A-49

Gujarat National Law University

First Intra Moot Court Competition, 2018

In The Honourable Supreme Court of Nord

Civil Appeal No. 299 of 2017 arising out of Special Leave Petition
No. 49 of 2018
Under Article 136 of the Constitution of Nord

In The Matter Of

Lexide Nord……………………………….Petitioner
v.
Mr. Okamoto…………………………….Respondent

Written Submission on behalf of the Petitioner

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ……………………………………………………II

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ……………………………………………………IV
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION …………………………………………....VI
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS ……………………………………………………..VII
5. ISSUES RAISED ………………………………………………………………..IX
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ………………………………………………...X
7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ………………………………………………….XII
7.1. Whether the Petitioner is liable for Negligence as held by the Hon’ble High
Court of Hedgekat?........................................................................................XII
7.1.1. That there was no breach of duty on behalf of the
Petitioner…………………………………………………………...XIII
7.1.2. That the actions of the Respondent were voluntary in
nature………………………………………………………………..XV
7.2. Whether the Petitioner is Strictly Liable for the accident involving the
Respondent?................................................................................................XVII
7.2.1. That the accident was caused solely because of the Respondent’s own
acts………………………………………………………………..XVIII
7.3. Whether the Respondent is liable for Defamation?
………………………………………………………………..XX
7.3.1. That the statement made by the Respondent was defamatory in
nature………………………………………………………...…......XXI
7.3.2. That the statement referred to the Petitioner…...…………….
……......................................................XXII
7.3.3. That the statement was
published…………………………………………………………XXIII
8. PRAYER……………………………………………………………………...XXV

Page |I
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

SA .. .. Smart Assist
& .. .. And
¶ .. .. Paragraph
AC .. .. Appeal Cases
ACJ .. .. Accidents Claims Journal
AIR .. .. All India Report, 1914-
All ER .. .. All England Law Reports, from 1936-
B & Ald .. .. Barnwell & Alderson, 1817-1822
Bing .. .. Bingham’s Reports, 1822-1834
CEO .. .. Chief Executive Officer
Co. .. .. Company
ed. .. .. Edition
ER .. .. Espinasse’s Reports, 1793-1807
Ex Ch .. .. Exchequer Reports, 1847-1856
FCR .. .. Federal Court Reports, 1939-1950
Govt .. .. Government
HC .. .. High Court
HL .. .. House of Lords
Hon’ble .. .. Honourable
ILR .. .. Indian Law Reports
J&K .. .. Jammu & Kashmir
KB .. .. Law Reports, King’s Bench, from 1891-
Ker .. .. Kerala
LIIT .. .. Long Island Interstate Thoroughfare
LR .. .. Law Reports, Old Series, 1866-1875
Ltd .. .. Limited
M&W .. .. Meeson & Welby, 1836-1847. Exch.
NNE .. .. NIX Nord Exchange

QB .. .. Law Reports, Queen’s Bench, from 1891-

R&D .. .. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal
Rep .. .. Report
SC .. .. Supreme Court
SKAP .. .. SK Agro Products Limited
SLP .. .. Special Leave Petition
TC .. .. Indian Law Reports, Travancore-Cochin Series
TFN .. .. Transport for Nord
TLR .. .. Times Law Reports, from 1885-1948
v. .. .. Versus
WLR .. .. Weekly Law Reporter

Page | II
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Books
1. Akshay Sapre, R&D The Law of Torts (27th ed. 2016).
2. Blackstones Commentary of the Laws of England, Vol. 1 (4th ed.).
3. Harper & James, Law of Torts 537 (5th Ed. 1977).
4. Salmond, The Law of Torts (14th ed. 1965).
5. Winfield & Jolowicz, Tort (12th ed. 1984).
Cases
Foreign Cases
1. Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works Co., (1856) 11 Ex Ch 781:156 ER 1047.

