CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WOMEN’S COPARCENARY RIGHTS

The research proposal submitted in partial fulfilment of the course Family

Law- II, for obtaining the degree of B.B.A.,LL.B(Hons.) during the
Academic Year 2019- 2020.

SUBMITTED BY: SAKSHI TIWARI

Roll No. – 2035

SUBMITTED TO:

Faculty of Family Law- II

Ms. Pooja Srivastava

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 DECLARATION BY THE STUDENT

I hereby declare that the work reported in the B.B.A. LL.B (Hons.) Project Report entitled

“Critical Analysis of Women’s Coparcenary Rights” submitted at Chanakya National

Law University, Patna is an authentic record of my work carried out under the

supervision of Ms. Pooja Srivastava. I have not submitted this work elsewhere for any

other degree or diploma. I am fully responsible for the contents of my Project Report.

(Signature of the Candidate)

SAKSHI TIWARI

Chankaya National Law University, Patna

Date-

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

“IF YOU WANT TO WALK FAST GO ALONE

IF YOU WANT TO WALK FAR GO TOGETHER”

A project is a joint endeavor which is to be accomplished with utmost compassion,

diligence and with support of all. Gratitude is a noble response of one’s soul to kindness or

help generously rendered by another and its acknowledgement is the duty and joyance. I

am overwhelmed in all humbleness and gratefulness to acknowledge from the bottom of

my heart to all those who have helped me to put these ideas, well above the level of

simplicity and into something concrete effectively and moreover on time.

This project would not have been completed without combined effort of my revered Family

Law professor Ms. Pooja Srivastava whose support and guidance was the driving force to

successfully complete this project. I express my heartfelt gratitude to her. Gratitude is also

due to my parents, family, siblings, my dear friends and all those who helped me in this

project in any way. It was truly an endeavor which enabled me to embark on a journey

which redefined my intelligentsia, induced my mind to discover the various events which

led to the development of obscenity laws and their perception through this case.

Moreover, thanks to all those who helped me in any way be it words, presence.

Encouragement or blessings...

- Sakshi Tiwari

- 4th , Semester

- B.B.A LL.B

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

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 1. INTRODUCTION

Since time immemorial the framing of all property laws have been exclusively for the benefit
of man, and woman has been treated as subservient, and dependent on male support. The
right to property is important for the freedom and development of a human being. Prior to the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 shastric and customary laws that varied from region to region
governed Hindus and sometimes it varied in the same region on a caste basis resulting in
diversity in the law. Consequently in matters of succession also, there were different schools,
like Dayabhaga in Bengal and the adjoining areas; Mayukha in Bombay, Konkan and Gujarat
and Marumakkattayam or Nambudriia and MnKeralitakshara in other parts of India with
slight variations

The multiplicity of succession laws in India, diverse in their nature, owing to their varied
origin made the property laws even mere complex. Earlier, woman in a joint Hindu family,
consisting both of man and woman, had a right to sustenance, but the control and ownership
of property did not vest in her. In a patrilineal system, like the Mitakshara school of Hindu
law, a woman, was not given a birth right in the family property like a son.In this paper we
have analysed the discrimination against women under Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The
paper begins with a study of devolution of property in various traditional schools. It then
proceeds to analyse the position of women in the Constitution of India. The focus of this
paper is on the concept of coparcenary and the inherent discrimination meted on the women
by depriving them proprietary rights in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Finally, we have
analysed the new notion of coparcenary under various State amendments and the pros and
cons of these amendments in the light of right to equality guaranteed under the Constitution
of India.

AIM OF STUDY
● To study about the coparcenary rights of women under Hindu Law.
● To make a critical analysis of position of women within the ambit of property in present
times.

HYPOTHESIS
 The present provisions of law conferring property rights are more gender neutral.

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 The retrospective effect of the 2005 amendment gives an impetus to the beneficiary
nature of the legislation

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The study is collected from the national and international journals and books and publication
from various websites and legislations, recent articles which give importance and more
information to designing trial of summon cases.

SOURCES OF DATA
The researcher will be relying on both primary and secondary sources to complete the
project.
 Primary Sources : Bare Act.
 Secondary Sources :Books, criminal journal etc.

MATERIAL AND METHODS

The study is collected from national and international journals, books and publications from
various websites which give importance to the trial on summon cases.
Sources of study: The researcher has referred books, research articles, unpublished thesis and
e-sources as a part of secondary sources for the writing of the project.

LIMITATIONS
The researcher is unable to trace the primary sources needed to write about the topic as the
topic demands research in the archives which is not available to the research as admission to
the government archives is not allowed.

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 2. CONCEPT OF HINDU JOINT FAMILY UNDER MITAKSHARA
SCHOOL

The Mitakshara law, is followed extensively in India. According to this school, a son by birth
acquires a right and interest in the joint family property. But, the interest in the property is
restricted to three generations of male lineal descendants, which includes son, grandsons and
the great grandson. These three constitute a class of coparceners, based on birth in the family.
Under the Mitakshara system, joint family property devolves by survivorship within the
coparcenary. This means that with every birth or death of a male in the family, the share of
every other surviving male either gets diminished or enlarged. For example, if a coparcenary
consists of a father and his two sons, each would own one third of the property. If another son
is born in the family, automatically the share of each male is reduced to one fourth. But, no
female is recognised as a member of the coparcenary in Mitakshara law.We find many
variations of this school in different parts of India. According to the Bengal, Benares and
Mithila sub- schools of Mitakshara recognise five female relations— widow, daughter,
mother, paternal grandmother, and paternal great-grand mother as being entitled to inherit
namely. The Madras sub-school recognised the heritable capacity of a larger number of
females including the son’s daughter, daughter's daughter and the sister’s heirs who are
expressly named as heirs in Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929[2]. The son's
daughter and the daughter's daughter ranked as bandhus in Bombay and Madras. The
Bombay school which is most liberal to women, recognises a number of other female heirs,
including a half sister, father’s sister and women married into the family such as stepmother,
son's widow, brother’s widow and also many other females classified as bandhus.

