Daf Ditty Eruvin 100: Animal Morality

Our Daf implies, first, that a cluster of logically ante-halakhic virtues exists;
second, that these virtues can be inferred from natural phenomena; and,
probably, third -- with Plato and against the Sophists -- that they relate
to physis rather than nomos, being not only observable through nature but
inherent within it.

Nor does the passage [on Eruvin 100b] stand alone. The wide-ranging concept
of derekh eretz -- roughly the equivalent of what Coventry Patmore called
"traditions of civility" -- points in the same direction. Its importance again,
not as descriptively synonymous with conventional conduct but as
prescriptive lex naturalis should not be underestimated

Reb Aharon Lichtenstein1

1
Leaves of Faith, vol. 2, p. 33-34

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Even if the Torah had not been given, we could have learned positive ‫ מדות‬from the animal world.
We can learn; - ‫צניעות מחתול‬Modesty - from cats - who will only relieve themselves in privacy. -
‫וגזל מנמלה‬to refrain from stealing - from ants - who collect food and do not steal from each another.

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As Rabbi Ḥiyya said: What is the meaning of that which is written:

‫ ִמַבֲּהמוֹת ָא ֶרץ; וֵּמעוֹף‬,‫יא ַמְלֵּפנוּ‬ 11 Who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth, and
.‫ַהָשַּׁמ ִים ְיַחְכֵּמנוּ‬ maketh us wiser than the fowls of heaven?'
Job 35:11

He explains: “Who teaches us by the beasts of the earth”; this is the female mule, which
crouches and urinates and from which we learn modesty. “And makes us wiser by the birds of
the sky”; this is the rooster, which first cajoles the hen and then mates with it.

Similarly, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if the Torah had not been given, we would nonetheless
have learned modesty from the cat, which covers its excrement, and that stealing is
objectionable from the ant, which does not take grain from another ant, and forbidden relations
from the dove, which is faithful to its partner, and proper relations from the rooster, which
first appeases the hen and then mates with it.

RASHI

…….no ant takes grain that was stored by any other…..

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What does the rooster do to appease the hen? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Prior to mating,
it spreads its wings as if to say this: I will buy you a coat that will reach down to your feet.
After mating, the rooster bends its head as if to say this: May the crest of this rooster fall off if
he has the wherewithal and does not buy you one. I simply have no money to do so.

Rabbi Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer ‫ הרב יוסף גבריאל בקהופר‬writes:2

Had we not received the Torah we would have been able to learn various middos (character traits)
from other sources. This Gemara gives four examples of animals whose traits and actions we could
have learned just by observing them.

Hashem gave animals middos so that we would be able to learn from them (see Rashi here). All
middos that we find in animals we can find in ourselves, as well. Hashem put these middos into
them so that we should learn to utilize them properly (Mussar Chochmo, Mishlei 6:6).

The Maharal explains that animals do not actually deliberately and consciously act, out of their
personal wisdom. Rather, these middos are part of their nature. Animals act a certain way, but not
because they understand what they are doing; their nature is to act this way. The ant is neither
diligent in her work, nor abstinent from theft because possesses wisdom or the fear of Heaven.
Rather, this is her nature.

What exactly is the purpose of this engrained nature?

The purpose is to teach us derech eretz — how we should act. Hashem teaches us derech eretz
through the animals and birds. This is one of the reasons why they were created (ee Etz Yosef ad
loc.). Neither the ant nor the dove avoided theft because its forbidden. Rather, they do so in order
for us to learn to act like them.

Rabbi Yochanan teaches that if the Torah had not commanded us regarding theft, we would have
learned the lesson not to steal by observing the ant.3 Rashi explains that every ant stores grain

2
http://rygb.blogspot.com/2006/01/learning-from-animals-eruvin-100b.html
3
https://dafdigest.org/masechtos/Eruvin%20100.pdf

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throughout the summer so that it will have enough to provide its needs for the winter, and that no
ant takes grain that was stored by any other. The midrash takes this further:

Devarim Rabba 5:2

This is what Scripture says,

‫ְרֵאה ְד ָרֶכיָה‬ ;‫ ְנָמָלה ָﬠֵצל‬-‫ֶאל‬-Q‫ו ֵל‬ 6 Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways, and be
.‫ַוֲחָכם‬ wise;

.‫שֵׁטר וֹּמֵשׁל‬
ֹ --‫ָלהּ ָקִצין‬-‫ז ֲאֶשׁר ֵאין‬ 7 Which having no chief, overseer, or ruler,

,‫ָא ְג ָרה ַבָקִּציר‬ ;‫ח ָתִּכין ַבַּקּ ִיץ ַלְחָמהּ‬ 8 Provideth her bread in the summer, and gatherest her food
.‫ַמֲאָכָלהּ‬ in the harvest.

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 Prov 6:6-8
"Lazybones, go to the ant; study its ways and learn. Without leaders, officers, or rulers, it lays up
its stores during the summer, gathers in its food at the harvest."

What did Solomon see to learn from the ant regarding the lazy person?

Our rabbis say that the ant has three houses (or floors), and it does not congregate in the top
(floor) because of rain, nor does in the bottom because of mud, but rather in the middle. And it
only lives for six months. Why? Because anything that does not have sinews or bones only lives six
months. And all of its food is a grain and a half.

And it goes and gathers in the summer all that it finds, grain and barley and lentils. Rabbi
Tanchuma said: All of its life is a grain and a half and (yet) it gathers these? And why does it do
this? Because it says: Perhaps the Holy One Blessed Be He will decree life and it will be prepared
for me to eat. Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai said:

It once happened that they found a pit of it (an ant) that had three hundred kor (of food grains).
What they gather from the summer is for the winter, therefore Solomon said: "Lazybones, go to
the ant; study its ways and learn." So, to you shall fix for yourselves mitzvot from this world for
the world to come. And what is "study its ways and learn"?

Our rabbis say study its manners, because it flees from theft. Rabbi Shimon ben Halafta said: It
once happened that a single ant dropped a grain. And all of them (the ants) were coming by and
smelling it, and yet not one of them took it.

The one who it belonged to came and took it. See the wisdom that there is in it (the ant). And all
of this praise that it has it did not learn from a creation, and it does not have a judge or an officer.

As it is stated, "Without leaders, officers, or rulers." You for whom I have designated judges and
officers, all the more-so that you shall listen to them, and there will be judges and officers set for
you in all of your gates.

The Midrash (Devarim Rabbah 5:2) above, teaches this same lesson. It expounds upon the verses
from Prov 6:6-8, “Go to the ant you lazy one, see its ways and grow wise. Though there is no
officer nor guard who rules over her, she prepares her food in the summer and stores up her food
in the harvest time.”

The Rabbis said, “Let us note how proper is the conduct of the ant! Let us be impressed by how it
distances itself from theft!” Rabbi Shimon ben Chalafta said, “Once, an ant dropped its wheat
kernel, and as each ant sniffed it, it ran away and refused to touch that which was not his. Finally,
the one who dropped the wheat came, sniffed it, and retrieved that which was his.”

All this, concludes the Midrash, is the conduct of the ant which it does naturally, without being
taught by any other creature.
Such is the conduct of the ant, as it naturally abhors theft, without any officer or guard enforcing
the rules.

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The Chidushei Harim presented a piercing question against the Midrash. How can we be
impressed by the conduct of the ant? After all, every grain it has is stolen from fields owned by
others! How can we be impressed and learn how to avoid theft from a creature whose entire
sustenance is gathered from stolen goods?

The answer is that, on the one hand, it stays clear from any theft from its peers. On the other hand,
it steals its food from people. The reason for this confusion, as the verse explains, is that the ant
has no officer nor guard to direct its behavior. In other words, it has no guide to develop its morals
in order to define what is proper and what is unacceptable.

The message of the Midrash is precisely this: Good intentions are not enough. Without Torah, the
world would be chaotic. Even one who understands that theft is unethical can only succeed within
a system which formally defines what is allowed and what is illegal behavior. The world needs
Torah to teach judges and legislators to define lawful conduct, and we also need officers to monitor
and enforce justice

Had we not received the Torah we would have been able to learn various middos (character traits)
from other sources.

Our Daf gives four examples of animals whose traits and actions we could have learned just by
observing them. Hashem gave animals middos so that we would be able to learn from them (see
Rashi here). All middos that we find in animals we can find in ourselves, as well.

Hashem put these middos into them so that we should learn to utilize them properly (Mussar
Chochmo, Mishlei 6:6).

The Maharal explains that animals do not actually deliberately and consciously act, out of their
personal wisdom. Rather, these middos are part of their nature. Animals act a certain way, but not
because they understand what they are doing; their nature is to act this way. The ant is neither
diligent in her work, nor abstinent from theft because possesses wisdom or the fear of Heaven.
Rather, this is her nature.

What exactly is the purpose of this ingrained nature? The purpose is to teach us derech eretz —
how we should act. Hashem teaches us derech eretz through the animals and birds. This is one of

7
the reasons why they were created (see Etz Yosef ad loc.). Neither the ant nor the dove avoid theft
because it is forbidden. Rather, they do so in order for us to learn to act like them.

