20052 of the Former As held in the case of St. Louis University vs. Cordero, 434
Special Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SCRA 575, 587, citing Don Lino Gutierres & Sons, Inc. v.
CV No. 84742. Court of Appeals, 61 SCRA 87:

The facts of the case follow. "It is necessary to impress upon litigants and their lawyers the
necessity of strict compliance with the periods for performing
Petitioner instituted a Complaint for Unfair Competition and/or certain acts incident to the appeal and the transgressions thereof,
Copyright Infringement and Claim for Damages with Prayer for as a rule, would not be tolerated; otherwise, those periods could
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary be evaded by subterfuges and manufactured excuses and would
Injunction against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of ultimately become inutile.
Makati (trial court).3
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion
On February 14, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision 4  for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief is
dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner. The fallo of said perforce DENIED.
Decision reads:
SO ORDERED.10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Complaint for Unfair
Competition and/or Copyright Infringement and Claim for Accordingly, petitioner filed a petition for review
Damages is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to on certiorari before this Court questioning the August 19, 2005
cost. and November 15, 2005 Resolutions of the appellate court.
Thus, petitioner presents the following grounds to support its
SO ORDERED.5 petition:

After receiving a copy of the trial court’s Decision, petitioner A.

seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals
(appellate court) on March 4, 2005.6
 THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY have recognized exceptions to the Rules, but only for the most
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules
WHEN IT SACRIFICED SUBSTANTIVE would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.12
JUSTICE IN FAVOR OF PROCEDURAL
TECHNICALITIES WITH ITS DISMISSAL In Obut v. Court of Appeals,13 this Court reiterated that it
OF PETITIONER’S APPEAL FOR "cannot look with favor on a course of action which would place
FAILURE TO FILE THE APPELLANT’S the administration of justice in a straightjacket, for then the
BRIEF ON TIME WITHOUT result would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at
CONSIDERING AT ALL WHETHER OR all. Verily, judicial orders are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a
NOT PETITIONER’S APPEAL DESERVED non-compliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances
FULL CONSIDERATION ON THE attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial
MERITS. action is the principle that a party-litigant if to be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint of
B. defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on technicalities."
IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIVE
JUSTICE, PETITIONER’S APPEAL The same principle was highlighted in Philippine National Bank
SHOULD BE REINSTATED and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Philippine Milling
CONSIDERING THAT THE ERRORS OF Company, Incorporated, et al.[14 where the Court ruled that
THE TRIAL COURT IN RENDERING ITS even if an appellant failed to file a motion for extension of time
APPEALED DECISION ARE EVIDENT ON to file his brief on or before the expiration of the reglementary
THE FACE OF THE SAID DECISION AND period, the Court of Appeals does not necessarily lose
MORE SO AFTER AN EXAMINATION OF jurisdiction to hear and decide the appealed case, and that the
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. Court of Appeals has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss
appellant’s appeal, which discretion must be a sound one to be
1. The trial court’s ruling that petitioner exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play
should have established actual confusion in having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.
the minds of buyers is contrary to
jurisprudence. Ergo, where strong considerations of substantive justice are
manifest in the petition, the strict application of the rules of
2. The trial court did not state the facts upon procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity
which it based its conclusion that petitioner’s jurisdiction.15 Thus, a rigid application of the rules of procedure
trademark is strikingly different and distinct will not be entertained if it will obstruct rather than serve the
from that of defendant’s. broader interests of justice in the light of the prevailing
circumstances in the case under consideration.
3. Respondent labeled its products in a manner
confusingly similar to that of petitioner’s. In the instant case, it is apparent that there is a strong desire to
file an appellant’s brief on petitioner’s part.
4. The trial court erred in finding that
respondent did not pass off its products as that When petitioner filed its motion attaching therewith its
of petitioner’s.11 appellant’s brief, there was a clear intention on the part of
petitioner not to abandon his appeal. As a matter of fact, were it
Simply, the issue to be resolved is the propriety of the dismissal not for its counsel’s act of inadvertently misplacing the Notice
of petitioner’s appeal for its failure to file the appellant’s brief to File Brief in another file, petitioner could have seasonably
within the reglementary period. filed its appellant’s brief as its counsel had already prepared the
same even way before the receipt of the Notice to File Brief.
Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in dismissing its
appeal, since dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is It bears stressing at this point then that the rule, which states that
frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied the mistakes of counsel binds the client, may not be strictly
in a very technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure followed where observance of it would result in outright
substantial justice. deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the
interest of justice so requires. In rendering justice, procedural
infirmities take a backseat against substantive rights of litigants.
For its part, respondent maintains that the appellate court did not Corollarily, if the strict application of the rules would tend to
err in dismissing petitioner’s appeal for its failure to file the frustrate rather than promote justice, this Court is not without
required appellant’s brief within the reglementary period. It power to exercise its judicial discretion in relaxing the rules of
stresses that in the absence of persuasive reason to deviate procedure.16 ]
therefrom, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and
expeditious dispatch of judicial business. Also, it must be stressed that petitioner had no participatory
negligence in the dismissal of its appeal.1âwphi1 Hence, the
ensuing dismissal of its appeal was completely attributable to
We find merit in the instant petition. the gross negligence of its counsel. For said reason, the Court is
not averse to suspending its own rules in the pursuit of justice.
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural rules Where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they client of due process of law, or when the interests of justice so
are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the require, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and the lawyer’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence.17
in the administration of justice. From time to time, however, we
All told, petitioner should be afforded the amplest opportunity The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, courts are not
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of cases
constraints of technicalities. pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
Nevertheless, considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or
the appropriate action to take is to remand the case to the are actually pending before the same judge. If the party desires
appellate court for further proceedings, for it to thoroughly the court to take judicial notice of the record of another case, he
examine the factual and legal issues that still need to be threshed should file the necessary pleading for the purpose and give the
out. other party the chance to be heard on the matter instead of
sending motion for postponement of the hearing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED, insofar as this case is REMANDED to the The court finds his argument academic since no appeal was
Court of Appeals for further proceedings, subject to the payment made from the order dismissing the said petition thus the
of the corresponding docket fees within fifteen (15) days from decision has become already final. Moreover, the court finds res
notice of this Decision. judicata as operative in the case since there are similar in the
identity of the parties, subject matter and cause of action in the
two cases involved thus the order of dismissal in the first
Let the records and the CA rollo of this case be transmitted petition now operates to bar the institution of the second
accordingly. petition.