In the Hindu system, ancestral property has traditionally been held by a joint Hindu family
consisting of male coparceners. Coparcenary can be defined as a narrower body of persons
within a joint family and consisting of father, son, son's son and son's son's son. Ancestral
property continues to be governed by a wholly partrilineal regime like the Mitakshara school,
wherein property descends only through the male line as only the male members of a joint
Hindu family have an interest by birth in the joint or coparcenary property. Since a woman
cannot be a coparcener, she is not entitled to a share in the ancestral property by birth. But a
son's share in the property would increase in case the father dies interstate would be in
addition to the share he has on birth. This is a blatant discrimination against women.

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Ownership in the joint family
The question of ownership is based on two different principles by the two authors. Ownership
in this context refers to a share in the joint family. In the Mitakshara School, Vijnaneshwar
held that there were two different kinds of property. A man could give away to whom he
willed his self-earned property while in the case of ancestral property the principle of janma-
svatva-vada held. Janma means birth and the whole expression means ―the principle of
ownership by birth‖ (Karve, 1968: 344). The doctrine of son‘s (i.e., son, son‘s son and son‘s
son‘s son) right by birth in the joint family property was a unique contribution of this school
to Hindu jurisprudence. This doctrine meant that the moment a son was born; he acquired an
interest in the joint family property which, by partition, could be, at any time, converted into
separate property. No system in the world had anything near the doctrine of son‘s birthright.
In other words the joint family property did not pass by inheritance but it goes to those who,
among the group known as coparceners, survive others, i.e., are able to live longer than
others.
The concept of the joint family property under the Mitakshara School implied the notion of
community of ownership and unity of possession. This expression meant that before partition,
no individual coparcener could say that he owned so many shares in the joint family property.
The interest of each coparcener was a fluctuating interest, the deaths may augment it, and
births may diminish it. In other words, if there are more births of son‘s there are more persons
having an interest in that property, and if at that stage partition took place, their shares would
be less. But if some coparceners died and then partition took place, the share of surviving
coparceners in the property would be more. Since there was no concept of birthright under
the Dayabhaga School, coparceners had specified and ascertained shares in the joint family
property and their interest did not fluctuate on births or deaths in the family property. Under
both the schools the principle of unity of possession is the same.
Coparcenary:
Coparcenary is narrow body of persons within a joint family, and consists of father, son,
son‘s son and son‘s son‘s son. Like joint family, to begin with, it consists of father and his
three male lineal descendants; in its continuance the existence of the father-son relationship is
not necessary. Thus, a coparcenary can consist of grandfather and grandson, of brothers, of
uncle and nephew and so on. The rule is that so long as one is not removed by more than four
degrees from the last holder (senior most living lineal male ancestor) of the property,
howsoever removed one may be from the original holder, one will be a coparcener. But if one
removed by more than four degrees, one will not be a coparcener. For example, A is the

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father and B to H are his seven lineal male descendents. It is evident that coparcenary
consists of A, B, C and D and E, F, G and H are not coparceners.

No female can be a coparcener:

Hindu Women‘s Right to Property Act 1937; In Mitakshara coparcenary, no female can be its
member, though they are members of the joint family. It means that no female had any
interest by birth in the joint family property. She had no right of survivorship or partition,
though if a partition took place certain females were entitled to a share. In the coparcenary
system some complications were created by the Hindu Women‘s Right to Property Act, 1937.
Under the Act the undivided interest of a coparcener on his death did not go by survivorship
to coparceners, but his widow took it as heir, though she took it as a limited succession his
interest in the joint family property as it stood at the time of his death. Section 3(3) gives the
widow a right to partition also.
The quantum of interest to which a Hindu widow is entitled is to be determined as on the date
on which she seeks partition. The result of the Act is that the right which the other
coparceners had under the Mitakshara School of taking that interest by survivorship remains
suspended so long as that estate enures. On the death of a coparcener, there is no dissolution
of coparcenary, so as to carve out a defined interest in favour of the widow. If she claims
partition she is severed from the other coparceners and her interest becomes a defined interest
in the coparcenary property, and the right of the coparceners to take by survivorship is
extinguished. But if she does not ask for partition, on her death, their interest will pass by
survivorship to other coparceners. The Hindu Women‘s Right to Property Act has been
repealed. A new rule succession of certain females to the undivided interest of the coparcener
has been enacted in S. 6, Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Rule Of Survivorship
The right of survivorship determines what happens to a certain type of co-owned property
after one of its owners dies. Under law there are many kinds of co-ownership, but the right of
survivorship is found only in joint tenancy, a contract between two or more parties specifying
their simultaneous ownership of some form of real or personal property such as a house, land,
or money. In all joint tenancies, at the death of one of the joint tenants, ownership of the
remaining property passes to the surviving tenants, or successors, who assert the right of
survivorship. This is a powerful legal right because it takes precedence over other claims
upon the property. Originally a right at Common Law, it is recognized by statute in all states.

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In order for co-owners of property to realize the right of survivorship, the property must be
owned in joint tenancy. Joint tenancy describes an ownership interest in property held by two
or more people called tenants. The tenants acquire their ownership interest in the property in
the same way and at the same time, and each holds an equal share. Joint tenancies are created
by deed, will, or other transfer of property. Property that is held under a different form of
coownership can be converted into a joint tenancy by amending the title to the property.
When one of the joint tenants dies, the right of survivorship takes effect, passing the deceased
tenant's interest in the property to the other joint tenant or tenants. Husbands and wives often
create joint tenancies for co-ownership of their real property; under the common law this
form of joint tenancy is called a Tenancy by the Entirety. It is an attractive legal option
because of the right of survivorship. Upon one spouse's death, the right of survivorship takes
precedence over claims on the property by the deceased person's heirs, beneficiaries, and
creditors. The right passes outside probate—the procedure by which a deceased person's will
is approved—so legal professionals sometimes call joint tenancy a probate avoidance device.
The dissolution of a marriage usually ends any subsequent claim of right of survivorship.
A joint tenancy continues as long as more than one joint tenant survives. Upon the death of
one tenant, the shares of the other tenants increase equally; in a sense they absorb the
ownership interest of the deceased person. This automatic process continues until only one
surviving joint tenant is left; this survivor becomes the sole owner of the property.
Courts frequently hear claims based on the right of survivorship. The surviving joint tenant
furnishes proof of the death of the other joint tenant as well as valid legal titles indicating that
the relevant real property was held in a joint tenancy. Documentary evidence establishing the
existence of a joint tenancy is generally required to overcome a challenge to the right of
survivorship.