The Blueprint of Creation

Rav Yeruchem Levovitz, the famous mashgiach of Mir, taught one of his characteristically deep
lessons to help us empathize with the pain of our fellow Jews. This world of action is a reflection of
higher worlds. Each of the four main worlds has its own unique method to internalize things. Although
what we see here is really an outgrowth of higher spiritual realities, they are revealed in our material
world in a material form.

This explains why when Moshe Rabbeinu wanted to feel the pain of his suffering brothers, he went out
to see their tribulations. Vayeitzei Moshe vayaar besivlosam – And Moshe went out and saw their
suffering.

As Rashi there explains, He put his eyes and his heart to feel pained due to their plight. Moshe had no
other way to truly feel their pain. In this physical world, one must venture out and see it in the flesh.
Nothing else will truly evoke enough empathy.

This explains a puzzling statement of our sages on our daf. There we find that if Hashem had not given
the Torah, we would have learned the prohibition to steal from ants; we would have learned tznius,
modesty, from cats.

Since the Torah is the blueprint of creation, as our sages say, every creature is formed as an imprint of
the Torah and can teach proper comportment to one who is attuned to learning from them in the proper
way.4

Learning Proper Behavior from the Animal Kingdom

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:

A well-known Talmudic homily appears on our daf:

4
Daas Torah, Devorim part II, p. 222

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Rabbi Yohanan said: Even if the Torah had not been given, we would nonetheless have
learned modesty from the cat, which covers its excrement, and that stealing is
objectionable from the ant, which does not take grain from another ant, and forbidden relations
from the dove, which is faithful to its partner, and proper relations from the
rooster, which first appeases the hen and then mates with it.

As is often the case, this discussion evolved from the “stream-of-consciousness” flow of
the Gemara’s dialogue. It opened with Rami bar Abba quoting Rav Asi as forbidding people
from walking on grass on Shabbat, based on the passage in Prov 19:2, “and he who hastens with
his feet, sins.” (The conclusion of the Gemara is that this is permissible, since we rule like Rabbi
Shimon that something done unintentionally on Shabbat is permitted.) In the continuation of the
Gemara, Rami bar Hama quotes Rav Asi, who interprets this passage metaphorically, as a
reference to sexual relations between husband and wife. According to this reading, the passage
teaches that a person cannot force his wife to engage “in a mitzva” against her will. The
Gemara’s reference to sexual relations as a mitzva indicates both the attitude of the Gemara that
relations within the framework of marriage is a positive act, and yet it is forbidden for the
husband to force his wife to participate, even if his intention is for a mitzva.

From this, the Gemara launches into a discussion of appropriate relationships between husbands
and wives in sexual matters, including the admonition to learn from the natural behaviors of the
animal kingdom how to conduct oneself in such matters. From the rooster we learn the
importance of mating rituals and how thoughtful, generous and loving words and acts should
lead up to intimacy.

On a different level, the case of doves is instructive because we find animals that are
monogamous. Once the male and female join up, they are loyal to one-another to the extent that,
should one of them disappear, the other will not choose another partner for the duration of that
season.

Is there morality without the Torah?

Rav Assaf Bednarsh writes:5

Is there morality without the Torah? Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have debated
whether there exists a natural morality that is binding even in the absence of any legislated ethical rules.
Similarly, Jewish philosophers have debated whether there would be objective moral right and wrong if God had
not revealed His will and commanded us various moral obligations, from the seven Noahide laws through the
six hundred and thirteen mitzvot of the Torah.[1]

5
https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-25-natural-morality-1

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The Eish Kodesh: No Natural Morality

The Piaseczner Rebbe, in his collection of sermons Eish Kodesh,[2] asserts that a gentile who acts
ethically does so because he believes in the existence of an independent moral truth. According to this
conception, the commandments of God reflect that pre-existing, independent truth. However, we Jews believe
that God is the only valid source of moral truth. According to the Piaseczner, it is forbidden to steal only because
the true God commanded us not to steal, and it is forbidden to murder only because the true God forbade murder.
Those commandments created a moral truth because they issued from the true God.

He proves this contention from the fact that Halacha does permit moral wrongs in certain circumstances,
which would not be possible if they were objectively forbidden. For example, theft is permissible when
authorized by the court (hefker beit din hefker). More radically, God Himself explicitly permitted murder in the
commandment to Avraham to sacrifice his son Yitzchak, which constituted a binding obligation, although it was
eventually rescinded due to external considerations.

According to this approach, there is no objective moral right or wrong in the world. What we call natural
moral intuition is merely the influence of secular ways of thought or the clever workings of the evil inclination.
The only valid source of truth is Divine revelation.

This negation of any valid truth that emerges from human reasoning or intuition strikes us as very devout,
and in fact corresponds to a general repudiation of the conclusions of unaided human reasoning, which is
pervasive in certain religious communities. But is this perspective consistent with the source texts of our
tradition?

Two Talmudic Passages that Assume Natural Morality

We find two Talmudic passages in which the Sages relate explicitly to the theoretical question of what
would have been had God not revealed His will in the Torah. Our Daf relates:

R. Yochanan said: Even if the Torah had not been given, we would have learned modesty from the cat [which
covers its excrement], and that stealing is objectionable from the ant [which does not take grain from another
ant], and forbidden relations from the dove [which is faithful to its partner]. (Eruvin 100b)

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One may wonder why we would have learned modesty from the cat and loyalty from the dove, and not lethal
violence from the lion or evil cunning from the snake. It seems that R. Yochanan did not intend to suggest that
we merely emulate what the animals around us do, but rather that we use our natural moral intuition to observe
the behaviors of the various animal species and intuitively realize which of those features are worthy of emulation
and which should be condemned. In any case, R. Yochanan clearly states that even if God had never revealed
His will to us, we would be responsible to learn morality on our own.

Likewise, we find in another Talmudic passage: Yoma 67b

The Sages taught: “You shall do My ordinances [and you shall keep My statutes to follow them, I am the Lord
your God”] (Leviticus 18:4) – [“My ordinances” is a reference to] matters that, even had they not been written, it
would have been logical that they be written. They are the prohibitions against idol worship, prohibited sexual
relations, bloodshed, theft, and blessing God [a euphemism for cursing the Name of God]. “And you shall keep
my statutes” – [This is a reference to] matters that Satan challenges because the reason for these mitzvot are not
known. They are: The prohibitions against eating pork and wearing sha’atnez (garments of wool and
linen); performing the chalitza ceremony with a yevama (a widow who must participate in a levirate
marriage); the purification ceremony of the leper; and the scapegoat. And lest you say these are meaningless
acts [as they have no reason], therefore the verse states: “I am the Lord,” to indicate: I am the Lord – I decreed
these statutes and you have no right to doubt them. (Yoma 67b)

The Talmud explicitly states that those commandments of the Torah that are labeled mishpatim should have
been legislated even if they were not written in the Torah. In other words, we are expected to intuit and follow
certain rules of morality even in the absence of revelation.[3]

Ramban and Rambam Support Natural Morality

This is also the position of Ramban, as expressed in his commentary to the story of the deluge.[4] Ramban
asks why, according to the midrashic tradition, the fate of the generation of the flood was sealed because of the
sin of theft, as opposed to their many sexual perversions. He answers that the prohibition of theft is intuitive and
is therefore binding even in the absence of prophetic revelation. The generation of Noach was punished for
violating the natural moral law, even in the absence of revelation. Likewise, R. Yosef Albo[5] explains that there
exist three types of law, the first of which, called natural law, is binding in all times and places, even without an
act of human or divine legislation.[6]

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 Similarly, Rambam writes that the unaided human mind can deduce the existence of various moral
precepts. He writes explicitly that the seven Noahide laws can be known by our moral intuition even in the
absence of revelation,[7] and he states that a gentile who obeys these seven Noahide commandments merely
because of the inclination of human reason is considered wise, even though he is not pious, because he follows
the path of wisdom even though he does not heed revelation.[8]

R. Saadia Gaon

R. Saadia Gaon is perhaps the most ambitious in his formulation of the significance of natural morality.
He explains that God implanted in human psychology a moral intuition that is capable of discerning moral truths
that are universally binding.[9] R. Saadia Gaon states clearly that even before the revelation of the Torah, we
were obligated to follow the dictates of natural morality. He further assumes that the Torah cannot possibly
contradict natural morality, and boldly asserts that if Moshe had descended from Mount Sinai and commanded
us a Torah that contradicted the dictates of natural morality, we would have been bound to reject it. He even
assumes that even God Himself is bound by natural morality, and it was therefore a moral imperative for God to
promulgate the commandments found in the Torah, because natural morality dictates that a wise ruler who is
able to encourage moral practice must do so.[10]

Summary

The Eish Kodesh claims that from a religious perspective, there is no true morality other than that
revealed by Divine command. We have demonstrated, based on two Talmudic passages and the statements of
the great medieval Jewish philosophers, that from a Jewish perspective, the human mind is capable of attaining
binding moral knowledge. God Himself, who implanted a moral intuition in human beings, expects all people to
follow the dictates of natural morality even in the absence of revelation, and He holds us responsible if we fail
to do so. Even a Jew, then, can agree that there is an objective moral truth independent of Divine commandments.

