Mid-Term Exam

By

Bradley A. Martin

Introduction to Security Studies

SEC-6302

Dr. Robert Nalbandov

February 13, 2012

Angelo State University

Answers to Posted Questions #3 and #4

1
  Which schools of thought - Realism, Liberalism or Constructivism – shall prevail in
the state policies of coping with terrorism?

The “War on Terrorism” has caused the United States of America and other countries to re-

evaluate their positions on international relations with failed, failing, and rogue nations. The

question has been asked, which school of thought shall prevail in the state policies of coping

with terrorism? This essay will answer the question without offering a prescriptive nature of

what should be done or what actions countries should take, but will answer the question of which

school of thought shall prevail. Sometimes these points can be complementary and other times

contradictory. The essay will begin with a brief overview of the schools of thought, followed by

a brief synopsis of current interactions coping with terrorism, and finally a prediction of what

school of thought will prevail in the future.

The first school of thought in international relations is the realist perspective. According to

Morgenthau, “the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape

of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.” 1 It is this power

relationship or expressions of power that define realism. According to Nalbandov, “power in

realism occupies the central place for projecting the country’s influence abroad by the statesmen.

There are various Instruments of Power (IOPs) used to foster state’s interests on the international

arena: The four instruments are Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME).” 2

Realism is pessimistic about human nature and seeks to define international relations through

1
H.J. Morgenthau. 'Six Principles of Political Realism' in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (eds.) 2009. International
Politics. Pearson Education Ltd., p. 8.

2
Robert Nalbandov ,“Instructional Narrative Three”, SEC 6302, Spring 2012, Angelo State University
http://ramport.angelo.edu

2
eternal truths not idealism.3 Several individuals throughout history have been identified as

“realist” including Niccolo Machiavelli and Henry Kissinger. Realism can be boiled down to a

few assumptions with the most important being the nature of man, according to Legro and

Moravcsik, “the first and least controversial assumption of realism concerns the nature of basic

social actors. Realism assumes the existence of a set of “conflict groups,” each organized as a

unitary political actor that rationally pursues distinctive goals within an anarchic setting.” 4

Realists tend to be defined by the utilization or advocacy of “hard power” or military force.

Ultimately, realists tend to view international relations as balancing power arrangements between

nation states.

The second school of thought in international relations is liberalism. Liberalism tends to put

more focus on factors outside of nation states, according to Nalbandov, “power continues to play

a major role in Liberalism, but, unlike realism, it is "soft" focusing on such issues as economic

sanctions, political and diplomatic pressure on a systemic level, protection of human rights,

environmental and energy security. Liberalism puts a strong emphasis on many types of

freedoms: individual, collective, economic, and market freedoms (laissez-faire).”5 It is these

transnational groups such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the

United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other groups rather

than states that can have a tremendous impact on international relations. According to Nye and

Keohane, “[liberalism] treats the reciprocal effects between transnational relations and the

3
Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1987, pp 1-15 in “Realism, Liberalism, and the War Powers Resolution”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 102:3 (1989),
p. 639.
4
Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still A Realist?”, International Security, Vol 24:2 (1999),
p. 12
5
Robert Nalbandov ,“Instructional Narrative Three”, SEC 6302, Spring 2012, Angelo State University
http://ramport.angelo.edu

3
interstate system as centrally important to the understanding of contemporary world politics.”6

Based upon this information, liberalism is often identified as having a positive view of human

nature and is identified with idealism.

The third school of international relations is the constructivism school. Constructivism

argues, “There is no objectively existing reality. It is constructed and shaped according to our

preferences, which, unlike in realism, are not set in stone. Preferences, as constructivists claim,

are fluid, subjective and themselves dependent on the primary drive in interpersonal and inter-

state affairs: identity. It is personal and political identity that regulates the existing world order

and helps maintain peace through alliances and security regimes.”7 In this theory, according to

Wendt, “conceptions of self and interest tend to “mirror” the practices of significant others over

time. This principle of identity-formation is captured by the symbolic interactionist notion of the

“looking-glass self,” which asserts that the self is reflection of an actor’s socialization.”8

Constructivism sees politics without hard rules, but sees nation states as diverse, flexible, and

unpredictable, therefore making it difficult to plan or prepare for future contingencies.

