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 Uneiaes+fied
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Reserve Component Special Forces Integration and Employment Models for the Operational
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 ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Wayne J. Morgan, LTC, USAR

TITLE; Reserve Component Special Forces Integration and

Employment Models for the Operational Continuum

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 15 April 1991 PAGES:

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

A significant portion of USSOCOM assigned forces are Reserve

Component units, yet the statement often heard from Regular
officers at USSOCOM is "if we can't use them, what good are
they...?" The question is certainly fair enough on the surface,
but is a clarion for much greater knowledge and understanding of
the Reserve force and it's employment potential. The Cohen-Nunn
Act of October 1986, as an attachment to the Fiscal Year 1987
Defense Authorization Act, designed the framework for the
establishment of the United States Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM). Implementing law, Public Law 99-661, was specific in
the assignment of all Reserve Component Army Special Forces, to
include those of the Army National Guard, to the joint four-star
command. Although strongly opposed within Department of Defense
(DOD) and by the Services, after five years of operation, the
Command has largely proven the merit of the Congressional fore-
sight. However, optimum utilization of the assigned Reserve
Component Special Forces remains elusive and supericial. This
study provides viable and dynamic integration and employment models
for Reserve Component Special Forces to enhance a CINC's Peacetime
Engagement strategy.
 USAWC Military Studies Program Paper
The views expressed in this paper are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
This document may not be released for open publication
until it has been cleared by the appropriate milit-rv
service or government agency.

RESERVE COMPONENT SPECIAL FORCES

INTEGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT

MODELS %at1)
FOR THE
Accesion For
OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM N--
NTIS CRAk'Al
DTIC TA3
Jist'isication ..............

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT BY

.................
.............. ........
Di-zt:ibtutio: I1

Availabiity Codes

I Availa, Ior
by Dist Special

Lieutenant Colonel Wayne J. Morgan

Special Forces, US Army Reserve

Colonel William J. Flavin

Special Forces
Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public

release; distribution is unlimited.

US Army War College

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
 ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Wayne J. Morgan, LTC, USAR

TITLE; Reserve Component Special Forces Integration and

Employment Models for the Operational Continuum

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 15 April 1991 PAGES:

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

A significant portion of USSOCOM assigned forces are Reserve

Component units, yet the statement often heard from Regular
officers at USSOCOM is "if we can't use them, what good are
they...?" The question is certainly fair enough on the surface,
but is a clarion for much greater knowledge and understanding of
the Reserve force and it's employment potential. The Cohen-Nunn
Act of October 1986, as an attachment to the Fiscal Year 1987
Defense Authorization Act, designed the framework for the
establishment of the United States Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM). Implementing law, Public Law 99-661, was specific in
the assignment of all Reserve Component Army Special Forces, to
include those of the Army National Guard, to the joint four-star
command. Although strongly opposed within Department of Defense
(DOD) and by the Services, after five years of operation, the
Command has largely proven the merit of the Congressional fore-
sight. However, optimum utilization of the assigned Reserve
Component Special Forces remains elusive and supericial. This
study provides viable and dynamic integration and employment models
for Reserve Component Special Forces to enhance a CINC's Peacetime
Engagement strategy.
 The Congressional mandate for the establishment of the United
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) concurrently

transferred all Reserve Component Special Operating Forces from

various service reserve components to the new Command. However,

the question most often heard from Regular Army officers at USSOCOM
regarding these forces is "if we can't use them, what good are

they...? The question is fair enough. It illustrates clearly the

pervasive ignorance of the Reserve Component, which is not

surprising based on past levels of integration in the Total Army.

USSOCOM and subordinate command staffs remain woefully unresourced

in Reserve Component Active Guard Reserve (AGR) officers and non-

commissioned officers, without whose presence, Reserve issues and
perspective are not successfully integrated. This insufficiency

of Reserve Component integration at the highest levels insures

limited information transfer within the Total Force, and assures a

much less than optimum utilization of the substantial Reserve

Component force structure assigned to the Commander-in-Chief

1
Special Operations Command:

Special Forces 45%

Civil Affairs 97%
Navy SEALS 20%
Special Boat Units 57%
AC 130 Gunships 50%
USAF Volant Solo 100%
 The purpose of this paper is to present the employment
capabilities currently residing in Reserve Component Special Forces

Groups, and how they might be proactively integrated and employed.

The objective is to answer unequivocally the availability for "use"

question - Reserve Component Special Forces are legally available

and capable of operational employment. Use them!

CURRENT FORCES
The Reserve Component (RC) Special Forces Groups (Airborne)
(SFGA) are located across the breadth of the Continental United

States. The troop unit listing, located in the appendices,

indicates geographic location to battalion level, but few of the
Special Forces companies are co-located with the battalion
headquarters. Consider that while 3-11 SFGA battalion headquarters

is in Perrine, FL, companies are located in Tampa, FL, Columbus,

GA, and Winston-Salem, NC. This situation is typical, and is a

necessity based on demographic imperatives for the USAR and ARNG

Special Forces Groups. The units act as "magnets" in the

recruiting of prior service and 18-series personnel, as well as for

recruiting non-prior service, high-quality personnel.

A synopsis of RC SFODA is presented in the following analysis

of six Special Forces Operational Detachments A (SFODA), comprising

64 personner. -These Detachments, from 1-11 Special Forces Groups

(Airborne) (SFGA), were interviewed during their participation in

a major SOF (Special Opertions Forces) exercise in Europe during

1990. They operated in Norway and Denmark in consonance with

2
assigned mission requirements of Special Reconnaissance (SR) and

Direct Action (DA).

The SFODA were launched by 1-11 SFGA Forward Operational Base

(FOB) in the United Kingdom. The four Norway SFODA were

interviewed during the redeployment phase at the Exercise Support

Headquarters in Norway, and the two Denmark SFODA were interviewed
while in the Isolation phase at the FOB.
2
PROFILE SYNOPSIS:

AVERAGE AGE 34+years

MARRIED 57 percent
BA/BS EDUCATION 35 percent
PRIOR SERVICE 79 percent

MOSQ YEARS TENURE 7+years

ACTIVE DUTY 73 percent

YEARS SERVICE AC 3+years

RC 9 years
Current SFODA 5.5 years
PT TIMES/WK 4(-)
RUN DISTANCE 3+miles
ABN PROF/CE per YR 4+
DFT/YEAR CONUS 3+
OCONUS 2.5 last five years

LANGUAGE RATED 37+percent

NORDIC SKI ABILITY Less than Intermediate
OWN SKI EQUIP 55 percent
TIMES SKI/YR 9+

WARTIME CAPABILITY
SELF-ASSESSMENT
--PERSONAL Good+
DETACHMENT Good(-)

The "ageing of the force" question has been an Active

Component (AC) concern of the RC SFGA for a number of years. The
average age of these SFODA at 34 was not extreme, and generally,

3
the force to continue becoming younger as Vietnam era soldiers

leave or retire from the units. Additionally, the number of

personnel who were awarded MOSQ through the now defunct RC Special

Forces Qualification program is rapidly waning. The 27% RCSFQC

figure resident in these profiled teams has undoubtedly been

reduced in the past two years, and with it, also the aggregate age

of the SFOD~s. One can readily project that within the near
future, the average age of RC SFGA teams will be in the 30 years

old range and that 100% of personnel on the teams will be active
duty/"long-course" Special Forces Qualification Course graduates.
Unit cohesion was analyzed based on the composite basis of

each SFODA as a perzentage of assigned to total deployed, with a

time factoring based on the length of time assigned personnel had

been with the SFODA.

Special Forces doctrine states that a "Team" is any mission-

tailored element from a minimum of two personnel to an

indeterminate number of personnel. Tailoring is an essential

requirement and unique capability within the special operations

force. Generally, a deployable detachment for exercise/mission

capability in EUCOM has been defined as a minimum of one officer,

one communicator, and one medic, comprising a total not less than
3
six personnel.

A concern in readiness analysis for both the AC and RC SFODA

is the formation of "ad hoc" SFODA in order to meet minimum
personnel requirements for ARTEP or exercise deployment. The term

cross-leveling is used to describe the temporary assignment of

4
personnel to meet operational minimums caused by either a shortfall

in deployable key personnel, or to meet a minimum requirements in

numbers of personnel.

