71st PCC Minutes
71st PCC Minutes
71st PCC Minutes
of
st
71 PCC Meeting
Date: 08.10.2018
Eastern Regional Power Committee
14, Golf Club Road, Tollygunge
Kolkata: 700 033
EASTERN REGIONAL POWER COMMITTEE
PART – A
ITEM NO. A.1: Confirmation of minutes of 70th Protection sub-Committee Meeting held on
21st August, 2018 at ERPC, Kolkata.
The minutes of 70th Protection Sub-Committee meeting held on 21.08.18 circulated vide letter dated
06.09.18.
PART – B
ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION ON GRID INCIDENCES OCCURRED IN AUGUST, 2018
ITEM NO. B.1: Tripping of 400 kV Rangpo-Binaguri-II and operation of SPS-II on 12.08.18 at
05:31 hrs.
400 kV Binaguri-Rangpo-II tripped on B-N fault at 05:31 hrs resulting operation of SPS - I which
tripped all units except one unit at Teesta III, one unit at Tashiding, Dikchu, Chujachen and
Jorethang. Even after successful operation of SPS-I, SPS - II operated at 05:52 hrs causing
tripping of 400 kV Teesta III Rangpo S/C which led to black out of Teesta III and Dikchu generation
complex. Detailed report is enclosed at Annexure-B1.
ERLDC informed that after successful operation of SPS-I on 12.08.18, Two units of Dikchu HEP
were synchronized by Dikchu without informing ERLDC, as a result SPS-II got operated.
400 kV Rangpoo-Binaguri D/c, being a vital link between hydro generators in Sikkim and the rest of
the grid, every operation of the SPS and subsequent synchronization/ restoration of tripped units with
grid should be informed to ERLDC for maintaining grid security.
Accordingly, PCC advised all the hydro IPPs i.e. Tashiding, Dikchu, Chuzachen & Jorethang to
inform ERLDC, in case of tripping of any unit due to SPS operation. Also, they need to inform
ERLDC before synchronization with the grid.
ED, ERLDC emphasized that tripping of any element due to any SPS operation in the region should
be informed to ERLDC.
Since, the representatives of IPPs were not present in the meeting, it was decided that the PCC
observation will be communicated to them.
Powergrid informed that as per the decision of 148th OCC meeting, the logic of SPS-2 has been
changed. The line flow for SPS-2 operation has been increased to 900 MW from 850 MW keeping
the time for actuation as 700 msec. Powergrid added that sending DT to Teesta-III from Rangpo end
has also been implemented and the same would be tested subjected availability of shutdown.
ITEM NO. B.2: Disturbance at 220/132 kV Joda (OPTCL) Substation 0n 31.08.18 at 13:57 hrs.
220 kV Joda Ramchandrapur S/C and 220 kV Bokaro Jamshedpur were not in service. 220 kV
Joda - TTPS D/C tripped on Y-B-N fault resulting increase in power flow through 220 kV
Jamshedpur Jindal S/C. 132 kV Jamshedpur - Chandil D/C and 132 kV Purulia - CTPS D/C also
tripped due to overload.
OPTCL informed that 220 kV Joda-Ramchandrapur S/c was under shut down for maintenance
work.
DVC informed that 220kV Jamshedpur- Jindal- Joda S/c was normally kept open to avoid BTPS ICT
overloading.
1. During the instant 220 kV Joda-TTPS tripped, there was a transient fault in 132 kV CTPS-
Purulia circuit # I which tripped the circuit from both CTPS and Purulia ends.
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3. 132 kV Kolaghat-Kharagpur Circuit –I (L#74 in diagram) was under shutdown prior to the
incident. The tripping of 132 KV CTPS-Purulia D/C resulted overloading of Kolaghat-
Kharagpur circuit-II (Line#73) and the line tripped on overload from Kolaghat end.
4. The entire load shifted to 132 kV Chandil- Jamshedpur D/C which got tripped on overload
from Chandil end.
DVC added that there was no tripping in 220 kV Jamshedpur-Jindal Line as the O/C setting was
set to a higher value keeping in view the line being an inter-state line.
PCC viewed that tripping of multiple lines on overload is highly unwanted in power system
operation point of view and advised DVC to take adequate measures in system planning.
PCC once again advised to bring new 400/220kV ICT at Koderma into service at the earliest.
ITEM NO. B.3: Disturbance at 220/132 kV Chandil S/s on 08.08.18 at 05:49 hrs.
At 05:49 hrs bus PT burst at Chandil. As per verbal information received, 220 kV STPS - Chandil
S/C, 220 kV Ramchandrapur Chandil S/C & 220 kV Ranchi Chandil S/C were hand tripped resulting
power interruption at 220/132 kV Chandil S/s.
JUSNL informed that 220 kV Chandil S/s has single bus system. They informed that the bus fault
occurred due to bursting of PT in B-phase resulting tripping of all the 220 kV lines.
ERLDC informed that as per the disturbance recorder analysis, both 220 kV Chandil -
Ramachandrapur S/C and Chandil-Ranchi S/C were tripped on zone-4 distance protection with fault
clearing time of 500 msec.
JUSNL informed that Chandil-STPS S/C also tripped from Chandil end. The protection operated for
tripping of STPS line could not be known due to non- availability of DR for that line.
JUSNL further informed that a new PT was installed on next day and the lines were charged
thereafter.
PCC advised JUSNL to check the details of tripping of 220kV Chandil –STPS S/C and also to
review the zone-4 timer settings for all the lines as per PCC recommendations. PCC also advised
JUSNL to change the switching configuration in 220 kV S/s to double bus system and in case of
space constraint bus sectionalizer could be explored.
ITEM NO. B.4: Disturbance at 220/132 kV Motipur(BSPTCL) S/s on 15.08.18 at 13:00 hrs.
The following elements tripped due to operation of busbar protection at Motipur substation.
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220 kV Motipur – Darbhanga (DMTCL) D/C
220 kV Motipur – Musahari D/C
220 KV Motipur-MTPS-1
All 220/132 KV ATR
As reported by BSPTCL, the relay wrongly operated for a thorough fault. Reason for tripping as
analyzed by them was as follows:
As per PMU data, faults was seen in B phase around 13:00 hrs which got cleared within 100 ms.
a. Wrong isolator status means wrong summation of the currents while calculating differential
current and it will create differential current all the time. But Check zone element will not operate, so
bus bar protection should not also operate.
b. Wrong CT ratio for bus coupler will also generate differential current during normal condition. But
again as bus coupler is not included in check zone summation so bus bar should not operate.
c. What was the wrong logic incorporated through PSL need to be checked.
d. As fault persisted for almost 6 cycles then why no other distance protection operated need to be
checked.
BSPTCL informed that there was no bus fault in the substation. The mal-operation of busbar
protection was due to some issue in PSL logic of B-phase relay configuration. BSPTCL further
informed that OEM(ABB) has rectified the issue in PSL logic and thereafter the relay testing was
done and found to be healthy. They added that after the rectification work there was no mal-
operation of busbar operation in Motipur substation.
BSPTCL could not explain the location and details of fault which triggered this busbar operation.
