Saludo Jr. Vs CA

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38.

G.R. No. 95536 March 23, 1992


Saludo Jr. Vs CA

Legal Concepts/Definitions:

1. The hornbook rule on interpretation of contracts consecrates the primacy of the


intention of the parties, the same having the force of law between them. When the
terms of the agreement are clear and explicit, that they do not justify an attempt to read
into any alleged intention of the parties, the terms are to be understood literally just as
they appear on the face of the contract.
2. Undertaking of a common carrier- A common carrier undertaking to transport property
has the implicit duty to carry and deliver it within reasonable time, absent any particular
stipulation regarding time of delivery, and to guard against delay. In case of any
unreasonable delay, the carrier shall be liable for damages immediately and proximately
resulting from such neglect of duty.
3. A bill of lading is a written acknowledgment of the receipt of the goods and an
agreement to transport and deliver them at a specified place to a person named or on
his order. Such instrument may be called a shipping receipt, forwarder's receipt and
receipt for transportation.
4. The oft-repeated rule regarding a carrier's liability for delay is that in the absence of a
special contract, a carrier is not an insurer against delay in transportation of goods.
When a common carrier undertakes to convey goods, the law implies a contract that
they shall be delivered at destination within a reasonable time, in the absence, of any
agreement as to the time of delivery.  But where a carrier has made an express contract
to transport and deliver property within a specified time, it is bound to fulfill its contract
and is liable for any delay, no matter from what cause it may have arisen. 
5. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation, and generates a relation attended with public duty. The operation
of a common carrier is a business affected with public interest and must be directed to
serve the comfort and convenience of passengers.

Issue:

Whether or not the duty of common carrier to observe extraordinary diligence already started
even if they did not yet received the thing to be delivered

Facts:

After the death of plaintiffs' mother, in Chicago Illinois, Pomierski and Son Funeral Home of
Chicago, made the necessary preparations and arrangements for the shipment, of the remains
from Chicago to the Philippines. Pomierski brought the remains to C.M.A.S. (Continental
Mortuary Air Services) at the airport (Chicago) which made the necessary arrangements such as
flights, transfers, etc. C.M.A.S. booked the shipment with PAL thru the carrier's agent Air Care
International, with Pomierski F.H. as the shipper and Mario (Maria) Saludo as the consignee.
PAL Airway Bill No. 079-01180454 Ordinary was issued wherein the requested routing was from
Chicago to San Francisco on board TWA Flight 131 of October 27, 1976 and from San Francisco
to Manila on board PAL Flight No. 107 of the same date, and from Manila to Cebu on board PAL
Flight 149.

The remains (of Crispina Saludo) were taken to CMAS at the airport; that there were two bodies
at the (Chicago Airport) terminal, and somehow they were switched, that the remains (of
Crispina Saludo) were on a plane to Mexico City. The following day, the shipment or remains of
Crispina Saludo arrived (in) San Francisco from Mexico on board American Airlines. This
shipment was transferred to or received by PAL at 1945H or 7:45 p.m. This casket bearing the
remains of Crispina Saludo, which was mistakenly sent to Mexico and was opened (there), was
resealed by Crispin F. Patagas for shipment to the Philippines

Held: NO

Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the extraordinary responsibility of
the common carrier begins from the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. This
responsibility remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or
stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in transitu, 29 and
terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time for the acceptance, of the goods by the
consignee or such other person entitled to receive them. 30 And, there is delivery to the carrier
when the goods are ready for and have been placed in the exclusive possession, custody and
control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate transportation and the carrier has
accepted them. 31 Where such a delivery has thus been accepted by the carrier, the liability of
the common carrier commences eo instanti. 32

Hence, while we agree with petitioners that the extraordinary diligence statutorily required to
be observed by the carrier instantaneously commences upon delivery of the goods thereto, for
such duty to commence there must in fact have been delivery of the cargo subject of the
contract of carriage. Only when such fact of delivery has been unequivocally established can
the liability for loss, destruction or deterioration of goods in the custody of the carrier, absent
the excepting causes under Article 1734, attach and the presumption of fault of the carrier
under Article 1735 be invoked.

As already demonstrated, the facts in the case at bar belie the averment that there was delivery
of the cargo to the carrier on October 26, 1976. Rather, as earlier explained, the body intended
to be shipped as agreed upon was really placed in the possession and control of PAL on October
28, 1976 and it was from that date that private respondents became responsible for the agreed
cargo under their undertakings in PAL Airway Bill No. 079-01180454. Consequently, for the
switching of caskets prior thereto which was not caused by them, and subsequent events
caused thereby, private respondents cannot be held liable.

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