RC SF companies are relatively stable, with typically less

than a 10% turnover in MOSO personnel. This characteristic is

unique to the RC SFGA, when compared to both RC and AC personnel

"turbulence." While RC conventional forces sustain personnel
turnover greater than that of the RC SFGA, AC counterparts have a
far greater turbulence exceeding 50% per year. Consider that in
1985, Army divisions averaged 53.6% turnover, while the 101st Air
Assault Division had a 60.4% turnover of personnel.4 These
personnel turnover/"turbulence" rates are the norm for AC personnel

management in units. Consider that in FY '90, the TTHS account

(Trainees, Transients, Holdees, Students) daily average was 83,000

active duty personnel. AC SFGA turbulence exceeds 30% for forward

deployed/OCONUS units, 5 and likely reflects AC Army-wide TTHS

account percentages in CONUS.

RC SFGA stability abrogates the negative affects of this "ad

hoc" of SFODAs, especially when cross-leveling is accomplished

within SF companies. Salient to this "ad hoc" concern, is the
special operators perspective that the SFODA is the trained base

for mission tailoring.

Further -analysis indicates only one individual was cross-

leveled to meet a mission-critical MOS shortfall. This mission

shortfall cross-level was met internally within the parent company,

which not surprisingly was for a Medic. The analysis also

5
indicates that all but one cross-leveling was accomplished
"internally" or within parent companies. In this case, the cross-

level moved an Intelligence Sergeant from A Company to C Company to

increase the SFODA to twelve personnel. The following data

represents the 32% cross-leveled by MOS:

XO OPNS SGT INTEL SGT ENGR MEDIC COMMS WPNS

II III II I IIII* 111II IIII

Based on discussions with the Group and battalion personnel,

a major reason for bringing each of the deployable SFODA to maximum

strength of twelve was the determination to place as many personnel

as possible on the ground in OCONUS/ operational areas. This is an
operating standard exercised by both 11 and 20 SFGA at every
opportunity. Therefore, in determining the readiness cohesion of
an SFODA, one must look at the base detachment first, and then look

at the reason for and source of the personnel being cross-leveled.

The analysis indicates that "base deployable SFODAs" were

cross-leveled internally by parent companies in order to exercise

more personnel OCONUS. 6 Additionally, cross-leveling was not done

to meet mission capability requirements/minimums.

These deployed SFODA profiles indicated that approximately 32%

of the force was cross-leveled in preparation for the deployment;

68% of the deployed force were not cross-leveled, and they

reflected a cohesive average of 5.45 years tenure with their SFODA.

6
 MOSO

Levels of MOSQ in the RC SFGA has been a long-standing

criticism, but one which has since the late 1980's been decremented

almost exclusively by funding/resources. The determination to use

the active duty Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) as the

sole source of MOSQ for the RC SFGA proved to be one of the best
moves made in upgrading and increasing the readiness of the force.
However, high quality recruits are being held in the SF companies
pending school openings or training monies due to systemic

disconnects and oversights by those programming Army Reserve

Component SOF budgets. The RC MOSQ problem is an in-house, self-

induced shortfall. The units are achieving quality recruiting; the

system is failing to follow-through.

Both AC and RC SFGA have been reflecting a somewhat similar

10% shortfall from their respective MOSQ targets. The RC SFGA have

made steady growth in MOSQ since the early 1960s, averaging an 8-

10% increase in MOSQ each decade. Currently, RC SFGA average in

the 70% range, while maintaining C2 and C3 readiness postures.

Historical data, and given the proven ability of the RC SFGA to

support the active duty/"long-course" SFQC program, one can project

a 15% to 20% increase in RC MOSQ, in the next decade.7

The salient determinant in the status of MOSQ in the RC SFGA

is whether or not the funds, resources and manpower will be made

available by USASOC in support of RC personnel available for MOS

schooling. RC Special Forces unit commanders believe they can

provide the quality input. Many of these commanders, however,

7
believe that funding and the systemic malaise must be dynamically
corrected to portend well for the future.

MISSION SPECIFIC TRAINING

Doctrine clearly directs Special Forces units to train for

specific mission requirements per Theater CINC OPLANS and

directives. As stated in FM 80-1 (Nov 89), pp 7-1, 7-6, 7-7,
SFODAs typically train for no more than two of the four SF
missions, and that "Special Forces units train to OPLAN
requirements not to doctrinal missions." Both 11 and 20 SFGA
trained as directed by their warfighting CINC for Special
Reconnaissance (SR) and Direct Action (DA) missions, with specific

priority of one mission over the other.

However, the Groups in practice, have conducted limited
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)/UW training by virtue of the
combined training environment and exchange programs in which they

often participate. 1-11 SFGA maintains the capability of

instructing Programs of Instruction in both Norwegian (48 hour) and

Danish (24 hour). As an example, the SFODB acting as Exercise

Support Headquarters in Dombas, Norway during FTX MOSKUS 90
presented extensive weapons, demolitions, communications, and
medical training to the soldiers of the Norwegian Home Guard. The
20 SFGA has-pr-sented special skills training to both Italian and

Spanish forces in the past.

OCONUS OPTEMPO CY87-91

8
 The optempo accomplished by RC SFGA has established a proven
capability. By 1987, both 11 and 20 SFGA were establishing
respective Special Forces Operating Bases (SFOB) and Forward
Operating Bases (FOB), launching/recovering SFODAs,
sending/terminating communications and providing the
admin/logistics required to support Group operations. Consider
that in 1987, 20 SFGA deployed fifteen SFODA and four SFODB in
seven European countries. 11 SFGA deployed approximately twenty
SFODAs during the same year in multiple exercises to Denmark,
Norway, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom. A similar
optempo occurred in 1988, with 20 SFGA committing twelve SFODA, and
multiple Forward Operating Bases (FOB) in Italy, Germany, and
Spain. 11 SFGA committed six SFODA to exercises in Germany, while

conducting winter warfare training in New York and New Hampshire.

In 1989, 20 SFGA committed ten SFODA and two SFODB to Italy,

Spain, and Germany, supported by an FOB. 11 SFGA returned to
Norway and the United Kingdom with an FOB, a SFODB and six SFODA.

1990 was again active with 20 SFGA committing SFODAs to

Germany, Italy, and Turkey, for the first time. 11 SFGA was
extensively employed in Norway and Denmark in three separate
exercises. Additionally, 11 SFGA conducted winter warfare training
in Utah and West Virginia, and re-established the Special Air
Service (SAS)-exchange with 23 SAS Regiment at Hereford, England.

11 SFGA deployed five SFODA to Norway to attend a Norwegian

winter warfare course in the first quarter 1991. Although all
completed the training successfully, more importantly the entire

9
contingent completed the 30 KM Ski March (race) with 25 lbs

rucksack and service rifle. This is exceptional, as typically 40%

fail to make qualifying times. The AFNORTH observers reported, in

message traffic that overall performance of these units was

"excellent. " 8
In a significant event for the Special Forces community, an
AOB and two SFODAs successfully participated in a major threshold
winter warfare exercise, as the first US SF in what has

historically been a SAS-exclusive event. CINCNORTH (British four

star general) and COMNON (Norwegian three star general) were "quite

pleased" with the performance of these SFODA, commenting that

9
.compared quite favorably with active duty counterparts."

The Group also programmed Winter Warfare training in

Washington state and Labrador, CANADA. Another battalion was

projected to conduct "over-the-horizon" waterborne infiltration

training with NAVSPECWARGRU ONE at Coronado, California. 11 SFGA

continued the ongoing Special Air Service (SAS) exchange, which

included Joint Combined Exercises for Training (JCET) in UK and

CONUS with 21 and 23 SAS (TAVR).

Meanwhile, 20 SFGA had been informally alerted in early NOV

90, for possible activation/mobilization in support of DESERT

SHIELD/STORM. See Appendix C.

20 SFGA (ARNG) ACTIVATION FOR DESERT SHIELD

Responding to a formal USSOCOM request to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff on 3 DEC 90, and following an extensive and critical "staff

10
review" by the Army and Joint Staff, the requested 3 Jan 91
activation date was ordered for 20 Feb 91.
Following formal alert notification on 1 Feb 91, 20 SFGA
increased their training tempo, used a combination of IDT-(Inactive

Duty Training) and active duty status to increase their training

tempo while at home stations. The Group was federally activated on

20 FEB 91 and closed the Ft. Bragg MOB-site on 22 FEB 91.

The Group arrived overstrength in personnel, and was committed

in three primary directions: (a) Pre-SFAS training, to include
Basic Airborne School, (b) SFAS/SFQC, and (c) Certification and
Validation of its' SFODA/B. It is interesting to note that active

duty coordinators had not anticipated the Group arriving with a

recruited personnel pool, administratively and physically prepared

to undergo training at various levels of training from Basic

Airborne to the Special Forces Qualification Course.

