2011017012.jakia Akther Mitu
2011017012.jakia Akther Mitu
2011017012.jakia Akther Mitu
On
Covid-19 and Its Impact on Employment -
International Perspective
Submitted To
Farhad Hossain
Assistant Professor (HRM)
Department of Business Administration
Leading University
Submitted By
Jakia Akther Mitu
ID: 2011017012
Program: MBA
Semester: 4th-B
Department of Business Administration
Leading University
In performing our assignment, I had to take the help and guideline of some
respected persons, who deserve my greatest gratitude. The completion of this
assignment gives me much pleasure. I would also like to expand my deepest
gratitude to all those who have directly and indirectly guided me in preparing
this assignment.
In addition, Special thanks to Our Senior Lecturer, Mr. Farhad Hossain who
introduced me to the methodology of work, and whose passion for the
“underlying structures” had lasting effect.
Table of Content
Contents Page
1. Introduction 1-2
1.2 Methodology 1
1.3 Limitation 2
2.4 Workers and enterprises in the informal economy are the most 12-13
vulnerable
2.5 Young people & The emergence of a “lockdown generation” 13-14
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‑19) is an infectious disease caused by severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). It was first identified in December 2019 in Wuhan,
Hubei, China, and has resulted in an ongoing pandemic. As of 6 September 2020, more than 26.9
million cases have been reported across 188 countries and territories with more than 880,000
deaths; more than 18 million people have recovered.
COVID-19 has turned the world upside down. Everything has been impacted. How we live and
interact with each other, how we work and communicate, how we move around and travel. Every
aspect of our lives has been affected. Although the world is in lockdown, governments,
epidemiologists, school principals, entrepreneurs and families around the world are already
planning the next steps: how to safely reopen schools and businesses, how to commute and travel
without transmitting or contracting infection, how to support those most affected by the crisis –
the millions who have lost their livelihoods or their loved ones, how to ensure the already serious
inequalities don’t deteriorate further. The crisis has already transformed into an economic and
labor market shock, impacting not only supply (production of goods and services) but also demand
(consumption and investment). In this study, I will cover how Covid-19 has impacted on
employment worldwide.
The main objective of this study is to analyze about covid-19 and its impact on employment from
the international perspective. To make comments and pointing out some suggestions based on
findings after analysis.
1.2 Methodology
This study is mainly based on secondary data. Secondary data and information have been gathered
from Internet browsing, Journals, Research paper etc. Primary data and information also have
collected through using observation and taking other respected person opinion.
1
1.3 Limitation
The major limitation factor for this report is that information from different sources were quite
inconsistent which created some problems in making the assignment & compelled us to verify the
information diligently. The time limit was also a fact because at the same time we are doing our
other assignments. So, it was quite hard to keep everything at a run.
2
2. Overview of Covid-19 and the World of Work
The COVID-19 crisis is having a substantial impact on all aspects of our lives. The immediate
focus and ongoing priority is inevitably, and correctly, on public health, and is likely to remain
that way for the coming weeks and months. In the world of statistics there is equally a focus on
timely information on the spread and impact of the virus. In the first instance, this of course relates
to statistics on the number of cases and the outcome of those cases.
In the case of the labour market many millions of workers across a large number of countries have
been directly impacted by lockdowns. Some are able to continue their work through teleworking
or remote working arrangements. Many others have seen a reduction or complete loss of their
livelihood. Others still, for example workers in health or public security, will experience a different
type of change, namely a huge increase in working burden in the face of the crisis.
The continued sharp decline in working hours globally due to the COVID-19 outbreak means that
1.6 billion workers in the informal economy – that is nearly half of the global workforce – stand
in immediate danger of having their livelihoods destroyed, warns the International Labour
Organization. As a result of the economic crisis created by the pandemic, almost 1.6 billion
informal economy workers (representing the most vulnerable in the labour market), out of a
worldwide total of two billion and a global workforce of 3.3 billion, have suffered massive damage
to their capacity to earn a living. This is due to lockdown measures and/or because they work in
the hardest-hit sectors.
