G.R. No. 164024. January 29, 2009.

LUIS B. MANESE, ANTONIA ELLA, HEIRS OF

ROSARIO M. ORDOñEZ, represented by CESAR
ORDOñEZ, SESINANDO PINEDA and AURORA
CASTRO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES DIOSCORO
VELASCO and GLICERIA SULIT, MILDRED CHRISTINE
L. FLORES TANTOCO and SYLVIA L. FLORES,
respondents.

Natural Resources; Foreshore Lands; Words and Phrases;

Foreshore land is defined as that strip of land that lies between the
high and low water marks and is alternatively wet and dry
according to the flow of the tides·it is part of the alienable land of
the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not
otherwise.·It is admitted by both parties that the subject matter of
controversy is foreshore land, which is defined as that strip of land
that lies between the high and low water marks and is alternatively
wet and dry according to the flow of the tides. It is that part of the
land adjacent to the sea, which is alternately covered and left dry
by the ordinary flow of tides. It is part of the alienable land of the
public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not
otherwise. Foreshore land remains part of the public domain and is
outside the commerce of man. It is not capable of private
appropriation.
Same; Same; Reversion; In all actions for the reversion to the
Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon,
the Republic of the Philippines is the real party in interest, the action
to be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.·In all actions for
the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon, the Republic of the Philippines is the real
party in interest. The action shall be instituted by the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead, in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines. Moreover, such action does not prescribe.
Prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by the State to
recover its property acquired through fraud by private individuals.
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* SECOND DIVISION.

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VOL. 577, JANUARY 29, 2009 109

Manese vs. Velasco

Equity; Positive rules prevail over all abstract arguments based

on equity contra legem.·As to petitionersÊ contention that they
should be deemed real parties in interest based on the principle of
equity, we rule otherwise. Equity, which has been aptly described as
„justice outside legality,‰ is applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Positive rules
prevail over all abstract arguments based on equity contra legem.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Law Office of Calanog & Associates for petitioners.
Federico A. Lascieras for respondent Gliceria S.
Velasco.
Dante H. Diamante for respondents Mildred Christine
Flores Tantoco and Sylvia L. Flores.

QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:

For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated April 28,

2004 and the Resolution2 dated June 22, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68934. The appellate court
had affirmed the Order3 dated June 15, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, Branch 59, in
Civil Case No. 99-129, dismissing the petitionersÊ complaint
for annulment of title and damages against the
respondents.
The subject matter of the controversy is the alleged
foreshore land with an area of about 85,521 square meters,
fronting Tayabas Bay in Guisguis, Sariaya, Quezon.4

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1 Rollo, pp. 37-42. Penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestaño, with

Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente Q. Roxas concurring.
2 Id., at p. 44. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with
Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Aurora S. Lagman concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 45-50.
4 Id., at p. 37.

110

110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manese vs. Velasco

On October 13, 1971, respondent Dioscoro Velasco was

issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-167835 covering
said property by the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province,
based on Homestead Patent No. 133300. On March 22,
1977, Velasco sold the property to respondent Sylvia Flores,
and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1609236 was
issued in her name. On January 4, 1981, the property was
sold by Flores to Mildred Christine Flores-Tantoco and TCT
No. T-1777357 was issued in the latterÊs name. Later, the
property was divided into seven lots and TCT Nos. T-
177777, T-177778, T-177779, T-177780, T-177781, T-177782,
and T-177783 were issued in the name of Mildred Christine
Flores-Tantoco. On January 18, 1992, the lots covered by
TCT Nos. T-1777808 and T-1777819 were sold back to Flores
such that TCT No. T-27811210 and TCT No. 27811011 were
issued in her name.
Adjacent and contiguous to the alleged foreshore land is
the agricultural land owned by petitioners.
On August 31, 1999, the petitioners filed a Complaint12
for Annulment of Title and Damages against respondents
before the RTC of Lucena City. They alleged that the
issuance of the homestead patent and the series of
transfers involving the same property were null and void.
They further alleged that they applied for lease of the
foreshore land and the government had approved in their
favor Foreshore, Reclaimed Land or Miscellaneous Lease
Application. Petitioners claimed that they were in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and use of
said foreshore land since 1961. They stated that they had
introduced improvements thereon and planted

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5 Records, pp. 11-12.

 6 Id., at p. 14.
7 Id., at p. 17.
8 Id., at p. 18.
9 Id., at p. 19.
10 Id., at p. 22.
11 Id., at p. 23.
12 Id., at pp. 1-10.

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VOL. 577, JANUARY 29, 2009 111

Manese vs. Velasco

coconut seedlings (which had grown up into coconut trees)

as well as other fruit-bearing trees and plants. They added
that they had subleased the land to several tenants.
Petitioners averred that Dioscoro Velasco was not
qualified to become a grantee of a homestead patent since
he never occupied any portion nor introduced any
improvements on the land. They claimed that Velasco was
issued a homestead patent because he committed fraud,
misrepresentation, and falsification in connivance with
employees of the Bureau of Lands. They argued that the
sale between Velasco and Flores was invalid because it was
not approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources as required under Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as „The Public Land Act.‰13 Hence, they
claimed that the sale by Flores to Tantoco was likewise
invalid.
On December 2, 1999, respondents moved to dismiss14
the complaint on the following grounds: (1) petitioners do
not have the legal personality to file the complaint since
the property forms part of the public domain and only the
Solicitor General could bring an action for reversion or any
action which may have the effect of canceling a free patent
and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis
of the patent; (2) the sale of the property by Velasco to
Flores is valid even without approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources as the required
approval may be obtained after the sale had been
consummated; (3) the certificate of title issued to Velasco
can no longer be reviewed on the ground of fraud since a
homestead patent registered in conformity with the
provisions of Act No. 49615 partakes of the nature of a
certificate issued in a judicial proceeding and
_______________

13 An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relative to Lands of the

Public Domain, approved on November 7, 1936.
14 Records, pp. 35-37.
15 An Act to Provide for the Adjudication and Registration of Titles to
Lands in the Philippine Islands, enacted on November 6, 1902 and took
effect on January 1, 1903.