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 3. RIGHTS OF SURVIVING COPARCENER
The Mitakshara School based its law of inheritance on the principle of propinquity (nearness
of blood-relationship or community of blood), while the Dayabhaga school based its law of
succession on the principle of religious efficacy or spiritual benefit. But the Mitakshara did
not give full effect to the principle, and limited it by two subsidiary rules:
(i) exclusion of females from inheritance, and
(ii) preferences of agnates over cognates. These subsidiary rules made the Mitakshara
law of succession reactionary. Thus, if a Hindu died leaving behind a son and a
daughter, by application of the first rule, daughter would be excluded and son
would get the entire property. Similarly, if a Hindu died leaving behind a son‘s
son and daughter‘s son, the son‘s son would succeed to the entire property and
daughter‘s son would be excluded by the application of the second rule. Under the
modern Hindu law, this difference between the two main Schools is no longer
tenable.
Under the Hindu succession Act, 1956, there is one uniform law of succession for all
Hindus, to whatever school or sub-school they may belong. Vijnaneshwar who came
before Jeemutavahana took a position consciously against such a point of view. He said
that the matter of division of property (daya) was not a religious transaction involving
certain samskaras. Even those who had no samskaras had property to divide. This was a
purely secular matter falling within what is termed Vyavahara. The right to property
could not rest on the duty of sraddha but rested on consanguinity. He used the age-old
word sapindya and gave it a novel interpretation, spinda were those who shared common
body particles. On this definition the right of the son, the grandson etc., was established
as immediate successors to property. This definition of sapindya did not make clear why
an own brother with whom one shared body-particles should come later than the son or
grandson, i.e., the descendants.
On Jeemutavahana‘s principle it is understandable as the son and son‘s son brought the
largest spiritual benefit as givers of pinda (Karve, 1968: 350). Vijnaneshwar performed
another feat of logical irrelevance in that he declared that those who together brought a
person to life were spindya as they were creators of one pinda. The word pinda here has
the connotation ‗individual‘ which one finds in late classical Sanskrit. By this definition
he made the wife a sapindya of the husband; the wives of different brothers sapindya of
their husbands, husband‘s brothers and husband‘s brother‘s wives. These queer

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 gymnastics were performed in order to justify the right of a widow in the property in case
a man died without heirs. Jeemutavahana said that the property of a dead person went to
him who brought the greatest spiritual benefit to that person. A dead person got spiritual
benefit when he was offered pinda (the food-ball) on certain days prescribed by the Hindu
ritual. Food called pinda was offered by a man to his father, grandfather, great
grandfather and their wives. A minute portion (what remained sticking to the hand, lepa –
in the action of making a ball – is then offered to the great – grandfather and two further
ancestors, merely water is given to further three ancestors. Apparently, at some later date
it was permitted to offer panda to one man by name. This was called ekoddista offering.
Those who gave and received a pinda were called sapindya. Jeemutavahana said that
those who had the duty to give pinda had the right to inherit. The widow of a man dying
without an heir could inherit of she offered pinda.
Once sonship was established he had to perform the sraddha, i.e., the giving of pinda.
Jeemutavahana‘s position is more logical and more consistent with older usage. The
sraddha ritual performed to give pinda to an ancestor is performed by a man in such a
way that he gives pinda to many of his ancestors and their wives including his father and
mother. A sraddha could be performed by a widow for her husband only. Presumably, the
king inheriting a property also performed an ekiddista sraddha This attitude is also
reflected in the pinda offering because a man gives pinda by name to his three immediate
ancestors only. If the daughter has a son the estate remained in her son‘s line once she had
inherited. The rights of the widow and the daughter were established through the
ekiddista-sraddha they were allowed to perform according to Jeemutavahana. The right of
the daughter‘s son rested on the fact that he could give pinda to his mother‘s ancestors
and so the mother‘s father was spiritually benefitted. The Mitakshara principle of
consanguinity held good as regards the daughter and the daughter‘s son and his special
principle of consanguinity explained the widow‘s position. The commentators made no
distinction between inheritance and succession. The distinction was made but not in the
Smriti literature.
Inheritance is coming into possession of certain material and spiritual goods belonging to
somebody connected by blood and/or ritual bonds. Succession is coming into possession
of a certain status and the right to do certain things following that status. In the case of
women, the difference between inheritance and succession became clear in practices
which were followed at least since the above commentaries were written right through the
British period upto the present. A widow was not allowed to visit the innermost sacred

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 shrines of the temples, she could not preside at any familial ritual which had the sacred
fire as part of it. All ritual had the fire and so she could not take part in it. As a widow she
was inauspicious and could not be present at celebrations. Marriage, thread ceremony
etc., were done with the sacred fire as the main deity. At these ceremonies an invitation is
given to god for whom a procession goes to a temple. In former times, invitations were
given personally by a man and a woman – a husband and wife preferably but otherwise
by a man accompanied by a kinswoman whose husband was alive. Thus a widow could
inherit property but through the death of her husband lost all the rights to perform certain
rituals. If her daughter was to marry, she had to call the husband‘s brother or uncle to give
away the daughter. On such occasion the brother-in-law and his wife perform the fire
worship and give away the bride. On the occasion of the marriage of a widow‘s son again
the uncle (father‘s brother) and his wife would ‗receive‘ the bride.
The familial and public rituals could not be performed by a man if he had no wife.
Though a man had a position independent of his wife, he lost status when he became a
widower. As men practiced polygyny, the chances of a man becoming a widower were
few. But there are enough evidences in ancient literature and modern practice to show
that a widower did lose some right which he would otherwise have as a head of the
family. All familial and public Hindu rituals were always performed with the help of the
wife. A man who had no wife could not perform a public sacrifice or a domestic ritual but
apparently from ancient times men had found a way out of this difficulty. The first such
reference is made by Kalidasa who said that Rama, after abandoning his wife Sita,
performed many sacrifices without getting married again. This he could do by placing
beside him a golden image of Sita. So it is clear how property was distributed in the
Mitakshara School as well as in the Dayabhaga School. In the former, the joint family
property did not pass by inheritance but it went to those who, among the group known as
coparceners, survive others, i.e., are able to live longer than others. No female had any
interest by birth in the joint family property where as in the latter, the rights to ancestral
property accrue only after the death of the person who was in possession of it. Sons had
no right by birth in any property, and all properties devolved by inheritance.