The world of work has been impacted severely by the imposition of lockdown
measures, which include various forms of workplace closures. As at 15 June, almost
one third of the world’s workers (32 per cent) were living in countries with required
workplace closures for all but essential workplaces. An additional 42 per cent were living
in countries with required workplace closures for some sectors or categories of workers,
and a further 19 per cent in countries with recommended workplace closures (figure 1)
3
Taken together, the vast majority, namely, 93 per cent, of the world’s workers
continue to reside in countries with workplace closure measures of some kind still in
force. This global share has remained relatively stable since mid-March, though there has
been a marked shift towards softer measures. For instance, the proportion of workers in
countries with the strictest form of workplace closure peaked at around 70 per cent in late
March and subsequently declined to 32 per cent in mid-June.
There are significant variations in workplace closures across regions. The region
currently most affected by restrictions on workers and workplaces is the Americas. In
contrast, as at 15 June, no country in either the Arab States or Europe and Central Asia still
stipulated the closure of all but essential workplaces, while in Africa only 2 per cent of
workers were still living in countries with such stringent requirements.
Nevertheless, even in countries where required workplace closures are not currently
widespread, many businesses remain unable to restore operations to full capacity. As
at 15 June, all countries in the Arab States region had some workplace closure requirements
in place for specific sectors or categories of workers. Overall, 81 per cent of workers in
Europe and Central Asia, 69 per cent of workers in Africa and 51 per cent of workers in
the Americas reside in countries where workplaces are required to remain closed in certain
sectors or for some categories of workers.
4
Currently, the risk of new infections and a second wave remains. New lockdowns or
the continuation of current strict measures over the coming months would lead to further
disruption of economic activity and labor markets, thereby jeopardizing an employment
recovery.
14 % decline in working hours. During the first quarter of the year, an estimated 5.4 per cent of
global working hours (equivalent to 155 million full-time jobs) were lost relative to the fourth
quarter of 2019. Working hour losses for the second quarter of 2020 are estimated to have reached
14.0 per cent worldwide (equivalent to 400 million full-time jobs), with the largest reduction (18.3
per cent) occurring in the Americas.
During the first quarter of 2020, an estimated 5.4 per cent of global working hours
(up from 4.8 per cent as estimated previously) were lost relative to the fourth quarter
of 2019, equivalent to 155 million full-time job. Given the earlier spread of the virus in
China (which implemented strict containment measures already in late January) and other
countries in Asia and the Pacific, it is not surprising that this region accounted for
approximately 80 per cent of the global reduction in working hours during the first quarter
of the year. More specifically, the Eastern Asia subregion experienced a decline in working
hours of 11.6 per cent, or 95 million full-time equivalent (FTE) jobs, in the first quarter.
However, as the pandemic began to spread globally, significant losses in working hours
were observed in other regions. Europe and Central Asia experienced a reduction in
hours in the first quarter of 2020 of 3.4 per cent, or 11 million FTE jobs, with the largest
losses occurring in Southern Europe (5.3 per cent) and Western Europe (4 per cent). Some
11 million FTE jobs were lost in the Americas during the first quarter of the year, with the
biggest impact felt in South America, where working hours declined by 4.8 per cent relative
to the fourth quarter of 2019. In Africa, the working-hour losses in the first quarter of 2020
are estimated at 2.4 per cent, or 9 million FTE jobs.
5
Figure 2:
Drawing on new data that suggest a larger impact than expected, particularly in developing
regions, the ILO has substantially revised upwards its estimate of global working-
hour loss in the second quarter of 2020, compared with previous estimates. The latest
estimates presented in this edition of the ILO Monitor reveal a decline in global working
hours of 14 per cent in the second quarter of 2020 (up from the previous estimate of
10.7 per cent), which is equivalent to 400 million full-time jobs. Lower-middle-income
countries are the hardest hit, experiencing a decline of 16.1 per cent.
The Americas is estimated to have suffered a reduction in working hours of 18.3 per cent,
or 70 million FTE jobs, in the second quarter of 2020, compared with the previous estimate
of 13.1 per cent. This is the highest working-hour loss among the major geographical
regions and the largest upward revision since the fourth edition of the ILO Monitor. Within
this region – and among all regions and subregions of the world – South America has the
highest estimated working-hour loss in the second quarter, at 20.6 per cent. Losses for
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Central America and for Northern America are estimated at 19.2 and 15.3 per cent,
respectively.