R. Lichtenstein: Natural Morality is Superseded by Torah

R. Aharon Lichtenstein, in an article about this topic entitled “Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic
Independent of Halakhah,”[11] likewise concluded that the mainstream Jewish tradition does recognize the
existence of binding morality even in the absence of revealed commandments. R. Lichtenstein then asks a second
question. If we assume that there is some system of morality that would be binding upon us had we not received

12
the Torah, but we did in fact receive the Torah, what relevance does natural morality have for us now that we
are bound by the Divine morality of the Torah?

R. Lichtenstein answers that, at least on an operative level, natural morality has no relevance to the life
of a Jew who is obligated by the commandments of the Torah. The Torah, argues R. Lichtenstein, constitutes a
complete moral system that includes all the principles of natural morality, in addition to the more advanced
moral and spiritual demands that apply particularly to the Jewish People. Natural morality has thus been
superseded by the Torah, and we may conclude that the natural moral order has no relevance whatsoever to a
Jew, because following the commandments of the Torah will fulfill all the demands of natural morality, plus
much more.

R. Glasner: Natural Morality Supplements the Torah

Another twentieth-century Jewish thinker and leader of religious Zionism, R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner,
took a radically different approach to this issue.[12] He suggests that while the Torah did command us all the
moral precepts necessary for spiritual perfection, which could never have been discovered by natural means, the
Torah omitted some moral obligations that are known by unaided human reason and were therefore deemed
unnecessary to repeat. Examples of this include the prohibitions of cannibalism, eating disgusting creatures, and
public nudity, and the obligation of a father to support his young children. R. Glasner explains that these moral
obligations are binding on us even though they were not written in the Torah. Furthermore, one who violates the
principles of natural morality commits a worse sin than one who violates a commandment of the Torah, as he
betrays not only his commitment to Judaism, but his very humanity. Therefore, when faced with a choice
between violating a Torah commandment or a principle of natural morality, one must choose the lesser evil of a
Torah violation rather than the greater evil of transgressing natural morality. For example, one who is stranded
on a desert island and must eat either non-kosher meat or human flesh in order to survive should eat the non-
kosher meat, which constitutes a more serious halachic infraction, rather than the human flesh. which constitutes
an infraction of natural morality.[13]

R. Kook: Natural Morality is the Foundation of the Torah

A third answer to this question is found in the writings of R. Kook. In contrast to R. Glasner, R. Kook is
convinced that the Torah encompasses the whole of morality and omits nothing. However, experience proves
that those who insist on following only that which they learn from the Torah, suppressing their natural moral
intuition, do not achieve moral perfection and often act immorally while professing unswerving loyalty to the

13
Torah.[14] R. Kook explains that natural morality is crucially important and indispensable for a Jew who strives
to serve God. However, natural morality is not more important than Torah observance, nor is it a necessary
supplement to Torah observance.

According to R. Kook, there is nothing greater than the fear of Heaven and service of God expressed by
following His Torah. However, not everyone who professes to follow the Torah is in fact interpreting the Torah
properly, and not everyone who claims to act out of fear of Heaven, or even believes that he does so, is in fact
inspired by true fear of Heaven. It is all too easy for the fear of Heaven to be adulterated and for the Torah to be
misunderstood and corrupted so that it serves selfish and unethical motives instead of the true service of God.
Even the Torah itself cannot guarantee that it will not be misinterpreted and its intention perverted. What, then,
can guarantee that a student of Torah achieves a proper understanding of Torah and that one who strives to fear
Heaven can attain an authentic fear of Heaven? According to R. Kook, this is the role of natural morality. The
litmus test for authentic fear of Heaven is whether it suppresses our natural ethical instinct or raises that instinct
to higher levels of power and sophistication.[15] One possessed of a healthy moral intuition who leads an ethical
life can then look into the Torah and find the path to spiritual perfection. In Rav Kook's words, "to such a person
will be opened gates of enlightenment, which are broader, brighter, and holier than any enlightenment than can
be achieved by human reason alone.” However, if one does not have the necessary moral infrastructure, and
particularly if one approaches Torah with the idea that true commitment to Torah necessitates a suppression of
one's moral instincts, then he cannot possibly find enlightenment or holiness in his Torah study.[16]

Rav Kook describes the relationship between natural morality and Torah with a beautiful parable,
comparing natural morality to a foundation and the Torah to a beautiful palace. The palace is incomparably
greater than the foundation, and we want nothing more than to live in the grand and majestic palace. However,
the foundation is a prerequisite for the existence of the palace. A palace built on a sturdy foundation will serve
its function well, but a palace built without a foundation will quickly come crashing down and destroy its
inhabitants.[17] On a practical level, R. Kook concludes that we must embrace the educational vision of the
Sages, who taught us that derekh eretz kadma la-Torah, ethics precedes the Torah.[18] In every generation, we
must teach natural morality as a prerequisite for understanding the Torah, and in fact there is no part of the Torah
that can be appreciated properly without natural morality.[19]

We have thus seen four approaches to the relationship between natural morality and Torah. The Eish
Kodesh maintained that there is no such thing as natural morality; a Torah Jew must realize that morality is
found only in the Torah and not anywhere else. R. Lichtenstein argued that there is a natural morality that is
binding in God's eyes, but the Torah has superseded that morality and constitutes a complete and sufficient

14
system of morality. R. Glasner claimed that even after we received the Torah, we need to heed the commands of
our moral intuition, because not all of morality is found in the Torah, and those moral precepts which are not
found in the Torah are even more binding than those explicated in the Torah. R. Kook held that the Torah
subsumes all of morality, and one who properly understands Torah morality lacks nothing. However, the Torah
was not meant to supplant natural morality, but rather to raise and advance it to immeasurably greater heights.
One who begins with natural morality can reach higher levels of holiness and spirituality by following the Torah,
but one who attempts to fulfill the Torah without the prerequisite of natural morality will instead corrupt the
Torah and pervert its intention.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The question of whether morality exists in the absence of Divine revelation is not equivalent to the question
of whether morality could exist without God, one side of which was memorably formulated by Dostoevsky: "If
God does not exist... then all is permitted." It is certainly possible to claim that morality cannot exist in the
absence of God but could exist without Divine revelation. In this shiur, we will not analyze the question of
whether there could be morality if God did not exist. Since we believe that the entire world would not exist if
God did not exist, it is impossible to inquire as to what would be were the world to exist without God. Instead,
we will assume the existence of a world created by God and analyze whether God would hold us accountable to
behave ethically if He had not commanded us to do so.
[2] R. Kalonymus Kalman Shapira (Poland, 1889-1943), Eish Kodesh, p. 68. This particular sermon was
delivered on Rosh Hashanah 1940 in the Warsaw Ghetto.
[3] Marvin Fox (“Maimonides and Aquinas on Natural Law,” Dine Yisrael 3 [1972], pp. 5-27), who denies the
existence of natural morality, interprets these two Talmudic passages as stating merely that it would have been
practically beneficial to deduce and legislate these moral principles, not that they would have been ethically
binding. However, this is not the straightforward reading of these passages, and it certainly contradicts the
opinion of Ramban and other medieval Jewish philosophers quoted below.
[4] Ramban to Bereishit 6:13.
[5] R. Yosef Albo (Spain, c. 1380-1444), Sefer Ha-Ikarim, book 1, chapter 7.
[6] His other two categories are conventional law, which is binding as a result of human legislation and aims to
improve society in accordance with the specific needs of the time and place, and Divine law, which is ordained
by Divine revelation and aims to achieve spirituality and holiness.
[7] Hilkhot Melakhim 9:1.