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON THE ADOPTION OF MITAKSHARA

COPARCENARY SYSTEM
The provisions regarding succession in the Hindu Code Bill, as originally framed by the
B.N.Rau Committee and piloted by Dr.Ambedkar, was for abolishing the Mitakshara

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 coparcenary with its concept of survivorship and the son's right by birth in a joint family
property and substituting it with the principle of inheritance by succession. These
proposals met with a storm of conservative opposition. The extent of opposition within
the government itself can be gauged from the fact that the then Law Minister Mr. Biswas,
on the floor of the house, expressed himself against daughters inheriting property from
their natal families. Sita Ram S Jajoo from Madhya Bharat, identified the reason for the
opposition accurately, when he stated: "Here we feel the pinch because it touches our
pockets. We male members of this house are in a huge majority. I do not wish that the
tyranny of the majority may be imposed on the minority, the female members of this
house."[8] However, the majority prevailed when the Bill was finally passed in 1956.
When Dr.Ambedkar was questioned as to how the provisions relating to coparcenary was
retained in spite of strong opposition he said: "It was not acompromise. My enemies
combined with my enthusiastic supporters thought that they might damn the Bill by
making it appear worse than it was [9]

By the retention of the Mitakshara coparcenary without including females it meant that
females cannot inherit ancestral property as males do. If a joint family gets divided, each
male coparcener takes his share and females get nothing. Thus the law by excluding the
daughters from participating in coparcenary ownership not only contributed to an inequity
against females but has led to oppression and negation of their right to equality and
appears to be a mockery of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

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 4. PROPERTY ACTS RELATED TO WOMEN
The right to property held by women differs from religion to another in India. They differ
among Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, Christians and others. During the British period and after, a
number of laws have been passed to improve the position of women in relation to property.
The effects of these laws are briefly assessed.

THE POSITION OF WOMEN UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.

The framers of the Indian Constitution have taken special care to ensure that the State took
positive steps to give women equal status with men. Articles 14, 15(2), (3) and Article 16 of
the Constitution of India, attempt not only inhibit discrimination against women but in
appropriate circumstances provide a free hand to the State to provide protective
discrimination in favour of women. Also Part IV of the Constitution which contains the
Directive Principles of State Policy inter alia provides that the State shall endeavour to ensure
equality among individuals[3].

Notwithstanding these Constitutional mandates and directives, a woman is still neglected and
the rights of the women is blatantly disregarded by some of the provisions of personal laws
like the inherent discrimination and inequality in the Mitakshara coparcenary under Section 6
of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. But, to say that coparcenary rights under Mitakshara
system violates Article 14 raises an important question- Does “laws in force” in Article 13(1)
of the Constitution include personal laws? The Apex Court has yet to give a definitive view
on this point. But in State of Bombay v Narsu Appa Mali 1 the Bombay High Court took the
view that the term “laws in force” includes only laws passed or made by legislature or other
competent authority and does not include personal laws. But in the Supreme Court in Sant
Ram v Labh Singh2 and in Shri Krishna Singh v Mathura Ahir3 has accepted the contrary.
But, Seervai is of the opinion that-

“we have seen that there is no difference between the expression ‘existing law’ and the ‘law
in force’ and consequently, personal law would be ‘existing law’ and ‘law in force’. This
consideration is strengthened by the consideration that custom, usage, and statutory law are
so inextricably mixed up in personal law that it would be difficult to ascertain the residue of

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personal law outside them”
THE MARRIED WOMEN’S PROPERTY ACT OF 1874
The Married Women‘s Property Act (Act III of 1874) was one of the earliest laws which
widened the scope of stridhan.
Under the Act, the separate property of the woman included: 1. Wages and earnings of
married woman in any employment, occupation or trade carried on by law; 2. Money
acquired through literary, artistic and scientific skill; 3. All savings from and investment of
such wages; and 4. A Policy of Insurance effected on her own behalf. This extension of the
definition of stridhan increased the right to own and acquire property and thereby provided an
incentive to women for being engaged in remunerative outside work (Raj and Sharma, 1994:
80).

THE HINDU LAW OF INHERITANCE (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1929

The next legislation in the direction of extending her property rights was the Hindu Law of
Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929. This Act extended to the whole of India, expect the then
Part ‗B‘ State. The Part B states were former princely states or groups of princely states,
governed by a rajpramukh, who was often a former prince, and an elected legislature. The
rajpramukh was appointed by the President of India. The Part B states were eight i.e.
Hyderabad, Saurashtra, Mysore, Travancore-Cochin, Madhya Bharat, Vindhya Pradesh,
Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU), and Rajasthan. It was applicable to persons
who belonged to the Mitakshara School and ‗to property of males not held in coparcenary
and not disposed of by will‘. This law recognized son‘s daughter, daughter‘s daughter, sister
and sister‘s son as among the heritable Bandhus and were placed immediately after father‘s
father and before father‘s brother (Ibid: 90-91).

