A NATIONAL SECURITY

STRATEGY PRIMER

Created by a team at
The National War College
 National War College
National Defense University
The National War College at the National Defense University
in Washington, DC, is the premier Department of Defense joint
professional military education institution for national security
strategy. Its mission is to educate future leaders of the Armed Forces,
Department of State, and other civilian agencies for high-level policy,
command, and staff responsibilities by conducting a senior-level
course of study in the theory, development, and assessment of
national security strategy.
The 10-month curriculum emphasizes the joint and
interagency perspective. Reflecting this emphasis, 59 percent of the
student body is composed of equal representation from the land, sea,
and air Services (including the Marine Corps and Coast Guard). The
remaining 41 percent is drawn from the Department of State and
other Federal departments and agencies, as well as international
fellows from a number of countries. Graduates earn a master of
science in national security strategy.
The NWC commandant, a military officer of one-star rank,
occupies a nominative position that rotates among the Army, Navy,
and Air Force. As joint sponsor of the National War College, the
Department of State nominates a Foreign Service Officer with
Ambassadorial rank to serve as the commandant’s deputy and
international affairs adviser.
 CONTENTS
PREFACE ......................................................................................................................... iii

CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................. 1
• Introduction to National Security Strategy
• What Is National Security Strategy?
• Relationship of the National Security Strategy to specific national security strategies
• The Role of the National Security Council (NSC) and the NSC Staff
• Introduction to Strategic Logic

CHAPTER II
ANALYZING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION .......................................................... 6
• General
• Assumptions are Pivotal
• The International and Domestic Contexts
• Interests, Threats, and Opportunities
• Personal and Cognitive Bias Awareness

CHAPTER III
DEFINING THE DESIRED ENDS............................................................................. 10
• The Role of National Interests in Defining Ends.
• Political Aim(s)
• Specific Objectives

CHAPTER IV
IDENTIFYING AND/OR DEVELOPING THE MEANS.......................................... 12
• The Means of National Security Strategy
• Elements of Power
• Institutions and Actors
• The Instruments of Power (DIME)
• Interrelationships among the Three Components of Means
• Employing Means/Developing Means

CHAPTER V
DESIGNING THE WAYS .......................................................................................... 21
• General
• Fundamental Strategic Approaches
• Modes of Action
• Matching Institutions/Actors with Instruments
• Orchestration

i
CHAPTER VI
ASSESSING THE COSTS, RISKS AND RESULTS ................................................. 25
• Iterative Assessment
• Evaluating Costs
• Identifying Risks
• Viability Assessments
• Red-Teaming
• Course Corrections

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 28

Common Primer Terms of Reference ............................................................................... 30

FIGURES .......................................................................................................................... 35
The NWC National Security Strategy Framework
National Security Strategy Model for Relating Ends, Ways, and Means

Bibliography with NDU Links...........................................................................................37

ii
 PREFACE
1. Purpose

A National Security Strategy Primer provides students with a common point of reference for
material covered in the National War College curriculum. We use the Primer as a point of
departure for discussions about strategy, and as a principal tool for understanding and achieving
core course learning objectives. The Primer specifically addresses the concept of national
security strategy and an approach for developing it, one that should be studied closely. In
addition to using current joint and service-specific doctrine, extant procedures, and existing
policy guidance, A National Security Strategy Primer uses the literature on national security
strategy found in academia, the business sector, and elsewhere. While the Primer is geared
towards the National War College core curriculum, it can also serve as a useful tool for
interagency practitioners charged with designing or assessing national security strategies.

2. Scope

This Primer details the elements of strategic logic taught at The National War College and
focuses on national security strategy development. While the elements of strategic logic are
relevant and applicable to strategy-making in general, the focus herein is not specifically military
or resource strategies, but the broader concept of national security strategy.

3. Application

The guidance in this Primer should inform each student’s course of study at the National War
College. Developing coherent and effective strategy is difficult due to the complexity and
uncertainty inherent in any strategic challenge. 1 Unraveling the complexity and managing the
uncertainty requires an ability to think strategically about the problem at hand. Thinking
strategically entails applying strategic logic. A National Security Strategy Primer is an important
restatement of the principal aspects of strategic logic. Students should be mindful that other
useful approaches to strategy-making at the national security level exist. Some are covered
elsewhere in the curriculum, and are employed in various departments and agencies of the
executive branch. Where available, this Primer relies on definitions contained in JP 1-02,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Should a student see
material discrepancies between the Primer and other sources, s/he should bring them to the
attention of the Faculty Seminar Lead (FSL).

4. Note

A National Security Strategy Primer is neither official policy nor doctrine. It is the product of a
collaborative effort by members of the National War College faculty, staff and student body.

1
A wide variety of definitions for strategy exist. We are guided, throughout this Primer, by the definition of
strategy as “A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and
integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” From: DOD Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf as of August 2017, p. 220.

iii
The Primer is one tool among many designed to assist students in mastering the National War
College curriculum.

ii
 CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW
1. Introduction to National Security Strategy. The National War College (NWC) National
Security Strategy Primer provides information and guidance on the development of national
security strategy, which includes: 1) the National Security Strategy (NSS) signed by the
President of the United States setting out the overarching strategic direction for the country; and
2) focused national security strategies crafted to deal with specific security challenges. 2 The
publication is intended to assist students in better understanding the complex process of
designing the national security strategies from which all subsequent security planning should
flow. It provides an introduction to the elements of strategic logic that frame the development of
strategy at the highest levels of the national security apparatus. It can serve as a useful
framework outside of NWC, but is not intended to replace processes or procedures established at
other entities.

2. What is national security strategy? Fundamentally, national security strategy is the

development and application of ideas for employing means and orchestrating the instruments of
national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic) to achieve viable ends that
protect or advance national interests. National security strategy can apply broadly or with
respect to a specific situation. Conceptually, national security frequently entails the search for
advantage over a foreign nation, group of nations, or non-state actor; a favorable foreign
relations position; and/or a defense posture capable of successfully deterring hostile action.

National security strategy is an iterative process, which begins with assessing a security
situation that affects national interests. From this starting point it defines achievable, desirable
“ends” that will preserve, protect or advance national interests. Those ends entail both the
political aim, or the desired condition the strategy intends to attain, and the specific objectives
that must be accomplished to achieve the political aim. From this perspective, national security
strategy bridges the gap from the current state of affairs or condition to the desired state of
affairs or condition, articulated via the “political aim.” The national security strategist identifies
what specific objectives, if achieved, will support the political aim, and also what “ways” (how
to proceed toward achieving the political aim) and “means” (tools, resources, and/or
capabilities) will be required to enact the strategy. Note that the term “ways” may be construed
broadly to refer to the fundamental strategic approach to be employed or, more narrowly, to how
the selected means will be used to achieve the political aim. Finally, throughout the strategy’s
development and implementation, the national security strategist must iteratively and
objectively assess its viability.

2
Many national strategies covering a wide range of issues are prepared within the U.S. Government. Examples are:
A National Strategy for Counterterrorism and A National Strategy for the Arctic Region (see:
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/06/29/national-strategy-counterterrorism and:
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf). Herein they are referred to
variously as associated, subsidiary, functional and regional strategies. In most cases they address in more detail
interests identified in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and while not subordinate in a strict sense, they generally
are consistent with direction provided in the NSS.

1
3. Relationship of the National Security Strategy to specific national security strategies. In
1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act put in place a more
deliberate, structured, and formalized approach to developing an overarching national security
strategy. The Act directs the President to submit an annual report on the national security
strategy of the United States to Congress. That report must set forth the national security strategy
of the United States; detail the country’s vital worldwide national security interests, goals, and
objectives; and outline the proposed short- and long-term uses of national power. President
Ronald Reagan submitted the first of these reports, titled National Security Strategy of the United
States in 1987. 3

Strategists who help develop the NSS must understand its pivotal role in the creation of
subsidiary strategies and plans. They should help prepare the NSS with enough wisdom, insight
and judgment to assist strategists and planners across the executive branch tasked with
developing strategies and plans to resolve specific security challenges. As the Army War
College’s Harry R. Yarger emphasized,

[t]he hierarchical nature of strategy facilitates span of control. It represents a logical

means of delegating responsibility and authority among senior leadership. It also
suggests that if strategy consists of objectives, concepts, and resources each should
be appropriate to the level of strategy and consistent with one another. Thus
[military] strategy at the national . . . level should articulate military objectives at
the national level and express the concepts and resources in terms appropriate to
the national level for the specified objective. 4

Associated regional and functional strategies must be in support of national interests and
consistent with the broad outline of the National Security Strategy and applicable derivative
strategies. Those charged with developing these subsidiary strategies must be mindful of the
overarching strategic concepts laid out in the NSS. Alternatively, when tasked with developing a
strategy, the strategist could start with a clean sheet of paper, work through the elements of
strategic logic, and assess whether the strategy produced aligns with the overarching strategic
concepts provided by the NSS. If not, the strategist should then be prepared to reevaluate the
strategy, or make the case for a strategy that diverges from the NSS.

The relationship between the overarching National Security Strategy and associated functional
and regional strategies is illustrated in the following two examples.

During the forty-plus years of the Cold War, the United States pursued a national
security strategy of containment. Its scope and scale were enormous, driving
global U.S. policy for decades and absorbing tremendous amounts of time, money
and effort. The overarching strategy of containment served as the guiding

3
The White House released the most recent National Security Strategy of the United States on December 18th, 2017.
All 17 National Security Strategies of the United States are archived at http://nssarchive.us/.
4
Harry R. Yarger, “Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model,” in U.S.
Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy, 3d ed. (Carlisle, PA:
U.S. Army War College, 2008), p. 45.

2
 framework for subsidiary strategies aimed at addressing specific regional and
functional security challenges. Thus strategies such as the Marshall Plan for the
reconstruction of Europe, the American wars in Korea and Vietnam, and the U.S.
space program were guided by the overarching containment strategy.

