What is the strategic studies

Strategic studies can be defined with the use of military as an instrument of state policy.
According to Carl von Clausewitz (1976), he defined strategic studies as “the use of engagement
for the purpose of war”. A further development of this notion of strategic comes from Colin Gray
(1999) when he defined strategy as “the bridge that relates military power to political purpose”.
He describes that Strategic is the application of military power to achieve political objectives or
more specifically, ‘the theory and practice of the use, and threat of use, of organized force for
political purpose’.

Instead, according John Baylis and J. J. Wirtz (2007), strategic studies helped to channel
superpower competition from absolute war to more benign forms of competition, toward
‘peaceful coexistence’, to borrow an old soviet phrase, “strategic studies developed theories,
policies and operations that reduced the risk of war”.

According to Ken Booth and Eric Herring (1994), strategic studies is about
“understanding and explaining the military dimension of International relations.” It is because
strategic studies are a subfield of international relations and concern with the great issues of
peace and war. Booth has classified Strategic Studies into three stages, arising from the birth of
nuclear weapons. The first stage of Strategic Studies, according to Booth, began in early 1950s, with
few theoretical achievements worth noting since it was the time of infancy for the concept formation.
Then the second stage came, between 1956 and 1985. It was a “Golden Age” of Strategic Studies, as
he titled, during this period, Strategic Studies had been introduced into universities with academic
and practical significances to policy making, and the theories related to nuclear deterrence became
core values of Strategic Studies. With multi-dimensional ideas involved, such as politics, economics,
psychology, history, diplomacy, and technology pouring into the discipline, most scholars took it for
granted that Strategic Studies played a central role in the study of International Relations. The third
stage appeared in the late 1980s as the Cold War drew to an end. The final stage of Strategic Studies
actually faced some severe criticisms from different schools of thoughts due to the change of global
security concerns and possible signs of paradigm shifting occurred. For some, the sign might indicate
a weak theory tendency that seemed unable to explain the world appropriately. During this period,
not much progress in theoretical improvement to speak of in the Strategic Studies to justify its state-
centric academic stand in the international society. That is to say, the core values that Strategic
Studies once cherished and built for in the Cold War Era were called into serious questions. A call by
many for paradigm shifts echoed in strategic community in an attempt to map out new direction and
defend for its legitimate validity.

As strategic studies seeks to be a practical subject of use to the practitioner, the seeming
failure of limited war theory in indo-china forced many to question its continuing utility.
Similarly, the difficulties faced in Iraq may well sour contemporary perceptions of strategy.
Richard Betts in David was convincing when he states that university faculties should decide
what to cover on the basis of long term evidence of what mattered in world politics rather than
recent events, intellectual fads or moral hopes (David 2008 ;18). Strategic studies enable us
conceptually make this jump from the battle space and appreciated the true value of military
action. The need of strategic studies was at its most intense in response to the complexity of
strategy. As David Jablonsky (2008) in David stated that a true scientific product is not possible
from the study of strategy. The development of modern strategic studies can be attributed to one
man to one invention. Bernard Brodie is the man and his invention was about nuclear weapon. 1
Brodie later called for the reintegration of politics and history into the subject.

David Jablonsky (2006) in his writing title ‘why is strategy difficult?’ stated several
reason why there were so hard to understand the strategy. First he argued about the relationship
between war and policy is difficult and awkward. Second he stated that strategy is multi-
mentioned (including such dimensions as society, culture, economic and logistics, strategic
theory and doctrine and command and time) and success requires a level of competence to be
achieves in them all. Third was success requiring harmony of actions among the level of
strategy. Fourth, strategy is conducted against an intelligent foe. The enemy will attempt to offset
one’s advantages. Fifth, the nature of war is violence, competitive, complex and constant. This
must be respected but put pressure on the commander and his forces, especially in relation to
modern norm and social values. Sixth, the friction prevents war from achieving its maximum
operation efficiency. Seventh, war is a human activity imbued with non-rational and emotional
forces. Lastly, war has a polymorphous character. It can take many forms each of which requires
a subtly difference approach. Often a particular war will exhibit a mixture of different forms
operating simultaneously.

