Land Law Lecture Notes 2009, by Jese

Notes Prepared by Jesse, James Chalambo
Author Note: This Handout has been prepared for Land Law Students; it is
not final and thus should not be cited as a reference.
Lecture One: THE HISTORY OF LAND LAW IN

TANZANIA
INTRODUCTION:
Definition of Land
The term land is defined by the Land Act, 1999 (Act No. 4/1999) as to
include - the surface of the earth and the earth below the surface and all
substances other than minerals and petroleum forming part of or below the
surface, things naturally growing on the land, buildings and other structures
permanently affixed to land (s.2). This definition excludes minerals and
petroleum forming part of or below the surface. The essence of it is that in
Tanzania the occupier of land cannot claim to have rights over minerals or
mineral oil and also water rights and rights over any foreshore. These rights may
be acquired on application to appropriate authorities under specific laws.
Read the following cases:
- Saleh bin Hadi v. Eljofri (1950) 24 KLR 17,
- Sing v. Singh, vol. 11 EACA 48,
- Francis v. Ibitoye (1936) 13 N.L.R. 11.
Meaning of Property
In its widest sense, says Salmond, property includes all a person’s legal
rights, of whatever description. In a second and narrower sense, property
includes not all a person’s rights but only his proprietary as opposed to his
personal rights. The former constitutes his estate or property while the latter
constitutes his status or personal condition. In this sense a man’s land, chattels,
shares and the debts due to him are his property but not his life or liberty or
reputation. (Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Ed. pp 441-412). The law of
property is the law of proprietary rights in rem, the law of proprietary rights in
personam being distinguished from it as the law of obligations. Therefore tangible
1 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

moveable or immovable things like land, goods etc, is property but any right or
claim arising out of a contract would not be property. The word ‘property’ has two
meanings (i) a right to or interest in a thing and (ii) the thing itself. The ‘thing’ may
be immovable or moveable. Property is of two types, (i) corporeal and (ii)
incorporeal. The former can be either immovable or moveable, the latter consists
of (i) right in or over a material thing which is lesser than full ownership such as
by way of an encumbrance or lease, or easement or trust and (ii) right to an
immaterial or intangible thing such as patents, trade mark, copyright which are
also called in modern parlance as intellectual property. So while corporeal
property is tangible property incorporeal is intangible. To use a common
categorization, property is generally, either immovable or movable. Any property
which is not immovable property would be movable property. And further,
property is also divided into two classes (i) real and (ii) personal. The former
consists of immovable nature such as land and buildings. Personal property
consists of rights which are ‘unseen’ or in personam. Moveable property is
considered as personal property.
Any property can be acquired by any of the four methods, viz., (i)
possession, (ii) prescription, (iii) act inter vivos or by transfer or agreement,(iv)
inheritance.
Meaning of estate
Estate denotes any property whatever and is divided into real or personal
estate. ‘Estate’ is an interest which a person enjoys over land or chattel,
particularly the former. Therefore the same land is capable of having more than
one estate or interest like the lessor and the lessee or mortgagor and mortgagee.
Meaning of Tenure
Immovable properties are of different tenures. Tenure means a kind of
right or title by which real or immovable property is held. Tenure signifies
the relation of the holder of land to the land whereby land is held on. The word
tenure indicates the nature of ownership of land. In England, before the passing
of the Law of Property Act, 1925, there were several feudal tenures existing, but
all of them were abolished since the passing of the Law of Property Act. Now in

England, there are only two types of ownership in land remaining. These are-
Estate in fee simple absolute in possession and Estate for a term of years
absolute (s. 1(i) of the Law of Property Act) which are equivalent as free hold
tenure and lease hold tenure. Which means, the property is either held in full
ownership or held under a lease or sub lease.
Movable and Immovable properties

At Common law the natural division of physical property is between land
which is ‘immovable’ as it is sometimes called and, other objects known as
chattels or ‘movables’. This simple distinction however is inadequate. The
reason is that, chattels may become attached to land so as to lose their character
of chattels and become part of the land itself. The general principle is therefore
stated that ‘Quicquid plantatur SoloSolo Cedit’.” Meaning that, whatever is
attached to the soil becomes part of it. Thus, if a building or any structure is
erected on land and some objects (chattels) are attached to the building the word
‘Land’ includes the soil, the building and the objects affixed to it. In this situation
the objects lose their character of chattels and become part of the land itself; and
the owner of the land becomes the owner of the building. All these articles which
remain as the owner’s property are thus called ‘fixtures’, or immovable.
However, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether a thing is a fixture
or just a chattel. In deciding whether or not an object has become a fixture, there
are two main elements to be considered, namely;
(i) The degree of annexation and,
(ii) The purpose of annexation.
For an article to be considered as a fixture some substantial connection with the
land or building on it must be shown. A chattel attached to the land or a building
will prima-facie be a fixture even if it would not be very difficult to remove it.
The purpose of annexation however, is said to be the main factor. The

modern tendering is to regard the degree of annexation as being chiefly of
importance as evidence of the purpose of annexation. The more securely an

object is affixed and the more damage that would be caused by its removal the
more likely it is that the object was intended to form a permanent part of the land.
In determining the purpose of annexation, the question to be asked is:

“was the intention to effect a permanent improvement of the land or building as
such or was if merely to effect temporary improvements or to enjoy the chattel as
a chattel”? In the first case the chattel is a fixture, in the second it is not.
At Common law the principle of Quicquid Plantatur Solo Cedit applied
without qualification. Where an article is described as fixture it cannot be
removed by the person who brought it on to the land or by his successors in title.
If it is not a fixture it can be removed. The maxim actually caused a number of
unjust situations. This rule was thereafter relaxed. Read: Ruanda Coffee Estate
v. Singh (1966) E.A. 564. More on this will be covered in another topic relating
to the payment of compensation.
THE HISTORY OF LAND LAW IN TANZANIA

The legal and administrative machinery governing land tenure in Tanzania
Mainland has its genesis in the colonial period. The stated objectives of Colonial
rulers over land policy and tenure was to effect a transformation of the customary
tenure into tenure where the Colonial objectives could be achieved easily.
Both the German and British colonial states in Tanganyika encouraged
establishment of plantation agriculture and development of peasant agriculture.
Under this land policy the state vested in itself exclusive powers to decide on
matters regarding land ownership, land distribution and land use. This was
meant to facilitate exploitation of resources (both land and human labour).
The land regimes established by the German (1895 to 1916) and British
(1918 – 61) assumed that the indigenous occupants (Natives) had no
“Ownership rights” over their land. The western anthropological view was that
African land tenure is much the same in every part of the continent; i.e. it is
communal and an individual only has security of tenure whilst he is using the

land. They said, “land is owned by the community never by the individual” and
thus land is inalienable.
Under the German, land alienation was thus facilitated by an Imperial
Decree of 26.11.1985 (The Imperial Decree regarding Creation, Acquisition and
Conveyance of Crown Lands). This enactment stated that except where claims
to ownership and to real rights in land could be proved by private and certain
other persons, all land was to be deemed unowned and to be regarded as Crown
land and the ownership to such land was vested in the Reich. Existing rights of
individuals were to be recognised by commissions set up for such purposes and
the manner of proof of a title in land was generally to be by documentary
evidence. As Africans holding under customary land tenure had no documentary
titles their rights in land were not recognised. It followed that titles to land were to
be obtained through the governor either by – “conveyancing of ownership “or by”
leasehold.”
After the First World War, the British Government assumed responsibility
over Tanganyika under the surveillance of the League of Nations, which later
became the United Nations. The general policy relating to land in Trust
Territories was clearly stipulated in Article 8 of the Trusteeship Agreement and
which was a reproduction of the corresponding Article in the League of Nations
‘B’ mandate for Tanganyika, the Cameroons and Togoland. The Article stated
that “ in framing laws relating to the holding or transfer of land and natural
resources, the Administering Authority should take into consideration native laws
and customs, and should respect the rights and safeguard the interests, both
present and future, of the native population”.
When the British established its administration, it passed The Land
Tenure Ordinance, 1923 (Later referred as Land Ordinance, 1923 Cap 113),
which was based on the Land and Native Rights Ordinance of the Northern
Nigeria. This followed suit the German law. It stated in section 3 that: “The whole
of the lands of the Territory, whether occupied or unoccupied, are [on 26
January, 1923] hereby declared to be public land’. The proviso to that section
exempted from ‘public lands’ and from the operation of the Act “a title to land or

any interest therein lawfully acquired before 26 January, 1923”. These titles were
stated to have the same effect and validity as they had before the passing of the
Act, but the proviso was interpreted not to embrace customary law titles. This
was done to preserve interest acquired during the German period, because by
virtue of Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 the existing German titles were to be
recognized.
The Ordinance placed the control of such ‘public land’ in the hands of the
Governor. The Governor was empowered to make grants of land on rights of
occupancy for periods not exceeding 99 years. And it was stated clearly under
section 4 that “no title to the occupation and use of any such lands shall be valid
without the consent of the Governor.” The governor under this law could grant
land to companies, settlers and any other legal or individual persons. In essence,
the legal regimes gave the Colonial government a free hand as and when
necessary to control and alienate indigenous land without being encumbered by
any legal obligations.
To preserve German derived titles the Land Registry Ordinance, 1923 was
enacted; in which all lands that were lawfully acquired during the German era
were to be registered and become freehold tenure. In addition, S.11 thereof
provided that any person who claims to be in adverse possession of pubic land
and applies for registration as the first registered proprietor thereof shall been
titled to be so registered. (Adverse possession for 60 years or by proving 30
years adverse possession prior to 26.1.1923).
Therefore, it should be noted that the conversion of German titles to
freehold was not automatic, but, they were to be registered under the Land
Registry Ordinance as a requirement. This was discussed in A.G. v. Ndugumbi
(1963) 21 EACA 43, where it was held that the effect of S.2(1) of Land (Law of
Property and Conveyancing) Ordinance, 1923 was to convert the pre-existed
titles of absolute ownership into fee simple with absolute possession.
Right of Occupancy

Looking at the Land Ordinance 1923, it was legally unclear whether

interests of natives were safeguarded. The ‘Right of Occupancy’, for example,
was defined as “a title to the use and occupation of land.” The omission of not
including customary title to the land raised criticisms in the Permanent Mandates
Commission of the League of Nationals. Hence, in 1928 the scope of application
of the Ordinance was widened. The definition of ‘right of occupancy’ was
expanded to include “the title of a native or a native community lawfully using or
occupying land in accordance with native law and custom” (Land Ordinance
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1928 No. 7). Since then the customary land titles have
come to be called “deemed rights of occupancy”. Meaning that, they were
‘deemed’ to exist not through grant.
In this regard there existed three types of rights over land tenure in the
country soon after the Land Ordinance was enacted, viz.
1. The Granted Right of Occupancy which was granted by the governor
under the Land Ordinance, 1923 (section 6);
2. Customary or deemed Right of Occupancy which was not granted by the
state but ‘deemed’ to exist under customary law and practice; and
3. Freehold system – derived from title(s) lawfully acquired during the
German period.
EFFECTS UNDER CUSTOMARY RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY

The widening of definition of Right of Occupancy to include interest of
native using or occupying land under customary law did not assist the natives.
The Land Ordinance jus declared and defined customary tenure but without
securing and statutorily entrenching customary titles and rights. This enabled the
colonial state to alienate lands to non-natives without any problem. Comparing
the two tenures, the granted right of occupancy and customary/deemed right of
occupancy, the latter was only declaratory. The law did not define the rights of
customary land holders as against the state, nor were these rights entrenched in
law in any form. Thus the lands occupied by indigenous people remained public
lands under the control and subject to the disposition of the state.

On the other hand, the relation between the state and the holders of land
under the granted right of occupancy was in essence contractual and regulated
by law. A statutory holder was given certificate of occupancy. Terms and
conditions of the grant were stipulated in the certificate of occupancy, which
made security dependent on use by attaching development conditions to every
right of occupancy. Consequently the practice grew up that customary land
tenure came to be identified and treated as inferior to statutory/granted right of
occupancy. The occupation and use of land by customary holders was validated
by the colonial courts by assuming constructive consent on the part of the
Governor. The customary titles were categorized as merely “permissive rights”.
See the case of:
1. Muhena bin Said v. Registrar of Titles [1948] 16 EACA 399;
2. Mtoro bin Mwamba v. A.G. [1953] TLR 327.
MUHENA BIN SAID CASE

In this case, the appellant derived his title to land near Mwanza through an
Arab in 1890. He applied to be registered as owner in fee simple. In 1931, the
Land Officer, Acting Registrar of Title, wrote to appellant’s advocate that “the
claim to freehold by your client is admitted.” When the Registrar came to
determine whether the appellant was entitled to be registered he dismissed his
application. Hence an appeal was made. The basis of his application was that
having lived in the land in question for more than 60 years or 30 years prior to
26th January, 1923 he was entitled to be registered by virtue of adverse
possession (as per the Land Registry Ordinance, 1923).
The Court (Sir Graham Paul – C.J.) stated that “possession has been
proved for the requisite period, but that the obviously difficult thing is to prove
adverse possession as against the German or British governments who
undoubtedly as a matter of policy permitted the inhabitants generally of the
territory to use land for their reasonable requirements of residence and
sustenance without any special grant to any individual. To satisfy the Registrar
that the possession was adverse in this case evidence would (in the judge’s

view) be required of something definite in the occupation of the applicant or his

predecessors to take that occupation out of the category of the admitted general
permissive occupation by all the inhabitants of the territory.
The Court proceeded to say – “there is nothing so far I can see in the
evidence to show that the occupation by the applicant or his predecessors was in
any way special or different from that of any other inhabitants of the territory or
inconsistent with it being just the general permissive occupation enjoyed by all
inhabitants”.
The appellant also argued that since his predecessor was an Arab whose
religion (i.e. Islam) recognizes individual ownership of land, the appellant
acquired similar ownership right – the Court held that the first Arab occupant
entered into the land peaceably not by conquering. Edward C.J., added that
since the first Arab entered peaceably under same sort of arrangement with the
chief or representative member of the tribe, he could not foist their land law and
custom upon the land. That being so, the chief or representative could give him
no better title to the land than he possessed and could only grant him a tenure
recognized by the customary law of the tribe. The judge concluded:- “I am
satisfied that the customary law of that tribe like that of most African tribes in the
interior of the continent had no conception of freehold tenure such as is known to
English law or the analogous individual ownership known to Muslim law.” The
suit failed.
MTORO BIN MWAMBA CASE

The appellant in this case applied for first registration as beneficial owner
of land in fee simple to a land situated in Upanga area, which he claimed under
Washomvi laws and customs. Alternatively he claimed to be registered as owner
by virtue of adverse possession. The appellant contended that he and his
predecessors in title had been in effective possession of land prior to German
Sovereignty in 1895 and that he had acquired “in equity” a title thereto
equivalent to an estate in fee simple in accordance with the laws and customs of
the Washomvi tribe of which he was a member, which recognized an individual

ownership of land equivalent to freehold and that by the law of Islam which had
been applied by the Sultan of Zanzibar during his suzerainty, an individual title
could be acquired by clearing vacant land and planting it with coconut palms.
When the case went to appeal; (Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa) it was
held that conversion to the Islamic religion did not include conversion to the
Islamic law of land tenure. The appellant was still bound by African Customary
law and was for the purpose of the Land Ordinance a “native.” The Court further
held that Customary law does not know individual ownership of land, what it
recognizes is only usufructuary rights” (the right to use land).
On the issue of adverse possession, the court held that “were land is held
by a native, the inference must always be that possession is permissive not
adverse.”
Other cases to read are:
-Re Sourthern Rhodesia (1919) AC 211;
-Amodu Tijani v. the Secretary Southern Nigeria (1921) 2AC. 399;
-Descendants of Sheikh Mbaruk. Bin Rashid v. Minister for Lands and Mineral
Resources (1960) EA. 348.
The Case of Descendants of Sheikh Mbaruk Bin Rashid