The hours worked in Europe and Central Asia are estimated to have declined by 13.9 per
cent, or 45 million FTE jobs, in the second quarter, up from the estimate of 12.9 per cent
presented in the previous edition of the ILO Monitor. The largest loss in this region is
estimated to have occurred in Southern Europe (18.0 per cent), followed by Northern
Europe (15.3 per cent), Western Europe (14.3 per cent), Central and Western Asia (13.6
per cent) and Eastern Europe (11.6 per cent).
In Asia and the Pacific, the total working-hour loss for the second quarter of 2020 is
estimated at 13.5 per cent, or 235 million FTE jobs, up from the previous estimate of 10
per cent. Among the subregions, the greatest reduction in working hours is estimated to
have occurred in Southern Asia (with a decline of 17.9 per cent in the second quarter),5
followed by South-Eastern Asia and the Pacific (12.6 per cent) and Eastern Asia (10.4 per
cent).
Working hours in the second quarter of 2020 are estimated to have declined by 13.2 per
cent, or 8 million FTE jobs, in the Arab States, an upward revision of 2.9 percentage points
from the estimates presented in the previous edition of the ILO Monitor.
In Africa, the total working-hour loss in the second quarter of the year is estimated at 12.1
per cent, or 45 million FTE jobs, up from the previous estimate of 9.5 per cent. In terms of
subregions,6 estimates for working-hour losses in the second quarter of 2020 indicate that
Northern Africa experienced the sharpest decline (15.5 per cent), followed by Southern
Africa (12.2 per cent), Central Africa (11.9 per cent), Western Africa (11.6 per cent) and
Eastern Africa (10.9 per cent).
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2.2.3 A Closer Look at Working-Hour Losses
Working-hour losses, as estimated using the ILO nowcasting model are an aggregate indicator of
the labour market impact of the COVID-19 crisis. As figure 4 shows, the loss in working hours
occurred in different ways – at least in the initial stages of the COVID-19 crisis – mainly as a result
of the labour market institutions in place and the political decisions made. For example, in the
Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, working-hour
losses were overwhelmingly caused by shorter hours and by people being employed but not
working. These two types of arrangement preserve the attachment of workers to their current jobs,
thereby reducing the risk of a disruption to their labour market trajectories in the medium term. In
both countries, the contribution of unemployment to the reduction in working hours was very
small, though inactivity rose significantly in the Republic of Korea. As for Peru and Mexico, where
strict containment measures were introduced, changes in unemployment were also small. In
Mexico, the contribution of shorter hours and of people being employed but not working stands at
roughly half of the hours lost, while the other half is due to inactivity; unemployment plays a
modest role. In Peru, roughly 90 per cent of the fall in hours was driven by job loss leading to
inactivity, with no contribution by unemployment. Canada experienced substantial job losses,
leading to an increase in both unemployment and inactivity. Finally, in the United States of
America, job losses accounted for roughly two thirds of the decline in working hours, with
unemployment responsible for almost half of that decline
Figure 3:
8
The factors driving the decline in working hours vary considerably across the countries for which
relevant data are available. In some countries, shorter working hours and “being employed but not
working” (e.g. where workers are put on temporary leave) contributed significantly to the decline,
while in others, the main driving factor was people being pushed into unemployment and
inactivity. These variations suggest that a narrow focus on unemployment does not allow a proper
assessment of the pandemic’s impact on the labor market.
Many of those still working, especially health workers, are at the frontline, fighting
the virus and making sure that people have their basic needs met, including workers
in transport, agriculture, and essential public services: Globally, there are 136 million
workers in human health and social work activities, including nurses, doctors and other
health workers, workers in residential care facilities and social workers, as well as support
workers, such as laundry and cleaning staff, who face serious risk of contracting COVID-
19 in the workplace. Approximately 70 per cent of jobs in the sector are held by women.
Based on real-time economic and financial data, the impact of the crisis on economic
output can be assessed at the sectoral level (with limitations to disaggregation due to
available global data): Drawing from this assessment, a number of key economic sectors
can be identified as suffering from a drastic fall in output, including accommodation and
food services, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and real estate and business
activities (table 2). These sectors are labour intensive and employ millions of often low-
paid, low-skilled workers, particularly in the case of accommodation and food services and
retail trade. The economic risks will be felt particularly hard by workers in these sectors.
These sectors employ 1.25 billion workers around the world, representing almost 38
per cent of the global workforce: Depending on the country context, these workers are
facing a drastic and devastating reduction in working hours, wage cuts and layoffs, and are
likely to form the bulk of the estimates from the nowcasting model presented above.