The current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has been identified with the realist tradition.

According to Klarevas, “in such a setting, non-state actors are discounted, unilateralism is

favored over multilateralism, military force is a privileged means to an end, and international law

6
J.S. Nye and Keohane, R.O. 1971. Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction, in International
Organization , 25 (3), Transnational Relations and World Politics, p. 331.

7
Robert Nalbandov ,“Instructional Narrative Three”, SEC 6302, Spring 2012, Angelo State University
http://ramport.angelo.edu

8
Wendt. A. 1992. Anarchy Is What States Make of It, in International Organization, 46(2), 404.

4
and human rights are expendable in the final analysis because morality is never universal.”9

However, other scholars disagree, according to David Laheny, “we should not be surprised that

scholars of international politics have largely avoided terrorism as a topic; by its nature,

terrorism has fit poorly with the emphasis in international relations on interstate conflict.”10

Realism predominately seeks to tie terrorism to state sponsors of terrorism and seeks to repudiate

the rise of transnational groups by acknowledging transnational groups will not rise above

traditional nation states. Unfortunately, the realist emphasis on nation-states ignores the power

of transnational groups and focused predominately on nation-states.

Dr. David Kilcullen the Australian anthropologist and counter-insurgency expert has noted

four primary models for the current wars involving terrorism and insurgency. The models are

complementary and not contradictory. According to Dr. Kilcullen the four models or reason are

1) backlash against globalization, 2) global insurgency, 3) civil war within Islam and 4)

asymmetric warfare.11 Based upon these various models, Dr. Kilcullen concludes the United

States approach to counter terrorism is failing. In his opinion, the weapons of war (military

power) are not winning against terrorism. In this strategy, Kilcullen proposes a comprehensive

or multi-faceted approach to counter-terrorism. This approach would include building security

capacity within host nations, providing training to other militaries and security forces, and

enhancing diplomatic and economic means. What Kilcullen proposes is less focus on military

power or hard power as proposed by realists and more focus on “soft power” as proposed by

liberal international relations scholars such as Joseph Nye. In particular the soft power approach

9
Louis Klarevas, “Political Realism: A Culprit for the 9/11 Attacks”, Harvard International Review, Vol. 26:3
(2004), p. 19
10
David Leheny, “Symbols, Strategies, and Choices for International Relations Scholarship After 9/11”,
International Organization, Spring 2002, p. 61
11
David Kilcullen, “The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One”, Pritzker Military
Library, http://www.pritzkermilitarylibrary.org/Home/David-Kilcullen.aspx

5
would include a focus on economic, psychological, and diplomatic means. For example, Dr.

Kilcullen discussed the popular notion of winning the “hearts and minds” of the people affected

by insurgency. Conventional wisdom suggests militaries must do everything they can to win the

support of the people. As Dr. Kilcullen has noted, General Sir Gerald Templer who coined the

phrase hearts and minds was actually referring to was counter-insurgency has a psychological

and emotional component and that is more important than a purely military component.12 In this

“total war”, nations must build capabilities in information warfare, media campaigns,

reconstruction aid, humanitarian aid, post-conflict reconstruction, and building the rule of law

and human rights.

So what theory shall prevail in the future? Realism has a reliance on nation-states as actors

and would downplay what today would be called “globalization”. Constructivism is an

intriguing idea of self and self identification which may play apart in terrorist group psychology,

however, it offers few prescriptions and fails to allow for the predictability of future events.

According to Tim Dunne, “No liberal theorist believes there is a duty to include authoritarian

enemies – be they states or terrorist networks – in the pacific union: they do not share ‘our

values’ and their states are illegitimate because they lack the consent of the governed. Yet,

beyond the exclusion of non-democracies, there is no agreement on how liberal states should

engage with those whom Kant called ‘unjust enemies’.”13 While there is no agreement on how

liberal states should engage with “unjust enemies”, there is agreement on what Americans

believe, in the words of conservative pundit Robert Kaplan, “Americans have never accepted the

principles of Europe’s old order, never embraced the Machiavellian perspective. The United

12
Ibid
13
Tim Dunne, “Liberalism, International Terrorism, and Democratic Wars”, International Relations, Vol. 23:1
(2009), p. 109