This is a case regarding the nature of rights acquired by Arabs who settled
on land granted to them by the German Administrator of Tanganyika, without any
documentary title. The issue before the Court was whether Arab occupiers
acquired customary possessory title, or freehold title or whether they were just
tenants at will.
The facts of the case can be stated as follows:
In 1896 the German Administration of Tanganyika settled certain Arab
Immigrants on land at Ukonga in the District of Kisarawe. Although these Arabs
and their descendants had occupied the land since the original settlement, they
had never had any documents of title but no one had ever claimed the land. In
1952 the Member (Minister) for Lands and Mines gave notice under s. 5 of the
Land Acquisition Ordinance of his intention to acquire the land in question and

called upon all parties concerned to specify the nature of their interest thereon.
Claims were made by the appellants and negotiations for compensation followed
but finally broke down.
In due course a suit was filed by the Ministry for Lands and Mineral
Resources under s.9 of the Land Acquisition Ordinance (Cap 118) to have the
appellants removed. The summons was served on the appellants who field a
written statement of defence. Some of the questions that were framed in the
High Court were as follows:
(1) Who is the person or persons entitled to all those pieces/parcels of land
situate at Ukonga?
(2) What is the estate or interest of such person or person in the land
acquired?
At the hearing, the High Court held that the court had no jurisdiction, but it held
that, apart from the question of jurisdiction, the appellants had substantiated their
claim to be entitled to the lands and found that they were entitled to be paid
compensation. In the appeal, among the grounds raised, the crucial ground was
that – the learned judge erred in fact in finding that the German government had
granted to the appellants permanent occupation which was freehold in nature.
The decision of the trial High Court judge based on construction of s. 20 of
the Land Acquisition Ordinance. That section reads:
“20 – If any question arises respecting the title to the lands to be acquired
under this Ordinance, the parties in possession as being the owners
thereof, or in receipt of the rents of such land being purchased or taken
shall be deemed to have been lawfully entitled to such land unless the
contrary be shown to the satisfaction of the court and they and all parties
claiming under them or consistently with their possession shall be deemed
entitled to the consideration or compensation money…”
The judge held that the claimants were in possession at the time of acquisition
and must be deemed to have been lawfully entitled to the land, unless the
contrary be shown to the satisfaction of the court. The judge stated:

“To my mind the claimants have shown a right of title which comes within
the meaning of the section although I am certainly not prepared to specify
precisely what interests would and what interests would not come within
the section. The claimants’ family had been in occupation of the lands for
some fifty – six years prior to the acquisition proceedings in 1952, and
during the whole of that period it would appear likely that they had been
regarded by the local people as the owners of it …. Having held that the
claimants have substantiated their claim to have been lawfully entitled to
the lands, the onus of showing that the contrary is so, under s. 20 must I
think in the circumstances of this case be on the Crown, and it is therefore
for the Crown to satisfy the court that the original possession was
permissive only”.
The judge finally, held that “I am satisfied that at the time the intention of the
German
Government was permanent occupation and not, as Miss Sligh maintains, a
tenancy at will. There was, to use the words of, Graham Paul, Ag. President,
something “definite” and “special” in the occupation which took it out of the
category of any general a even special permissive occupation and in my opinion
the government, by its apparent intention and its actions, is stopped from denying
the freehold nature of the claimants’ title”.
The Court of Appeal reversed this decision. It held that the appellant’s
predecessors entered into possession of the land by permission of the then
government of the territory. There was no reason to suppose that the German
Administration intended to give the original Arab settlers anything more than
permission to occupy the land, and accordingly the appellants and their
predecessors were not in possession “as the owners thereof.” The court stated
further that,
“It is to be noted that the Ordinance (i.e. the German Imperial Ordinance
of 26 Nov. 1895) was in force when the appellants’ predecessors were
settled on the land, and that, as found by the learned judge, and indeed,

I think, conceded, no document of title were issued. I feel little doubt that
in settling the appellants’ predecessors on the land the German
Government were doing no more than giving then permission to use the
land for their reasonable requirements of residence and sustenance.
Had any other form of title been intended a document of title would have
been issued, indeed, must have been issued to create a valid title under
the German ordinance.”
THE LAND LEGAL REGIME AFTER INDEPENDENCE

Attempts at Individualization of Land Tenure
Towards the end of British rule in Tanganyika the colonial government
welcomed and supported the emergence of a class of wealthy African farmers in
the place of a peasantry. It was believed that that class would increase political
and economic stability in the rural areas. The first effort at creating a class of
wealthy African farmers was made through the formation of The Tanganyika
Agriculture Corporation in 1954. Its stated aim was to promote “a healthy,
prosperous Yeoman farmers class, firmly established on the land, appreciative of
its fruits, jealous of its inherent wealth and dedicated to maintaining the family
unit on it.”
It was argued that the African peasant must be separated from his
“traditional” environment before he could be transferred into a modern small
holder. The same policy of supporting the most progressive farmers was
recommended in the Report of the Royal commission on Land and Population in
East Africa published in 1955. The Commissioners felt that implementation of
that policy lay in the replacement of customary land tenure by individual freehold.
The report stated: “The policy concerning the tenure and disposition of land
should aim at the individualization of land ownership and mobility in the transfer
of land which, without ignoring existing property rights, will enable access to land
for economic use.”
The Royal Commission highlighted with commendation the important
element of the freehold system, namely the quality of unrestricted disposition

which in a free market, the Commissioners said, would allow “mobility in the
transfer and disposition of land consequently ensuring the power of progressive
farmers in buying up the less progressive”. The Commissioners further argued
that on granting individual titles to land the owners would be given documentary
titles which would enable them to raise money from financial institutions. The
commissioners pointed out that in contrast, the non-negotiability of a customary
law title “prevents a progressive farmer from raising money for capital
impairments.”
The Colonial Government in Tanganyika accepted the recommendations
of the Royal Commission and in a paper entitled Review of Land Tenure Policy
(Government Paper No. 6 1958) announced that it was going to implement the
recommendations. This followed closely what the government had earlier on
stated in its Circular No. 4 of 1953. In this circular (para 12) it was stated that:
“It is the intention that in townships all land should be alienated from tribal
tenure and that Africans should obey the same laws of the territory with
regard to their occupation as members of any other race.”
Following this circular, the practice grew up in urban areas that upon the
creation of City, Municipal or Township boundaries urban land became alienated
from customary tenure and those who remained within the urban boundaries or
came after declaration were regarded as squatters. Following this and the
Government Paper No. 6 of 1958, TANU opposed these measures. In a paper
called “Mali ya Taifa” published in 1958, the TANU President, Mwalimu Nyerere
stated,
“the Government intends to remove this menace of shifting cultivation. I
support the Government on this issue, and I must say that we must look
for an immediate remedy. I am however opposed to the proposed
government solution to this problem of shifting cultivation. I agree that the
freehold system of land ownership can remove many of the obstacles
already mentioned, but it is a solution which will create may other
problems more difficult to solve than the ones it intends to eliminate …

If people are given land to use as their property then they have the right to
sell it. It will not be difficulty to predict who, in fifty years time will be the
landlords and who the tenants. In a country such as this, where generally
speaking the Africans are poor and the foreigners are rich, it is quite
possible that, within eighty or hundred years, if the poor African were
allowed to sell his land, all the lands in Tanganyika would belong to
wealthy immigrants and the local people would be tenants. But even if
there were no rich foreigners in this country there would emerge rich and
clever Tanganyikans. If we allow land to be sold like a robe within a short
period there would only be a few Africans possessing land in Tanganyika
and all the others would be tenants.”
These arguments, truly, were against the rise of a landed bourgeoisie.

Nyerere viewed that, ownership of land does not rest in man but is vested in God
and that the people whether in groups or individual, have only rights of user. In
his view, land was not a saleable commodity at all.
AFTER INDEPENDENCE
(a) FREEHOLD CONVERSION
When Mwalimu Nyerere was opposing the extension of the freehold
system to African he did not say anything about the existing freeholds. Four
years later he directed his attention to this question. In a paper “Ujamaa – the
Basis of African Socialism” published in 1962 and in an obvious reference to the
fact that development of freehold land is dependent on the profit motive to the
owner, Mwalimu stated:
“The TANU Government must go back to the traditional African custom of
landholding that is to say; a member of society will be entitled to a piece of
land on condition that he uses it. Unconditional, or “freehold” ownership of
land … must be abolished.”
This authoritative paper was followed by a Government Paper No. 2 of 1962. It
contained proposals of the TANU Government for the conversion of freehold

titles into ‘government leases’. The freehold titles were abolished in 1962 when
they were converted into Government Leaseholds of 99 years by the Freehold
Titles (Conversation and Government Leases) Act, 1963; Cap 523. All existing
fees simple in possession were converted into government leaseholds for a
period of 99 years subject to possible annexure of development conditions. No
new grant for an estate in fee simple or for any absolute or perpetual interest was
possible after 1st July 1963. The Republic became the landlord who was entitled
to a rent from the former freeholder. This rent was calculated in accordance with
the provisions of the first schedule to the Act and was quite nominal. Although a
government lease was a disposable interest, the government lessee had to seek
the consent of the Commissioner for Lands before any disposition. If
development conditions were not complied with the government lease would be
forfeited.
The conversion of freehold titles into government leases in 1963 subjected
valuable land to some amount of government control. And Nyerere referred this
conversion of freehold titles into government leases as land nationalization. In
doing this, however, the independent government still embraced both peasant
agriculture and plantation agriculture. Thus, having accepted that policy the new
government further accepted the legal framework which had been erected to
facilitate implementation of the policy. The Land Ordinance with its concept of
‘public land’ was accepted and retained. What the legislature did was to
substitute the word ‘President’ for the word ‘Governor’ whenever it appeared in
the Land Ordinance. Consequently, the power of granting land on right of
occupancy became vested in the President.
In 1969, through The Government Leaseholds (Conversion to Right of
Occupancy) Act, 1969 with effect from 1st April 1970 the government leases
were in turn converted into Rights of Occupancy and these rights of occupancy
were deemed to have been granted under the Land Ordinance. Since then the
Right of Occupancy has remained the only land tenure recognized in the
Tanzania land law. If a right of occupancy was granted by the President it was
subject to development conditions contained in the certificate of title and land

regulations. (See the Land Regulations, 1926 and the Land (Pastoral)
Regulations, 1927 which were later repealed and replaced by the Land
Regulations,1948.) There are specific development conditions for each type of
right of occupancy, failure to comply with the terms of the regulations is a good
cause for the revocation of the right of occupancy.
(b) TANU AND THE LANDLORDS

The TANU objectives of eliminating a class of exploiters did not end with
conversation of freehold system. The guiding principle of TANU was that
landlords are exploiters. In 1962 Nyerere asserted,
“Landlords in a society which recognizes individual ownership of land can
be, and usually are in the same class as the loiterers, I was talking about:
the class of parasites.”
He finally said; what has remained is to fight on the legislative fronts against
landlords. In this regard, TANU’s struggle began with Nyarubanja tenure – a
feudal system of landholding which existed in then West Lake region (now
Kagera Region). In this system the landlord, called “Mtwazi” took possession of
land by way of dispossession and claim to have a right over it against any other
persons. If he allowed people to stay there, they became his tenants – called
“mtwarwa.” The landlord was entitled to shares in the tenant’s produce. It was a
rule that the tenant could not sell his holding, pledge it or otherwise dispose of it.
Lastly, it was a custom for all tenants to build their house with the doors facing
the house of the landlord as a sign that they looked to him for everything. To put
this system into an end, the Nyarubanja Tenure (Enfranchisement) Act of 1965
(No 1) was enacted. It became into operation in March 1965. The Act was
expressed to apply to the whole of the West Lake Region. It set out to
enfranchise those Nyarubanja tenants who held land immediately before the date
of its commencement. The enfranchising procedure was by vesting in those
persons titles free from all incidents of Nyarubanja tenure. The Act prohibited
creation of any future holdings in Nyarubanja tenure. There was provision for

compensating ex-landlords for any unexhausted improvements they had effected

on the enfranchised lands.
However, the Act had many shortcomings. Noticeable among them is
uncertainity concerning its scope. Although the aim of the Act was to abolish all
forms of tenure in West Lake Region with feudal overtones, the terminology used
caused confusion particularly in the areas where the terms Nyarubanja, Mtwazi
and Mtwarwa were unknown. For example, even in Ngara District the system
used a different name. A committee chaired by Samuel Luangisa was appointed
to look into the causes of the failure of the Nyarubanja enfranchisement
legislation and to recommend solution.
Following its report, in 1968 the Customary Leaseholds (Enfranchisement)
Act was enacted. This Act become applicable to any part of Tanzania mainland
provided some kind of customary leasehold were seen. On the effective date, i.e.
1st August 1969, every parcel of land held by tenant was enfranchised. The
landlord’s rights in land were extinguished.
VILLAGE COMMUNITIES/VILLAGE SETTLEMENT

Back in 1962 Nyerere had formed an idea of settling people in planned
communities. On 10th December, 1962 President Nyerere, after reviewing the
problems involved in developing Tanganyika, made the following observations on
the beneficial possibilities of the planned communal system.
“Before we can bring any of the benefits of modern development to the
farmers of Tanganyika the very first step is to make it possible for them to
start living in Village Communities.”
He went on to say:
“Unless the widely distributed people of Tanganyika are brought together,
we shall not be able to use tractors, we shall not be able to provide
schools for our children; we shall not be able to build hospitals or have
clean drinking water; it will be quite impossible to start small village
industries, and instead we shall have to go on depending on the town for
all own requirements; and, even if we had a plentiful supply of electric

power we shall never be able to connect it up to each isolated

homestead.”
He subsequently added:
“The effect of this settlement will be far-reaching, for planned settlement
does not only mean farms; it also means roads, commerce and some local
industries, as well as schools for the children, and health centres to help
people enjoy the life they are creating.”
Thus, the First Five Year Plan sought to achieve rural transformation
through village settlement schemes under the ‘Transformation Approach.’ This
approach had been recommended by the World Bank Mission in 1960. The view
of the government was that there were two cardinal problems of peasant
production, namely, land tenure and agricultural underdevelopment. It felt that
the solution to these problems lay in the transformation approach whose stated
goal was “the introduction of technical, social and legal systems which allow the
exercise of modern agricultural techniques based on relatively high productivity
and which consequently justify considerable investment in capital”. (see
Tanganyika Government (1964) First Five Year Plan, 1st July 1964 to 30th June
1969, vol. 1 General Analysis p.14).
The focus of this approach was regrouping or resettling of peasants in
new lands. It involved capital intensive new settlements which were supervised
by government officials. The strategy involved singling out a few peasants who
were considered progressive and supplying them with loans, mechanical
equipment, and other inputs. By so doing, it was hoped that others would be
motivated by their positive results and hence induced to do the same. A new
ministry was established for this purpose, The Ministry of Lands, Settlements and
Water Development. The land tenure for village settlement was erected by the
“Land Tenure (Village Settlements) Act, No. 27 of 1965 as amended later by Act
No. 17 of 1966.