PCC advised BSPTCL to check the disturbance recorders of all the lines in 220 kV Motipur S/s and
communicate the findings to ERPC/ERLDC at the earliest.
Regarding keeping all the feeders to a single bus, BSPTCL informed that there was no such
standard operating procedure for feeder operation for their substations. PCC observed that keeping
all the feeders in single bus is detrimental to grid operation, grid reliability and grid security. PCC
advised BSPTCL to always distribute the feeders among the buses for better grid operation.
ITEM NO. B.5: Total power failure at 220kV Darbhanga(BSPTCL) S/s on 15.08.18 at 01:35 hrs.
There is only one source for 220 kV Darbhanga (BSPTCL) S/S i.e. 220 kV Darbhanga – Darbhanga
- I. At 13:35 hrs, 220 kV Darbhanga- Darbhanga-I tripped on B-N fault. After patrolling it was found
that B-ph jumper was snapped at the distance of 2KM from 220KV Darbhanga (BSPTCL) GSS.
As per PMU data, B phase fault has been observed at 13:35 hrs which got cleared within 100 ms.
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Name of the elements End 1 Relay Indication End 2 Relay Indication
220 kV Darbhanga – Yet to be received B-N, Z-I, 1.1 km from
Darbhanga - I BSPTCL end.
BSPTCL informed that there was no carrier protection for 220kV Darbhanga(BSPTCL)-
Darbhanga(DMTCL) line at present. They are under process of implementing the same.
On query from PCC about autoreclose operation for the above line, DMTCL informed that they have
activated the same at their end. BSPTCL informed that they have not configured autoreclose facility
at their end.
ITEM NO. B.6: Disturbance at 400 kV Farakka S/s on 19.08.18 at 15:26 hrs.
400 kV Farakka - Kahalgaon I & II tripped from Farakka end only. At same time, 400 kV Farakka -
Sagardighi II tripped from Sagardighi end.
Tripping of 400 kV Farakka Sagardighi II from Sagardighi end may be explained. Reason for non-
operation of autoreclose for 400 kV Farakka - Kahalgaon D/C at Farakka may also be explained.
NTPC informed that zone 3, R-N fault pickup observed in Micom P444 relay (Main-II) at Farakka
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end of 400 KV Farakka-Kahalgaon line-2, in the mean time the line got tripped from Farakka end by
Micom P437 relay (Main-I) on zero sequence triggering.
Regarding tripping of 400 kV Farakka-Sagardighi Circuit-II, Powergrid informed that the timer of
zone-3 was set to instantaneous as the line was earlier idle charged from Sagardighi end. They have
changed the timer setting after this tripping.
PCC members shared their experience that Micom P437 relay was maloperated in number of cases.
PCC advised NTPC to replace/divert Micom P437 relay to avoid unwanted tripping of such important
transmission line. PCC also advised to check the reason for not sending carrier from Farakka to
Kahalgaon and non-operation of Autorecloser.
ITEM NO. B.7: Disturbance at 400 kV MPL S/s on 19.08.18 at 15:47 hrs.
400 kV MPL - Ranchi - II tripped from MPL end only. At same time, 400 kV MPL - Maithon D/C
tripped from Maithon end.
Tripping of 400 kV MPL - Maithon D/C from Maithon end may be explained. MPL informed that
A/R was not successful at MPL end for 400 kV MPL - Maithon D/C due to operation of air pressure
switch.
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Powergrid informed that the fault was in MPL-Ranchi circuit-II. At Ranchi end, carrier intertripping
scheme (Permissive Overreach Protection) was enabled which caused tripping of the line from
Ranchi end within 100 msec.
On query from PCC about the reason for enabling the POP scheme, Powergrid informed that they
have implemented it as the FSC was present in Ranchi substation and this was as per their
standard operating procedure. PCC advised Powergrid to share the procedure/directives regarding
implementation of the POP scheme with ERPC/ERLDC.
Regarding tripping of MPL-Maithon D/C line on zone-3 from Maithon end, Powergrid informed that
the timer of zone-3 was set to instantaneous as the line was earlier idle charged from Maithon end.
They have changed the timer settings for the lines after this tripping.
ITEM NO. B.8: Disturbance at 400/220 kV Bolangir S/s on 21.08.18 at 18:13 hrs.
400 kV bus I was under shutdown for connecting new bays of 125 MVAr B/R. Both the 400 kV lines
i.e. 400 kV Angul – Bolangir S/C and 400 kV Jeypore – Bolangir S/C were connected to bus II
through Tie CB & main CB of 400/220 kV ICTs at Bolangir.
At 18:13 hrs 400/220 kV both ICT I & II tripped on OTI, WTI & Bucholz trip relay resulting loss of
total power failure at 400 kV level.
Powergrid explained the disturbance with a presentation. The presentation is given at Annexure-
B.8.
It has been informed that the tripping of both the ICTs was due to damage of control cable, which
caused DC earth fault resulting operation of OTI, WTI and buccholz relay of the ICT.
They informed that they have changed the threshold voltage for binary input contacts from 88 V to
176 V DC.
Powergrid added that temporary rectification of cables has been done to avoid DC earth fault
however, the control cables would be replaced during next opportunity shutdown.
ITEM NO. B.9: Disturbance at 400/132 kV Motihari(DMTCL) S/s on 22.08.18 at 14:59 hrs.
At 15:00 hrs, 400/132 kV ICT-II at Motihari tripped due to operation of OSR relay resulting tripping
of ICT - I on overload current relay operation.
DMTCL informed that the tripping of similar nature had also occurred in last month due to moisture
ingress problem. After that they have taken the corrective measures to avoid moisture ingression
and there was no subsequent tripping of the relay.
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In view of tripping of other ICT on overload, PCC observed that there is a need of SPS
implementation to avoid the overloading of other ICT, in case of one ICT tripped. PCC advised
Bihar to formulate a draft scheme of SPS and submit it to ERLDC/ERPC for further discussion.
Other tripping incidences occurred in the month of August 2018 which needs explanation from
constituents of either of the end is given in Annexure-B10.
In 58th PCC, ERLDC informed that most of the constituents are not submitting the DR and EL data
for single line trippings.
PCC advised all the constituents to upload the details along with DR and EL in PDMS on-line portal
and referred the issue to TCC for further guidance.
In 36th TCC, all the constituents were advised to use the PDMS on-line portal for uploading the
single line tripping details along with DR (comtrade files), EL and other relevant files for all trippings
of August 2017 onwards. Otherwise, it will be considered as violation of compliance of clause 5.2(r)
& 5.9 of IEGC.
PCC advised all the concern constituents to take necessary corrective action to resolve the issues.
68th PCC opined that the draft scheme submitted by Odisha was three years old and the draft
scheme is needed to be reviewed with existing network configuration.
PCC decided to discuss the islanding scheme in next PCC Meeting and advised OPTCL to submit
all the relevant details to ERPC and ERLDC.
In 69th PCC, OPTCL presented the revised islanding scheme based on updated network
configuration and power flows. The details are enclosed at Annexure-C.1.
In 70th PCC, OPGC has submitted the updated details which are enclosed at Annexure-C1.a.