7 SFGA and US Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) provided

outstanding support and assistance. The results of the 90 day
activation are noteworthy and refute the "derived" conclusions of

the infamous 1989 ARI Study which ostensibly determined them

incapable of achieving such capability. Refer to Appendix B. 20
SFGA demonstrated in practical terms the level of training
readiness the RC SFGA attain and sustain in their annual training

cycles:
(1) Per OPLANS, the 200K Force List battalion met all
mobilization requirements within the prescribed ninety-six hours

period.

11
 (2) Within a 40+/- day period, all operational SFODA (81%)

and SFODB (100%) were certified and validated by USASFC. The time

limiter was availability of range and support facilities. Many

believe the process could have been accomplished within a two week

period. CG, USASFC and USCINCSOC found 20 SFGA fully prepared for
10
operational deployment and "combat ready."
(3) During the activated period, in addition to those
personnel entered into SFAS and SFQC, new recruits numbering 124
personnel completed Basic Airborne Training with a 100% success

rate.
It should be noted that the 19% shortfall in SFODAs declared

"combat ready" is the same shortfall taken into the validation

process. This shortfall was driven by MOSQ shortages, caused by

the ongoing systemic and funding problems discussed earlier.

When 20 SFGA demobilized, over 200 of it's personnel remained

on temporary active duty for training at various levels of MOSQ

training.
For all the successes, however, 20 SFGA demobilized with over

50 volunteers posted to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT as individual

"fillers." Both 7 SFGA and 20 SFGA protested the methodology of

using their personnel as individual replacements. For many of the

20 SFGA officers and men the ever present suspicion between AC and

RC had again s!1faced - that the active component will use reserve

units as individual replacements only.

12
 US ARMY RESERVE SFGA COST COMPARATIVE

Military pay (MPA/RPA/NGPA) and Operations & Maintenance

funds (O&M) are the two basic budget categories used in this cost

comparative for active and reserve component SFGA. See Appendix

D.
TO&E equipment and Housing/billeting are not included in this
annualized compilation. Although the presentation is simplistic,
it captures a close representation of the cost differentials

between RC SFGA and AC SFGA.1"

The cost for an RC unit is generally considered to be between
20 and 25% of an Ac unit, depending on the specific type unit. The
cost factor/ratio for maintaining an Active Component and a Reserve

Component SFGA are:

$ 50.5/AC SFGA : $ 13.2/RC SFGA

3.8 : 1
Stated more generally, four RC SFGA can be maintained in
reserve for the cost of one SFGA in the Active Component. Besides
the advisable aspect of involving a democratic people in the

conduct of their military enterprise, fiscal consideration is a

major determinant in the establishment of the reserve military

structure.
THE MOBILIZATION SPECTRUM

The spectrum for accessing the Reserve Component can be viewed

in two basic categories based on active duty by executive authority

and Mobilization under Congressional review or purview. The chart

"Reserve Force Activation and Mobilization Criteria," illustrates

13
 z 4 >

tuCC0~ 4(Ua
Z0 cc0 W 1 J E
Cc 1 0Ck
> Wa 040I

z~ +

CC 00c
09 5- 00c 0 aWI

z CCc

1C ImwW wZ
IL > 04c

z ccF

2~6 cc> w~ 0

0 4cW-

0 n MAWO2 m w 4c ~
0RU
3000

06 0 s
l'0- 0. 1U
4 -5
-j2C
the spectrum from individual voluntary active duty to a national

Total Mobilization. A detailed explanation of the various

categories of reserve component duty status is provided in Appendix

E.

The first category of "Executive/By-law" access of the RC

comprises those active duty options which are established by-law

within executive authority and not requiring Congressional

approval:

(1) Annual Training - Maximum of 15 days, by-law;

involuntary requirement for Selected Reserve personnel.
(2) Inactive Duty for Training (IDT) - Unit Training

Assemblies (UTAs); not constrained by law; typically resourced at

48 per year or 54 per year for Special Forces units. Involuntary

requirement for Selected Reserve.

(3) Active Duty for Training (ADT) - Voluntary,

unrestricted time for training on active duty.

(4) Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD) - Voluntary,

unrestricted by time and nature of duty, in support of active

component requirements.

(5) Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) - Voluntary,

unrestricted by time and nature of duty, in support of reserve

component requirements.
(6) Operational Activation - Selected Reserve units and

individuals only, involuntary active duty for operational purposes

only, for a maximum of 200,000 personnel for up to 180 days (360

days for combat units, pending requested change in law).

14
 The second category along the spectrum starts with "Selective
Mobilization and requires concurrence by Congress:

(1) Selective Mobilization - Involuntary mobilization of

Ready Reserve for domestic emergencies not involving an external

threat.
(2) Partial Mobilization - Involuntary mobilization of up

to 1 million personnel of the 2.9 million Ready Reserve for a

period not longer 24 months. Requires external threat or threat of
war.

(3) Full Mobilization - Involuntary mobilization by

Congress of up to 2.9 million Ready Reserve for a period not to
exceed the duration of the threat or war, plus six months.

(4) Total Mobilization - Involuntary mobilization of all

reserves and start of reconstitution of forces. Requires external
threat or war, and is for the duration of the threat or war, plus

six months.

During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the progression in

accessing the RC went from (a) category one, voluntary active duty

using TTAD/ADSW, to (b) category one, Operational Activation, to

final state of (c) category two, Partial Mobilization. One should

note that most of the Gulf War was fought using reserve forces
without Congressionally provided forces. "Partial Mobilization"
occurred early in 1991 well after the reserve was fully employed.

excepting the still contentious employment of reserve combat

maneuver forces.

The spectrum is fully supportive of the operational continuum,

15
allowing for an expansire and long-term employment of reserve

forces. However, it should be recognized that the specific

limitations found in the law reflect an attempt to protect the RC

12
from a history of misuse during previous mobilizations.

RCSF INTEGRATION IN THE 1990'S AND BEYOND

Integration of the force is important for a number of reasons,

not least of which is the merging of AC and RC into a "total
force." The Full Time Support (FTS) program is an excellent

vehicle for achieving a large portion of a merging of AC and RC

structure. The program currently comprises a combination of active

component, Active Guard Reserve (AGR), military technicians (mil-

techs), and civil service personnel. The inclusion of the

"Individual Mobilization Augmentee" (IMA) category of the Selected

Reserve would complete the "integration" implementers.

The driving purpose of FTS is to prepare troop program units

(TPUs) for focused training during allocated drill/MUTAs, removing

the on-going administrative distractions common to personnel

intensive organizations. Possibly no other single program

influences RC readiness as directly as the status of FTS.'3

Unfortunately, the program for the USAR, directly under Army

FORSCOM, remains significantly the least funded of the seven DOD

Reserve Compoffints.

Congress has long intended that FTS for both the Army Guard

and Army Reserve troop program units should achieve a 14% basis.

The Army Guard has recently reported Full Time Manning (FTM) at

16
around 11.8%, while the Army Reserve remains markedly undermanned

at less than 9% FTM, or 54% funded with an 8,000 personnel

shortfall.'4 Currently projected budgets indicate Active Guard

Reserve strength will be reduced substantially by Department of

Army,15 further reducing FTM basis for the Reserve Component.

Active Component participation in the USAR FTS program is

approximately 3.8% or 1,045 personnel assigned. AC manning in the
RC SFGA in the early 1980 period was often not to an acceptable
standard. Shortfalls in this regard were driven by assigning
personnel who were potentially in their last duty tour prior to
retirement. However, when motivated professional personnel are
assigned, regardless of their career progression, the benefit for
the RC is substantial. Typical of any reassignment, the newly

assigned AC member will (a) have little to no knowledge of the RC,

(b) require 6 to 12 months to gain a basic understanding of the RC,

and (c) be in a hand-off mode three months before reassignment.

However, the resulting two year period of optimum utility is well

worth the learn-up period, for these personnel bring the latest AC

standards and knowledge directly into the RC troop units.

This program of assigning active component soldiers into RC

troop program units is far more productive than posting them to

Army "Readiness Commands." Many reserve component officers

question the value of resourcing "readiness commands," if the goal

is to achieve dynamic readiness in RC units. AC personnel assigned

as members of a troop unit are far more credible, motivated and

beneficial than the periodically visiting "advisors," and gain an

17
appreciation for the RC not otherwise achieved.