112

112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manese vs. Velasco

becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the

expiration of one year from its issuance; and (4) petitionersÊ
action is barred by laches since for almost 28 years, they
failed to assert their alleged right over said property.
On June 15, 2000, the RTC granted the Motion to
Dismiss and ruled that petitioners do not have the legal
personality to file the complaint. It held that the
government, not petitioners, is the real party in interest
and, therefore, only the Solicitor General may bring the
action in court. The dispositive portion of the RTCÊs Order
states:

„WHEREFORE, the instant Motion is granted and the

plaintiffs[Ê] complaint dismissed.
SO ORDERED.‰16

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCÊs Order,

disposing as follows:

„WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is

DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order dated June 15, 2000 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, Lucena City dismissing
plaintiffs-appellantsÊ complaint for annulment of title with damages
is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.‰17

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners raise the following issue for our resolution:

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

DISMISSING THE APPEAL AND IN AFFIRMING AND
UPHOLDING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF LUCENA, BRANCH 59 THAT THE
PETITIONERS DO NOT HAVE THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO
INSTITUTE THE COMPLAINT FOR CANCELLATION OF OCT
NO. P-16789 ISSUED PURSUANT TO HOMESTEAD PATENT
NO. 133300 IN THE NAME OF DIOSCORO VELASCO AND THE
TRANSFER

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16 Rollo, p. 49.
17 Id., at p. 42.

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Manese vs. Velasco

CERTIFICATES OF TITLES SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED IN

FAVOR OF S[Y]LVIA L. FLORES AND MILDRED CHRISTINE
FLORES-TANTOCO.18

Stated simply, the sole issue in this case is whether or

not petitioners are real parties in interest with authority to
file a complaint for annulment of title of foreshore land.
Petitioners concede that under Section 101 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141,19 only the Solicitor General or
the officer acting in his stead may institute all actions for
reversion in the proper courts. However, they invoke the
principle of equity, arguing that equity and social justice
demand that they be deemed real parties in interest and
given a right to present evidence showing that the land
titles of respondents are void.20 Respondents, on the other
hand, reiterate that petitioners are not real parties in
interest because they do not represent the State.21
After due consideration of the submissions and
arguments of the parties, we are in agreement that the
instant petition lacks merit.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:

„SEC. 2. Parties in interest.·A real party in interest is the

party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.‰ (Emphasis supplied.)
_______________

18 Id., at p. 103.
19 SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of
lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted
by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper
courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
20 Rollo, p. 31.
21 Id., at p. 118.

114

114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manese vs. Velasco

It is admitted by both parties that the subject matter of

controversy is foreshore land, which is defined as that strip
of land that lies between the high and low water marks and
is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the
tides. It is that part of the land adjacent to the sea, which
is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of
tides. It is part of the alienable land of the public domain
and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise.
Foreshore land remains part of the public domain and is
outside the commerce of man. It is not capable of private
appropriation.22
Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides:

„All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the

public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper
courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.‰

In all actions for the reversion to the Government of

lands of the public domain or improvements thereon, the
Republic of the Philippines is the real party in interest. The
action shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the
officer acting in his stead, in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines.23 Moreover, such action does not prescribe.
Prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by the
State to recover its property acquired through fraud by
private individuals.24
Based on the foregoing, we rule that petitioners are not
the real parties in interest in this case. We therefore affirm
the dismissal by the trial court of the complaint and the
ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioners must first
lodge their complaint with the Bureau of Lands in order
that an adminis-

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22 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126316, June 25, 2004, 432
SCRA 593, 598-599.
23 Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership v. Ruiz, No. L-33952,
March 9, 1987, 148 SCRA 326, 339-340, citing The Director of Lands v.
Lim, et al., 91 Phil. 912 (1952).
24 Republic v. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr., G.R. No. 146030, December
3, 2002, 393 SCRA 361, 374.

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Manese vs. Velasco

trative investigation may be conducted under Section 9125

of The Public Land Act.
As to petitionersÊ contention that they should be deemed
real parties in interest based on the principle of equity, we
rule otherwise. Equity, which has been aptly described as
„justice outside legality,‰ is applied only in the absence of,
and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of
procedure. Positive rules prevail over all abstract
arguments based on equity contra legem.26

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25 SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall be

considered as essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or
permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement
therein or omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying the
consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any
subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set
forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the
concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the duty of the Director of
Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable, to
make the necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the material facts set out in the application are true, or whether
they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith,
and for the purposes of such investigation, the Director of Lands is
hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if
necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In every
 investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad
faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of
essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land
shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully
issued by the Director of Lands or his authorized delegates or agents, or
shall refuse or fail to give direct and specific answers to pertinent
questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation
may issue out further proceedings.
26 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100709, November 14, 1997,
281 SCRA 639, 649, citing Causapin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
107432, July 4, 1994, 233 SCRA 615, 625; Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
No. L-36958, July 10, 1986, 142 SCRA 587, 591.

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