15
[8] Hilkhot Melakhim 8:11. An alternate version of this text of the Rambam states that such a gentile is neither
pious nor wise. However, all the manuscript evidence supports the reading that we have adopted. See the critical
notes in Mishneh Torah, Sefer Shoftim, ed. Shabse Frankel.
Rambam's position on the nature of moral knowledge is complex. In both texts from Hilkhot Melakhim,
Rambam states that logic inclines towards these moral precepts, but not that it absolutely demonstrates their
correctness. Likewise, in the introduction to his commentary on Masekhet Avot, known as Shemonah Perakim,
Rambam takes umbrage at R. Saadia Gaon's characterization of those commandments that overlap with natural
morality as “logical” commandments (mitzvot sikhliyot), because Rambam holds that moral knowledge does
not have the same epistemological status as metaphysical knowledge and is not subject to strict logical proof.
See Shemonah Perakim, ch. 6; Moreh Nevukhim I:2, III:27. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not
differentiate between the position of Rambam and that of R. Saadia Gaon and other medieval Jewish
philosophers.
[9] Philosophers have proffered a number of theories regarding what the source of natural morality is. Many
philosophers have theorized that natural morality consists of those obligations that can be derived from certain
first principles that are assumed to be axiomatic, e.g., utilitarianism or Kant’s categorical imperative. Conversely,
R. Saadia Gaon and other philosophers hold that the source of natural morality is not any philosophical system,
but rather a moral intuition that is naturally found in the human mind. According to this conception, it is possible
that there is natural morality but not natural law. In other words, we can inherently know the general principles
that govern moral behavior, but not necessarily all the specific rules that constitute the application of moral
principles to the real world. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not distinguish between the question
of natural morality and that of natural law.
[10] R. Saadia Gaon claims that even those parts of the Torah that deal with our ritual obligations towards God
and could have not have been known via natural morality nonetheless fall under the obligations of natural
morality. Morality dictates that we repay kindness with thanks and appreciation, and we are therefore morally
bound to praise and serve God, because He created us. Natural morality, however, does not specify the particular
ways in which we should express our appreciation to God.
[11] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, “Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah?,” reprinted in Leaves
of Faith: The World of Jewish Living, vol. 2, pp. 33-56.
[12] R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner (Hungary, 1856-1924), Dor Revi’i, Petichah Kelalit, section 2, pp. 57-58.
[13] It is well known that the two founding Roshei Yeshiva of Yeshivat Har Etzion, R. Aharon Lichtenstein and
R. Yehuda Amital, disagreed regarding this theoretical scenario. R. Amital, quoting R. Glasner, was of the
opinion that one must consume the non-kosher meat rather than the human flesh, and R. Lichtenstein ruled that
one must consume the human flesh before eating non-kosher meat. This fits R. Lichtenstein's approach as
explained above. If, in fact, the Torah does include all necessary moral principles, then if the Torah did not

16
include a severe prohibition of cannibalism, we must conclude that the prohibition of cannibalism is not
particularly severe compared to that of consuming non-kosher meat.
[14] It we were to envision such a person, R. Glasner would explain his failing as a neglect of those moral
principles not found in the Torah. Based on R. Lichtenstein, we would have to assume that a true follower of the
Torah could never be an unethical person, and therefore such a character must not have learned Torah properly.
The Eish Kodesh would suggest that there is nothing wrong with such a character at all. If he authentically
follows a valid interpretation of the Torah then, by definition, he is moral. If our ethical intuition judges
otherwise, then we would we be required to ignore it and follow the Torah morality instead.
[15] R. Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Kohen Kook, Orot Ha-Kodesh, vol. 3, p. 27.
[16] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 5.
[17] Ibid., par. 2.
[18] Vayikra Rabba 9:3.
[19] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 3. In a later essay (By His Light, appendix to ch. 1, pp. 21-23), R.
Lichtenstein echoes R. Kook’s position and suggests that although the Torah supersedes natural morality on an
operative level, morality serves as the basis for the Torah on an axiological level. He also uses the metaphor of
a foundation and a building for the relationship between universal values and Torah.

Unfortunately, I am too much of a historicist and learn nothing about “truth” for the texts cited
and the learned discussion above. Spirit for me, is so incarnated in this beautiful cosmos as it
unfolds that these texts, albeit sacred, reveal more about their authors than about what is out there.

If postmodern reading means anything, it taught me to see my own biases in these texts, and thus
a mirror of myself and my reading practices and (lack of) mastery of the entire corpus of rabbinic
literature.
When it comes to nature and morality or nature and Torah, these are cultural constructions we
have built, however magnificent the edifices, and are just that. What is my connection with the
animal world? DO I learn anything moral from an animal? How absurd! I must move away from
these literal readings for them to still make sense.

Which brings me to the fantasy world of Rebbe Nachman who uses animals as tropes of the
imagination as we shall see below.

17
Cats and Ants

Rabbi Jay Kellman writes:6

Imagine if the Torah had not been given. While for many, such a thought is unthinkable—“for
they are our life and the length of our days, and on them we will meditate day and night”—for
many, actually, most Jews, such is the reality. Raised with little connection to Judaism, with little
or no Jewish education, and part of the 70% of Jews who do not attend synagogue on Yom Kippur7
the Torah, for all intents and purposes, was not given.

One cannot expect one who has no connection to Torah to observe its laws. Thus, beginning in the
19th century, rabbinic responsa negated many of the Talmudic laws relating to non-observant
Jews, arguing that the social setting had become so different as to make them obsolete. Unlike in
prior generations, the non-observance of Shabbat was not a sign of rebellion and denial of G-d and
thus, the public Shabbat desecrator no longer had to be rejected as a member of the Jewish
community. Surely one cannot expect one raised in a secular home to keep kosher or shake a lulav!
Nor can one fault them for marrying out.

But tolerance has its limits.

“Rabbi Yocḥanan said: If the Torah had not been given, we could have learnt modesty from the
cat, honesty from the ant, chastity from the dove, and derech eretz, proper etiquette, from the
rooster who first appeases and then mates” (Eiruvin 100b).

While we may be able to forgive “sins” of a ritual nature, there is no acceptable excuse for unethical
behaviour, regardless of one’s upbringing and educational experiences. One does not need a Torah
to teach us basic human decency. One does need others to teach proper behaviour. While that may
be helpful and make ethical behaviour more natural, when unavailable, we must turn elsewhere—
even to the animal kingdom, if need be. The Torah may have been “given only in order to refine
the character of people”, but we need to ensure we refine our characters with or without the benefit
of Torah.

Philosophers have long debated the role and necessity of Divine law in shaping moral character.
It is clear where Rav Yochanan stands, and it is his view that many others have adopted. Our
founding father, Abraham, justified claiming Sarah as his sister because, “There is no fear of G-d
in this place”. Apparently, one can fear G-d, i.e., have a sense of proper morality, even without the
explicit instruction of the Torah. Sa’adya Gaon, living in 10th century Babylonia, categorized
many of the mitzvot of the Torah as mitzvot sichliot, mitzvot of intelligence—mitzvot that those

6
https://www.torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/eiruvin-100-cats-and-ants
7
According to the PEW report of 2013 some 32% of Jews have Christmas trees, whereas only 31% belong to a synagogue!

18
possessed of intelligence, i.e., humans, could have derived on their own, had they not been given.
We do not need a Torah to tell us that we must not murder, steal, cheat, or lie, or that we must
honour our parents.8

While philosophers may debate the issues, the empirical evidence would seem to substantiate the
view of Rav Yochanan. Can one truly argue that, absent a life of Torah, one cannot live a morally
upstanding life? There are many people—Jewish and non-Jewish alike—who have no connection
to Torah, and yet are wonderful people who display empathy, integrity and sensitivity. And sadly,
there are some who profess fidelity to Torah whose moral integrity leaves much to be desired. The
link between Torah and morality is not always obvious.

Our Talmudic Sages fully grasped that all of G-d’s creation has something to teach man. We must
learn not only mikol adam, from all peoples, but also from the cat, the ant, the dove and the
rooster—and so much more.

Of course, to learn from the animal kingdom, we must study the animal kingdom. Just as the study
of the sciences should awaken us to the wonders of G-d’s creation, so it is with the study of
zoology.

It is worth noting that, aside from the rooster, Rav Yochanan felt no need to explain how exactly
we learn modesty from the cat, honesty from the ant, and chastity from the dove. Rashi, realizing
that many were not quite as conversant as our Sages regarding the animal kingdom, explains that
the cat covers its excrement and does not urinate in the presence of people. Wikipedia, presumably
unaware of this Talmudic passage, informs us that, “Cats are known for spending considerable
amounts of time licking their coats to keep them clean”. The ant, Rashi notes, will not steal food
from another ant, and doves are faithful to their partners.

Rav Yochanan’s definition of tzniut focuses on what we might call the social norms of basic
manners and human decency. Tzniut starts with basic hygiene and cleanliness. It is derech eretz,
literally the path of the land, that references modesty in sexual matters. It is clear to Rav Yochanan
that tzniut and derech eretz are universal norms. One can learn how to observe them indirectly
from the Torah—their parameters are not defined in the Torah, and are in fact not even directly
referenced—or directly by studying G-d’s creations.

One might think that now that the Torah has been given, there is little need to learn from the
animals. But that would be incorrect. Our tradition abounds with teachings we are to learn from
animals. “Yehudah ben Teima said: Be strong as a leopard, and swift as an eagle, and fleet as a
gazelle, and brave as a lion, to do the will of your Father who is in heaven” (Avot 5:20). The first
words of Rav Yosef Karo in his Shulchan Aruch are that we “should awaken like a lion to serve
our Creator”.

8
Perhaps the most forceful critique of this view in modern times is given by Dennis Prager, who argues that absent G-d’s direct
command, there is little moral ground for arguing that murder is wrong

19
G-d has gifted us with various ways to learn how to lead our lives. He revealed Himself through
the natural world that He created and through the written word that He gifted to us in the Torah—
what we might explain today as both audio and visual ways to learn. May we learn well.

Modern science and biology reveal how interconnected we are with the planet, animals and plants
in an ecosystem. That view from the satellite above earth changed our perception of ourselves
forever. No longer do can we dominate (and indiscriminately destroy) other species but phylogeny
and genetics shows just how similar we are. This seems to apply to social learning which puts a
different spin on the moralistic pietistic pronouncements emerging from our text/daf.