In 1994, the Clinton Administration promulgated A National Security Strategy of

Engagement and Enlargement. Its aim was to enhance security by maintaining a
strong defense capability and promoting cooperative security measures; open
foreign markets and spur global economic growth; and promote democracy
abroad. This overarching National Security Strategy was supplemented by
regional and functional strategies throughout the two Clinton administrations.
Those strategies dealt with specific security challenges such as the expansion of
NATO, the enactment of NAFTA, and intervention in the Third Balkan War of
1991-2001. 5

4. The Role of the National Security Council (NSC) and the NSC Staff. The National
Security Council (NSC) is the President’s principal forum for considering and coordinating
national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet
officials. The NSC staff, headed by the National Security Adviser, serves as the President’s
national security and foreign policy staff within the White House. Typically, the NSC is
responsible for developing the overarching National Security Strategy. Specific regional and
functional strategies, however, often originate in particular executive departments, agencies or
services. At some point, proposed strategies will make their way into the NSC’s interagency
review and coordination process, and will go before the NSC itself for final review and approval.
Their genesis, however, and their early drafts will likely be the work of a single strategist or
small team working within a component of one of the executive departments, agencies, or
services. That reality reinforces the need for a cadre of professionals across the national security
establishment capable of developing national security strategies. Students should be mindful that
one of the criteria often used to assess their NWC papers is whether the product is of sufficient
quality for review by the NSC Staff without revision.

5. Introduction to Strategic Logic. Development and execution of national security strategy

demands the ability to think strategically. Thinking strategically entails applying the five
following fundamental elements of strategic logic.

• Analyzing the strategic SITUATION (the challenge and its context)

• Defining the desired ENDS (the outcomes sought), to include first defining the overarching
political aim, and then the specific objectives required to achieve it
• Identifying and/or developing the MEANS (resources and capabilities) to bring to bear
• Designing the WAYS to use the means to achieve the desired ends
• Assessing the COSTS/RISKS associated with the strategy

5
The 17 National Security Strategies of the United States are accessible at http://nssarchive.us. The site also
includes links to subordinate strategies (i.e., the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy). The site
is maintained by the Taylor Group, a national security consulting firm unaffiliated with the U.S. Government or any
foreign government.

3
Applying this logic demands the highest levels of critical thinking, insight, and judgment, as well
as the courage to act on that judgment. Each of the elements of strategic logic entails numerous
questions that should be addressed to produce an effective strategy. Unfortunately, the strategist
can find definitive answers to only some of those questions. For the rest, the strategist must rely
on assumptions. In developing strategies, unknown factors often outnumber those that are
known. Thus, the strategist always operates in an atmosphere of widespread uncertainty and
ambiguity. Carl von Clausewitz, the early nineteenth century Prussian general and military
theorist who features prominently in the NWC curriculum, spoke to the qualities the strategist
needs to operate in this atmosphere when he opined on military genius:

If the mind is to emerge unscathed

from this relentless struggle with
the unforeseen, two qualities are
indispensable: first, an intellect that,
even in the darkest hour, retains
some glimmerings of the inner light
which leads to truth; and second,
the courage to follow this faint light
wherever it may lead. 6

Clausewitz was writing about the

unforeseeable future, but even the
present is not fully knowable.
Strategists must address critical
uncertainties, whether about the
future or the present, with
assumptions. These could be
assumptions about specific but
unknown facts (truths), about cause and effect, about the influence of time on the challenge at
hand, and about the consequences of inaction or about certain courses of action.

While listing the elements of strategic logic makes that logic appear linear, developing strategy
actually is a much more complex, multi-dimensional, iterative, and often imprecise process. One
useful way to visualize the interrelationships of the elements of strategic logic is shown in the
accompanying diagram. It depicts the strategic situation as a cloud, because like a cloud, it is
amorphous, ever-shifting, and considerably opaque. Comprising that cloud are considerations
such as the problem’s parameters, international and domestic conditions that bear on the
problem, one’s national interests and political aims, threats to those interests and aims (or
opportunities for advancing them), constraints on one’s freedom of action, the most critical
assumptions about the dynamics of the problem confronted, and any other factors important to
the strategic situation that surrounds the problem being addressed. It is essential to maintain
intellectual agility while applying the steps of strategic logic.

6
von Clausewitz, Carl, On War (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976) p. 102

4
The key to developing a strategy for dealing with a problem lies in devising an ends-ways-
means-costs/risks relationship that accommodates the strategic situation and will produce the
overall outcome desired. The ends are the political aim(s) sought and their specific objectives,
the means are the resources, power and capabilities available or able to be developed, and the
ways are how means will be used to achieve the ends. Costs are the price one has to pay—
financially and otherwise—to execute one’s strategy, and risks are developments that could go
wrong and work to one’s disadvantage. To emphasize, the diagram portrays the ends-ways-
means-costs/risks as circular rather than linear. The circular relationship stresses the need to
consider each element in relation to all the others. The strategist must consider the ends with
reference to the available means, possible ways, and likely risks and costs. This principle also
applies to each of the other elements of the ends-ways-means-costs/risks formulation. Finally,
the circular relationship indicates that there is no end to the process; the strategist must
continually go back and iteratively reassess the strategy across its execution.

5
 CHAPTER II
ANALYZING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION
1. General. Every security challenge occurs within a broader strategic context. Analyzing that
context and the situation, in general, is the first step in applying strategic logic. For the NSS, the
strategic situation encompasses the most important conditions and dynamics that bear on current
and future U.S. security across the globe. For an associated regional or functional strategy, the
strategist must assess how widely to cast the analytical net. As with the NSS, the goal is to
capture the most important conditions and dynamics that bear on the challenge being addressed.
Critically, the strategist must be discerning with the available information. Too much peripheral
information can obscure rather than clarify the strategic situation. As importantly, the strategist
must assess the information’s ramifications for possible strategic approaches. As ever, the
strategist must answer both the “what” and the “so what” questions.

2. Assumptions are Pivotal. Assumptions, which are suppositions taken as true in the absence
of proof, are essential in the analysis of the situation. Despite today’s information-rich
environment, there are significant limits on what anyone can know about any particular strategic
situation. Consequently, strategists must address uncertainties with assumptions. Strategies are
necessarily built on assumptions about opponent capabilities, the dynamics of the international
situation, and the most important aspects of one’s domestic situation. Assumptions also help
define one’s own interests, what threatens them, and how. Assumptions about an opponent’s
interests and intentions are equally important, as are assumptions about the cause and effect of
potential actions, the role of time, and the likely outcomes, costs and risks of those actions. In
short, assumptions enable and shape the development of any successful national security
strategy. Made purposefully, deliberatively, and with appropriate caution, they can promote
strategic success. Made unwittingly or with inadequate reflection, they can undermine the entire
strategic process. Perhaps the most dangerous assumptions are the ones made unwittingly when
one fails to question what one seemingly knows to be true. Assumptions surface throughout the
development of a strategy, but the strategist should identify explicitly and separately those
assumptions most essential to a strategy’s success, along with their implications and some
explicit characterization of the strategist’s level of confidence in each of those key assumptions.
Assumptions should be identified and assessed throughout the strategic logic process.

3. The International and Domestic Contexts. The strategic logic process begins with an
assessment of the international and domestic contexts or strategic environment.

• International Context. Elements in the international context powerfully shape both the
situation at hand and possible approaches to dealing with it. The strategist must identify
the most important regional and global conditions and dynamics that bear on the nature
of the situation at hand and the range of potential strategic responses.

• Domestic Context. A state’s own domestic context can either enhance or inhibit the
ability to develop a strategy for a particular challenge. Thus, the strategist must identify
domestic political, economic, bureaucratic, social/cultural, and technological factors that
are likely to help or hinder both the strategy-making effort, and its viability once
executed. Particularly important is the strategist’s judgment of how robust a strategic
6
 effort the nation’s economy can support, and at what point the national will might falter
in the face of a costly and protracted strategic effort.

• Constraints. Constraints are tangible and intangible factors that limit strategic freedom
of action. Insufficient means, whether in the form of diminished elements of power or
weak institutions and actors, are often difficult to overcome. The element of time
potentially poses a constraint on action. Also, policy, legal and normative boundaries can
present constraints, whether imposed from within the state or externally. Explicitly
stating the most important constraints on freedom of action helps ensure the strategist
takes each into account fully when designing the strategic approach.

• Problem Statement. To provide definitive focus for the development of a strategy, a

clear, concise problem statement is essential. To begin, the strategist should identify the
salient characteristics of the strategic situation that are causing it to capture the
strategist’s attention. What is it all about? What are the current conditions that make the
strategic situation appear unsatisfactory or promising and call for concerted action?
Note: After completing a thorough analysis of the strategic situation, the strategist
would do well to revisit and refine the problem statement.

4. Interests, Threats and Opportunities. National interests are best understood as fundamental
and enduring needs or wants the pursuit of which promote a state’s well-being and guide its
actions. National interests can be categorized broadly as: security, prosperity, and principles (or
values). For the sake of clarity, interests should not be viewed as finite achievable ends, but
instead as enduring, unachievable guides. For example, a state may determine its security is not
immediately at risk and thus place emphasis on the pursuit of other interests. Such was the
situation in the U.S. following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This does not mean that security
is no longer an interest or that is has been “achieved” but instead that, based on the current
conditions, pursuit of additional security may not be as important as needs/wants associated with
other interests. When context changes, security may again take primacy.

Often condition statements are used to articulate a state of affairs that is understood to be in the
national interest. For example, a condition statement representative of U.S. interests may be
written as “A United States that is secure, at peace, stable, and prosperous in a world that
respects the rule of law and international norms of behavior.” Condition statements may be
written very broadly like the one above, or more narrowly associated with a specific situation or
event. Whether written as a condition statement or described as a pure interest, strategists must
define precisely and concisely the interest(s) the nation has at stake in the challenge to be
addressed by a national security strategy. Moreover, when dealing with a specific challenge the
strategist should, to the maximum degree possible, refine the interests at stake to those of the
highest priority. This emphasis will keep the strategy tightly focused on what matters most for
the nation.