6
States is a liberal, progressive society through and through, and to the extent that Americans

believe in power, they believe it must be a means of advancing the principles of a liberal

civilization and a liberal world order.”14 Additionally the return of liberal theory has been noted

by other scholars, “as empirical theory it focuses on major dimensions of change in

contemporary international relations which, when taken together, point to the likelihood that

fundamental systemic change is underway. It is increasingly plausible to conclude that the

balance of power system of the past few centuries, and the decisive role therein of hegemonic

war, are being superseded.”15

As recent conflicts have demonstrated, war is a complex endeavor. Neo-conservatives in

many instances thought military power alone would provide the United States with the ability to

overthrow Iraq and sustain a peaceful Iraqi democracy. Neo-conservative foreign policy which

is idealistic in its view, thought primarily United States leadership and military power would lead

to victory. In some ways, the Iraq War can also be seen as a realist war, according to

Lieberfield, “the realist perspective implies that so long as the U.S. aspires to hegemonic status

and understands its own security to depend on demonstrations of overwhelming military

strength, it will be compelled to respond to any actual or potential attack on itself or its

allies as if its vital national security interests were threatened. The U.S. is less constrained than it

was in the Cold war, when the superpowers had a mutual interest in avoiding direct

confrontation, and has increasingly adopted a policy of preventive war.”16 It appears the United

States learned its lesson in Iraq, most likely an idealistic realist approach that spreads United

14
Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe See the World Differently,”
Policy Review, No. 113 (June/July 2002), pp. 3–28 in Michael C. Desch, “America’s Liberal Illiberalism: The
Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy, International Security, 32:3 (Winter 2007/2008), 18
15
James L. Richardson, “Critical Liberalism in International Relations”, Working Paper 2002/7, Australian National
University, Canberra, Australia. Accessed from http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ir/pubs/work_papers/02-7.pdf
16
Daniel Lieberfield, “Theories of Conflict and the Iraq War”, International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 10:2
(2005), 5

7
States hegemony by the point of a barrel will not continue. President Obama has made efforts to

build American multi-lateral partnership, specifically in Asia.

In conclusion, the theory that shall prevail in the future with regards to terrorism is

liberalism. The United States military originally sought to win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

with overwhelming military force through an idealistic neo-conservative and somewhat realist

foreign policy, after fighting in a quagmire for years, the United States military shifted strategy.

In both cases, overwhelming military force did not lead to victory, but required significant

changes in the scope, tactics, and strategy of war. In both cases, a “surge” of additional military

forces was made to ensure tactical security for each country. Additionally, more resources were

allocated to diplomatic and economic channels. Presently, the focus in Afghanistan has been to

focus on the training of additional security forces and to allow the Afghan government and

security forces to take the lead in fighting the war. While realism is an intriguing theory, it

places little focus on transnational groups and focuses solely on nation states. Given the rise of

globalization, multi-national companies, international terrorist groups, narco-terror groups, and

international organizations such as OPEC and NATO, realism’s lack of focus on transnational

groups is misguided. Constructivism is correct in its application that countries responses in

international relations are flexible, however, it is not very prescriptive of what countries can do.

The world faces a decision regarding how to combat terrorism, either through balancing power

relationships which realists endorse or through using culture, diplomacy, security training, and

democracy, a complete concept suggested by liberalism in international relations theory.

8
9
 Are the works of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz still applicable in a contemporary warfare?

Military historians, students, scholars, and practicing military professionals have asked the

question for generations as to whether military classics and military strategy of the past should

be studied and whether it can apply to modern warfare. After the Gulf War and the Fall of the

Soviet Union, several military scholars developed the idea that a new generation of warfare has

emerged that removes the applicability of military classics such as Sun Tzu’s The Art of War or

Carl von Clausewitz’s On War. Ultimately the conclusion of this paper, is that the tactics,

equipment, and methods of warfare may change, but the very nature of warfare does not, war

remains a political animal. The works of Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, and many other

strategists remain viable even in today’s modern and contemporary battlespace.