Social learning in humans and other animals: The Evidence

Jean-François Gariépy1*, Karli K. Watson1, Emily Du1, Diana L.

Xie1, Joshua Erb1, Dianna Amasino1 and Michael L. Platt9

Decisions made by individuals can be influenced by what others think and do. Social learning
includes a wide array of behaviors such as imitation, observational learning of novel foraging

91
Department of Neurobiology, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and Duke Institute for Brain Sciences, Duke University,
Durham, NC, USA 2Department of Biological Anthropology, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA

20
techniques, peer or parental influences on individual preferences, as well as outright teaching.
These processes are believed to underlie an important part of cultural variation among human
populations and may also explain intraspecific variation in behavior between geographically
distinct populations of animals. Recent neurobiological studies have begun to uncover the neural
basis of social learning. Here we review experimental evidence from the past few decades showing
that social learning is a widespread set of skills present in multiple animal species. In mammals,
the temporoparietal junction, the dorsomedial, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, as well as the
anterior cingulate gyrus, appear to play critical roles in social learning. Birds, fish, and insects also
learn from others, but the underlying neural mechanisms remain poorly understood. We discuss
the evolutionary implications of these findings and highlight the importance of emerging animal
models that permit precise modification of neural circuit function for elucidating the neural basis
of social learning.

Introduction
The behavior of others provides a rich source of information that individuals can use to improve
their behavior without direct experience. To illustrate, imagine for dinner you must choose
between two restaurants that you have never tried before. Your friends tell you that one of them
serves excellent food, but the other restaurant has unsanitary conditions. Without directly
experiencing each outcome, most people can use this information to guide their decision about
where to eat. This not only applies to learning food preferences, but also to mating decisions, fear
learning, and problem-solving strategies.10 The process through which individuals learn from
others rather than through direct experience is referred to as social learning. Social learning may
underlie large-scale population phenomena such as variation in food preferences among
geographically-distinct populations of animals and the diversity found in human cultures.11 Many
animal species learn from others, including chimpanzees, rats, monkeys, birds, and octopuses,
suggesting that these abilities may have evolved as an adaptation to a range of different ecological
niches.12 The adaptive advantage of social learning is also evident from the outcomes of game
theory tournaments, in which algorithms that learn from opponents outperform those that do not.

10
Olsson and Phelps, 2007; Gruber et al., 2009; Yorzinski and Platt, 2010; van den Bos et al., 2013; Wisdom et al., 2013
11
Whiten, 2005; van de Waal et al., 2013
12
Fiorito and Scotto, 1992; Galef, 1995; Galef and Whiskin, 1995; Dally et al., 2008; Horner and de Waal, 2009; van Schaik
and Burkart, 2011; Morgan et al., 2012; van de Waal et al., 2013

21
Several comprehensive reviews have been written on social learning and social cognition.13 Hence,
our review focuses on studies that cover both the behavioral and neural mechanisms that mediate
social learning. Here, we use “direct experience learning” to refer to any type of learning that
individuals perform independently of others and “social learning” to refer to any form of learning
influenced by other individuals.

The Neurobiology of Learning from Direct Experience

The mechanisms by which individuals learn from direct experience have received a great deal of
attention in recent years. Reinforcement learning models rely on updating a value representation
of a given action when that action leads to favorable or unfavorable outcomes. These models use
feedback from past outcomes to guide future decisions. Learning relies on the computation of a
prediction error, which corresponds to the difference between an outcome and some previously
established expectation. The stored expectation is updated by this prediction error, multiplied by a
learning rate that determines the speed at which outcomes can influence behaviors.14 A variety of
brain areas appear to be involved in reinforcement learning. This includes the striatum, which
contains neurons that fire for specific sensory cues when they are paired with reward through
conditioning (Aosaki et al., 1994). Dopamine neurons in the substantia nigra are known to encode
prediction errors and are necessary for learning that requires prediction errors. In humans,
functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments suggest that the activity of many other brain
areas correlates with variables computed from learning theory including the amygdala (Gläscher
and Büchel, 2005). Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) lesions in monkeys impair the learning of
task-switching paradigms, suggesting that the ACC might be important in monitoring errors and
for attention in changing environments (Rushworth et al., 2003).

However, reinforcement learning is not sufficient to explain all forms of animal learning. Studies
have shown that rats and birds are capable of learning sequences of events and they can use this
knowledge to predict future rewarding events that have yet to be. Furthermore, in social learning
experiments, animals can learn from others by observing their decisions and the resulting
outcomes, and adjust their own actions without having directly experienced the outcomes
themselves. Principles analogous to those driving reinforcement learning may be involved in these

13
Galef and Giraldeau, 2001; Whiten, 2005; Zentall, 2012; Stanley and Adolphs, 2013; van den Bos et al., 2013
14
Gläscher and Büchel, 2005; Pfeiffer et al., 2010; Funamizu et al., 2012

22
cases, including the updating of expectations based on sensory inputs, but these types of learning
require additional computational components besides feedback from outcome. Computationally,
this may include a module for observing what happens to others and for adjusting one's own
preferences based on these observations.

These findings indicate that animals, including humans, can learn without direct experience. The
mechanisms by which this type of learning occurs are very diverse, and may include both simple
enhancement of attention to others, in the case of socially facilitated food preferences, and the
recognition of emotional facial cues in others as they experience outcomes, to more complex
mechanisms including mentalizing and theory of mind.

Overview of Neural Circuits Implicated in Social Learning in Humans

A number of studies have implicated specific brain areas in human social behavior. These areas
include the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the anterior cingulate gyrus (ACCg), the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). All of these regions
may contribute to the interpretation of others' intentions and social learning (Behrens et al., 2009).
The TPJ integrates systems for memory, language, attention, and social processing and its
activation is correlated with the degree to which an opponent is perceived as intelligent (Carter
and Huettel, 2013). Moreover, gray matter volume in the TPJ predicts altruistic tendencies
(Morishima et al., 2012). TPJ has been implicated in mentalizing and understanding intentions,
suggesting involvement in empathy, altruism, and learning or strategizing in a competitive context
(Samson et al., 2004; Carter et al., 2012). By contrast, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC)
may contribute to executive control, planning, and goal-directed behavior in social contexts,
particularly deception (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Knoch et al., 2006). The dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex underlies processes including cognitive control and social interaction (Venkatraman et al.,
2009). Studies of the anterior cingulate gyrus (ACCg) have revealed involvement in error
correction and reinforcement learning from social outcomes as well as emotional and facial
expression recognition (Behrens et al., 2008; Venkatraman et al., 2009; van den Stock et al., 2013).

In this review, we will explore current knowledge on the contexts in which social learning occurs
in non-human animals and the brain mechanisms underlying such forms of learning. Social
learning can happen through a variety of mechanisms that may include effects of others on

23
attention (Figure 1A), learning stimulus or action value through observation (Figure 1B), motor
simulation and imitation (Figure 1C) and active instruction using movements or sounds
(Figure 1D). The brain substrates that mediate these skills often subserve non-social cognitive and
motivational processes as well. Based on these observations, we hypothesize that many cognitive
and motivational systems that originally evolved to solve non-social problems have been co-opted
by evolution to contend with social challenges (Gould and Lewontin, 1979). Complementing these
general-purpose mechanisms are a small set of brain areas for which there is tantalizing evidence
of uniquely specialized social functions, which may have evolved in only a limited number of
species that have confronted the most complex social environments. These potentially uniquely
social mechanisms remain to be fully described, in part due to the difficulty of studying them in
standard model animal species that often lack the extreme social complexity found in humans,
some great apes, and highly social birds like corvids.
FIGURE 1

Figure 1. Socially facilitated learning occurs through a variety of mechanisms. (A) By

drawing attention to a particular location or object, social cues make foraging-relevant features
more salient. Such cues may or may not be intentionally delivered by the signaler. Birds commonly
use flocking information to identify the location of a food patch. Image by Dan
Knudson. (B) Signals released or displayed by other individuals, including approach or avoidance
behaviors, facial expressions, and chemical deposits, signal the valence of the enhanced stimulus
or location. Here, minnows spend more time undercover in response to a predator the initial
exposure to the predator is paired with alarm substance. Bars indicate increase in time spent hiding
after a training exposure to a pike with (open bars) or without (gray bars) alarm substance.
Measurements are taken during exposure to pike and alarm substance, pike without alarm
substance (water only), or empty tank without alarm substance, 1, 3, and 5 days after initial

24
exposure, respectively. *P < 0.05; **P < 0.01. Figure modified with permission from (Chivers and
Smith, 1994). Minnow image by Sanse, via Wikimedia Commons. (C) Although few non-human
species have been found to imitate other individuals in the strict sense, the observation and
performance of motor behaviors are known to activate overlapping neural circuitry. “Mirror
neurons” in the frontal cortex of macaque monkeys fire both when performing a motor act and
when watching another individual perform the act. This could provide a mechanism by which
appropriate behavior is “primed” in a naive individual that observes a knowledgeable conspecific.
Figure reproduced with permission from (Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006). (D) In the process of
active instruction, specific information is intentionally communicated to other individuals. This is
known to occur in the context of the bee waggle dance, in which the travel path to a remote nectar
site is signaled to other foragers in the hive. Image by J. Tautz and M. Kleinhenz, Beegroup
Würzburg, via Wikimedia Commons.