• Valuing Interests. Having defined the nation’s interests in a particular situation, the
strategist must assess the value of those interests. That evaluation helps determine the
level of energy, effort, and resources to expend in preserving, protecting, or advancing
the interests at stake. There is no generally accepted valuation scale for interests, but the

7
 following three-level scale works well. “Vital” interests are ones that a state will use
force or risk war to protect. While survival of the state is certainly a vital interest, there
may be other vital interests at stake even when the survival of the state is not threatened.
That said, given the significant implications connoted by “vital interests,” the strategist
should be very careful in using the term “vital” or in accepting others’ use of the term to
describe interests. An “important” or “major” interest is one that would see the state
weakened if it did not take action to protect or preserve that interest. Finally, a
“peripheral” interest is one that is desirable but is valued less in terms of costs or risks.
Whatever valuation scheme a strategist uses, the definitions of the various levels are
necessarily imprecise and a matter of judgment. As valuation of an interest can change
over time, regularly reassessing the value of interests is essential. Moreover, it is difficult
to value interests in the abstract; thus valuing interests may only become meaningful in a
specific context in which those interests are threatened or in which one has an
opportunity to advance them. Finally, political leaders have in the past and will continue
to differ in their judgments over the valuation of interests (or in their judgements about
threats to those interests). Such differences will almost certainly manifest themselves
during the change from one presidential administration to the next and in multinational
and interagency strategy-making.

• Threats. Fundamentally, a situation is threatening only if it endangers some aspect of a

national interest. Thus, determining whether and to what degree a situation threatens a
U.S. national interest is crucial. This question should serve as a point of departure when
assessing any strategic situation. As with interests, the strategist derives real advantage by
prioritizing threats based on analysis of which are most dangerous or most likely. This
prioritization helps keep the strategy focused on what is most important. The strategist
must also develop a scheme for assessing the seriousness of threats. Used in combination
with the strategist’s assessments of the value of the interest, this can provide important
additional insight about the most appropriate strategic approach to dealing with the
challenge. A significant threat to a vital national interest will call for a different response
than a negligible threat to a peripheral national interest. Threats pose perceivable harm to
a state’s interests. The following abstract formula may be useful in assessing threats:
Threat = Capability (theirs) x Will (theirs) x Vulnerability (ours). Conceptually, the
higher the values, the greater the threat.

• Opportunities. National security strategists should recognize when the strategic situation
affords an opportunity to advance a national interest. Having defined the national
interests at stake in a particular security challenge, the strategist may not see a threat to
those interests. Instead, the situation may present an opportunity to advance the interests
at stake. It is important, however, not to confuse opportunities with the advantages that
derive from dealing successfully with a threat. If a situation presents threats, it likely
doesn’t present opportunities associated with those threats, e.g., opportunities should not
be thought of as the flip-side of threats, the desired state of affairs after successfully
dealing with the threats, or the asymmetric advantages one enjoys for addressing the
threats. Like threats, however, opportunities exist in relation to national interests, and the
strategist should be no less rigorous in defining and distilling opportunities in a concise,

8
 coherent strategy. After all, national security strategies for cooperating with one’s allies
and trading partners are usually opportunity-based strategies rather than threat-based.

5. Personal and Cognitive Bias Awareness. Human beings naturally bring with them certain
worldviews that inevitably shape their perceptions. Worldviews are neither inherently good nor
bad. They develop over time, and are shaped by countless factors, to include one’s education,
experiences, values and cultural mores. Worldviews are shaped by assumptions, and since they
inevitably affect one’s ideas and attitudes about strategic-level problems and solutions, they
introduce considerable bias into the strategy development process. Another source of bias is the
fact that strategists tend to agree with people who agree with them, and to over-scrutinize or
dismiss those who do not. The need for social acceptance can lead to in-group bias, just as their
preference for the status quo can inordinately affect their perceptions of change. Past negative
experiences tend to outweigh lessons from positive ones, and people tend to believe that other
people and cultures think like they do. Given the stakes at hand, national security strategists
should be cognizant of such biases, particularly as they apply to themselves.

9
 CHAPTER III
DEFINING THE DESIRED ENDS
1. The Role of National Interests in Defining Ends. National interests should be the primary
driver of ends when addressing a security challenge. They also provide the benchmark against
which to assess threats to the nation, or opportunities for advancing the nation’s well-being. Yet
national interests are generally too broad and amorphous to provide a concrete goal for a specific
national security strategy. Strategies that set national interests as their goal run the risk of lacking
a clear aim and thus diffusing effort.

2. Political Aim(s). A security challenge constitutes an external situation that a nation finds
either troubling or promising. The purpose of national security strategy is to reshape the
challenging circumstance into a state of affairs that is either less troubling or more promising.
That desired end-state, or outcome, is the political aim of a national security strategy, and it
provides a well-defined focus for developing the strategy. 7 Identifying the national interest(s) at
stake in a particular strategic challenge clarifies why dealing with that challenge is important.
The political aim defines the outcome the strategist believes will preserve, protect, and/or
advance the national interest(s) at stake. A political aim should be clear, coherent, and
achievable.

In establishing the political aim, the strategist must consider costs, risks, and constraints that
could make that aim less viable. Indeed, in crafting a statement of the political aim for a strategy,
a strategist must remain mindful of outcomes or conditions that must be avoided. If such
outcomes or conditions do exist, they should also be and explicitly articulated in the strategy.
The strategist must also ensure the political aim—the desired outcome—attenuates, if not fully
eliminates, the threat to interests. Where an opportunity to advance interests presents itself, the
strategist must ensure the political aim exploits it.

At times, domestic political or policy considerations may prompt an administration to define a

political aim with respect to a particular security challenge without having had the benefit of a
rigorous, detailed analysis of the strategic situation. In such instances, the strategist is provided
the political aim and crafts the most viable strategy feasible to achieve it. Nonetheless, the
strategist must conduct a rigorous, detailed analysis of the strategic situation. If that analysis
leads the strategist to believe the political aim is not feasible, the strategist should be willing and
able to make that case to the national leadership.

3. Specific Objectives. Having identified the outcome the strategy aims to achieve—the
political aim—the strategist now has to specify how to reach that goal. To do this, the strategist
develops specific objectives that, when accomplished in combination, will achieve the desired
political aim.

7
In discussing the relationship between war, policy and politics, Clausewitz identifies political aim (translated, at
times, as political object) as the national-level objective. For instance, he says, “The political object is the goal, war
is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. “ (Carl von
Clausewitz, Carl, On War (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976), edited and translated by
Michael Howard and Peter Paret. p. 87). The conception of political aim used herein follows Clausewitz’s general
logic though we refer to all means available to a nation, not just war.

10
Coherence in a strategy results from a tight linkage between the national interests at stake, the
political aim pursued to secure those interests, and the specific objectives that address threats or
opportunities to achieve the political aim, thereby protecting or furthering national interests.

The most important characteristics of a sound objective are precision and brevity. It must clearly
describe what needs to be accomplished, and it must do so with no wasted verbiage. Ambiguous
objectives fail to provide sufficient focus for the strategy, and verbose objectives open the door
to misperceptions and diversions of effort. There is no standard for how many objectives a
strategist should formulate for a particular security challenge. The nature of both the challenge
and the political aim will shape that. As a general rule, fewer and broader—while still precise—
objectives will help keep the strategy focused on the desired political aim and will address the
most important threats and/or opportunities.

11
 CHAPTER IV
IDENTIFYING AND/OR DEVELOPING THE MEANS
1. The Means of National Security Strategy. The third element in strategic logic is
identification of means needed to achieve objectives and produce the desired political aim. In
short, means are the capabilities and resources one can bring to bear in the effort to produce
the desired political aim. Sometimes adequate means are available; other times they must be
developed. There are three components to the means in national security strategy: elements of
power, institutions/actors, and the instruments of power.

2. Elements of Power. The elements of power consist

of those tangible and intangible factors that undergird
the ability of a state or non-state actor to achieve its
political aims. There is no universally agreed list of the
elements, and much scholarship exists on what, in fact,
constitutes national power. 8 However, any list of the
elements of power would likely include those shown
here. Most important is not the exact composition of the
list, but the recognition that the means of national security strategy rest on fundamental elements
of power. The ability of a state or non-state actor to effectively convert elements of power into
specific capabilities that can be used to pursue political aims is crucial to its strategic success.

Although listing elements makes them appear distinct, they are overlapping and interdependent
and must be considered in relation to one another. They defy simple definition, and their
importance is always relative to a given strategic situation. In general, a state’s natural resources,
geography, economy, infrastructure, and industrial base are traditionally recognized as
“foundational” elements of power—those that are critical for supporting other strategic actions.
Human capital encompasses demographics, which can include population size, birth rates,
immigration trends, and levels of education. Governance refers to matters such as political
structure, effectiveness, and might include the population’s mood, its view of what the nation’s
aims and objectives ought to be, and what sacrifices it is willing to make to achieve them. A
nation’s level of research, development, and technology encompasses a state’s capability to
innovate. Like national will, culture is a particularly broad concept that is difficult to measure but
can play an important role in the state’s ability to build and project power. Culture may also
shape a nation’s international reputation, which reflects the perceptions of foreign institutions,
actors, and individuals. 9

Strategists should evaluate whether their strategies, when implemented, will add to or detract
from their nation’s elements of power. States should avoid embarking on a strategic course of
action if it will ultimately diminish national power rather than preserve or supplement it.

3. Institutions and Actors. National security strategists often look to selected government
institutions and actors, such as the Department of State or Defense, to achieve objectives and

8
“Elements of Power” may also be described as “correlates of power.”
9
Though not included in the chart, in the modern environment, data may also be considered an element of power.

12
produce outcomes that are tied to a strategy’s political aim. Depending
on the situation, however, other institutions and actors may be
appropriate. The accompanying list illustrates a range of public, private,
domestic, international, and other organizations and actors that may
contribute to a strategy’s success through formal, semi-formal, or
informal relationships.