The importance of the AGR program is substantial. Not only

does it provide the technical knowledge regarding the functioning

of the RC, but it also provides continuity and corporate memory

within the reserve unit. The AGR program provides the basis and
strength for all other Full Time Support. Those who believe AC
integrated FTS is the primary solution generally have not had the

honor to experience the RC readiness situation.

The military technician program is one of debate in the RC.

Many would like to see the program completely removed from FTM.
However, in certain technical skill areas, aircraft/automotive
maintenance for example, mil-techs may be the only alternative

based on real availability of MOSQ personnel for those

requirements. It remains a topic of some debate, with overall
reliance on mil-techs decreasing and in some units being completely

removed.
AC integration in the FTM program in support of the RC SFGA
has followed a pattern similar to that depicted below:

POSITION GROUP BATTALION COMPANY

ExecutiveOfficer/Deputy AC/AGR AGR AGR
Personnel Officer AGR AGR AGR
Personnel/Admin NCO AGR/TECH ACR/TECH AGR/TECH
Operations-olicer AC/AGR AC/AGR AGR
Operations NCO AC/AGR AC/AGR AC/AGR
Supply/Log Officer AGR AGR AGR
Supply NCO AGR AGR AGR
Fig.l, CURRENT OPTIMUM FULL TIME MANNING

18
 Each of the RC SFGA have somewhat different FTM plans, and
each is manned to a greater or lesser extent. Most of the
companies FTM runs between 5% to 7%, and none of the Groups have

approached the Congressional FTM target of 14%. Yet, while the

target has not been met, the Reserve Component has been directed to

make substantial reductions in existing 10 USC and 32 USC Active

Guard Reserve Full-Time Manning strength. Reflecting the Army's

macro-methodology for proportional force structure reductions
between components, the Reserve Component's existing personnel base
is to be reduced, seemingly without regard to remaining structure

requirements. Not reducing the RC FTS program at this time would

provide an increase in percentage manning, possibly achieving the
dynamic Congressional 24%, with no increased demand on the "total

force" budget.

The inclusion of IMAs into "total force" integration planning

allows for substantial RC participation and support in Active
Component commands, as dramatically illustrated during the 1991
Gulf War. These personnel are usually fully screened by the Active

Component command and are assigned to that command for all training
and mobilized duty. IMAs can also be utilized by the Active
Component command in a category-B drilling status of twenty-four

UTAs per year, in addition to Annual Training and other EAD status.

Although not mobilized for duty with their parent command, the

IMAs of Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) provided

excellent support to USSOCOM, especially in the SOJ2 Directorate.
Comprising 84% of assigned strength, from it's establishment
19
SOCCENT's IMA integration over four years had been one of the most

successful and proactive examples of AC:RC integration in the Joint

commands. Unfortunately, the depth of that success was blatantly

susceptible to the perspective of a new commander, as was evidence

during the Gulf War.

The concept of "round-out" is also a method of achieving

integration, but it is even less desirable in the case of Reserve

Special Forces than for conventional brigade-size units. "Round-
out" envisions active counter-part association and a highly

instructive interactive relationship between the AC and RC unit.

History and experience have shown that this is not the operative
reality achieved in most caseq. Geography, training time
disconnects, and a myriad of unknowns cause the desired high level

of association to diminish beyond benefit to either the AC or the

RC unit. The benefit of "round-out" to a RC unit's readiness is

superficial in most cases. The benefit of integrating AC personnel

directly into units has proven in the RC SFGA to highly productive.

The key is to keep the in-flow of AC knowledge and standards

constant and resident in the units. This integration becomes

especially productive when the assigned AC personnel view

themselves as members of the RC unit, and not just Regulars
assisting the lessor component.

Projecfii an optimum FTS model of approximately 14% for RC

Special Forces companies, battalions and groups, one might project

the following:

20
 POSITION GROUP BATTALION COMPANY
Executive Officer/2IC AGR/AC AGR/AC AGR/AC
Personnel Officer/Sl AGR AGR

Personnel NCO AC/AGR AC/AGR

Admin NCO AGR AGR AGR

Asst Pers/Admin NCO AGR AGR
Intell Officer/S2 AGR/AC AC/AGR
Intell NCO AC/AGR AGR/AC
Asst Intel NCO AGR
Operations Officer/S3 AC AC/AGR
Air Opns Officer AGR/AC
Operations NCO AC/AGR AC/AGR AC
Asst Opns NCO AGR
Finance Officer AGR

Asst Finance NCO AGR

Logistics Officer/S4 AGR AGR

Supply NCO AC AC/AGR AGR

Asst Supply NCO AGR/AC AGR
Medical NCO AC/AGR AC/AGR

Commo Officer AC/AGR AC/AGR

Commo NCO AGR AGR AC
SFODA NCO (6/SF Co.) AGR/AC
Other Admin/Support AGR (25)

15 X 3BN = 11 X 9 Co=
TOTAL FTS PERSONNEL 45 45 99
Fig.2 OPTIMUM 14% FULL TIME MANNING
The model proposes 189 personnel in various combinations of AC

and AGR. Where the position indicates either an AGR or an AC

requirement, the lead category is the preferred solution. Twenty-

five personnel are shown in the "other admin/support" for

21
parachute-rigger, maintenance, weather, signals, mess and

administrative support for the Group. No civilian positions were

included as these personnel would be fully deployable in support of

operational missions in the operational continuum.

EMPLOYMENT MODELS

Army policy regarding employment of Reserve Component (RC)

Special Operations Forces (SOF) remains a question of intent.

USSOCOM has been proactive in the use of Reserve Component forces,

and the results of the 20 SFGA Desert Storm mobilization reflect

this mutual willingness and capability. In the post-DESERT STORM

period, CINCSOC continued to offer the validated "combat ready"

20th SFGA for operational use by the Theater CINCs. The intended

use was to recapture those Peacetime Engagement missions foregone

due to the exigencies of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The base

policy question which drives RC SF readiness and training has two

parts: (1) Is there a policy to employ RC SOF in proactive, real

world Peacetime Engagement/LIC, and (2) will there be emphasis on

enhanced readiness and training for early activation in Regional

Contingency operations?"

USSOCOM, in it's head-of-agency role regarding MFP-11

budgeting, is required to conduct joint mission analysis in support

of its projections. During the period JAN 90 to JUN 91, USSOCOM

Joint Mission Analysis researched and analyzed RC SOF real world

availability and employability in the operational continuum, to

include routine peaceful competition roles. The following rules

22
were developed to provide enhanced RC SOF employment parameters:

1. RC Special Forces would be used in the peacetime

engagement/LIC role to recover or reestablish operational (training

exercise/ mission) shortfalls or unfilled requirements. The

primary four legal categories/tiers for accessing RC assets were

used, with the requirement that each tier be sourced in sequence

before proceeding to the next tier to fill an unresourced

requirement:

I. STANDARD, or "17 DAY RULE" (Annual Training)

II. VOLUNTARY ACTIVATION, (10 USC, 672)
III. OPERATIONAL ACTIVATION, (10 USC, 673b)
IV. MOBILIZATION, (PARTIAL/FULL)

2. Tier I. resources are provided in the standard Annual

Training mode of 15-17 days annually. It is the most restrictive
for RC employment and does not address a full range of employment

parameters. Such an option would be one of meeting longer mission

requirements with multiple elements operating in time sequence.
Tier I. does not reflect the OCONUS optempo established by RC SOF

in the past eight years.

3. TIER II. is essentially voluntary activation or extended active

duty (EAD) in various categories, such as "Temporary Tour of Active

Duty" (TTAD) and "Active Duty Special Work" (ADSW). Input from RC

SFGA units and review of historical OCONUS optempos, indicated a RC

SFGA capability to provide EAD individuals and units as indicated

below:16

23
 I - 17 DAYS 1 - 30DAYS 1 -45 DAYS
36 SFODA per SFGA 11 SFODA per SFGA 5 SFODA per SFGA
6 SFODB per SFGA 2 SFODB per SFGA 1 SFODB per SFGA
Fig.3, TIER II RESOURCE AND EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

4. Resources from TIER III are provided through operational

activation of derivative UIC units/Individual Mobilization

Augmentees (IMAs) by executive authority (10 USC, 673b). Duration

of employment is 180 days per year for non-combat (CA/PSYOP)
forces, and 360 days for combat forces (Special Forces).
5. TIER IV employment parameters are provided within the context
of a partial or a full mobilization. It provides unrestricted
access of the RC for twenty-four months or the "duration plus six
months."