FIGURE 2

Figure 2. Sensory modalities underlying social learning differ across species. In socially-
facilitated food preference, rats (top) rely heavily on olfactory signals. Olfactory trails laid by
conspecifics can signal what to eat and where to find it. Moreover, olfactory components from the
food detected on the breath of a conspecific, causes rats to prefer the associated food, even when
tested weeks later. This preference can also be elicited by pairing the food odorant with carbon
disulfide, a volatile chemical found in the breath (reviewed in Galef, 2012). In contrast, primates
(bottom) are heavily visual. Visual cues convey information about the food as well as about the
social agent associated with the food. Social information such as kin relationship, rank, and group
membership modulates the effect of social cues on food-related learning (van de Waal et al., 2013).
Rat noses photo by Alexey Krasavin; rat nose photo by Robin Stjerndorff; Chocolate photo by
Simon A. Eugster; Cinnamon photo by trophygeek; Vervet head photo by Wegmann, all from
Wikimedia Commons. Brain photos courtesy of University of Wisconsin and Michigan State
Comparative Mammalian Brain Collections. Vervet food sharing photo modified from (van de
Waal et al., 2013), with permission.

25
Transmission of Skills, Actions, and Goals

Animals are also capable of learning new skills, foraging methods, and social conventions by
observing conspecifics (Figures 1C,D). The potato-washing and wheat-winnowing behaviors of
Japanese monkeys are among the most well-known examples. Kawamura (1959) observed the
propagation of these behaviors from individuals to their relatives and friends, and then to the
extended group. In wild meerkats, naïve pups are more likely to consume food that requires
handling skills, such as hardboiled eggs and scorpions, if they are given the opportunity to observe
an adult eating those foods (Thornton, 2008). A long-term study looked at traditions or social
conventions in white-faced capuchin monkeys, defining those as behaviors that are common in
subpopulations of capuchin monkeys while absent among other populations, implicating social
influences on learning (Perry et al., 2003). Several behaviors were found to qualify as traditions or
social conventions, including hand-sniffing, sucking of body parts, and playful gestures displayed
with another individual (Perry et al., 2003). In populations of white-faced capuchin monkeys,
young foragers can observe and learn from mature foragers who consume food requiring multi-
step processing (Perry, 2011). Learning skills from others occurs in a wide range of other animals
as well, including octopuses, birds, and mammals (Sherry and Galef, 1984; Fiorito and Scotto,
1992; Thornton, 2008). Chimpanzees and humans also demonstrate impressive abilities to learn
complex sequences of actions through observation (Whiten et al., 1996; Whiten, 1998).
Chimpanzees have been shown to transmit to others nut-cracking techniques involving stones or
tree roots and ant-dipping through direct mouthing and pull-through (Humle and Matsuzawa,
2002; Humle et al., 2009; Luncz et al., 2012). Much remains to be discovered concerning the
neural mechanisms underlying such cultural transmission of behavior, but a study on
communicative innovation has identified activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the
temporal lobe when pairs of human subjects generate and subsequently understand novel
communicative symbols (Stolk et al., 2013).
FIGURE 3

26
Figure 3. Hypothetical roles for macaque brain areas known to be involved in social
interactions, planning and perception. Social learning may involve directing attention at others
or tracking their gaze. It may also involve observing their behaviors and emulating or imitating
sequences of actions. Finally, some forms of social learning might rely on observing outcomes,
preferences and aversion or fear. LIP, Lateral intraparietal area; STS, Superior temporal sulcus;
dlPFC, Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; ACCg, Anterior cingulate cortex gyrus.

Modern scholars have turned their attention using new tools of sociology and
deconstruction to understand the talmudic view of animals and animality:

27
Beth Berkowitz writes:15
Animals and Animality in the Babylonian Talmud selects key themes in animal studies - animal
intelligence, morality, sexuality, suffering, danger, personhood - and explores their development
in the Babylonian Talmud. Beth A. Berkowitz demonstrates that distinctive features of the Talmud
- the new literary genre, the convergence of Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian cultures, the
Talmud's remove from Temple-centered biblical Israel - led to unprecedented possibilities within
Jewish culture for conceptualizing animals and animality. She explores their development in the
15
Barnard College, New York, US: file:///Users/julianungar-sargon/Desktop/Animal_Studies_and_Ancient_Judaism.pdf

28
Babylonian Talmud, showing how it is ripe for reading with a critical animal studies perspective.
When we do, we find waiting for us a multi-layered, surprisingly self-aware discourse about
animals as well as about the anthropocentrism that infuses human relationships with them. For
readers of religion, Judaism, and animal studies, her book offers new perspectives on animals from
the vantage point of the ancient rabbis.

Animal studies has its origins in philosophy but extends to all fields of the humanities, especially
literature, history, and anthropology. The central concern of animal studies is how human beings
perceive other species and themselves as one among them. Animal studies in ancient Judaism has
generally not been undertaken in a critical mode, with notable and increasing exceptions. This
article covers work from the past decade (2009–2019) that deals centrally with animals, from
ancient Israel to late antiquity, spanning the Hebrew Bible, apocrypha and pseudepigrapha, library
of Qumran, rabbinic literature, and material culture. Topics addressed are animal sacrifice and
consumption; literary depictions of animals; studies of individual animal species; archaeology and
art featuring animals; animal ethics, theology, and law; and critical theoretical approaches to
species difference. The conclusion considers future directions for animal studies in ancient
Judaism.

The central concern of animal studies is how human beings perceive other species and themselves
as one among them. Calarco organizes animal studies into three phases: identity, difference, and
indistinction (Calarco 2015). Identity theorists stress the similarities between human beings and
animals in a reaction against the human exceptionalism of mainstream western thought. Singer’s
Animal Liberation is the touchstone for this approach (Singer 2009). Difference theorists predicate
ethics on the alterity of animals rather than their similarity to human beings. Derrida’s ‘The Animal
That Therefore I Am’ is canonical for this line of thinking (Derrida 2002). Indistinction refers to
recent intersectional and materialist perspectives that upend the distinction between people and
animals. Haraway’s Companion Species Manifesto is a good example (Haraway 2003).

Fraiman’s counternarrative of animal studies observes that feminist scholars Carol Adams,
Josephine Donovan, Vicki Hearne, and Haraway, who were working on animals since the early
1980s, have been elided by the dominant metascholarly narrative that favors authorizing male
figures such as Singer and Derrida (Fraiman 2012).

Influential scholars of animal studies outside philosophy include Erica Fudge and Harriet Ritvo in
history, Tim Ingold and Margo DeMello in anthropology, Paul Waldau and Donovan Schaefer in
religion, Gary Francione and Steven Wise in law, Kelly Oliver and Lori Gruen in feminist theory,
Kari Weil and Colleen Glenney Boggs in literature, literary writers James Coetzee and Jonathan
Safran Foer, and ethologists Jane Goodall, Barbara Smuts, Frans de Waal, and Marc Bekoff.
‘Speciesism’, the bias that favors human beings over other species, and ‘anthropocentrism’, the
privileging of human perspectives and interests, are foundational concepts. Other key terms in
animal studies include Anthropocene, biopolitics and biopower, anthropological machine, animot,
becoming-animal, animacy, companion species, and contact zones. Anthropocene names the
current geological epoch in which human activity has come to dominate the planet’s environment
(Davies 2016).

29
Biopolitics and biopower, from Foucault’s History of Sexuality, describe interventionist regulatory
controls over biological life that facilitate capitalism, institutionalized racism, and mass warfare
(Foucault 2012: 133-60; Lemke 2011; Prozorov and Rentea 2016). The anthropological machine
is Agamben’s term for the operation of the human/animal binary, which consigns certain groups
of people to the status of sub-human and endangers human and animal lives (Agamben 2004;
Oliver 2009: 229-46). Animot is Derrida’s playful coinage meant to critique the homogenizing
word animal (Derrida 2002: 405-18; Senior, Clark, and Freccero 2015). Deleuze and Guattari’s
becoming animal describes a form of interactive contagion that rejects the hierarchy, linearity, and
unity of the human (Deleuze and Guattari 2004). Animacy is Chen’s theorization of the anxieties
that surround the production of humanness (Chen 2012). Companion species and contact zones
are concepts developed by Haraway to capture the entanglements and co-evolution between human
beings and other creatures (Haraway 2003; 2008). Another key term describes the field itself:
‘critical’ animal studies. ‘Critical’ refers to the theoretical critique offered by animal studies and
to the moral urgency and activist orientation of the inquiry (McCance 2013: 4-5).