“International Governmental Organizations” (IGOs) and “International

Financial Institutions” (IFIs) are entities such as the United Nations and
the International Monetary Fund, respectively. “Quasi-Governmental”
organizations are partially state-owned or run, but operate with broader
independence; one example is the United States Institute for Peace.
“Partners” refers to foreign governments, their agencies, and personnel.
“Proxies” refers to non-governmental foreign partners who, through
their actions, directly or indirectly implement a nation’s strategy; the
Mujahedeen and the Contras are two historic examples for the U.S;
Hezbollah is a current example for Iran. Used here, the term “media” refers to the full spectrum
of reporters, bloggers, journalists, and virtually any other person or agency that broadcasts,
prints, or uploads any form of news; it also includes the entertainment industry, again broadly
construed. “Business” is another wide-ranging term that represents all forms of private or state-
owned commercial enterprises. Used here, “civil society” includes charities, unions, private
organizations, political parties, religious groups, non-commercial firms, and civic groups. Some
of those groups are similar to “Non-Governmental Organizations” (NGOs), which include not-
for-profit, voluntary citizens’ groups organized at a local, national, or international level.
“Empowered individuals” are persons relied upon by national-level strategists, independent of
any institutional affiliations; examples could include celebrities, other persons of notoriety, and
philanthropists—some of whom may be virtually unknown.

None of the above institutions or actors hold a monopoly on particular instruments of power.
While it is helpful to recognize institutional capabilities, resources, and missions, it can be
counterproductive for strategists to bind any institution or actor too tightly to a specific
instrument. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense is the institution most closely tied to
the U.S. military instrument of power, and most of its capabilities and missions are associated
with the application of the military instrument. However, The DoD can and does also wield the
diplomatic instrument, the information instrument, and at times the economic instrument. The
strategist that assumes the DoD is synonymous with the military instrument is assuming away a
range of capabilities that could be crucial to achieving the desired ends.

4. The Instruments of Power (DIME). Actors and institutions pursue objectives by wielding
four primary instruments—diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME)—to project
power; each instrument comprises a set of fundamental capabilities, which are noted in the
accompanying figure. 10 The strategists’ challenge is to determine what combination of those

10
The DIME model is one of several approaches to capturing the instruments of power. DIME is used in both U.S.
Joint Doctrine and the doctrine of various other countries. Another common acronym is DIMEFIL, which
represents the instruments of power as Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and
Law Enforcement. Consistent with U.S. Doctrine, the Primer incorporates “FIL” within DIME.

13
capabilities is best suited to deal with the situation at hand; this effort requires understanding the
utility of each instrument: what are its capabilities and limitations given a particular situation,
what are the best concepts and methods for how to use it, and what are its costs and risks.

• The Diplomatic Instrument. Diplomacy is sometimes

described as “the outward expression of foreign policy”—the
effort to provide real-time coordination of all the other
instruments. This definition is appealing to practitioners
because it captures the lead roles of both senior diplomats in
formulating foreign policy and of embassies in executing it
overseas. Yet, this perspective conflates diplomacy with both
policy and statecraft. This conflation makes it difficult to
understand diplomacy as an independent instrument of
statecraft. A significantly more limited and operational
definition as used in the DIME construct looks at diplomacy as
official engagement—how a state formally interacts with state
or non-state actors. This interaction takes many forms, running
the gamut from officially conveying threats, imposing
sanctions, and declaring war (“hard” or “coercive”
diplomacy), to identifying shared interests, building alliances,
and negotiating or sustaining agreements. Types of
engagement can be roughly characterized in three ways:
representation, negotiation, and implementation.

‒ Representation (explaining and advocating). The most common diplomatic acts

involve the day to day building of relationships and engaging foreign counterparts to
describe, defend, or forward a position and seek responses that support, or at least do
not contradict, it. These actions help to ensure that others feel their views are heard
and ensure others understand U.S. policy.

‒ Negotiation. As a principal method for producing strategic results, negotiation is the

generally give and take process to reach an agreement that resolves a problem/conflict
or works to the mutual advantage of the parties involved. At a more mundane level, it
also involves developing technical parameters on how countries, government entities,
companies, and even individuals should proceed with transnational interactions.

‒ Implementation (including of agreements). Diplomacy includes implementation

actions as well as reaching agreement. Just as agreement takes many different forms
(e.g., bilateral statements, joint communiqués, partnerships, and legal treaty
commitments), follow-up activities shape and manage the ensuing environment.
Examples include maintaining a coalition, providing technical assistance, strategic
dialogues, treaty verification, and may include certain aspects of national and
international law enforcement.

A wide variety of institutions and actors can conduct diplomacy. The Department of State
is the principal institution for conducting diplomacy on behalf of the United States, but it

14
 is not the only actor. For example, the President and the White House staff engage with
the offices of heads of state in other countries to collect and convey information about
strategic intent. Similarly, Department of Defense officials meet with foreign
counterparts to discuss military cooperation but also to defuse tensions, build
relationships, and negotiate agreements. Treasury, Commerce, and Trade representatives
pursue economic objectives via diplomatic means when they engage foreign officials to
secure commercial deals, reach agreement on trade or imposing sanctions, or coordinate
decisions of International Financial Institutions (IFIs). And the Intelligence Community
engages domestic and foreign counterparts in a variety of information-sharing initiatives
to build relationships in addition to addressing shared security concerns. Parallel
organizations in other states conduct similar diplomatic activities.

• The Informational Instrument The information instrument encompasses a wide range

of concepts: cyber, intelligence, public diplomacy, strategic communications,
psychological and influence operations, and propaganda, among others and is wielded by
an even broader range of actors, from the government, to academia, businesses, civil
society, and many more. Despite the range of concepts and actors involved, the nature of
the information instrument revolves around the pillars of perception, distribution, and
control of knowledge. As with all the instruments, in application these pillars function
more as an overlapping continuum than perfectly distinct categories.

‒ Perceive involves accurately understanding the world as it is, it has two aspects; first
the collection, processing, integration, analyzing, and interpretation of available
information. The impact of the first aspect of perceiving the world is exemplified in
former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill attribution of the Allied victory in
World War II to the Ultra Program, which deciphered German encryption and
allowed the Allies to read German war plans prior to execution. This first aspect,
centered around, but not limited to, the intelligence community, is more institutional
than instrumental. In other words it relates to the creation, maintenance, or enabling
of power rather than the direct wielding of power. The second aspect of perception
relates to external recognition of a state’s ability to accurately understand the world.
The perception that an adversary has a robust ability to identify and understand
creates a powerful constraint that can, itself be wielded to influence target behavior.

‒ Inform consists of the persuasive transmission of knowledge to an audience of

choice. It rests on the connectivity with an audience, the content of the message, and
cognitive impact of the information. Many aspects of inform are embodied in the
concept of Strategic communication which involves efforts to understand and engage
key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the
advancement of one’s interests, policies, and objectives through the use of
coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products. Yet inform may also
include more passive, soft, or informal forms of knowledge transmission, such as
cultural/social structures, public media, exchange programs and narratives.
Successful dissemination of a message is based on myriad contextual factors,

15
 including trust in the sender, relation of the sender to the message, preconceptions of
the audience, culture, language, method of transmission, capability and durability of
transmission systems.

‒ Control focuses on the destruction, manipulation, and restriction of information to

produce a desired effect. Control has two broad aspects; corrupt and deny. Corrupt
involves destruction, manipulation, or usurpation of information to prevent a target
from accurately perceiving or responding to a situation, persuasively disseminating
their own message, or controlling the friendly information environment. Deny
involves the restriction of unfriendly information from one’s own information
environment. Control is partly encapsulated in the doctrinal definition of Information
operations which entail efforts by one party to deny another the ability to acquire and
use information, and to protect and enhance its own ability to do the same.
Information control involves actively disrupting perception and/or interdicting
dissemination of rival state and actor communications, conducting deception
operations, many offensive cyber activities, propaganda, and other actions intended to
restrict, manipulate, or destroy information to control behavior or perception of a
target.
As the internet, social media, and information/technical infrastructure have expanded
over the past quarter-century, and as more activity has shifted to cyberspace, information
has become an increasingly critical aspect of state power. Today, state and non-state
actors work to exploit new technical information capabilities; autocratic states broadly
project propaganda and disinformation; and terrorist groups exploit social media and
other digital means to spread their messages, recruit armies, and elicit funds. Perhaps
most significantly, virtually all critical infrastructure—civilian and military—in the
developed world is attached to computer networks. The ubiquity and permeability of
cyberspace create vulnerabilities that states and non-state actors exploit to their advantage
and overlook at their peril. Cyberspace, however, is not synonymous with the information
instrument; it is a domain through which information can flow and in which certain types
of information operations can take place. It is difficult to assess how information will
develop as an element and an instrument of state power in the long run, yet current trends
point toward its ever-increasing importance.

• The Military Instrument. The military instrument of power entails applying, threatening
to apply, or enabling other parties to apply or threaten to apply force in furtherance of
political aims. The use of the military instrument in war is potentially the most dangerous
action a state can undertake; strategists and leaders should apply it only with a clear
understanding and assessment of its nature, capabilities, limitations, and costs/risks.
Though there are no universally accepted definitions of the aspects of the military
instrument, the concepts of "Force,” “Threat of Force,” and “Force Enabling” capture its
essence and provide an appropriate framework for such assessment.

‒ Force is the application of violence by one party to coerce, subdue or eradicate

another, and it can occur in any domain (Land, Sea, Air, Space, and Cyber). Force

16
 may include overt, clandestine, and covert activities; small-unit actions; single
targeted strikes; employment of proxies; the use of destructive cyber power; or any
other activity in which violence is applied to achieve political aims and their
associated specific objectives.

‒ Threat of force is used to modify coercively an adversary’s current behavior or

shape its future actions. Like force, the threat of force is used to achieve political
aims, it can be used either defensively/preventatively to deter an adversary from
initiating damaging action for fear of the consequences, or offensively to compel an
adversary into ceasing damaging action or giving up something of value. 11 In either
case, the key determinant of effectiveness is credibility; the adversary must believe in
both one’s capability and willingness to make good on the threat. Moreover, the
threat of force can be explicit or implicit; diplomats and heads of state frequently
express or imply it in diplomatic messages, adding weight to the diplomatic
instrument of power.