SO ORDERED Duremdes vs Duremdes, G.R. No. 138256

The Antecedents
Shirley Duremdes was the owner of a parcel of land identified
as Lot No. 1786, Pcadm-478-D covered by Tax Declaration No.
14-033-0039. The parcel of land was located in Barangay
Prieto vs Alpadi Dev't Corp., G.R. No. 191025 Tupaz, Carles, Iloilo and had an area of 50,000 square meters.
Cresenciano Duremdes and Hortencia Bataga, Shirley's parents,
“if the party desires the court to take judicial notice of the record and the latter's brother Nelson Duremdes administered the
of another case, he should file the necessary pleading for the property while Shirley was working abroad as a nurse. When
purpose and give the other party the chance to be heard on the she came back to the Philippines for a brief respite, she asked
matter.” her parents and her brother to vacate the property because she
had decided to sell it. Her parents and her brother refused. On
Facts May 24, 1984, Shirley sought the help of the Group Commander
Gabriel Prieto and Zeferino Arroyo are owners of parcels of of the Civil Relations Group of the Office of the Civil Affairs of
land adjoining to each other. When Arroyo died, the certificate the Philippine Constabulary (PACLAP), Camp Delgado, Iloilo
of title in his name was cancelled and a transfer of certificate of City for the eviction of her kins to no avail.  [4] Nevertheless,
title was then issued to his heirs. The heirs of Arroyo filed a Shirley agreed to sell the property to her father's brother, her
petition before the CFI claiming that the technical description in uncle Agustin Duremdes. On May 31, 1989, Shirley executed a
their title does not conform to the decision of the land deed of conditional sale over the property in favor of Agustin
registration court where the area given in their title is less than for P40,000. Shirley acknowledged receipt of the said amount,
157 sq meters than to what they are entitled and thus prayed for and again asked her parents and brother to vacate the property.
the correction of the description in their title. The court directed The latter adamantly refused.
the Register of Deeds to change the description in the transfer
certificate of title. Prieto now filed an action against the In the meantime, Shirley again left for the United States of
defendants with the petition to annul the order made by the court America to work as a nurse. Cresenciano still refused to vacate
claiming that a portion of his land was unjustly added to the the property despite Agustin's demands for him to do so.
defendant’s title. But during the special proceeding Prieto and Agustin then sought the assistance of the Presidential Assistance
his counsel failed to appear and the court issued an order Committee, again, to no avail. Agustin also sought the
dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute. assistance of the barangay captain. This time, Cresenciano
alleged that the property was not in his possession but was
Prieto filed an action for annulment of the special proceeding occupied by an agricultural tenant, Herminio Tara, who also
and prayed to reconvey the 157 sq meters of lot that was taken happened to be his brother-in-law. Agustin investigated the
from him and was added to the title of the defendants. matter and discovered that Herminio had been a tenant of
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res Cresenciano since February 3, 1979. This was later confirmed
judicata which the court allowed. Prieto now contends that there by a certification from the Ministry of Agrarian
is no res judicata and invoked the court to have been erred in Reform. [5] Cresenciano's property was contiguous to the parcel
dismissing his first petition to annul the special proceeding even of land Agustin had bought from Shirley.
when he did not appear in court as no parole evidence is needed
to support his petition where the matters concerning the land On October 10, 1984, Agustin filed a Complaint[6] for recovery
registration proceeding are parts of the record of the court which of possession, ownership and damages before the RTC of Iloilo
are well within the court’s judicial notice. City, Branch 38, against Cresenciano and Nelson Duremdes. He
alleged that the defendants, who were only administrators of the
Issue: subject property[7] while the previous owner (Shirley) was
employed in the United States, refused to turn over the
Whether or not the court should have taken judicial notice on possession of the lot, for which reason he suffered damages.
the land registration case adjudicated in the same court instead
of dismissing the first petition to annul the special proceeding? In their answer with counterclaim, the defendants denied that
they were the administrators of the land, and that they were the
possessors of the same. They alleged that it was Nelson
Ruling: Duremdes who took care of the property in behalf of Shirley,
and that the present possessor was Herminio Tara, who claimed judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff
to be a tenant of the aforesaid property. The defendants alleged and condemns the defendants:
that the plaintiff knew that Herminio was in possession of the