6. Utilization parameters based on employment duration and

activity are presented in the following chart. Although Tier III.
employment must be for operational requirements, not for training,
public law does not otherwise prohibit the use of RC SOF in any

activity while in an active duty status.

TIER TIER
DURATION II. I, III & IV.
(VOLUNTARY) (INVOLUNTARY)

SHORT TRAINING/ TRAINING/

(1-17 days) MISSION MISSION
MEDIUW TRAINING/ MISSION
(1-30 days) MISSION
LONG TRAINING/ MISSION
(1-45 days) MISSION
Fig.4, RC SOF EMPLOYMENT PARAMETERS
(DURATION & ACTIVITY)

24
 While the USSOCOM JMA scenarios indicated initiation of 10

USC, 673b, Selected Reserve operational activation within days of

a mobilization, this can be argued to be an altogether benign

approach to RC employment. A more proactive approach would have

operational activation occurring at the same time active Theater
apportioned SFGA were alerted or within weeks of deployments for a
Regional Contingency. In any regard, one might anticipate an

emerging policy based on a more informed and proactive perspective

insuring optimization of limited Total SOF resources.

SCENARIO BASED EMPLOYMENT MODELS

Based on the data presented, the models that follow illustrate

how these extensive resources can be employed. Hypothetical

scenarios, which do not reflect any current or proposed missions,

are each of the Theater apportioned RC SFGA. The employment models

do, however, incorporate historical optempo data, parameters
established by Public Law and concepts provided by numerous Reserve

Component SF officers in RC SFGAs. The models are conceptually

conservative when compared with the USSOCOM JMA enhanced employment

assumptions, previously discussed.

Pre-operational training and identification of personnel

requires a twelve month lead from tasker, which is typical for

active component long-range planning and training schedules. In

particular, this provides sufficient IDT (Inactive Duty

Training)/"drills" for training, planning, development of POI, and

administrative/logistics preparations for OCONUS deployment.

25
Deploying units are inspected and "brief-back" to tasker/Theater

SOC sixty days prior from deployment, and again fifteen days prior

to deployment.

NOTIONAL SCENARIO 1.

TASKING:
THEATER/COUNTRY - SOUTHCOM/Peru
MISSION TYPE - FID
WINDOW/ADMIN - 55 days
OPN'L - 42 days

MISSION SYNOPSIS:
JSCP apportioned RC SFGA conducts a six-week POI Counter-insurgency
(CI) course to train Peruvian Army/National Police CI forces in
combat patrolling, land navigation, immediate reaction drills,
basic demolitions, and raid techniques. Trainees comprise three
parachute infantry companies (360) and forty (40) national
policemen.

EMPLOYMENT MODEL:
TEAM/
FUNCTION UNITS PHASE DAYS DUTY STATUS(DAYS)
Cmd/Log Team 1 All 55 FTM + TTAD
SFODA 4 All 45 TTAD
SFODB 1 I 21 AT(15) + TTAD(6)
SFODA 1 I-II 30 AT(15) + TTAD(15)
SFODA 2 I 17 AT(15) + IDT(2)
SFODA 2 I-Il 17 AT(15) + IDT(2)
SFODB 1 II 21 AT(15) + TTAD(6)
SFODA 1 I-1I 30 AT(15) + TTAD(15)
SFODA 2 II 17 AT(15) + IDT(2)

26
 NOTIONAL SCENARIO 2.

TASKING:
THEATER/COUNTRY - EUCOM/Various
MISSION TYPE - DA/SR/FID
WINDOW/ADMIN - 55 days
OPN'L - 45 days

MISSION SYNOPSIS:
JSCP apportioned RC SFGA establishes SFOB and employs three FID
MTTs (Poland, Republic of Russia, and Hungary) and 15 SFODA over a
45 day period in Exercise FLINTLOCK, in support of allied forces
combined training in a Peacetime Engagement arena.

EMPLOYMENT MODEL:

TEAM/
FUNCTION UNITS PHASE DAYS DUTY STATUS(DAYS)
SFODB 1 All 55 FTM + TTAD
SFODB 1 I 21 AT(15) + TTAD(6)
SFODA 3 I 30 AT(15) + TTAD(15)
SFODA 6 I 17 AT(15) + ADT(6)
SFODB 1 II 21 AT(15) + ADT(6)
SFODA 9 II 17 AT(15) + ADT(6)

NOTIONAL SCENARIO 3.

TASKING:
THEATER/COUNTRY - CENTCOM/Kenya
MISSION TYPE - FID
WINDOW/ADMIN - 30 days
OPN'L - 21 days

MISSION SYNOPSIS:
JSCP apportioned RC SFGA is tasked to participate in SOCCENT major
exercise, with operational Forward Operating Base and six SFODA.
RC forces conduct combined training with Kenyan parachute
battalion, emphasizing Direct Action operations and techniques in
a counter-insurgency scenario.

27
EMPLOYMENT MODEL:

TEAM/
FUNCTION UNITS PHASE DAYS DUTY STATUS(DAYS)
LNO/Log Team 1 All 30 FTM + TTAD
SFODB 1 All 21 AT(15) + TTAD(6)
SFODA 6 All 21 AT(15) + TTAD(6)

NOTIONAL SCENARIO 4.

TASKING:
THEATER/COUNTRY - PACOM/Nepal
MISSION TYPE - DA/SR/FID
WINDOW/ADMIN - 30 days
OPN'L - 21 days

MISSION SYNOPSIS:
Theater apportioned RC SFGA conducts a medical assistance/training
operation in support of Royal Nepalese military medical unit. One
B Team provides command and control, with three A Teams, to
coordinate medical operations for Group Surgeon and medical
section, augmented with eighteen SF Medics.

EMPLOYMENT MODEL:
TEAM/
FUNCTION UNITS PHASE DAYS DUTY STATUS(DAYS)
LNO/Log Team 1 All 30 FTM + TTAD
SFODB 1 I 21 AT(15) + TTAD(6)
SFODA 3 I 21 AT(15) + TTAD(6)
SF Medics 18 I 21 AT(15) + TTAD(6)
Grp Surgeon 1 I 21 AT(15) + TTAD(6)
Medical Sect 1 I 21 AT(15) + TTAD(6)

The models illustrate the various modes or status of active

duty which can be used to deploy RC SFGA assets for substantial

operational periods in a Peacetime Engagement role. It should be

28
noted that this capability increases with marginal increases in

FTM.
Budget resourcing, in terms of Army National Guard/NGPA and
Army Reserve/RPA, has been and will be the real decrement to RC

SFGA employment. The US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological

Command established a 29 day Annual Training policy for it's units
starting in 1991. This basically sets aside monies for each
soldier to be utilized in an EAD role annually. If the funds are
not used by that soldier, they can be applied to another soldier
seeking a longer period of active duty. US Army Special Forces
Command, the advocacy headquarters for the RC SFGA, would be
advised to do the same for it's RC SFGA. This could be the initial
effort at establishing an annual EAD agreement with the RC SFGA.

Currently, RC SFGA are not required to set aside or identify

specific numbers of SFODA/SFODB for periods greater than the

standard Annual Training maximum of 15 days, with a possible two

days IDT for an initial assembly day and a stand-down day at home
station. It is reasonable to believe that it might be able to
coordinate an annual operational commitment from each of the RC

SFGA. The USSOCOM JMA parameters were informally discussed at

length with planners in all the RC SFGA, and the parameters were

found to be generally acceptable.

A possible RC SFGA deployment commitment, based on the USSOCOM

JMA model, could provide extended active duty (EAD) assets of one

SFODB and five SFODAs for 45 days, and two SFODBs and eleven SFODAs

for a 30 day period. These are not inconsequential numbers in view

29
of typical Theater SOF requirements.

OPERATIONAL PERIOD SFODB SFODA

1 - 17 days 3 - 6 30 - 38
1 - 30 days 2 11
1 - 45 days 1 5
Fig.5, EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY ASSETS

These extended employment requirements could be assigned on a

rotational basis to the battalions. For example, Ist battalion in
year one would have the 45 day requirements, 2nd battalion would
provide the 30 day requirements, and the 3rd battalion would
provide the standard 17 day commitments. Each year thereafter, the
commitments would move to the next battalion in the cycle, etc.
Establishing an agreed extended capability would "normalize"

periodic extended commitments for the Groups. The RC SFGA would be

able to program these commitments as ongoing, long-range planning

requirements, and commanders could begin tailoring their

SFODA/SFODB for annualized EAD requirements. Individual soldiers,
likewise, would begin projecting into the future by preparing
families and employers for the increased optempo.