‒ Force enabling consists of improving the capacity/capability of international partners

to apply or threaten force and encompasses a wide array of concepts. It may be used
to help state or non-state actors bolster their military capability, to improve state or
regional security, to enhance elements or institutions of military power, to make an
allied or aligned state a more effective partner, or to link a foreign state to one’s own
by way of military cooperation. Force enabling activities are frequently, though not
exclusively, conducted by the armed forces and intelligence services. Such efforts
often tie closely the diplomatic, information, and economic instruments.

• The Economic Instrument: As an element of power, the economy—national wealth

and prosperity, serves as a key foundation. A large economy is an important (but not
individually sufficient) factor enabling a state to develop effective institutions. The larger
and more productive a state’s economy, the more resources available to convert into
institutions, fund external operations, and offer as inducements. A large economy also
empowers the various instruments, by its very existence strengthening the ability of the
instruments to effective external change. The national security strategist must critically
assess both the positive and negative effects that a proposed strategy may have on
national economies. Strategies that jeopardize economic health should be chosen warily,
with a clear view of the vital interests at stake.

As an instrument, economic tools focus on either furthering or constraining others’

prosperity (economy), or on influencing key groups and decision-makers. Thus, there are
three major categories of the economic instrument that a state can wield when attempting
to affect outcomes in the foreign policy realm: trade, finance, and assistance.

‒ Assistance is money, goods, materiel, or service’s given by one state or non-state

actor directly to another. Assistance can be used to improve the target’s
11
The classic discussion on the distinction of these two forms of coercion is: Schelling, Thomas C., Arms and
Influence, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) pp. 69-78

17
 capability/capacity in a specific sector, as budget support, as humanitarian support,
and to develop goodwill or ties to support a longer term relationship or induce short-
term actions; it can be either directed (i.e. “with strings attached”) or undirected.
Relative to private capital flows, private philanthropy, and diaspora remittances, state
to state assistance has become a smaller and smaller proportion of assistance to poor
nations in the past 50 years. However, assistance is still a relevant and potentially
useful category of the economic instrument power

‒ Trade of goods and services has the potential to increase the wealth and prosperity of
trading partners. Limits or restrictions on trade (including sanctions and tariffs) harm
or threaten to harm an adversary’s economy. Conversely, trade agreements or reduced
tariffs can be inducements for certain desirable foreign policy outcomes. Although
trade is normally considered mutually beneficial, a state must carefully consider the
potential harm to its own economic prosperity when considering trade restrictions as
an instrument of state policy. A state may also want to consider the role of private
and state owned enterprises in the projection of state power and the potential direct
and indirect influences such enterprises may have.

‒ Finance and access to capital markets is required for modern businesses to undertake
investments to increase productive capacity, and also for modern governments to
provide expected services (e.g., infrastructure, health, welfare, education) to their
citizens. Financial lending, investment, and capital flows are necessary for the
macroeconomic stability of states and the entire global economy. Restricting or
impeding access to finance and banking systems or manipulating investments can
achieve political aims or objectives, but like trade restrictions, a state must carefully
consider the potential harm to its own and its allies/partners’ economic prosperity
(and reputation as an impartial financial entity) when considering using financial
tools to wield the economic instrument.

Strategists should consider the nature of their own state’s economy and that of their
allies/partners’ as well as that of the target state or entity. The more that a state’s
economic activity is privately controlled (by proportion) and the more it relies on free-
market forces to generate economic prosperity, the less direct ability it has to shape its
own trade and financial activities to suit particular strategic purposes. In such situations,
the less confident strategists should be that trade, financial, or aid actions will be able to
produce a particular strategic effect on a target country.

5. Interrelationships among the Three Components of the Means. National security

strategists need to appreciate how the means’ three components—elements, instruments/actors,
and instruments—relate to each other. The elements of power are the “raw material” or “the bank
account” states use to create institutions and/or to enable the instruments of power. But because
these elements are inevitably finite (though non-linear and non-zero sum), a state must also use
its institutions and instruments to develop, protect, and conserve them. Preserving the elements

18
therefore sustains the state’s power; if one or
more elements is significantly diminished—
whether through strategic inattention, adversary
action, or the pursuit of strategies that are too
costly—relative decline could ensue. The
relationship between the elements and the
institutions/instruments is important, but so too is
the direct relationship between institutions and the
instruments. It is the fundamental capabilities of
the instruments, employed by appropriate
institutions and actors, and brought to bear in
appropriate combinations, that produce effects to
resolve security challenges and achieve desired
political aims. Put more simply, institutions and
actors wield the instruments in pursuit of the
state’s political aims. Thus, for example, it is not
armed forces that produce effects; instead, the use
of force, threat of force or enabling of force
produces effects. Similarly, it is not diplomats that
produce effects; instead, it is the use of
representation, negotiation, or implementation
that produce effects. In other words it is the
activity not the actor that produces effect.

6. Employing Means/Developing Means. At the National Security Strategy (NSS) level,

strategists examine not only the current global security situation, but also the desired situation for
the nation in the future. This analysis requires considering not just the means needed to achieve
political aims today, but also the means (elements, actors and institutions, and instruments) that
the nation will need in the years ahead; these may include alliances, specific military
capabilities, international agreements, critical infrastructure, or an educated workforce trained
with particular skills.

Strategies designed to respond to specific security challenges frequently require considering how
to implement them within the bounds of existing means. Occasionally, however, the challenge
may be of sufficient magnitude and with a sufficiently long anticipated timeline that a strategy
can both employ the means at hand and include an effort to develop new means. For example,
America’s ultimate political aim in the Pacific during World War II was Japan’s unconditional
surrender. In the months immediately after Pearl Harbor, U.S. strategy focused on employing
existing means to blunt further Japanese advances. That effort bought time for the United States
to mobilize and innovate, which eventually created vastly increased and significantly more
advanced military capabilities. Together, mobilization and the development of advanced
technology enabled the United States to create the military means needed to achieve its political
aim. Similarly, as part of the U.S. strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union during the Cold
War, President John F. Kennedy established the goal of a manned mission to the Moon. That
effort spawned a national space program that enhanced America’s elements of power. As a result
of the space program, the United States strengthened its geography (occupying key points in

19
space), R & D and technology, human capital, international reputation, and national culture.
These newly developed means were crucial to the long-term strategy of the U.S. to defeat the
Soviet Union.

20
 CHAPTER V
DESIGNING THE WAYS
1. General. Designing the ways to achieve the political aim and its specific objectives is the
fourth element in strategic logic. Whereas “identifying the means” focuses on with what,
“designing ways” addresses how. In deciding how to use the selected means (elements,
institutions/actors, and instruments) to achieve the political aim and its specific objectives, the
national security strategist must answer—and continuously revisit—the following four
fundamental questions. First, what fundamental strategic approach(s) is most suitable? Second,
within that fundamental strategic approach, which modes of action seems most promising (e.g.,
direct vs. indirect, or sequential vs. cumulative)? Third, given the answers to the first two
questions, which instruments and institutions are best suited to help secure the political aim, and
what institutions should wield them in that endeavor? Finally, how will the strategist orchestrate
the selected instruments to achieve the desired ends?

2. Fundamental Strategic Approaches. The process of formulating the

ways for a strategy will likely begin with consideration of the most
appropriate strategic approach(s) for dealing with the national security
challenge at hand. Strategic approaches fall roughly along a spectrum from
virtually no action to the near absolute eradication of an opponent. The
accompanying box lists the fundamental strategic approaches a strategist
could choose to pursue, ranging from least to most aggressive. The dashed
line in the box demarcates a critical decision point in the formulation of a
strategy—the point at which the strategist is considering approaches that
include the potential use or threatened use of force. In selecting the
appropriate approach, the strategist must take into account the interests at
stake, the strategic context, the political aim and its objectives, and the
available means. Conversely, once chosen, the approach should guide
employment of the selected instruments. Finally, the strategist must
continually revisit whether the chosen strategic approach is effective. Once a
state or non-state actor puts a particular strategy into effect, the strategic
situation may change, often in unanticipated—and at times almost
unimaginable—ways. As that happens, the strategist must rethink whether the initial approach
continues to suit the situation and will achieve the political aim with the available means at
acceptable levels of cost and risk. Potentially, the strategist must also consider if the situation
has changed to such a dramatic degree that the desired political aim is no longer viable. Below is
a list of strategic approaches, further defining the terms in the box to the right:

• Observe is the least active strategic approach and is often appropriate when threats to
interests are minimal, international partners independently address an issue sufficiently,
or when assessed costs and risks of greater action outweigh potential benefits.

• Accommodate means acceding to others’ interests/aims with the belief that acceding will
limit or prevent additional competition or conflict. Though this approach has certain
negative connotations it may be the most appropriate if the level of interest at stake does
not support the risks/costs of a more confrontational approach. Depending on the

21
 situation, accommodation can take multiple forms, including appeasement, adaptation,
abrogation, retraction, abandonment, etc.

• Shape is often a means building approach, intended to engender a more beneficial

environment. This approach may be most appropriate when threats are not clear or
immediate/severe and an opportunity creates a chance to mold the strategic situation in
one's favor.

• Persuade generally entails trying to convince another actor through force of argument.
Persuasion is primarily viable where the parties’ interests align or significantly overlap;
its utility is otherwise limited. Successful persuasion generally creates ideological
agreement and thus can lead to a stronger partnership than more aggressive actions.

• Enable is used—when interests align—to improve the capability of an actor already

taking beneficial action or who is likely to produce or benefit one's political aim.
Enabling can occur in myriad ways, such as force-enabling of a partner’s military
capability, or providing information or financial assistance to an ally.

• Induce involves offering something positive--for example promises of assistance,

security guarantees, or tariff concessions to change another state or actor’s behavior.
Inducement generally works by changing the targets cost/risk/benefit calculation, and
thus can work even when interests do not align initially or significantly overlap.
Inducements often create a transactional relationship.

• Coerce crosses an important conceptual threshold by moving from positive to negative

engagement with the potential for the use, or threatened use, of force. Coercive actions
may be actual or prospective and may include actions such as eliminating aid, refusing
weapons sales, raising tariffs, imposing sanctions, curtailing diplomatic relations,
deploying or posturing forces, and actually employing force. Coercion is generally
understood to encompass both deterrence and compellence.