1.
David Lonsdale (2008) strategy p; 18
 Strategic Hierarchy Primary Primary Primary Primary
Primary Focus Participants Policies Input Output
National Strategy National Objectives Chief of State; National National National
Governmental Policy Power Policy Plan
Adviser
National Security National Chief of State; National Suitable National
Strategy Security Security Adviser Security Policy National Power Security Plan
Objectives
National Military National Chief of State; National Military Power National Military
Strategy Military Objectives Military Adviser Military Plan
Policy
Regional Strategy Regional Objectives Foreign Minister; Foreign Policy Diplomacy: International
Ambassadors Economic Norms
Assistance
Theatre Strategy Area Subordinate Joint or Uni- Joint or Joint or Uni-
Military Military service Policies Uni-service service
Missions Commanders Forces Plans & Ops
(Sources: Collins, 2002)

What is Security studies

Security had being studies and fought over for as long as there have been human
societies. According to Rothchild (1995), security has meant very different things to people
depending on their time and place in human history. Security studies were a sub-field of
academic international relation (IR). Although it was given different labels in different places,
national security studies was preferred in the USA while strategic studies was a common epithet
2
in the UK, there was general agreement that IR was the sub-field’s rightful disciplinary home.
Traditionally security studies reflected an implicit and conservative concern to preserve the
status quo inasmuch as the great powers and the majority of academics who worked within them
understood security policies as preventing radical and revolutionary change within international
society.

According to Lasswell (1939), he define security as unavoidably political, that was

played a vital role in deciding who gets what, when and how in the world political. Security
studies can thus never be solely intellectual pursuits because it is stimulated in large part y the
impulse to achieve security for ‘real people in real place’ (Booth 2007; 1) A key development
within the academic mainstream of security studies occurred in 1983 within the publication of
Barry Buzan’s book people, states and fear. Buzan argued persuasively that security was not just

2.
Paul D. Williams (2008). Security studies: An Introduction p; 3
about states but related to all human collectives. Buzan also develop the framework in which he
argued that the security of human collective (not just state) was affected by factors in five major
sectors. The five sectors were military, political, economic, societal and environment.3

Security studies were the subfield of most multidisciplinary research concerns the
relationship of security, culture, image and identity. 4 On term of security studies, the sub-
discipline one of the significant features of contemporary debate is the split between two forms
of theorizing that contained in the realism/ liberalism and constructivism triangle and the other
based in various forms of critical engagement. They are reproduced in two different mainstreams
that seem to have few points of contact in the contemporary research debate.

Security studies at the core are concerned with the level of reality about there is no
epistemological argument. The collapse of security leads to real violence against real people. To
act brutality that lie without any discussion of relativism.

Difference between Strategic Studies and Security

Strategic studies are defined by some dictionary as “research field with procedures
through which actors utilize their military assets to achieve given political objective.”(Evan;
1998).

On the other hand, the penguin dictionary of international relations (Evans, Newnham
1998), security studies is defined as a “sub-branch of international relations dealing with
explanation of security concepts, their implementation when developing foreign policy and their
consequential effect on structures and processes in world politics”. It describes security studies
as a field of study, during the cold war aimed mainly at issues related to military security. It also
observes that security and strategic studies mutually be related in the cold war times. The
relatively substantial overlapping of strategic studies and security during the cold war was
caused mainly by a relatively limited scope of security studies. In his outstanding study from the
beginning of the 90s of the 20 th century, Stephen Walt in Williams (2008) sees the key target of
security studies in the phenomenon of war. He has further defined security studies as “study of
threat, employment and control of military power”. This overlapping led to occasional