Page | III
2. Bolton v. Stone, AC 850, (1951) 1 All ER 1078.
3. Bourhill v. Young, (1943) AC 92.
4. Bruno v. Ritchie (1904) FCR 842.
5. Capital and Countries Bank v. Henty (1887) LR 7 AC 741.
6. De Crespigny v. Weslleley, (1869) 5 Bing 392.
7. Dixon v. Holden, (1869) LR 7 Eq 488.
8. Donogue v. Stevenson, (1932) HL 100.
9. E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, (1910) AC 20 HL.
10. Glasgow Corporation v. Muir, (1943) AC 448.
11. Illot v. Wilkes, (1820) 3 B & Ald 304.
12. Kiddle v. City Business Properties Ltd., (1942) 1 KB 269, 274.
13. Parmitter v. Coupland (1840) 6 M&W 105.
14. Ponting v. Noakes, (1849) 2 QB 281.
15. Rex v. Donovan, 1934 All ER Rep 207.
16. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330.
17. Silikin v. Beaverbrook Newspapers, (1958) 2 All ER 536: (1958) 1 WLR 743.
18. Sim v. Stretali, (1936) 2 AII ER 1237.
19. Sim v. Stretch, (1936) 52 TLR 669, 671.
20. West v. West (1911) 27 TLR.

Indian Cases
1. Gittan Ram v. State of J&K, AIR 2013 SC 83 J&K 83.
2. Govindan Nair v. Achuta Menon, (1915) ILR 39 Mad 433.
3. Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, and another, AIR 2005 SC 3180.
4. Minu B. Mehta v. Balakrishna, AIR 1977 SC 1248.
5. Narayanan Bhattathripad v. Govt of Travancore-Cochin, ILR 1956 TC 639.
6. Padmavati v. Dugganaika, (1975) ACJ 222.
7. Veeran v. Krishnamoorthy, (1966) Ker 172.
Online Sources
1. Supreme Court Cases online EBC
2. www.manupatra.com

Page | IV
Page | V
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Counsel for the Petitioner has approached this Honourable Court under
Article 1361 of the Constitution of Nord to file a Special Leave Petition against the
order of the High Court of Hedgekat.

1
Article 136 of the Constitution of Nord reads as:
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of Nord
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, & sentence or order passed
or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.

Page | VI
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The instant case arises out of an SLP filed by Lexide Nord (Petitioner) under
Article 136 of the Constitution of Nord against the order of the HC of
Hedgekat. The Petitioner claims that neither it was strictly liable for the
accident nor was it liable for negligence. Furthermore, it claims that Mr.
Okamoto (Respondent) was liable for defamation.
2. Lexide Nord is a wholly owned subsidiary of Lexide Mobility Systems S.A.
(hereinafter Lexide), based in the Republic of Nord. Lexide was a pioneer in
semi-autonomous cars incorporated in the city of Pitschi, Republic of
Weisenbuhl. Weisenbuhl and Nord were similar types of economies actively
seeking to limit their dependence on fossil fuels.
3. Lexide EV, a semi-autonomous car, was the pet project of Ms. Eri Hubert, the
founder and present CEO of Lexide. It was a level 2 automated vehicle under
the applicable law, harboring various sensing hardware, and its on-board
automated vehicle control system “Smart Assist”. SA was not automatically
enabled on the Lexide EV, and was required to be manually engaged by the
driver of the car. Apart from this, Lexide had also imposed several safety
constraints on the use of SA and had provided written instructions in the car’s
owner’s manual about the types of roads on which it should and should not be
used. Furthermore, it had launched a new version of SA, i.e. version 8.4, with a
better warning mechanism than its previous version, i.e. version 5.3.
4. Soon after its launch in the Nord market on 9 June 2015, the Lexide EV was an
instant success and was the top selling semi-autonomous car in the years 2015
through 2017. TFN, an independent governmental agency dedicated to
promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline safety, in a report
published in January 2016 found that if only 10 percent of the cars on Nordian
roads were semi-autonomous, 1,000 lives and 18 billion Nord Dollars would be
saved each year. Furthermore, if the percentage of cars increased to 90 percent,
then these numbers would jump to 22,000 lives and 350 billion Nord Dollars.

