G.R. No. 192450. July 23, 2012.

SANTIAGO V. SOQUILLO, petitioner, vs. JORGE P.

TORTOLA, respondent.

Civil Law; „Reversion,‰ and „Declaration of Nullity of Free

Patents,‰ Distinguished.·Banguilan v. Court of Appeals, 522 SCRA
644 (2007), was emphatic that: Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs
of Honorio Dacut, distinguishes an action for reversion from an
action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of
title as follows: „An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of
free patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action for
reversion. The difference between them lies in the allegations
as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is
sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent
allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the
disputed land. Hence in Gabila v. Barriga, where the plaintiff in his
complaint admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or
amendment of the defendantÊs title because even if the title were
cancelled or amended the ownership of the land embraced therein
or of the portion affected by the amendment would revert to the
public domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and that
the only person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of
Lands. On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations
of the plaintiffÊs ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance
of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendantÊs
fraud or mistake, as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these
documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In
such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit
but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of
title obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio. The real party
in interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-
existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even
before the grant of title to the defendant. x x x[.]‰ (Citations omitted
and emphasis supplied)
 _______________
* SECOND DIVISION.

332

332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Soquillo vs. Tortola

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Oscar P. Rabanes for petitioner.

REYES, J.:

Antecedent Facts

On March 28, 1966, Lorenzo Coloso, Jr. (Coloso, Jr.) sold

to Ramon Jamis (Jamis) a 1,192 square meter parcel of
land (disputed property) situated in Alubijid, Misamis
Oriental. A notarized deed of conditional sale of an
unregistered land was thus executed.
As indicated in a notarized deed of definite sale dated
March 29, 1966, Jamis thereafter sold the disputed
property to herein respondent Jorge P. Tortola (Tortola).
Tortola took possession of the disputed property, planted
it with fruitbearing trees, and built a residential lot
thereon. He also paid the realty taxes due from the said
property corresponding to the years 1975 to 2002. However,
the receipts for the payments still stated Coloso, Jr.Ês name,
with the exception of Tax Declaration Nos. 942443,
indicating „Lorenzo Coloso, Jr. c/o Mr. Tortola‰ and 026083,
bearing the name of „Jorge Tortola.‰1
In 1977, Tortola and his family moved to Bukidnon. He
left Godofredo Villaflores (Villaflores) as his agent and
caretaker of the disputed property.
Tortola received from Atty. Rene Artemio Pacana (Atty.
Pacana) a letter dated March 1, 1988 informing the former
that Arthur Coloso (Coloso) and the other heirs of Coloso,
Jr. had sought his legal services to recover the disputed
property.

_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 34-35.
 333

VOL. 677, JULY 23, 2012 333

Soquillo vs. Tortola

Atty. Pacana requested from Tortola an explanation as to

how the latter acquired the disputed property. In a reply
letter dated March 14, 1988 sent to Atty. Pacana, Tortola
attached a copy of the notarized deed of definite sale
executed between the latter and Jamis.
In 1992, Atty. Pacana once again sent a letter reiterating
his prior inquiries and demanding for documents to prove
that Coloso, Jr. disposed the disputed property in TortolaÊs
favor. Tortola reminded Atty. Pacana of his reply letter in
1988 and again enclosed copies of the notarized deeds of
conditional and definite sale executed in 1966.
On September 21, 1993, Coloso and the other heirs of
Coloso, Jr. filed an application for free patent with the
Office of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO) of Cagayan de Oro City to obtain a
title over the disputed property.
On July 15, 1994, a survey of the disputed property was
conducted. The land investigator reported that the heirs of
Coloso, Jr. were in possession and were cultivating the
disputed property, hence, he recommended to the CENRO
the issuance of a free patent in their favor.
On December 14, 1994, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-20825 covering the disputed property was
issued in favor of the Heirs of Coloso, Jr.
On October 11, 2000, Coloso and the other heirs of
Coloso, Jr. executed a notarized deed of absolute sale
conveying the disputed property to herein petitioner
Santiago V. Soquillo (Soquillo).
In 2001, Soquillo filed before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Alubijid a complaint for illegal detainer against
Villaflores and his wife. The complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. 245. Villaflores failed to file an answer
thereto, hence, the case was decided in favor of Soquillo.
Villaflores and his wife were ejected from the disputed
property.
334

334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Soquillo vs. Tortola

Tortola discovered VillafloresÊ ejectment from the

disputed property. On September 16, 2002, Tortola filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Initao,
Misamis Oriental a complaint against Coloso, the Heirs of
Coloso, Jr., Soquillo, and the MTC of Alubijid, Misamis
Oriental for annulment of title/sale/judgment with prayers
for the issuance of injunctive reliefs and award of damages.
The complaint, origin of the instant petition, was docketed
as Civil Case No. 2002-393.