CONCLUSION
The RC SFGA offer the warfighting CINCs a substantially
greater abilit-y to influence their Peacetime Engagement strategies

beyond currently accepted force limitations. As illustrated by the

background supporting data and the employment models, the RC SFGA

are readily available, both legally and operationally, for

30
employment in the operational continuum. With funding and command

intent, the RC SFGA could become highly viable and fully

accountable assets to Peacetime Engagement and regional contingency

requirements in the post-Cold War era.

Full Time Manning remains the lynch-pin to proactive readiness

and employment capability. Senior Army SOF headquarters have never
achieved a viable level of representation. In both USSOCOM and US
Army Special Operations Command, the AGR staffing is below
effective levels. In USSOCOM alone, a headquarters of more than

500 personnel, there are only two RC Special Forces officers

currently assigned to assure a Reserve Special Forces perspective
for a stated 45% of Total SOF. The level of support in the RC SFGA

has generally been little more than 50% of the Congressional

target. If these disparities in across the board FTM are not
corrected, the long-term viability of the RC SFGA may not portend
well. The force structure is too dynamic from a cost and

capabilities perspective to continue in the current benign

paradigm. The four RC SFGA, available for combat employment within
weeks of mobilization, nearly cost less than one standing AC SFGA.

Perhaps this has been an unstated paradigm.

The erroneous perception has been that the Reserve Component

Special Forces Groups are too difficult to employ proactively on an

annual and recurring basis. The fact is, given an understanding

and knowledge of the relatively few and rather minimal limiting

factors, forty-five percent of the Army's Special Forces are

absolutely and resolutely available for operational employment.

31
 APPENDIX A.
RESERVE COMPONENT SPECIAL FORCES GROUPS (AIRBORNE)

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

19TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP(ABN) Draper,UT

Headquarters & Headquarters Co. Draper,UT
Support Company Camp Williams,UT
1st SF Battalion Camp Williams,UT
2nd SF Battalion Ceredo,WV
5th SF Battalion Camp George West,CO

20th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP(ABN) Birmingham,AL

Headquarters & Headquarters Co. Birmingham,AL
Support Company Birmingham,AL
1st SF Battalion Huntsville,AL
2nd SF Battalion Jackson,MS
3rd SF Battalion Camp Blanding,FL

US ARMY RESERVE

11TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP(ABN) Fort Meade,MD

Headquarters & Headquarters Co. Fort Meade,MD
Support Company Fort Meade,MD
1st SF Battalion Newburgh,NY
2nd SF Battalion Reynoldsburg,OH
3rd SF Battalion Perrine,FL

12TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP(ABN) Arlington Heights,IL

Headquarters & Headquarters Co. Arlington Heights,IL
Support Company Arlington Heights,IL
1st SF Battalion Arlington Heights,IL
2nd SF Battalion Tulsa,OK
3rd SF Battalion Hamilton Field,CA

32
 APPENDIX B.
1ST SOCOM/ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE STUDY

In July 1988, The US Army Research institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences (ARI) wes contracted by 1st SOCOM to assess RC

SFGA training time sufficiency to meet operational requirements.

The report, "An Assessment of Special Forces Reserve Component

Training Capabilities," was compiled without RC interface, and

throughout makes substantive error regarding the Reserve Component,

Special Forces doctrine and the RC SFGA.

The study compared hours required to train for basic

proficiency in each of the Special Forces missions with hours

nominally available to a Selected Reserve troop program unit. The

hours required for training in the four primary Special Forces

missons of Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional

Warfare, and Foreign Internal Defense, was determined by Special

Warfare Center.

The Study incorporates the following substantive errors in

compilation and analysis:

1. ARI basis for comparison assumes that Special Forces units

are required to train in all four SF missions annually. Contrary

to this basic assumption, FM80-1, Doctrine fo- Army Special

Operations Forces, states "not all SF units train for all doctrinal

SF missions. Mission priorities vary from theater to theater. SF

units train to OPLAN requirements not to doctrinal missions.. .Based

on theater war plans, each SF unit is oriented to a specific region

of the world...an SFOD normally prepares for no more than two types

33
of missions."

2. The aggregate hours required for each of the four

capabilities were used in total, without consideration for

similar/identical training across the four mission areas.

Therefore, the hours requirement is vastly over-stated, which

projects a substantial short-fall in Reserve force training

capability in hours.

3. "Mandatory non-special forces mission activities" hours is

subjective and double counts officer and non-commissioned
professional development time, and inflates POR training,

inspections and formations, and annual training travel time (at 96

hours?).
4. Development of hours available for training is

illustrative of superficial knowledge of Reserve Special Forces

training. Companies will often train from Friday evening through

to Sunday afternoon. Deployments for Training/Fly-Aways, and Field

Training Exercises are rarely conducted in an eight hour per day

scenario. Additionally, the study was unaware of the provision

which authorizes up to six "additional airborne unit training

assemblies" (AAUTAs). This provides an additional 48 hours to the

hours available for training capability. The base hours of 396

hours should indicate a minimum of 444 hours. Allowing minimally

for the aspect of Deployments For Training (DFT) and other

intensified training periods, one can conservatively increase the

Inactive Duty Training (IDT) as depicted in the presentation below.

34
 5. Feedback from the Reserve Special Forces Groups indicated
that no inquiries were conducted by ARI. Such an effort would have

clearly surfaced the key driver for RC SFGA training - the

warfighting CINCs assign missions and the force trains to

accomplish those missions. Unconventional Warfare and Foreign

Internal Defense were not tasked to the RC SFGA.

The following presents hours available to hours required,

based on the ARI report:

ARI RC BACKGROUND
PRESENTATION STUDY
Mission Training Time

Unconventional Warfare 249.95 N/A

Direct Action 305.2 305.2
Special Reconnaissance 261.2 42* (w/o dup)

Total hours 816.0 347.2

Mandatory Non-Special Forces

Mission Training
Officer Development 12 *dbl acctg *
Officer/NCO Development* 16 16
Physical Training/APFT 24 24
Wpns Qualification 8 4
CTT Prep & Test 10 8
SQT Prep & Test 10 8
Maintenance(Equip & Veh) 10 10
Inspections/Formations 24 18
Annual Property Inventory 8 4
Processing O'seasRepl(POR) 30 10
Urinalysis Testing 2 2
HLTV (Class & Testing) 4 4
Pre-Mob Briefing 1 1
Mobilization Briefing 1 1
SAEDA & OPSEC Briefings 2 2
Safety Briefings 5 5
Weigh-ins 6 4
Travel To/From AT/Exercise 96 24

Total hours 275 145

**Correc- addition (269)**

35
Training Time Available
Annual Training(AT)
(17 days X 12 hrs/day) 204 204
Inactive Duty Training(IDT)
(24 days X 8hrs/day) 192 n/a
(16 days X 9hrs/day) * n/a 144 *PT hour
(8 days X 12hrs/day) ** n/a 96
**DFT/FTX
Addt'l Abn Unit Training
Assemblies(AAUTA)
(6 days X 8hrs/day) 0 48

Total hours 396 492

THEREFORE:
Training Time Required
Mission 816 347
Non-mission 269 145
TOTAL Training Time
Required 1091 492
TOTAL Training Time
Available 396 492

(SHORTFALL)/BREAKEVEN (695) BREAKEVEN

Warfighting-based Mission Essential Task Lists (METL's) were

not used by ARI in this comparative analysis.