Several military historians, experts, and retired military officers now believe the United

States has entered into what Colonel T. X. Hammes has called Fourth Generation Warfare

(4GW) which is characterized as an “evolved form of insurgency.”17 Military historian Martin

Van Crevald has described this new kind of warfare as losing its political motivations and “being

driven by a mixture of religious fanaticism, culture, ethnicity, or technology.”18 Dr. Steven

Metz, a noted critic of Clausewitz has stated, “thus the core of Clausewitz’s philosophy of war-

that states wage wars using armies in pursuit of political objectives-will disappear.”19 These

“fourth generation” theorists see a reduction of armed conflict between nation states and the rise

of transnational groups as a characteristic for future conflict. Unfortunately, these theorists fail

17
Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2004, p. 2
18
Martin Van Creveld,, The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since
Clausewitz. New York: Free Press, 1991, p. 2
19
Steven Metz, “A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st Century Warfare,” Parameters, vol. 24, no. 4
(Winter 1994–95), p130 in Echevarria II, Antulio. “War, Politics, and RMA-The Legacy of Clausewitz” Joint
Forces Quarterly Winter 1995-1996: 76-80. Accessed January 24, 2012. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/
1810.pdf

10
to see the political nature of the armed conflicts for which these groups engage. These groups

fight for some political or social purpose. Carl von Clausewitz and his writings are normally

summarized by his most famous and most often quoted line, “war is a mere continuation of

policy by other means”.20 Perhaps Clausewitz most important strategic thought is that of the fog

or friction of war, “Lastly, the great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because

all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not

unfrequently—like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions

and an unnatural appearance. What this feeble light leaves indistinct to the sight, talent must

discover, or must be left to chance. It is therefore again talent, or the favor of fortune, on which

reliance must be placed, for want of objective knowledge.”21 The fog or fiction of war can best

be described as uncertainty or surprise. No matter how well planned or war-gamed, surprise

events often occur during warfare. Often it is the group that best adapts or responds to the

surprise event that takes the initiative and wins the war. War is often chaotic and random.

Today conflict by groups such as Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other armed groups are

fought with political, economic, or social motives in mind. In the eyes of the Fourth Generation

theorists, since these groups do not have access to normal political means, they engage in

asymmetric or unconventional warfare. Again, this is a continuation of policy by other means,

the means available to the armed groups. For example, Al Qaeda does not have access to a

nuclear powered aircraft carrier with squadrons of planes such as the United States Navy. IF Al

Qaeda had access to such military hardware, they would use it. However, what Al Qaeda does

have is dedicated members and mass recruitments via internet sites. In either case, if Al Qaeda
20
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translation by J.J. Graham (1873), Book 1.28,
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm
21
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translation by J.J. Graham (1873), Book 2.22,
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm

11
had conventional arms or when it uses irregular warfare, it is engaging in a continuation of

policy by other means. Al Qaeda lacks the ability to engage in conventional warfare, so it

engages in the methods and means it has easy access to undertake. Fourth generation warfare

theorists make the claim that irrational warfare, not the orderly “rational” nation state warfare of

the 18th and 19th centuries is going to characterize war moving into the future. However, even in

cases of irrational behavior, it appears groups fight with planned motives and strategies.

According to Fleming, “even when war stems from irrational impulses, it does not follow that it

will be fought irrationally-as the role of Al-Qa’eda and the Taliban in contemporary wars in Iraq

and Afghanistan indicate.”22 Attacks on innocent civilians conducted by Al Qaeda might stun

American soldiers, but the fighters have goals to conduct information warfare, recruitment

videos, and to engage in psychological warfare.

Sun Tzu, the Chinese General and strategist most famous for his work The Art of War which

is a collection of military wisdom and military strategy is often seen by some as an archaic

thinker. Many theorists and military planners believe his methods and material are out of date.

However, a brief review of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War leads to a difference conclusion. Within

Section III, Sun Tzu states, “In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's

country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture

an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to

destroy them.”23 Sun Tzu provided additional guidance when taking a country, “Therefore the

skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without

laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.”24
22
Colin M. Fleming, “New or Old Wars? Debating a Clausewitzian Future.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 32:2
(2009), p. 225-226
23
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translation by Lionel Giles (1910), Section III,
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17405/17405-h/17405-h.htm
24
Ibid

12
The modern equivalent would be to use all the means of national power including economic,

political, military, and diplomatic. These are often termed instruments of power and abbreviated

as Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME).25

In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgent groups utilized many concepts from Art of