3.
P. D. Williams (2008) security study: an introduction p:4
4.
Stuart Croff (2008) security study p;504
confusions of these research branches. Some authors often mixed up both terms regarding them
as equivalent with their application defined on geographical bases. (Buzan, 1998). Beside that in
USA, strategic studies and security considerably limited due to an excessive focusing on
technical aspects. In this context, the importance of strategic studies and security was certainly
questioned after the cold war end.
According to Joseph S. Nye and Sean M.Lynn-Jones report in International Security
Studies conference on the state of the field (1988), stated that the important of security analysis
were economy, sociological and psychology dimension of treats. Security therefore was
identified as a part of international security study but they believed that strategic studies defined
as the choices between alternative strategies for the state excluded some more basic theoretical
questions about the causes of war or the relationship between international economy and
international security.

But security studies had their own weaknesses.5 First there has been little central
theoretical innovation since 1960. The author argued that tendency to the international security
studies with strategic studies unduly the narrows the scope of filed and cut it off from its
political, economic and historical context. Second argument the work burden so much where it
was reflects a pre-occupation with current policy fads. Third argument was about the thought
that state of the field was making it difficult for it to get established in some university
department. Fourth the agreement that ethnocentrism continues to degrade the field. And finally
the believe that the fields suffered from the severe shortage of good empirical data.

Optimists have declared that the end of the century was ushering in a new era of peace
and cooperation based on liberal democracy, transnational capitalism and international
organizations. The more pessimistic offer warnings of an anarchic future filled with inter-
civilization or ethnic conflict and weapon proliferation. 6 Economic and environment security
have often taken center stage although numerous other voice from human rights to gender and
culture. This can be frames in term of the tension between strategic studies and security studies. 7
Another argument that the shift from strategic to security studies ought to expend the categories
and area of analysis considerably beyond their

5.
P. D.Williams (2008). Security studies: An Introduction
6.
K.Krause & M.C. Williams (1997). Critical Security Study p:33
7.
K.Krause & M.C. Williams (1997). Critical Security Study p:33
traditional purview with strategic studies retaining its more narrow purpose and scope while
being embedded within the broader ambit of security study. 8 A basic challenge that expended
conceptions of security must confront is the charge that they are not about security at all.

The distinctions of strategic studies are relevant in principle, because they illustrate why
strategic studies should be the most important part of the subfield broader in scope than strictly
military problems, but more focused than security studies, which is potentially boundless. In
practice, the distinctions solve few problems because the dividing lines between strategic studies
and the other two layers can never be clear. Only security studies have academic standing, so the
place of strategic studies emerges through debates about defining security.

Most scholars of security identify it with strategic studies, but much of what they do
9
strikes some in other subfields as too close to military science for comfort. Critics argue for
reorienting the security subfield to so many other issues that the military core may become a pea
lost in an amorphous ball of wax. The intellectual coherence of strategic studies increases with
linkage to the military core, but institutional status and legitimacy grow with distance from it. 10

Strategic Studies and Security Studies, the intellectual and institutional status of strategy is
confused by persistent lack of consensus on how much attention military aspects of security
should get and where lines should be drawn between narrow military science, integrative
strategic studies, and all-encompassing security studies. In "Strategy as a Science" Brodie noted
that military strategy was subordinate to the larger problem of how to increase one s advantage
without unduly jeopardizing the maintenance of peace or the pursuit of other values. 11 This
broader enterprise, which might be called "security policy," can be construed to cover the total
preparation for war as well as the waging of it. It would thus deal. . . with political, social, and
economic as well as military matters in both domestic and foreign contexts. 12 His later frustration
with economists' approach to strategy was their inattention to factors he lumped with "security"
in 1949. Nowadays it is fair to distinguish strategic and security studies in order to recognize that
security includes things besides military concerns, as long as no doubt is left that security policy
requires careful attention to war and strategy.