Page | VII
5. On 20 August 2016, Jig-gie Automotive Components AG, with whom Lexide
Nord had signed an Exclusive Supply Agreement for procurement of the
sensing hardware used in the Lexide EV sent a written notice informing them
about possible issues with a single lot of sensors supplied to Lexide Nord. As a
result of which, Lexide Nord initiated a product recall process in the Nord
market on 12 September 2016, thereby urging the owners of the Lexide EV to
bring their cars to an authorised dealership. Such a voluntary action, in the
absence of a legislation mandating the same was applauded by the Nord media.
6. On 30 August 2015, Mr. Shintaro Okamoto, the managing director of SKAP
and an independent director on the board of the NNE bought a Lexide EV.
Being a driving enthusiast, Mr. Okamoto used to drive his Lexide EV to and
from his office on a daily basis taking the LIIT. On 21 December 2016, at 9:43
AM (Nord Local Time), Mr. Okamoto’s Lexide EV travelling westbound on
LIIT, struck a refrigerated truck-tractor carrying dairy products and went off
the roadside at a shallow angle. Mr. Okamoto was gravely injured in the
accident, however, the commercial truck driver was not.
7. After close inspection, it was found out that neither did Mr. Okamoto update
his Smart Assist to the latest version, nor did he participate in the voluntary
product recall. TFN inspected the major mechanical systems of Mr. Okamoto’s
car and identified no anomalies. On 23 December 2016, Nord News, an
English Daily, published excerpts of the statements given by Mr. Okamoto in
an exclusive interview. As a result of which, on 27 December 2016, the total
stock value of Lexide Nord dipped by 1.5 million Nord Dollars in the NNE.
8. Simultaneously, Lexide Nord filed a civil suit for damages against Mr.
Okamoto in the HC of Hedgekat alleging defamation, followed by a civil suit
against Lexide Nord by Mr. Okamoto alleging strict liability for the accident
and negligence on its part. On 15 July 2017, the High Court found Lexide EV
strictly liable for the accident and for negligence, and found no ground to
uphold the allegations of defamation brought by Lexide Nord against Mr.
Okamoto. Aggrieved by the decision, Lexide Nord preferred a Special Leave to
Appeal in both the suits under Article 136 of the Constitution of Nord before
the SC of Nord.

Page | VIII
 ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the Petitioner is liable for Negligence as held by the Hon’ble

High Court of Hedgekat?
2. Whether the Petitioner is Strictly Liable for the accident involving the
Respondent?
3. Whether the Respondent is liable for Defamation?

Page | IX
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. Whether the Petitioner is liable for Negligence as held by the Hon’ble

High Court of Hedgekat?
The petitioner argues upon the very fact that it was negligent while
performing its duties, as a result of which the accident was caused. However,
as far as the facts go, it is clear that the petitioner had upheld its duties
diligently. It had taken all the necessary steps, which were enough to deal
with any foreseeable malfunction in the car. The safety constraints of the SA;
the written instructions provided in the car’s owner’s manual; and the
voluntary product re-call process of 12 September 2016, were proof that the
petitioner was diligent on its part as far as the safety of the car was concerned.
These facts points towards the very fact that there was no negligence on the
petitioner’s part. It had done whatever it could have, and whatever a
reasonable man could have done to avoid foreseeable injuries. As a result of
which, the necessary ingredient of “breach of duty” is absent, thereby making
the respondent’s claim false. Furthermore, the respondent himself is
responsible for the accident, as the actions of the respondent were negligent
and the facts of this case are proof that they were voluntary in nature.
2. Whether the Petitioner is Strictly Liable for the accident involving the
Respondent?
It is the petitioner’s submission that it was not strictly liable for the accident.
It had taken all necessary measures that were required to be taken, against the
possibilities of a foreseeable injury. The respondent on the other hand, was
negligent enough to ignore all sorts of safety measures, which were taken up
by the petitioner. By not participating in the voluntary product re-call, the
respondent proved that it was negligent in its actions, furthermore, Lexide EV
being a level 2 automated car was used negligently, and not according to the
applicable law. Hence, it can be concluded that the respondent’s negligent
acts were the sole reason for the accident.

Page | X
3. Whether the Respondent is liable for Defamation?
The respondent through his statements has brought down the image of the
petitioner in the eyes of the public at large. It has damaged the petitioner’s
reputation and has caused material damage to its interests. The stock market
figures materialises the same. The respondent being a person of such stature,
should have exercised reasonable care while making such stringent
arguments, but unfortunately, he ended up making false claims, all of which
got published in the front page of Nord News, an English daily with a
substantial reader base. Thus, all the necessary elements of defamation were
present in this very case, and hence, the respondent is liable.