War, in particular the following passage seems indicative of insurgent methods “hence, when

able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are

near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him

believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. If he is

secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. If your

opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow

arrogant. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack

him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.”26 Sun Tzu’s tactics are still

used by militaries and transnational groups today, according to Bartley, “terrorists use Sun Tzu’s

basic battlefield strategies to harass and fatigue their larger, more cumbersome enemy, the

United States.”27 In the case of Sun Tzu it is widely believed that North Vietnamese General Vo

Nguyen Giap, North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, and Chinese revolutionary Mao Zedong,

were influenced by the writings of Sun Tzu.28 Readers of Sun Tzu will see how he highlights the

important values of flexibility and adaptability in battle. According to Colonel McCready, “in

the coming decades, with the United States remaining the world’s dominant military force,

employing Sun Tzu’s strategic lessons will be more important than ever. The United States
25
Robert Nalbandov ,“Instructional Narrative Three”, SEC 6302, Spring 2012, Angelo State University
http://ramport.angelo.edu
26
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translation by Lionel Giles (1910), 1.19-24,
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17405/17405-h/17405-h.htm
27
Caleb M. Bartley, “The Art of Terrorism: What Sun Tzu Can Teach Us About Terrorism”, Comparative Strategy,
24(2005), p. 237
28
Douglas M. McCready, “Learning from Sun Tzu”, Military Review, May-June 2003, 85-88

13
might not incorporate all of Sun Tzu’s lessons into its offensive strategy, but it will face

opponents who use these lessons, or similar lessons, against the United States. Opponents

recognize that direct confrontation with the United States can only result in their defeat.”29

The United States military has shown a limited ability to adapt to growing threats or as

Colonel John Nagl has noted, our enemies are not constrained by bureaucracy and acquisition

programs, they are very adaptive. Our enemies often have product improvement cycles of weeks

and find it easier to get inside the United States OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, and

Act).30 Ultimately, if you seek to understand an enemy, it makes sense to follow the statements of

the enemy, to learn enemy motivations, understand the theories and strategies behind the

enemy’s intent, and to understand the enemy’s strategies and tactics. Historians Eliot Cohen and

John Gooch note in their seminal work Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War

three types of organizational failure that lead to military defeats, they include failure to

anticipate, failure to learn, and failure to adapt.31 It appears several militaries throughout history

could have learned valuable lessons, and possibly prevented defeat by understanding their enemy

and the ways its enemy conducted war. For example, in the United States war in Vietnam, the

United States military engaged in search and destroy missions and fought a war of attrition under

General William Westmoreland. Under General Creighton Abrams, the mission switched to a

traditional counter guerilla campaign and the United States military had tactical success.32 The

ultimate result of the war might have been the same, but the course would have been remarkably

different. Similar things can be said for the invasion of Iraq. According to Dr. Williamson

29
Douglas M. McCready, “Learning from Sun Tzu”, Military Review, May-June 2003, 88
30
John A. Nagl, “Learning to East Soup with A Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam ”,
Pritzker Military Library, http://www.pritzkermilitarylibrary.org/Home/john-nagl.aspx
31
Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York: Free Press, 2005.
32
Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam,
Orlando: Harcourt Books (1999).

14
Murray, the United States military did not learn the lessons of the importance of post conflict

occupation public safety from the invasion of Panama and failed to apply them to Iraq.33

Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are both important strategic theorists who provided the

beginnings of what today is called strategic thought. Planners and leaders must take a holistic

approach to war. They must understand their enemy’s completely. Not just military hardware,

military numbers, or capabilities but culturally, economically, and politically. The United States,

as have many nations have been caught “behind the eight ball” in some situations. The United

States must learn that a failure to understand the fundamental basics of strategy and theory will

lead to failure.

In conclusion, the nature of warfare does not change. Several classics of military strategy

remain just as important today as they did throughout history. Various methods and technologies

used to wage war will continue to be part of vigorous debate. However, in the words of Colin

Gray, “Some confused theorists would have us believe that war can change its nature. Let us

stamp on such nonsense immediately. War is organized violence threatened or waged for

political purposes. That is its nature. If the behavior under scrutiny is other than just defined, it

is not war.”34 Ultimately, if our enemies are studying the great classics and theories of military

strategy and find use for them, it would make sense that we should study the many and varied

works of history and learn to apply them or at least understand them. If the United States

military or any other military fails to study the classics of military history and theory, then they

do so at their own peril.