property. In fact, prior to the filing of the case, they had a 1. To turn over possession and
conference regarding this controversy before the Ministry of cultivation of the parcel of land
Agrarian Reform in Balasan, Iloilo. The defendants also claimed described in paragraph 3 of the
that the damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiff had no complaint to the plaintiff and to
factual and legal basis, and thus prayed for the dismissal of the declare plaintiff to be the rightful
complaint. owner of the said lot;
2. To pay the sum of Fifty Thousand
The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Pesos (P50,000.00) to compensate
Despite the defendants' opposition, the trial court granted the for the loss of produce of the land
motion of the plaintiff and rendered a Decision dated February and the deprivation and enjoyment of
11, 1985. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as the rights of the plaintiff;
follows: 3. To condemn the defendants to pay
incidental expenses of Five Thousand
1. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: Pesos (P5,000.00);
2. Declaring the plaintiff as owner of the land in question; 4. To condemn defendants to pay the
3. Ordering the defendants to vacate the land and deliver sum of Ten Thousand Pesos
immediately possession of the same to the plaintiff; (P10,000.00) as attorneys fees; and
4. Ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff the 5. To pay moral damages in the sum of
produce of the land since September 21, 1984, or its Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
value to be computed according to prevailing market
price until fully paid; Plaintiff prays [for] such other relief and/or
5. Ordering the defendants to pay P1,000.00 as attorney's remedy as maybe just and equitable under the
fees; plus premises.  [13]
6. Costs. The motion was granted. [14] After trial on the merits of the case,
7. The counterclaim is dismissed for lack of basis. the court a quo rendered a Decision[15] dated February 27, 1991
ordering the defendants to vacate the land and to pay damages to
SO ORDERED.[8] the plaintiff, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
The defendants thereafter appealed the case to the Court of judgment is rendered ordering the defendants
Appeals,[9] which rendered judgment reversing the decision of (and/or any person acting for and on their
the trial court and remanding the case to the court a quo for behalf) (1) to deliver to the plaintiff the 3-
further proceedings. [10] According to the appellate court: hectare riceland portion of subject Lot No.
It is true that the defendants-appellants 1786, Pcadm-478-D; (2) to pay plaintiff
admitted plaintiff's ownership over subject jointly and severally, 12 cavans
parcel of land. However, they have likewise of palay annually, starting from the year
denied being in possession of said lot. A 1984, representing the produce of the 3-
question necessarily arises as to whether or hectare riceland portion, until said portion is
not defendants- appellants are really in delivered to plaintiff; and (3) to pay plaintiff
possession of the land in question or it is P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
possessed by one Herminio Tara who is
allegedly a tenant thereof. Certainly, these Defendants' counterclaim is ordered
questions need to be ventilated and dismissed for lack of merit.[16]
determined in a proper trial where parties can
present their respective evidence. Judgment According to the trial court, the main issue to be resolved was
on the pleadings, even on this score alone, whether or not the defendants were in actual possession of the
would surely place defendants-appellants in a land in question. It found that the claim of the defendant
quandary because they will be ordered to turn Cresenciano, that the actual possessor of the land was Herminio
over possession of the land which they deny Tara, was part of a scheme to deprive the plaintiff of his right to
being in possession of in the first place. This, possess the land. The court went on to explain that if the
plus other issues postulated by the defendants could prove that the land was actually possessed by a
defendants-appellants in their Opposition to tenant, then the latter could not be so dispossessed under the
the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Land Reform Law. This would thereby achieve the defendant's
certainly pose genuine issues which require objective of retaining the land in his possession. The trial court
the proper determination of the court for a also made the following findings:
more substantive resolution of the instant Taken together with the other circumstances
case.[11] surrounding this case, the fact that Shirley
Amantillo went to the PACLAP to complain
Dolores Duremdes, the plaintiff's wife, thereafter filed a Motion that her father, defendant Cresenciano
for Substitution[12] alleging that her husband, Agustin Duremdes, Duremdes, refused to deliver the possession of
was now physically incapacitated due to a stroke. The court the land which she had already sold to
granted the motion. She thereafter filed a motion to admit an plaintiff has significant weight and
amended complaint where she reiterated the following prayer: consideration in favor of the latter. If