Page | XI
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. Whether the Petitioner is liable for negligence as held by the Hon’ble High
Court of Hedgekat?
1. The counsel humbly submits to this Hon’ble Court that the petitioner is not
liable for negligence as held by the Hon’ble HC of Hedgekat, as it
contends that an essential ingredient for constituting negligence was absent
in the claim.
2. The jurisprudential concept of negligence defies any precise definition. 2
Eminent jurists and leading judgments it is said have assigned various
meanings to negligence. In Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, the SC
observed:3
“Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or doing
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Actionable
negligence consists in the neglect of the use of ordinary care or skill
towards a person to whom the defendant owes the duty of observing
ordinary care and skill, by which neglect the plaintiff has suffered injury to
his person or property”.
The definition involves three constituents of negligence:
(a) A legal duty to exercise due care on part of the party complained of
towards the party complaining the former’s conduct within the scope of the
duty;
(b) Breach of the said duty; and
(c) Consequential damage. In an action for negligence, the affected party
has to prove these constituents, as absence of any one of the given
constituents renders the claim defenseless. In this very case, there was no
breach of duty on behalf of the petitioner.

2
Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab and another, AIR 2005 SC 3180.
3
Ibid.

Page | XII
 i. That there was no breach of duty on behalf of the Petitioner.
3. Breach of duty means non-observance of due care which is required in a
particular situation.4 It is therefore important to mention that the petitioner
took all the necessary precautions needed to avoid any sort of malfunction
which in turn could have caused the accident. The safety constraints of its
on-board automated vehicle control system SA; the written instructions
provided in the car’s owner’s manual; and the voluntary product re-call
process of 12 September 2016,5 were proof that the petitioner was diligent
on its part as far as the safety of the car was concerned.
4. The duty of care which a party owes, depends on the reasonable
foreseeability of the injury so caused.6 If at the time of the act or omission,
the party could reasonably foresee the injury, he owes a duty to prevent
that injury and failure to do that makes him liable.7 Duty to take care is the
duty to avoid doing or omitting to do anything, the doing or omitting to do
which may have as its reasonable and probable consequence injury to
others, and the duty is owed to those to whom injury may reasonably and
probably be anticipated if the duty is not observed. 8 To decide culpability,
it has to be determined what a reasonable man would have foreseen and
thus form an idea of how he would have behaved under the circumstances.9
5. To explain the standard of foresight of the reasonable man, Lord
Macmillan observed, in Glasgow Corporation v. Muir:10
“The standard of foresight of a reasonable man is, in one sense, an
impersonal test. It eliminates the personal equation and is independent of
the idiosyncrasies of the particular person whose conduct is in question.
Some persons are by nature unduly timorous and imagine every path beset
with lions. Others, of more robust temperament, fail to foresee or
nonchalantly disregard even the most obvious dangers. The reasonable

4
Akshay Sapre, R&D The Law of Torts 480 (27th ed. 2016).
5
Facts on Record, ¶ 20.
6
Donogue v. Stevenson, (1932) HL 100.
7
Ibid.
8
Bourhill v. Young, (1943) AC 92.
9
Veeran v. Krishnamoorthy, (1966) Ker 172.
10
(1943) AC 448.

Page | XIII
 man is presumed to be free both from over apprehension and from
overconfidence, but there is a sense in which the standard of care of the
reasonable man involves in its application a subjective element. It is still
left to the judge to decide what, in the circumstances of the particular
case, the reasonable man would have had in contemplation, and what,
accordingly, the party sought to be made liable ought to have foreseen.
Here, there is room for diversity of views…..What to one Judge may seem
far-fetched may seem to another both natural and probable”.
According to this doctrine, the petitioner was liable for all those
possibilities which a reasonable man can foresee, whereas in this case, it
had taken all the necessary measures required to be taken.
6. In Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works Co.,11 it was held that “the
defendants had provided against such frosts as experience would have led
man, acting prudently, to provide against; and they were not guilty of
negligence, because their precautions proved insufficient against the effect
of extreme severity of the frost of 1855, which penetrated to a greater
depth than any which ordinarily occurs south of the polar regions.” As in
this case, the petitioner had taken all necessary precautions, and it was not
possible for them any other precautionary step to avoid such an accident.
7. Again, in Bolton v. Stone,12 it was held that “What a man must not do, and
what I think a careful man tries not to do, is to create a risk which is
substantial.” In this case, the respondent clearly took a risk which was
substantial in nature and was not a risk which the petitioner could have
reasonably foresee. The precautionary steps taken by the petitioner had
covered all the foreseeable injuries, and it couldn’t have covered such an
accident.
The counsel for the petitioner further states that the petitioner had taken all
possible measures, against all foreseeable injuries and had not breached
any duty on its part. Furthermore, Lexide EV was a level 2 semi-
autonomous car, and the petitioner had mentioned instructions which were
material to the use of the car. In every way possible, the petitioner had