8.
K.Krause & M.C. Williams (1997). From strategy to security p: 35
9,10.
Richard K. Betts (2009) Should Strategic Studies Survive?
11.
Bernard Brodie (1949). Strategy as a science. World politic
12.
Bernard Brodie (1949). Strategy as a science. World politic
 Security studies today embraces many related topics such as diplomacy, policy
formation, social and economic mobilization, scientific innovation, arms control, and terrorism.
Some, however, regard even this breadth as inadequate. Arguments that security studies should
consider problems ranging from economic performance to environmental damage are quite fair.
They do not help to organize the field of international relations, however, because they do not
delimit a subfield. A subfield must be broad enough to encompass a significant range of
problems, but narrow enough to be a coherent area of inquiry, distinguishable from other
subfields and the parent field.

Recognition of this boundary problem led Baldwin to suggest that security studies be
abolished as a subfield and "reintegrated" into international relations .13 First, Baldwin argues, no
other subfield but security is "defined in terms of techniques of statecraft." Even if this is true,
the difference is less significant than the similarities. International Politic Economy is as much or
as little about economic phenomena as security studies are about military phenomena. Both trade
and war involve conflict and cooperation, negotiation, and ultimate media of exchange and
settlement. Both combat and commerce are modes of interaction in which purposes, constraints,
instruments, and procedural dynamics produce outcomes and overlap with other realms of
interaction. Second, Baldwin suggests, "the rationale for subfields is to ensure that important
subtopics are not neglected," and security topics are established at the core of the parent field of
international relations where realism is the dominant paradigm. Specialization, however, is at
least as much for deepening knowledge on important subjects as for guarding against neglect.

Moreover, it has been twenty years since one could worry that IPE might be neglected,
and realism has been on the defensive again since the cold war ended. Considering that
international relations has more or less broken down into two main subfields, it hardly seems
necessary to drop to one. If anything, more subfields should be strengthened (for example,
environmental studies, which covers subjects ultimately as important as the regnant subfields and
is more neglected than either security or International Politic Economy). Clarity and claims
might best be served by renaming the security subfield "IPM" (International Politico-Military
Studies). This would con firm the focus on strategic integration of ends and means, highlight the
parallel to IPE, and circumvent the dispute over "security" that mixes legitimate claims with
objectionable attacks on strategic studies. The deal would concede the

13.
Baldwin (1997). "The Concept of Security," Review of International Studies 23.
case for identifying the scope of security with international relations in general, in exchange for
recognition of an "IPM" subfield of strategic studies on a par with any other. Practically,
however, there is no constituency on either side for such re-categorization, so strategy's academic
status will continue to be set through arguments about security studies.

As consensus on standards remains elusive, students of strategy regularly encounter

criticisms of the field s quality, occasionally in print but most often in professional badinage.
One objection is that mainstream strategic work is theoretically weak or has not advanced since
the deterrence theory of the early cold war.

Debates on war causation and civil-military relations have filtered into other subfields via
levels of analysis and bureaucratic politics arguments, and security studies adapted cognitive
theory and organization theory before International Politic Economy (IPE) did. Even if it were
true that theoretical innovation in strategic studies has been less paradigm-shattering than in
other fields, this would not ipso facto demonstrate weakness rather than strength. Critics would
have to demonstrate that more recent and numerous theories in other fields are better theories
more useful for understanding the world than the fewer and older ones of strategy. Theories may
endure because they prove durable, or may change constantly because each new one proves
wanting. One Clausewitz is still worth a busload of most other theorists.

Otherwise, it is no more reasonable than it would be to denigrate political economy for

attention to specific commodities, financial instruments, or trade agreements. These other
approaches thrive and compete effectively in universities with mainstream strategic studies as
practiced in Brodie s tradition.