The President of the United republic could grant a right of occupancy

called – ‘A settlement right,’ to the Commissioner for Village Settlement. The
Commissioner had power to assign the settlement right to the Village Settlement
Cooperative Society, which in turn would grant derivative rights to its members.
Derivative rights meant leases, licenses for use and occupation and easements.
It is clear from the Act that in these village settlements both homestead
plots and agricultural plots were held individually. Production was on individual
basis. The people did not farm together jointly and were normally separately
responsible for planting, weeding and harvesting under the supervision of
management..
By 1966 the village settlement scheme failed; See James & Fimbo (Source Book
p. 124) which explain the following as causes for its failure,
- Many of the farmers chosen to join the schemes were far from suitable.
Meetings were held around the districts to attract farmers to the schemes,
but the response in many cases came from urban unemployed people
with little experience and less interest in farming. They applied to join
the schemes more for the promises of free rations and services than for
the opportunities offered to improve their standard of living by their own
efforts;
- No serious attempt was made to explain to the farmers Government
policy. Farmers considered themselves rather temporary and underpaid
employees on Government estates;
- There was no farmers’ involvement in the planning and establishment of
the schemes – the schemes were initiated and managed by
government servants, consequently bureaucracy in decision making
developed;
- The initial planning on many schemes was poor;
- There was an unnecessary heavy capital investment, the capital cost per
acre and staff requirement was very high;

- The allocation of land rights on individual basis made co-operative activity

and later transition to communal ownership very difficult.
Following the Arusha Declaration in February 1967 which committed

Tanzania to the goals of ‘Socialism and Self reliance,’ the village settlement
programme was abandoned in favour of that of Ujamaa Vijijini (Ujamaa villages).
The Arusha Declaration blue print spelt out TANU’s policy of Socialism and Self –
Reliance which revolved around 4 main themes; namely, - public control over the
economy; - development through self-reliance, - social equality,- and rural
development.
The Arusha Declaration and the Second Five Year Plan, 1969 – 1974,
gave priority to rural development and increased production of agricultural crops
for consumption and export became imperative. Besides the need for increased
agricultural production, the government expressed the need to create collective
productive activities in the rural sector through application of the principles of
Ujamaa. The policy statement on Rural Development & Socialism stated,
“The basis of rural life must be the practice of cooperation in its widest
sense – in working and in distribution and all with the acceptance of the
absolute equality of all men and women.”
An enabling Act of Parliament was passed in very late in 1973 by the

name of Rural Lands (Planning and Utilization) Act, No. 14 of 1973. The Act
envisaged two stages. First, the President may declare any area of Tanganyika
to be a specified area for the propose of the Act. Second, the Minister for
Regional Administration may make regulations regulating farming operations in
such area or reserving the area or any part thereof for establishment of an
Ujamaa village or providing for the extinction, cancellation or modification of the
rights, titles and interests in or over parcels of land falling wholly or partly within
the specified area. (See for example G.N No 25/1974; 216/1974; 659/1986 and
88/1987).

In the implementation of the Ujamaa programme, bureaucratic control

became the order of the day although as initially conceived; formation of Ujamaa
villages was to be voluntary. What happed during the implementation of the
programme was that there were no pretence about the voluntary character of the
programme implementation – the programme took the form of massive
government operations, hence the expression “OPERATION VIJIJI”. These
operations were embarked upon following TANU decision in November 1973 that
all peasants must live in planned villages by the end of 1976. In doing this, some
significant number of people was deprived of their pieces of land which they held
under customary law, and were given in exchange other pieces of land in the
villages established pursuant to Operation Vijiji. Despite there being the Rural
Lands (Planning Utilization) Act, 1973, the exercise was undertaken not in
accordance with any law but purely as a matter of government policy. (See the
case of AG v. Lohay Akonaay (1995) TLR 80).
In some places, the settlement pattern in traditional villages was
rearranged. In most cases villagization involved settlement on virgin land. The
state ignored traditional land allocating authorities (i.e. chiefs, clan leaders,
headmen, council of elders etc) which, however, had disintegrated. The function
of allocating land to villages was assigned to District Development Councils
(DDC) established by the Decentralization of Government Administration (Interim
Provision) Act 1972. At the same time the Villages and Ujamaa Villages
(Registration, Designation and Administration) Act, No. 21 of 1975 was enacted.
This Act did not contain any provisions on land tenure. It only contained
provisions which empowered the Prime Minister to designate a village as Ujamaa
village if “a substantial portion of the economic activities of the villages are being
undertaken and carried out on a communal basis.”
Under the Directions made under the above Act, the D.D.C. would allocate
land to a village. The village Council in turn allots a piece of farmland to every
Kaya in the village according to need and ability to develop it. Since neither the
DDC nor the village council were/are recognized by customary law as land
allocating authorities it was doubtful whether such land was held under

customary law. And where a village was designated to be Ujamaa village the
requirement was that once land had been allocated by the DDC the village
Council of the Ujamaa village was obliged to,
“take such measures as may be necessary to acquire
rights of occupancy in respect of land within the limits
of the village and no other person shall have any right,
title or interest in or over any land within such limits.”
This meant that after this had been done, customary tenure would cease
to exist. The failure to act according to law led to, in 1980s, some aggrieved
villagers to seek remedies in courts by claiming recovery of the lands they were
disposed during the exercise. This was done when Ujamaa villages started to
disintegrate. To avoid much conflict the government resorted in enacting orders,
regulations and finally an Act of Parliament. The Regulation of Land Tenure
(Established Villages) Act, No 22 of 1992 is a point in reference. The effect of this
Act was to extinguish customary rights in land acquired before ‘operation vijiji’ in
an established village; to prohibit the right to compensation for such extinction, to
oust the jurisdiction of the courts, to terminate relevant court proceedings and
prohibit the enforcement of any relevant court decision. Following this, a case
was filed against the Government and consequently some provisions of this Act
were declared unconstitutional in Attorney General v. Lohay Akonaay, & Joseph
Lohay (1995) TLR 80.
Read the following cases to understand the status of customary tenure vis
a vis granted right of occupancy as judicially determined between 1980s to 1999.
 NAFCO v. Mulbadaw Village (1985) TLR 88.
 Suzana Kakubukubu & Others v. Walwa Joseph Kasubi and others; Civil
Appeal No. 14 of 1991 (C.A.T).
 M. P Nyagwaswa v. C. M. Nyirabu (1985) TLR 103.
 Yoke Gwaku & Others v. NAFCO & Another, High Court of Tanzania, Civil
Case No 52 of 1988.
 Mwalimu Omari & Other v. Omari Bilali, Civil Appeal No 19 of 1996,
(CAT).

 Joshua Okuku v. Shaban Adam, Civil appeal No. 1 of 1996.

 Lekengere Faru Parut Kamunyu & 52 others v. Minister for Tourism
Natural Resources and Environment & 3 Others Civil Appeal No. 53 of
1998, (CAT).
Lecture Two: THE RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY SYSTEM

The Right of Occupancy is a tenure which is unknown to the English
common law. It was introduced into the then Protectorate of Northern Nigeria as
a result of the recommendation of the Northern Nigeria Lands Committee which
reported in 1910. The Committee recommended that land legislation should
declare all land to be under the control and administration of the government and
that no title to the use or occupation of land should be valid without the consent
of the Governor. It went on to suggest other stringent limitations on individual
titles. That, no individual was to have exclusive rights as against the government.
The right was to be revocable for a wide number of reasons including the need of
the land for public purposes, whereas no compensation was to be payable by
right, only as a matter of administrative practice. The recommendations were
embodied in the Land and Native Rights Proclamation No. 9 of 1910, which was
revised and largely re-enacted by the Land and Native Rights Ordinance No. 1 of
1916 of Nigeria.
When the British came into Tanganyika, the then colonial government
adopted almost identical provisions in 1923 by passing the Land Ordinance of
1923. The rights and powers of the holder of right of occupancy are never
absolute, and their exercise is in most cases, limited by a number of restrictions,
and subject to control. This system has continued to be part of the law of
Tanzania even after the enactment of the new Land Acts of 1999, namely the
Land Act, No. 4 of 1999 and the Village Land Act, No. 5 of 1999 which at present
govern the land legal regime in Tanzania Mainland.

CLASSIFICATION AND TENURE OF LAND

The new Land Act, 1999 continues to state just as the repealed Land
Ordinance, 1923 that “All land in Tanzania shall continue to be public land and
remain vested in the President as trustee for and on behalf of all the citizens of
Tanzania” (s. 4(1)). The law therefore says that, “ a grant of a right of occupancy
shall be made in the name of the President and shall be sealed with a seal of a
nature and pattern which the President may, by order, published in the Gazette
approve” (s. 4(5)).
For the purpose of the management of land under the Land Act, 1999 and
all other laws applicable to land, public land is now categorized into the following:
 General Land;
 Village Land; and
 Reserved Land ( See s. 4(4) of the Land Act).
The village land is that category of land within the domain of the village
authority, whereas species of reserved land are indicated in section 6 of the Land
Act, 1999. All other remaining land forms the category of general land. However
there are provisions which allow the transfer of land from one category to another
( See ss.5(1) of the Land Act and the Village Land Act).
Under the scheme provided in the new Land Acts, land can be occupied in
different ways as follows:
(i) Granted right of occupancy (s. 29 of the Land Act).
(ii) Customary/deemed right of occupancy (ss. 25, 14 of the Village
Land Act).
(iii) Residential license (also called derivative right) under s. 23(1) of
the Land Act whereby urban or peri-urban dwellers are issued
with temporary license.
(iv) Derivative rights through the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC)
for non citizen investors.

Rights of occupancy and derivative rights are granted for a short term and long
term period.
 Long term rights of occupancy periods range from 5 - 99 years and are
renewable, but for not more than 99 years.
 Long term derivates rights and leases range between 5 - 98 years.
 Short term right of occupancy is for less than 5 years (See S. 32 (1) of Land
Act). In practice, grants of a short term are rarely made and when granted,
they are granted over land in respect of which there is no planning scheme
under the provisions of the Town Planning Act. According to the Land
Registration Act, Cap 334 only long term right of occupancy are compulsory
registrable (S. 27 thereof).
The nature of the rights of the occupier of land can be summarized as follows:
(i) It can only arise by grant from the President (s.22 of the Land Act) for a
definite term, not exceeding 99 years.
(ii) The occupier has exclusive rights to the use of land the subject of the
right of occupancy against all persons other than the President except
mines, minerals, gas, water or rights over the foreshore, (S.22(2) of the
Land Act). This connotes the concept of ‘imminent domain’, that, the
President is deemed to be “the superior landlord”, or as having
“reversionary title” or “radical title”. However, the law empowers the
President under section 4(2) of the Land Act to delegate any of his
functions under the Act to the person called Commissioner for Lands
who shall be the principal administrative and professional officer over
all matters connected with administration of land in the country. It
follows that the Commissioner for Lands or any other authorized officer
(for instance, the Land Officers) are authorized to enter on the land the
subject of a right of occupancy to inspect any land and to investigate
whether the conditions subject to which the right of occupancy has
been granted have been complied with (See s. 34(8) of the Land Act).

(iii) The occupier is entitled to compensation in case of expiry, (where the

Land Commissioner decline to renew his right of occupancy) or
revocation of the right of occupancy (except when done for breach of
conditions) or where the right of occupancy is compulsory acquired for
public interest under the Land Acquisition Act No. 47 of 1967. (See s
45 of the Land Act).
(iv) With governmental approval the occupier can transfer the right of
occupancy, or otherwise dispose of it. (See ss. 36, 37 of the Land
Act).
Author’s Note: It is important to refer to section 22 of the Land Act to see the
specific features/incidents of a right of occupancy granted under the Land Act
and section 18 of the Village Land Act for incidents of customary right of
occupancy and compare them.
To understand the judicial attitudes of the nature of “right of occupancy”
system read the case of: (Is the right of occupancy equal to lease?).
- Director of Lands & Another v. Sohan Singh (1952) 1 TLR (R) 631;
- Premchand Nathu v. Land Officer (1962) EA 738;
- Patman Garments Industries Ltd v. Tanzania Manufactures Ltd (1981)
TLR 103 (on powers of the President to revoke right of occupancy).
Tanzania`s exprerience with land administration and land policy reforms:

Womens
Land Rights (Extract from the Guardian of 27th July 2007)
By Dr.Furaha Lugoe
Land policy reform in the modern context is about equitable land redistribution and guaranteeing
land rights and tenure security to enable economic growth and poverty reduction. Land has a
particularly significant role to play for securing the livelihoods of poorer rural people. More than
half the population in many African countries lives below poverty line subsisting on less than US $
1 per day and a significant part of this poor populace, live in abject poverty on less the US $ 0.75
per day.

Since land is a primary means of both subsistence and income generation in rural economies,
access to land, and security of land rights, are of primary concern in improving on such statistic
towards the eradication of poverty. In rural areas, land is a basic livelihood asset from which
people produce food and earn a living. Access to land enables family labour to be put to
productive use in farming. It is a source of food, and provides a supplementary source of
livelihoods for rural workers and the urban poor.
The grazing of livestock on extensive rangelands is a basic livelihood activity for pastoralists and
access to pasture land. Gathering fruits, leaves and wood from common land is an important
regular source of income for rural women and poor householders, as well as constituting a vital
coping strategy for the wider population in times of drought and famine.
Land can be loaned, rented or sold in times of hardship and thereby provides some financial
security.
At the same time as a heritable asset, land is the basis for the wealth and livelihood security of
future rural generations. In this regard, it is important that the lands sector must develop policies
geared at giving every adult in the rural areas legal access to land. The contribution of land to
economic growth depends upon the security of tenure, duration and the enforceability of property
rights since these provide an incentive for agricultural investment and helps develop markets to
rent and sell land (Mtatifikolo and Lugoe, 2006).
Land markets, enable the transfer of land from less to more efficient producers, thereby increasing
yields and agricultural output. Increased agricultural growth will bring benefits not only to those
receiving titles directly, but also to the poor as a result of more employment, cheaper food and
other trickle down effects. However, in some cases land titling may benefit few powerful private
interests and create opportunities for land concentration and speculation rather than investment.
Hence, the land market has to be carefully regulated to produce the desired results of poverty
reduction, economic growth and development.
A Victory for Women`s Land Rights:

A key aspect of the land tenure system of Tanzania as provided in the Land Act no. 4 and the
Village Land Act no. 5 of 1999 is the enhancement of the right of vulnerable groups (women,
children, minorities) in society (Shivji, 1997). The male dominant structure of society governs nearly
80% of the rural population including succession and inheritance in Tanzania. The problems are
deep-rooted in succession or inheritance of immovable property including land by the female
gender.
Custom, culture and certain religious practices have combined to produce a bias against
vulnerable groups. Both Land Act No. 4 and Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999 have attempted to put
into effect the above sentiments with provisions relating to repugnancy of customary law,
acquisition of land rights and sales or assignments of land and mortgages. A number of critical
statements against gender discrimination are provided in the Land Act no. 4, in the context of co-
ownership and mortgages (see sections 85, 112, and 161 (2)), which apply to the Village Land Act
as well.
The latter is very specific on the rights of children in sections 20(2), 23(2) (e) (iv), 30(3) c) and 33