9
10
Of the economic sectors most affected, the wholesale and retail trade segment
represent the largest share of workers, who are typically low paid and unprotected:
This group of 482 million workers includes, among others, checkout clerks, stockers,
shopkeepers and workers in related jobs. Workers in this sector who are engaged in
activities deemed essential (e.g. food distribution) may continue to work, but they face
greater occupational health risks. Workers in non-essential businesses face widespread
closures and sharp reductions in employment and hours.
The accommodation and food services sector are also severely affected, accounting
for 144 million workers: This sector is suffering from almost full closure in some
countries and a steep decline in demand in cases where operations can continue. More than
half of these workers are women
The manufacturing sector, which employs 463 million workers, has been hit hard in
some segments, as workers are told to stay at home, factories close, and global supply
chains grind to a halt: Quarantine measures, closure of retail stores, cancelled orders and
salary reductions are suppressing demand in key industries such as automobiles and
textiles, clothing, leather and footwear.
The transport, storage and communication industry accounts for 204 million jobs:
around the world, including airline pilots and crew members, drivers, postal and other
delivery workers, as well as people who work in warehouses that support transport and
global supply chains. While some of these workers are negatively affected (e.g. those in
the airline industry), others continue to meet the increased demand for online retail.
Although the economic impact has not yet been felt in agriculture, the largest sector
in most of developing countries, risks of food insecurity are emerging due to
containment measures, including border closures. Over time, workers in this sector may be
increasingly impacted, particularly if the virus spreads further into rural areas.
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coverage. Though these regions do not yet have high death rates due to COVID-19, the
virus is currently spreading rapidly in ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work.
Second edition a number of developing countries where the nexus between informality,
weak capacity and high-density populations poses severe health and economic challenges
for governments.
The sectoral analysis shows that not all sectors and not all types of workers are equally affected.
It also shows that many of those most affected are those who are already low-wage workers and
have less access to social protection coverage. As such, this can have a further negative impact on
already existing inequality
2.4 Workers and Enterprises in The Informal Economy Are the Most Vulnerable
As noted in the second ILO Monitor, more than 2 billion people worldwide work in
the informal economy in jobs that are characterized by a lack of basic protection,
including social protection coverage. They often have poor access to health-care services
and have no income replacement in case of sickness or lockdown. Many of them have no
possibility to work remotely from home. Staying home means losing their jobs, and without
wages, they cannot eat.
As of 22 April 2020, close to 1.1 billion informal economy workers live and work in
countries in full lockdown, and an additional 304 million in countries in partial lockdown.
These workers together represent 67 per cent of informal employment. Taking into account
the additional effects of sectoral risk (as highlighted in the preceding section) –
employment status, the size of enterprises and different levels of lockdown measures (full,
partial a weak measures) – results in an even higher estimate of the impact of COVID-19
on informal economy workers. This estimate suggests that almost 1.6 billion informal
economy workers, accounting for 76 per cent of informal employment worldwide, are
significantly impacted by the lockdown measures and/or working in the hardest-hit
sectors. Almost all of these workers (over 95 per cent) are working in units of fewer than
ten workers.
12
Among informal economy workers significantly impacted by the crisis, women are
over-represented in high-risk sectors: 42 per cent of women workers are working in
those sectors, compared to 32 per cent of me
Income losses for informal economy workers are likely to be massive. ILO estimates
show that earnings for informal workers are expected to decline in the first month of the
crisis by 60 per cent globally, 28 per cent in upper-middle-income countries, 82 per cent in
lower-middle and low-income countries and 76 per cent in high-income countries (table
2). The high figure for high-income countries reflects the fact that the group includes large
economies where informality is substantial and which have adopted full lockdown policies.
The lower figure for upper-middle-income countries is largely explained by the fact that
this group comprises fewer countries with full or partial lockdown measures. By region,
the expected decline is largest at 81 per cent in Africa and Latin America.
With further increases in income inequality among workers, an even greater proportion of
informal economy workers will be left behind. Assuming a situation without any
alternative income sources, lost earnings would result in an increase in the rate of relative
poverty (defined a the proportion of workers with monthly earnings that fall below 50 per
cent of the median earnings in the population) for informal workers and their families by
almost 34 percentage points globally; more than 21 percentage points in upper-middle-
income countries; around 52 points in high-income countries; and 56 points among lower
and low-income countries.