It was decided that ERLDC and ERPC will study and finalize the islanding scheme in next PCC
Meeting.
PCC opined that the islanding scheme would be finalized after detailed discussion with OPGC and
OPTCL.
ITEM NO. C.2: Total power failure at 220kV Hatia(JUSNL) S/s on 20.07.18 at 09:10 hrs.
Due to clearance issue with some 11 KV feeder (which has an in feed from Hatia old) repeated
faults occurred in 220 kV Ranchi - Hatia-I and II. As a result total power failed at 220kV Hatia S/s.
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In 70th PCC, JUSNL informed that repeated disturbances and total power failure at Hatia substation
on 20.07.18 was due to the clearance issue with 11kV feeder under 220kV Ranchi-Hatia D/C line.
JUSNL informed that the 11 kV feeders were re-routed after the above incidences to get the
sufficient clearance.
PCC advised JUSNL to check the Sag level and clearance of 220 KV lines to avoid this type of
tripping.
From the analysis of PMU plot and disturbance recorders at Ranchi & Hatia end, a number of
protection related issues came into notice.
PCC analysed the issue & advised JUSNL to take the following actions
Whenever PLCC will remain out of service, the auto reclose operation should be made to
non-auto mode and zone 2 timing may be reduced (preferably less than 0.35 Sec.) to
minimize the fault clearing time.
The trip on reclose function should be enabled in the relay whenever autoreclose function is
in operation.
Regarding unwanted tripping of 220/132 kV ATRs at Hatia and Patratu substations and tripping of
Hatia-Patratu line in zone-4, PCC felt that there was a protection coordination issue and advised
JUSNL to submit the corresponding relay settings to ERPC/ERLDC at the earliest.
The issue of delayed opening of breaker at Hatia end i.e.400 msec after zone-I tripping initiation
was remained unexplained. The sequence of operation as well as the details of elements tripped
during the incident could not be explained by JUSNL.
PCC decided to discuss this issue in next PCC meeting and advised JUSNL to explain the issue in
next meeting with all the relevant details.
ITEM NO. C.3: Repeated interruption of power supply at Lalmatia and Sahebgunj area
In view of repeated uncoordinated trippings and mal-operation of relays at 220/132kV Lalmatia S/s in
the past, PCC decided to form a Committee with members from NTPC, Powergrid, ERLDC and
ERPC. The Committee would visit Lalmatia and adjoining substations for on-site inspection and
Third Party Protection Audit.
In 70th PCC, Audit team presented the report highlighting the major issues with respect to Lalmatia
substation. The report is attached in Annexure-C.3.
ERPC secretariat has also communicated the audit observations to JUSNL and NTPC for early
compliances.
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JUSNL informed that the audit observations have been forwarded to concerned division for
compliance.
It has been observed that, no transmission lines from 400 kV PPSP Plant are having the auto-
reclosure facility in enabled condition. Further, the auto-reclosure facilities are also not enabled at
remote end substation.
WBPDCL may kindly update on the status of healthiness and enabling of the auto-reclosure on the
transmission lines from PPSP Power plant. It may kindly be noted that, most of the power plant
(Thermal/Hydro/Gas) in the Indian Power System have no issue in enabling single-phase auto-
reclosure for the line emanating from their plant. This has indeed increased their reliability during
bad weather conditions during which transient fault occur on the lines.
The agenda could not be discussed in 70th PCC as WBSEDCL representative was not present in
the meeting.
The agenda could not be discussed as WBSEDCL representative was not present.
ITEM NO. C.5: Time Setting for Digital Disturbance Recorder in the Relay
Disturbance recorder file is the most important data during any event analysis. Further, it is
essential that the disturbance recorder file should have adequate information about the event. In
order to achieve that, it is desired to have 3-5 seconds as the recording time so that all the
important aspect of event can be captured. However, it has been observed that, most of the
Disturbance Recorder files have very small time window of record ( 0.5-1.5 seconds) and thus
leading to lack of data for events like auto-reclosure, PDR operation etc.
In view of this, it is suggested to adopt a pre-event time window of 0.5 second and Post-event time
window of 2.5 to 4.5 seconds.
In 70th PCC all the constituents were advised to comply the above suggestion.
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Deliberation in the meeting
Based on the data available in PDMS, the zone 3 settings of all ISTS lines in Eastern Region were
verified and compared with the corresponding resistive reach of the line thermal loading. Zone 3
settings were also checked with the agreed protection philosophy of ER. The discrepancies
observed in the settings will be presented in the meeting.
In 67th PCC, PRDC presented the list of ISTS lines where they observed the discrepancy in zone-3
setting.
In 70th PCC, PRDC was advised to resend the list of the lines to all constituents and constituents
were advised to verify the settings at the earliest.
As per AMC, PRDC will conduct training on PDMS and PSCT in state utility premises of Eastern
Region. Tentative schedule is given below:
Accordingly, training was conducted at Patna from 11th June 2018 to 15th June 2018, in West Bengal
from 09th July 2018 to 13th July 2018 and in Bhubaneswar from 06.08.18 to 10.08.18
In 70th PCC it was decided to conduct the training at Ranchi, Jharkhand from 10th Septemebr 2018 to
14th September 2018.
The compliance status of 1st Third Party Protection Audit observations is as follows:
Total % of
Name of Constituents Complied
Observations Compliance
Powergrid 54 46 85.19
NTPC 16 14 87.50
NHPC 1 1 100.00
DVC 40 26 65.00
WB 68 49 72.06
Odisha 59 42 71.19
JUSNL 34 25 73.53
BSPTCL 16 5 31.25
IPP (GMR, Sterlite and MPL) 5 5 100.00
* Pending observations of Powergrid are related to PLCC problems at other end.
The substation wise status of compliance are available at ERPC website (Observations include
PLCC rectification/activation which needs a comprehensive plan).
According to CEA technical standard for construction of electric plants and electric lines -Clause
43(4) (c), transmission line of 220 KV and above should have single-phase auto-reclosing facility for
improving the availability of the lines. However, from the tripping details attached June-August,
2016 it is evident that the some of 220kV above Inter & Intra-Regional lines do not having auto-
reclose facility either at one end or at both ends. Out of these for some of the lines even
PLCC/OPGW is not yet installed and carrier aided protection including Autorecloser facility is not
yet implemented. Based on the trippings of June- August, 2016 and PMU analysis a list of such
lines has been prepared and as given below:
List of line where auto reclose facility is not available(Information based on PMU data analysis)
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220KV BUDIPADAR- 21.07.1 EARTH PLCC
18 OPTCL PGCIL
RAIGARH 6 FAULT defective
400 KV KOLAGHAT- 03.08.1 WBPDC WBSET
19 Y-N FAULT
KHARAGPUR-II 6 L CL
Yes Old Relay and
not functional.
7-8 months
220 KV FARAKKA- 03.08.1
20 B-N FAULT . NTPC JUNSL required for
LALMATIA 6
auto re-close
relay
procurement.
Voice
established.