Animal studies in ancient Judaism has generally not been critical in this sense, with notable and
increasing exceptions. This article covers work from the past decade (2009–2019) that deals
centrally with animals, whether critically inclined or not, from ancient Israel to late antiquity,
spanning the Hebrew Bible, apocrypha and pseudepigrapha, library of Qumran, rabbinic corpora,
and material culture. The classical Greek and Roman world and early Christianity are essential
context for ancient Judaism but will not be treated here, nor will medieval and modern Judaism.
Topics to be addressed are: animal sacrifice; animal consumption; literary use of animals; texts
with animal protagonists (Balaam’s ass in the book of Numbers, the animals of Nineveh in the
book of Jonah, and the Animal Apocalypse in 1 Enoch); studies of individual animal species (the
donkey, snake, lion, and dog); archaeology and art featuring animals (the dog burials at Ashkelon,
animal bone deposits at Qumran, and elephant mosaic at Huqoq); animal ethics, theology, and law;
and critical theoretical approaches to species difference. Many studies fall into more than one
category but for convenience are discussed in relation to only one. I close with a general
assessment of current research and with reflections on what the future holds for animal studies and
ancient Judaism.

Work on Jewish environmental ethics incorporates ancient texts and ideas. Tirosh-Samuelson’s
synthetic essay on Jewish environmentalism addresses animal-related topics such as limitations on
eating animals, animal suffering, and bio-diversity (Tirosh-Samuelson 2017). Her bibliography on
Judaism and the environment is a rich resource (Tirosh-Samuelson 2015–). Gross’s essay on
Jewish animal ethics deals with a variety of biblical and classical rabbinic texts on the question of
how and why animals matter (Gross 2013). He defines a dialectic within Jewish culture between
kindness towards animals, which emphasizes human creatureliness, and ascendancy over animals,
which emphasizes human distinctiveness. In his article on sport hunting, Gross proposes that the
vehement opposition to hunting found in Jewish texts becomes a mode of religious activity in itself
that draws social borders and imagines relations with other living creatures. Gross’s aim is not to
explain the opposition but to explain the explanation, which is that hunting inhibits the virtue of
rahamim (Gross 2017).

David Seidenberg’s eco-theology is founded on the proposal that tzelem elohim (imago dei, the
image of God) applies not only to human beings but also to the ‘more than human world’

30
(Seidenberg 2015). Seidenberg devotes Part I of his monograph to classical rabbinic midrash.
Drawing on contemporary evolutionary anthropology, Walker-Jones (2017) makes a similar case
that the Bible’s concept of imago dei entails human connection with other species. He proposes
that the root metaphor in Genesis for the human relationship to other animals is kinship or family.
Linzer (2010) and Cahan (2014) both examine talmudic passages about animal suffering along
with medieval commentaries and codifications. For Linzer, the concern with animal suffering as
evinced by the Talmud, commentaries, and codes offers a valuable case study in the interaction
between ‘Torah values’ and halakhah. For Cahan, it shows how classical, medieval, and modern
rabbis balance competing values.

Watts Belser, Wasserman, Neis, and I explore animality in rabbinic literature. Watts Belser does
so through the lens of disability (Belser 2015). Genesis Rabbah 95.1’s equation of eschatological
harmony among animals with the healing of disabled bodies suggests, according to Belser, that
‘human healing too can extend beyond the individual body, to encompass a transformation of
social violence’ (Belser 2015: 301). The utopia envisioned by the midrash is doubleedged: it is
shared by tranquil animals and healed human beings, but it assigns guilt for human disability to
animals. Wasserman’s book on Babylonian Talmud Tractate Avodah Zarah likewise finds in
rabbinic literature the expression of an affinity between humans and animals, though in
Wasserman’s work that affinity is accompanied by anxiety and is associated with Jewish/gentile
difference (Wasserman 2017). The anxiety of difference is nowhere better exemplified than in the
tractate’s initial claim that gentiles like to have sex with animals. Wasserman follows the trail of
the various cattle, dogs, snakes, and other creatures who creep through the tractate, exploring the
intersection among species, gender, and religious hierarchies. Wasserman shows that in elevating
Jewish men to the top of the social hierarchy, and pooling animals, non-Jews, and Jewish women
together at the bottom, the Talmud leaves the species boundary surprisingly blurry.

Neis’s work also shows the line between species to be far from bright within rabbinic thinking.
Neis’s studies in tannaitic literature explore interspecies and cross-species reproduction (Neis
2018a; 2018b; 2018c). Neis shows that, for the Tannaim, the human is in some cases neither
exceptional nor distinct but set alongside other species. In rabbinic thinking it is altogether possible
for a mother belonging to one species to give birth to progeny that belongs to another, and for the
species classification of a particular individual to be hybrid or indeterminate. Neis is interested in
the cases in rabbinic reproductive biology where the human and the nonhuman become entangled,
and questions of likeness, resemblance, and image—including God’s—become fraught. Nissan
(2015) likewise studies the hybrid creatures of rabbinic law—lizardfishes and armadillo lizards—
his discussion itself a hybrid, meandering from medieval bestiaries and Persian proverbs to ancient
Indian seals and Italian crossword puzzles and Gilded Age American animal cartoons. My book
selects a number of significant themes in animal studies—animal intelligence, morality, sexuality,
suffering, danger, personhood—and explores their development in key passages in the Babylonian
Talmud (Berkowitz 2018). I propose that the Talmud imagines animals as agents and subjects in
new ways—as ‘persons’ with the capacity to pursue interests and to plan for the future, to
experience pleasure and be held accountable for sin, to undergo suffering even if that suffering
might be seen as necessary to satisfy human wishes, and to break free of the property category into
which they are usually placed. Built into this new discourse of animal personhood is an
engagement with, and sometimes a critique of, the anthropocentrism that resists it.

31
Conclusions

The last decade of scholarship attests to the centrality of animals in the literary imagination,
religious ritual, moral thinking, visual code, historical memory, imperial politics, communal
experience, cognitive map, and physical being of ancient Jews. The disciplines, topics, and texts
treated here—from fish blood and mythical sea monsters, to industrious ants and fasting animals,
heroic rams and scapegoat donkeys, roaring cubs and dumb dogs, tile elephants and puppy bones,
‘writing on animals’ and the ‘humane subject’, to disability, bestiality, and reproductive biology—
speak to the spectacular breadth of animal studies in ancient Judaism. Even the most committed
anthropocentric cannot hide from the animals that populate the world of ancient Judaism.

In conclusion, I offer two observations about the work covered in this article and use them as a
springboard for thinking about future research directions. First, the majority of the scholarship on
animals in ancient Judaism does not engage with critical animal studies. Second and more
surprisingly, the scholarship does not often engage with itself. In other words, the archaeologists
hypothesizing about the bone deposits at Qumran are not drawing directly upon the work of the
Bible scholars reading Balaam’s ass, and so on, with the ethicists writing about animal suffering,
or the religionists theorizing animal sacrifice.

These two phenomena—the relative absence of critical animal studies, and the lack of dynamic
interaction within the field—are related. Ancient Judaism scholars working on animals do not for
the most part see themselves as working in animal studies and therefore do not seek out other work
on animals, whether it be from a critical perspective or from another subfield in ancient Judaism.
With the rise of critical animal studies, scholars of ancient Judaism are likely to become more
sensitized to species difference as a distinctive configuration.

While it is hard to imagine many scholars of ancient Judaism sprinkling their discussions with
Derrida’s animot or Deleuze’s becoming-animal, more crossfertilization within the study of
ancient Judaism, as well as between the study of ancient Judaism and broader animal studies
discourse, seems a not unreasonable expectation. Such cross-fertilization should help to remedy
some of the more glaring lacunae in the scholarship.

This article shows that while there is substantial work on animals in the Hebrew Bible, other
ancient Jewish literatures are underserved. Animals in Josephus, for example, or Qumran sectarian
texts, await analysis. Even within the study of the Hebrew Bible, gaps remain regarding important
animal figures in the narrative such as the ram in the binding of Isaac or the ravens, lions, and
bears in the book of Kings, animals who have long been considered mere instruments or objects
within the narrative. The same can be said for the animals appearing in rabbinic literature who
have long been treated as background except in rare cases like the story of Rabbi Pinhas ben Yair’s
pious donkey in Babylonian Talmud Hullin 7a-b (Kulp and Rogoff 2017: ch. 9; Ilan 2017: 126-
28). Many rabbinic stories feature animal characters, however, and even more rabbinic laws. This
article shows also a heavy leaning towards literary ‘use’ of animals. But what are the implications

32
and repercussions of humans using other species in their literary discourse? Scholars do not often
fold such reflection into their readings. P. Miller’s study of animals in early Christian writings is
a model for sensitive reading of the animals who roam through ancient literature (P. Miller 2018).
Finally, the sparsity of ancient Judaism scholarship on the intersection between species and gender
is striking given the explosion of general scholarship in this area (Chen and Luciano 2015; Parreñas
2017; Gruen and Probyn-Rapsey 2018).