Young people constitute major victims of social and economic consequences of the pandemic, and
there is a risk that they will be scarred throughout their working lives – leading to the emergence
of a “lockdown generation”.
The most recent figures show that young people are disproportionately affected by the
COVID-19 crisis, with multiple shocks including disruption to education and training,
employment and income losses, and greater difficulties in finding a job.
13
A total of 178 million young workers around the world, more than four in ten young
people employed globally, were working in hard-hit sectors when the crisis began.
Almost 77 per cent (or 328 million) of the world’s young workers were in informal
jobs, compared with around 60 per cent of adult workers (aged 25 and above). The youth
informality rate ranges from 32.9 per cent in Europe and Central Asia to 93.4 per cent in
Africa. Even before the crisis, more than 267 million young people were not in
employment, education or training (NEET), including almost 68 million unemployed
young people.
Both technical and vocational education and training (TVET) and on-the-job training
are suffering massive disruption. In a recent ILO–UNESCO–World Bank joint survey,
around 98 per cent of respondents reported a complete or partial closure of technical and
vocational schools and training centers. Although over two-thirds of training is now being
provided at distance, often online, few low-income countries have actually made that
transition.
Another new global survey by the ILO and partners of the Global Initiative on Decent Jobs
for Youth reveals that over one in six young people surveyed have stopped working
since the onset of the COVID-19 crisis. Among young people who have remained in
employment, working hours have fallen by 23 per cent. Moreover, around half of young
students report a likely delay in the completion of their current studies, while 10 per cent
expect to be unable to complete them at all. On a standardized scale of mental well-being,
more than half of the young people surveyed have become vulnerable to anxiety or
depression since the start of the pandemic.
Since the COVID-19 crisis is disproportionately affecting women workers in many ways, there is
a risk of losing some of the gains made in recent decades and exacerbating gender inequalities in
the labour market. In contrast to previous crises, women’s employment is at greater risk than
men’s, particularly owing to the impact of the downturn on the service sector. At the same time,
women account for a large proportion of workers in front-line occupations, especially in the health
and social care sectors. Moreover, the increased burden of unpaid care brought by the crisis affects
14
women more than men. Against the backdrop of gender inequalities in the labour market, the crisis
is disproportionately affecting women workers in four main ways.
1. A large proportion of women work in sectors severely affected by the crisis: Globally,
almost 510 million, or 40 per cent of all employed women, work in hard-hit sectors,
including accommodation and food services; wholesale and retail trade; real estate,
business and administrative activities; and manufacturing (figure 5). This compares with a
share of 36.6 per cent of employed men. The proportion of women working in hard-hit
sectors is particularly high in Central America (58.9 per cent), South-Eastern Asia (48.5
per cent), Southern Europe (45.8 per cent) and South America (45.5 per cent). In these
subregions, the share of men working in hard-hit sectors is significantly lower (43.0 per
cent in Central America, 33.2 per cent in South-Eastern Asia and 42.0 per cent in South
America), apart from Southern Europe, where it is higher (49.1 per cent).
With regard to certain female-dominated sectors, women account for 61 per cent of
employment in arts and entertainment and other service workers,16 and for 54 per cent of
employment in accommodation and food services, while they are over-represented in the
wholesale and retail trade sector (42.1 per cent of those employed in the sector, compared
with 38.7 per cent of total workers). Beyond services, in some labor-intensive segments of
manufacturing, such as garments, women are vulnerable to job losses as a consequence of
disruption to supply chains and falling consumer demand.17 The gender gap in the
proportion of informal workers in hard-hit sectors is far greater, with 42 per cent of women
working informally in these sectors at the onset of the crisis, compared with 32 per cent of
men.
15
Asia and 88.5 per cent in the Americas.20 Furthermore, domestic workers are often
migrants, which exacerbates their vulnerability because of the general lack of social
protection in destination countries, and also because they are unable to return to their home
countries owing to lockdown measures and travel bans
3. The overwhelming majority of workers in the health and social work sector are
women: Globally, women represent more than 70 per cent of those employed in health and
social work; in some developed regions, they account for almost 80 per cent of the health
workforce. However, women in this sector tend to be engaged in lower-skilled and lower-
paid jobs, which are associated with wider gender pay gaps (26 per cent in high-income
countries and 29 per cent in upper-middle-income countries).21 Health workers, in
particular those dealing with COVID-19 patients, are often subject to arduous (and
sometimes dangerous) working conditions. Long working hours in intensive care units, a
lack of personal protective equipment and other resources, understaffing and intense
emotional stress expose health workers to higher risks of infection and transmission,
especially in low- and middle-income countries.