The RTC Decision

On September 18, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision2

disposing of the complaint as follows:
(a) Tortola was declared as the owner and legal
possessor of the disputed property.
(b) The deed of sale executed on October 11, 2000
between Coloso and Soquillo was ordered annulled.
(c) The Register of Deeds (RD) of Misamis Oriental was
ordered to annul and cancel OCT No. P-20825 in the
names of the heirs of Coloso, Jr. and to issue a
transfer certificate of title in TortolaÊs favor.
(d) The decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 245 was
annulled and set aside.
(e) The defendants in the complaint, among whom was
herein petitioner Soquillo, were ordered to pay Tortola
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P20,000.00 as attorneyÊs
fees.3
The RTC ratiocinated that:

_______________
2 Under the sala of Presiding Judge Dennis Z. Alcantar; id., at pp. 31-
39.
3 Id., at pp. 38-39.

335

VOL. 677, JULY 23, 2012 335

Soquillo vs. Tortola

„[I]t can be established that [Tortola] acquired a right over the

subject parcel of land under a Deed of Definite Sale dated March 29,
1966, which was registered on September 5, 2002 in the Registry of
Deeds, and by the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 023086 by
Tax Declaration No. 026083 in the name of Jorge Tortola.
Registration of the instrument in the Office of the Register of
Deeds constitute[s] constructive notice to the parties of the transfer
of ownership over the subject property.
[Tortola] occupied the said property and constructed his house
and resided thereon until he left for Maramag, Bukidnon sometime
in the late 1960Ês, leaving the occupation of the said property to
Spouses Villaflores, with his permission, continuously until 2002.
The ownership and possession of the land was admitted and
acknowledged by the herein defendants Heirs of Coloso[, Jr.] in
their letters to [Tortola]. Likewise, defendant Soquillo, admitted the
actual occupation of the land by Spouses Villaflores by the fact of
his filing a civil action against them in court.
x x x Under the law, if the property has not yet passed to an
innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is still
available. Defendant Soquillo cannot be considered as an innocent
purchaser for value or that he acquired the subject property
through mistake and fraud. He can only be considered a trustee by
implication, for the benefit of [Tortola], who is the true and lawful
owner of the litigated land, pursuant to Article 1456 of the New
Civil Code.
Defendants assert laches as a defense. Laches cannot prejudice
the lawful right of [Tortola] in its ownership and possession of the
subject litigated property. There was no failure or neglect on the
part of [Tortola] in asserting his rights after knowing defendantÊs
(sic) conduct, evidenced by all the letters sent to the defendants
resulting to their knowledge of the actual ownership and occupation
of the subject land. [Tortola] is not negligent and has not omitted to
assert his right and/or abandoned or declined to assert his rights,
proof of such is the filing of the instant complaint.
The principle of indefeasibillity of title does not apply
where fraud attended the issuance of title, as in this case.
The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private
land, which in this case the subject litigated land belonged to
plaintiff-Tortola, is null and void, and produces no legal
effects

336

336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Soquillo vs. Tortola

whatsoever (Heirs of Simplicio Santiago vs. Heirs of Mariano

 E. Santiago, 404 SCRA 193).
[Tortola] was compelled to litigate to protect his interests and
vindicate his rights.
The issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-20825 lacks
the required publication, notice, survey, certification and other
mandatory requirements, under the law, which legally allows such
title to be cancelled and transferred to the legal owner, [Tortola],
because there could have been no notice of the application that can
be issued or posted on September 20, 1993 because the application
was filed and received by the CENRO only on September 21, 1993.
Defendant Soquillo purchased the land from the Heirs of Coloso[,
Jr.] in spite of his knowledge that the land is owned by [Tortola] and
that the Heirs of Coloso[, Jr.] were not in actual possession of the
subject land, which land was actually occupied, at that time, by the
Spouses Villaflores, the lessee[s] of [Tortola]. Such knowledge of an
unregistered sale is equivalent to registration. Further, the deed of
sale in favor of Soquillo was not registered with the Register of
Deeds of Misamis Oriental until today.
xxx
x x x Such proof of ownership and possession of [Tortola] is
corroborated by the testimony and certification of the former
Barangay Captain of Lourdes, Alubijid, Misamis Oriental, attesting
to the truth that [Tortola] is the actual occupant of the litigated
land and such occupancy was never questioned, disturbed,
contested or molested until October 18, 2001, where his agents
Spouses Villaflores was (sic) summoned and later on, made the
defendants in an illegal detainer case before the court.‰4 (Citations
omitted)

Soquillo filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) an appeal

to the foregoing. He argued that the RTC erred in not
finding that TortolaÊs complaint stated no cause of action.
He alleged that since Tortola sought the cancellation of a
free patent, not him but the State, was the real party-in-
interest. Soquillo likewise averred that he was a purchaser
in good faith and for

_______________
4 Id., at pp. 35-38.

337

VOL. 677, JULY 23, 2012 337

Soquillo vs. Tortola
value, thus, the RTCÊs order to reconvey the disputed
property and award damages in TortolaÊs favor was
improper.