(1) c) and that of pastoralists in sections 29 (2) (a) (iii), 3 (1) (l), 7 (1) and 8 (8) (d). The Village
Land Act provides for a representation of women (at least 25%) on the Village Council, at least 4
members of the Village Adjudication Committee and at least 3 on the Village Land Council (dispute
settlement) to guard against discrimination in the access to land.
In the context of Tanzania, as an example to Africa, there has been steady progress in the
contributions of the lands sector towards poverty eradication. The PRSP progress reports for
2000/01 and subsequent years have credited the lands sector with a number of accomplishments,
including: (i) Streamlined procedures for land access and therefore improving the sensibility of the
land tenure system; (ii) Providing a greater scope for women to own land rights, although much still
had to be done to reduce the gender poverty gap and vulnerability; (iii) Setting the ground for the
use of land as a productive asset and collateral in mortgage loans by commercial and micro-
finance banks and other finance houses; (iv) Providing a mechanism for enhancing property rights
of low income households through the provisions of the new land laws, including the possibility of
tenure regularisation in informal settlements; (v) Initial popularisation of the Land Acts to enhance
the legal capacity of women and other vulnerable groups and their predicament.
These accomplishments are to be enhanced by the strategic plan for the implementation of the
land laws (SPILL) now under implementation. The Gender debates of the 1990s on Land Rights
could achieve more: The above provisions are a list of issues for which women and gender groups,
in general, bargained for in the run-up to the national land policy and the new land laws in
Tanzania.
Their participation was exemplary and were given attention by all including the presidential
commission on land matters, the seminars preceding the NLP and the parliamentarians. Whether
or not they could have achieved more depends on the agenda carried forward by the stakeholders.
The issue of women`s land rights should be addressed in amore holistic and proactive way so that
the status quo with regard to marginalisation, sidelining and neglect can be challenged and in order
to advance appropriate proposals for policy changes.
It is widely felt that land policy reform advocates on the side of the gender question in Tanzania
were more interested in reversal of legal provisions on succession and inheritance (Manji, 1998).
Succession in land title and landed property, it is felt, is one aspect of women’s unequal rights to
land but is not everything as women’s relations to land are much more complex than status
relationships reflected in inheritance.
More importantly are relations governed by roles of women as food producers for the home and
market, i.e., as farmers and farm workers and are affected by policies on land matters. Women as
full subjects on land relations should pursue issue of difficulties encountered in exercising effective
control and management of land; of removing barriers to land access; and of food production
hindered by inequitable distribution and re-distribution of land.
Women issues therefore transcend issues of women employment as indicator of status; advocacy
in amending legal provisions in laws on inheritance or land; urban concerns and class structure.
Women issues ought to recognise land as the most important and valuable of all assets particularly
to rural economies (Manji, 1998). In villages land provides livelihood, an identity and a sense of

belonging and, determines status. It is a vital asset for women over other sources of income,
particularly for those engaged in smallholder agriculture, including employment.
Discrimination is Repugnant at Law:Gender discrimination in land matters is repugnant at law. The

concept of repugnancy has a historical origin in Tanzania and many other African countries. The
Tanganyika Order in Council, 1920 stated that customary laws were applicable to the extent that
they were not repugnant to justice and morality. Fimbo (2004) adds that in the Village Land Act, a
new version of repugnancy has been enacted, namely, repugnancy of customary laws to notions of
equality of the sexes. Sub-section (2) of section 20 declares that a rule of customary land law is
void and inoperative to the extent that `it denies women, children or persons with disability lawful
access to ownership, occupation or use of any such land`.
In this provision the Legislature is addressing itself to customary rules of inheritance that
discriminate against daughters. Both Land Acts contain gender-neutral provisions on acquisition of
lands rights in Tanzania. Thus it is open to any man or woman, being a citizen of Tanzania, to
apply for granted right of occupancy or customary right of occupancy (Shivji, 2005).
With an eye on gender equality, section 23- (3) of the Village Land Act No. 4 of 1999 provides that
in determining whether to grant a customary right of occupancy, the village council shall; `have
special regard in respect of the equality of all persons, such as: that an application from a woman,
or group of women no less favourably than an equivalent application from a man, a group of men
or a mixed group of men and women`. Sub-section (4) further provides that where an application is
refused, the village council must furnish the applicant with a statement of reasons for the refusal.
The significance of this provision is that the aggrieved person may wish to challenge the decision in
a land court. Another innovation in this regard relates to the concept of co-occupancy between
spouses.
Section 161 of the Land Act contains a rebuttable presumption that spouses will hold the land as
occupiers in common in all cases where a spouse obtains land under a right of occupancy for the
occupation of all spouses. In every such case the Registrar of Titles is required to register the
spouses as occupiers in common.
So in an appropriate case an application for a granted right of occupancy by a spouse may lead to
registration of both spouses or all the spouses as occupiers in common. In addition a spouse`s
contribution of labour to the productivity, upkeep and improvement of land held in the name of one
spouse only leads to acquisition of interest in that land by the other spouse.
In summary, Gender issues in land seek to address the rights of women to own and use land that
constitutes the ultimate resource for human kind. These rights are more basic than reversal of
customary arrangements over inheritance and/ or employment. Women should not lose focus of
primary issues in the struggle for land access. Further gender discrimination is repugnant to justice
and morality in most communities. Therefore gender sensitive legislation is to support
emancipation of women towards equitable access to land and subsequent enhancement of
production and higher contribution to the GDP. In this regard affirmative action, in cases of gross
deprivation and neglect particularly where customary rules of inheritance and religious polarization
are deeply entrenched, should not be ruled out.

Reviewed by Dar es salaam Institute for Land Administration and Policy Studies. SOURCE:
GUARDIAN
See this summary on rights of women to land:

Women’s Rights in The Land Act, 1999 and The Village Land Act, 1999
These Acts are of particular importance, since secure land rights are key in promoting women’s
economic empowerment and the majority of working women in Tanzania live in rural areas, are
engaged in agricultural work and are without the right to own, manage or inherit land.
In general, the new land laws secure the rights of women in the following ways:
a. Secure women’s rights to acquire title and registration of land.

b. Actively promote women’s representation in decision-making bodies addressing land
issues, such as participation in administrative and dispute settlement institutions.
c. Address issues of customary land rights and uphold the principle of non-discrimination
based on sex.
d. Inclusion of women’s land rights in the forthcoming National Land Policy (see Government
Programmes below).
Specific provisions in both Acts regarding women’s rights, and equal opportunity for women
concerning land management, include:
b. Sub-section 20(2) of the Village Land Act, 1999 prohibits the use of customary law in
determining the right of occupancy, if the law discriminates against, inter alia, women:
"Any rule of customary law and any decision taken in respect of land held under customary tenure,
whether in respect of land held individually or communally, shall have regard to the custom,
traditions, and practices of the community concerned and the rule of customary law or any such
decision in respect of land held under customary tenure shall be void and inoperative and shall not
be given effect to by any village council or village assembly or any person or body of persons
exercising any authority over village land or in respect of any court or other body, to the extent to
which it denies women, children or persons with disability lawful access to ownership, occupation
or use of any such land."
b. Family land is protected by a presumption of co-occupancy, which recognizes both

spouses (Land Act, 1999, ss. 161-164.).
c. A married woman must give her consent before her husband can make a disposition (i.e.:
mortgages, sales, leases and other derivative rights) of their matrimonial landed property
(Land Act, 1999, s. 112(3).).
d. Appointment of members to the National Land Advisory Council must have regard to the
importance of ensuring a fair balance of men and women (Land Act, 1999, s.17).
e. Village Councils must not allow or make assignments which would negate the right of a
woman to occupy land (Village Land Act, 1999, s.30(4)(b).).

f. In approving a disposition of a customary right of occupancy, the Village Council is bound,

inter alia, to ensure that the special needs of women for land are adequately met (Village
Land Act, 1999, s.33(1)(d).).
g. In case of a husband exercising his customary right of surrendered occupancy, first priority
for offer of the land must go to his wife or wives (In the latter case, in their order of seniority
- Village Land Act, 1999, s.36.).
h. The number of women participating in the Village Adjudication Committee and Dispute
Settlement Machinery, must not be not less than half the minimum number of members
(Village Land Act, 1999, ss. 53(2), 53(5) and 60(2).).
CUSTOMARY/DEEMED RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY

In the case of Mtoro bin Mwamba (supra) the judge held that, ‘the Bantu
had no idea of a right to the land in itself in re … the general right over the land
might be termed usufractuary occupational agricultural right and heritable’. It
was the view of colonial judge that individual ownership of land is unknown to
African societies, the reason being that all land is held communally.
It cannot, actually, refuted that in early African societies a person could not
acquire permanent rights in land through purchase or any other means for there
was no scarcity of land and the pattern of cultivation was shifting, being done for
subsistence. However, with the availability of more detailed studies from various
communities, it is now clear that it is not true that Africa land tenure was much
the same in every part of the continent, variations existed and changes took
place as time went on. For example, various forms of feudalism flourished in
many parts of Africa.
Under customary law, there were major three ways of acquiring land (1)
by cultivation through clearing virgin land (2) by purchasing and (3) by inheriting
land from one’s elders. Under all those, nobody’s permission was necessary in
order to acquire ownership. Under the Land Ordinance, 1923, this system of
occupation came to be referred as ‘Deemed Right of occupancy’ or ‘Customary
right of occupancy’ - means a title of a native or a native Community lawfully
using or occupying land in accordance with native law and custom. This
definition is now modified in the Village Land Act, 1999 as follows,

“the title of a Tanzania citizen of African descent or a community of

Tanzanians citizens of African descent using or occupying land under and
in accordance with customary law.”
Furthermore, the Village Land Act, 1999 now creates a difference between
‘Deemed Right of Occupancy’ and ‘Customary Right of Occupancy’. While a
deemed right of occupancy is regarded to be a customary right of occupancy but
it is not necessarily the same. A customary right of occupancy is now granted by
the Village Council under s.25 of the Village Land Act, and a certificate of
customary right of occupancy is issued thereto. It follows logically that, those
interests acquired by virtue of native law and custom remain as deemed rights of
occupancy and those which are now issued by the village council are called
customary rights of occupancy.
This arrangement came about as a result, partly, of the recommendation
of the Presidential Commission of Enquiry into Land Matters (Commonly referred
after its Chairman- Prof. Issa Shivji, ‘the Shivji Commission’). The Commission
recommended two forms of tenure, that is to say, the ‘right of occupancy’ and
‘customary rights’ And on the relationship between them (as argued earlier in the
case of Yoke Gwaku (supra)) the Commission stated that,
“The Land tenure system is based on multiple land regimes all existing
side by side and none of which shall be considered superior to the other
and interests under each of them shall enjoy equal security of tenure
under the law.”
When the National Land Policy of 1995 was drafted, it made further clarification
by making a policy statement to the effect that,
“(vi) A dual system of tenure which recognizes both customary and
statutory rights of occupancy as equal in law will be established.”
The National Land Policy became the core document to the drafting of the Land
Acts as it contains the Government position. The Village Land Act, 1999 tries to
implement the above policy statement. Under section 18 it states that:

“18 – (1) A customary right of occupancy is in every respect of equal

status and effect to a granted right of occupancy and shall subject to the
provisions of this Act, be –
(a) capable of being allocated by a village council to a Citizen, a family
of citizens, a group of two or more Citizens whether associate
together under any law or not …
(b) in village land or reserved land
(c) capable of being of indefinite duration
(d) governed by customary law …
(e) inheritable and transmissible by will
(f) liable, subject to the prompt payment of full and fair compensation,
to acquisition by the state for public purposes in accordance with
any law making provision for that action.
Arguably, the above provision does not cover the “deemed right of occupancy”
since it is not “capable of being allocated by a village council.” However, the
definition of customary right of occupancy states that “it includes deemed right of
occupancy,” (s. 2 of the Land Act).
The core issue here is to consider whether these Land Acts (Acts Nos. 4
and 5) have succeeded to create a dual system of tenure as equal in law. It is
argued that the Land Act, 1999 still maintains the superiority of the granted right
of occupancy over the customary and deemed right of occupancy. For example,
while s.18(1) of the Village Land Act states that both tenures are of equal status
and effect, s. 34(3) of the Land Act, contains the following words:
“(3) where a right of occupancy includes land which is occupied by
persons under customary law, it shall be a condition of that right of
occupancy that those customary rights shall be recognized and those
persons so occupying the land shall be moved or relocated only –
(a) so far as is necessary to enable the purpose for which the right of
occupancy was granted to be carried out; and
(b) in accordance with due process and principle of fair administration,
being given….”

This provision seems to override section 18 of the Village Land Act

because of the clear provisions of section 181 of the Land Act which provides
that, wherever any other written law applicable to land is in conflict with the
provisions of the Land Act, the Land Act shall prevail. So, through the grants of a
right of occupancy the petty bourgeoisie can cleverly side step customary tenure.
Arguably, it can be said that s. 34 (3) of the Land Act evades tenure security of
customary title, and progressively replaces it by granted right of occupancy.
PROCEDURES FOR GRANTING RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY

Neither in the Land Ordinance, Cap 113 nor in the Land Regulations, 1948
made under it had the procedure for granting of right of occupancy. Because of
this lacuna, the Ministry of Lands took two administrative steps for guidance. In
the first place, it introduced the granting of a letter of offer of right of occupancy
for an applicant of a granted right of occupancy before a certificate of occupancy
is prepared and issued to him. Secondly, it established land/plot allocation
committees which were responsible for considering applications. In this
procedure, the applicant applies for a grant. After approval of the application by
land allocation committee the applicant was issued with an offer for which he is
required to accept by paying the necessary fees for the plot within a certain
specified period (like 30 days). This procedure of Plot allocation was provided in
the Circulars issued by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development,
Circular No. NLUUD-C-1133/11/23 of 13th November 1978. (See the case of Col.
Kashimiri v. Naginder Matharu (1988) TLR 163 – the Court of Appeal of
Tanzania adopted took judicial notice of this circular)
Since the institution of plot allocation committees, three problems arose,
namely:
(i) plot allocations were sometimes made without committee meetings,
(ii) there was a conflict between land granting bodies – the
Commissioner for Lands and local government authorities e.g. The
City Council of DSM, over jurisdiction to allocate plots.

(iii) concurrent jurisdiction of the Commissioner and District Land

Officers to make land/plot allocation which led to double or multiple
allocations.
(Read: Fimbo, G.M. Essays in Land Law Tanzania at pp. 84-99 and the case of
Tanzania Manufacturers Ltd v. Patman Garments Industries Ltd (supra)).
Another problem which arose was regarding the significance of the letter
of offer of a right of occupancy. The main issue of contention was when was the
right of occupancy created? Is it just after the letter of offer has been issued and
accepted or is it after the title of the right of occupancy is issued? In the case of
Sarjit Singh v. Sebastian Christom (1988) TLR 24 the High Court (Kyando, J.)
held that “a right of occupancy is created by the approval of the applicant’s
application for the grant of one, ie.. a right of occupancy, and the acceptance by
the applicant for the granted right”. The existence of a certificate of right of
occupancy is merely evidence of a right of occupancy but not the right itself.
Reading the Land Act, 1999 this position seems to be overruled by section
29(1) (2) (3) (4). Sub-section (4), for instance, provides that “the occupier to
whom a certificate of occupancy is issued shall sign at the bottom of the
certificate as acceptance of the terms and conditions of that certificate and no
certificate of occupancy shall be valid or give rise to any liabilities on the part of
the state or any rights on the part of the occupier to whom the certificate has
been issued until it is so signed.” (emphasis supplied).
Since there were many problems under the old land law regime the new
Land Act tries to address those problems under various provisions to make land
administration transparent and certain. For example, land administration and
distribution of land rights over general or reserved land is now completely
centralized in the office of the Commissioner for Lands. However there is room
for delegation of functions, under G.N. No 76 of 2001, “Land (Functions of
Authorized Officers) Regulations, to authorized officers. To a greater extent the
Land Act introduces openness and transparency in land administration and land
delivery. There are four stages before a right of occupancy is granted:

 First, under S. 25(1) an application for a right of occupancy is submitted on a

prescribed form (duly filled Land form No. 19) to the Commissioner;
accompanied by passport size photograph, application fee, and any other
information as required by the Commissioner. There should also be a
declaration of all rights and interests in land in Tanzania which the applicant
has at the time of application. Application by a non citizen or foreign company
should be accompanied by a Certificate of Approval granted by Tanzania
Investment Centre (TIC) under Tanzania Investment Act, 1997. (See the
entire S. 25 of the Land Act).
The Commissioner is obliged to maintain a register of application which

shall be available to inspection by the members of the public. (S.25(6)).
 Secondly, after receiving such applications The Commissioner shall be
responsible for determining the application (S. 26(1)).
In determining the above, the Commissioner may act on the
recommendation from a local government authority or other body (S.
26(2);(3)). If he accepts the application and determines to grant a right of
occupancy he issues ‘a letter of offer’ to the applicant in the prescribed form
(Land Form No. 20) (S. 27 (1);(2)).
 Thirdly, is an acceptance of the letter of offer by the applicant in the
prescribed form (Form No. 20) accompanied by any fee or deposit or any
irrevocable commitment to pay such fee or deposit (S.28(1)).
 Fourthly; the Commissioner grants a right of occupancy by issuing of
certificate of occupancy in the prescribed form. (S.29(2) (Land Form No. 22).
Note: Read the whole of S. 29 of the Land Act. But note also that, where
the certificate of occupancy to the applicant is not issued within 180 days
since the date of receiving a letter of offer, the offeree may apply to the
Registrar of Documents to have his offer registered.
The Land Act establishes what are called Land Allocation Committees (S.
12(1) which may be established at the rural level or at the urban level or district

authorities (S.12(3)). But their role is to advice the Commissioner on the

exercise of his power to determine applications for right of occupancy.
Non Citizen Investors
Occupation of land by non-citizens is restricted to lands for investment

purposes under the Tanzania Investment Act, 1997. Under the Land Act, a
foreign investor may occupy land through:
 Derivative rights under section 20(2) of the Land Act, 1999; (See S. 19(1)
for definition or derivative right).
 Application to the Commissioner for Lands for grant of a right of

occupancy under section 25(1)(h) and (i) of the Land Act, 1999 ;
 Sub-leases from private sector;
 Licenses from the Government ;
 Purchase from other holders of granted right of occupancy.
As for derivative rights, land designated for investment purposes shall be

identified, gazetted and allocated to TIC, which shall create derivative rights to
investors. Instances of grant of right of occupancy to a non-citizen are recognized
under section 19(2) of Land Act, 1999. Since, section 22(1)(i) allows the granted
right of occupancy to be capable of being a subject of disposition, a non-citizen
can obtain it from the market. Read the case of SHAFFIQUE DHIYEBI v.
PSRSC, HC (Land Division) Land Case No. 46 of 2004( unreported).