16
4. During the crisis, the unequal distribution of increased care demands affects women
disproportionately: In normal times, women provide around three quarters of all unpaid
care work. The amount of time dedicated by women to unpaid care work increases with
the presence of children in the household.23 The closures of early childhood education
centres, care services and schools, along with the unavailability of older relatives to provide
support, have exacerbated care demands during the crisis.
17
3. Policy Responses
Unprecedented labour market disruptions require timely and large-scale support for enterprises
and workers around the world. The ILO’s policy framework for tackling the COVID-19 crisis
highlights the importance of responses under four pillars. Immediate support is needed for
enterprises and workers around the world on an unprecedented scale. The urgency of policy actions
to protect both enterprises, particularly smaller businesses, and workers, especially when operating
and working in the informal economy. Guided by the ILO policy framework, effective policy
measures need to be developed with strong attention to the following issues
18
Investment in testing and tracing does pay off. T&T is associated with less workplace
disruption and can contribute to increased consumer confidence, which in turn should help
to stimulate demand. It is important to ensure that any T&T programme is undertaken as
part of a government-led initiative and that appropriate safeguards are built into the
collection and processing of the data so as to protect the privacy of workers’ personal data
and prevent unlawful discrimination.
Given the risk of long-lasting damage to young people’s labour market prospects and
to their overall well-being, governments need to provide comprehensive solutions,
combining elements from all four pillars of the ILO’s policy framework for tackling the
COVID-19 crisis, including support for education and skills development covering digital
skills and e-learning, work-based learning, entrepreneurship, social protection and
improving rights and conditions in the workplace for young people.
19
countries’ specific circumstances, and they may need both domestic and external support
with regard to financing and implementation.
Support to businesses and jobs need to target the most vulnerable in order to mitigate
the economic and social consequences of the confinement period. Given the
vulnerability of small enterprises and workers in the informal economy, governments
should explore all options to finance measures that support firms and their workers and
provide adequate social protection. As shown above, substantial numbers of own-account-
workers, micro and small businesses, and people in the informal economy are highly
vulnerable to the impact of the pandemic in developing countries.
Effective responses require speed and flexibility. Swift policy action, based on country-
specific contexts (structure of enterprises’ composition, level of informality, etc.) will be
essential at each distinct phase of the COVID-19 crisis: containment measures and
reduction of economic activity, re-activation once the pandemic is under control, and
recovery. Policies and programs should remain flexible and result from consultation with
the social partners, with monitoring in place to maintain, adjust and phase out interventions
as appropriate.
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relationships or existing social security schemes, to provide for fast and efficient access to
support funds.
Policies need to focus on providing income support for both businesses and workers
to maintain economic activities, with special attention to enterprises that are at greater
risk of business failure and to the self-employed and workers who are more likely to fall
into long-term unemployment or underemployment. Temporary waivers or rescheduling
of taxes and other payments should be introduced to preserve livelihoods and prevent
bankruptcies. Temporary subsidies to firms cover labor costs and the extension of credit
lines and loan guarantees at concessional terms should be considered to support
employment retention. Short-time working arrangements are helping more advanced
economies cope with the drop in labor demand thus far, as this allows businesses to
maintain employment relationships more easily and to prevent mass layoffs.
Tailored responses are needed to reach and support small businesses, through
combined measures of direct financial support and loan guarantees to avoid saddling
firms with too much debt (but conditional on retaining workers). Preparedness to identify
and expand financial resources is therefore essential to deal with high demand for lines of
credit. For small businesses, microfinance and semi-formal financial institutions can
constitute an effective means of reaching enterprises and own-account workers operating
in the informal economy.
Income support for workers and enterprises operating in the informal economy is
critical to prevent them from plunging far deeper into poverty. As there is little time to
design new schemes, successful programs should be prioritized and scaled up, such as cash
transfers, child allowances and programs used for shelter and food relief. In many cases,
conditional and unconditional cash transfers may be needed for an extended period of time.
Income support for poor workers and households is vital for firms, especially those that
produce consumption goods.