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is defendant Cresenciano Duremdes in not in
most respectfully prayed of the Honorable actual possession of the land, his daughter
Court that after due notice and hearing, should not have complained against him for
his refusal to deliver to plaintiff the
 possession thereof. complaint filed with the said office was against Cresenciano and
Noel Duremdes, and not against Nelson Duremdes. Nelson
There is a veiled conspiracy between Duremdes was not one of the defendants in the case. Because no
defendant Cresenciano Duremdes and his member of the PACLAP testified regarding the letter, it
brother-in-law, Herminio Tara, which became practically had no probative value; the trial court thus gravely
all the more prominent and apparent when the erred when it considered the said letter in ruling for the
DAR issued a certification that the said defendants. Furthermore, the lower court ignored Dolores'
Herminio Tara is a registered tenant in a admission when she testified on direct and cross-examination
landholding owned by defendant Cresenciano that it was Noel Duremdes who was in possession of the land,
Duremdes (Exh. "E"). Moreover, on cross- and Herminio Tara's declaration that he was its present
examination, defendant Cresenciano possessor.
Duremdes confirmed that he is the
Cresenciano Duremdes who is the owner of The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling with
the land wherein Herminio Tara is a modification in its Decision dated August 31, 1998. The
registered tenant (TSN, hearing of March dispositive portion reads as follows:
23,1990, p. 7). WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
with respect to Cresenciano Duremdes
The opening of an account with the Rural is AFFIRMED with the modification that the
Bank of Balasan (Iloilo) Inc. by Herminio complaint against defendant-appellant Nelson
Tara in the name of Agustin Duremdes was Duremdes in Civil Case No. 16091 is
merely a part of the scheme and machination hereby DISMISSED.[23]
resorted to by the former in a veiled
conspiracy with defendants to make it appear According to the appellate court, the following circumstances
that Herminio Tara has been in actual indicate that Herminio was Cresenciano's tenant and, as such,
possession of the land in question and that was the present possessor of the subject property:
plaintiff refused to receive the rentals from his
alleged tenant, Herminio Tara.[17] 1.
In its reply to the letter-query of Agustin's counsel, the
Agrarian Reform Team No. 189 of the then Ministry of
The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Agrarian Reform informed that "per records of this
trial court denied.[18] office, Mr. Herminio Tara is a registered tenant in the
landholding owned by Mr. Cresenciano Duremdes
The Case On Appeal situated in Brgy. Bolo, Carles, Iloilo." (Exhibit "E")
The defendants again elevated to the Court of Appeals [19] for the 2. The said letter further disputes Cresenciano's allegation
resolution of the following issues: relating to Herminio's status as Agustin's tenant.
3. The aforecited letter-reply vis--vis the certification of
A) Who actually are in possession of the property consisting of the Office of the Municipal Assessor (Exhibit "16")
about two (2) hectares subject matter of this litigation; dated November 29, 1989 stating that Cresenciano does
not own a property adjacent to Agustin's land clearly
B) Since Herminio Tara admitted having been in actual indicates that the land leased by Cresenciano and Noel
possession of the property under litigation, and the share of the to Herminio was Agustin's land.
landowner Agustin Duremdes over the produce is being 4. Agustin and Herminio's alleged "violent" confrontation
deposited with the Rural Bank of Balasan, should defendants be took place on or before March 23, 1984 (Exh. 1) when
ordered to deliver the possession of the said land in favor of the the former found Herminio working on the subject
plaintiffs;[20] land. At that time, the property was still owned by
Shirley and administered by Noel Duremdes ("Noel"),
A Who actually are in possession of the property consisting of about two (2) hectares
son of subject matter of this litigation;
Cresenciano.
) 5. The Notices of harvest dated October 20, 1986,
October 12, 1987 and September 5, 1988 (Exhibits "6",
B Since Herminio Tara admitted having been in actual possession of the property under
"7" and "8",litigation, and the
respectively) are share of theand
irrelevant landowner
immaterial
) Agustin Duremdes over the produce is being deposited with the Rural Bankasof they Balasan,
covershould defendants
periods after thebefact
ordered to deliver
or filing of the
the possession of the said land in favor of the plaintiffs; [20] complaint in the court a quo.
6. The passbook purportedly showing bank deposits of
According to the defendants-appellants, the appellee was unable Agustin's share in the harvest was opened only on
to possess the entire area of the subject lot because a portion of October 1, 1984 after the institution of the instant case.
about two hectares was in the possession of Herminio Tara. In [24]