• Subdue seeks to remove all choice from the target; this is in contrast to even the most
forceful act of coercion, which still leaves the choice to be or not be coerced with the
targeted actor. Subdue is generally heavy on force and may include occupation, forceful
regime change, and destruction or severe degradation of the target's capacity to employ
force or defend itself.

• Eradicate seeks the absolute elimination of the target state or actor, many or all of its key
leaders and believers, as well as the ideology guiding it.

22
3. Modes of Action. In addition to choosing a fundamental
strategic approach, the strategist should consider which mode(s)
of action will best accomplish the chosen strategy. The modes of
action shown in the box to the right are not a checklist, but a few
examples of choices about various methods a strategist could
utilize to build a strategy. Although the choices may seem
binary, different objectives within the same strategy may
simultaneously employ multiple modes of action (e.g., using
both overt and covert force). The modes of action listed are not
all-encompassing, strategists need to consider a wide range of
potential modes as part of their “ways” development. They also need to consider whether a
particular mode fits the strategic situation, will achieve the political aim and its specific
objectives, and can do so with the available means at acceptable levels of risk and cost.

4. Matching Institutions/Actors with Instruments. When designing the “ways,” strategists

must remember that institutions/actors are not instruments. Institutions/actors wield the
instruments of power in pursuit of the political aim and its specific objectives. This notion is
central to the link between means and ways. Strategists should think broadly when deciding
which institutions or actors should employ the chosen instruments. For example, tasking the
Department of Defense (DoD) with the application of force seems intuitive, but may not always
be the right choice; in certain circumstances, an intelligence agency, a proxy, a partner, or
perhaps a law enforcement agency may be better suited to apply force (wield the military
instrument). While having DoD employ force may be one option, the strategist should consider
as many other options as practicable.

5. Orchestration. The instruments of national power overlap, interconnect, and are

interdependent. Each of the instruments works most effectively when supported by and operating
harmoniously with the others. Consequently, the strategist should consider what the proposed
strategy is asking each instrument to do; at any point in time and space, one of the instruments
may play the principal role in advancing the strategy, while the others are in support. The
strategist ensures that each is doing all it can at that moment to achieve its particular purpose and
to support the efforts of the other instruments. It is critical for the success of the strategy that no
instrument’s operations work against those of the principal or lead instrument.

Orchestration defines how institutions wield the instruments of power through distinctive actions
and approaches in a logical, coherent strategy for accomplishing political aims. Effective
orchestration depends on several factors. Because strategy normally includes several specific
objectives intended to accomplish the political aim, and because actions taken in support of any
particular objective could undermine attainment of other objectives, each objective must be
prioritized in terms of its importance. Moreover, given that resources are finite, prioritization is
essential to ensure the most important objectives get the resources needed for their attainment. In
addition, strategies often benefit from the clear identification of a lead instrument, with the rest
of the instruments operating in support. The strategist must take care not to let the actions of
supporting instruments undermine the main line of effort. The strategist should also sequence
objectives, specifying whether one objective needs to be attained before another objective can be
pursued. On occasion some objectives can be achieved in parallel: that is, simultaneously. Also

23
vital is the need to coordinate the instruments to ensure they are not working at cross-purposes.
To ensure limited means are appropriately apportioned to achieve the desired effects, strategists
must properly balance resources between objectives and instruments. Achieving objectives
often requires the integration of multiple instruments in a “whole-of-government” approach.
Such integration may be exceedingly difficult but can make the difference between success and
failure.

As a strategy unfolds, instruments and institutions interact with each other. Many of those
interactions are intentional and positive, part of the strategic design. Some interactions, though,
are unintentional and potentially negative. Consequently, strategists have to work to assure that
interactions among the instruments and institutions produce positive synergistic effects. As an
example, when U.S. strategists formulated the plan for providing relief to Southeast Asian
nations after the 2004 Tsunami, they assessed that the effort would also send constructive
messages about America to the local population. In turn, they anticipated that those positive
messages would undermine a degree of support from local populations for Al Qaeda’s
Indonesian affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah. Similarly, strategists have to shape their strategic designs
to prevent unanticipated interactions from producing negative effects. For example, using force
can often lead to collateral destruction and casualties, which may in turn incite resistance among
an adversary’s population. Such concerns mandate extensive consideration and may well limit
actions.

24
 CHAPTER VI
ASSESSING THE COSTS/RISKS AND RESULTS
1. Iterative Assessment. Assessing the costs and risks stemming from a strategy is the fifth
fundamental element of strategic logic. As with the first element—analyzing the strategic
situation—assessing costs and risks must permeate the process of developing national security
strategy. Neither analyzing the strategic situation nor assessing risks and costs should be pursued
linearly iteratively and with regular frequency.

2. Evaluating Costs. Costs represent the outlay of resources and other assets needed to achieve
a political aim. They include, the funding required to acquire, build, enable, protect, convert,
achieve, or maintain something of strategic value, whether tangible or intangible. Costs also can
include people killed and injured, infrastructure damaged or destroyed, diminished capital,
accumulated debt, weakening of the economy, or tarnished reputation and diminished influence.
They can be transactional, political, temporal, or stem from forfeited opportunities.

While the strategist can calculate some costs with specificity, others must be based on
assumptions. Nevertheless, whether based on hard data or estimates and judgments, strategists
must provide a definitive statement of likely costs for the decision-maker. Only in this way can
the strategist make it possible for the decision-maker to weigh the hoped-for benefits from a
particular strategy against the expected costs. Proposed strategies for which the likely costs
exceed the value of the hoped-for benefits ought to be rethought. This process reinforces the
criticality of having defined precisely: 1) the interests the state has at stake in the problem; 2) the
value of those interests; 3) threats to those interests; and 4) the seriousness of those threats. The
essential question in the cost-benefit analysis of any strategy is whether it protects/advances the
state’s interests at an acceptable cost. Ultimately, many national strategy debates revolve around
value tradeoffs—for instance, lives vs. economic harm—that are difficult, if not impossible, to
resolve definitively. Strategists ought to consider at least three categories of costs—resources
(lives, money, equipment, time), political costs, and opportunity costs. In addition, strategists
would do well to consider the costs of inaction.

3. Identifying Risks. Strategists must consider risks as they design strategies. In general, risk
entails the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. With respect to strategy, risks are
elements that could go wrong. As the general definition states, the severity of a risk is
determined by both the likelihood of its occurrence and the magnitude of damage that would
ensue if the risk became manifest. Thus, a state that employs force against an adversary that
possesses nuclear weapons runs the risk that the enemy will retaliate with a nuclear strike. The
magnitude of the ensuing damage would be huge, but if there is little or no likelihood that the
other state would respond with a nuclear strike, then the severity of the risk might well be
deemed acceptable.

There is no magic formula for calculating risk. Risks emerge as the strategist brings insightful,
objective analysis and judgment to bear on what research and intelligence has revealed about the
nature and dynamics of the problem. Despite the strategist’s best efforts, however, both the
likelihood and severity of any identified risks will remain only probabilities. Therefore, it is

25
critical that the strategist develops a scheme for valuing both the likelihood and the severity of
risks and uses that scheme to characterize each of risks considered by decision-makers.

Strategists must assess both risks to the strategy and risks from the strategy. Risks to the
strategy are things that could cause it to fail, and they arise particularly from assumptions that
prove invalid in whole or in part. Risks from the strategy are additional threats, costs, or
otherwise undesired consequences caused by the strategy’s implementation. When the United
States invaded Iraq in 2003 with the political aim of changing the Iraqi regime, a risk to the
strategy was that popular resistance within Iraq to the U.S. invasion would coalesce into an
effective insurgency. At the same time, a clear risk from the U.S. strategy was that the
weakening of Iraq that would almost certainly occur as a result of the U.S. invasion would open
the door for Iran to establish a much stronger position in the region. In the end, U.S. decision-
makers judged their political aim to be of sufficient value to warrant accepting both of those
risks.

4. Viability Assessments. Throughout the strategy development process, strategists must

continuously assess a strategy’s viability. Multiple factors can affect a strategy’s prospects for
successful implementation. To assess the viability of a national security strategy, strategists
should use the “…ilities” tests, which allow them to evaluate the strategy from multiple vantage
points. Strategists should begin by considering suitability, which addresses whether the strategy
will protect/advance the national interest(s) at stake and not work against other national-level
strategies, policies, and goals. Second, the strategist should test feasibility, which examines
whether the strategy will actually achieve the political aim. Are sufficient means of the
appropriate type available (or attainable) to achieve the political aim? Even if a strategy is
suitable and feasible, the strategist must determine its desirability, which entails assessing
whether the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs—is attainment of the political aim
worth what it will cost to attain it? To be judged desirable, the strategy (not just the hoped for
outcome) must deliver something valued beyond all that will be expended to purchase it. Next
comes the test of acceptability. Is the plan of action consistent with the state’s values, the
national mood, domestic concerns, the interests of allies and partners, and the personal goals of
political leaders? Finally, comes the test of sustainability. Can the necessary level of resources,
political will and backing, and popular support be sustained long enough to attain the political
aim? Strategists should continuously apply these basic tests of viability throughout the strategy
development process. Assessments of viability are generally a matter of degree. If the answer to
any one of the tests is ever a definitive “no,” the strategist should consider a different strategic
approach that offers greater viability.

5. Red Teaming. Throughout the strategic logic process, but particularly during the assessment
phase, use of a red team to think critically about the problem, the major assumptions, and other
key elements of the proposed strategy from the target’s perspective is essential. The discussion
in Joint Pub 5-0 on the use of red-teaming in joint planning offers a helpful guide on how similar
red team efforts could sharpen strategic logic and improve the strategy-making process. 12

6. Course Corrections. Once a state or other party launches a strategy, it must conduct frequent
iterative assessments of that strategy’s progress. No strategy is infallible. Strategies are, after all,
12
See Joint Pub 5-0 Joint Planning, 16 Jun 2017, APPENDIX K: RED TEAMS, pp. K-1 thru K-7.