Much is about to change for the study of animals in ancient Judaism if recent conferences are any
indication: a workshop on animals, law, and religion at Harvard Law School in 2015; a conference
on animals and the law in antiquity at Brown in 2018; sessions on animal studies at the Association
for Jewish Studies conferences in 2014 and 2018 and at the Society for Biblical Literature
conference in 2018. The 2018 SBL featured a session dedicated to the new Dictionary of Nature
Imagery of the Bible, whose aim is to expand knowledge of biblical flora, fauna, lands, and water
(DNI Project). In some sense, the study of animals in ancient Judaism may be returning to its roots
in the works of Feliks, Schochet, and Borowski, whose fascination with animals jumps off every
page of their foundational studies (Feliks 1954; 1981; 1982a; 1982b; Borowski 1998; 2002;
Schochet 1984). Our fascination with animals seems to be growing as fast as animal habitats are
shrinking.

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Unfortunately, I am too much of a historicist and learn nothing about “truth” for the sacred texts
cited and the learned discussion above. Spirit for me, is so incarnated in this beautiful cosmos as
it unfolds that these texts, albeit sacred, reveal more about their authors than about what is out
there.

If postmodern reading means anything, it taught me to see my own biases in these texts, and thus
a mirror of myself and my reading practices and (lack of) mastery of the entire corpus of rabbinic
literature.

When it comes to nature and morality or nature and Torah, these are cultural constructions we
have built, however magnificent the edifices, and are just that. What is my connection with the
animal world? DO I learn anything moral from an animal? How absurd! I must move away from
these literal readings for them to still make sense.

Which brings me to the fantasy world of Rebbe Nachman who uses animals as tropes of the
imagination as we shall see below.

Learning from the Rooster:

Rebbe Nachman and Imagining the beast
From Bezalel Naor, The Kabbalah of Relation 17

THE KABBALAH OF RELATION BY RABBI BEZALEL NAOR

BOOK REVIEW
Dovid Sears writes:18

The departure point for the book is an oft-cited yet curious passage in the Babylonian Talmud
(Eruvin 100b) which says that had the Torah not been given on Mount Sinai, then we would have
learned various positive character traits from the animal kingdom. The most famous example given
is that we would have learned modesty from the example of the cat. Surprisingly, most of the
Talmud’s attention is lavished on the rooster, from whom a husband would learn that he must
appease his wife before entering into marital relations with her. From the Talmud’s telling of the
story, it turns out that the rooster lies to the hen, promising to buy her a coat (or in another reading,
earrings) that he is no position financially to purchase! According to Naor, this “white lie” is the
very secret of our finite, paradoxical existence in this world, and he then takes us, the readers, on

and a Camel: A Case Study in the Reception of Genesis Rabbah’, JQR 107.2: 157-81. Wolfe, C. 2009 ‘Human, All Too Human:
“Animal Studies” and the Humanities’, Proceedings of the MLA 124.2: 564-75. 2010 What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press). Zimran, Y. 2018 ‘The Notion of God Reflected in the Lion Imagery of the Book of Hosea’, VT
68.1: 149-67.
17
Spring Valley, NY: Orot, 2012
18
https://seforimblog.com/2013/02/the-kabbalah-of-relation-by-rabbi/

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a tour de force, as only he is capable, of our entire Judaic literature: Bible, Talmud, Medieval
Philosophy, Kabbalah, Hasidism—and of course, the specialty of the house: Rav Kook.

The Breslov literature often contrasts the imagination of a spiritually evolved human being with
that of a coarse person who has the “imagination of a beast.”19 Rabbi Nathan [Sternhartz] discusses
these concepts in Likkutei Halakhot (beginning Hil. Sheluhin 5). There he states that the
imagination can be a shali’ah (emissary) of the sekhel (reason); or it can be co-opted by the
physical, which is to say, the animalistic side of human nature.

Rabbi Nahman’s lessons are extremely imagistic and poetic in their construction. “This is
a behinah (aspect) of this; that is a behinah (aspect) of that.” In this way Rabbi Nahman builds
connections between things and shows their underlying unity. And of course, there are Rabbi
Nahman’s famous thirteen mystical stories, which anticipated surrealism by more than a century.
All this is a demonstration of “birur ko’ah ha-medameh,” clarification of the imagination, so that
it may express the essence of mind.
Although the kabbalists do not share the puritanical view of Maimonides toward the body and the
conjugal act, as Rabbi Naor points out, they are not so far apart in their attitudes toward
hedonism—but not for the same reasons. The philosophers prized the intellect’s ascendancy over
emotion and sensuality, and Maimonides may have been influenced by this attitude. The mystics,
however, are more concerned with transcendence and sublimation (in the religious sense, not in
the Freudian sense). Their bias is not due to a prejudice in favor of reason, but bespeaks the love
and awe of God.

The morning blessing reads: “…Who has given understanding to the rooster to discern
between day and night.” Isn’t the blessing reversed? Night precedes day. Certainly the
blessing should read “to discern between night and day”!

Based on teachings from the Zohar and Rabbi Isaac Luria (Ari), the robe given by rooster to the
hen may be said to correspond to the process of birur—the extrication of all souls from Adam
Beli’al, or “Anti-Adam” —throughout the course of history. That is, the human body from the
head to feet represents the yeridat ha-dorot, the spiritual decline of the generations. The “head,”
beginning with Adam, is like day, while the “feet,” or later generations, are like night. In these
final generations, the Shekhinah, which represents God’s immanence in creation, is positioned at
the feet of Adam Beli’al. The rooster understands the spiritual decline at each stage of the game.
We who live in the spiritual “twilight zone” can’t function like our noble ancestors (compared to
whom the Talmud says we are as donkeys). Hence, the phraseology of the blessing, “between day
and night.”

Rabbi Naor quotes Reb Eizikl Komarner’s remarks about the fallen “letters” of creation, which
the tsaddikim must elevate from what the Zohar calls “raglin de-raglin,” or “feet of feet”—the
lowest levels. The Komarno Rebbe cites the Maggid of Mezeritch, who contrasts “adornments that
did exist” with “adornments that did not exist.” The former is related to the Torah
and mitsvot (commandments)—the holy—while the latter are related to the mundane and that
which is most distant from holiness.

19
For example, see Likkutei Moharan, Part I, lessons 25, 49; and especially Part II, lesson 8 (“Tik’u/Tohakhah”).

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It strikes me as worth comparing this to Rabbi Nahman’s cryptic parable about a king who
commissioned two fellows to decorate separate but facing halves of his new palace.20 The first
appointee mastered all the necessary skills and then painted the most beautiful murals depicting
all sorts of animals and birds on the walls of his chamber. The second guy goofed off until the
deadline was only a few days away—and became panic-stricken. Then he had a brainstorm. He
smeared the walls with a substance (“pakst”) so black that it shined. Thus, the walls were able to
reflect everything in the other room. Then Decorator Number Two hung a curtain to divide
between the rooms.

When the big day arrived, the king inspected his new palace, and was overjoyed with the murals
of the first man, executed with such consummate skill. The other chamber was shrouded in
darkness, due to the curtain. But when our “chevreman” drew back the curtain, there now shone
into the room the reflection of everything that was in the first room directly across. (Here the Rebbe
mentions birds specifically for the third time.) Even the elegant furnishings and precious objects
that the king brought into the first chamber were reflected in the second. Moreover, whatever
additional wondrous vessels the king wanted to bring into his palace were visible in the second
chamber.

What were these “additional wondrous vessels” that had not yet been brought to the palace, but
which the king desired? Moreover, it is not clear that the king meant to bring them to the first
chamber, with its lovely murals and furnishings, thus, to be reflected in the second chamber. What
the text seems to state is that these desired “wondrous vessels” were already visible in the second
chamber— “and the matter was good in the king’s eyes.”21

Maybe we can venture the interpretation that it is the tsaddik (righteous man) who diligently heeds
the king’s command and decorates his half of the palace so beautifully, while it is the ba’al
Teshuvah (penitent) who creates the shiny black room. The ba’al Teshuvah must receive an
illumination from the tsaddik on the other side of the hall, who did everything “by the book.” Yet
Rabbi Nahman indicates that the ba’al Teshuvah has an advantage over the tsaddik.22

Perhaps this parable of Rabbi Nahman is cut from the same cloth as the Hasidic idea discussed at
the end of Rabbi Naor’s book, that the tsaddik, through his willing and somewhat self-sacrificial
descent to the lowest levels, brings to the realm of kedushah additional elements that could not
otherwise have been obtained. It is this paradoxical descent of the tsaddik that ultimately brings
the greatest delight to the Master of the Universe.

20
Hayyei Moharan, sec. 98; English translation in Rabbi Avraham Greenbaum, Tzaddik (Breslov Research Institute), “New
Stories,” sec. 224.
21
In Hebrew: “Ve-khen kol mah she-yirtzeh ha-melekh lehakhnis ‘od kelim nifla’im le-tokh ha-palatin, yiheyu kulam nir’im be-
helko shel ha-sheni, ve-hutav ha-davar lifnei ha-melekh.”
22
TB, Berakhot 34b: “In the place where the penitents stand, the wholly righteous cannot stand.”

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