THE HINDU WOMEN’S RIGHT TO PROPERTY ACT, 1937

One of the most important enactments ‗to give better rights to women in respect of property,
was the Hindu Women‘s Right to Property Act, 1937 passed mainly due to the efforts of Mr.
Deshmukh. The Act extended to the whole of India except the then Part ‗B‘ States. It was
applicable in the case of a Hindu dying intestate. The provisions of the law as embodied in
Section 3, were applicable to a Hindu who died intestate notwithstanding any rule of Hindu
Law or Custom to the contrary. According to the Law, a widow was entitled to the same
share which a son received in the case of property in respect of which he died intestate (Ibid:
91). Mayne aptly pointed out the advantages of the Act. According to him, the Act made

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―Mitakshara widow succeed to the coparcenary interest of her husband in the partable of the
Joint family and along with his male issue to his separate property and to enable a Dayabhaga
widow to succeed along with the male issue in all case.‖As for the self-acquired property of
an individual, the wife, the daughter and the mother were as usual recognized as heirs. It
should, however, be noted that the property they inherited was in the nature of a restricted
estate, for at the death, it passed on the next heir of the male from whom she inherited (Ibid:
91-92). In respect of separate property of a Mitakshara Hindu and in respect of all properties
of a Dayabhaga Hindu, the Act introduced three widows, viz., intestate‘s own widow, his
son‘s widow and his son‘s son‘s widow as heirs along with the son, grandson and great
grandson, as also in their default. The widow took a share equal to the share of a son and, in
default of the son took the entire property. If there were more than one widow, all of them
together took one share. For instance, if a Hindu dies leaving behind his separate property
and his own widow son‘s widow and grandson‘s widow, each of the widows will take 1/3
share in the property. Or, take another example, P dies leaving behind two widows, W1 and
W2 and two sons S1 and S2. He leaves behind separate property, S1 and S2 each will take
1/3 and W1 and W2 each will take 1/6 (both widows together taking one-third share (Diwan,
2006: 372). The Woman‘s estate has now been converted into stridhan by S. 14, Hindu
Succession Act, 1956. Any property that a Hindu female will get after June 17, 1956, will be
her absolute property unless specifically given to her with limitation. The woman‘s estate
over which she has possession when the Act came in to force (June 17, 1956) is converted
into her absolute estate. The old Hindu law of woman‘s estate and reversioners is still
relevant in respect of property over which she had no possession when the Act came into
force.

THE HINDU CODE, 1948

On 9 April 1948 a revised Hindu Code was introduced in the Constituent Assembly
(Legislative). Its main provision regarding women‘s right to property and inheritance
consisted of the following changes: 1. The proposed law of inheritance deferred the
Mitakshara coparcenary and adapted to Dayabhaga rule which accorded absolute ownership
rights to the heir, male or female. 2. Succession was to be based on blood relationship to the
deceased rather than on cognatic or agnatic relationship. 3. The widow of a deceased Hindu,
the daughter and the widow of a predeceased son were to be accorded the same rank as a son
in the matter of inheritance. The daughter was to be provided half of the son‘s share in
parental property. 4. A large number of female heirs were introduced than either under the

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Dayabhaga or the Mitakshara. 5. Abolition of all conditionalities in the inheritance of female
heirs in practice earlier such as their marital or economic status. They were to inherit by
virtue of being heirs. Besides inheritance, the Bill legitimized civil marriage in addition to
sacramental marriage. It also recognized a marriage as valid irrespective of the caste or the
sub-caste of the parties entering into the relationship. In addition, it contained significant
provisions for maintenance, adoption, divorce and prescribed monogamy (Sheel, 1999: 11).
But, in spite of the incorporation of suggestions regarding the re-introduction of Mitakshara
joint family among other measures, the Bill failed to appeade the orthodox groups and was
finally dropped by the Government on 26 September 1951. Ambedkar resigned in protest.
The Bill was passed only in a piecemeal fashion after a few years with its radical edges
rounded off to render it less offensive to its opponents. The half-hearted approach revealed
the patriarchal state‘s compulsions, ambivalence and the lack of will to make social justice a
reality (Ibid).

HINDU SUCCESSION ACT, 1956

The Hindu Succession Act 1956 is a landmark in the history of Hindu Law for a number of
reasons. It has made qualitative changes in the Hindu Law of Succession.
Sub-section (1) of Section 14 to the Hindu Succession Act runs as under: Any property
possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this
Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation: In this sub-section ‗property‘ includes both movable and immovable property
acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devices, or at a partition or in lieu of
maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not,
before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill exertion, or by purchase or by prescription
or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhan
immediately before the commencement of this Act (Diwan,2006:374). It may be seen that
the above definition of property includes all the heads of Vijnaneshwar‘s enumeration of
property.

A person, so long as he is alive, is free to deal with his property in any way he likes. He is, by
making a will, free to lay down his own scheme of distribution of his property after his death.
This is known as a testamentary disposition. If he dies without leaving a will, it is the purpose
of the law of inheritance to determine the persons who will take his property. In our

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contemporary world, someone must be the owner of the property, an individual, corporate
person or state.
The law of succession is classified as under: 1. Testamentary succession, and 2. Intestate
succession. The law of testamentary succession is concerned how best the effect could be
given to the wishes of the testator (i.e., the person who made the will); what are the rules
relating to making of a will and allied and subsidiary matters. The testator enjoys full
freedom of bequeathing his property (Ibid:385). The law of intestate succession is concerned
with matters such as: who are the persons entitled to take the property i.e., who are the heirs;
what are the rules of preference among the various relations; in what manner the property is
to be distributed in case a person has more than one heirs; what are the disqualifications of
heirs and the allied and subsidiary matters (Ibid: 385). The law of intestate succession is more
properly the law of inheritance. The law of inheritance consists of rules which determine the
mode of devolution of the property of the deceased on heirs solely on the basis of their
relationship to the deceased (Ibid). The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 deals with intestate
succession among Hindus.
Section 14, Hindu Succession Act, introduces fundamental changes in the concept of
woman‘s property. It abolishes Hindu Woman‘s estate and converts existing woman‘s estate
(existing prior to the coming into force of the Act and over which Hindu female has
possession) into her absolute property.
Section 15, Hindu Succession Act- Although Hindu woman‘s limited estate has been
abolished and, so long as the woman is alive, she has absolute power over all types of
property (she is also free to dispose it off by will), yet for the purpose of intestate succession,
the source of property is still material. The old Hindu law of succession to the property of a
Hindu female (stridhan) was extremely complicated. The modern law of succession to the
property of a Hindu female is simple though it suffers from some bad draftsmanship. For the
purpose of succession, the property of a Hindu female falls under the following three heads:
(a) property inherited by a female from her father or mother, (b) property inherited by a
female from her husband or father-in-law, and (c) property obtained from any other source,
by inheritance or otherwise. It should be noted that the former two heads would become
operative only if the female dies issueless. If she has her issues, the distinction between the
sources from which she got the property is not material