26
built upon a foundation of assumptions, and some—maybe many—of those assumptions will
prove flawed to some degree. Additionally, the strategic situation could change in ways that
invalidate initially sound assumptions. As assumptions prove incorrect or are invalidated, the
strategist must adjust the strategy’s ends, means, and/or ways to accommodate the new reality.
Some of the most powerful assumptions are unconscious judgments about how the adversary
will react to the various aspects of the strategy. Adversaries, however, act in line with their own
logic, and analyses of the situation, which may lead them to respond in unexpected ways,
including ways that seem at odds with their interests. Moreover, adversaries are not passive
targets of a strategy, but active participants. As such they can be expected to do all they can to
frustrate or prevent an opposing plan’s success, and to maximize their own gains.

Successful execution of any strategy entails constant adjustments to an adversary’s moves. As

German field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder is credited with noting long ago, “No plan
survives first contact with the enemy.” That statement captures an essential truth about strategy,
as well: as soon as a strategy is put into effect, the strategic situation changes in numerous ways.
The opponent is also a strategic actor, with his own strategy. The implementation of strategy is
thus, in a sense, a contest between two or more competing strategies and a test of which actor can
best and more rapidly adapt to the other.

As the strategic situation changes, the strategist must revisit the analysis to ensure the strategy
continues to rest on a comprehensive and timely understanding of the most important conditions
and dynamics shaping the unfolding situation. Significant changes should force the strategist to
adjust the strategy’s ends, means, and/or ways to accommodate new realities. As a strategy
proceeds, the strategist should constantly assess the prospects of achieving the political aim. If
those prospects are not increasing—or worse, are decreasing—then alternative courses of action
should be explored. This requirement might entail defining a new political aim, bringing new or
additional means to bear, formulating a new strategic approach, or abandoning the effort
altogether. Changing one’s ends, means and/or ways can be difficult.
Scaling back one’s aims is especially challenging once force has been used. As history teaches
us, loss of life makes it exceedingly difficult to moderate or change the political aim, lest
sacrifices be perceived as in vain.
That said, the principal consideration for assessing whether a strategy may need to be reassessed
is whether it is achieving the desired political aim at an acceptable cost. If strategists and
political and military leaders determine the costs to be “sunk”; that is, they cannot be recovered
because the political aim cannot be achieved, it is time—however painful it may be—to change
the political aim, and, accordingly, the strategy that supports it.

27
 CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The modern strategic environment poses significant challenges, challenges that are evolving at
considerable speed. The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the strategic environment from
one dominated by bipolar considerations to one transitioning to multi-polar challenges.
Globalization powered by rapid advances in information technology and processes has reshaped
the dynamics of international relations. Long-suppressed ethnic, religious, and even personal
conflicts have spawned an increase in intra- and interstate violence. Terrorism, civil wars,
secession and irredentism threaten to fracture existing states and break down regional order.
The world has witnessed a revival of nationalism, populism, and nativism that further threatens
to undermine the post-World War II international order. Most recently, revisionist great powers
have risen and begun challenging the existing order and U.S. preeminence. Simultaneously, the
character of war/conflict is quickly changing with rapid technological and social upheavals.
The time when U.S. strategists could fall back on the Cold War's overarching strategic concept
of containment is long past. Strategic thinking must adjust to the evolving strategic
environment. Each strategic challenge is unique. Each demands thorough, comprehensive, and
insightful analysis of the situation. Each demands definition of a realistic political aim and
specific objectives, grounded in an objective assessment of one’s interests, resources, and
capabilities, as well as those of one’s adversaries and allies. Each requires the crafting of a
creative, coherent strategic approach that takes into account all of the possible ways the
adversary might try to counteract and/or frustrate one’s strategy.

The best “insurance” for strategic success is to think strategically—to diligently and
systematically work through the five fundamentals of strategic logic. Strategists should ensure
that each judgment and decision made to resolve the questions inherent in each of the elements
of strategic logic builds upon and fits with all those made previously, leaving no gaps in the
logic. As importantly, strategists must not “pre-judge” the outcome, decide on a preferred
strategic approach at the outset, and then manipulate the logic to justify that approach.
Strategists must let an objective application of strategic logic reveal the best strategic approach
to adopt.

Good strategists never forget that strategy is—at a minimum—a “two-player” game. Every
strategy has to work against a thinking, proactive adversary who always has a vote in how
events unfold. His or her aim—his or her job—is to find ways to neutralize an opponent’s
strengths and frustrate that opponent’s strategic approach. Even a significant power differential
in one’s own favor does not guarantee success. Time and again, superior powers have learned
that skilled, determined, and creative adversaries can find ways to minimize their opponent’s
superior capabilities and create leverage of their own that creates a more level playing field.

Finally, strategists must consider what kinds of outcomes are reasonable—and achievable—
given the advantage and leverage they are able to create. To reach for more than that—no matter
how seemingly desirable—is strategically foolish and generally ends up costing far more than
whatever benefits—if any—are gained. The best safeguard against strategic folly is a cadre of
well-educated, trained, and experienced professionals and leaders who rigorously apply the

28
elements of strategic logic. This is perhaps the most important lesson students can take
from their experience at the National War College.

29
 Common Primer Terms of Reference

National Security The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the
Strategy instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military
and economic) to achieve ends that protect or advance national
interests.
The National Security A document mandated by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Strategy of the United Department Reorganization Act. The NSS outlines the broad
States (The NSS) national security strategy of the United States.
The National Security The National Security Council (NSC) is the President’s principal
Council (NSC) and the forum for considering and coordinating national security and
NSC Staff foreign policy matters with his/her senior national security advisors
and cabinet officials. The NSC staff, headed by the National Security
Adviser, serves as the President’s national security and foreign
policy staff within the White House.
Strategic Logic The logic needed to develop and orchestrate national security
strategy Strategic Logic entails applying the five following
fundamental elements:
• Analyzing the strategic SITUATION (the context and
assumptions about that context)
• Identifying INTERESTS at stake in the situation
• Defining the desired ENDS (the outcomes sought), to include
first defining the overarching political aim, and then the
subordinate objectives required to achieve it
• Identifying and/or developing the MEANS (resources and
capabilities) needed to achieve the desired ends
• Designing the WAYS to use the means to achieve the desired
ends
• Assessing the RISKS/COSTS associated with the strategic
design, as well as tests of coherence and the “—ilities” tests

Assumption An unproven assertion treated as true. To produce a coherent,

effective strategy, strategists must fill knowledge gaps with
assumptions. Strategies are replete with assumptions about
opponent capabilities, interests, and intent, the dynamics of the
international situation, and the most important aspects of one’s
domestic situation. Assumptions help define perceived threats to
one’s own interests, and the cause and effect of potential actions.
Problem Statement A concise summation of why a strategic threat or opportunity
warrants attention. A problem statement should briefly: (a) describe
issue/situation (i.e., the BLUF); (b) explicitly link the problem to a
national interest; and (c) specify how the threat/opportunity affects
that interest. Crafting the problem statement helps discern whether
the threat or opportunity is significant enough to warrant a strategy
without being so broad as to be unmanageable.

30
Context Any factor(s), internationally, regionally, or domestically that affect
the development or implementation of a national security strategy.
Context can include: political matters; historic events; cultural,
religious, ethnic, or tribal factors; societal norms and structures—
almost anything that could influence the strategist’s work.
National Interests The fundamental, enduring values of a state. National interests are
subject to various interpretations. The strategist must define
precisely and concisely the interest(s) the nation has at stake in the
challenge addressed. For purposes of this document, National
Interests are not a specific or achievable end state. They are
aspirational, and thus distinct from political aims, which are
tangible conditions.
Condition A current or desired state of affairs.
Threats to National A strategic situation that endangers one or more national interests.
Interest(s) Threats occur only in relation to interests, and should be defined in
a concise, coherent manner.
Opportunity to A favorable set of circumstances extant in the strategic context that
Advance National may allow for the advancement of one or more interests;
Interest(s) opportunities exist independently of the successful resolution of a
threat to an interest. The strategist should not confuse opportunities
with advantages derived from successfully dealing with a threat.
Constraint Tangible and intangible factors that limit strategic freedom of
action. Constraints include insufficient means or political
restrictions on the means available. Legal, political, and normative
considerations can also constrain strategy.
Political Aim The desired end-state of a national security strategy. The political
aim defines the outcome the strategist believes will preserve, protect,
and/or advance the national interest(s) at stake. Because the
political aim is a distinct and achievable goal, it is best defined
using nouns and adjectives—for example, “a stable, secure Iraq.”
The strategist must ensure that the overarching political aim—the
desired outcome—preserves or advances interests.
Specific Objectives The specific achievements that, when accomplished and combined,
create the end-state envisioned in the political aim. Specific
objectives typically consist of verbs and adverbs, to wit: “Deter
Russian aggression” or “Halt Serb ethnic cleansing.” Important
attributes of a sound subordinate objective are precision and
brevity, devoid of any mention of ways or means.
Ends An overarching, generic term that encompasses political aims and
their subordinate objectives.
Means Generally, resources and capabilities that either exist or need to be
developed to achieve desired Ends. There are three inter-related
components of the means in national security strategy: the elements
of power, such as resources, human capital, and industry, which
sustain national power; institutions/actors, such as the President,
Congress, the UN, etc., that wield the instruments of power; and the

31
 instruments of power themselves—diplomacy, information, military,
and economic.
Elements of Power The tangible and intangible factors from which the power of a state
or non-state actor is built and sustained. While there is no definitive
list of the elements of power, they include inter alia: natural
resources, geography, human capital, economy, industry,
R&D/technology, infrastructure, governance, national will, and
international reputation. To have enduring viable strategic options,
states/actors must sustain, conserve, or build the elements of power.
Institutions and Actors The organizations, structures, and individuals that national security
strategists rely on to secure a strategy’s political aim. Government
agencies and their personnel generally design and implement most
strategies; however, other non-government institutions and actors
may be better suited for certain tasks.
The Instruments of The instruments of power include diplomacy, information, the
Power (DIME). military, and economics (DIME). Each instrument possesses a
unique nature/essence, and distinct capabilities and limitations.
Ways How the strategist achieves the political aim and subordinate
objectives. Though “means” focus on questions of taking action
“with what,” national “ways” address the question of “how” those
means are used.
Fundamental A continuum of strategic approaches for applying instruments of
Strategic Approaches power to achieve a desired political end. The spectrum spans
everything from taking no action to eradicating an opponent.
• Observe: Monitoring without otherwise acting.
• Accommodate: Acquiescence to a rival’s demands/wishes.
• Enable: Creating, supporting or otherwise bolstering the
capabilities of other international actors.
• Shape: Taking action to adjust the strategic environment to
make it more favorable or conducive for future action.
• Persuade: Convincing another actor through the force of
argument.
• Induce: Promising or providing something positive to achieve
a desired response from other international actors.
• Coerce: Taking or threatening negative actions to affect
another international actor’s behavior. Deterrence is a
form of coercion that threatens negative consequences for
an opponent should they attempt to change the status quo.
Compellence is another form of coercion that threatens
negative consequences for an opponent should they attempt
to maintain the status quo.
• Subdue: Using force to make another actor voluntarily or
involuntarily capitulate.
• Eradicate: Destruction of another international actor, to
include its government, ideology, economy, military, etc.