American strategic research is mainly about how to avoid war. Most work in strategic
studies is profoundly conservative, in the literal sense, because it is concerned with stability, a
value that privileges peace and over revisionism. In this respect, liberals interested in arms
control have been the most conservative. Few academic works promote schemes for using force
to change the status quo. Rather, they focus on deterrence or defense, to discourage the resort to
violence to effect political change. Focusing intend on how to manipulate the threat of deadly
force, for whatever benign purpose, strikes some as fatalistic, selling short the search for
cooperative strategies. Realist assumptions about group conflict that underlie most strategic
studies require no more and no less validation than those of optimists who believe in the
obsolescence of war. Debate over these assumptions lies at the heart of political theory and has
been recycled and unresolved for centuries. It would be foolhardy to bet that social science can
resolve it and arrogant for either side to deny an academic place to the other.

Political science

International Relation

Security Studies

Strategic Studies
Military Studies

(Source: Sources: Baylis, J., Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction To Strategic Studies)

Should strategic studies replace by security studies?

From my point of view, strategic studies should not replace by security studies because
strategic itself have their own reasons to stay on in the sub- field of academic arena. Strategic
Studies remains as relevant today as ever before. The problems of strategy ultimately are about
matching instruments of state power with the ends of policy. The specific security problems states
face necessarily change with the milieu, but the fundamental of strategy remains constant what
changes are the specific recommendations and methodologies adopted by states to answer these
security problems and challenges. Strategic Studies needs to recognize these changes in its operating
milieu, and to adapt to these changes accordingly. Strategy has always been about finding the right
prescription to the specific problems at hand. In this respect, the study of strategy ought to bear this

in mind as it faces the 21 st Century. The problems that current policy-makers faces are necessarily
different from those their predecessors in previous times faced. Necessarily, the strategic
prescriptions that these policy-makers will make ought to differ as well. The fundamental principles,
however are unchanging.

Richard Betts (1997) published a journal titled “Should Strategic Studies

Survive?”，which had caused a lot of controversies over the issue of paradigm shift or change in
the academic community of Strategic Studies. In the year of 2000 Betts put his another notable
paper on International Security with the topic “Is Strategy an Illusion?”, in which he responded
critics by arguing that Strategic Studies are still valid and relevant to global politics today, even
though there are some apparent flaws in world interpretation. Following his argument, a lot of
strategic analysts and scholars carried out some self-verified reflections on similar topics in
exploring the difficulties that Strategic Studies have been bearing upon in the post Cold War
international politics. They have notably worked hard to map out future direction for the
Strategic Studies. There is no denying the fact that the problems of ethnic conflict, global
warming, and nuclear proliferation have become major global issues in the Post Cold War era.
These questions stay centers of international attention. This seems to suggest that states, once
had been seen as a center for the study of international affairs, have yielded the way to issues
related to the global concerns, such as international terrorism, ethnic conflict, environmental
protection, and piracy. Critics contended that some serious misunderstandings and unawareness
by Strategic analysts over the realities of shifting focus in the world political structure did occur.
Thus the aim of this study starts with a background study of strategy and examines the
definitions of strategy so as to understand the core ideas of Strategic Studies; then follows by
viewpoints and allegations from critics.
Strategic studies still relevant nowadays and also future because several reasons. First, as
we can see every year, all the countries over the world spend a lot of money to development of
their military assets, buy weapons and also develop their regiment. An example, For FY 2011,
the President Obama requested $548.9 billion for the Department of Defense Base Budget. This
was $15 billion more than the $533.7 billion Department of Defense Base Budget request for FY
2010. Total defense spending requested for FY 2011 was $895 billion. This was more than the
total defense budget request of $855 billion for FY2010, and the total budget request for Security
and the War on Terror request of $782 billion in FY 2009. (Source: OMB) 14 The budget
included $159 billion in contingency funds to support initiatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It
also expanded benefits for 9 million retired military personnel and Veterans with disabilities. It
allowed for improved care for wounded service members, especially mental health needs. The
budget reviewed acquisitions and defense technology development to eliminate waste by 17%

through 2011. It ended or reduced several programs, including the C-17 aircraft, the Joint Strike
Fighter Alternate Engine program, the Third Generation Infrared Surveillance program, and the