THE 2005 AMENDMENT

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On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a Joint
Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara Law, the daughter of a coparcener shall– (a) by
birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son; (b) have the same
right in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son; (c) be subject
to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son
(Diwan,2006: 389).
2. Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of subsection (1) shall
be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded,
notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or any other law for the time being in force,
as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition.
3. Where a Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act,
2005, his interest in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law,
shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and
not by survivorship, and the coparcenary property had taken place and, - (a) the daughter is
allotted the same share as is allotted to a son; (b) the share of the pre-deceased son or a pre-
deceased daughter, as they would have got had they been alive at the time of partition, shall
be allotted to the surviving child of such pre-deceased son or of such predeceased daughter;
and (c) the share of the pre-deceased child of a pre-deceased son or of a predeceased
daughter, as such child would have got had he or she been alive at the time of the partition,
shall be allotted to the child of such pre-deceased child of the pre-deceased son or a pre-
deceased daughter, as the case may be.

Explanation: For the purpose of this sub-section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara
coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to
him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of
whether he was entitled to claim partition or not.

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 5. PREJUDICE AND PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH WOMEN’S
COPARCENARY RIGHTS
Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act deals with devolution of interest in the coparcenary
property. Section 6 contemplates the existence of coparcenary property and more than one
coparcener for the application of the rule of devolution by survivorship. The head note of the
section reads "Devolution of interest in coparcenary property". The language of the main
provision to the effect that "his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the
surviving members" indicates that the devolution by survivorship is with reference to the
deceased coparceners interest alone; this coupled with the notional partition contemplated in
Explanation 1 in this section for the ascertainment of the interest of the deceased coparcener
in a Mitakshara coparcenary property indicates that there is no disruptionof the entire
coparcenary. It follows that the other coparceners, would continue to be joint in respect of the
other coparcenary property till a partition is effected. The main provision of this section deals
with the devolution of the interest of a coparcener dying interstate by the rule of survivorship
and the proviso speaks of the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property.

Now, in order to ascertain what is the interest of the deceased coparcener, one necessarily
needs to keep in mind the two Explanations under the proviso. These two Explanations give
the necessary assistance for ascertaining the interest of the deceased coparcener in the
Mitakshara coparcenary property. Explanation I provides for ascertaining the interest on the
basis of a notional partition by applying a fiction as if the partition had taken place
immediately before the death of the deceased coparcener. Explanation II lays down that a
person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or
any of the heirs of such divided coparcener is not entitled to claim on intestacy a share in the
interest referred to in the section.

Section 6 dealing with the devolution of the interest of a male Hindu in coparcenary property
and while recognising the rule of devolution by survivorship among the members of the
coparcenary, makes an exception to the rule in the proviso. According to the proviso, if the
deceased has left him surviving a female relative specified in Class I of Schedule I, or a male
relative specified in that Class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the
deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or interstate
succession under this Act and not by survivorship. The rule of survivorship comes into

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operation only:- (1) where the deceased does not leave him surviving a female relative
specified in Class I, or a male relative specified in that Class who claims through such female
relative and , (ii) when the deceased has not made a testamentary disposition of his undivided
share in the coparcenary property. Thus, under the proviso if a female relative in class I of the
schedule or a male relative in that class claiming through such female relative survives the
deceased, then only would the question of claiming his interest by succession arise.

The proviso to section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 contains a gender bias. It has been
provided therein that the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara Coparcenary shall devolve
by interstate succession if the deceased had left surviving a female relative specified in class I
of the Schedule or a male relative" specified in that class, who claims through such female
relative.

In order to appreciate the gender bias it is necessary to see the devolution of interest under
Section 8 Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The property of a male Hindu dying intestate
devolves according to Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 , firstly, upon the heirs
being the relatives specified in class I of the Schedule. However, there are only four primary
heirs in the Schedule to class I, namely, mother, widow, son and daughter. The remaining
eight represent one or another person who would have been a primary heir if he or she had
not died before the propositus. The principle of representation goes up to two degrees in the
male line of descent; but in the female line of descent it goes only upto one degree.
Accordingly, the son's son's son and son's son's daughter get a share but a daughter's
daughter's son and daughter's daughter's daughter do not get anything. A further infirmity is
that widows of a pre-deceased son and grandson are class I heirs, but the husbands of a
deceased daughter or grand-daughter are not heirs[12].

The retention of the Mitakshara coparcenary without including females in it meant that
females cannot inherit ancestral property as males do. If a joint family gets divided, each
male coparcener takes his share and females get nothing. Only when one of the coparceners
dies, a female gets a share of his share as an heir to the deceased. Thus the law by excluding
the daughters from participating in coparcenary ownership not only contributed to an inequity
against females but has led to oppressionand negation of their right to equality[13]

NEW COPARCENARY UNDER STATE ACTS

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The concept of the Mitakshara coparcenary property retained under Section 6 of the Hindu
Succession Act has not been amended ever since its enactment. But, five states in India
namely, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Karnataka [14]have taken
cognisance of the situation an have made necessary amendments. As per the law of four of
these states, (Kerala excluded), in a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law, the
daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same
manner as the son. Kerala, however, has gone one step further and abolished the right to
claim any interest in any property of an ancestor during his or her lifetime founded on the
mere fact that he or she was born in the family. In fact, the Kerala Act has abolished the Joint
Hindu family system altogether including the Mitakshara, Marumakkattayam, Aliyasantana
and Nambudri systems. In Kerala the joint tenants has been replaced by tenants in common.
The approach of the Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Karnataka state
legislatures is, strikingly different from that of Kerala and these states instead of abolishing
the right by birth strengthened it, while broadly removing the gender discrimination inherent
in Mitakshara coparcenary. The broad features of the legislations are more or less couched in
the same languageThe State enactments in these four states provide that—

(a) the daughter of a coparcener in a Joint Hindu Family governed by Mitakshara law, shall
become a coparcener by birth in her own right in the same manner as the son and have similar
rights in the coparcenary property and be subject to similar liabilities and disabilities;

(b) On partition of a joint Hindu family of the coparcenary property, she will be allotted a
share equal to that of a son. The share of the predeceased son or a predeceased daughter on
such partition would be allotted to the surviving children of such predeceased son or
predeceased daughter, if alive at the time of the partition.