In the reactivation phase, policies should target the provision of timely information
about the status of containment measures and exit strategies. Exit from containment
should take advantage of social dialogue to ensure that reopening of workplaces occurs
21
with safeguards for the safety of workers and consumers. Many sectors will require
governments to coordinate the distribution of essential inputs to firms and provide support
to reprogramming production towards the health sector and essential products and services.
Longer-term, large public investments are needed to boost employment and crowd in
private investment. Governments could accelerate economic growth and boost
employment with measures such as employment-intensive public investment, government
procurement that provides preferences to small businesses, and tax incentives to stimulate
local sourcing of larger firms. Investments in upgrading physical and social infrastructure
can 12ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Third edition improve firms’
access to supplies and offer new market opportunities, including opportunities to mitigate
and adapt to climate change.
Job-rich recovery will lay the foundation for inclusive and sustainable growth. As
shown above, the impact of the pandemic is likely to be uneven, adding significantly to
existing vulnerabilities and inequalities. In the recovery phase, greater attention should be
paid to the strengthening of employment policies to support enterprises and workers, along
with strong labor market institutions and comprehensive and well-resourced social
protection systems, including care policies and infrastructure, that kick in automatically
and in an inclusive way as crises occur
It is particularly important to mobilize resources and channel them effectively to deal with
the far-reaching economic and social consequences of the pandemic and promote a job-
rich recovery while ensuring that workers are protected in the workplace. Indeed, many
countries have swiftly introduced a wide range of policy measures, with a strong focus
on the first and second pillars of the ILO policy framework, that is, on stimulating the
economy and employment and on supporting enterprises, jobs and incomes.
Most countries have made significant, often unprecedented efforts through fiscal and
monetary policy tools to deploy resources as fast as possible with a view to preventing
an outright collapse of the economy and supporting income and jobs. This has required
both innovation and flexibility. In many countries, fiscal rules and legal constraints to
expansionary fiscal policy were waived in the light of the COVID-19 crisis, while central
22
banks went well beyond their conventional role, using their balance sheets to intervene
directly in the economy and buy large quantities of government and corporate bonds.
Fiscal measures in advanced economies, averaging 5 per cent of GDP in each case,
account for 88 per cent of the global fiscal stimulus. The specific policy mix varied
across these countries, but a large part of the fiscal response took the form of deferrals and
waivers of tax, social security contributions and other payments, along with the provision
of grants, credit guarantees and wage subsidies to businesses (including small and medium-
sized enterprises) – in some cases, these were conditional on employment retention. The
bulk of discretionary spending in most advanced economies was used to expand existing
social protection schemes for workers and vulnerable households (including
unemployment benefits, sickness benefits and social assistance). Large-scale conventional
and unconventional monetary policy measures were also introduced quickly to avert a
liquidity crisis.
In many low-income countries, the situation is even more challenging because fiscal
space is extremely limited. This fiscal capacity has been further eroded by a sharp decline
in commodity prices, export earnings, remittances and foreign investment. Without large-
scale international support, stimulating the economy and employment through fiscal
measures will be beyond the reach of many of these countries.
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As for monetary measures, many emerging and developing economies have the scope for
reducing interest rates further, but additional efforts to find sustainable and effective ways
of mobilizing resources are needed, given the limitations of monetary policy transmission
in these countries. The large scale of the interventions and the urgency of delivery posed a
number of implementation challenges for countries in all regions and income group.
In general, delivery was smoother where it could rely on existing strong institutional
mechanisms, such as well-developed and well-resourced social protection systems,
efficient tax administration, a well-capitalized banking sector and strong public investment
banks. Some countries adapted existing systems in order to introduce innovations,
including new work-sharing schemes, the extension of support to the self-employed and
conditionality clauses for the disbursement of funds and guarantees.
Many countries have been able to react quickly by mobilizing, expanding and
adapting existing social protection mechanisms. According to the “ILO Social
Protection Monitor on COVID-19”,32 as at 16 June, a total of 200 countries and territories
had announced 1,166 social protection measures in various policy areas, including
measures for health and income protection, unemployment protection and job protection.