14.
Office of Management and Budget http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
Net-Enabled Command Capability program. It supported a reconfigured ballistic missile defense
strategy.15

Top Ten Military Spending Countries

Country In Billion Dollars
United States 335.7
Japan 46.7
United Kingdom 36
France 33.6
China 31.1
Germany 27.7
Saudi Arabia 21.6
Italy 21.1
Iran 17.5
South Korea 13.5

(source : http://www.mapsofworld.com/world-top-ten/world-top-ten-military-spending-countries-map.html)

Second, the events of 11 September 2001 changed everything, not least of which was the
administration’s outlook concerning strategic influence. Faced with direct evidence that many
people around the world actively hated the United States, Bush began taking action to more
effectively explain U.S. policy overseas. Initially the White House and Department of Defense
(DoD) turned to the Rendon Group, a private public relations firm that was already under
contract to burnish the U.S. image overseas.16 Rendon focused on the immediate 24-hours news
cycle as a means to shape opinions, rather than a long-term ideological change. Rendon helped
create Coalition Information Centers (CIC) in Washington, London and Islamabad. Personnel in
these offices prepared daily press releases and responses to any enemy propaganda in the news,
conducted polling and held focus groups, and coordinated the appearances of U.S. officials on
key Arabic television programs to occur at strategic, highly watched moments. Over time,
Rendon’s work was supplanted by other organizations.

Third are the issues like international anti-terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, arms
control, and the study of armed force are all policy relevant.17 In fact, much Strategic Studies
activities nowadays have been about the peaceful settlement of disputes and generally supportive
of the work of the United Nations. In this regard, the future of Strategic Studies in terms of
academic institutions will be tested, according to Freedman, in a number of respects. First, as
long as strategists work for offering advice to official decision making. Second, strategy should

15.
Department of Defense Budget
16,17
. S. L. Gough (2003). The Evolution of Strategic Influence
be view as an art and not a science. Third, strategists still remain relevant only if they have kept
in touch with the range of possible situation that might tend to extremes (Freedman, 2002). For
example, when the War on Terrorism started in the fall of 2001, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
established the Information Operations Task Force (IOTF), at the direction of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Myers. Originally, the CJCS intended the IOTF to be
an interagency group that would direct information and influence operations and act as the single
point of contact for the U.S. Government; its original title was “Information Operations Resource
Center (IORC).”18 But no other agencies or departments would participate in the IORC. No other
agency wanted to put their people under a Department of Defend (DoD) brigadier general. When
the IORC didn’t become an interagency group, JCS established the IOTF. It was given space, but
few other resources. Deputy Director for Information Operations (DDIO) stripped almost two-
thirds of its own people, including all of the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Division, away
from their normal duties to fill the IOTF..
Fourth, the criticism and responses from both against and for do shape the subject’s
focus, boundaries, philosophy and agenda for a better picture of Strategic Studies in the future.
Some attempts have been made to re-conceptualize the field of Strategic Studies with a greater
philosophical as well as methodological self-consciousness. Security Studies will certainly not
replace the Strategic Studies as the new agenda in international relations as long as a state-centric
approach still plays the key role in modern world politics. Apart from above-mentioned
evolvement of the discipline, the conviction that civilian strategists have critical contributions to
make the strategic policy beyond military patterns will create a market for professionally trained
civilian strategists to fill in. From the very beginning it was clear that the policy issues rather
than intellectual curiosity led the growth of the Strategic Studies community. Universities are
certainly not hostile to policy-oriented research.

Fifth, Military professionals and their major tasks stress on the effective employment of
military force to achieve military targets. Clausewitz and his book are considered the typical
paradigm for these military specialists. Some cases, the civilian cannot facing the that needs
specialized like special force to conduct some task so in this problem only people who had
trained in a military can faced like to saved the hostage.