fact, a violent confrontation even ensued between appellee

Agustin and Herminio when Agustin tried to take possession of However, the court also found that except for the certificate to
the land, and Herminio suffered physical injuries when the file complaint issued by the Barangay Lupong Tagapamayapa,
incident occurred. The appellants also pointed out that despite nothing in the documents and testimonies on record implicated
all this, the appellee failed to implead Herminio as party- appellant Nelson Duremdes although a certain "Noel," a son of
defendant. Cresenciano, was mentioned on several occasions, he was not a
party in the instant case. Hence, the court dismissed the case
It was also contended that when Shirley Duremdes complained with regards to appellant Nelson Duremdes.
to the PACLAP[21] against her father, she had not yet sold the
property to the plaintiff. Her letter to the PACLAP was dated The Issues
March 24, 1984 while the sale took place on March 31, 1984.
[22]
 Aside from claiming that no meeting or conference ever According to the petitioner, the appellate court's decision clearly
transpired between Shirley Duremdes and the appellants before indicates its finding that Herminio Tara was working and
the PACLAP, the appellants also pointed out that the letter- leasing the land owned by the respondent, and that the former
was working as an agricultural tenant on the subject land before In the instant case, the respondent apologized to the Court and
ownership thereof passed to the respondent from Shirley admitted his faux pas. In his reply, he offered the following
Duremdes. Thus, Herminio Tara remained and should remain as reasons for non- compliance with the rules: (1) due to the busy
such agricultural tenant over the subject land even if its schedule and other pending legal work, counsel for the
ownership had already changed. The petitioner further contends petitioner was erroneously of the impression that the period
that it is immaterial whose agricultural tenant Herminio Tara is. granted by the Court was to start upon the receipt of the Court's
He also asserts that because a tenancy relationship is involved, resolution which granted the thirty-day extension; (2) the
jurisdiction over the case rests with the Department of Agrarian services of the said counsel were hired only when the present
Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB). petition became necessary; and (3) the said misconception was
"done in good faith."
The petitioner asserts that, as the records of the case will show,
he consistently raised the issue of the tenancy of Herminio Tara This Court cannot countenance such flimsy and tux-worm
in the lower court, and later in the appellate court. He insists that excuses. Counsel for the petitioner, as a member of the bar, is
the matter involving jurisdiction can still be raised before the presumed to know the law, particularly the rules of procedure.
Court because the CA, through its decision, brought the issue to He cannot feign ignorance of the said rules. If we were to allow
the fore. The petitioner prays that the decision of the CA be set such lapses to go unnoticed, the administration of justice would
aside for lack of jurisdiction, as the subject real property is be derailed; incompetent, irresponsible lawyers would soon
occupied and possessed by a duly registered agricultural tenant, permeate the Court.
who was not even impleaded as a party in the case.
The petitioner asserts that the issue in the present petition "is
In her Comment, the respondent moved for the dismissal of the such that the case needs to be resolved on the merits and should
complaint, on the ground that the petition for review was filed not be dismissed on a mere technicality." The petitioner
out of time. The period within which to file the petition for questions the finding of the Court of Appeals, that no tenancy
review expired on May 9, 1999; the petitioner filed the instant agreement existed between the respondent and Herminio Tara.
petition only after the lapse of 65 days therefrom. Thus, This is, however, a factual issue which is beyond the purview of
according to the respondent, it is clear from the facts and the this Court to act upon and resolve. The Court cannot be tasked
records of the case that the petition for review was filed beyond to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze,
the period allowed by the Court, and that the same was filed assess and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and
merely for purposes of delay and to subvert the ends of justice. appellate court were correct in regarding them superior credit.
[25] [31] 
The issue being raised by the petitioner does not involve a
question of law, but a question of fact, not cognizable by this
The issues thus presented for the Court's resolution in the case at Court in a petition for review under Rule 45.[32]
bar involve both procedural and factual matters: (1) whether or
not the petition was filed out of time as to warrant its dismissal; It is a well-settled rule that findings of fact of the trial court,