33
Williamson Murray, “The Iraq War: A Military History”, Pritzker Military Library,
http://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/pritzker-military-library/id118754706
34
Colin Gray, Another Bloody Century, London: Weidenfeld (2005), p. 30 in Colin M. Fleming, “New or Old Wars?
Debating a Clausewitzian Future.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 32:2 (2009), p. 230

15
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bartley, Caleb M. “The Art of Terrorism: What Sun Tzu Can Teach Us About Terrorism”,
Comparative Strategy, 24(2005), 237-251

16
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Translation by J. J. Graham (1873). Accessed January 24, 2012.
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm

Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New
York: Free Press, 2005.

Creveld, Martin Van., The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed
Conflict Since Clausewitz. New York: Free Press, 1991,

Dunne, Tim “Liberalism, International Terrorism, and Democratic Wars”, International

Fleming, Colin M., “New or Old Wars? Debating a Clausewitzian Future.” Journal of Strategic
Studies, 32:2 (2009),

Gray,Colin. Another Bloody Century, London: Weidenfeld (2005)

Hammes, Thomas X., The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. St. Paul: Zenith
Press, (2004)

Kagan, Robert “Power and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe See the World
Differently,” Policy Review, No. 113 (June/July 2002), pp. 3–28 in Michael C. Desch,
“America’s Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy”
International Security, 32:3 (Winter 2007/2008), 7-43

Kilcullen, David “The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One”,
Pritzker Military Library, Lecture presented at the Pritzker Military Library, Chicago, IL, June
2009. http://www.pritzkermilitarylibrary.org/Home/David-Kilcullen.aspx

Klarevas, Louis “Political Realism: A Culprit for the 9/11 Attacks”, Harvard International
Review, Vol. 26:3 (2004)

Legro, Jeffrey W. and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still A Realist?”, International Security,
Vol 24:2 (1999), p 5-55.

Leheny, David. “Symbols, Strategies, and Choices for International Relations Scholarship After
9/11”, International Organization, Spring 2002, p. 57-70

BIBLIOGRAPHY (CONTINUED)

Lieberfield, Daniel “Theories of Conflict and the Iraq War”, International Journal of Peace
Studies, Vol. 10:2 (2005), 1-21

17
McCready, Douglas M. “Learning from Sun Tzu”, Military Review, May-June 2003, 85-88

Metz, Steven .“A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st Century Warfare,”
Parameters, vol. 24, no. 4 (Winter 1994–95), p 126-132

Morgenthau, H.J. 'Six Principles of Political Realism' in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (eds.)
2009. International Politics. Pearson Education Ltd., 7-14.

Murray, Williamson, “The Iraq War: A Military History”, Pritzker Military Library, Lecture
presented at the Pritzker Military Library, Chicago, IL December 2006.
http://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/pritzker-military-library/id118754706

Nagl, John A. “Learning to East Soup with A Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya
and Vietnam ”, Pritzker Military Library, Lecture presented at the Pritzker Military Library,
Chicago, IL, July 2007. http://www.pritzkermilitarylibrary.org/Home/john-nagl.aspx

Nalbandov, Robert “Instructional Narrative Three”, SEC 6302, Spring 2012, Angelo State
University, Accessed February 1, 2012. http://ramport.angelo.edu

Nye, J.S. and Keohane, R.O. 1971. Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction,
in International Organization , 25 (3), Transnational Relations and World Politics, p. 331.

Richardson, James L. “Critical Liberalism in International Relations”, Working Paper 2002/7,

Smith, Michael Joseph. Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1987, pp 1-15 in “Realism, Liberalism, and the War Powers Resolution”,
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 102:3 (1989) pp. 637-657.

Sorley, Lewis. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last
Years in Vietnam, Orlando: Harcourt Books (1999).

Tzu, Sun. The Art of War, translation by Lionel Giles (1910) accessed January 24, 2012.
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17405/17405-h/17405-h.htm

Wendt. A. 1992. Anarchy Is What States Make of It, in International Organization, 46(2), 391-
425.

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