(c) This property shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall
be regarded as property capable of being disposed of by her by will or other testamentary
disposition.

(d) The state enactments are prospective in nature and do not apply to a daughter who is
married prior to, or to a partition which has been effected before the commencement of the
Act.

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In Kerala Section 4 (i)[15] of the Kerala Joint Family System (Abolition) Act, lays down that
all the members of a Mitakshara Coparcenary will hold the property as tenants in common on
the day the Act comes into force as if a partition had taken place and each holding his or her
share separately. But the major criticism against the Kerala model is that if the Joint family
was abolished today in the other states then a deemed partition would take place and women
not being coparceners would get nothing more. Whereas if they are made coparceners, then
they become equal sharers.

WOMEN AS KARTA
The law commission has rightly observed that although the Hindu Succession (State
Amendment) Acts have conferred upon the daughter of a coparcener status but there is still a
reluctance to making her a Karta. This is because of the general male view that she is
incapable of managing the properties or running the business and is generally susceptible to
the influence of her husband and his family, if married. This seems to be patently unfair as
women are proving themselves equal to any task and if women are influenced by their
husbands and their families, men are no less influenced by their wives and their families[16]

If women can act as coparcenaries then they must also be given the powers of Karta. The
shastra is clear that in the absence of senior member a junior member (if he has reached the
age of legal competence) may incur debts for the needs of the family, and in the absence of a
male member a female member may do so[17]. The Sanskritic texts empower women to act
as Karta in instances like when the husband is away or missing or the son is yet to attain
majority.

“the manager (or householder, actual or eventual )is liable to accept (or admit) all alienations
made for the purposes of the family by a pupil, apprentice, slave, wife, agent or bailiff”[18]

Bhavasvamin says that this verse does not authorise the representatives of the absent manager
to incur debt which he has himself specifically forbidden, even if they are for maintenance.
The inference is that any alienations for the maintenance or even for les necessary purposes
(provided they are for the family’s benefit) will be binding upon the manager (when he
returns or appears on the scene by simply coming of age, as the case may be) because in his
absence the implied authority rests with his formally authorised representative or, failing one

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such , with his fellow members of the family who, though not coparcenaries, are able to
transact business in such emergencies”[19]

Further various text provide that -

“a debt contracted by his wife never binds the husband, except that incurred in a time of
distress: expenses for the benefit of he family fall upon the males”[20]

“A debt incurred for the purposes of the family by the slaves, the wife, the mother, the pupil,
other son, even without the masters consent, when he has gone abroad should be paid (by
him). Thus says Bhrigu”[21]

“The husband should pay a debt contracted by his wife and the son should pay a debt
contracted by his mother. If it is contracted for the sake of the husband(by the wife or the
mother) when he (the husband or the son) goes abroad after telling her”[22]

“whatever is incurred for the sake of the family by an uncle, brother, son, wife, slave, pupil or
the dependant, that must be paid by the householder”.[23]

These texts go to prove that the ‘women in defacto is independent; as soon as her husband
returns or her son attains majority she becomes dependant, but meanwhile the responsibility
rests with her, and the powers should be obviously be allowed to her accordingly’[24]. It is
ridiculous to contend that a lady may be fit to be a High Court Judge she is not entitled to
exercise within her own family the discretion that a manager can exercise[25]

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
There are conflicting opinions of the various High Courts on the question of women
coparcenary and thus a Karta. The matter for the first time came up before a full Judge Bench
of the Nagpur High Court in Kesheo v Jagannath[26] where it was held that “any adult
member may be the manager of the joint family, and in case of a need a step mother could
bind her step son, who was a minor, by alienation of the joint hindu family property in
whatever character she purported to act”. The next case that dealt with this problem was
Hanooman Prasad’s Case[27] where the powers of the widow mother as a manager of the
property of her minor son was discussed. The Court in this case held that “the test of the

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lady’s act was not who she was or in what capacity she purported to act? But whether the act
was necessary or the minor’s interest as understood by law”.

The same view was followed in Pandurang Dohke v Pandurang Garle[28], where the
widowed mother passed a promissory note for necessity, as a guardian of her two minor sons.
She was a defacto manager and was held to have the managerial powers and the sons could
not repudiate the debt.

The view of female being the manager of the Joint hindu family was further strengthened
when the Woman’s Right to Property Act, 1937 was passed, which made the widow the
owner of the coparcenary interest.

But the Madras High Court in- Seethabai v Narasimha[29] gave a contrary decision. In this
case the widows claimed that they were the undivided members of the coparcenary by virtue
of the operation of the Act of 1937, they objected to the appointment of the guardian for the
property of the minor sons. The Court appointed one widow, as the guardian of one minor
and a stranger was appointed as the guardian of the other. None of the widows, it was held
could be the manager. It was held that to be a manager one must be a pukka coparcener, a
male with a birth right and not a mere statutory interest. This decision took a step back and
adversely affected the position of women. The similar strand of thought was followed in
Mayuri Padhano v Lokananidhi Lingaraj[30] where it was held that a mother, when the
husband is alive, cannot be a manager. She might indeed act as a guardian of her son, if her
husband was dead and perhaps act as a defacto guardian. But as a manager she had no power
whatsoever. The principle that a woman could be a manager was decisively rejected. The
High Court of Patna has asserted the same view in Sheogulam v Kishan Choudhuri[31], it
was denied that a mother of a minor son, during the long absence of her husband might act as
a ‘Karta’ and incur debts for family purposes and further that such loans would not be
binding up on the family. The matter finally came up before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Commissioner of I.T. v Seth Govindram Sugar Mills [32], where it upheld the view taken by
the Madras High Court and has overruled the decision of Nagpur High Court as they felt that
it was contrary to the established rules in the dharmashashtras.