The CA Decision

On April 23, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision5 denying

SoquilloÊs appeal. The CA declared:

„The defense that the Complaint below failed to state a cause of

action must be raised at the earliest possible time. In fact, it can be
raised as a ground for Motion to Dismiss under Rule 16 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Here, [Soquillo], as shown by the
records of the case, neither raised such issue in their Answer nor
filed a Motion to Dismiss raising such issue.
xxxx
x x x [Soquillo] cannot be considered a purchaser in good faith
and for value because defendant Arthur Coloso as Attorney-in-fact
of the heirs of Lorenzo Boy Coloso did not have the right to sell the
disputed land to the former.
xxxx
x x x [D]efendant Arthur Coloso had prior knowledge that the
disputed land was already occupied by Mr. Villaflores, as agent of
[Tortola]. However, despite such knowledge, defendant Arthur
Coloso as representative of the heirs of Lorenzo Boy Coloso, Jr., filed
an Application for Free Patent, and falsely declared therein that
they occupied and cultivated the disputed land since 1985. By
reason of such application and false declarations, the defendants
were issued an Original Certificate of Title No. P-20825.
Such false declarations in the Application, however, constituted
concealment of material facts, which amounted to fraud. This,
therefore, inevitably resulted to the cancellation of title, as is
pursuant to Heirs of Carlos Alcaraz vs. Republic of the
Philippines, et al., where the Supreme Court stated:
„x x x x

_______________
5 Penned by Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba, with Associate Justices
Edgardo T. Lloren and Ramon Paul L. Hernando, concurring; id., at pp. 40-49.

338

338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Soquillo vs. Tortola

Doubtless, petitionerÊs (sic) failure to state in their

 free patent application that private respondents, as
representatives of the heirs of Timotea and Igmedio,
are also in possession of the land subject thereof
clearly constitutes a concealment of a material fact
amounting to fraud and misrepresentation within the
context of the aforequoted provision, sufficient enough
to cause ipso facto the cancellation of their patent and
title. For sure, had only petitioners made such a disclosure,
the Director of Lands would have had second thoughts in
directing the issuance of petitionersÊ patent and title.
x x x x‰
Consequently, contrary to [SoquilloÊs] contention, the principle of
indefeasibility of title cannot be invoked in this case. Public policy
demands that one who obtains title to a public land through fraud
should not be allowed to benefit therefrom.
xxxx
Furthermore, defendant-appellant Santiago Soquillo cannot be
considered as purchaser in good faith and for value. The fact that
defendants Heirs of Lorenzo Boy Coloso, Jr. were not in possession
of the disputed land should have impelled him to go beyond the
title, as is in harmony with the Supreme CourtÊs pronouncement in
Eagle Realty Corporation vs. Republic of the Philippines, et
al., which reads:
„Indeed, the general rule is that a purchaser may rely on
what appears on the face of a certificate of title. x x x An
exception to this rule is when there exist important
facts that would create suspicion in an otherwise
reasonable man (and spur him) to go beyond the
present title and to investigate those that preceded it.
x x x One who falls within the exception can neither be
denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a
purchaser in good faith, hence, does not merit the
protection of the law.‰
Besides, defendants, Heirs of Lorenzo Coloso, Jr., had not
transferred any rights over the disputed land to [Soquillo], because
the former were not owners of the same at the time they sold the
land to [Soquillo]. x x x No one can give what he does not have–x x
x.

339

VOL. 677, JULY 23, 2012 339

Soquillo vs. Tortola

Moreover, since defendant Arthur Coloso as representative of

the Heirs of Lorenzo Boy Coloso, Jr. acquired OCT No. P-20825 over
the disputed land through fraud, We sustain [the] lower courtÊs
award of moral and exemplary damages pursuant to Articles 21,
2219(10), and 2229 of the New Civil Code. The award of AttorneyÊs
fees is likewise sustained considering that [Tortola] was compelled
to litigate in order to protect his interest pursuant to Article 2208 (1
and 2) of the New Civil Code.‰6 (Citations omitted and emphasis
supplied)

Hence, the instant petition for review7 raising the

following issues:

„WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN:

(1) NOT FINDING THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE
OF ACTION;
(2) NOT FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER IS A PURCHASER IN
GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE; and
(3) AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYÊS FEES.‰8

In the instant petition, Soquillo reiterates the

arguments he had proferred in the proceedings below. On
the other hand, no comment was filed by Tortola as the
copy of the resolution requiring him to file the same had
been returned to the court with the notation „RTS,
unknown, insufficient address.‰9

Our Disquisition

The instant petition is bereft of merit.