Lecture Three: REVOCATION OF THE RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY

INTRODUCTION
As stated in the previous lectures the rights of land users are:
(i) The right of exclusive possession of the right of occupancy against all
persons other than the President.
(ii) The right, in conformity with statutory provisions, to erect dwelling
houses, production, cultural, services and other buildings and
structures, to sow agricultural crops and plant forests and fruits,
decorative and other tress, pastures etc.
(iii) The right to transfer the right of occupancy, mortgage or otherwise
dispose of it subject to government approval.
(iv) The right to compensation should the interest of occupier is acquired in
the public interest.
It was also mentioned to you that the mere grant of a right of occupancy does
not confer on the occupier any water rights, rights over any foreshore, any rights
to mine, minerals or mineral oil. These rights may be acquired on application to
appropriate state authorities under specific legislation.
Just as rights go with duties/liabilities so is in the occupation of right of
occupancy. The duties of land users are mostly dependent on the specific aim for
which the land was granted. Generally, the land occupier is obliged to use the
land granted for the purposes for which it was allotted. In such a case he shall
not leave his land unused. A grantee of the right of occupancy for agricultural,
pastoral or mixed agricultural and pastoral purposes or a grantee of land for
building purpose in urban areas shall comply with conditions stipulated in the
certificate of right of occupancy given to him and specifically observes the
conditions contained in the Land (Conditions of Rights of Occupancy)
Regulations of 2001 (G.N No. 77 of 2001). For example, regulation 6(1) thereof
maintains that:
“Where the land the subject of a granted right of occupancy in a Planning area or
in any urban or peri-urban area is undeveloped land or land in a redevelopment
area the occupier thereof shall apply for planning consent under the Town and

Country Planning (Application for Planning Consent) Regulations 1960, and

shall apply for a building permit under the Township (Building) Rules, 1953
within six months of the grant of the right of occupancy and shall use the land in
conformity with the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Regulations,
1960.”
REVOCATION
The previous Land Ordinance, Cap 113 was very skeletal in many
respects. One area was that it granted wide discretionary powers to the Governor
(later the President) and bureaucrats with regard to revocation of right of
occupancy. Under the previous Land Ordinance, 1923, section 10, it was clearly
stated that, it shall not be lawful for the President to revoke a right of occupancy
save for “good cause.” See the case of Patman Garments Industries Ltd v,
Tanzania Manufacturers Ltd (supra) where the Court of Appeal attempted to
interpret section 10(1) of the Ordinance. Good cause was defined to include, any
breach of any term or condition contained or to be implied in the certificate of
occupancy (i.e. development conditions); or breach of any regulations under that
Ordinance relating to the transfer of or dealings with rights of occupancy or
interests therein. Under the Land Act, similar provisions can be found. The
President is empowered to revoke a granted right of occupancy upon any breach
arising from any condition attached to the right of occupancy (S. 45(1)) and upon
other “good cause”. What matters can amount into good cause are specified
under subsection (2). Generally, a holder of right of occupancy holds his
certificate of title subject to conditions expressly provided in the certificate of a
right of occupancy, in the Land Act, the Land Registration Act, Town Planning
Act and all regulations made there under. In short, the holder is required to
comply with the laws which govern the nature of his/her title.
The good thing with the Land Act is that, before revocation is done “due
process” must be followed. Certain specified procedures as provided from S.
35(4)- 49) must be adhered to, these includes serving of notice to the occupier
informing him/her the breach he/she is alleged to have committed as was

required in the case of Director of Land and Mines v. Sohan Singh (1952) 1 TLR
631
In 1970 an amendment was made to the Ordinance by virtue of Act No.
28 of 1970 under which subsection (2) was added into. This subsection granted
power to the president to revoke a right of occupancy “if in his opinion, it is in the
public interests so to do”. These provisions brought to surface the following
problems: (i) no definition of “public interest” was given in the Ordinance; (ii)
there was no provision for notice to the occupier before his right could be
revoked; (iii) there was no provision for appeal to any forum against the
revocation order, (iv) there were numerous revocations which were made without
good cause and (v) revocations were often made to solve the problem of
double/multiple allocation and in order to clear the way for fresh grants of rights
of occupancy.
Like the Land Ordinance which empowered the President to revoke a right
of occupancy in the “public interest,” the Land Act does the same under section
45(3). The problem is that, up until now the word ‘public interest’ is not defined
anywhere. Case law has tended to focus only on the justiciability of public
interest but not its meaning. With regard to revocation power, the President has
no power to delegate this power. This position is reinforced from the National
Land Policy para. 4.2. 14(ii).
Students Should read these cases/materials:
(i) Read the case of DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND MINES v SOHAN SINGH
(1952) TLR 63, and PREMCHAND NATHU & CO LTD v. LAND OFFICER
[1962] E A 739 PC; [1960] EA 941, and consider how the court dealt with the
issue of notice at the time of revocation.
(ii) Read page 89 to 99 in Fimbo G.M; The Essays in Land Law Tanzania, Dar
es Salaam, 1992.
(iii) Read the following cases relating to revocation of right of occupancy: Premji
v. Calico Textiles Industries Ltd., High Court, Dar es Salaam, Civil Case No. 5 of
1987( found in page 94 of Essays in Land Law); Patman Garments Industries

Ltd., v. Tanzania Manufactrers Ltd., (1981) TLR 303 (also found in Essays in
Land Law page 95); Agro Industries Ltd., v. Attorney General [1994] TLR 43.
THE LAND ACT 1999 ON REVOCATION

The Land Act has addressed itself to the problems mentioned above by
making extensive provisions on grounds of revocation, the process of revocation
and relief to the occupier who is aggrieved by the revocation. Like the previous
Land Ordinance, the power to revoke right of occupancy is vested in the
President. (Section 45(1)). This power is exercised upon any breach arising from
any condition or good cause (see s. 45(1)(2)) or where the President is of the
opinion that “it is in the public interest to do so”.(s. 45(3)). However, before
proceeding to take action in respect of a breach of condition of the right of
occupancy the Commissioner must consider a number of things, which includes:
(a)the nature and gravity of the breach and whether it could be remedied;
(b)the circumstances leading to the breach by the occupier;
(c)whether the condition that has been breached could be amended so as to
obviate the breach. (s. 45(4)).
So, revocation is not the only remedy available. The Commissioner may,
instead of proceeding with the process of revocation either impose a fine on the
occupier in accordance with section 46, or serve a notice on the occupier in
accordance with section 47 requiring the breach to be remedied (s. 45 (5)).
Now, should the Commissioner be minded to proceed to take action on a breach
the process of revocation is elaborate as follows;
(i) He must issue a warning letter to the occupier advising him that he is
in breach of the conditions of the right of occupancy(s.45(4) (c); GN
No. 71 of 2001 Land Form 6);
(ii) Serve a notice on the occupier in a prescribed form requiring the
breach to be remedied; [ if such notice is not complied with the
Commissioner will proceed with the next step];

(iii) Serve upon the occupier a notice of revocation in the prescribed form
and notifies the Registrar of Titles of the service of such notice of
revocation (s. 48(1));
(iv) Then the Commissioner recommends to the President to revoke the
right of occupancy(s/ 48(2));
(v) Finally, the President approves a revocation and the Commissioner is
required to cause it to be published in the Gazette and in one or more
newspapers(s.49(1)).
[For deeper understanding students are advised to read whole of sections 44
– 49 of the Land Act].
No doubt that under these detailed procedures to be followed no revocation
can be done arbitrarily. This in turns enhances tenure security of occupier of right
of occupancy.
The Village Land Act on the other hand does not contain provision for
revocation of deemed right of occupancy or customary right of occupancy by the
village council. It employs a different terminology. And that is - deprivation of land
under customary right of occupancy. This sanction can be invoked only if the
relevant customary law provides so. The condition precedent is breach of a
condition imposed under and in accordance with customary law. (Ss. 37(1),
39(1)). The procedure to follow in the event of breach is (i) the village council
issues a warning to the occupier advising him that he is in breach of
condition(s38(6)), (ii) the occupier makes a representation (s. 39(1)), (iii) the
village council determines to proceed to exercise a customary law remedy
(s.39(1) (c ), and finally (iv) the Commissioner to assent to the remedy (s.39(2)).
COMPENSATION FOR UNEXHAUSTED IMPROVEMENT

What is unexhausted improvement is defined in the Land Act section 2 to
mean “any thing or any quality permanently attached to the land directly resulting
from the expenditure of capital or labor by an occupier or any person acting on
his behalf and increasing the productive capacity, the utility, the sustainability of

its environmental quality and includes trees, standing crops and growing produce
whether of an agricultural or horticultural nature.”
Compensation is a right of a person who effected some improvements on
the land and thereafter he is dispossessed by another person. Compensation is
normally payable by the person who takes the benefits of the improvements. For
example, where ‘A’ leases his land to ‘B’, upon effluxion of time ‘A’ should
compensate ‘B’ for whatever benefits he can enjoy from B’s improvements.
Improvements on the land may be carried out mainly under two situations: (i) in
pursuance of a grant of occupational rights in land- either express or implied; just
like where a right of occupancy is granted to the occupier, or a tenancy or
licence; (ii) in pursuance of adverse occupation of land.
Payment of compensation in the Land Ordinance was being effected as
per the provisions of section 14 thereof. Generally where right of occupancy is
revoked the occupier was entitled to compensation for unexhausted
improvements upon the land. Read the case of MANYARA ESTATES LTD v.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CREDIT AGENCY [1970] E A 177 and consider
the right of the mortgagee when the right of occupancy is revoked during the
subsistence of the mortgage. In short the court held that (as per Law, J.A., at
page 182-183) “One has only to refer to the deeds …. The security in each case
(mortgage) was the right of occupancy and nothing else, and when the right of
occupancy was revoked, the security was destroyed”. This case compelled the
government to amend the Land Ordinance in 1970 by Act No. 28 in which section
14B was added in. This added section provided that:
Where any amount is paid to the President on behalf of a previous
occupier in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (b) of section 14
and the President is satisfied that-
(a) such previous occupier had created a mortgage on the right of
occupancy of the land previously held by him; and
(b) that the amount payable to the mortgages in respect of such mortgage
remains wholly or partially unpaid, the President shall, out of the
amount so received by him, make payment to the mortgagee of the

amount remaining due to him under the mortgage, and where such
payment is made to a mortgagee the remainder only, if any shall be
paid to the previous occupier.
The proviso was that in order to receive payment the mortgagee was required to
lodge his claim in writing to the Minister within three months since revocation was
done.
The Land Act also provides for payment of compensation to the former
occupier whose right of occupancy has been revoked. Section 49(3) provides
inter alia that “ there shall be payable to the former occupier whose right of
occupancy has been revoked compensation which shall equal the value of
unexhausted improvements made in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the right of occupancy on the land at the time of revocation less-
(a) the costs to the Government of any proceedings for or taken in
connection with the revocation;
(b) any rent, taxes and dues together with any interest on the rent, taxes
and dues which were owed to the Government immediately before the
revocation;
(c) any sums owed by the former occupier, or by the Government as a
consequence of the revocation, to any person claiming a derivative right
to the land through the former occupier; ( see the definition of derivative
right in section 2);
(d) any monies which the Government is obliged to spend or which it is
reasonably necessary for the Government to spend to repair any
damage to the land or any building on the land or to any contiguous land
or to any persons lawfully occupying and using the land or any
contiguous land as result of any act or omission to act by the former
occupier during his occupation, whether that act or omission to act was
lawful or not;
(e) any other expenses which the Government incurs or may reasonably
anticipate incurring as a result of or on account of the revocation.

According to the Land (Assessment of the Value of Land for Compensation)

Regulations, 2001 GN No. 78 0f 2001 the basis for assessment of the value of
any land and unexhausted improvement for purposes of compensation, under
the Act shall be the market value of such land. In the event of revocation the
Government shall pay compensation out of the Local Compensation Fund
established by section 173 of the Land Act. The GN No. 79 of 2001, namely,
Land (Compensation Claims) Regulations 2001 mentions under its regulation
4 categories of persons who can claim compensation.
[ Examine whether unpaid mortgagee falls under any category of person].

Lecture Four: THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT (LEASE)1

DEFINITIONS AND FEATURES OF LEASE
A lease is also a species of transfer of immovable property. While a sale
is an absolute transfer of property, a lease is a partial or limited transfer of
property. One can define a lease as a transfer of right to enjoy property made for
a certain time, express or implied, in consideration of a price paid or promised or
of money, a share of crop, service or any other thing of value or to be rendered
periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee who
accepts the transfer on such terms.
A lease, therefore, is a transfer of property to the extent of a right to the
transferee that is the lessee, to enjoy the same that is to make use of the
property, for a fixed period in consideration of some price or premium and in
consideration of the payment of rent or both. A lease is, therefore, not a mere
contract but is a transfer of an interest in land. It creates a right in rem. Therefore,
by way of a deed of lease what is transferred by the owner or the lessor to the
lessee is his right to enjoy the property for a certain period (subject to the terms
of the lease) and not the whole or any other part of the rights of ownership of the
lessor. This type of transfer is called in conveyancing ‘a demise’. So by demise
or a lease what is transferred is only the right to use the land subject to the terms
or covenants that may be agreed upon. Indeed, a lease is the outcome of the
rightful separation of ownership and possession. The essential characteristic of
a lease is that the subject of the lease (i.e. land) is occupied and enjoyed but the
corpus of the subject does not disappear by user. On the grant of a lease, the
lessor retains what is called reversion, which he may assign.
The expression ‘lease’ and ‘tenancy’ are several times intermixed. Both have
the same meaning but generally under conventional/traditional usage, a tenancy
1 Although the paper has been prepared as a simple guide to students of land law, the
students should not take it as the only reference material for purpose of land law. The
paper is also useful for the students to acquire legal writing skills. It shows how
references by way of foot notes are cited etc; this will equip students with the requisite
skills that can be used in writing their papers and/or dissertations.

is usually referring to the relatively short term while lease to more formal longer
period, that is, more than a year or so. So, a tenancy for more than a year is
generally called lease, though there is no distinction made by law. The word
‘tenancy’ is used when the lease is for a period of month to month or for less than
one year or if it is at will or at sufferance. In English law ‘tenancy’ indicates
‘possession’ not ownership. So, ‘tenant’ means one who occupies land or
tenement under a landlord.
A lessee’s right to enjoy or use the property is a right in an immovable property

and is a right in rem and, therefore, transferable and heritable. It is by itself an
immovable property or interest therein and it is therefore, a subject matter of
conveyancing like the transfer of property by way of sale or mortgage. It follows,
therefore, that a lessee can transfer his leasehold interest by way of sub-lease
or by way of absolute assignment or assignment by way of mortgage.
Illustration of Assignment and Subletting
X………………Y
20 years
A……………..B
15 years
C………….D
This diagram is the usual way of representing the following events. X grants a 20
years’ lease to A and then assign the reversion to Y. B also takes an assignment
of A’s lease and grants a sub-lease to C for 15 years, whereas C assigns his
sub-lease to D.