Innovative approaches have helped to ensure timely and effective delivery in both
advanced and developing countries. For instance, digital technology and mobile phones
were used extensively in many countries for the registration and payment of social
protection benefits.33 Some developing countries (e.g. Ghana and Nigeria) set up special
relief mechanisms to channel international donor funds and remittances specifically to the
most vulnerable population groups. The use of tax waivers and deferrals helped to get
resources quickly to households and businesses. In addition, some countries and cities
provided households with cash transfers in the form of digital consumption vouchers (to
discourage their use for savings or debt repayments), or offered travel vouchers for use in
local restaurants (e.g. Japan and the Republic of Korea).
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3.1 Key Challenges Ahead
Despite the extraordinary and often unprecedented measures introduced around the world, the
damage done by the COVID-19 crisis to labour markets is enormous and leaves policymakers to
confront major policy challenges. Actual labour market outcomes for the rest of 2020 and beyond
will depend on the choices they make, as well as on the pandemic’s future trajectory. Moreover,
the decisions taken in the near future are likely to have long-lasting implications for the world of
work. Countries will not all face the same situation. The gravity of the issues they must resolve
and the tools and resources that they can bring to the task will vary considerably. But a number of
key challenges will have to be addressed by most, if not all, of them.
First, finding the right balance and sequence of health and economic and social policy
interventions to produce optimal sustainable labour market outcomes: From the onset
of the pandemic, priority has had to be given, with varying degrees of success, to containing
and eliminating the spread of the virus. While this has had major economic and social costs,
it is the necessary precondition for sustainable recovery. Nevertheless, policymakers are
increasingly called upon to make tough calls about the timing of the reopening of
workplaces, the health protocols to be observed in them, and the continuation, or not, of
support to enterprises and workers that are unable to resume normal activities. Such
decisions are made all the more difficult by the costs to the State and to private actors of
the prolongation of restrictions, the concern that premature action could precipitate a
second wave of the pandemic, and the increasing pressure of public opinion.
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Thirdly, supporting vulnerable and hard-hit groups, and generating fairer labour
market outcomes: The pandemic has laid bare some of the worst deficits and inequities
of the world of work and made them worse. Women, young people and informal workers
were all severely disadvantaged before the onset of the crisis, and they are among those
who have suffered some of its most severe consequences. Similarly, public opinion has
been awakened to the often difficult and undervalued work of groups of the labour force –
notably health and care workers, cleaners and domestic workers – whose contribution has
been, and remains, essential to overcoming the pandemic.
Fourthly, securing international solidarity and support especially for emerging and
developing countries: Whatever the achievements of countries individually, the overall
response to the global COVID-19 crisis has been characterized by a marked deficit of
international cooperation. The evidence presented in this edition of the ILO Monitor shows
that the enormous volume of resources deployed by high-income countries to combat the
pandemic has simply not been available to others. This has a major impact on the capacity
of developing and emerging countries to protect their citizens and curb the pandemic,
which, in turn, will impair the prospects for all countries. The rhetoric of the need for a
global response to the global crisis of COVID-19 needs to be translated into concrete
measures to assist countries with limited fiscal space, in particular through multilateral
action to deliver concessional finance and debt relief.
Fifthly, strengthening social dialogue and respect for rights at work: In many cases,
social dialogue – bringing together governments, employers and workers – has proved its
worth in shaping effective, balanced and acceptable policy responses at the sectoral and
national level. Social dialogue can likewise help to shape sustainable recovery paths in the
period ahead. People in most countries have been subject to far-reaching restrictions on
their personal freedoms during the pandemic, which has generally been considered
necessary and legitimate. However, such acceptance depends on them being proportionate,
appropriate and limited in time. The COVID-19 pandemic provides no justification for any
restrictions on fundamental rights at work, as enshrined in international labour standards,
and upholding these rights fully is a precondition for effective social dialogue
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4. Conclusion
The world will emerge from the pandemic with higher levels of unemployment, inequality,
poverty, debt and political frustration. This makes it all the more important that, individually and
collectively, governments make the ambition of “building back better” – as opposed to building
back to where we previously were – a central tenet of their recovery plans.
Measures for economic reactivation should follow a job-rich approach, backed by stronger
employment policies and institutions, better-resourced and comprehensive social protection
systems. International co-ordination on stimulus packages and debt relief measures will also be
critical to making recovery effective and sustainable. International labour standards, which already
enjoy tripartite consensus, can provide a framework.
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References
https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/how-covid-19-changing-world-statistical-
perspective-international-agencies
https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/covid-19/
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/briefingnot
e/wcms_749399.pdf
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/04/1061322
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