_______________
6 Id., at pp. 44-48.
7 Id., at pp. 8-30.
8 Id., at p. 18.
9 Id., at p. 80.

340

340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Soquillo vs. Tortola

Questions of law and not of facts

are the proper subjects of a peti-
tion for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.
In Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free
Workers v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc.,10 we declared:

„This rule [Rule 45 of the Rules of Court through which Soquillo

filed the instant petition] provides that the parties may raise only
questions of law, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Generally, we are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the
evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals below.
When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact
of the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are
not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any
of the following recognized exceptions[.]‰11 (Emphasis
supplied)

In the case at bar, Soquillo raises factual questions

which were already resolved in the proceedings below.
Further, the factual findings of the RTC and the CA were in
accord with each other and were supported by substantial
evidence.
Even if we were to resolve the first
issue raised by Soquillo relative to
the alleged lack of standing of Tor-
tola as the real party-in-interest,
there is still no ground to dismiss the
latterÊs complaint. The action filed
by Tortola was not for reversion, but
for the declaration of nullity of a free
patent and a certificate of title.

_______________
10 G.R. No. 190515, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 656.
11 Id., at p. 660.

341

VOL. 677, JULY 23, 2012 341

Soquillo vs. Tortola

In SoquilloÊs appeal filed with the CA, he raised for the

first time the issue of TortolaÊs complaint allegedly not
stating a cause of action for having been filed in the latterÊs
name when the State was the real party-in-interest.
If in the interest of sheer liberality, we were to resolve
the issue, there is still no ample ground to dismiss TortolaÊs
complaint.
Banguilan v. Court of Appeals12 was emphatic that:

„Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of Honorio Dacut

distinguishes an action for reversion from an action for declaration
of nullity of free patents and certificates of title as follows:
„An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free
patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action
for reversion. The difference between them lies in the
allegations as to the character of ownership of the
realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action
for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would
admit State ownership of the disputed land. Hence in Gabila
v. Barriga where the plaintiff in his complaint admits that he
has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of the
defendantÊs title because even if the title were cancelled or
amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of
the portion affected by the amendment would revert to the
public domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and
that the only person or entity entitled to relief would be the
Director of Lands.
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require
allegations of the plaintiffÊs ownership of the contested lot
prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title
as well as the defendantÊs fraud or mistake, as the case may
be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the
parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity
arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact
that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands to be-

_______________
12 G.R. No. 165815, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 644.

342

342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Soquillo vs. Tortola

stow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained

therefor is consequently void ab initio. The real party in
interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-
existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question
even before the grant of title to the defendant. x x x[.]‰13
 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

In TortolaÊs complaint, he alleged prior ownership of the

disputed property and fraud exercised upon him by the
heirs of Coloso, Jr. to obtain a free patent and certificate of
title covering the same. The complaint was not for
reversion but for the declaration of nullity of the free
patent and title. Hence, Tortola was the real party-in-
interest and the complaint was properly filed in his name.
The second and third issues raised
by Soquillo had already been exhaus-
tively discussed by the RTC and the
CA. The disquisitions relative there​t​ o
made by the courts a quo were sup-
ported by substantial evidence,
hence, they need not be disturbed.
The second and third issues raised by Soquillo were
exhaustively discussed by the RTC and the CA. Soquillo
was not a purchaser in good faith. He and the heirs of
Coloso, Jr. who were his predecessors-in-interest, knew
about the sale made to Tortola and the possession of the
disputed property by Villaflores. Besides, Tortola registered
the sale, albeit with much delay, in 2002. As of the time
TortolaÊs complaint was filed, no registration was effected
by Soquillo.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 23,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01476 is
AFFIRMED.

_______________
13 Id., at p. 653.

343

VOL. 677, JULY 23, 2012 343

Soquillo vs. Tortola

SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo,** Perez and Sereno,

JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

 Notes.·In all actions for the reversion to the
Government of lands of the public domain or improvements
thereon, the Republic of the Philippines is the real party in
interest, the action to be instituted by the Solicitor General
or the officer acting in his stead, in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines. (Manese vs. Velasco, 577 SCRA 108 [2009])
In a reversion proceeding, premised on the claim that
the property is foreshore land or that the patents were
obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, the burden is
now upon petitioner to prove such allegations. (Republic vs.
Leonor, 609 SCRA 75 [2009])
··o0o··

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