PROBLEM OF GIVING COPARCENARY RIGHTS TO WOMEN

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Giving coparcenary rights to women would entail some complications which cannot be
sidelined

1. Once a daughter becomes a coparcener she naturally continues to be a member of the natal
joint family and after marriage she will also be a member of her marital Joint family[33]. In
this connection, it is relevant to notice the observations of Mr.Pataskar made while
participating in the parliamentary debate at the time the Hindu Succession Bill, 1955 was
moved. He said:

"To retain the Mitakshara Joint Family and at the same time put a daughter on the same
footing as a son with respect to the right by birth, right of survivorship and the right to claim
partition at any time, will be to provide for a joint family unknown to the law and unworkable
in practice"[34]

“It needs mention, that though alien to Hindu patriarchal notions, under some of the
customary laws in Nigeria, an eldest daughter even after her marriage has a right to be head
of her natal joint family. Even in India, mothers have acted as guardian of their minor sons,
and defacto managers of the joint families on the husband’s death. Though her position as
defacto manager is recognised the dejure conferment of the right has eluded her”[35].

2. Another infirmity of these state enactments is that they exclude the right of a daughter who
was married prior to the commencement of the Act, from the coparcenary property, though,
the right is available to a daughter who is married after the coming into force of the said
amendment acts. As a result a married daughter continues to have her interest in the joint
property of her paternal family, if her marriage has taken place subsequent to the enactment
while the daughter who got married before the enforcement of the law gets no right at all in
the joint property of her parental family. In Samvedi v.Union of India[36] Mr.Justice Punchhi
held " the eligibility of a married daughter must be placed on par with an unmarried daughter
(for she must have been once in that state), so as to claim the benefit....."[37]

3. Further it has been suggested that “once a daughter is made a coparcener on the same
footing as a son then her right as a coparcener should be real in spirit and content. In that
event section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act should be deleted”[38]. Section 23[39]
provides that on the death of a Hindu interstate, in case of a dwelling house wholly occupied

28 | P a g e
by members of the joint family, a female heir is not entitled to demand partition unless the
male heirs choose to do so; it further curtails the right of residence of a daughter unless she is
unmarried or has been deserted by or has separated from her husband or is a widow. The law
commission has also felt the need for special protection of a widow's right to reside in the
dwelling house that the family dwelling house should not be alienated without the widow's
consent or without providing her an alternative accommodation after she has agreed to the
sale of the dwelling house.

4. Further, the need is for an all India legislation since if the Joint Family property is in two
states, one which is governed by the Amending Act and the other not so governed, it may
result in two Karta, one a daughter and the other a son. Difficulties pertaining to territorial
application of Amending Act and the Lex Situs principle will also arise.[40]

“Since the subject matter of the laws of succession fall in Entry 5 of the Concurrent List of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Therefore, Parliament as well as the State
Legislatures are competent to enact laws in this area. In case another State brings some third
model of legislation in this field, there is a likelihood of having still more diversity in the law.
This would result in the Directive Principles of State Policy not being adhered to which
require the State to endeavour to secure a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.
Accordingly, there is need to have a central law enacted by Parliament under Article 246 of
the Constitution. In such a situation the law made by these five states would stand repealed to
the extent of repugnancy, unless expressly repealed”.[41]

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 6. CONCLUSION
The retaining of coparcenary is patently unfair and discriminatory as it violates the provisions
of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. Andhra Pardesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu
have taken a step in the right direction. But, the infirmities in these State acts must be
corrected to make them effective.

1. The adoption of the Kerala Model would prima facie appear to be fair to women as they
did not have any right by birth; but on further examination it became clear that if the joint
Hindu family is abolished as on date and there are only male coparceners, then only they
would hold as tenants in common and women would not get anything more than what they
are already entitled to by inheritance under section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. To
overcome this the Law Commission of India has rightly suggested that it would be better to
first make daughters coparceners like sons so that they would be entitled to and get their
shares on partition or on the death of the male coparcener and hold thereafter as tenants in
common.

2. But to make them coparceners in the true spirit it would be necessary as the Law
Commission of India has suggested to abrogate the doctrine of pious obligation and the
deletion of S23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

3. Also, we are of the opinion that a express provision be inserted in all the State Acts
conferring on women the status of Karta. If this is not done then it would again violate Article
14.

4. Further the distinction between married and unmarried daughters be done away with from
the State acts in light of the Hon’ble Supreme Court decision on Savita Samvedi v Union of
India.

5. Finally Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 must be abolished, if not it might
create technical problems in dispensing justice and cause miscarriage of justice..

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books
 Paranjape P.V, Criminology and Penology (2006)
 Sharma R.N, Criminology and penology, Surjeet publication, New Delhi (2008)
 Ratan lal and Dhiraj lal, Criminal Procedure Code,15th Edition (2000)
 Ratan lal and Dhiraj lal, Indian penal Code, 30th Edition,(2008)

Websites

 https://www.legalbites.in/crpc-notes-trial-in-summons-cases/
 https://www.legalbites.in/law-notes-crpc-difference-between-warrant-case-summon-case
 http://thepracticeoflawjalan.blogspot.com/2012/04/crpc-trial-before-magistratescourt.html
 http://devgan.in/criminal_procedure_code/chapter_20.php
 http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/articles/Trial-of-warrant-cases-7919.asp
 https://blog.ipleaders.in/all-about-the-various-stages-of-criminal-trial-in-india/
 http://hanumant.com/CrPC-DifferencesShortNotes.html
 http://mja.gov.in/Site/Upload/GR/%20I%20Summ%20of%20Cri.pdf
 http://dpsalegal.com/summons-case-warrant-case/
 https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=summons%20case

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