11
(1856) 11 Ex Ch 781: 156 ER 1047.
12
AC 850, (1951) 1 All ER 1078.

Page | XIV
 exercised due care and tried its best to avoid any sort of danger pertaining
to the automation of the car.
ii. That the actions of the Respondent were voluntary in nature.
8. When a person consents to the infliction of some harm upon himself, he
has no remedy for that in tort.13 In case, the plaintiff voluntarily agrees to
suffer some harm, he is not allowed to complain for that and his consent
serves as a good defence against him. No man can enforce a right which he
14
has voluntarily waived or abandoned. This common law doctrine which
states that if someone willingly places themselves in a position where harm
might result, the party so placed cannot claim damages or compensation.
9. The petitioner had initiated a product re-call in the Nord market on 12
September 2016 stating the possibility of a malfunction in one of the lots
of its sensors. So, the petitioner took a reasonable step to avoid any sort of
potential damage which could have been caused. Regardless of this very
fact, the respondent was negligent enough to ignore the product re-call.
This shows that the respondent was negligent and that he acted upon the
risk known to him, thus signifying his consent to the risk involved, making
his actions voluntary.
10. The petitioner had also updated the version of its on-board automated
vehicle control system SA from the previous version, i.e. version 5.3, to
the latest, i.e. version 8.4, in an attempt to enhance the warning
mechanism. It was a step which was taken, keeping in mind about the
various possibilities of negligence which drivers tend to show while using
SA. The respondent had been negligent enough to ignore this notification
and not comply with the aforesaid instructions, thereby signifying his
consent to the risk involved. This point further validates the fact that his
actions were voluntary.
11. In Illot v. Wilkes,15 the principle of volenti non fit injuria was applicable. It
was held that the trespasser, who knew about the presence of spring guns
on a land, could not recover damages when he was shot by a spring gun.

13
Rex v. Donovan, 1934 All ER Rep 207.
14
Salmond, The Law of Torts 47 (14th ed. 1965).
15
(1820) 3 B & Ald 304.

Page | XV
 As stated earlier, the respondent showed negligence by not updating his
car’s SA, furthermore, he refused to take part in the company’s voluntary
product re-call. These facts validate the aforesaid principle substantially.
12. Similarly, in Padmavati v. Dugganaika, 16 the principle of volenti non fit
injuria was applicable. It was held that neither the driver nor his master
could be made liable, firstly because it was a case of sheer accident and,
secondly, the strangers had voluntarily go into the jeep. With respect to the
case at hand, the respondent had voluntarily taken the risk which led to the
accident as explained in paragraphs 9 and 10 earlier.
Hence, it is well established before this Hon’ble Court that the petitioner
had taken reasonable care and that there was no breach of duty on its part.
Furthermore, there is a clear case of volenti non fit injuria involved as
validated in the aforesaid arguments.

16
(1975) ACJ 222.