220 KV MUZAFFARPUR - 10.08.1
23 B-N FAULT PGCIL BSPTCL For carrier
HAZIPUR - II 6
required
shutdown
Expected to
install
220 KV ROURKELA - 11.08.1 OPGW
24 B-N FAULT PGCIL OPTCL protection
TARKERA-II 6 available
coupler by Jan
17
220 KV BIHARSARIF- 07.09.1 BSPTC
27 B-N FAULT TVNL
TENUGHAT 6 L
220KV Bidhannagar- WBSET
32 DVC
Waria-II CL
220KV Jamshedpur-Jindal-
33
SC
34th TCC advised all the respective members to update the above list along with the last tripping
status in next PCC meeting.
TCC further advised all the constituents to give the latest status of PLCC of other 220kV and above
lines under respective control area.
OPTCL:
1. 220kV Rengali(PG)-Rengali S/Y (Proposal for Commn. in OPGW is pending): PSDF appraisal
committee accepted the proposal
2. 220kV Indravati(PG)-Indravati(PH) (Proposal for Commn. in OPGW pending): PSDF appraisal
committee accepted the proposal
3. 132kV Baripada(PG)-Baripada ( Tendering in Progress for OPGW): Contract awarded
4. 132kV Baripada(PG)-Rairangpur (Tendering in Progress for OPGW): Contract awarded
BSPTCL:
1. 220kV Purnea (PG)-Madhepura line
2. 220 kV Biharshariff- Begusarai line Work is in progress expected to be commissioned
3. 220 kV Biharshariff- Bodhgaya line by December 2017.
4. 220kV MTPS-Motiari line
5. 220KV Madhepura-New Purnea D/C Auto recloser is out of service at Madhepura
6. 220KV Muzaffarpur-Hajipur D/C line Auto recloser is out of service at Hazipur
7. 220KV FSTPP-Lalmatia-1 Auto recloser is out of service at Lalmatia
8. 220KV Patna-Khagaul-SC Auto recloser is out of service at Khagual
In 65th PCC, Powergrid informed that they will replace the Autorecloser relay of 400 kV Rourkela-
Chaibasa 1 and 400 kV Meramundali-Sterlite 1 & 2 by April 2018.
In 67th PCC, BSPTCL informed that they are planning to hire an agency for implementing PLCC
system in all the lines in their network.
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In 70th PCC, WBSETCL informed that PLCC was in service for both the ends of 220kV Bidhannagar-
Waria-II line.
ITEM NO. C.11: Non-Submission of Details of Alipurdwar HVDC pole tripping to ERLDC.
On 27th Aug 2018 at 00:23 Hrs and on 6th Sept 2018 at 04:01 Hrs, HVDC Pole 3 at Alipurdwar
tripped due to line fault. In order to know how the issue and analyse the event as per the IEGC and
CEA grid standard, the flash report/FIR and DR/EL was asked from Alipurdwar end however it has
not been received.
In view of coordinated analysis of any event it is desired that the DR/EL and flash report/FIR of any
pole tripping from Alipurdwar may kindly be forwarded to ERLDC/ERPC also in line with IEGC 5.2.r
and CEA grid Standard 15.3.
Powergrid informed that for all inter regional HVDC lines their corporate office is centrally
coordinating the HVDC pole tripping and submitting the report to NLDC.
PCC decided to take up the issue with NLDC and Powergrid corporate office for submission of
details to ERLDC.
ITEM NO. C.12: Checklist for submission of updated data for Protection Database
The network data in Protection Database needs to be updated on regular basis on account of
commissioning of new elements in the CTU as well as STU networks. Accordingly a checklist has
been prepared which is enclosed in Annexure-C12.
All the constituents requested to submit the checklist on monthly bases in every OCC/PCC
meetings.
Members noted.
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ITEM NO. C.13: ADDITIONAL AGENDA
The auto-reclosure dead time is one of the important aspect while performing successful auto-
reclosure on EHV transmission line. As per the practice in various utilities, the dead time for 400 kv
and above circuit is kept as 1 second or above up to 1.5 second. This dead time is kept to ensure
that the arc has extinguished and breaker is ready for closing after opening. Further, it is desirable
that the auto-reclosure at both ends of the transmission line to be kept equal to reduce number of
faults/voltage dip in the system. Only exception of this is a special requirement of some generating
plants where they keep higher time delay and attempt A/R only after successful reclosure at remote
end.
During the tripping of 400 kV Jeerat –Bakreshwar on 17 Aug 2018 from Bakreshwar end and
successful Auto-reclosure at Jeerat, it was found that the dead time is kept 600 ms at Bakreshwar
end. Further, also for 400 kV Kolaghat-Arambag circuit, the A/R at Kolaghatis kept as 600 ms.It may
kindly be noted that dead time of A/R has been kept as one second in most of the utilities across
India to ensure successful A/R with extinguishment of the arc.
In view, of the above it is advised that the uniform practice of 1 second may be adopted as
the dead time in all 400 kV lines from WBPDCL generating for A/R. Members May like to
Discuss.
WBPDCL agreed to go through the proposed suggestion and inform their views to PCC at the
earliest.
400 kV Binaguri Substation recently has seen spurious over voltage tripping of circuit. The details of
these events are given below:
1. On 13th June 2018 at 06:32 Hrs :There was a successful Auto-Reclosure on 400 kV
Binaguri- Bongaigaon 2 circuit due to B phase to earth fault. At the same time , 400 kV
Binaguri-Rangpo circuit 2 which is in same diameter of 400 kV Binaguri-Bongaigaon 2 at
Binaguri end got tripped from Binaguri end on Over voltage stage 2 operation (Y phase
voltage). In addition 400 kV Bingauri-Tala 1 also has tripped on over voltage stage 2
operation from Binaguri end (R phase Voltage). The reason for the transient overvoltage is
not known. Rest of the circuit from Binaguri end did not trip during this event.
2. On 10th Sept 2018 at 11:31 hrs : 400 kV Tala-Binaguri 4 circuit tripped on overvoltage
protection from Binaguri end while the voltage at Binaguri was 407 kV. During this event,
there was no fault in the system.
3. On 11th Sept 2018 2018 at 08:10 Hrs: 400 kvBinaguri-Malbase circuit tripped on
overvoltage protection from Binaguri end while the voltage at Binaguri was 404 kV. During
this event, there was no fault in the system.
The above tripping of lines from Binaguri on spurious over voltage protection when the system is
not having high voltage is serious in view of long outage of 400 kV Purnea-Biharsharif D/C and 400
kV Kishenganj-Patna D/C. PGCIL ERTS-2 has informed that the event 2 and 3 have occurred due
to sensitive over voltage static relay.
In view of the above three events, Following issues need detailed deliberation:
15
71st PCC Minutes
4. Detailed analysis and Reason for Over-Voltage Stage 2 operation at Binaguri in case of
event 1.
5. Why the numerical relay over voltage protection are not being utilised when such mal-
operation are being observed from the static relay.
PGCIL ERTS-2 may kindly brief on the above two points and remedial action taken.
Powergrid informed that the overvoltage issue was due to the static relays used in those lines. They
added that all the static relays have been removed and they had already been replaced by
numerical relays.