(2) whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the instant especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded
case, and if so, whether it can still exercise its jurisdiction, in the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed
view of an allegation of the existence of a tenancy agreement. on appeal.[33] Such findings are binding and conclusive on the
Court.[34] In Spouses Tansipek v. Philippine Bank of
The Court's Ruling Communications,[35] we had the occasion to enumerate the
A perusal of the records of the case indicates that the present exceptions to the rule, thus:
petition for review on certiorari was indeed, filed out of time. ... (1) [W]hen the conclusion is a finding
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
Decision dated August 31, 1998 on September 24, 1998. The and conjectures; (2) when the inference made
CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated March 10, 1999. is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
Counsel for the petitioner was served with a copy of the CA (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
Resolution denying the motion on March 24, 1999, and (4) when the judgment is based on a
thereafter filed on April 8, 1999 a motion for extension of forty- misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
five (45) days within which to file a petition for review.  [26] The findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court granted the motion in its Resolution dated June 16, 1999, Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
but gave the petitioner only thirty (30) days from the expiration beyond the issues of the case and the same is
of the reglementary period within which to file the petition for contrary to the admissions of both appellant
review on certiorari, with a warning that no further extension and appellee; (7) when the findings are
would be given.[27] The petitioner thus had thirty (30) days from contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when
April 8, 1999 to file the petition for review, or until May 9, the findings of fact are conclusions without
1999. The petition was filed only on July 8, 1999. [28] On this citation of specific evidence on which they are
ground alone, the dismissal of the petition is inevitable. based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners' main and
Although it has been said time and again that litigation is not a reply briefs are not disputed by the
game of technicalities, that every case must be prosecuted in respondents; and (10) when the findings of
accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
properly presented and justly resolved, [29] this does not mean the supposed absence of evidence and
that procedural rules may altogether be disregarded. Rules of contradicted by the evidence on record.  [36]
procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for
persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of The instant case does not fall under any of the foregoing
an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the exceptions.
prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of
the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the Neither can the petitioner find solace in the allegation that the
party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to jurisdiction in the instant case properly falls with the DARAB
abide by the rules.[30] because of the existence of a tenancy agreement.
First. For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there
must be a tenancy relationship between the parties. [37] In order
for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is
essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:
1) [T]hat the parties are the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the
subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; 3) that there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) that
the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; 5) that there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest
is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee.  [38]

Second. The trial court found that no such tenancy agreement

existed between the respondent and Herminio Tara, and that
such allegation was a mere ploy to prevent the respondent from
exercising dominion and ownership over the subject property.
This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We find no cogent
reason to reverse such finding.

Third. The petitioner is barred from raising the issue of

jurisdiction. The petitioner actively participated in all stages of
the instant case, setting up a counterclaim and asking for
affirmative relief in his answer. [39] He failed, however, to
question the court's jurisdiction over the suit. After relying on
the jurisdiction of the regular courts, he cannot be permitted to
turn around and question it. It is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction.[40]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack

of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.