As to the 20-years’ lease (head-lease) X is the ‘lessor’, ‘Y’ is the ‘assignee of the
reversion’ or new landlord, and A the ‘lessee’. B is in dual position; as to 20years’
lease, he is the ‘assignee of lease’, or the new tenant; as to the 15 years’ lease
(sub-lease), he is ‘sub-lessor’. C is the ‘sub-lesee’ and D the ‘assignee of the
sub-lease’ or the ‘sub-tenant’.
For the purpose of enforcing covenants in the lease it is important to note that
‘Privity of Contract’ exists between X and A and between B and C, whilst
‘Privity of Estate’ exists between Y and B (having the same estates as originally
vested in X and A) and between B and D. Thus, as between the original parties
to a lease (i.e. X and A; and B and C) all covenants in the lease are enforceable
under normal contractual principles based on the privity of contract. However,
where one party to a lease has assigned (not subletting) his interest, covenants
may be directly enforceable by or against the assignee because of the principle
of privity of estate. In this regard those covenants which ‘touch and concern’
the land are so enforceable.
2.0 AGREEMENT TO LEASE

Every transaction of lease, particularly when the lease is for a long period, is
generally preceded by an agreement to lease, followed by investigation of title
of the lessor to the property and finally by execution of the deed of lease.
Under section 54 (1) of the Land Registration Act, Cap 334 [R.E 2002] no lease
shall be registered unless it is expressed to be for a term exceeding five years or
contains an option whereby the tenant can require the landlord to grant him a
further term or terms which, together with the original term, exceed five years.
This means, it is only a lease for five years or more which is registrable under the
Land Registration Act, Cap 334 and can therefore be made by a registered
instrument. In the case of a lease or tenancy for less than five years it can be
effected orally or by an unregistered deed.

2.1 The Essentials of an agreement to lease

To create a valid lease the following are important:
(a) The parties to the lease-
Since one features of the leasehold interest is that, except where statute law
operates, it is founded on a contract, there must be two parties to such contract.
A lease cannot be made with oneself.2 Under section 65(1) of the Land Act, 1999
[Cap 113], however, “any person may make a disposition3 to himself and any
other person or together with any other person to himself alone.”
(b) The property to be demised-
The subject matter of a lease must be land as defined in the law. The expression
‘lease’ is also nowadays used in respect of hire purchase agreements relating to
moveable property like vehicle etc. But this is misnomer. Financing leases or
leasing of machinery for securing finance is only a garb for hire purchase
agreement.
(c) Reversion-
A lease must always be granted out of a larger estate, such as the right of
occupancy, and there must always be a reversion. If there are no interests to
revert to the landlord at any stage, the legal result is that there has been an
assignment of that interest. Thus, the fundamental rule is that an estate must be
shorter than the one out of which it is created. Section 78(2) of the Land Act,
1999 says for instance, that the maximum term for which any lease may be
granted shall be ten days less than the period for which the right of occupancy
has been granted [for a definite period].
(d) Certain term-
It is an old principle that the term for which the lease is made must be certain.
This easily applies where the term of the lease is defined in the agreement. One
problem arose during the World War II, where a lease was drawn ‘for the
duration of the war’. This was declared to be invalid since the term was uncertain
2
Rye v. Rye [1962] AC 496
3
See the definition section 2 of the Land Act. The word ‘disposition’ includes lease.

in time.4 As a result, Parliament hurriedly passed the ‘Validation of War-time

Leases Act, 1944’ which converted such tenancies into ones for a fixed period of
ten years, determinable after the end of the war, usually on one month’s notice.
This principle obviously is harder to apply in case of periodic tenancies for in a

sense they are in effect leases for an uncertain duration determinable by notice.
But the certainty need not exists at the date of the lease. But the period must be
such that the day will arrive which will make it certain. So, certain term can either
be a fixed term of certain duration (e.g. 10 years) or a fixed term with its duration
capable of being rendered certain by notice (e.g. a yearly tenancy etc).
(e) The right of exclusive possession must be given-
Exclusive possession is the hall-mark of an estate in land, and is an essential
characteristic of a tenancy. For a lease to be created the right to exclusive
possession of the premises must be given to the tenant. Since a lease is an
estate in land, i.e. a proprietary right that should be enforceable against the
whole world including the landlord, the tenant must be given the right to exclude
all other persons from the demised land during the period of the lease. A right to
occupy a certain land cannot be a tenancy/lease if the person granting the right
remains in general control of the property; as is normally the case with rooms in
hotel, guest house or boarding house. A mere lodger has no tenancy5 . However,
even a licence6 may nowadays confer such a right of exclusive possession. In
determining whether a document conferring exclusive possession is a lease or a
licence the court looks at the substance of what the parties intended rather than
the external form of the document7. The crucial question to ask is - was the
occupier intended to have only a personal non- assignable privilege or was he to
have a disposable stake in the property that would bind third parties?
4
In the case of Lace v. Chantler [1944] K.B 368
5
Appah v. Parn Cliffe Investments Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1064; Merchant v. Charters [1977] 1 WLR
1181
6
Read the article by James R.W; “Some Problems Concerning Lease and Licenses” In Eastern
African Law Journal No. 8, vol.3 of 1967.
7
Barnes v. Barrat [1970] 2 QB 657; Finbow v. Air Ministry [1963] 1 WLR 697; Shell Mex v.
Manchester Garage [1971] 1 WLR 612

2.2 Option to renew or sale

An agreement for lease also sometimes contains a provision giving option either
to extend the period of the lease or terminate the lease before the expiration of
the agreed period. An option to renew the lease is generally given to the lessee.
An option to renew is given to the lessee to be exercised by him either within a
particular period or on the expiration of a particular period as may be agreed
upon, by giving prior notice to the lessor of such period as may be agreed upon.
If no period is mentioned the option can be exercised at any time before the
determination/termination of the lease. The option may be absolute or
conditional. In case of absolute option the lessee can extend the period, that is
renew the lease on the same terms and conditions8 by giving prior notice for the
period as may be stipulated. Where the clause of option has stipulated that the
lease will be renewed on the same terms and conditions including rent or
excluding rent or on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon as to rent
or other provisions, provided the lessee had paid the rent up to date and
observed the terms and conditions of the lease, this is a conditional option.
If the option is conditional that is subject to fresh terms as to rent or otherwise

being agreed upon between the lessee and the lessor or if the lease provides
that the same can be renewed for a further period, if agreed upon between the
parties, the option is almost illusory because in such a case only if both the
parties agree upon the terms and conditions of the new lease the same can be
granted or renewed. If both the parties agree, then even if there is no provision
for renewal, the lease can be renewed for any further period by consent of
parties. If the lease is renewed for further period either under an option or
by mutual consent, a fresh document of lease will have to be executed and
a mere notice of renewal or agreement for extension may not be sufficient.
So, when there is an option given to the lessee or the lessor to renew the lease
the exercise of the option does not by itself extend the period or renew the lease
but a fresh deed of lease must be executed. The provision regarding how the
8
See Hitkarini Sabha v. Jabalpure Corporation, AIR 1961 M.P 324

option is to be exercised as a condition precedent must be strictly complied

with. And the covenant for renewal must be clear and definite otherwise it
would be treated as void.
The covenant or agreement to renew the lease runs with the land and can be
availed of by the lessee’s successors and assigns.
A lease may also contain a provision for purchasing the reversion by the
lessee. This option is also made conditional upon the lessee exercising the
option within a particular period or after a particular period but before the
determination of lease by efflux of time or otherwise and on payment of the price
agreed upon and by giving a prior notice for such period as may be agreed upon.
The conditions precedent must strictly be carried out. An option to purchase
the reversion is in effect an agreement to sell and purchase and the agreement
becomes effective when the option is exercised. On exercising the option the
relation between the two ceases to be that of lessor and lessee and becomes
that of vendor and purchaser. Such option does not run with the land unless it
is so specifically provided.
3.0 COVENANTS9 IN LEASES

A well drawn deed of lease will contain (i) covenants by lessee (ii) covenants by
lessor (iii) any special terms and conditions10 agreed upon between the parties or
which are statutorily implied.
9
Covenant is a contractual stipulation contained in the agreement/lease
10
The distinction between a covenant and a condition is that a covenant is an agreement under
seal whereby, one or more of the parties to the deed stipulate for the truth of certain facts or are
bound to do or not to do a specified thing, while a condition is a quality annexed to an estate by
virtue of which it may be defeated, enlarged, or created on an uncertain event. For example,
forfeiture clause in a lease is a condition. Condition is preceded generally by word like “provided
that” or “upon condition”. Under the English law the difference between a condition and a
covenant is that if there is a breach of a condition the lease is liable to be terminated but if there is
a breach of a covenant the remedy against breach is by way of damages or injunction or specific
th
performance. See Halsbury’s Law of England, Vol. 1 4 Edition. Para 321.

The usual covenants11 on the part of the lessee are (a) to pay rent, (b) to use the
land for the purpose for which the lease is given and no other purpose, (c) to
keep the property in repairs and good condition subject to normal wear and tear,
(d) to permit the lessor or his agent to inspect the property, (e) not to do anything
on the property which would be dangerous or hazardous or a nuisance to the
adjoining owners/occupiers, (f) to yield up possession of the property to the
lessor on the expiration of the period of lease or earlier termination thereof (g) to
observe all municipal/town rules and regulations governing the property and the
use thereof.
On the part of the lessor the common law imposes very few obligations on the
landlord. The lessor normally gives a covenant that so long as the lessee pays
rent and observes and performs his covenants and other terms and conditions of
the lease the lessee shall hold the property without any interruption on the part of
the lessor. This is a statutory or implied covenant and is contained in section 88
(1) of the Land Act, 1999.
Because of the imbalance of bargaining power between landlords and tenants

there have been legislative measures to ensure that balance is created to avoid
conflicting interests. In this regard there has been legal development of
covenants which are implied by law whenever a relationship of landlord and
tenant is created. These covenants statutorily implied cannot be ousted by
express covenants12 in the lease unless the particular statute provides a
possibility for ‘contracting out’ on certain conditions and those conditions have
been complied with. So, although the parties are entitled to covenant as they
may wish by inserting any covenants and conditions which they may deem fit;
11
Section 91 of the Land Act, 1999 defines what “usual covenants” are. It says that unless the
context requires otherwise, a reference to the ‘usual covenants’ is to be taken as reference to the
covenants implied in the lease by sections 88 and 89.
12
Express covenants are those which are spelled out in the agreement. Implied covenants are
implied either by common law, by virtue of the creation of the relationship of landlord and tenant
for the protection of the parties and make the relationship workable, or by statute for the
regulation of certain matters in relation to the specific kinds of tenancy or all types of tenancy.

they are required to observe the implied covenants and conditions stipulated by
the law governing them.
3.1 Rights and Obligations of Lessor and Lessee

It is common knowledge that the rights of one party to the contract are the
obligation of another. The rights of the landlords create obligation on the part of
the tenant and vise versa.
3.1.1 Implied Covenants by the Landlord
(i) Quiet enjoyment____ as provided under section 88(1)(a) of the Land Act,
1999; ss. 56 (1) (a) and (2) of Cap 334 and ss. 33, 38 of the now repealed Rent
Restriction Act, 1984
It is a requirement both in the common law and now statutorily that the tenant will
have ‘quiet enjoyment’ of the demised land so long as he pays rent and observes
and performs the covenants and conditions contained or implied in the lease.
This phrase connotes freedom from physical interference with the tenant’s
enjoyment of the land13. For example, if without any lawful reason the landlord
disconnects electricity may amount into breach of this obligation.
(ii) Non derogation from grant___ section 88(1) (b) of the Land Act provides
this
This covenant is an application of the general principle that a grantor may not
derogate from his grant.14 In other words, he may not take away with one hand
what he has given with the other. So, an owner must not interfere with
easements (aright over or against another’s land) or profit – a- prendre (a right to
take something from another’s land). The landlord must not exercise any rights
reserved by him in such a way as to defeat the purpose of the grant. In Aldin v.
13
Perera v. Vandiyar [1953]1 All ER 1109
14
Palmer v. Fletcher (1663).

Latimer Clark Muirhead and Company,15 Muirhead leased land to Aldin, a timber
merchant. In order timber to dry, there needed to be a free flow of air to the
sheds where the timber was staled. Muirhead retained the adjoining land. After
Muirhead’s death, the interest passed to Latimer, the respondent. Latimer
proposed to build on the land in such a way that the free flow of air to the sheds
on the land leased to Aldin would be interrupted. It was held that this constituted
derogation from grant and that Latimer was, therefore, not entitled to build so as
to interrupt the access of air to Aldin’s sheds. He was prevented by injunction.
(iii) Fitness for Habitation____ as per section 88(1) (d) of the Land Act
At common law, the landlord gave no implied warranty or undertaking as to the
fitness of the premises for habitation (except in the case of furnished premises)
or their suitability for any particular purpose, at the commencement of the
tenancy, or even during the continuance of the lease. This is based upon the
maxim ‘caveat emptor’ which requires that a purchaser take land as he finds it,
and satisfy himself as to its condition16. However, some of the statutes governing
lease provide for that requirement that the house let must be fit for human
habitation. For example, the Housing Act of 1957 (UK) provides for this
requirement for houses let at low rent.
In the Land Act, 1999, (s. 88(1) (d)), there is a duty for the landlord to let a house,
flat or room which is fit for human habitation at the commencement of the lease
and will continue to be kept fit during the lease. So, where the demised premises
fall short of habitation caused by damages certain consequences will follow17.
The Land Act suggests the following consequences. Under section 88(1) (e) it is
provided that if at any time the leased premises or any part of them are
destroyed or damaged by fire, flood, or explosion or other accident, not
attributable to the negligence of the tenant, his invitees or employees, or the
damage is caused by civil commotion, lightning, storm, earthquake, volcanic
15
(1884) 2 Ch. 437
16
See Hart v. Windsor (1844) 12 M & W 68; Cavalier v. Pope [1906] AC 428
17
See the case of Savy v. Jenny Tharani [1965] EA 211

activity or other natural disaster, so as to make the demised premises or any part
of it wholly or partially unfit for occupation or use, then:
___ the rent and any contribution payable by the lessee to the outgoings on the
premises, or a just proportion of that rent or contribution, according to the nature
and extend of the damage sustained, shall be suspended until the leased
premises have been again rendered fit for occupation and use.
___ However, if the leased premises have not been so rendered fit for
occupation and use within six months of their destruction or damage, the lessee
may at his option and on giving one month’s notice of his intention to terminate,
terminate the lease.
However, an alternative remedy is suggested by section 109(2) (b) of the Land
Act. This provision provides that where the lessor has failed to comply with the
covenant of making the land leased habitable by effecting the necessary repairs
the tenant may:
- serve a notice on the lessor that unless he undertake the repairs and
maintenance which he (the lessor) is obliged to undertake within 30 days,
the lessee will undertake the repairs and maintenance instead.
- If the lessor does not commence the repairs and maintenance as specified
in the notice and does not seek an extension of time within which to
undertake the repairs and maintenance the lessee will undertake the
same, and
- set off the cost of that work against the rent due under the lease, or
- deduct from any rent due under the lease any sums which the lessor has
required the lessee to pay as condition either of obtaining the lease or of
continuing as the lessee.
(iv) Repairs____ see section 88(1) (c ) of the Land Act and section 56(1)(b) of
Cap 334.
At common law, the landlord is under no implied covenant with regard to repairs
and therefore only if he covenants expressly to do repairs, or unless the law
specify to the contrary, can the tenant force him to do any repairs that become