They further informed that the overvoltage function of numerical relays has been enabled but testing
is yet to be done.
***************
16
71st PCC Minutes
POWER SYSTEM OPERATION CORPORATION LIMITED
EASTERN REGIONAL LOAD DESPATCH CENTRE
14, GOLF CLUB ROAD, TOLLYGUNGE
KOLKATA – 700033
Report on 400 kV Rangpo-Binaguri 2 tripping followed by SPS-1 and SPS-2
Operation
1. Date and time of the Incident: 05:31 and 05:51 Hrs, 12-08-18
2. Category : GD-1
3. Area Affected : Tashiding, Jorethang, Dikchu, Chujachen, Teesta 3, Rangpo and Binaguri
4. Antecedent Conditions:
a. Frequency: 50.04 Hz
b. Lines under shutdown: 400 kV Dikchu-Rangpo under break-down
Element Name ( Line /Unit) Line Loading/ Generation Prior to the event (SCADA)
400 kV Rangpo-Binaguri D/C 838 MW + 833 MW
400 kV Teesta 3- Rangpo 886 MW
Teesta 5 Generation 501 MW
Teesta 3 Generation 794 MW
Dikchu Generation 100 MW
Jorethang Generation 95 MW
Tashiding Generation 97 MW
Chujachen Generation 111 MW
5. Details of tripping
Due to Bad Weather in the Sikkim, 400 kV Binaguri-Rangpo 2 tripped on B phase to earth fault
at 05:31 Hrs. Auto-reclosure attempt was taken however line got tripped due to the persisting
nature of fault during the event. The PMU plot of the fault is given in figure 1 . Immediately
with this SPS-1 operated as line flow was more than 850 MW on other circuit. This in turn has
tripped the all-running units of Teesta 3 (Except one Unit) and one unit each of Jorethang,
Tashiding, Dikchu and Chujachen. However, it was observed that Dikchu unit 2 also tripped and
it was intimated that the differential protection has operated for the unit.
In the meantime, line flow was well below 850 MW on 400 kV Rangpo-Binaguri circuit 1. . At
05:51 Hrs, Dikchu has synchronized both its unit one by one without any information to ERLDC
Grid Operator. With this, the power flow on 400 kV Rangpo-Binaguri 1 exceeded 850 MW
leading to operation of SPS-2. This led to tripping of 400 kV Teesta3-Ranpo circuit from Teesta
end and blackout of Teesta3 and Dikchu generating plant.
Trial attempt was taken on 400 kV Rangpo-Binaguri 2 at 05:58 Hrs, however, the fault persisted.
After this, 400 kV 400 kV Teesta3-Ranpo was charged at 06:19 Hrs and Teesta3-Dikchu at 06:27
Hrs. Subsequently, one unit of Teesta 3 and Dikchu were revived at 06:27 Hrs. The 400 kV
Rangpo-Binaguri 2 circuit was finally revived by 17:53 Hrs and all generation were restored with
its revival.
• Buch Trip and OTI Trip are given in 67.1IV- numerical relay SIPROTEC 7SJ804. 67.1IV is powered by DC-
1.
• After the study of event log it was observed that the 2 nos. of body trip and 3 nos. of alarm contacts
were chattering and simultaneously DC earth fault relay was operated.
• Hence it is confirmed that at the time of tripping a transient DC earth fault has occured in source-1,
due to which contacts for Bucholz and OTI trip started chattering.
• As the threshold voltage of 67.1IV was set to 88V, the contacts operated and hence gave trip
command during transient DC earth fault.
• The cable carrying the trip and alarm information is found to be
damaged and is covered with insulating tape.
Action Taken
DT received at Sagardighi,
2.4 KA,B-N,Z-1,139 KM,
400KV JEERAT-SAGARDIGHI-SC 25-08-2018 6:26 25-08-2018 7:13 B-N,Z-1,42.61KM B-N Fault < 100 msec No A/R operation Yes Jeerat will check the issue
A/R successful
at their end
-44x2MW
BHUSAN-1 & 2
-0MW +0MW
VAEDANTA-2 AAL- 1
VEDANTA- 2
-0MW
132kV RADIAL LOAD ARRANGEMENT FOR ISLAND
SCHEME
Brajarajnagar 45 MW
Kalugana 45 MW
Jharsuguda 30 MW
MCL 15 MW
Rajgangpur 60 MW
132KV Connectivity of Budhipadar GSS
Sundargarh GSS
Rajganpur GSS
Brajarajnagar GSS
Jharsuguda GSS
Kuchinda GSS
Lapanga GSS
220 KV BUS - A
Auto Trf-1
Auto Trf-2
X
Ib-1
160 MVA
160 MVA
X
Ib-3
122MW
122 MW
132 KV BUS
Jharsuguda-2
Jharsuguda-1
Rajgangpur
Brajrajnagar
20 MVA Trf
12.5 MVA Trf
MSP
Lapanga
MCL-1
MCL-2
Kalunga
X X X X X X
SNG-1
SNG-2
X X X X X X X
45 MW 60 MW 17 MW 17 MW 45 MW I/C 15 MW 15 MW 0 mw 4 mw 6 mw
15 mw
X
X
132 KV
X RAJGANGPUR
132 KV KULUNGA GRID S/S
X GRID S/S(LILO)
X X X X X 132 KV Switch Yard at
LAPANGA GRID S/S
X
X 132 KV S/Y OF
TARKERA GRID S/S
132KV Jharsuguda GRID S/S
X X X - CB OPEN
X- CB CLOSED
SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF ISLANDING RELAY INSTALLED IN B/C PANEL FOR
TRIPPING OF DIFFERENT FEEDERS AT BUDHIPADAR GRID S/S.
Bus-I
Bus-II
TFR
Bus
89A 89B
Islanding Relay Features
BUS-1 BUS-2
DC SUPPLY
PT PT
PT SS
ISLANDING RELAY
FUSE &LINK Micom P341 INSTALLED AT
B/C RELAY PANEL
TRIP CKT OF 220KV B/C BREAKER
BO1
SW1
TRIP CKT OF 220KV IB-1 BREAKER
BO2
SW2
TRIP CKT OF 220KV IB-2 BREAKER
BO3
SW3
TRIP CKT OF 220KV IB-3 BREAKER
BO4
SW4
TRIP CKT OF 220KV IB-4 BREAKER
BO5
TRIP CKT. OF 132KV LAPANGA
BREAKER
BO6 SW5
TRIP CKT. OF ALL 220KV FEEDERS EXCEPT
CMR AT-1,AT-2 AND SELECTED IB CKTS
BO7 PLCC/OPGW TRIP CKT. OF 132KV
PLCC/OPGG AT BUDHIPADAR
AT JHARSUGUDA FEEDER AT
TO LAPANGA
LAPANGA LAPANGA
BO8
LEGEND
PTSS---- PT SELECTOR SWITCH
SW1-----SW5- ON/OFF SWITCH
CMR– CONTACT MULTIPLICATION RELAY
+220VDC
Islanding
X
Multiplication Relay
-220VDC
Hardware single selection switch (3 position: I, OFF, II) for both units installed on one GRP.