18.
S. L. Gough (2003). The Evolution of Strategic Influence
 Lastly, Colin S Gray and Ken Booth focus their works on explaining links between force
and policy goal. Although military force may not necessarily stand at the center of strategy
implementation, it still plays a vital role for policy making. For example when president Obama
tried to be mediator in the conflict of Israel and Palestine to peaceful settlement, the government
of United Stated still used the strategic plan to make sure the president save and to show the
ways of settlement even the planned. Other example Early in August 2002, Bush announced the
creation of the Office of Global Communications (OGC) to help manage and shape the U.S.
image abroad. Five months later Bush signed Executive Order 13283, officially establishing
OGC within the White House Office. Bush assigned OGC the mission to advise the President on
the most effective means “to ensure consistency in messages that will promote the interests of
the United States abroad, prevent misunderstanding, build support for and among coalition
partners of the United States, and inform international audiences.” This advice was to be given
only for overt information activities.19

19.
George W. Bush, “Establishing the Office of Global Communications,” Executive Order
13283
Conclusion

Strategic Studies is policy relevant and a theory of action, it still can be intellectual aid to

official performance. As possible military confrontation in Korean Peninsula and disintegration of

Chechnya has become more prevalent, more attention has been focused in the problem of cross-

national conflict. As the conflicts have occurred since the end of the Cold War, which testify,

however, the role of force remains a significant feature of international politics. Strategy continues to

be the major role in the study of international relations and in spite of the prevalence and the rise of

intra-state violence enhanced the role of non-state actors in the world politics, strategic analysts

continue to argue that even with all current critics and challenges to the modern state, it still remains

a major player in world arena and Strategic Studies, with no doubt, is still relevant to the world

today.
Bibliography

Beaufre, Andre. (1965). An Introduction to Strategy. London: Faber & Faber.

C. S.Gray (1982) Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience. Kentucky: The
University Press of Kentucky
D.Jordan & etl (2008). Understanding Modern Warfare. United Kingdom : Cambridge
University Press
D. Jablonsky (2006). ‘why is strategy difficult?’ retrieved on January 27, 2011 at
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army.../strategy2004/06jablonsky.pdf 

E. A. Kolodziej (2005) Security and International Relations. United Kingdom: Cambridge

University Press
G. Bush. “Review of U.S. Government International Broadcasting Activities.” National
Security Review. Washington, D.C.: The White House Retrieved On February 28, 2011, at
http:www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13289.htm
G.“Bush. United States Government International Broadcasting.” National Security
Directive 51. Washington, D.C.: The White House Retrieved On February 28, 2011, at
http:www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13249.htm
G.Bush. “Establishing the Office of Global Communications.” Executive Order 13283
Retrieved On February 28, 2011, at http:www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13283.htm

G. Kassimeris & J. Buckley (2010). The Ashgate Research Companion to Modern Warfare.
England : Ashgate Publishing Limited
H.Bull (1968). “Strategic Studies and its Critics.” World Politics

J.Baylis, J. J. Writz, E. Cohen, Colin S. Gray, eds. (2007). Strategy in the Contemporary World:
An Introduction to Strategic Studies. New York: Oxford University Press
K.Booth & E. Herring (1994). Keyguide to Information Sources in Strategic Studies. London :
Mansell Publishing
K. Krause & M.C Willims (1997). Critical Security Study. Minneapolis : University of
Minnesota Press
P. D. Williams (2008). Security Studies an Introduction. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis
Group

R. K. Betts (2009). Should Strategic Studies Survive?. The Johns Hopkins University Press
National Security Council. Responsibilities and Principles Governing the Conduct of the
Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare. National Security Council
Memorandum. Washington, D.C.: National Security Council,
World top ten Military Spending budget. Retrieved on January 27, 2011 at
http://www.mapsofworld.com/world-top-ten/world-top-ten-military-spending-countries-
map.html
Office of Management and Budget. Retrieved on January 27, 2011 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/

LTC S. L. Gough (2003). The Evolution of Strategic Influence. U.S. Army War College
Carlisle barracks, Pennsylvania