36
 APPENDIX C.
OCONUS OPTEMPO CY87-90

1987
20 SFGA WINTEX/CIMEX (NATO) HQ AFSOUTH
20 SFGA EX SCHWARZES PFERD FRG
1-20 SFGA (ODB+2 ODA) FTX SCHWARZES PFERD FRG
(ODB+3 ODA) FTX TRABUCCO SPAIN
(ODB+4 ODA) ROYAL DUTCH MARINES PUERTO RICO
(ODB+3 ODA) FTX MULFONE ITALY
2-20 SFGA SR/DA ANNUAL TRN UTAH
3-20 SFGA (1 ODA) FTX CHERGUI MOROCCO
(1 ODA) FTX SAHEL TUNISIA
(1 ODA) FTX SCHWARZES PFERD GERMANY
11 SFGA WINTEX (NATO) GERMANY
2-11 SFGA EX FLINTLOCK UK
NORWAY
2-11 SFGA GERMANY
EX BELGIAN SUE BELGIAN
3-11 SFGA (2 ODA) ARMY
EX COLD WINTER NORWAY
3-11 SFGA (2 ODA) EX ANCHOR EXPRESS DENMARK
3-11 SFGA (1 ODA) DOMBAS GUERRILLA COURSE NORWAY

1988
20 SFGA EX DENSE CROP (NATO) HQ AFSOUTH
20 SFGA EX SCHWARZES PFERD GERMANY
1-20 SFGA (2 ODA) FTX MULFONE ITALY
2-20 SFGA (1 ODA) EX SCHWARZES PFERD GERMANY
3-20 SFGA FOB FLINTLOCK ITALY
(3 ODA) EX SCHWARZES PFERD GERMANY
(ODB+2 ODA) FTX TRABUCCO SPAIN
(ODB+2 ODA) FTX MULFONE ITALY
1-11 SFGA (5 ODA) JCRX FLINTLOCK GERMANY
(1 ODA) FTX ALPINE FRIENDSHIP GERMANY
2-11 SFGA WINTER WARFARE FT DRUM, NY
3-11 SFGA WINTER WARFARE NEW HAMPSHIRE

1989
20 SFGA WINTEX (NATO) GERMANY
1-20 SFGA FOB/AOB WINTEX (NATO) ITALY
1-20 SFGA (ODB+3 ODA) FTX MULFONE ITALY
2-20 SFGA (ODB+2 ODA) FTX TRABUCCO SPAIN
3-20 SFGA (2 ODA) FRENCH COMMANDO JCET MARTINIQUE
(2 ODA) GERMAN AIRBORNE GERMANY

37
1-il SFGA FOB WINTEX/CIMEX UK
(ODB+4 ODA) EX MOSKUS NORWAY
(2 ODA) NORWEG-ARMY SKI COURSE NORWAY

1990
20 SFGA SFOB EX DENSE CROP (NATO) HQ AFSOUTH
1-20 SFGA (2 ODA) FTX IRON PALAS TURKEY
2-20 SFGA (ODB+3 ODA) FTX MULFONE ITALY
FOB FLINTLOCK GERMANY
(2 ODA) EX SCHWAREZ FERD GERMANY
1-1i SFGA (ODB+4 ODA) EX MOSKUS NORWAY
(2 ODA) EX SPRING TRN DENMARK
(2 ODA) NORWEG-ARMY SKI COURSE NORWAY
(1 ODA) N.WARFARE TRN CTR ALASKA
2-11 SFGA WINTER WARFARE UTAH
3-11 SFGA WINTER WARFARE CP DAWSON
(ODB+2 ODA) 23 SAS EXCHANGE HEREFORD, UK

38
 APPENDIX D.
COST ANALYSIS

FY91 FY92 FY93

AC SFGA (5)
PAY & ALLOWANCES (MPA)
EM PERSONNEL 4458 4781 5104
COST FACTOR (CF) 27.3 29.1 30.5
$121.7M $134.5M $155.7M
OFF PERSONNEL 923 986** 1049***
CF 63.3 67.2 70.7
$ 58.4M $ 66.3M $ 74.2M
TOTAL MPA $180.1M $200.8M $224.9M
O &M $ 31.3M $ 26.3M $ 27.8M
TOTAL $211.4M $227.1M $252.7M
USAR SFGA (2)
PAY & ALLOWANCES (RPA)
EM PERSONNEL 2136 2136 2136
CF 6 6.4 6.7
$ 12.8M $ 13.7M $ 14.3M
OFF PERSONNEL 449 449 449
CF 14.6 15.3 16
$ 6.6M $ 6.9M $ 7.2M
TOTAL RPA $ 19.4M $ 20.6M $ 21.5M
O &M $ 6.4M $ 5.1M $ 5.1M
TOTAL $ 25.8M $ 25.7M $ 26.6M

39
 APPENDIX E.
PUBLIC LAW AND THE MOBILIZATION SPECTRUM

Public law provides the basis for regulations that govern

reserve component utilization, the how, when, and where these

forces may train and be operationally employed. The primary public

law which governs RC training and operational-use/employment is .0

USC, sections 672 and 673, and 32 USC for aspects relating to the

National Guard, specifically.

INVOLUNTARY ACTIVE DUTY

Public Law 10 USC, 672, "Reserve Components generally"

discusses the basic provisions of involuntary annual active duty

for members of the Selected Reserve, under the authority of the

various service chiefs. This portion of the law provides "Annual

Training" limited to a maximum of 15 days per year, and is the only

provision for "involuntary" active duty use of the Reserve

Component forces short of an Executive activation. The Law insures

that units and individuals of the Selected Reserve receive military

training on an annual basis.

Involuntary duty is required of the RC soldier in a "Inactive
Duty for Training" (IDT) status, generally accomplished on what is

known as the "Drill week-end," comprising multiple "Unit Training

Assemblies" (UTAs). The voluntary member in a Troop Program Unit

(TPU) is required by regulation to attend 48 UTAs per training/

calendar year. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) are also

classified as members of the Selected Reserve. IMAs may also be in

40
"drill" status--usually Category B status--which requires 24 UTAs
per year.

UTAs may be grouped in combinations to accomplish special

aspects of the unit's Yearly Training Plan. Units have used MUTA-

7s (Thursday afternoon through Sunday), for example, to conduct

Deployments-For-Training (DFTs) or "fly-aways," which encompass
Airborne deployments to distant major training locations for
FTX/Specialized Warfare sustainment training.
In summary, "involuntary" use of RC SFGA prior to Executive/
Operational Activation, is limited to a maximum of 15 days per year

and to a total of 48-54 UTAs in an Inactive Duty for Training (IDT)

status.

VOLUNTARY ACTIVE DUTY

Individual reserve component soldiers and units are available
voluntarily for active duty, prior to Executive/Congressional
Activation or Mobilization of the Reserve, for unlimited use of
trained (minimum of 16 weeks basic training) RC volunteers, whose

service is generally limited to 179 days per year. The 179 day
rule is an administrative guide-line in order to adhere to
Congressionally established AC end-strengths. Major commands have

the authority to waiver the 179 day limitation.

Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD) and Active Duty Special

Work (ADSW) are the two primary classifications of duty for RC

volunteers on active duty. TTAD supports the Active Component, in

order to bring Reserve expertise to an AC requirement or issue.
Pay and allowances are provided from the accounting "basket" known

41
as Military Personnel Appropriations (MPA). ADSW supports reserve
work/projects, and is funded with Reserve Personnel Appropriations

(RPA/NGPA).
The major planning consideration is that RC personnel (with

minimum of 16 weeks basic training) are voluntarily available for

operational commitments across the conflict continuum. Public law

places no limitations on the nature of the active duty. As an
example, consider that the former Secretary of the Navy Lehman flew
combat missions from carriers during the Vietnam War while on

Annual Training and other periods of voluntary active duty.

SELECTED RESERVE ACTIVATION (200K CALL-UP)

Ready access of Selected Reserve personnel and units, by-law

limited to 1.2 million personnel, is provided by an expansive and

flexible statute--Title 10 of US Public Law, Section 673, para b.

The law provides for the activation of from one to 200,000

personnel by Executive/Presidential order. Congressional and War
Powers Act provisions do not affect the President's exercising this
law. The intent of the law is to provide the President the
unencumbered use of Selected Reserves for reasonable periods.

Congress strengthened the law in 1986, and again in Nov 90 during

Operation Desert Shield to increase the viable use of combat

forces. The law is not restrictive in nature of operational
employment, and places no limitations based on operational
continuum (Peacetime Engagement). However, based on historical
misuse of the Reserve Component, activation under these provisions

42
is for operational use only, and not for training.

During the Gulf War, Congress increased the utilization period

for combat units from 90 days, with an automatic extension period

of 90 days, to an aggregate availability period of 360 days.

Support units remained available for an initial 90 days, and a 90-

day extension. The law currently is based on 90 days with an

additional 90 day for all units, combat or support. Department of
Defense is working an action to re-establish the 180 days, plus 180
days additional for combat units, and indicates that this will

become law.
The law also allows for tailoring of these forces in support

of the Total Force, by using "derivative UICs," in much the same

manner as the US Air Force has for many years in its proactive use

of RC air assets.

The Selected Reserve is, by-law, a sub-set of the Ready

Reserve. The Selected Reserve comprises those individuals,

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) and personnel in Troop
Program Units (TPUs) who "drill"/train on a regular basis and

receive pay, limited benefits and reserve retirement program

credit. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is comprised of trained

individuals who may be Mobilized as augmentation personnel.