Hardware single selection switch (3 position: I, OFF, II) for both units installed on one GRP.
*Hardware single selection switch (3 position: I, OFF, II) for both units installed on one GRP.
GCB Unit#1 ON A
N STANDBY CEP START
df/dt or dn/dt high > D
GCB Unit#2 ON A
N STANDBY CEP START
df/dt or dn/dt high > D
The fast operation of this vector shift function renders it to operate at the instant of a
disturbance rather than during a gradual change caused by a gradual change of power
flow. Operation can occur at the instant of inception of the fault,at fault clearance or
following non-synchronized reclosure, which affords additional protection to the
embedded generator.
AnnexureC1.a
By
ODISHA POWER GENERATION CORPORATION LTD.
1
Objective:
Formation of proposed island shall achieve the following objectives:-
i) Prevention from total black out by avoiding effect of cascade tripping of the Power
System.
ii) Fast restoration of supply.
Present Status:
Presently there is no islanding scheme in operation in OPGCL.
3
4
5
ISLANDING MULTIPLICATION RELAY CONFIGURED IN IBTPS SWITCHYARD CONTROL ROOM
6
Logic configured in REG670 Relay for Islanding of Unit-I Generator
7
Logic configured in REG670 Relay for Islanding of Unit- 2 Generator
8
• The over – frequency protection is achieved using SAPTOF function block in Generator
Protection relay REG670. There are 3 instances of SAPTOF function in REG670 relay, in which
the 1st is used to confirm the disturbance in the system frequency (As shown in above figure-
red colored), 2nd and 3rd instance is used for delayed operation of the over- frequency
function in line with the logic shown above.
9
Configuration of Delayed Over Frequency and Under Frequency Function
10
• Above timers are settable and can be adjusted as per requirement. If there is no
trip from islanding relay, over and under frequency protections will operate as per
the times shown without external timers (timer-1 to 4).
• If there is a trip from Islanding relay, over and under frequency protections are
blocked till the time set in corresponding timers as per the above shown
configuration. Hence total tripping time delay will be corresponding timer delay +
over and under frequency protection function set time delay.
11
LOAD-GENERATION BALANCE SCHEME CONFIGURATION IN UNIT#1
MAXDNA CONTROL SYSTEM
12
LOAD-GENERATION BALANCE SCHEME CONFIGURATION IN UNIT#2
MAXDNA CONTROL SYSTEM
13
14
15
Protection Audit Report of 220/132/33 kV Lalmatia Substation
Date: 16-08-18
Introduction: Due to the multiple tripping of circuits from 220/132/33 kV Lalmatia substation and associated
protection issues, Eastern Region Protection Committee has decided in the 69th PCC meeting to carry out the
Protection Audit of Lalmatia substation. Accordingly, a team comprising of ERPC, ERLDC, NTPC, PGCIL and
JUSNL visited the 220/132/33 kV Lalmatia substation on 16th August 2018 and performed the protection audit. The
Team Members of the Protection Audit Group comprises of following members:
Substation: Lalmatia substation is having a historical background. The substation was created in around 1989 for
catering to the ECL coalmine load. It is 220/132/33 kV substation owned by ECL which was later being maintained
by NTPC Farakka. However, subsequently, with the other distribution load coming up, the switchyard was extended
by JUSNL with augmentation of 220/132 kV ICT, 132 kV lines and 132/33 kV transformers.
The substation is thus subdivided into two parts out of which one looked after by NTPC Farakka and other by
JUSNL. NTPC Farakka is looking after the 220/132 kV switchyard consisting of 220 kV Farakka-Lalmatia ckt and
220/132 kV ICT. While the JUSNL looks after the 220/132 kV ICT 2 (Kanohar Make), 132 kV Kahalgaon(NTPC)-
Lalmatia, 132 kV Kahalgaon (BSPTCL)-Lalmatia, 132 kV Kahalgaon (BSPTCL)-Sahebganj, 132 kV Lalmatia-Dumka
1 & 2, 2 X 50 MVA 132/33 kV ICTs and 33 kV switchyard with 6 33 kV feeders (Godda, Mahagama, Patahargaon,
Meharama, Barijor and ECL) for JUSNL load. The 132 kV buses maintained by NTPC and JUSNL are coupled and
having isolator arrangement decoupling.
Page 1 of 8
The Protection Audit findings are thus subdivided into two parts i.e. One for 220/132 kV NTPC Maintained section
and other 132/33 kV JUSNL owned section for this substation.
1. Switchyard and its Maintenance: The whole switchyard was in bad shape. As per the details, the JUSNL part
switchyard was commissioned in 1991 (27 years old). Following were observed when switchyard inspection during
protection audit was carried out:
Old Equipment: The switchyard equipment’s (Isolator/CT/PT/LA/Breaker) are old and rusty and
need immediate attention. Adequate spare management is also required for any emergency. The bays
which has been commissioned in 2011 onwards were also found in bad shape due to lack of proper
maintenance.
PCC and Gravelling: Long grasses and weeds were observed throughout the switchyard. Proper
graveling was not observed in entire switchyard which may be hazardous to human safety, equipment
health and can cause unwanted tripping. There is a need for proper PCC and Gravelling in switchyard
along.
132/33 kV Transformers: Severe oil leakage in one of the 132/33 kV ICT was observed and its oil has
also penetrated the panel box of OTI/WTI and can result in unwanted tripping. The ICT panel box also
needs proper care as gasket was found to be missing and rainwater can ingress which may also result in
unwanted tripping. Silica Gel in 132/33 kV ICTs was found pink and needs to be replaced or recovered
by heating. 2 no’s of the cooling fan in one of the 50 MVA ICT was not working due to non-replacement
of the faulty connector.
Bay Equipment Nomenclature: Proper Bay equipment numbering and phase segregation for
identification of equipment have not been done which may result in the wrong operation of equipment
and can cause hazard to O & M Personnel.
Earthing of LA: Proper earthing was not provided to Las in the switchyard.
O&M Activities: There was no proper O&M for equipment at the substation. This is the major concern
that was observed at the substation. No Records were available for the O&M at the substation level.
Even the JUSNL Testing team were not able to tell regarding the O&M plan of the substation and its
monitoring.
2. Equipment O & M and Testing: During the audit, records were asked for equipment(CT/PT/Breakers) testing
and it was observed that:
Equipment and relay have been tested only at the time of Commissioning and after that, no routine test
and maintenance has been done. Proper record of the pre-commissioning tests were also not available.
It was also observed that there was a lack of Testing equipment for Routine testing at the substation level.
Details of past equipment failure were also not available at the substation.
3. Relay and Associated issues:
Page 2 of 8
132 kV Transmission Line Protection: It was found that only one numerical relay has been provided
whose Distance and O/C and E/F feature has been utilized to provide the Main as well as backup
protection. Only in 132 kV Sahebganj Circuit, separate electromechanical type backup O/C and E/F
protection have been provided.