Page | XVI
 II. Whether the Petitioner is Strictly Liable for the accident involving the
Respondent?
13. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the petitioner is not
strictly liable for the accident involving the Respondent, as it was the
negligent acts of the Respondent that led to the accident.
14. There are certain situations when an individual may be liable even when
there has been no negligence on his/her part. The undertakers of the
activities have to compensate for the damage caused irrespective of any
carelessness on their part.17 In this connection, a certain rule was laid down
in the decision of the House of Lords in Rylands v. Fletcher, 18 known as
the “Rule of Strict Liability”. The basis of liability was laid down by
BLACKBURN, J. in these words: “The rule of law is that the person who,
for his own purpose, brings on his land and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and
if he does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is
the natural consequence of its escape”.19
15. The distinguishing element between liability arising out of negligence and
strict liability was stated in Gittan Ram v. State of J&K. 20 The J&K HC
said that the concept of negligence comprehended that the foreseeable
harm could be avoided by taking requisite precautions. 21 Thus, the concept
of negligence is wholly irrelevant in the case of Strict Liability, whereby
the operator of the activity is held liable irrespective of its having taken
precautions to avoid harm.
16. The three essentials for the application of the Rule of Strict Liability are as
follows:
(a) The person should bring some sort of dangerous thing on his/her land;
(b) The thing thus brought on the land should escape; and
(c) The use of the land should be non-natural.

17
Supra note 4 at 488.
18
(1868) LR 3 HL 330.
19
Ibid.
20
AIR 2013 SC 83 J&K 83.
21
Ibid.

Page | XVII
 17. But, the judgement of BLACKBURN, J., approved by the House of Lords
in Ryland v. Fletcher itself recognised that the liability is not absolute
being subject to certain exceptions. BLACKBURN, J. made it a part of the
rule that “he (the defendant) can excuse himself by showing that the
escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default; or perhaps that the escape was
the consequence of vis major; or the act of God”.22 In the light of that
passage, a person is not liable if the damage is owing to the following
causes:23
(a) Act of God (vis major);
(b) Wrongful act of a third party; and
(c) Plaintiff’s own default.
In this very case, the Respondent being negligent, was solely responsible
for the accident and hence the third defense, i.e. Plaintiff’s own default is
being applied.
i. That the accident was caused solely because of the Respondent’s own acts.
18. Damage suffered by the plaintiff on account of his own intrusion into the
defendant’s property, cannot be complained against for the damage so
caused. In Ponting v. Noakes,24 the plaintiff’s horse intruded into the
defendant’s land and died after having nibbled the leaves of a poisonous
tree there. The defendant was held not liable because damage would not
have occurred but for the horse’s own intrusion to the defendant’s land.
19. Here in this case, the petitioner had initiated a product re-call on 12
September 2016 on the basis of a written notice sent by Jig-gie, informing
them about the fact that there was a remote possibility of malfunction with
a particular lot of sensors. Such a voluntary product re-call was lauded by
the Nord media. Similarly, the petitioner had also updated the existing
version of SA, i.e. version 5.3, to the latest version 8.4. All these measures
substantiate the very fact that the petitioner had carried out due diligence
while performing its part of the trade. The respondent, on the other hand
was negligent enough to ignore both, the voluntary product re-call and the

22
Rylands, supra note 14.
23
Narayanan Bhattathripad v. Govt of Travancore-Cochin, ILR 1956 TC 639.
24
(1849) 2 QB 281.

Page | XVIII
 update notification. This shows the amount of negligence in his own acts,
thereby proving the fact that he was at fault.
20. Furthermore, Lexide EV was classified as a level 2 automated vehicle
under the applicable law. In a level 2 automated vehicle, it is the driver’s
responsibility to monitor the automation, maintain situation awareness of
traffic conditions, understand the limitations of the automation, and be
available to intervene and take over the car at any time. 25 The respondent
didn’t comply with any of the given instructions, thereby ignoring the
applicable law as well. This again substantiates the very fact that the
respondent was at fault.
21. In Minu B. Mehta v. Balakrishna,26 The SC had held that the liability of the
owner or the insurer of the vehicle could not arise unless there was
negligence on the part of the owner or the driver of the vehicle, in case of a
road accident. Similarly, in the present case, the petitioner is not liable as
there was clearly no negligence on its part as far as the safety measures of
the Lexide EV was concerned.
22. In Kiddle v. City Business Properties Ltd., 27 it was held that the reason for
the escape is immaterial as long as the exercise of reasonable care would
not have prevented it. Applying the same principle to the case at hand, we
can clearly conclude that there was reasonable care taken by the petitioner
in every way possible, and in no way can it be held liable for negligence.
Hence, it is established before this Hon’ble Court that the petitioner is not
strictly liable for the accident which was caused. Furthermore, it has been
proved that the Respondent’s own negligent acts were the sole reason for
the accident so caused.