necessary. A covenant by the landlord for structural and external repairs is now
implied however in short residential tenancies and dwelling houses let at low rent
in UK.
For the purpose of clarity I will cite the relevant sections of the Tanzania law on
the duty to repairs. For the registered lease under Cap 334, section 56(1) (b)
thereof says that:
“ There shall be implied in every registered lease covenants by the tenant with
the landlord, binding the tenant__
(a) N.A
(b) not to cut down, injure or destroy any living tree being upon the land
leased and to keep and yield up the land leased, in the case of
agricultural, in good heart, and in the case of buildings, in good and
substantial repair and condition;”(emphasis added)
What does this provision means? It means that the tenant has the obligation in
case of premises to keep them in “good and substantial repair and condition”. It
his obligation to repair the leased land once it is let to him.
Section 88(1) (c ) of the Land Act, on the other hand, provides the obligation of
the landlord in the following terms, that is to say - “where part only of a building is
leased, to keep the roof, all external and main walls and main drains, and the
common parts and common installations and facilities, including common
passages and walkways in a proper state of repair”.
What can be derived from the above provision is that it is ‘only where part of a
building is leased’, that the landlord has the obligation of repair those parts
mentioned in the provision. So, this means that where the tenant(s) has rented
the whole house the duty to repair is vested to him. This might appear to
resemble section 56(1)(b) of Cap 334. Further more it is important to read
together with these provisions the following sections. First is section 89(1) (e) of

the Land Act which provides an implied obligation on the part of the lessee in
every lease(other than a short term lease) to, subject to the lessor’s obligations
set out in paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of section 88 and except where part
only of a building is leased, to keep all buildings comprised in the lease in a
reasonable state of repair, regard being had to the condition of the building and
the materials of which it is composed at the beginning of the lease. Second, is
section 89(1) (f) which provides the tenant’s obligation where part only of the
building is leased. It says “subject to the lessor’s obligations set out in
paragraphs (c) and (d) of subsection (1) of section 88, where part only of a
building is leased, to keep the leased part of the building in a reasonable state of
repair, regard being had to the condition of the building and the materials of
which it is composed at the beginning of the lease.”
From the above provision it is therefore instructive to read paragraph (d) of
section 88(1) which requires the landlord to ensure that a leased house, flat or
room is kept fit for human habitation throughout the lease period.
The logical interpretation to all the above cited provisions is that the duty to repair
is divided between the lessor and lessee. On the part of the lessee the obligation
is as follows: First, where only part of the building is leased the tenant is
obligated to keep his leased part in a reasonable state of repair. Second, where
the whole building is leased to the tenant the tenant is required to keep all
buildings comprised in the lease in a reasonable state of repair. The crucial issue
here is to know what can amount into “a reasonable state of repair”. Section 92
defines it. It means “in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, mean
in such a state of repair as that which a prudent owner, might reasonably be
expected to keep his own building, due allowance being made for the age,
character and locality of the building and the means of the person under the
obligation to comply with such a covenant [and] provided that there shall not be
read into any such covenant an undertaking by a lessee to put any building or
part of it into a better condition than it was in at the commencement of the lease.”

This means that the duty to the tenant to repair is not very high. He is only
required to effect repairs which he might be expected to do as a reasonable
tenant. In other words- to live in the leased premises in the ‘tenant-like manner’.
The duty of the landlord with regard to repair is as provided in section 88(1) (c)
where only part of the building is leased, and generally to ensure that the house,
flat or room leased is kept fit for human habitation during the lease. So, all
substantial repairs pertaining to the leased premises are to be carried upon by
the landlord. Whenever a dispute arises it will be the question for the court to
decide and apportion responsibilities as per the law.
(v) Payment of rates, taxes, dues and other outgoings__ section 88(1) (g) of
the Land Act.
The duty to pay leviable rates from any law; taxes such as land rent(s.33(1) of
the Land Act), dues and any other outgoings such as premium for insurance can
either be to tenant or landlord, unless under any law the same are to be payable
by the landlord only. However, section 88(1)(g) stipulates that where the parties
have not, by agreement, arranged who shall have to duty to pay rates, dues and
other outgoings which are payable in respect of the land leased the landlord
shall pay.
3.1.2 Implied Covenants by the Tenant
(i) Obligation to pay rent___ section 89(1)(a) of the Land Act, section 56(1)(a)
of Cap 334.
In the relationship of landlord and tenant there is an implied condition that the
tenant shall pay rent reserved by the lease at all times and in the manner
specified in the lease. The amount of rent agreed must be certain, otherwise it
will not be rent properly so-called, in which case there will be an implied promise
by the tenant to pay a reasonable sum to the landlord by way of compensation
for the use and occupation of land. This is called mesne profit. It is therefore a

condition that the landlord may have a right of re-entry or forfeiture of lease if the
tenant does not pay rent since failure to pay rent amounts into a breach of
condition.
(ii) Obligation not to commit waste___ section 89(1)(b) (c) of the Land Act;
section 56(1)(b) of cap 334
It is the obligation of every tenant to use the premises in ‘a tenant-like manner’,
i.e. the tenant is bound to use the demised premises with due care so that its
value to the landlord will not be destroyed or diminished when the reversion falls
in. A tenant commits waste if he causes any alteration to the premises or the land
by way of damage, destruction, addition, improvement or neglect, which injures
the reversion. Section 89(1) (b) of the Land Act imposes this obligation by
requiring the tenant to use the land in a sustainable manner and in accordance
with any conditions imposed on the use of that land by the lease. And paragraph
(c) to subsection (1) requires the tenant to yield up the land or buildings leased in
the same condition as they were when the term of the lease began.
In practice, in order to protect the landlord’s interest there is a duty on the tenant
to maintain and repair the demised land. Any waste committed by the tenant or
his invitee or his employee may amount into breach of covenant. Generally, there
are three categories of waste, namely:
(a) Voluntary waste- this is committed by any act causing damage such as
destroying buildings or altering or converting premises done by the
tenant.
(b) Ameliorating or Meliorating waste- something which improves the value of
the premises such as by building on the land or extending an existing
building. Ordinarily, unless the landlord can show substantial damage no
injunction can be granted when ameliorating waste is shown.
(c) Permissive waste- is distinguishable from voluntary waste in that the
damage caused results from negligence to maintain or repair such as
allowing walls to deteriorate and eventually collapse, etc.

In the case of Hamid Mbaye v. Brigade Commander18 the defendant made

certain alterations to the house, for example, the toilet had been sealed and
turned into a kitchen. The High Court held that the damage was willful and had to
pay for the damages.
(iii) Restraint on Alienation___ section 89(1) (i) of the Land Act

In the common law, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, a tenant is
entitled to assign the lease, or sub-let or part with possession of the premises
(e.g. let someone else live in the house). As a result the well drawn lease
contains an express words against assignment, subletting or parting with
possession ‘without licence or consent’ of the landlord. The breach of which will
usually give rise to forfeiture or a claim for damages.
Under the law in Tanzania there is an implied covenant restricting the right of the
tenant to assign, sublet or transfer of possession of demised premises, or any
part of it except with the consent of the landlord- section 89(1)(i). However, this
covenant is deemed to be subject to a proviso that the licence or consent of the
landlord should not unreasonably be withheld. Section 93 (3) of the Land Act,
provides circumstances under which consent can be said to be unreasonably
withheld. The onus is on the tenant to show that he requested a consent of the
landlord and the landlord has unreasonably refused consent.
Case for reference is Mrs Clara D’Souza v. Charles Frank Kanyamala (1974)
LRT 27 where the court held that where assignment is made without consent the
assignee becomes a trespasser. However, section 98(2) of the Land Act states
that if there is a covenant in the lease that the lessee will not, or will not without
the consent of the lessor transfer or assign the lease, a transfer or assignment
has effect whether or not the lessor has consented to that transfer or assignment
and whether or not that transfer or assignment is in breach of the covenant but
18
[1984] TLR 294 )HC Z’bar)

this subsection does not prevent the lessor from seeking and remedy for any
such breach.
(iv) Landlord’s right to view ___section 89(1) (g),section 88(2)(a) of the Land
Act; section 56(1)(c ) of Cap 334
It is a rule that in the absence of an express right reserved under the lease, the
law implies right on the landlord to enter the premises to view the state of the
premises. However, before doing so, the lessor should serve the tenant with a
notice of give him reasonable notice before he can exercise that right of viewing
the premises. If he does not do so he may be liable for trespass. Paragraph (g) to
subsection (1) of section 89 requires the lessee to permit the lessor or his agent
or employees at all convenient times and after reasonable notice to enter on the
leased land or buildings to examine their condition and to undertake any repairs
and make good any defects for which the lessor is responsible.
4.0 REMEDIES FOR THE BREACH OF COVENANTS
(a) Forfeiture or Right of Re-entry

Where the tenant is in breach of any covenant in the lease the landlord is given
the power to terminate the lease: It is an implied power of the landlord, under
section 88(2),(b) that where any rent is unpaid for one month after due date for
payment has reached or where the lessee has failed for a period of one month
to observe or perform any condition, covenant or other term the landlord may
terminate the lease after serving the tenant with a notice of intention to do so.
The procedure for determination of lease is provided under sections 104 and 105
as follows:
Serving of notice of intention to terminate the lease.
Where a lessee is in arrears with the rent and has been in arrears for not less
than 30 days, or where a lessee is in breach of a covenant or condition in the
lease the lessor may serve on that lessee a notice of intention to terminate the
lease.

The content of the notice for non payment of rent (s. 104(2))
A notice served on a lessee shall adequately inform the recipient(lessee) of all
the following matters:
(i) the nature and extent of the breach complained of,
(ii) the amount which must be paid to remedy the breach,
(iii) the period, being not less than 30 days from the date of the service of the
notice within which the breach must be remedied,
(iv) in the event that the breach is not remedied the lease shall terminate at the
expiry of 30 days from the date of service of notice.
The content of the notice for breach of any other covenant or condition (s.
105(2))
A notice served on a lessee under this section shall adequately inform the
recipient(lessee) of all the following matters:
(i) the nature and extent of the breach complained of,
(ii) where the lessor considers that the breach is capable of being remedied he
shall inform him:
- the action which the lessee must take or desist from taking to remedy
the breach
- the amount (if any) of compensation which the lessee must pay to
remedy the breach and to reimburse the lessor’s reasonable expenses
incurred in connection with the breach,
- the reasonable time, being not less than 30 days within which the
lessee must take or desist from taking any action
- in the event that the breach is not remedied the lease shall terminate
on expiry of 30 days from the date of service of notice.
The law requires that (section 106) the lessor should as well and at the same
time or as soon as practicable serve a copy of that notice served to the lessee to
the sub lessees( if any), spouse of the lessee, mortgagee of the lessee or of sub

lessee and, where the lessee is bankrupt, to the trustee in bankruptcy of the
lessee. However, this obligation only applies if the lessor has actual notice of the
names and addresses of those persons other than the lessee.
Where such above mentioned process has been started by the lessor the only
remedy the tenant or any person having an interest in the lease, has is to apply
to a District Land and Housing Tribunal where the land is situate for relief (s. 107)
against termination of the lease by the lessor. The Tribunal, upon application
made, shall consider whether or not to grant a relief against an order of
termination. It shall be guided by the factors mentioned under section 108(1).
(b) Distress for Rent

Distress for rent is a common law remedy which consists of the right of the
landlord exercisable without application to the court but ordinarily exercised by a
court certified bailiff, to enforce payment by seizing and selling enough of goods
found on the premises, and the landlord recouping himself of the rent due from
the tenant. In essence, it is a self-help remedy. At present this remedy is rarely
used. By virtue of the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments Act (No. 2) of
2005 [Act No. 11 of 2005] which amends the Land Act the remedy of distress for
rent which was originally abolished by the Land Act, 1999 has been re-
introduced. If the tenant is in arrears of rent for not les than 30 days the lessor
may, instead of serving a notice of intention to terminate the lease, exercise his
right to levy distress for rent (s. 102) after serving of notice of intention to do so
as per the requirements of section 104. However, such distress for rent cannot
be done by the lessor but must be exercised by using a Court Broker or the
Broker of the Land and Housing Tribunal. In the event that the exercise of right
for distress cannot be exercised peaceably, such as in a situation where the
lessee is resisting, distress for rent should be done under the order of the court
(s. 102(2)).
(c ) Other remedies

The above two remedies of determination of lease and distress for rent can only
be exercised by the landlord and are specific remedies for breach of covenant,
condition or term of the lease. Nevertheless, there are other remedies which
under any contract can be employed. These can be exercised by the lessor or
lessee in the event of breach. The Land Act, under section 109, has provided for
these remedies. So, where a lessee is in breach of a covenant or condition of a
lease, the lessor may, instead of serving a notice of intention to terminate the
lease, commence an action against the lessee (i) for damages (ii) for specific
performance (iii) for injunction or, (iv) to recover as a debt ay arrears of rent (i.e.
action for rent).
Where a lessor is in breach of a covenant or condition in a lease, the lessee may

commence an action against the lessor (i) for damages (ii) for specific
performance (iii) for an injunction and (iv) repudiate the lease and cease to pay
rent.
5.0 ENFORCEABILITY OF COVENANTS IN THE LEASE

In this part, we are concerned with the question of who can enforce a covenant
and against whom, or as it is often referred to, “ the running of covenants”. The
rule under the common law is that as between the original parties, liability is
based upon the privity of contract between them19, and therefore not only all
covenants, but also any contracts collateral to the lease are enforceable in
contract throughout the continuance of the lease, even though the landlord or
tenant assigns his interest. When once there has been an assignment, there is
no privity of contract between the new parties, but since the relationship of
landlord and tenant has been created between them by the assignment, there is
19
As between the original parties to the lease there is a two-fold relationship. There is privity of
contract, arising from the contractual agreements created by the terms of the lease and there is
privity of estate, arising from the tenure created by the granting and accepting of the lease by the
two parties respectively. Privity of estate continues only whilst there is tenure between them, so
that upon an assignment of either the lease or the reversion, it is destroyed as between them. For
tenure is then between the remaining party and the assignee. But this is not so for privity of
contract which , under the common law, continues between the original parties until the end of the
lease.

privity of estate between them, which is the basis of liability upon those
covenants which ‘touch and concern the land’; (the modern words are “covenants
which have reference to the subject matter of the lease”).
As a general rule, no covenants are enforceable between parties in the absence

of privity of contract or privity of estate (e.g. between a landlord and a sub-
tenant). So, whether an assignee of the lease or the reversion is liable under
lease or is entitled to sue upon a covenant in the lease depends upon two things:
(i) whether there is privity of estate between the parties, and
(ii) whether the particular covenant is one that ‘touch and concern the
land’.
If it does, it is called a ‘ real covenant’20, if it does not, a ‘ personal covenant’. The
issue now is what covenants touch and concern the land. Any covenant which
affects the landlord qua landlord or the tenant qua tenant may be said to touch
and concern the land.21 If the covenant of its very nature and not merely through
extraneous circumstances affects the nature, quality or value of the land
demised, or the mode of enjoying it, it falls within the definition. However, it is
better to note examples:
(i) All covenants which are implied by law into lease they touch and
concern the land.22
(ii) Conditions for re-entry for breaches of covenants in the lease which
themselves touch and concern the land do so.23
5.1 Rights and Liabilities of Assignee
When the question of enforcing legal liabilities arise, two questions must be
considered, namely, is the defendant liable and is the plaintiff entitled to sue? In
order to determine the rights and liabilities of assignee to sue or be sued it is
20
Real covenants run with the land or reversion.
21
Breams Property Investments Co. Ltd v. Stroulger [1948] 2 K.B 1
22
Wedd v. Porter [1916] 2 KB 91
23
Horsey Estates Ltd v. Steiger [1899] 2 QB 79

important to consider whether the burden of the covenant has passed and
whether the benefit of the covenant has passed.
Assignment of the Lease