A. 132 kV Kahalgaon NTPC(40.3 km)
B. 132 kV Kahalgaon BSPTCL (46.66 km)
C. 132 kV Sahebganj (48.45 km)
D. 132 kV Dumka 1 (95.88 km)
E. 132 kV Dumka 2 (96 km)
The impedance setting for various zones along with time setting was found to be not in order in the line
relays. Further, Power swing blocking philosophy was not found uniform.
100 MVA 220/132 kV Transformer (Kanoher Make): Differential protection is Numerical relay while
Backup protection is of Electromagnetic type. The REF protection for ICT is of static type and it is a
combined REF for HV/LV rather than separate for 220 and 132 kV. Rest of the protection like
OTI/WTI/OSR/ Buchholz were found for the ICTs. The over flux protection is not enabled in
Numerical relay due to non-extension of CVT wiring from 220 kV adjacent relay panel room of NTPC to
132 kV relay panel room of JUSNL.
2 X 50 MVA 132/33 kV Transformers (EMCO and Marsen make): Differential protections are
Numerical relay while Backup protections are of Electromagnetic type. Rest of the protection like
OTI/WTI/OSR/ Buchholz were found for the ICTs. The Overflux and REF protection is enabled for
one transformer (Mersan) in its differential relay while the same is not done for EMCO make transformer
where neutral bushing CT is not present.
LBB and Bus Bar Protection: 132 kV LBB and Bus Bar Protection of static type has been provided in
the substation but it has not operated till now as per the substation staff. The testing and checking has
also not been done for both these protections. That’s why its operational status is also of concern. The
bus bar protection extension is possible or not was also not known to anyone.
There was no proper record for testing and commissioning of relay along with any relay setting change
done at the substation. The JUSNL team also could not provide the complete details for the substation.
Two under frequency relays, one each for 132 KV Kahalgaon (BSPTCL) and 132 KV Kahalgaon
(NTPC) feeder has been provided under the Islanding Scheme of Farakka. The relays have been set at
47.7 Hz without any time delay for tripping of these feeders to isolate 220/132 kV Lalmatia substation
and its radial loads with 220 kV Farakka-Lalmatia feeder with Farakka’s Unit. When enquired, the
operators in the Control Room/ Testing team were not aware of this relay and in one of these, alarm was
persisting.
4. AC Distribution Board:
Overcurrent relay for ACDB protection and Alarm System were not operational.
Page 3 of 8
Changeover switch for one bus of the ACDB was found in broken condition. This is a serious concern in
case of the failure of one of the AC supply as the operator will not be able to transfer the load on the
alternate source by coupling of the ACDB buses.
5. DCDB and Battery Bank:
220 V Battery Bank: Make: EXIDE Wet Type, Commissioned in 2016.
48V Battery Bank: Make: EXIDE Wet type, Commissioned in 2016.
Alarm System was not operational so any failure of DCDB will not be immediately known to the
operator.
Exhaust fan in Battery Room was not working and cable trench of Battery room was in damaged
condition and not covered.
6. DC System Healthiness: No major DC earth fault was observed however DC Voltage measurement done
during the audit are as follows:
Measurement Battery Nearest Feeder Farthest Feeder
+ve to -ve 255 V 254 V 244 V
+ve to Earth 108 V 113 V 109 V
-ve to Earth 134 V 139 V 134 V
7. Display Panel:
Voltage difference was observed in 132 kV feeders connected to the same bus in the control room panel
box. There is a need for CVT testing and metering equipment calibration at the substation so that correct
data can be displayed to the operator.
For the 220/132 kV ICT, many of the digital display for current and voltage were found not working.
One of the issue with voltage display was the non-availability of CVT extension from NTPC side to
JUSNL side.
8. UFR Relay: As per the data available with ERPC, one UFR relay should have been on the 33 kV Mahagama
feeder, however, the same was not found on Mahagama feeder (Max load 14 MW).
9. Transmission Line Issues: It was observed that the transmission lines from the substation is maintained by
various utilities. 132 kV Kahalgaon NTPC and 132 kV Kahalgoan BSPTCL lines are being maintained by JUSNL
and BSPTCL. While 220 kV Farakka feeder is being maintained by NTPC.
It was intimated that maximum number of tripping has been observed in 132 kV Kahalgaon NTPC and 132 kV
Kahalgoan BSPTCL which are on same towers. For these circuits, 1-48 Towers are maintained by BSPTCL while
49-123 towers are maintained by JUSNL. JUSNL intimated that most of the fault are observed in BSPTCL
maintained section due to large trees and broken/poor condition for earth wire between 21-34 towers. JUSNL
explained that they have recently carried out the complete line patrolling and cut the trees in BSPTCL section
after which the number of faults has reduced.
10. Other Observation:
Page 4 of 8
132/33 kV ICT II has been tripping on the differential for any 33 kV through fault on several occasion.
This was also observed during the period of Audit. This also necessities the testing of relay and checking
and review of its relay setting.
It was found that whenever 220 kV Farakka -Lalmatia trips on fault, then 132 kV Kahalgaon (NTPC)
Lalmatia feeder also trip from lalmatia end indicating that the line is tripping on through fault. This may
be due to CT polarity, wrong zone protections setting, PSL logic etc. This also needs immediate action.
This similar issue was also observed with 132 kV Kahalgaon BSPTCL-lalmatia feeder which trip for
through fault on 132 kV Sahebganj, 132/33 kV ICTs. This indicates the need of checking of CT Polarity,
relay setting, Zone 4 protections setting and time delay and relay testing.
The JUSNL CRITIL team who were present during the audit were asked regarding the Disturbance
recorder files for tripping however they have not extracted the same for any tripping in this year. This is a
serious concern and violation of Grid code and Grid standards.
11. Manpower Training: Based on the various inputs received , the audit team observed that substation staff, as well
as CRITIL Team of Jharkhand, do not have proper training on O&M, Testing etc. This is one major concern and
there is a need of immediate action at this front.
1. Switchyard and its Maintenance: The whole switchyard was in bad shape. As per the details the NTPC
Maintained section of switchyard was commissioned in 1989 (29 years old). Following were observed when
switchyard inspection during protection audit was carried out:
Old Equipment: The switchyard equipment’s (Isolator/CT/PT/LA/Breaker) are old and rusty and
need immediate attention. Adequate spare management is also required for any emergency. These were
found in bad shape due to lack of proper maintenance. Severe oil leakage was found in one of the CT in
the substation.
PCC and Gravelling: Long grasses and weeds were observed throughout the switchyard. Proper
graveling was not observed in entire switchyard which may be hazardous to human safety, equipment
health and can cause unwanted tripping. There is a need for proper PCC and Gravelling in switchyard
along.
100 MVA 220/132 kV Transformer (Maintained by NTPC): Severe oil leakage was observed in the
ICT. The ICT panel box also needs proper care as gasket was found to be missing and rainwater can
ingress which may also result in unwanted tripping. Silica Gel in ICT was found pink and needs to be
replaced or recovered by heating. 3 Fans of the ICT cooling system were not found in working condition.
Bay Equipment Nomenclature: Proper Bay equipment numbering and phase segregation for
identification of equipment have not been done which may result in the wrong operation of equipment
and can cause hazard to O & M Personnel.