32
Modes of Action A set of binary strategic options regarding how the instruments of
power are used to achieve the desired subordinate
objective/political aim. Strategists should consider a wide range of
potential modes to implement a strategic concept. They should
consider whether a particular mode fits a strategic situation, will
achieve the political aim and its subordinate objectives, and can do
so with available means at acceptable levels of cost and risk.
Examples of modes of actions are: direct—indirect; unilateral—
multilateral; sequential—parallel; action—message; offensive—
defensive; active—passive; overt—covert, etc.
Orchestration A logical, coherent strategic plan for accomplishing political goals
using the instruments of power. Strategic plans prioritize objectives,
sequence actions, coordinate instruments to ensure they are not
working at cross-purposes and balance limited resources between
instruments and objectives. Orchestration often requires the
integration of multiple instruments (e.g. in a “whole-of-
government” approach).
Assessment Assessment consists of evaluating a strategy’s national and
international costs and risks.
• Costs: The price, financial or otherwise, one has to pay to
implement a strategy. Costs can include: deaths, resources,
expenses, penalties, prestige, and/or missed opportunities.
• Risks: Aspects of a strategic design that could go wrong or
work to the strategy’s disadvantage. Risks often relate to the
divergence between assumptions of an opponent’s or third
party likely reactions to a strategy and their actual reactions
to that strategy.
Assessing a strategy’s internal viability involves determining
whether it is suitable, feasible, desirable, acceptable, and
sustainable (i.e. the “—ilities tests”). Multiple failures in the “—
ilities tests” may indicate that the strategic design is flawed.
• Suitability addresses whether the strategy serves national
interests and is consistent with other national-level
strategies, policies, and goals.
• Feasibility examines whether political aims are realistically
achievable and whether sufficient means and time are
available or attainable to achieve the political aim.
• Desirability assures that the strategic plan matches the desired
political aim, and the expected benefits of implementation
outweigh the anticipated costs.
• Acceptability determines if the strategy is consistent with the
state’s values, the national mood, domestic concerns
(political or otherwise), and partners’ interests.
• Sustainability considers whether resources and popular
support can endure long enough to attain the political aim,

33
 even in the face of potential changes in the strategic
environment.
Viability The overall assessment produced by the –ilities test.

34
 THE NWC NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FRAMEWORK

1. ANALYZING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION

* What is the story? Develop a problem statement.

* Assess the international and domestic contexts.
* Identify knowns, critical unknowns, and key assumptions (re: self, others, environment).
* What national interests—if any—are at stake? How vital is each interest?
* Determine threats and opportunities and their relation to national interests.
* How imminent are the threats? How salient are the opportunities?

2. DEFINING THE DESIRED ENDS

A. POLITICAL AIM(S)

* Stated and implied political aims—define desired end-state/success. What does success look like?
* What are likely constraints—governmental, domestic, international, media-driven, etc.?

B. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

* Can the political aims be translated into viable objectives?

* Specify objectives, achievable at a reasonable cost that will accomplish desired political aims
* Rank objectives by priority.

3. IDENTIFYING AND/OR DEVELOPING MEANS

* Identify our instruments of power (DIME) needed to obtain ends.

* Assumptions about capabilities/limits of our instruments.
* What are the intangibles for all actors, to include morale/will and time available?

4. DESIGNING THE WAYS

* Specify fundamental strategic approach(es) – state how the instruments blend together. Are the associated
objectives pursued sequentially or simultaneously?
* Consider Modes of Action.
* Identify institutions/agencies that will direct the various instruments of power.
* Most likely constraints? Does the strategic approach account for them?

5. ASSESSING THE COST, RISKS, AND RESULTS

* What are likely costs and benefits? Can they be tracked/measured?

* Most likely risks, including those to and from the strategy—have they been accounted for and mitigated?
* Viability Assessments: Is our strategic approach suitable, feasible, desirable, acceptable, and sustainable?
* What are the most pivotal assumptions? Consequences if wrong? What mechanisms to validate?
* How does success translate into lasting political effects?

Red Teaming
* Assumptions about allies’, neutrals’, target’s political aims, underlying rationale, and specific objectives.
* Identify target’s instruments of power needed to attain ends—Is one or more likely to be dominant?
* Assumptions about the capabilities/limits of target’s instruments.
* What are the target’s most likely and most dangerous courses of action? Does our strategy negate them?

35
National Security Strategy Model for Relating Ends, Ways, and Means

36
 Bibliography with NDU Library Links

Art, Robert J. and Kelly M. Greenhill. The use of Force: Military Power and International Politics
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015; Eighth edition, 2015.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.717049&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Art, Robert J. and Kenneth Neal Waltz. The use of Force: Military Power and International Politics
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009; 7th ed, 2009.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.302881&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Beaufre, André. An Introduction to Strategy: With Particular Reference to Problems of Defense,

Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age New York: Praeger, 1965.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.65589&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War New York: Free Press, 1988, 3rd ed., 1st American ed, 1988.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.79525&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Brands, Hal. What Good is Grand Strategy? : Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry
S. Truman to George W. Bush New York, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.707738&site=eds-live&scope=site;
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nationaldefense/Doc?id=1083
1262.

Cerami, Joseph R. and James F. Holcomb. U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy Carlisle
Barracks, PA] : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.195172&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Clausewitz, Carl von, Michael Eliot Howard, Peter Paret, and Bernard Brodie. On War Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.84664&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Collins, John M. Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1973.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.86180&site=eds-live&scope=site.

37
———. Military Strategy: Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives Washington, DC:
Brassey's; 1st ed, 2002.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.203394&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Deibel, Terry L. Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.253453&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Earle, Edward Mead, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert. Makers of Modern Strategy:
Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.110420&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Evans, Graham and Jeffrey Newnham. The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations London:
Penguin Books, 1998.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.181584&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Freedman, Lawrence. Strategy: A History New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.557373&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Gaddis, John L. On Grand Strategy New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2018.

George, Roger Z. and James B. Bruce. Analyzing Intelligence. Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations
Washington DC: Georgetown University, 2008.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.596702&site=eds-live&scope=site;
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nationaldefense/Doc?id=1023
6724.

Gilpin, Robert and Jean M. Gilpin. Global Political Economy: Understanding the International
Economic Order Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.200031&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Gow, James. War and War Crimes: The Military, Legitimacy, and Success in Armed Conflict New
York: Columbia University Press, 2013.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.715131&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Gray, Colin S. Modern Strategy New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.187595&site=eds-live&scope=site.

38
Howard, Michael. "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy." Foreign Affairs no. 5 (1979): 975.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.10.2307.20040266&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking, Fast and Slow New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1st ed, 2011.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.509718&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Kennan, George Frost, Giles D. Harlow, and George C. Maerz. Measures Short of War: The George F.
Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946-47 Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press: sold by Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 1991.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.97303&site=eds-live&scope=site;
https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/u?/ndupress,36789.

Liddell Hart, Basil Henry, Sir. Strategy New York, NY: New American Library, 1974; 2nd rev. ed,
1974.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.143847&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Lykke, Arthur F. "Defining Military Strategy." Military Review 77, no. 1 (Jan, 1997): 182.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=mth&AN=9707081700&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Martel, William C. Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American
Foreign Policy New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.711620&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace New York:
Knopf; distributed by Random House; 5th ed. rev. and reset, 1972.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.103624&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Murray, Williamson, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin H. Bernstein. The Making of Strategy: Rulers,
States, and War Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994; 1st pbk. ed,
1996.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.704722&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Nye, Joseph S. The Future of Power New York: Public Affairs, c2011; 1st ed, 2011.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.681338&site=eds-live&scope=site;
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nationaldefense/Doc?id=1044
0281.

39
Organski, A. F. K. and Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.76773&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Paret, Peter, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert. Makers of Modern Strategy: From
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1986.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.77401&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Rosecrance, Richard N. and Arthur A. Stein. The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.122943&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Rumelt, Richard P. Good Strategy, Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why it Matters New York:
Crown Business; 1st ed, 2011.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.553071&site=eds-live&scope=site; http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=435988.

Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.672104&site=eds-live&scope=site;
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nationaldefense/Doc?id=1076
7077.

Treverton, Gregory F. and Edward Sylvester Ellis. Measuring National Power Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 2005.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.230312&site=eds-live&scope=site;
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/RAND_CF215.pdf.

Worley, D. R. Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National
Security System Herndon, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2015.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.749092&site=eds-live&scope=site;
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nationaldefense/Doc?id=1106
6811.

Wright, Thomas J. All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-First Century and the
Future of American Power New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.760739&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Yarger, Harry R. "Chapter 8: Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College
Strategy Model," 107-113: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2006.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=tsh&AN=25803737&site=eds-live&scope=site.

40
Zarate, Juan Carlos. Treasury's War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare New York:
Public Affairs, First Edition, 2013.
https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=cat04199a&AN=ndu.556724&site=eds-live&scope=site.

41
42
43