Assume that the landlord “L” leases land to the tenant “T” and the tenant assigns
the lease to a third party “K” The common law rule laid down in Spencer’s case24
is that:
“K is entitled to the benefit, and subject to the burden, of all covenants and
conditions touching and concerning land, for there is a privity of estate. In short
both the benefit and the burden of the covenants touching and concern the land
run with the land.”
However, the assignee is liable only for breaches of covenant committed whilst
there is privity of estate between himself and the landlord. He is not liable for
breaches committed before the assignment unless they are continuing
breaches,25 nor for breaches committed after a further assignment of the lease
by him,26 except for breaches committed while the lease was still vested to him.
Under the common law a breach of the covenant after assignment of the lease
results in the liability not only of the assignee in breach but also, of the original
tenant. If, by default of the assignee, the tenant is sued, he is entitled to claim
indemnity from the assignee responsible (whether he is the first or subsequent
assignee) upon a right of indemnity that the law implies between joint debtors.
This common law rule, however, has been changed by the Land Act, 1999.
Section 97(1) abolishes privity of contract absolute. Once there is an assignment
of lease the assignor of a lease does no longer remains liable for breaches of
any covenants unless the assignor remains in occupation of the leased land after
the assignment (s. 97(2)).
24
(1583) 5 Co. rep 16a
25
Granada Theatres Ltd v. Freehold Investment (Leytonstone) Ltd., [1959] Ch. 592
26
Paul v. Nurse (1828) 8 B & C 486

Assignment of reversion
Assume the landlord, L, leases his land to the tenant, T, and then L assigns his
reversion to a third party, R, subject to the lease. The common law rule was that
with the exception of ‘implied covenants’, neither the benefit nor the burden of the
covenants in the lease ran with the reversion. R was neither able to sue nor liable
to be sued. But with the Grantees of Reversion Act, 1540 ss. 1 and 2, the benefit
and burden of all covenants and provisions contained in a lease which touched
and concerned the land passed with the reversion. In other words, an assignee
of the reversion can sue or be sued upon any covenants in the lease ‘having
reference to the subject matter of the lease’.27 Another issue is whether the
assignee of reversion can sue for previous breaches?
At common law, a right to sue for damages or to forfeit the lease for breach of
covenant could not be assigned, so that if a reversion was assigned after a
covenant had been broken, the new reversioner could not sue or forfeit the lease.
Now, with the Law of Property Act, 1925 the assignee is alone entitled to sue the
tenant for rent or for breaches of covenant, whether such rent accrued or such
breaches occurred before or after the assignment28provided they have not been
waived.
The relevant section in the Land Act governing running of covenants in the lease
and reversion is section 95(1). According to this provision, where the reversion is
transferred, assigned, granted or otherwise changes hands by operation of law,
then, unless a contrary intention appears from the lease, expressly or impliedly,
or from other circumstances the obligations imposed by every covenant of the
lease on the lessor run with the reversion and may be enforced by the lessee
against the assignee of reversion. However, the assignee of reversion can only
enforce the rights to the benefits of every covenant of the lease which has
reference to the subject matter of the lease against the lessee. This right extend
27
This provision is now in the Law of Property Act, 1925
28
Re King [1963] Ch. 459

even to those rights which became exercisable or accrued before the

assignment, unless that right was waived or the lessee was released from the
obligation to which the right relates (s. 95(2)).
6.0 CLASSIFICATION OF LEASE
Leases or tenancies can be classified into various categories as follows:

(i) Leases for a fixed period (Fixed term lease).
(ii) Periodic Leases.
(iii) Tenancy at Will.
(iv) Tenancy at sufferance.
(v) Tenancy by estoppel.
(vi) Service tenancy.
(vii) Statutory tenancy.
 Leases for a Fixed Period.29

A lease may be granted for any certain period of certain duration, e.g. six
months, one year, twenty years etc. The term must be either certain or capable
of being rendered certain before it takes effect.30 That means, the lease should
specify when it commences and when it ends. If no date is specified for
commencement of the lease it will usually be deemed to commence immediately,
unless it is a future lease (reversionary lease) and the date of commencement
cannot be inferred. A fixed-term lease can be with an option to renew at its
expiration.31
A lease for a fixed period ends automatically when the terms expires, i.e.
expiration by effluxion of time. There is thus no need for the landlord to give the
tenant notice to quit in order to terminate the lease before the end of the period,
(unless, and in certain circumstances, the tenant is in breach of his undertakings,
29
See section 78 of Land Act.
30
Lace v. Chantler [1944]KB 368
31
North church Estates Ltd v. Daniels [1947] Ch. 117; [1946] 2 All ER 524

e.g. he fails to pay the rent due or on the happening of some specified events).
Nor can the tenant terminate the lease before the end of the period(though he
can ask the landlord to accept his surrender of the lease).
Future Lease (Reversionary Lease)

As shown above, it is possible to create a lease that takes effect at some future
date. Originally, this was not possible because of the doctrine of ‘interessee
termini’ (tenant’s interest pending entry). Which meant that actual entry onto the
property was usually necessary before the lease could be effective. Thus, under
the common law rule, a tenant could not acquire estate in the land until he had
taken possession under the lease.
This doctrine was abolished by section 149(1) and (2) of the Law of Property Act,
1925 (UK) which provided that leases are capable of taking effect from the date
fixed for commencement without actual entry. In Tanzania the position was
formerly stated in the Land Registration At, Cap 334 under section 55 that:
“ A lease of registered land may be made for a term to begin on a future date, not
being later than 21 years from the date on which the lease is execute”.
Similar position is repeated in section 83(1) of the Land Act, 1999 and section 98
abolishes the common law doctrine of intessee termini. It states that:
“ A person who accepts a transfer or assignment of a lease becomes the lessee
without any need for that person to:
(a) acknowledge the lessor as such;
(b) take possession of the land or building complied in the lease.”
 Periodic Leases32
Weekly, monthly, quarterly and yearly leases are examples of periodic leases, A
periodic tenancy is one that continues indefinitely until ended by proper notice by
either party. The difference from a fixed-term tenancy is that instead of its
32
See section 79 of the Land Act

duration being fixed, right from the commencement of the tenancy, it continues
automatically from period to period, until it is determined at the end of any period
by a valid notice to quit given by one party to the other. As the tenancy
progresses through one period and another, the tenancy is regarded as one
continuous tenancy, without break and without renewal.
The length of the notice required to terminate such a lease depends( subject to
agreement to the contrary or to the law) on the form that the periodic leases
takes e.g. a weekly lease can be terminated by giving a week’s notice; a monthly
lease by giving a month’s notice and so on, the notice expiring in each case at
the end of a completed period. However, as for yearly tenancy, in the absence of
agreement to the contrary, six months’ notice is required. The Land Act does not
clearly provides this but section 79(4) states that “ a periodic tenancy may be
terminated by either party giving to the other notice, the length of which shall be
not less than the period of the tenancy and shall expire on one of the days on
which rent is payable.”
There are various circumstances under which periodic lease may be created.
These situations are:
(i) A periodic lease may be created expressly where such terms such as
‘yearly lease’, or ‘yearly tenancy’ or ‘tenancy from year to year’ or from
week to week, month to month etc are used33..
(ii) Furthermore, it may be created where (in the absence of any indication
as to the type of the lease granted) there is express reference to the
period of notice required to terminate the lease. Thus, a lease to ‘K’
determinable on the giving of six months’ notice creates a six-monthly
lease.
(iii) If there are no express words creating a particular form of lease nor
any other circumstances from which an intention to create a certain
form of lease may be inferred, then by implication of law, a periodic
33
Section 79(1) (b) of the Land Act

lease arises.34 The form which the periodic lease thus created will take
will depend on the period with reference to which the rent is
calculated,35 e.g. where the rent reserved is so much per year, a yearly
lease will be implied even though the rent is payable monthly.
(iv) A periodic lease may also arise at the expiry of an existing lease. For
example, suppose L leases his land to T for seven years at a rent of
Tshs 200,000 a year, payable quarterly. T thus holds a lease for a
fixed period of seven years. At the end of that time, if he remains in
possession of the land (that means he ‘holds over’) and pays a
month’s rent, which L accepts then, provided there are no
circumstances indicating some other intention, T holds by implication
of law as a monthly tenant under a periodic lease36.
 Tenancy at Will
A tenancy at will may also arises in some various situations such as these:
- If the landlord, L, permits the tenant, T, to occupy land as tenant and the
arrangement is such that the tenancy may be determined by L or T at any time,
then T occupies the land as a tenant at will. (But the occupation should be of a
tenant and not merely as a servant or agent).
- In some cases the tenant holds rent free, as where the vendor of a land, owing
to some delay in completion, lets the purchaser into possession of the property
before the conveyance has been executed.
- Also a tenant who holds over after the expiration of an existing lease, such as a
fixed term-tenancy, may become a tenant at will or a tenant on sufferance; but
34
Section 79(1) (a) of the Land Act.
35
See section 79 (3) of the Land Act
36
See section 79(1) ( c) and (2) and section 82(2) of the Land Act.

when he pays or agrees to pay rent on the same terms as under his former
lease, periodic tenancy may arise by implication of law.37
A tenancy at will therefore arises where a person occupies land with the consent-
i.e. “at the will” of the owner under a tenancy of uncertain duration. In a tenancy
at will the lessee is said to have no defined estate in the land, i.e. he holds it for
no fixed period, but at “ will “. The lessor can put him out at any time. In addition,
a tenancy comes to an end when either party does any act incompatible with the
continuance of the tenancy, as where the tenant commits voluntary waste, or the
landlord enters the land and demand possession, or either party gives notice to
the other determining the tenancy or by an act which is inconsistent with the
landlord’s continuing consent such as death of either party. Or the landlord
assigning his interest in the land to a third party. Essentially, the tenancy is only a
personal relationship between the landlord and the tenant38. Sometimes it is very
difficult to distinguish tenancy at will and licence.39
 Tenancy at sufferance
A tenancy at sufferance is said to arise where a tenant, having entered upon land
under a valid tenancy, holds over without the landlord’s consent or assent e.g.
on the expiry of a fixed term-lease and without the landlord’s consent the tenant
holds over his previous tenancy, It is not really a tenancy at all, and is
distinguishable from a tenancy at will by lack of consent, express or implied, on
the part of the landlord. There can then be no payment of rent, under a tenancy
on sufferance but the landlord can sue to recover mesne profits. The tenancy
may be determined at any time where the landlord exercise his right of re-entry
or sue the tenant to recover possession.
 Tenancy by Estoppel
37
As shown ealier in section 79(1) © and section 82(2) of Land Act.
38
Wheeler v. Mercer [1957]AC 416 at 426.
39
Binions v. Evans [1972] Ch. 359; [1972] 2 All ER 70

It is a rule of evidence that once a tenant has been put into possession, the
landlord is estopped from denying his tenant’s title, and the tenant from denying
his landlord’s.40It follows that if a person with no estate in land purports to grant a
tenancy thereof, both parties and their respective assigns will be estopped from
denying that the landlord had title to grant the tenancy and that the tenancy is
effective as against each other.
A tenancy by estoppel, as such a tenancy is called, is thus enforceable between

the parties and their assigns, but not against third parties. However, if the
landlord subsequently acquires a legal estate out of which the tenancy could be
granted, this is said to “feed the estoppel”, and the tenancy by estoppel becomes
a good tenancy, giving the tenant an actual estate in the land.
 Service Tenancy or Service Occupancy

Service tenancy or service occupancy arises whenever an employee occupies
living quarters of his employer.41 According to traditional English common rule a
service tenant is not different from a lodger. He is not usually a tenant in the strict
sense, even though he may occupy certain rooms as his quarters. In the case of
Nitwa Msemembo v. Marco Ndawa42it appears the court took similar orientation.
It held that a service tenant has temporary though exclusive use of the quarters
and not the legal possession of them, and accordingly, he cannot successfully
maintain an action for trespass against his employer or his duly authorized
servants.
Courts in England hold the view that there is a ‘service tenancy’ and ‘service
occupancy’. A service tenancy is just like any other tenancy except that it is
generally expressed to be terminable automatically on the termination of the
tenant’s contract of employment with his employer, who is also, in effect, his
landlord. A service occupancy arises also between employer and employee, but
40
Tadman v. Henman (1893) 2 QB 168, 171, section 124 of Evidence Act, 1967 (Tanzania)
41
Dobson v. Jones (1843)
42
[1974] LRT No. 29

in this case the residential accommodation is held by the employee under a mere
licence. The test generally applicable to distinguish between the two is whether
the employee is required to occupy the accommodation by the nature of his
duties- e.g. a resident caretaker, a game keeper etc. In such cases, the
employee will generally be taken to hold under a service occupancy only unless
a lease was expressly entered into. In this case, a servant is required to live in
the house in order the better to do his work. If a servant is given a personal
privilege to stay in a house for the greater convenience of his work and it is
treated as part and parcel of his remuneration, then he is a licensee. But if he is
given an interest in land separate and distinct from his contract of service, at a
sum properly to be regarded as a rent, he is a tenant. The distinction depends on
the truth of the relationship and not on the label which the parties choose to put
upon it.43
 Statutory tenancy (a creature of Rent Restriction Act, 1984 now repealed).
 Short term Leases

The Land Act, 1999 has established a category of lease which is known as a
‘short term lease.’ According to section 80 this lease can either be a fixed term
lease or periodic lease but its period must be short. If it is a fixed term lease, its
duration should not be more than one year; and if it is periodic lease, it must be
for periods of one year or less. Another periodic lease which fall under this
category is a periodic tenancy made without any agreement in writing.
Brief Overtview Of The Rent Restriction Act, 1984 ( Has been repealed by Act
No. 11 of 2005).
43
See Facchini v. Bryson [1952] 1 TLR 1386

Land Law Lecture Notes 2009, by Jese

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Land Law Lecture Notes 2009, by Jese

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Land Law Lecture Notes 2009, by Jese

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Notes Prepared by Jesse, James Chalambo

Lecture One: THE HISTORY OF LAND LAW IN

1 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

2 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

Movable and Immovable properties

The purpose of annexation however, is said to be the main factor. The

3 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

In determining the purpose of annexation, the question to be asked is:

THE HISTORY OF LAND LAW IN TANZANIA

4 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

5 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

6 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

Looking at the Land Ordinance 1923, it was legally unclear whether

EFFECTS UNDER CUSTOMARY RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY

7 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

MUHENA BIN SAID CASE

8 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

view) be required of something definite in the occupation of the applicant or his

MTORO BIN MWAMBA CASE

9 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

The Case of Descendants of Sheikh Mbaruk Bin Rashid

10 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

11 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

12 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

THE LAND LEGAL REGIME AFTER INDEPENDENCE

13 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

14 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

These arguments, truly, were against the rise of a landed bourgeoisie.

15 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

16 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

(b) TANU AND THE LANDLORDS

17 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

compensating ex-landlords for any unexhausted improvements they had effected

VILLAGE COMMUNITIES/VILLAGE SETTLEMENT

18 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

power we shall never be able to connect it up to each isolated

19 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

The President of the United republic could grant a right of occupancy

20 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

- The allocation of land rights on individual basis made co-operative activity

Following the Arusha Declaration in February 1967 which committed

An enabling Act of Parliament was passed in very late in 1973 by the

21 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

In the implementation of the Ujamaa programme, bureaucratic control

22 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

23 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

 Joshua Okuku v. Shaban Adam, Civil appeal No. 1 of 1996.

Lecture Two: THE RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY SYSTEM

24 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

CLASSIFICATION AND TENURE OF LAND

25 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

 Long term derivates rights and leases range between 5 - 98 years.

26 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

(iii) The occupier is entitled to compensation in case of expiry, (where the

Tanzania`s exprerience with land administration and land policy reforms:

Land Rights (Extract from the Guardian of 27th July 2007)

27 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009

A Victory for Women`s Land Rights:

28 Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 2009