Earthing of LA: Proper earthing was not provided to Las in the switchyard.
Page 5 of 8
O&M Activities: There was no proper O&M for equipment at the substation. This is the major concern
that was observed at the substation. No Records were available for the O&M at the substation level.
Even the NTPC Operating Staff were not able to tell regarding the O&M plan of the substation and its
monitoring.
2. Equipment O & M and Testing: During the audit, records were asked for equipment(CT/PT/Breakers) testing
and it was observed that:
Breaker Overhauling of 220 kV breakers was done last in 2009 and for 132 kV breakers in 2010. After
that, no testing and overhauling has been done.
All 220 and 132 kV CTs have been tested in 2014 and after that, there has not been any routine test and
maintenance.
It was also observed that there was a lack of Testing equipment for Routine testing at the substation level.
Details of past equipment failure were also not available at the substation.
3. Relay and Associated issues:
All the protection relay for lines and ICTs are of electro-mechanical in nature and are very old.
Last relay testing and setting have been done in the year 1999 and after that, it has not been done.
Records for relay setting calculation were available in the substation.
LBB and Bus Bar Protection: 220 kV & 132 kV Differential as well as LBB is provided but has not
operated till now. The Busbar protection Is combined scheme for both the switchyard, however, no
details on its extension is known to the operator/testing person.
2 X 50 MVA 132/33 kV Transformers and 100 MVA 220/132 kV Transformer: There was no
Differential relay, REF relay, over flux relay available for both 220/132 kV ICT and 2 X 50 MVA 132/33
kV ICTs.
LBB and Bus Bar Protection: 132 kV LBB and Bus Bar Protection of static type has been provided in
the substation but it has not operated till now as per the substation staff. The testing and checking has
also not been done for both these protections. That’s why its operational status is also of concern. The
bus bar protection extension is possible or not was also not known to anyone.
4. AC Distribution Board:
In Good Condition.
5. DCDB and Battery Bank:
220 V Battery Bank and 50 V Battery Bank: Commissioned in 2011
Two sets of battery charger for 220 and 50 V are there out of which one set for each voltage level was
found in faulty condition
6. DC System Healthiness: No major DC earth fault was observed however DC Voltage measurement done
during the audit are as follows:
Measurement Battery Nearest Feeder Farthest Feeder 220 kV bay
132 kV bay 132v kv bay
+ve to -ve 239.5 V 237.6 V 238.1 V 238.1 V
Page 6 of 8
+ve to Earth 78.4 V 78 V 78.3 V 77.8 V
-ve to Earth 161.1 V 159.5 V 160.5V 160.3 V
7. Control Room: No AC were found in the control room and relay panel room which are adjoined.
8. Manpower Training: One person from NTPC has been stationed at Lalmatia along with outsourcing of
remaining staff for substation maintenance. It was observed that no hourly record for voltage and various other
parameters are being maintained at the substation by the operating control room staff.
1. The substation needs a complete renovation along with resolution of the ownership issue in order to improve
the O & M. The impact due to the lack of O & M has been observed in the entire switchyard which is in
shabby condition. The Human life working in the switchyard is also exposed to threat due to improper
earthing, aging equipment, lack of graveling and PCC etc.
2. JUSNL who is presently owning the major portion of equipment has not done the maintenance leading to
deterioration of newly constructed bays since 2006. Proper O & M practice need to be reinforced by JUSNL
in its own portion to avoid unwanted tripping. JUSNL may kindly take up the same at earliest.
3. A complete check of equipment(CT/CVT/LA/Breakers) and their healthiness through testing need to be
ensured for entire switchyard at earliest to avoid unwanted tripping. JUSNL/NTPC may kindly take up
the same at earliest.
4. The old electromechanical relays in the substation need to be replaced with numerical relays and their
coordinated setting also to be done subsequently. In the present relay, there is need setting review, wiring and
logic check, CT polarity etc. to ensure there is no unwanted tripping as happening on daily basis. Further, the
panels/relays which are not in use need to be removed to improve the space utilization. JUSNL/NTPC
may kindly take up the same at earliest.
5. Existing Manpower need to be properly trained for proper O & M activities, daily operational activity, Record
Maintenance, Extracting of DR for Events and others. JUSNL/NTPC may kindly take up the same at
earliest.
6. AC and DC distribution system also need Maintenance at the substation. JUSNL/NTPC may kindly take
up the same at earliest.
It may kindly be noted that 220/132/33 kV Lalmatia substation is of vital importance for NTPC Farakka, NTPC
Kahalgaon and JUSNL. This substation will help in ensuring the proper coal supply as well as act as a path for the
black start during emergency between these two large generating stations. So, there is a need for immediate attention
in order to improve the condition of this substation at earliest.
Page 7 of 8
Some Pictures from the substation
Page 8 of 8
Annexure-C.6
Tripping incidences in 400 kV It was decided to modify the logic for Powergrid informed
Rangpo-Binaguri D/C line and SPS-2 so that it operates at a line flow that the line flow
1. subsequent operation of SPS-II of 900 MW instead of at 850 MW. setting for SPS-2
on 10.07.18 & 30.07.18
operation has been
PCC once again advised Dansenergy modified to 900 MW.
to review the relay settings at Dikchu Also the DT settings
end to avoid unwanted tripping. at Rangpo end has
PCC opined that the opening of been configured as
breakers at Teesta III end can also be per PCC advice.
possible by sending DT signal from
Rangpo end during the line breaker
operation at Rangpo end. PCC
advised Powergrid to configure the DT
settings at Rangpo end accordingly.
2. Repeated Grid disturbances at PCC advised DMTCL to contact OEM DMTCL informed that
400/132 kV Motihari(DMTCL) to avoid such type of unwanted tripping they have taken the
Substation. in future. corrective measures
as per the suggestion
given by OEM.
6. Disturbance at Hatia at PCC advised JUSNL to rectify the CVT JUSNL informed that
18:22 hrs on 30-05-2018 polarity connection as well as to test the testing was done
the CVT in normal condition and and CVT found
submit a report on this tripping within healthy.
seven days.
7. Issues related with PCC advised Powergrid to explore for Regarding inclusion
Generation Backing down inclusion of pole block with ground return of pole block with
during Talcher-Kolar SPS mode signal in the SPS logic. ground return mode
operation on 16th May 2018.
PCC advised NTPC, GMR and JITPL to signal in the SPS
ensure the generation reduction as per the logic, Powergrid
SPS logic. informed that the
issue was referred to
PCC advised NTPC also to explore for OEM.
inclusion of pole block with ground
return mode signal in the SPS logic.
10. Disturbance at 400/220 kV PCC advised BSPTCL and Powergrid BSPTCL informed
Biharshariff S/s on 28-03- to ensure proper relay coordination that they are in the
2018 at 18:43 hrs and 19-03- between 400kV and 220 kV system process of
2018 at 02:02 hrs.
including ICTs at Biharshariff S/s. implementing the
revised settings.
71st PCC advised BSPTCL to
configure the zone-2 timings as 250-
300 msec for the lines which do not
have PLCC operational so that a
proper relay coordination will be
ensured between ICTs and the lines.