25
Facts on Record, ¶ 5.
26
AIR 1977 SC 1248.
27
(1942) 1 KB 269, 274.

Page | XIX
 III. Whether the Respondent is liable for Defamation?
23. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that respondent is liable
for defamation. It is clear from the facts of this case that the statements of
the respondent is defamatory in nature and has brought loss to the
petitioner.
24. Every man has a right to have his reputation preserved inviolate. This right
of reputation is acknowledged as an inherent personal right of every person
28
as part of the right of personal security. It is a jus in rem, a right good
against the entire world. A man’s reputation is his property, more valuable
than other property.29 No mere poetic fancy suggested the truth that a good
name is rather to be chosen than great riches. Indeed, if we reflect on the
degree of suffering occasioned by loss of character, and compare it with
that occasioned by loss of property, the amount of the former injury far
exceeds that of the latter.30
25. A defamatory statement is a statement calculated to expose a person to
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to injure him in his trade, business,
profession, calling or office, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided in
society.31
26. For a statement to qualify as defamatory, the three essentials of defamation
should be present. These essentials are as follows:
(a) The statement referred to, must be defamatory in nature;
(b) The said statement must refer to the aggrieved party; and
(c) The statement must be published.
All these are essentials for defamation. Presence of all these elements
qualifies the statement in contention as defamatory. In this present case, all
such elements are present and hence, this was a clear case of defamation.

28
Blackstones Commentary of the Laws of England, Vol. 1 101 (4th ed.).
29
Dixon v. Holden, (1869) LR 7 Eq 488.
30
De Crespigny v. Weslleley, (1869) 5 Bing 392.
31
Parmitter v. Coupland (1840) 6 M&W 105.

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 i. That the statement made by the Respondent was defamatory in nature.
27. A statement tends to be defamatory if it injures the reputation of the
plaintiff. Defamation is the publication of a statement which tends to lower
a person in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally, 32
or which tends to make them shun or avoid that person.33
28. In the present case, the respondent had made certain statements which were
defamatory in nature. In an exclusive interview with Mr. Okamoto, Nord
News (an English daily), published excerpts of the statements given by Mr.
Okamoto, and read as follows:34
“Corporations and their founders have, in the urge to revolutionize human
interaction with technology, often been negligent while placing the cart
before the horse. Companies like Lexide are a classic example of how
customers have been reduced to being nothing less than guinea pigs for ill-
planned, and often life threatening, backyard corporate experiments”. This
statement made by the respondent was defamatory in nature, as it affected
the petitioner’s goodwill in a substantial manner.
29. It has been held in Sim v. Stretali,35 -
“The test of a defamatory nature of a statement is its tendency to excite
against the plaintiff the adverse opinions or feeling of other persons. The
typical form of defamation is an attack upon the moral character of the
plaintiff attributing to him any form of disgraceful conduct.”
The statements were defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning as it
excited adverse opinion or feelings of other persons against the petitioner
which was evident by the fact that the total stock value of Lexide Nord
dipped by 1.5 million Nord Dollars in the NNE. This contention can also
be validated by stating the very fact that market experts attributed the said
fall to the Respondent’s sharp comments. The statement is defamatory if it
conveys a defamatory meaning about the plaintiff to reasonable men

32
Sim v. Stretch, (1936) 52 TLR 669, 671.
33
Winfield & Jolowicz, Tort 293 (12th ed. 1984).
34
Facts on Record, ¶ 30.
35
(1936) 2 AII ER 1237.

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 placed on the position of those to whom it was published. 36 The standard of
understanding is that of the ordinary, reasonable man.37
30. The right of a person during his lifetime to the unimpaired possession of
his reputation and good name is recognized by law. 38 This right of the
petitioner was violated. And as a result of which, the petitioner had to go
through a lot of ridicule.
In light of the statements made above, it is humbly submitted before this
Hon’ble Court that the petitioner has suffered tremendously on account of
which its image was lowered in the eyes of public because of the
defamatory statements made by the respondent.
ii. That the statement referred to the Petitioner.
31. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the statements used
by the respondent clearly referred to the petitioner which is evident from
the fact that the respondent had used the name of the petitioner. Hence, all
the statements were directed towards the petitioner.
32. Every man whether he is in public life or not, is entitled not to have lies
told about him and by that is meant that one is not entitled to make
misstatement of facts about a person which are untrue and which redound
to his discredit. That is to say it tends to lower him in the estimation of
right-thinking men.39 Which was evident in this case, as it was the
respondent, who by stating words like “negligent”, “ill-planned” and “life-
threatening” clearly damaged the petitioner’s image in front of the public
at large. All such contentions made by the respondent were baseless, as it
is clear that neither was the petitioner negligent, nor was its experiments
ill-planned and life-threatening.
33. The respondent regardless of his intentions is still liable for defamation.
As in E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, 40 CHANNEL, J. in his direction to the Jury
laid down the law as follows:

36
Capital and Countries Bank v. Henty (1887) LR 7 AC 741.
37
West v. West (1911) 27 TLR.
38
Bruno v. Ritchie (1904) FCR 842.
39
Silikin v. Beaverbrook Newspapers, (1958) 2 All ER 536: (1958) 1 WLR 743.
40
(1910) AC 20 HL.

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 “The real point upon which your verdict must turn is, ought or ought not
sensible and reasonable people reading this article to think that it was a
mere imaginary person. If you think any reasonable person would think
that, it is not actionable at all. If, on the other hand, you do not think that,
but think that people would suppose it to mean some real person – those
who did not know the plaintiff of course would not know who the real
person was, but those who did know of the existence of the plaintiff, would
think that it was the plaintiff – then the action is maintainable”.
34. The excerpts of the statements made by the respondent were published on
the front page of Nord News. It clearly mentioned the name of the
petitioner along with the facts which were false and could not be validated
upon.
The counsel for the petitioner therefore submits before this Hon’ble Court
that the statement made by the respondent referred to the petitioner and this
caused injury to its name and reputation.
iii. That the statement was published.
35. A man’s reputation is the estimate in which others hold him, not the good
opinion which he entertains about himself. The attack on his reputation
will therefore follow when the words calculated to harm his reputation are
communicated to some third party, i.e. to some person other than the
person defamed, and in law this communication of defamatory words to a
third party is termed publication. Publication is the making known the
defamatory matter after it has been written to some person other than the
person of whom it is written”.41
36. As already mentioned and evident by the facts, the mode used by the
respondent for defaming the petitioner was Nord News, a reputed English
daily. The statements made by the respondent were further published on
the front page of its print edition on Friday, 23 December 2016. Nord
News, being one of the most reputable English dailies in the region had a
substantial reader base. Therefore, it can be held as a “reputable” or
“serious” publication.

41
Silikin, supra note 35.

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 37. It comes under the scope of libel. The publication of the defamatory
statement by the respondent was a disparagement in respect of the
petitioner’s professional and official reputation. It was not made to a
confined group of people but through larger media. The respondent had
called the business reputation of the petitioner into question by his
statements.
38. To publish a defamatory statement or matter is to make it know to any
other person than the one defamed; 42 even a private communication to a
single person would suffice.43 Thereby, while giving the interview to Nord
News, even though it was privately communicated to a single entity, it was
defamation. Hence, in every way possible it could be held that it was
defamation.
Hence, it is well-established before this Hon’ble Court that the acts and
conducts of the respondent are defamatory, false and concocted. The above
mentioned acts have caused serious damage to the image, reputation and
goodwill of the petitioner before the whole society which is its asset.

42
Harper & James, Law of Torts 537 (5th Ed. 1977).
43
Govindan Nair v. Achuta Menon, ILR (1915) 39 Mad 433.

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 PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, cases cited, issues raised, arguments
advanced and authorities cited, it is most humbly prayed and implored before
this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Nord, that it may be graciously pleased to
adjudge and declare that:
1. The petitioner is not liable for negligence as held earlier by the Hon’ble High
Court of Hedgekat.
2. The petitioner is not strictly liable for the accident so caused.
3. The respondent is liable for defamation and should pay damages for the
injuries sustained by the Petitioner.

And pass any such order, or direction as the Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper,
for this the Petitioner shall duty bound pray.

All of which is Respectfully Submitted

---------------------------------
---------------------------------
Counsel on behalf of Lexide Mobility Systems (Nord) Pte. Ltd.

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