Individuals of the IRR can be involuntarily employed for a maximum

of fifteen days per year. However, they can be voluntarily

assigned to a Selected Reserve TPU/unit prior to the involuntary

activation of the selected reserve unit.

43
 THE 200K FORCE-LIST

"200K Force List" is a somewhat confusing aspect regarding

Selected Reserve activation under the law. DOD/JCS established a

readiness tool referred to as the "200K Force List." The RC units

identified as "200K Units" benefit from a higher priority for

training, funding and equipment. There is one JCS force list

comprising an aggregate 200,000 personnel, identified by the

warfighting CINCs as priority call-up units. Confusion occurs when

the "200K Force List" is viewed as the sole basis for Activation of

the Selected Reserve under 10 USC, 673b. To reiterate, any unit or

number of individuals in the 1.2 million Selected Reserve (up to

200,000) is available for immediate Activation by the President for

any period up to an aggregate of 180 days, and if combat forces,

for up to 360 days.

SOLDIERS AND SAILORS RELIEF ACT

"The Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act(s)," 38 USC,

section 2021-2026, primarily provides employment and property

protection for RC personnel on active duty. The law covers a

federalized RC person for up to four years, and for five years if

the member is at sea over four years. The law is specific that it

does not matter whether that active duty in voluntary or

involuntary-a&ive duty. Although laws protect RC personnel from

the loss of their employment on returning to the civilian work

place, experienced RC personnel know that reality requires

communication and an understanding with one's employer. Federal

44
court may win the battle, but the future would generally not
bode
well for such continued employment. This aspect is very much a
"personal matter" and all experienced RC personnel handle
it with
few illusions. Concern over re-employment should not be used
as a
reason for not utilizing the Reserve Component.

45
 APPENDIX F.
GLOSSARY

AAUTA - Additional Airborne Unit Training Assembly.

AC- Active Component.

ADSW - Active Duty for Special Work. Replaces Special Active Duty
for Training (SADT) as a duty category. Its primary purpose is to
accomplish one-time, short duration projects (up to 179 days) which
are vital to the functioning of the Army Reserve. Any training
received is incidental to the tour.
ADT - Active Duty for Training. This type of active duty is
performed by any Reservist attending a school, counterpart training
or other special training activities.
AGR - Active Guard/Reserve. Army reservists or guardsman on full-
time active duty in support of Reserve Component units and/or
programs. AGR personnel are administered respectively by National
Guard Bureau and Office Chief of Army Reserve.
ARCOM - Army Reserve Command. One of 21 geographic major Army
reserve commands throughout the US (plus one in Germany). Most
(but not all) Army reserve units are subordinate to an ARCOM, which
is commanded by a Reserve major general.

ARPERCEN - Army Reserve Personnel Center in St. Louis, Mo. The

nationwide administrative and personnel management center for the
Army Reserve. It is the headquarters to AGR, IMA and IRR
Reservists.

ARNG - Army National Guard.

ARTEP - Army Training and Evaluation Program.

AT - Annual Training. Active duty performed annually (usually for

two weeks) by Reserve Component units and IMA Reservists. IRR
members may also periods of AT.

CONUSA - CONtinental US Army. The five numbered Army headquarters,

which are subordinate to FORSCOM and command Army Reserve units in
the various geographic regions. CONUSAs are commanded by Regular
Army lieutenant generals.

DFT - Deployment for Training.

FLY-AWAY - A DFT typically commencing on a Thursday or Friday

evening, with night combat equipment parachute "infiltration" jump
into a training area or an exercise.

46
GOCOM - General Officer Command. A unit of the Reserve Component
with a general officer commanding.

IDT - Inactive Duty Training. Defined by AR 140-1. The most

common example of IDT is weekend drill.

IMA - Individual Mobilization Augmentee. A Reservist who is

assigned to an active Army unit or agency with which he or she
would mobilize. IMAs are normally required to conduct their AT,
and if DIMAs (Drilling IMAs) all paid IDT with the assigned unit.

IRR - Individual Ready Reserve. A Reservist who does not belong to

a Reserve unit or hold an IMA assignment. IRR soldiers are not
part of the Selected Reserve, do not normally drill in IDT status,
but may serve tours of ADT. IRR is controlled by ARPERCEN.

MACOM - Major Army Command.

METL - Mission Essential Task List.

MOSQ - Military Occupational Skill Qualification.

MUSARC - Major US Army Reserve Command. The highest level of USAR
unit commanded by a Reserve general officer. All ARCOMs, Divisions
(Training) and any GOCOM with a major general commanding is a
MUSARC.
MUTA - Multiple Unit Training Assembly. Comprising more than one
minimum of a four hour training period for pay. A MUTA-2 comprises
two of these training periods, normally equivalent to a training
day. The MUTA-4 is the most common period, and often referred to
as a "weekend drill."

NGB - National Guard Bureau.

OCAR - Office Chief of Army Reserve.

ODT - Overseas Deployment Training.

PERSCOM - Total Army personnel Command, formerly Total Army

Personnel Agency (TAPA) and Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN).
Agency is the active component counterpart to ARPERCEN, and has
some responsibility for Reserve Component matters.

RC - Reserve Component. Each Service of the military has a regular

component and one or more reserve components. The Army has two, the
US Army Reserve and the Army National Guard of the United States.

SELECTED RESERVE - By law, comprises no more than 1.2 million

personnel of all services. These are the drilling RC personnel
available for immediate activation under provisions of 10 USC,
673b.
47
SFAS - Special Forces Assessment and Selection. Process conducted
at Ft. Bragg evaluating volunteers to determine if qualified
mentally, physically and psychologically for attendance the Special
Forces Qualification Course (SFQC).
SFODA/B - Special Forces Operational Detachment A or B. The basic
Special Forces operating unit is the "A" team of twelve men, with
resident MOSQ specialties.

TAG - The Adjutant General; each State has one and is most often
the appointed head of that State National Guard and in some cases
of the State militia, also.
TTAD - Temporary Tour of Active Duty. Active Duty in support of
Active Component requirements.
TPU - Troop Program Unit. RC units of the Selected Reserve which
normally train 48 MUTA and 14 days of AT, annually. These are
operational units with varying levels of readiness required.
USACAPOC - US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
Command, headquartered at Fort Bragg, NC, and subordinate command
of MACOM USASOC.
USASFC - US Army Special Forces Command, headquartered at Fort
Bragg, NC, and subordinate command of MACOM USASOC.
USASOC - US Army Special Operations Command, headquartered at Fort
Bragg, NC is the Army SOF major command (MACOM).
UTA - Unit Training Assembly.

48
 END NOTES
1. USSOCOM Joint Mission Analysis 1991 figures for Reserve
Component SOF, includes PSYOP at 82%.
2. USSOCOM Joint Mission Analysis, SOJ7-MT, Trip Report to
SOCEUR, UK, Norway, 11 SFGA OCONUS. LTC WJ Morgan, May 1990.

3. Ibid.

4. Christopher S. Straub, The Unit First. Keeping the Promise

of Cohesion, p.59.
5. Colonel William J. Flavin, SF, USA, former Commanding Officer,
1-10 SFGA (Europe), 23 March 1992.
6. Wayne J. Morgan, "Reserve Component Special Forces Background
Study," USSOCOM, July 1991, p. 25.
7. Ibid.
8. NATO CINCNORTH, "Observations from Dombas, Norway," Message
regarding observed performance of 11 SFGA SFODA, 11 April
1991.

9. Maj. Rowland Cooper, "After Action Report Battle Griffin,"

reports on de-brief by British and Norwegain commanding
generals of 11 SFGA performance, 29 March 1991.

10. General Carl Stiner, "Availability of 20 SFGA for Operational

Use," message to CINCs, 9 April 1991.

11. LTC Liebershal, USSOCOM SOJ8, SODP database, 25 January 1991.

12. LtCol R. A. Boeckman, "Mobilization and the Courts: Can We
Have One Without the Other," Marine Corps Gazette, February
1989.
13. US Army, America's Army: Not a Smaller Cold War Army, FY93,
p.56.
14. Office the Chief of Army Reserve, "Army Reserve Special
Report 1991," pp.40-43.
15. U. Army, America's Army, p.56.
16. USSOCOM Joint Mission Analysis, SOJ7-MT, Trip Reports to RC
SFGA 1990 and 1991, LTC WJ Morgan.

49
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53